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2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files

OA/ID Number: 91136
Folder ID Number: 91136-004

Folder Title:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	5	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Meeting Notes	Re: Meeting on Hostage Situation (8 pp.)	8/1/89	(b)(1)	TS
01b. Outline	Re: Hizballah (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01c. Map	Re: Lebanon (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02a. Meeting Notes	Re: Meeting on Hostage Situation (8 pp.)	8/2/89	(b)(1)	TS
02b. Report	Re: Talking Points for the DCI [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	8/2/89	(b)(1)	TS
02c. Map	Re: Lebanon [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03a. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Deng Xiaoping (5 pp.)	7/21/89	(b) (1)	
03b. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Deng Xiaoping (10 pp.)	7/18/89	(b) (1)	
04a. Letter	Chairman Deng Xiaoping to President Bush (1 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	
04b. Handwritten Note	President Bush to Brent [Scowcroft] Re: From the Desk of George Bush (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b) (1)	
04c. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Deng Xiaoping (2 pp.)	11/6/89	(b) (1)	

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Pinksheet Number: cap1129
OA/ID Number: 91136-004
Date Closed: 5/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04d. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Deng Xiaoping (2 pp.)	11/6/89	(b)(1)	
04e. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Deng Xiaoping (2 pp.)	11/6/89	(b)(1)	
05. Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador James R. Lilley, Re: Eyes Only for Ambassador Lilley [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1)	S
06. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (3 pp.)	11/8/89	(b)(1)	S
07. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (2 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	TS
08. Memcon Addendum	Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (1 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S
09. Memcon Addendum	Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (1 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S
10. Memcon	Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (5 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	S
11. Memcon	Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (6 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S
12a. Note	Brent [Scowcroft] to POTUS Re: Mr. President: (1 pp.)	6/17/89	(b)(1)	TS

Page 2 of 3

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador James Lilley Re: Dear Jim: (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
13a. Cable	Re: Summary on China Crisis (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
13b. Cable	Re: U/S Kimmitt Meeting with PRC Ambassador (5 pp.)	6/15/89	(b)(1)	S
13c. Cable	Re: Secretary - Han June 12 Discussion (3 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	TS
13d. Cable	Re: Kimmitt - Han Discussion of Embassy Security (5 pp.)	6/11/89	(b)(1)	S
13e. Cable	Re: Secretary - Han Discussion (5 pp.)	6/12/89	(b)(1)	TS
13f. Cable	Re: Secretary Baker's Meeting with Han Xu (6 pp.)	6/8/89	(b)(1)	S

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AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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01b. Outline	Re: Hizballah (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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WHORM Cat.:
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Aug 1, 1989
11:00 am MEG

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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02a. Meeting Notes	Re: Meeting on Hostage Situation (8 pp.)	8/2/89	(b)(1)	TS

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Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
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File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/12/2022

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-004
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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1036-MR(550.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/28/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

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Deed of Gift Restrictions


C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
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Talking Points for the DCI
2 August 1989

Hizballah



The pro-Iranian Hizballah has become the most dynamic actor in Lebanon. Since the group's emergence in 1983, it has grown from a small, poorly equipped band of zealots to a political and military movement numbering some 6,500 full time fighters and an estimated 75,000 adherents.

- Hizballah draws its political support from Lebanon's 500,000 strong Shia community--about 40 per cent of the population--the country's largest religious sect.
- Hizballah's stated goals are to expel Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, eliminate Western influence throughout the country, and replace the existing political system with an Iranian-style Islamic Republic.

Leadership

A handful of senior officials--virtually all Shia clerics--make Hizballah decisions, plan operations, and maintain high-level contacts with Iran and Syria.

- Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah is Hizballah's spiritual leader and a key decision maker, although he denies membership in the group.
- Imad Mughniyah, Hizballah's most prominent terrorist, has close ties to Fadlallah. Mughniyah masterminded Hizballah's string of airliner hijackings and has been a key figure in Hizballah hostage holding. His brother-in-law participated in the December 1983 attack on the US Embassy in Kuwait, and the Kuwaitis subsequently imprisoned him under sentence of death.

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PER E.O. 13526**

2009-1036-MR
MM 5/28/2015

- Husayn Musawi, a non-cleric, is intimately involved with Hizballah operations in the Bekaa Valley and coordinates Hizballah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard activities in Lebanon.
- Hasan Nasrallah is responsible for overseeing Hizballah activities in West Beirut.
- Abbas Musawi is responsible for Hizballah military activities in southern Lebanon, particularly attacks against Israel and Israeli forces operating inside Lebanon.

Ties to Iran

Tehran supplies military aid and financial assistance to Hizballah worth some \$50-100 million. Iran is deeply involved in Hizballah's hostage holding and terrorist operations.

- Based on evidence obtained from debriefing former hostages, 1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1); (b)(3) and a former hostage guard, we have confirmed that US hostages were held in the basement of the Iranian embassy in Beirut during early 1989.
- 1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1); (b)(3) Tehran ordered the kidnaping and release of ABC journalist Charles Glass.
- 1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1); (b)(3) Iranian participation in--among others--the 1983 attack on the US Marine Barracks in Beirut and the 1988 hijacking of Kuwait Airlines Flight 422.

Despite Iran's ability to orchestrate the release of some US and other Western hostages, Iran does not have complete control over the fate of the hostages or over Hizballah terrorists. We believe that although Hizballah

~~TOP SECRET~~ 1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1); (b)(3)

terrorists almost always comply with Iranian wishes, they still assert their own interests in holding hostages. In our view, Hizballah's room to maneuver on this issue may have been enlarged by the end of the Iran-Iraq war and Khomeini's death.

1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1); (b)(3)

Mughniyah 1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1); (b)(3)

1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1); (b)(3)

regarded using the hostages to obtain the release of Hizballah terrorists imprisoned in Kuwait as more important.

1.4(c); (b)(3)

Iran was deeply involved in the KU 422 hijacking, 1.4(c); (b)(3)

Ties to Arafat

Yasir Arafat has maintained longstanding personal ties to some Hizballah terrorist leaders, and has provided selected Hizballah leaders financial support.

1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1); (b)(3)

Links to Syria

Syria's once turbulent relationship with Hizballah has settled into a pattern of mutual accomodation. Syria occupies the Bekaa Valley--Hizballah's main military stronghold--but since Fadlallah's meeting with President Assad in 1988, Syrian and Hizballah military forces have cooperated far more closely.

~~TOP SECRET~~ 1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1); (b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ 1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1); (b)(3)

- Senior Syrian officers in West Beirut and the Bekaa Valley have regular contacts with senior Hizballah officials.
- Damascus plays a key role in facilitating Iranian military support to Hizballah. Supply flights from Tehran land at Damascus International Airport and materiel is transported overland to Hizballah's facilities in the Bekaa Valley

~~TOP SECRET~~ 1.4(c); 3.3(b)(1); (b)(3)

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AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/28/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


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The Partition of Lebanon, April 1989



1.4(c); (b)(3)

716111 (B00483) 4-89

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-1036-MR

mm 5/28/2015

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Aug 2, 1989
11:00 am Wtj

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SENSITIVE

To be opened only by
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1989

Dear Chairman Deng, Dear Friend:

I use this unique form of salutation because General Scowcroft told me that if I would continue to treat you as a friend, you would welcome that -- no matter the outcome of the difficulties now between us.

Of course, I, too, want it to be that way.

First, let me thank you and Li Peng for receiving General Scowcroft and Larry Eagleburger. The minute General Scowcroft returned to the USA, he came to Maine to brief me on your talks.

I have waited to send you this letter. I wanted first to go to Eastern Europe and the Economic Summit Conference at Paris, because I wanted to listen carefully to their views on their relations with China.

Also, in waiting, I was hoping against hope that some new development would take place that would enable us both to move towards improved relations. Unfortunately, no such development has occurred.

The G-7 Communique in Paris made reference to events in China. I can tell you in total confidence that the U. S. and the Japanese removed some rather inflammatory language from the Communique. It was still a Communique which I'm sure you'd rather not have had at all, but in the final form it did not urge new action affecting China.

Brent Scowcroft told me of your reference to the Chinese proverb: "It is up to the person who tied the knot to untie the knot."

Herein lies our major dilemma. You feel we "tied the knot" by our actions, especially regarding military sales.

We feel that those actions taken against peacefully demonstrating (non-violent) students and the nationwide crackdown against those simply speaking for reform "tied the knot."

Please understand, my friend, that when I use the word "we" in the preceding sentence, I am not simply referring to the United States. Rather, I am referring to many, many countries from North and South, East and West.

Let me emphasize, if there is anyone on the World Stage who understands how China views interference in its internal affairs, it is I. Likewise, I could indeed identify with the problems China's government faced when, as Li Peng told General Scowcroft, it felt that Zhongnanhai itself might be invaded or overrun. Li Peng pointedly asked General Scowcroft how we would feel if the White House were threatened by a mob out of control.

But here's the big problem. Given the all-penetrating (but not comprehensive) nature of television, people all around the world first saw massive but peaceful demonstrations, peacefully contained. With approval and respect, they saw Chinese leaders meeting with the students. They heard authoritative voices saying, "The Army loves the People;" and they saw soldiers showing amazing restraint. And people around the world saluted China and its leaders.

It is what happened next that we believe "tied the knot." You and Li Peng frankly described what you thought happened to the character of

the demonstrations and what you felt you had to do. But people all around the world, with their own eyes, saw other happenings, too; and China, which had been praised for restraint, was widely criticized.

I have great respect for China's long-standing position about non-intervention in its internal affairs.

Because of that, I also understand that I risk straining our friendship when I make suggestions as to what might be done now. But the U.S.-China relationship, which we have both worked so hard to strengthen, demands the candor with which only a friend can speak.

If some way can be found to close the chapter on the students whose actions were those of peaceful demonstrators, that would help enormously.

General Scowcroft reported to me that many of those arrested were common criminals, repeat offenders. I am not talking about these people.

If forgiveness could be granted to the students and, yes, to their teachers, this would go a long way to restoring worldwide confidence. Such a move could well lead to improved relations with many countries. For example, it would give me the opportunity to make a statement supporting your decision. Also, if it would be helpful to China, I could then publicly dispatch a high-level emissary to Beijing thus signalling to the world that our country was prepared to work our way back towards more normal relations.

You see, rightly or wrongly, it was the students who captured the imagination of so many people around the world. They are young and, like students everywhere, they are idealistic.

In our country, as Li Peng pointed out, there was, not long ago, much student unrest. There was some force used to quell the unrest and much criticism came our way. Many countries criticized us. Perhaps China did. But the unrest disappeared in time and the students here were leniently treated, even though some of our laws were deliberately broken. We never doubted that the students, even in dissent, truly loved our country.

Perhaps the differences in our systems are so great that you will find the above analogy irrelevant. I hope not. But of this I feel certain: the Chinese students who have spoken out truly love China.

I am drafting this letter to you from 37,000 feet in the air on my way back to the USA from Poland, Hungary, France and the Netherlands. Talk of economic reform is everywhere in Poland and Hungary. Others are finding, as China has, that incentive works, that joint ventures are good, and that standards of living can be improved through economic reform.

I hope you still feel that economic contacts with the West are good. In spite of a U. S. Congress that continues to try to compel me to cut off economic ties with China, I will continue to do my best to keep the boat from rocking too much.

Please understand that this letter has been personally written, and is coming to you from one who wants to see us go forward together.

Please do not be angry with me if I have crossed the invisible threshold lying between constructive suggestion and "internal interference."

When we last met, you told me you had turned more day-to-day matters over to others; but I

turn to you now out of respect, a feeling of closeness and, yes, friendship.

You have seen it all -- you've been up and down. Now I ask you to look with me into the future. This future is one of dramatic change. The U.S. and China each has much to contribute to this exciting future. We can both do more for world peace and for the welfare of our own people if we can get our relationship back on track. I have given you my unsolicited advice. Now I earnestly solicit your advice. If there is to be a period of darkness, so be it; but let us try to light some candles.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ly Burt". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

His Excellency
Deng Xiaoping
Chairman, Central Military Committee
People's Republic of China
Beijing

P.S. As with my previous letter to you, the only copy of this letter will be in my personal safe, for I truly want to speak by myself from the heart, and I ask you to do the same.

July 18, 1989

Dear Chairman Deng, Dear Friend:

I use this unique form of salutation because General Scowcroft told me that if I would continue to treat you as a friend, you would welcome that -- no matter the outcome of the difficulties now between us.

Of course, I, too, want it to be that way.

First, let me thank you and Li Peng for receiving General Scowcroft and Larry Eagleburger. The minute ^{Gen. Scowcroft} ~~he~~ returned to the USA, he came to Maine to brief me on your talks.

I have waited to send you this letter. I wanted first to go to Eastern Europe and ^{the Sioumees Summit Conference at} Paris, because I wanted to listen carefully to their views on their relations with China.

Also, in waiting, I was hoping against hope that some new development would take place that would ^{enable} ~~help~~ us both ^{to} move towards improved relations. Unfortunately, no such development ^{has} ~~did~~ occurred.

^{Communique}
The G-7₁ in Paris made reference to events in China. I

can tell you in total confidence that the ^{U.S.} ~~Japanese~~ and the

^{Japanese}
~~U.S.~~ removed some rather inflammatory language from the

^{It was still}
Communique, a ¹communique which I'm sure you'd rather not have

had at all, but ^{in final form it} ~~a communique which~~ did not urge new action

affecting China.

^{your reference to}
Brent Scowcroft told me of the Chinese proverb: "It is up to the person who tied the knot to untie the knot."

Herein lies our major dilemma. You feel we "tied the knot" by our actions ^{especially} ~~1~~ regarding military sales.

those We feel that ^{*peacefully demonstrating*}_{*(non-violent)*} actions taken against ~~the~~ students and

the nationwide crackdown against those ^{*simply*}₁ speaking for reform

"tied the knot."

Please understand, my friend, that when I use the word

"we" in the preceding sentence, I am not simply referring to

the United States. Rather, I am referring to many, many

countries from North and South, East and West.

Let me emphasize,
~~[FBI]~~ If there is anyone on the World Stage who understands how

China views interference into its internal affairs, it is I.

Likewise,
~~[Security]~~ ^{*indeed*} I could ^{*Gen.*} identify with the problems China's government
as Li Peng told Scowcroft,
faced when ^{*Zhongnanhai*} it felt that ((~~res. of Chinese leaders~~)) itself might

be invaded or overrun. Li Peng pointedly asked General Scowcroft

we would
how ~~[we'd]~~ feel if the White House was threatened by a mob out

of control.

But here's the big problem. Given the all-penetrating

(but not ~~all~~ comprehensive)

^ nature of television, people all around the world ^{first} saw massive

but peaceful demonstrations, peacefully contained. With *approval*

and respect, they saw Chinese leaders meeting with the students. They

heard authoritative voices saying, "The Army loves the People;"

and they saw soldiers showing amazing restraint. And people

around the world saluted China and its leaders.

we believe "tied the knot."

It is what happened next that ~~has caused the problem.~~ You

*what you thought happened to
how you felt the character*

and Li Peng frankly described ~~what you felt happened next and~~

of the demonstrations changed and what you felt you had to do.
~~explained why it happened.~~ But people all around the world,

, too;

with their own eyes, saw other happenings, and China, which

widely

had been praised for restraint, was [^]criticized ~~for oppression.~~

have great

I respect for

~~Because of~~ China's long standing position about non-

intervention in its internal affairs. ~~you cannot say to me~~

~~"What should we do?" I understand that.~~

Because of that

x I also understand that I risk straining our friendship

as to what might be done now.

when I make suggestions, But the U.S.-China relationship, which

we have both worked so hard to strengthen, demands the candor

with which only a friend can speak.

If some way can be found to close the chapter on the students ~~x~~
[and professors] whose actions were those of placid *Deenoudheters*
that would help enormously.

General Scowcroft reported to me that many of those arrested
were common criminals, repeat offenders. I am not talking about
these people.

If forgiveness could be granted to the students and, yes,
to ^{their} [the] teachers, this would go a long way to restoring worldwide

confidence. Such a move could well lead to improved relations
with many countries.

rightly or wrongly,

You see, it was the students who captured the imagination

people around the world like students everywhere,

of so many. They are young and they are idealistic.

~~I'll never forget the late 60's in this country - the disorder
and the dissent, but just as those kids criticized the U.S. and now the
same Chinese kids criticize China. They~~

In our country, as Li Peng pointed out, there was, not long

ago, much student unrest. There was some force used to quell

the unrest and much criticism came our way. Many countries

criticized us. Perhaps China did. But the unrest disappeared

here
in time and the students were leniently treated, even though

some of our laws were deliberately broken. *We never doubted
that the students, even in dissent, truly loved our country*

Perhaps the differences in our systems are so great that

the above

perhaps you will find ~~this~~ analogy irrelevant. I hope not.

But *at this I feel* certain; the Chinese students
who have spoken out truly love China

I am drafting this letter to you from 37,000 feet ^{in the air} on my way back to the USA from Poland, Hungary, France and the Netherlands. Talk of economic reform is everywhere in Poland and Hungary. Others are finding, as China has, that incentive works, that joint ventures are good, and that standards of living can be improved through economic reform.

I hope you still feel that economic contacts with the West are good. In spite of a U.S. Congress that continues to ^{they} ~~move~~ to compel me to cut off economic ties with China, I will continue ^{do my best} to ~~try~~ to keep the boat from rocking too much.

Please understand that this letter has been personally ^{and is} written, ^{and is} coming to you from one who wants to see us go forward together.

For example, it would give me the ^{opportunity}
~~Once that was done, I would be glad to make a statement~~
supporting your decision, ~~to forgive the students, and,~~ ^{also} if it
would be helpful to China, I ~~would~~ ^{could} publicly
~~high level emissary,~~ ^{to Beijing} thus signalling to the world
that our Country was prepared to work our way back towardas
more normal relations.

Please with me
^ Do not be angry if I have crossed the invisible threshold

lying between constructive suggestion and "internal interference."

When we last met, you told me you had turned more day-to-day matters over to others; but I turn to you now out of
a feeling of closeness
respect and, yes, friendship.
^

You have seen it all -- you've been up and down. Now I
ask you to look with me into the future. ^{is one of} This future ~~is one of~~
dramatically ^l ~~changing~~ ^{world}. The U.S. and China each has ^{much} ~~to~~
^{this} ~~let~~ to contribute to ~~the~~ exciting future. We can both do more
for world peace and for the welfare of our own people
^ if we can get our relationship back on track. I have given you
^{earnestly}
my unsolicited advice. Now I solicit your advice. If there is
to be a period of darkness, so be it; but let us try to light
some candles.

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

Respectfully,

P.S. As with my previous letter to you, the only copy of

this letter will be in my personal safe. For I truly want to

by myself
speak [^] from the heart, and I ask you to do the same.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1 ~~Letters~~ - July 21, 1989
Outgoing ~~-----~~
~~-----~~
Shirley

SENSITIVE

To be opened only
by General Snowcraft
or Bob Bates

SENSITIVE

To be opened only
by General Sowerby
or Bob Lister

SENSITIVE

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Letter	Chairman Deng Xiaoping to President Bush (1 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

From the desk of
George Bush

Brent

we need to

- a) hold close
- b) be sure JAB knows
- c) Lilly? - draw

*Handed
Orig to
Ans Zho
on 11/8/89*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 6, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Greetings to my friend.

Last night at the White House, former President Nixon debriefed me and some of my top associates on his visit to China. He appreciated the manner in which he was received there. My personal view is that his visit to China was helpful.

I scheduled this meeting immediately upon his return from China, hoping that this will signal to you, to the people here at home, and to the rest of the world that I want to find a way to work out the major difficulties that have darkened our relationship. I will be carefully considering everything Mr. Nixon told me.

Now, for a different subject. Soon I will be meeting President Gorbachev at a non-Summit meeting, in other words at a meeting without a set agenda. Though our relations with the Soviet Union are more free of tensions than at times past, enormous problems still remain. At a time of rapidly moving events in many areas of the world, this meeting is designed, not to reach major decisions, but to reduce the chances of misunderstandings on issues of significance. I want to assure you that nothing will take place at this meeting that will be detrimental to China's interests.

In my view the geo-political reasons that prompted Richard Nixon to come to China in the first place are still valid. I see many areas of importance today where China and the U.S. have similar interests.

With these considerations in mind I would propose sending a personal emissary to China after the December 2-3 meetings with President Gorbachev. That emissary would be prepared to fill you in on the details of the meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev. If that is agreeable in principle we can decide later who the emissary should be and who might receive him. If, prior to the US-Soviet meeting you have any concerns or thoughts to convey to me, I would welcome hearing from you.

On the broader subject that is a constant concern to me, how to normalize relations between us, I will continue to try to find some answers. With respect, I hope China will try to do the same. In this regard, I think the discussions that you had with President Nixon and with the physicist, Dr. Tsung-Dao Lee, were extremely helpful.

On October 26, it was a pleasure to receive your able new Ambassador a few days after he arrived and before formal presentations of credentials. By receiving him in this manner, I wanted you to know that I remain personally involved in emphasizing the importance I ascribe to our relationship and in trying to resolve our differences.

Respectfully,

Most sincerely,



His Excellency
Deng Xiaoping
Chairman, Central Military Committee
People's Republic of China
Beijing

November 6, 1989

*approved,
with changes
GB*

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Greetings.

Last night at the White House, former President Nixon debriefed me and some of my top associates on his visit to China. He appreciated the manner in which he was received there. My personal view is that his visit to China was helpful.

I [wanted to hear from him] **scheduled this meeting** immediately upon his return from China, hoping that this will signal to you, to the people here at home, and to the rest of the world that I want to find a way to work out the major difficulties that have darkened our relationship. I will be carefully considering everything Mr. Nixon told me.

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In my view the geo-political reasons that prompted Richard Nixon to come to China in the first place are still valid. I see many areas **of importance** today where China and the U.S. have similar interests.

**Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting**

With [this] **these considerations** in mind I would [like to send] **propose sending** a personal emissary to China after the December 2-3 meetings with President Gorbachev. That emissary would be prepared to fill you in on the details of the meetings **with General Secretary Gorbachev**. If that is agreeable in principle we can decide later who the emissary should be and who might receive him. If, prior to the **US-Soviet** meeting you have any concerns or thoughts to convey to me, I would welcome hearing from you.

On the broader subject that **is a constant concern to** [concerns] me [greatly], how to normalize relations between us, I will continue to try to find some answers. [and,] With respect, I hope China will try to do the same. In this regard, I think the discussions ^{*that you had with*} ~~with~~ President Nixon ^{*and with the physicist Dr Lee*} were extremely helpful.

On November ___ it was a pleasure to receive your able new Ambassador **a few days after he arrived and before** formal presentations of credentials. By receiving him in this manner, I wanted you to know that I remain personally involved **in emphasizing the importance I ascribe to our relationship and in** trying to resolve our differences.

Respectfully,

Most sincerely,

7:30 AM

Thursday

OCT 26, 1989

Document Originally
Attached to
Previous Page

From the desk of
George Bush

11-6

Brent
Little pride of
authorship so,
chop away!!
CS

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

November 6, 1989

Dear Mr Chairman ~~or Deng Xioping~~:

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

Greetings.

Last night at the White House, former President Nixon de-briefed me and some of my top associates on his visit to China. He appreciated the manner in which he was received there. *my personal view is that his visit to China was helpful.*

I wanted to hear from him immediately upon his return from China, hoping that this will signal to you, to the people here at home, and to the rest of the world that I want to find a way to work out the major difficulties that have darkened our relationship. I will be carefully considering everything Mr. Nixon told me.

Now, for a ~~different~~ *different* subject. Soon I will be meeting President Gorbachev at a ~~non~~-Summit meeting, in other words at a meeting without a set agenda. Though our relations with the Soviet Union are more free of tensions than at times past, enormous problems still remain.

I want to assure you that nothing will take place at this meeting that will be detrimental to China's interests.

geo-political

In my view the [^]reasons that prompted Richard Nixon to come to China in the first place are still valid. I see many areas today where China and the U.S. have similar interests.

With this in mind I would like to send a personal emissary to

emissary China after the December 2-3 meetings with President Gorbachev. *That*
would be prepared to fill you in on the details of the meetings
If that is agreeable in principle we can decide later ~~who~~ who the
emissary should be and who might receive him. If ~~in the meantime~~ *person to the meetings*
you have any concerns or thoughts to convey to me, I would welcome
hearing from you.

On the broader subject that concerns me greatly, - how to
normalize relations between us, I will continue to try to find
some answers; and, with respect I hope China will try to do the
same. In this regard, I think the discussions with President
Nixon were extremely helpful.

On November ____ it was a pleasure to receive your able new
Ambassador before formal presentations of credentials. *By receiving him in this manner*
you ~~him~~ I wanted
to know that I remain personally involved in trying to
resolve our differences.

Respectfully.

Most sincerely,

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador James R. Lilley, Re: Eyes Only for Ambassador Lilley [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/14/2015

Date Closed:	5/7/2009	OA/ID Number:	91136-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-2782-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	10/24/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>

(b)(1)

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI>

(b)(1)

<DTG> 231851Z OCT 89

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

(b)(1)

Q000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR LILLEY, FROM
GENERAL SCOWCROFT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

BEGIN TEXT:

OCTOBER 23, 1989

FOR: AMBASSADOR JAMES R. LILLEY
BEIJING

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LILLEY

1. JIM, FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
YOU (ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED). IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S
INSTRUCTIONS, THE ONLY OTHER COPY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO SECRETARY OF
STATE JIM BAKER FOR HIS EYES ONLY.

(COPY ATTACHED TEXT.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OCTOBER 23, 1989

DEAR JIM:

I TALKED TO PRESIDENT NIXON ON OCTOBER 21ST. DOUG PAAL WILL
BRIEF HIM ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1989. HE PLANS TO CHECK IN WITH
YOU. I ASKED HIM TO CONTACT

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

I TOLD PRESIDENT NIXON WE WOULD HANDLE THE PRESS INQUIRIES IN
ACCORD WITH HIS SUGGESTIONS BELOW. FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY I
AM SENDING THE PARTS OF HIS OCTOBER 17TH LETTER TO ME THAT RELATE
TO HIS COMING VISIT.

"I PLAN TO BE IN BEIJING FROM OCTOBER 25 TO THE 31ST. I WILL BE
TRAVELLING ALONE, WITH ONLY MIKE ENDICOTT, MY PRIVATE SECURITY
AIDE ACCOMPANYING ME; AS YOU KNOW I GAVE UP SECRET SERVICE FIVE
YEARS AGO. I WILL BE REPRESENTING NO CLIENTS, AND WILL BE PAYING
MY OWN EXPENSES. I HAVE INFORMED THE CHINESE THAT I WILL BE
DOING NO SIGHTSEEING AND NO SHOPPING AND HAVE RULED OUT PURELY
SOCIAL EVENTS. I WILL BE HAVING MEETINGS WITH THE MAJOR CHINESE



DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E.O. 13526

2009-1161-MR

2010-2782-MR

SCS 10/24/13

LEADERS AND HAVE ASKED THEM NOT TO PLAN PUBLIC LUNCHEONS OR DINNERS WITH THE USUAL TIPPING OF GLASSES, ETC. I WILL, OF COURSE, BE STRONGLY SUPPORTING THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES AND SHALL MAKE THE POINT THAT YOUR REFUSAL TO GO ALONG WITH EXCESSIVE SANCTIONS IS COURAGEOUS AND COSTLY POLITICALLY. THEREFORE, THEY SHOULD AVOID ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE EMBARRASSING TO YOU AND TO OTHER FRIENDS OF CHINA. WHEN I RETURN, I WILL GIVE YOU MY PRIVATE ASSESSMENT OF THE LEADERS AND THEIR POSITIONS IN WRITING.

WHILE I WILL NOT BE GOING AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ADMINISTRATION, I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THE PRESS OFFICE, IF QUERIED, WOULD AVOID STATEMENTS THAT MIGHT BE INTERPRETED BY OUR "FRIENDS" IN THE MEDIA AS ATTEMPTS TO DISASSOCIATE THE ADMINISTRATION FROM MY TRIP. IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN MY MEETINGS WITH THE CHINESE IF THE PRESS SPOKESMAN COULD SAY SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING: WE UNDERSTAND THAT PRESIDENT NIXON IS MAKING HIS SIXTH VISIT TO CHINA TO MEET WITH ITS TOP LEADERS. WHILE HE IS TRAVELLING AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN, PRESIDENT BUSH LOOKS FORWARD TO HEARING THE PRESIDENT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN CHINA WHEN HE RETURNS."

AFTER HIS VISIT BOTH JIM BAKER AND I WOULD APPRECIATE A PERSONAL UPDATE ON US-CHINA RELATIONS.

WARM REGARDS, AND LOVE TO SALLY.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

THE HONORABLE JAMES R. LILLEY
AMERICAN ANBASSADOR
BEIJING

2. WARM REGARDS, BRENT.

END TEXT

DECLAS: OADR
#0266

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0266 <TOR> 891023145752 MSG000246466672

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Zhu Qizhen, China's Ambassador to the U.S. (S)

PARTICIPANTS: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Karl Jackson, Senior Director for Asian Affairs, NSC

Zhu Qizhen, China's Ambassador to the U.S.
Chen Mingming, Interpreter

DATE, TIME November 8, 1989, 11:15 - 11:45am EST
AND PLACE: Brent Scowcroft's Office

General Scowcroft met with Ambassador Zhu Qizhen in the General's office at 11:15 a.m. (S)

Ambassador Zhu, after exchanging pleasantries, expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to meet with the President in October, and with General Scowcroft, before presenting his credentials. Zhu also expressed appreciation for General Scowcroft's efforts "to seek early normalization of the relationship between China and the United States." Zhu read from talking points in reporting "our assessment" of the Nixon visit. The Nixon visit had "positive and useful results. He and the Chinese leaders enjoy important and long-term interests." Zhu said he was hopeful that "the current difficulties would end as soon as possible, bringing to a close the current abnormal state of U.S.-China relations." (S)

Deng believes that we should both act speedily. He has put forward an important proposition for improving U.S.-China relations. He believes that whatever is done will be favorably reciprocated by the Chinese side." (S)

General Scowcroft replied that Nixon had given a very positive assessment of his visit, emphasizing the fundamental strategic interests shared by the two sides, and the fundamental importance of normalizing relations. He cited the differences in perspective between the two sides but indicated the importance of trying to make some initial moves. "The President agrees with this assessment; however, there are very real constraints based on the Congress. Based on the Nixon message as well as yours,

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1034-MR
4/1/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

both sides must work at untying the knot now. I am not sure, based on Nixon's report, what specific initiative you referred to in your statement. The presence of Fang in our Embassy is one. We will initiate something very shortly on that. We will make some proposals on that with great care because of the sensitivities. Based on the Nixon meeting, and in view of his longstanding friendship with China, the President has written Chairman Deng a personal letter. He wrote it himself to demonstrate the importance we place on the relationship. He feels very strongly about it and wants to move as rapidly as the two sides can." (S)

The General returned to the matter of Congress and stressed that it will be influenced by two factors: "The care with which the President moves" and "events in China." "What you do is your own internal affair and we do not want to interfere, but it influences us." (S)

Zhu stated, "I am instructed to tell you that the Fang matter is a very sensitive issue. Any proposals or suggestions about Fang should be made only through official channels." (S)

General Scowcroft replied that in the Fang matter we would deal through Ambassador Lilley, use official channels only, and involve the minimum number of people. (S)

Zhu raised the sanctions legislation currently being considered by Congress. He stated, "If any amendment is passed by the Congress, it will have a very bad effect on the Chinese people. Can passage be prevented or delayed?" (S)

General Scowcroft replied that the number of votes cast in favor of the legislation indicated that it would pass over a Presidential veto. However, the important thing is that "we have a national interests waiver on all provisions. All we need to do is send a letter to Congress. This effectively renders the provisions of the bill meaningless. This automatically gives the President the ability to mitigate the effects of the legislation. We can do nothing about its passing but we can mitigate its effect." (S)

Zhu asked about the possibility of postponing it until after the holidays. (S)

General Scowcroft said that timing depended on when Congress sends the legislation to the White House. Upon receipt we have 10 days to act. "If passed over a Presidential veto, this would

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enflame things in the Congress. We do not like this legislation at all. But we can make sure that it will not have any effect." (S)

Zhu replied that passage of the legislation "will not be conducive to normalization of the relations and will hurt the feelings of the Chinese people." (S)

General Scowcroft said, "we have the same objective. We will manage, within the constraints of our laws, to have the lead effect on U.S.-China relations." (S)

Zhu asked whether there was anything else. (S)

General Scowcroft replied that while Nixon was a private citizen, "the sentiments he expressed on the importance of the relationship represented the President's feelings as well. There is no difference of opinion between the two of them. In this President you have as good and understanding a friend as you could possibly have. If he sometimes does not move as rapidly as you would like, it is not because he does not value the relationship highly." (S)

Zhu remarked that Henry Kissenger was now in China. (S)

General Scowcroft noted that Kissenger will also meet with the President when he returns from China. In closing, he told Zhu, "we can always chat. Meeting does not require an important message." (S)

In escorting Ambassador Zhu to his car, a discussion of Fang and martial law ensued with Karl Jackson. Zhu remarked that China could not link normalization of relations to lifting martial law because the latter remains entirely an internal affair. Jackson replied that he hoped China would hurry to lift martial law as soon as possible so that we could both then show how unconnected this act would be to subsequent progress in normalization. Zhu smiled, laughed, and drove away. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

**DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET**

SCS 3/4/13

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chinese Ambassador Zhu Qizhen
(TS)

PARTICIPANTS: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Douglas Paal, Director of Asian Affairs, NSC,
Notetaker

Zhu Qizhen, Ambassador of the People's
Republic of China
Chen Mingming, Interpreter

DATE, TIME November 15, 1989, 3:01 p.m. - 3:06 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: Office of Brent Scowcroft

Ambassador Zhu: Thank you, General Scowcroft, for making time to see me on a busy day. (TS)

General Scowcroft: When you say it is important, then I will find the time. (TS)

Ambassador Zhu: I have been instructed to give you this letter for the President from Chairman Deng, I should say Mr. Deng, now that he has retired. The letter states that President Bush is welcome to send a personal emissary to China to brief China's leaders on the meeting in Malta. The Chinese side believes it would be preferable for the emissary to go before the meeting in December. But if it is more convenient, the emissary can come after the meeting, of course. It is the official view of the Chinese side that this person's visit need not be a secret one. It can be publicly announced and reported. (TS)

General Scowcroft: I understand exactly what you are saying. I will get the letter to the President right away. I will get back to you. We want to send a very senior person, therefore I have to see when it might be possible to go. We certainly will try to accommodate Mr. Deng's views. I will look at the schedule and get back to you. (TS)

Ambassador Zhu: As to whether the visit will be a secret one, what is the view of the American side? (TS)

General Scowcroft: We have not talked about it. I do not see a reason for it to be like some other trips. (TS)

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Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2782-MR
SCS 3/4/13

Ambassador Zhu: Can I give Beijing an initial response? (~~TS~~)

General Scowcroft: The formal response must come from the President. You can cite my personal reaction. (~~TS~~)

Ambassador Zhu: I understand Dr. Kissinger reported a message from his visit to Beijing and conveyed the message from Deng Xiaoping for General Secretary Jiang Zemin to meet the President. He told me you or Secretary Baker would be in touch with me. (~~TS~~)

General Scowcroft: On the particularly early issue from President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger on Mr. Fang, we will go through Ambassador Lilley to your government. I do not know if it will be through you or Lilley, but because Lilley is in touch with Fang we prefer to handle that through him. (~~TS~~)

Ambassador Zhu: We want to resolve that issue as a package. (~~TS~~)

General Scowcroft: The first step is to find out what the elements of the package are. We will be back in touch. (~~TS~~)

Ambassador Zhu: That's all I have instructions on. Is there anything else? (~~TS~~)

General Scowcroft: We had a very good discussion with Dr. Kissinger. The President saw him immediately because Deng Xiaoping said he wanted the messages conveyed quickly. They were essentially the same as Mr. Nixon's. Kissinger had a little more detail. I will get back to you shortly on the next steps. (~~TS~~)

Free

EYES ONLY

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

EYES ONLY

BUSH LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY - PRESERVATION

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Memcon Addendum	Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (1 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
 financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
 and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
 agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
 information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
 purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
 financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Memcon Addendum	Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (1 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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Memorandum of Conversation

Private Meeting of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen

Beijing, Diaoyutai Guesthouse No 9

Sunday December 10, 1989, 2:13 p.m. - 2:50 p.m. (Beijing Standard Time)

Participants:

U.S. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State

Ambassador James R. Lilley

Douglas H. Paal, NSC, Notetaker

Vivian Chang, Interpreter

PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen

Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu

Director, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, Zhang Yijun

Director, Office of American Affairs, Ma Wenzheng

Deputy Director, Zha Peixin

Ma Yunsung, Interpreter

Lian Shengbao, notetaker

General Scowcroft: I would like Secretary Eagleburger to speak now because he will be in charge of negotiations on the package.

Secretary Eagleburger: Before we leave I want to establish a few points on where we will go next. As the diplomat on this trip, let me be undiplomatic. My impression is that you and we are engaged in a kabuki dance. You say, and we accept, that there has to be movement on our side before you can move. We say to you, and are sincere, that there has to be movement on your side. We are now circling each other, each waiting for the other to move. There is no purpose served arguing over who moves first.

From our side, we are faced with the realities of dates on which decisions must be made. The first decision we must make will be on December 15, on the agreement to satellite launchings. Congress returns on January 23. Certainly when they come back, assuming no movement, the Pelosi Bill and whatever other legislation they decide will be reintroduced.

~~SECRET/NODIS/MARKET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2632-MR

SCS 7/12/13

While we have not given you our final word on the package you gave us yesterday, I can tell you now that it will not work as now structured. All of us on the American side agree it will not work, largely because the linkage between sanctions and the release of Fang Lizhi is so direct that at home we politically cannot manage it.

Let me emphasize that this is not the official government response, but General Scowcroft and I agree that when we get back to Washington and get together to formulate a detailed response, we will have to say the same thing to you.

We will pull a small group together. We will get a counterproposal to you by the end of the week, and hopefully give it to your ambassador. Without describing what the details of the package will include, I can indicate that they will include such issues as martial law, the release of Fang Lizhi, World Bank loans, and the sanctions. We will try to find how to fit all these pieces into that package.

I would like to make one specific point on Fang Lizhi. One proposal we will make will include that, because from our view his release will have the greatest impact of all the actions you might take and will make the rest of the package easier to do. We may also give you a second proposal which does not deal with this issue. If it is difficult to do the other things, we are prepared to set the issue of Fang aside, and after the atmosphere in our relations improves, we will be prepared to come back to that issue.

Again, we will examine your proposal back in Washington. Fang Lizhi is not necessarily the sine qua non to improving the atmosphere and undoing the damage collectively done over the last months.

With regard to who goes first, there is no need to have an argument, but from the Washington perspective, we have taken steps already, not least that we are here already.

On the Pelosi veto, you may not be satisfied with the President's decision. But it was politically costly for him, and it will be so when we go back. I was personally involved in granting an

exception for the export of inertial guidance equipment for the sale of the Boeing aircraft. And the Peace Pearl project is moving forward. These are some steps we have taken. Again, I raise this not to get into an argument or because I feel they are adequate. I raise them to demonstrate that the President is trying to take steps to improve the atmosphere. I should also tell you, if we heard the Premier right this morning, I thought he said that the Chinese government would make clear its unhappiness with the President's administrative measures regarding the Chinese students in the United States after we go home, if that is the threat I think I heard (nervous laughter from Chinese), the impact in the U.S. will undo whatever we have done by coming here yesterday and today, undo that completely. At a minimum we will not be able to improve the atmosphere as we say we want.

On the issue of the satellite launch, we face a decision date, December 15. I am not making a linkage, but we have to tell you that we have information, which some members of Congress have access to, that there are some lower level Chinese officials who are talking of sales of ballistic missiles, particularly to the Middle East. We do not question the statement of your Foreign Ministry spokesman on November 23, but some in the Congress will doubt it. It will be much easier on December 15, if we have a reaffirmation of the November 23 statement, plus some indication that missiles _____ will not be sold to regions of particular instability. We do not expect an answer now, but will need it by December 15.

Let me make two points. We are anxious with regard to the atmosphere to make some small moves on each side, even before we get the package response to you by the end of next week. We are looking for small steps to convince the Chinese people that it is wise to begin the process of improving relations and to help us with the Congress. I would like to leave a couple of ideas with you. For example, just for example, if your side could possibly stop jamming VOA or permit a VOA correspondent to come to China, in an unconnected fashion, we could remove the travel advisory.

Perhaps these are not the specific steps, but what we are searching for are beginnings in these next days before Congress returns. They are steps both sides can take without one or the other looking like one prevailing over the other. This will help with military sales, the banks, and convince the American and Chinese publics that it is wise to move in this direction.

We would like to suggest for your consideration, for Ambassador Lilley and your designee to work out details on when and how the Fangs may leave. It appears all of us agree on the need to solve this issue. Totally off the record, and ad referendum, we need to agree that both of us want to see his release.

With regard to our response to your package and the counterproposal, that can be done here or to your ambassador in Washington as you prefer. We would prefer Washington, but do not insist on it, assuming it is an effort we jointly want to accomplish.

Mr. Minister, in the U.S. we have the tradition of the good cop and the bad cop. You have had a full day of the good cop, and only fifteen minutes of the bad cop.

Ambassador Lilley: I would like to add one thing, if I may. Whatever we do on Fang Lizhi will help to improve the atmosphere on a broad range of issues. Vice Minister Liu Huaqiu has helped three get out already, and can do the talks.

Secretary Eagleburger: That is if we are prepared to settle the issue. If it is to put it off to one side, that is another matter.

Ambassador Lilley: One other matter that might be raised with Ambassador Zhu, that is to move to eliminate artificial constraints on the embassies, for example, the military attaches at our embassy are not permitted to join attache trips. Resolving this would help to move our atmosphere along.

Foreign Minister Qian: I think, Mr. Secretary Eagleburger, that I understand your remarks are not a response, and that you will respond next week as a counterproposal. First, both sides agree on a package solution, and while this is in process, the general public should not get the impression of any package deal. It should seem that both sides seek to improve relations.

I also agree we should not leave the impression of which side gains or does not gain, wins or loses, or moves first. I agree Vice Minister Liu and Ambassador Lilley should meet to discuss the details on Fang Lizhi. These negotiations can begin without waiting a response to the package. Naturally, implementation will come after your response.

I also agree that after your formal response in Washington the discussions can take place between Ambassador Zhu and your State Department officials. I also agree both sides should consider which steps both sides can take to improve relations between our countries and the atmosphere.

I would like to raise a few points. Our Peace Pearl project is underway, and we regard this as positive. We hope to see it continue without further setbacks. Not long ago, due to the temporary suspension, the actual cost of the program exceeded the budget for it. We hope the American side will consider that the Chinese side can hardly bear this burden. Also, in terms of military cooperation, which includes torpedoes, large caliber artillery shells, radar, there are some problems, and they should also include timely delivery.

You made mention of Premier Li Peng's remarks regarding the measures taken by president Bush with the Pelosi veto. This is a misunderstanding on your side. You know very well, the American side made lots of effort, but the Chinese government cannot justify this action to the people without reacting. We have already made our reaction.

Secretary Eagleburger: We noticed.

Foreign Minister Qian: After you leave, we will publish no more reaction. By reaction, as Vice Foreign Minister Liu already made clear to your embassy, the Ministry of Education will take action to send no more graduate students to your country. In the statement issued by the State Education Commission, this comment did not appear in the press. So in implementing this measure, we will take some notice of the impact on the U.S. and we hope the U.S. will do the same.

As for the sale of intermediate range missiles, China's position is very clear. The U.S. is very aware of it. The Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a clear declaration. In the days to come, when similar questions are raised we will make clear our position in the same way.

These are my points. I will add that through this visit we can start our joint efforts. Both sides should work collectively and separately.

Secretary Eagleburger: Done.

Foreign Minister Qian: Very good.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Memcon	Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (6 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12a. Note	Brent [Scowcroft] to POTUS Re: Mr. President: (1 pp.)	6/17/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
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AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador James Lilley Re: Dear Jim: (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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PROGRAM FOR VISIT TO CHINA BY MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT,
U.S. PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL EMISSARY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

9 December (Saturday)

- 15:00 Arrive Beijing by American special plane Boeing 707 (Southern Apron, Capital Airport)
- 15:10 Leave Airport for Diaoyutai State Guesthouse (Guesthouse)
- 15:50 Arrive Villa No. 9, Guesthouse
- 16:55 Leave Villa No. 9 for Villa No. 12
- 17:00 Talks with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (Villa No. 12, Guesthouse)
- 19:00 Welcoming banquet by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (Villa No. 12)
- 20:30 Private talks between Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and National Security Advisor Scowcroft (Villa No. 12)

10 December (Sunday)

- 7:30 Breakfast
- 8:20 Leave Guesthouse for Zhongnanhai (Through northwestern entrance)
- 8:30 Meeting with Premier Li Peng (Ziguangge, Zhongnanhai)
- 9:45 Meeting with General Secretary Jiang Zeming (Room 202, Zhongnanhai)
- 11:00 Meeting with Comrade Deng Xiaoping (Fujian Room, Great Hall of the People, through northern entrance)
- 12:00 Working lunch with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (Villa No. 9, Guesthouse)
- 14:20 Leave Guesthouse for Capital Airport (Southern Apron)
- 15:00 Leave Beijing by American special plane Boeing 707

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13a. Cable	Re: Summary on China Crisis (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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ORIGIN OFFICE EAP-01

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DRAFTED BY: EAP/CM: MWONG

APPROVED BY: EAP: RLWILLIAMS

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P: RKIMMITT

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TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING NIACT IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12356: ADR

TAGS: US, CH, PREL, SHUM

SUBJECT: U/S KIMMITT MEETING WITH PRC AMBASSADOR
HAN XU - JUNE 14

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.

2. UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT CALLED IN PRC AMBASSADOR HAN XU ON JUNE 14 TO PROTEST STRONGLY AND FORMALLY CHINA'S EXPULSION OF THE AMERICAN JOURNALISTS EARLIER THAT DAY. AMBASSADOR HAN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR XIAO HOUE AND EMBASSY INTERPRETER CHEN MINGMING. U/S KIMMITT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY EAP ACTING DAS WILLIAMS, P - SPECIAL ASSISTANT STROTZ AND EAP/CM NOTETAKER WONG.

3. U/S KIMMITT BEGAN THE MEETING BY NOTING THAT THE SECRETARY HAD INSTRUCTED THAT AMBASSADOR HAN BE SUMMONED TO THE DEPARTMENT IN ORDER TO FOLLOW UP ON THE STATEMENTS MADE DURING THE JUNE 14 WHITE HOUSE AND DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFINGS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE EXPULSION OF THE AMERICAN JOURNALISTS EARLIER THAT DAY. U/S KIMMITT THEN DELIVERED

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THE FOLLOWING PREPARED STATEMENT:

--THE UNITED STATES VIGOROUSLY PROTESTS THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TODAY TO EXPEL AMERICAN JOURNALISTS. THE AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS WERE PERFORMING FUNCTIONS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE FOR THEIR STATUS. THEY POSSESSED VALID JOURNALISTS' VISAS.

4. NOTING THE END OF HIS FORMAL PRESENTATION, U/S KIMMITT SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY WERE TRYING TO MANAGE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PRC AT THIS TIME IN A MANNER THAT WILL ALLOW US TO RESTORE AND ADVANCE THAT RELATIONSHIP. THE PRC ACTION TO EXPEL THE JOURNALISTS--AND THE WIDE PUBLICITY THIS HAD RECEIVED IN THE US MEDIA--MADE THE TASK OF MANAGING THE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP EXCEEDINGLY MORE DIFFICULT. THAT IS WHY HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY TO VIGOROUSLY PROTEST CHINA'S EXPULSION OF THE JOURNALISTS AND TO ASK THAT THIS BE COMMUNICATED TO THE GOVERNMENT IN BEIJING.

5. AMBASSADOR HAN RESPONDED THAT THE TWO AMERICAN JOURNALISTS HAD VIOLATED CHINESE LAWS AND REGULATIONS, AND THAT ACCORDINGLY, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WAS JUSTIFIED IN ASKING THEM TO LEAVE. THEREFORE, HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE US PROTEST. HOWEVER, HE WOULD CONVEY IT TO HIS GOVERNMENT. WITH RESPECT TO THE SECRETARY'S SENTIMENTS ON US-CHINA RELATIONS, HE WISHED TO POINT OUT AGAIN THAT CHINA ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THEREFORE, IT WAS CHINA'S HOPE THAT AMERICAN JOURNALISTS WOULD REFRAIN FROM DOING ANYTHING THAT VIOLATED CHINESE LAWS AND REGULATIONS.

6. U/S KIMMITT NOTED THAT THE US ALSO ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND WAS TRYING TO

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RESTORE THE FOUNDATION ON WHICH RELATIONS COULD BE BUILT. EACH SIDE HAD TRIED TO RESPECT THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. HE ADDED THAT THE PRC WAS WELL AWARE OF THE TRADITION OF ALLOWING JOURNALISTS ACCESS UNDER THE LAWS OF THE COUNTRY WHERE THEY ARE ASSIGNED. THE STATUS OF JOURNALISTS AND THE ACCREDITATION OF JOURNALISTS IS TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY IN THIS COUNTRY. WE BELIEVED THAT THE AMERICAN JOURNALISTS HAD ACTED ENTIRELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUS GRANTED BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT, AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IN THAT CAPACITY. THEIR EXPULSION WOULD ONLY SERVE TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON DIFFERENCES IN OUR RELATIONS AT THIS POINT, INSTEAD OF ALLOWING US TO GET BACK TO RESTORING THE RELATIONSHIP. KIMMITT SAID HE WOULD CONVEY WHAT HAN HAD SAID TO THE SECRETARY.

7. AMB. HAN RESPONDED THAT WHEN THE JOURNALISTS WERE EXPELLED, THE PRC GOVERNMENT HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WERE FOUND NOT TO BE ACTING IN A MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR STATUS AS JOURNALISTS, AND THEY WERE INFORMED AS TO WHICH CHINESE LAWS THEY HAD VIOLATED. MR. KIMMITT STATED THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD A DIFFERENCE ON THAT POINT AND HE WOULD COMMUNICATE THAT TO THE SECRETARY. HE ADDED THAT INCIDENTS LIKE THIS NEEDED TO BE AVOIDED TO GET THE FOCUS AWAY FROM DIFFERENCES, WHICH THE PRESS TENDED TO MAGNIFY, AND BACK TO THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT EXIST. WE WERE TRYING TO HANDLE OUR RELATIONS IN AS LOW-KEY AND QUIET A MANNER AS POSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY WHERE WE HAD DIFFERENCES. OTHERWISE, IT WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO HANDLE PROBLEMS IN A WAY THAT BEST SERVED OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS.

8. AMB. HAN SAID IT WAS CLEARLY STATED IN THE MESSAGE SENT TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM CHINA'S LEADERS THAT IT WAS

IMPERATIVE THAT BOTH COUNTRIES WORK TO ENHANCE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. HIS HOPE WAS THAT THE US SIDE WOULD

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RESPECT CHINESE LAW AND THE CHINESE POSITION. U/S
KIMMITT SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THIS TO THE SECRETARY.

9. ACTION REQUEST: THE AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO
APPROACH THE MFA AT AN APPROPRIATE SENIOR LEVEL TO MAKE
DEMARCHE DRAWING ON POINTS MADE BY U/S KIMMITT. (NOTE:
DEPARTMENT SPOKESWOMAN ANNOUNCED AT JUNE 14 NOON BRIEFING
THAT US WOULD PROTEST THIS ACTION IN BEIJING "TODAY" --
JUNE 15 BEIJING TIME.) BAKER

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13c. Cable	Re: Secretary - Han June 12 Discussion (3 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
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TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING NIACT IMMEDIATE

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EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR LILLEY FROM U/S KIMMIT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ASEC, CVIS, PHUM, CH (FANG LIZHI)

SUBJECT: TFCH01: KIMMITT-HAN DISCUSSION OF EMBASSY
SECURITY

REF: BEIJING 15831

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. U/S KIMMITT CALLED IN AMBASSADOR HAN XU AT 1300 JUNE 11 TO ASSERT US CONCERN ABOUT THE XINHUA PRESS BULLETIN ANNOUNCING THE ARREST WARRANT FOR FANG LIZHI AND ADVISING OF HIS PRESENCE AT THE US EMBASSY. COUPLING THIS WITH THE RECENT ANTI-FOREIGN TONE OF RECENT CHINESE MEDIA COMMENTARY, KIMMITT EMPHASIZED THAT ANY INTRUSION INTO OUR EMBASSY OFFICES OR RESIDENCES, UNDER ANY PRETEXT WOULD INCUR A PROFOUND AND WIDESPREAD CRITICAL REACTION IN THE U.S., THUS MAKING SUBSTANTIALLY

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MORE DIFFICULT EFFORTS TO RESTORE AND ADVANCE SINO-US RELATIONS. HAN INDICATED HOPE THAT THE U. S. WOULD REFRAIN FROM FURTHER INTERFERENCE IN CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND SAID PROTECTION WAS GUARANTEED AS LONG AS U. S. DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL OBSERVE THE LAWS OF CHINA. KIMMITT REITERATED SECRETARY'S POINTS ABOUT U. S. INTEREST IN FINDING WAY WITH THE PRC TO WORK TOWARD SOLUTIONS THAT ADVANCE MUTUAL GOALS. HAN RECIPROCATED. HAN CONCLUDED NOTING AN INCIDENT OUTSIDE HIS RESIDENCE WHEREIN HE INDICATED A PERSON HAD KNOCKED ON HIS DOOR DEMANDING TO SEE THE AMBASSADOR, WHILE POLICE DID NOTHING TO STOP HIM. END SUMMARY

3. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID WE HAD JUST RECEIVED A XINHUA REPORT WHICH STATED THAT THE BEIJING PUBLIC SECURITY DEPARTMENT HAD ISSUED A WANTED CIRCULAR FOR THE ARREST OF FANG LIZHI AND HIS WIFE LI SHUXIAN, AND THAT IT REPORTED THAT THE COUPLE HAD TAKEN REFUGE IN THE US EMBASSY IN BEIJING. HE INDICATE WE WERE CONCERNED THAT THIS REPORT, COUPLED WITH THE ANTI-FOREIGN TONE OF SOME RECENT CHINESE MEDIA COMMENTARY, MIGHT STIMULATE ACTION THREATENING TO OUR EMBASSY OR ITS PERSONNEL.

4. CONTINUING, KIMMITT SAID WE WERE AWARE THAT POLICE PROTECTION HAD BEEN STRENGTHENED IN BEIJING'S DIPLOMATIC AREAS, BUT NONETHELESS WE WERE CONCERNED THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO DETER LARGE SCALE MOB ACTIVITY. THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED HIM, AND KIMMITT HAD SPOKEN WITH MR. GATES AT THE WHITE HOUSE ABOUT IT, TO CALL TO THE CHINESE SIDE'S ATTENTION THAT ANY INTRUSION INTO OUR EMBASSY OFFICES OR RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS, IN CONNECTION WITH THE FANG ISSUE THE SECRETARY HAD RAISED WITH THE AMBASSADOR LAST EVENING OR FOR ANY OTHER REASON, WOULD

PRODUCE A WIDESPREAD AND PROFOUND CRITICAL REACTION IN THE US.

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5. THIS REACTION WOULD MAKE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE DIFFICULT THE RESTORATION AND ADVANCEMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, WHICH AS THE SECRETARY NOTED LAST EVENING WAS THE GOAL OF THE PRESIDENT AND, WE BELIEVED, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT. WE HOPED THE AMBASSADOR WOULD CONVEY THESE VIEWS TO HIS GOVERNMENT, AS IT CONSIDERED ITS RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST OF LAST NIGHT FOR SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE FANG ISSUE.

6. HAN RESPONDED THAT HE WISHED TO MAKE TWO POINTS:

-- HE HOPED THE US WOULD REFRAIN FROM FURTHER INTERFERENCE INTO CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND

-- SO LONG AS US DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL OBEYED THE LAWS OF CHINA, THEIR SECURITY WOULD BE GUARANTEED.

HE WOULD CERTAINLY CONVEY THE UNDER SECRETARY'S REMARKS TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND WOULD CONVEY A RESPONSE AS SOON AS

IT WAS RECEIVED.

7. KIMMITT SAID WE UNDERSTOOD THE CHINESE SIDE'S POSITION REGARDING THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CHINA. AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE LOOKING FOR A WAY MUTUALLY TO RESTORE THE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP. WE COULD NOT ESCAPE THE FACT THAT EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN BEIJING WOULD AFFECT OUR EFFORTS TOWARD THIS GOAL. OUR INTEREST IN THIS GOAL WAS MUTUAL AND WE HOPED TO WORK WITH THE CHINESE SIDE TO ACHIEVE IT. HE WOULD REPORT TO THE SECRETARY AND MR. GATES ON HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE AMBASSADOR.

8. HAN SAID HE WOULD NOT REPEAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON FANG LIZHI BECAUSE THE VICE

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FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ALREADY STATED THAT TO AMBASSADOR LILLEY IN BEIJING. HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE CHINESE SIDE VALUED ITS US RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD EXERT THE GREATEST EFFORT TO PREVENT SINO-US RELATIONS FROM BEING UNDERMINED. HOWEVER, SUCCESS DID NOT HINGE ON CHINESE EFFORTS ALONE; COOPERATION BY THE US SIDE WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL.

9. WE SHARE THIS GOAL, KIMMITT AGREED. AS THE SECRETARY HAD SAID LAST NIGHT, THE RELATIONSHIP WAS OF IMMENSE IMPORTANCE TO BOTH COUNTRIES. WE WANTED TO WORK COOPERATIVELY WITH THE CHINESE SIDE TO ADVANCE SOLUTIONS SERVING OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS.

10. HAN SAID HE WISHED ALSO TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROTECTION OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY IN THIS COUNTRY. THIS MORNING A MAN HAD KNOCKED ON HIS RESIDENCE DOOR AND DEMANDED TO SEE THE AMBASSADOR. THIS WAS IN THE PRESENCE OF SECRET SERVICE PEOPLE WHO DID NOTHING TO STOP HIM. AS HE HAD BEEN HANGING AROUND THE EMBASSY FOR SEVERAL DAYS, THE SECRET SERVICE PEOPLE MUST HAVE KNOWN THAT HE SEEMED TO BE MENTALLY DISORDERED, AND YET THEY DID NOTHING.

11. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT BUT WOULD PROMPTLY CHECK IN TO IT. WE WERE AWARE OF OUR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHANCERY AND RESIDENCES AND WOULD TAKE ALL MEASURES NECESSARY TO FULFILL THEM.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13e. Cable	Re: Secretary - Han Discussion (5 pp.)	6/12/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Date Closed: 5/7/2009	OA/ID Number: 91136-004
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL CH US
SUBJECT: TFCH01: SECRETARY BAKER'S MEETING WITH HAN XU

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. SECRETARY BAKER CALLED IN AMBASSADOR HAN XU THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 7 AND MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

--THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THE SECRETARY TO SPEAK TO AMBASSADOR HAN. THE PRESIDENT AND ALL AMERICANS ARE DISTRESSED AND SADDENED OVER EVENTS IN CHINA. THE CARNAGE WAS CLEAR FOR ALL TO SEE. DESPITE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY;

--THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT INTERFERE IN CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND IS ANXIOUS TO HOLD THE US-CHINA

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RELATIONSHIP INTACT. HE HAS BEEN UNDER PRESSURE TO TAKE ACTIONS FAR EXCEEDING THOSE ALREADY TAKEN. AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THOSE WHO BELIEVE IN FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE HEARD FROM;

--WE THOUGHT THE CHINESE POSTPONEMENT OF FM QIAN'S VISIT

WAS A GOOD IDEA. HE WOULD HAVE FACED PROTESTS IN THE US;

--THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THE SECRETARY TO SEEK ASSURANCES THE PRC WOULD TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO PROTECT US INTERESTS AND CITIZENS. AMBASSADOR LILLEY WOULD BE CALLING ON PRC OFFICIALS THE MORNING OF JUNE 8 TO REQUEST CLEARANCE FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO EVACUATE AMERICANS SHOULD IT PROVE NECESSARY. THIS WAS ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS ONLY, IF COMMERCIAL CHARTERS PROVED INSUFFICIENT.

AMBASSADOR HAN REPLIED THAT HE WOULD REPORT THE REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO BEIJING. HE NOTED THE PRC'S HOPE THAT FRIENDLY COUNTRIES WOULD NOT INTERFERE IN THE PRC'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE ALSO SAID THAT CHINA WOULD MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY AND OPEN DOOR, AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN MIND AS THE PRC TRIES TO FIND ITS OWN SOLUTION TO THE CURRENT SITUATION. END SUMMARY.

3. PRC AMBASSADOR HAN XU WAS CALLED IN URGENTLY FOR A MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY AT 4:40 P.M. ON JUNE 7.

4. AFTER THANKING AMBASSADOR HAN FOR COMING IN ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE, THE SECRETARY TOLD HAN HOW DISTRESSED WE ARE OVER EVENTS IN CHINA. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD

CALLED IN THE AMBASSADOR AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT, WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN AT NOON. THE

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PRESIDENT WANTED HIM TO CONVEY OUR SENTIMENTS. THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR HE WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CHINA, WHERE HE HAD SERVED. IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW THAT OTHER QUESTIONS ARE INVOLVED IN THIS INSTANCE. THE CARNAGE IN BEIJING HAS BEEN OVERWHELMING, AND ALL THE WORLD CAN SEE THIS. OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN HAVE BEEN DENYING THIS, BUT WE ALL KNOW IT HAPPENED. WE ARE GREATLY SADDENED BY THESE EVENTS.

5. THE SECRETARY SAID THE PRESIDENT IS ANXIOUS TO HOLD US-PRC RELATIONS TOGETHER; HE HAS PUT A LOT OF EFFORT INTO BUILDING THEM. HE REGARDS OUR RELATIONSHIP AS VERY IMPORTANT TO OUR TWO PEOPLES. THE SECRETARY NOTED THE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURES ON THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THE US ON THIS ISSUE. THE US HAS EXPERIENCED 213 YEARS OF DEMOCRACY WITH PEACEFUL PROTESTS AND PEACEFUL TRANSITIONS OF POWER.

6. THE SECRETARY SAID WE THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN A GOOD IDEA FOR FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN TO DELAY HIS VISIT. HAD HE COME, HE WOULD HAVE ENCOUNTERED MANY PROTESTS, SO THE POSTPONEMENT WAS WISE. THE SECRETARY TOOK PARTICULAR NOTE THAT THE VISIT WAS POSTPONED, NOT CANCELED.

7. SECRETARY BAKER ASKED HAN TO CONTACT HIS GOVERNMENT TO ASSURE THAT IT TOOK ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO PROTECT US INTERESTS AND CITIZENS. HE SAID AMBASSADOR LILLEY WILL BE GOING IN THE MORNING OF JUNE 8 TO REQUEST CLEARANCE ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO EVACUATE AMERICANS FROM BEIJING. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THERE ARE US COMMERCIAL CHARTER AIRCRAFT ARRIVING SHORTLY, BUT WE ARE REQUESTING ADVANCE CLEARANCE SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY TO BRING IN A MILITARY CHARTER.

8. THE SECRETARY NOTED OUR APPRECIATION OF THE FACT

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THAT VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHU HAD SEEN THE AMBASSADOR SO QUICKLY WHEN THE SHOOTINGS OCCURRED IN THE JIANGUOMENWAI DIPLOMATIC COMPOUND. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT OTHERS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO SEE THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER. AND WE WERE APPRECIATIVE OF THE QUICK RESPONSE IN OUR CASE.

9. AMBASSADOR HAN RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT HE HAD EXPLAINED THE PRC'S POSITION TWICE TO UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT IN EARLIER MEETINGS AND SAW NO NECESSITY TO REITERATE THAT VIEW WHICH WAS KNOWN TO THE US. HE HAD SAID THAT CHINA WOULD TRY TO FIND ITS OWN SOLUTION TO THE SITUATION. CHINA HOPED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE PRC, WOULD NOT INTERFERE. HAN PROMISED TO REPORT OUR REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT.

10. THE SECRETARY REITERATED WE WILL ONLY ASK FOR PERMISSION FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO LAND IF IT PROVES NECESSARY. HE SAID WE HAVE TWO MILITARY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IN YOKOTA READY FOR USE. WE HAVE NO PLANS TO USE THEM NOW, BUT WE WERE MERELY REQUESTING ADVANCE PERMISSION IF NECESSARY SHOULD THE SITUATION DETERIORATE.

11. AMBASSADOR HAN REPLIED THAT HIS GOAL WAS TO PROTECT US-CHINA RELATIONS, AND THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD KEEP LONG-TERM AS WELL AS SHORT-TERM CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND. WE HAVE WORKED VERY HARD TO BUILD THAT RELATIONSHIP, AND THIS IS A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE PERIOD. CHINA MUST FIND ITS OWN WAY, WHICH MIGHT NOT BE IN CONFORMITY WITH OUR WAY. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE

IMPORTANCE OF LONG-TERM CONSIDERATIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING THE RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS WHY THE PRESIDENT WANTED HIM TO TALK WITH HAN. THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO PRESERVE OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND HE HAS RESISTED PRESSURES TO TAKE ACTIONS FAR EXCEEDING THOSE

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TAKEN. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP CONTINUE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT ALSO WAS IMPORTANT FOR THOSE WHO BELIEVE IN FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE HEARD FROM. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY REITERATING HOW DISTRESSED AND SADDENED AMERICANS WERE, AND OUR HOPE THAT THE SITUATION WILL STABILIZE AND CALM DOWN, THAT CHINA WILL MOVE TOWARD MORE OPEN AND PLURALISTIC POLICIES, AND THAT WE CAN GET OUR RELATIONSHIP BACK ON TRACK. HAN SAID CHINA WOULD CONTINUE ITS INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY AND MAINTAIN ITS OPEN DOOR TO THE OUTSIDE.

12. PARTICIPANTS AT THE MEETING WERE: US--THE SECRETARY, U/S KIMMITT, PA ASSISTANT SECRETARY TUTWILER, EAP ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY CLARK, EAP ACTING DAS WILLIAMS, AND EAP/CM ACTING DIRECTOR BADER; PRC--AMBASSADOR HAN XU, POLITICAL COUNSELOR XIAO HOUE, INTERPRETER CHEN MINGMING. BAKER

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