Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files

OA/ID Number: 91136
Folder ID Number: 91136-003

Folder Title:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [3]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	5	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. List	Re: White House Communications Agency Personnel [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	
01b. List	Re: White House Communications Agency Personnel [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	
01c. Handwritten List	Re: White House Communications Agency Personnel [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	
01d. List	Re: C-135 (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	
02a. Draft Memcon	Re: Meeting Between Premier Li Peng, General Scowcroft, et al. (14 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	S
02b. Draft Memcon	Re: Meeting with Premier Li Peng (10 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	
02c. Memcon	Re: Meeting Between Premier Li Peng, and National Security Advisor Scowcroft (8 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	S
03. Draft Memcon	Re: Deng Xiaoping (7 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	
04. Memcon	Re: Private Meeting of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (5 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1128
OA/ID Number: 91136-003
Date Closed: 5/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05. Memcon	Re: Private Meeting of National Security Advisor Scowcroft with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen [redacted] (6 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S
06a. Draft Memcon	Re: Meeting Between General Secretary Jang Zemin, et al. (13 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	S
06b. Draft Memcon	Re: General Secretary Jiang Zemin (8 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	
07. Schedule	Re: Appointment Schedule/Brent Scowcroft [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (7 pp.)	2/5/90	(b)(3)	
08a. Handwritten Note	Re: Doug told… [50 U.S.C.403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	
08b. Cable	Re: Briefing the Japanese on Malta (2 pp.)	12/5/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1128
OA/ID Number: 91136-003
Date Closed: 5/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 12/11/89

November

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

December

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

January

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

Friday 12/08/89

1:30AM		Dep Residence f/Andrews AFB
2:15AM		Dep Andrews AFB (7 hrs 30 mins, -4 hrs)
5:45AM		Arr Elmendorf AFB (2 hrs refuel)
7:45AM		Dep Elmendorf AFB (7 hrs 50 mins, +18 hrs)
11:45AM		(P/Arrive Camp David)

Saturday 12/09/89

9:30AM		Arr Yakota AB, Japan (2 hrs refuel)
11:30AM		Dep Yakota AB, Japan (4 hrs 30 mins, -1 hr)
3:00PM		Arr Beijing, China
		EVENING MEETING IN BEIJING - SATURDAY
NOTES:		P/CD

Sunday 12/10/89

		LATE MORNING OR NOON MEETING IN BEIJING - SUNDAY
3:00PM		Dep Beijing, China (3 hrs 25 mins, +1 hr)
7:30PM		Arr Yakota AB, Japan
		Helo to downtown Tokyo (15 mins)
		EVENING MEETING IN TOKYO W/DEP FORMIN OWADA & MR. KURIYAMA

Monday 12/11/89

9:00AM		MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
10:00AM		MEETING W/FOREIGN MINISTER
		Helo to Yokota AB
12:30PM		Dep Yokota AB (6 hrs 25 mins, -18 hrs)
1:00PM		Arr Elmendorf AFB (2 hrs refuel)
3:00PM		Dep Elmendorf (6 hrs 30 mins, +4 hrs)
		1:30 pm - Arr Andrews AFB
		2:00 pm - Arr White House
		2:30-4:00 pm - P/Budget Review (NASA/Energy/Science) - Oval
5:00PM	5:30PM	Senior Staff Meeting - Sit Rm
8:00PM		P/BLK TIE Cong'l Ball - State Floor
NOTES:		(Baker OOT)

Official Party

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State

Douglas H. Paal, Director for Asian Affairs, National Security Council

Others in Travelling Party

Ambassador James Lilley

Mrs. Sally Lilley

Chase Untermeyer, Assistant to the President

* Florence E. Gantt, Special Assistant to General Scowcroft

* Mildred J. Leatherman, Special Assistant to Secretary Eagleburger

* Notetakers

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. List	Re: White House Communications Agency Personnel [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [3]

Date Closed:	5/7/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91136-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

White House Communications Agency Personnel

Richard Brown DOB 6- 7-60

Keenan Frank DOB 6- 3-58

[redacted] C

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. List	Re: White House Communications Agency Personnel [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [3]

Date Closed:	5/7/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91136-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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White House Communications Agency Personnel

Richard Brown DOB 6- 7-60

Keenan Frank DOB 6- 3-58

[redacted]
C

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Handwritten List	Re: White House Communications Agency Personnel [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [3]

Date Closed:	5/7/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91136-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Richard Brown DOB 7 Jun 60

[redacted] C

Keenan Frank 3 Jun 58

[redacted] C

FLORANCE

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01d. List	Re: C-135 (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [3]

Date Closed:	5/7/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91136-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.


PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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C-135 #4126

RANK	NAME	CREW POSITION	DOB	POB	PASSPORT NUMBER	PASSPORT EXPIRES
LTC	MILLER, RICHARD G.	PILOT	29 SEP 46	U.S.		
LTC	PELUSO, FRANCIS K.	PILOT	13 DEC 49	U.S.		
MAJ	KILCOIN, JEFFREY T.	PILOT	12 OCT 51	U.S.		
MAJ	MURPHY, KEVIN A.	NAVIGATOR	5 DEC 50	U.S.		
MAJ	RYAN, COLLEEN	NAVIGATOR	3 AUG 60	U.S.		
MAJ	HEISLEY, EDWARD A.	NAVIGATOR	17 DEC 50	U.S.		
MSGT	COPPAGE, SHERMAN M.	FLT ENG	24 MAR 55	U.S.		
TSGT	SWANSON, LEE E.	FLT ENG	13 NOV 51	U.S.		
SSGT	DAVID, CHARLES P.	CREW CHIEF	15 APR 53	U.S.		
MSGT	AMTOWER, PHILIP R.	RADIO	14 OCT 50	U.S.		
MSGT	FULLER, DALE R.	RADIO	31 DEC 48	U.S.		
SGT	DANIELY, TERENCE W.	STEWARD	22 MAY 62	U.S.		
TSGT	GADRE, TUSHAR P.	STEWARD	12 MAR 59	INDIA		
SSGT	THEROUX, ROBIN J.	STEWARD	23 APR 55	U.S.		
SSGT	STAIB, MARY M.	STEWARD	10 JUN 61	U.S.		
TSGT	GREEN, KEITH M.	STEWARD	30 SEP 56	U.S.		
SGT	PARIS, ROBERT R.	GUARD	31 MAY 64	U.S.		
TSGT	LEMPIN, CARL E.	GUARD	14 MAR 55	U.S.		
SSGT	ENWRIGHT, GREGOR A.	GUARD	16 MAY 61	U.S.		
TSGT	MACISAAC, GERARD C.	GUARD	16 MAY 63	U.S.		



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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Meeting Between Premier Li Peng, General Scowcroft et al

Sunday, December 10, 1989 - 8:45 a.m. - 9:40 a.m.

Beijing

Participants:

Premier Li Peng: At a quarter to ten you will be meeting with the General Secretary so there is still an hour to go and I hope we can make good use of this one hour for an exchange of views. Here I want to listen to your views because you are our guest. Yesterday you already had a meeting with our Foreign Minister. Today we are going to talk on the basis of those meeting you had last night. Your thinking is of particular concern to us as to the evaluation of the United States with regard to the general situation after the Malta high-level meeting. Does Your Excellency think the cold war has ended or not ended? As far as China is concerned, it does not pose a threat to any country or any region. We are devoting ourselves to the goal of doubling our GNP by the end of this century so that our people can lead a more comfortable life. We want a peaceful international alignment and a stable political situation. So here I would like to listen to your views about the international situation.

General Scowcroft: Thank you very much, Premier Li. May I say again it is a pleasure to be back and I bring you greetings from

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2010-2632-MR
ES 5/13/13

President Bush, who remembers with appreciation your hospitality for his visit last February.

I appreciate very much your opening comment and question because it underscores the very reason that President Bush asked me to come here. Since 1972 we have developed a practice of consulting together on major world developments. And this practice, we believe, has been of great value to both sides and to world stability as a whole. And it is in the spirit of that relationship that I am here with Secretary Eagleburger to discuss a major event in US-Soviet relations. President Bush wanted to make this gesture to underscore his strong interest in putting our relationship back on a positive track rather than a negative one. I would just say that in taking this step of sending us here and of his act in vetoing the Pelosi Bill, which passed the Congress unanimously, President Bush has not only made a gesture but has done so at considerable risk to himself, and initial reports from the United States with the announcement of the news of our visit has been sharply negative in some quarters.

It is important that as we seek to restore the relationship that you understand the problems the President faces in being able to move forward. I take the time to state this to you personally because I believe that at our last meeting we had a very good exchange on the attitudes between us and a very good

understanding of each other's problems. So I did want you to understand the current situation with the President.

You asked for our appraisal of the world situation at the current time. And pointed out China's position and objectives. Let me say that it is our judgment that a great many very fundamental currents are moving in the world today, that events are taking place with great rapidity and it is difficult to predict the future course of those events. In our judgment Mr. Gorbachev came to power feeling strongly that the Soviet economy was stagnant and in serious need of reform. His goal was basically to improve the efficiency of production and the efficiency and effectiveness of manpower. As he ran into trouble in his efforts to bring economic change and reform to the Soviet structure, he turned more and more to political and social measures to bring pressure to get his economic reforms adopted. He has tended to go more and more in that direction as the pressures increased and indeed the political and social changes have far exceeded the economic changes he has been able to impose. This policy has at the same time unleashed forces both inside the Soviet Union and especially in Eastern Europe which have created a momentum of their own, perhaps far beyond anything that Mr. Gorbachev anticipated. Inside the Soviet Union which, after all is in some sense an empire of many peoples, he has encouraged/unleashed sentiments of nationalism among the minority peoples and also

OK ~~the~~ the demand of the peoples for greater economic and political representations of their own needs and demands. In Eastern Europe the results have been even more dramatic. In those societies in many cases the regimes were imposed rather than native to the cultures and unrest was waiting just beneath the surface.

In Poland and Hungary the nationalist impulse was already underway and in those two countries change has been more gradual and more moderate and we are seeing in both countries now a coalition between Communist and non-Communist parties trying to deal with this new phenomenon. In those countries therefore there is still a considerable amount of stability and one can hope that the situation will progress at a measured pace not creating enormous problems. In other countries, however, especially East Germany and Czechoslovakia there was a severe resistance by the leadership to any of the current of change. When in the course of implementing his internal reforms, Mr. Gorbachev in a sense encouraged those kinds of reforms in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The result has been a very rapid movement, a rejection of current leadership almost totally, and the result is the possibility of a collapse of authority of any kind inside those societies with the consequence of severe and troubling instability.

Mr. Gorbachev made it clear to us that he does not intend to interfere in the affairs of Eastern Europe. He believes that they must find their own way at their own pace. The possible exception to that is the issue of German reunification. Whereas before our meeting at Malta, the Soviet policy seemed to be a rejection of the possibility of German reunification, Mr. Gorbachev formulated that question to President Bush in a slightly different way. He said that history had created the two German states in the aftermath of World War II, that the present world had inherited those two states and that history should determine the resolution of that situation, that it was not up to the world leadership to force either the pace or the direction of that movement. Clearly he is reluctant about German reunification but has moved off his position of absolute rejection of that possibility.

That is a very long background leading up to the question which you posed. Internally, inside the Soviet Union Mr. Gorbachev is facing severe problems. His economic situation is bad and has perhaps been made worse by the reforms that he has adopted. Economically he seems to have no clear, at least no sophisticated, understanding of how to introduce the market economics which he seems to want to employ. He is at the same time, at least in his conventional military forces making some cutbacks both in the size of the forces and in [the] procurement,

especially in tanks, for example, apparently in an attempt to shift resources from the military into the civilian economy. His increasing preoccupation with his economic problems and his shifting of resources to the civilian economy do, in fact, have a military impact. Certainly with respect to NATO and I think presumably in the East it does reduce capability of the Soviet Union to mount a massive surprise attack across the border. In Eastern Europe there has been another change with respect to the Warsaw Pact and the threat it constitutes to NATO. The rapid change in the political circumstances in the states of Eastern Europe has certainly made a significant change in the kind of threat that NATO would have to face from the Warsaw Pact. Of that there is no doubt. Mr. Gorbachev seems to have given up on Eastern Europe in the sense of trying to influence developments there. Whether or not that change means a turning of greater attention to the East or whether this is a part of a general relaxation it is probably too early to say.

With respect to the question about the cold war, President Bush has taken a position that the term "cold war" is a slogan, an emotional slogan, and he would prefer dealing with the facts and realities as we have been discussing rather than to deal with the slogan itself. In that respect, I think we have to look at two aspects of the manifestation of Soviet expansionism.

The first is that which came out of World War II, out of Stalinism, if you will, which constituted a direct threat to all of the countries, both those surrounding the Soviet Union and in the Third World at large, in the ideological expansionism of Soviet Communism. Indications both of developments inside the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe are that there may have been some lessening, if not termination, of that kind of impulse and yet in certain regional areas of the world there are still signs that there has been no diminution of that impulse to expansionism. But underneath this surface, if you will, in historic terms, this drive towards expansionism, there is a deeper historical thrust and this is that the Russian state itself goes back far before the Revolution of 1917.

I remember Chairman Deng in February eloquently describing some of the manifestations of that historical impulse to expansionism. I think in answering the question, one has to look at both of these impulses and I believe that history has yet to reveal the ultimate consequences of the activities taking place at the present time. this is a rapidly moving world at the present time.

Mr. Gorbachev suggested to President Bush at Malta that the world was becoming a multi-polar world, moving away from the bi-polar world of the early post-war period. And that such entities as a

rapidly unifying Europe, a growing strengthening of Japan, of China and potentially of India meant a very different world. He suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union needed to develop a cooperative approach to dealing with this world while at the same time disclaiming any ideas of condominium.

May I just close by suggesting that in this rapidly changing world the strategic relationship between the United States and China, while perhaps modifying somewhat in respect to changes in the Soviet Union, may be even more important as one looks at the possibility of different alignment of forces, for example _____ _____ between Japan and the Soviet Union and that therefore while it may change somewhat in character from the U. S. point of view, it is perhaps even more important than it was at the time that we began.

Premier Li Peng: Thank you very much for the detailed account of your views of the international situation. I want to take this opportunity to brief you on my views.

The history of the world did not repeat itself but it may have some striking similarities. The present developments of Eastern Europe may not necessarily be good. For example, German reunification, with two German states reuniting, the German state will emerge as the strongest nation in Europe. And this will

certainly exert some influence on Europe both economically speaking and in the future in other areas. Take the Soviet Union, for example, it is now no threat to NATO and the United States. I don't share this view because I believe with all the changes that the threat will still be there so you can't depend on any particular person. For example, Chairman Gorbachev, who is devoted to detente and new thinking, but you have to look at the entire nation and entire leadership. We can't make any prediction about prospects for Mr. Gorbachev but afterall he is faced with many difficulties. It is our view that the economy is the base, while ~~the~~ politics is the manifestation ~~of political~~ ~~base~~, without economic stability, you cannot enjoy political stability for a long time. And also diplomacy is a continuation of internal affairs of a country. Even if your internal affairs are in a mess, such diplomacy will be weak. Also with the growing economic strengthening of Japan there will be growing friction between Japan and Europe and the United States. You see, the Japanese are saying little but are quietly doing a lot by themselves. Why should they speak so little? Because ~~that~~ (interpreter stumbling) they have a bad reputation from an earlier time. ~~have prestige~~. But they are doing things. We are not surprised by current developments in Eastern Europe because of all of that which used to take place in China. You see when China was in the Cultural Revolution we had a similar case, that is chaos emerged in just a few days time. Had we not adopted resolute measures on June 4, the present situation in China would even be

more turbulent today. So a rift in the Communist Party in China would lead to a civil war.

I do not require you to accept my views now but please remember ~~than~~ my remarks. in five or ten years time you will see that events will prove our views, our measures are constructive in China and even contributed to stability ~~to~~ of the world.

Bring a message back to the masses in the United States that the political situation in China is stable. This ~~year~~ Ja we had a ~~full~~ Fourth plenary committee meeting in June, and then in November we had a 5th plenary session of that committee. These were two very important meetings in which we reached decisions on personnel and policy ~~agreement.~~ Now the objective, the specific steps and the line of China are very clear. So in making an analysis of the situation in China you should not listen to the views of the radical intellectuals but rather to the broad masses of peasants, workers, and members of the Communist Party of China because our party has a total membership of 40 million. I believe it is worthwhile to deal with such a stable leadership of China and once more the present China leadership, with Jiang as the core ~~of~~ Zemin is ~~dependable~~ reliable.

I don't deny that in China there are opposition forces and some people who complain about the present government of China. There are indeed such elements but those complaints come from two

sources. We have lapses in our work and some forces hostile to the socialists in the present ~~social~~ system but they are not in the mainstream in China and they cannot develop into the mainstream. So similar events as in Eastern Europe will not occur in China. As for the economic situation in China I think there are both good things and bad things. But the good news is more than bad news. Our inflation rate has now been brought below the double digit figure. The cost is a slowdown in our production growth rate. But only with this production rate slowdown ~~have we any reduction~~ can we achieve restructuring. Only with such a restructuring can we ~~bring it down to~~ make progress. Now the general public in China is very pleased with the fact that prices are quite stable and we have an abundance of ~~stocks~~ commodities -- not like the Soviet Union where their shelves are empty. Our shelves are full and this can be proved by Ambassador Lilley. I am not saying that we have more supplies or better commodities than in the United States but I am saying as compared with the Soviet Union or as compared with China during the same period last year when we had panic buying.

You were right in saying Chinese reform started with economic reforms and have been coordinated with ~~economic~~ political reforms. So China's economy is ~~developing into~~ going through a vicious cycle and we are constantly ~~overcoming~~ encountering all kinds of difficulties. You mention market forces. We also introduced market mechanism. At the same time we have preserved the planned economy. We tried to bring about a combination of the two. So even in the process of

our economic overhaul and economic retrenchment, some major reform measures will still be worked out and will still be implemented. So the analysis that in China's economy we have stopped reforms, that we are now reverting to ten years ago -- this analysis is wrong. So you can wait and see and observe our development and gradually come to a fair conclusion. But I estimate that the slowdown in China's economic growth rate will continue for some time and then achieve a more stable balance.

And finally I want to touch upon Sino-US relations. As far as China is concerned it is ready to improve Sino-US relations. We have taken the initiative to preserve our relations. We can understand your repeated explanation of the predicament and difficulties faced by President Bush. But on the other hand the Chinese Government and leadership are also faced with difficulties and are also under some restraint. We are ready and not reluctant to solve the problem of Fang Lizhi (?) because this question has also created a lot of trouble for us. So if in the future we should release Fang Lizhi, then we have to do a lot of persuasion toward our people. President Bush has on the one hand vetoed the Pelosi Bill but on the other hand has taken some administrative measures which are in essence the same as the legislation. So the Chinese people really find it difficult to understand this. The US may think this is drastic action but to China it is like old wine in a new bottle. You see China is a

developing country and by sending one student to study abroad we have to spend $10,000 each year on each student. This amount of money can enable us to bring out ten graduates. So I think If certain individuals don't come back it is okay. If none of them come back then this would not do. Because the government cannot justify this before the people. Therefore we have to make a strong ~~request~~ reaction to these administrative measures taken by President Bush. So after you go back home we will have to make some strong reaction but while you are here we will not make such reaction. I think you can understand we will have to make such strong reaction so I think it would be best if we can solve the problem of US-Chinese relations at one stroke because we share common interests. That is, on the other hand we should not rule out the possibility that both sides taken some practical steps. That is to say we should do some solid things. For example, I don't think it would create any difficulty for President Bush to send students back to China. It would not prove difficult for President Bush to ask the World Bank to extend loans to China because although President Bush does not control the bank ~~but~~ he can exert some influence.

And actually I very much appreciate your visit at this time because I regard it as a new beginning in improving our relations. The Americans are the most pragmatic people. But perhaps both sides can take practical steps to improve our

relations. You will now meet the General Secretary Jiang, since you have never met him before. In years to come he will be #1. Later you will meet with Chairman Deng.

I'll be supporting him. Our cooperation is better than my cooperation with Zhao Ziyang. This is for your private use.

[Exiting, to Ambassador Lilley] Don't act like Ambassador Lord and go meeting ~~students on our campus~~ with our radicals.

Sunday, December 10, 1989 - 8:45a.m.

Meeting with Premier Li Peng

~~[illegible] you will be meting with General Secretary so [illegible]~~

Li Peng - At a quarter to ten you will be meeting with theGeneral Secretary so there is still an hour to go and I hope we can make good use of this one hour for an exchange of views. Here I want to listen to your views because you are our guest. Yesterday you already had a meeting with our Foreign Minister. Today we are going to talk on the basis of those you
~~We~~ had last night. Your thinking is of particular concern to me as to the evaluation of the United States with regard to the general situation after the Malta high-level meeting. Does your excellency think the cold war has ended or not ended? As far as China is concerned it does not pose a threat to any country or any region. ~~[illegible]~~ We are devoting ourselves to the goal of doubling our GNP by the end of this century so that our people can lead a more comfortable life. We want a peaceful international alignment and a stable political situation. So here I would like to listen to your views about the international situation.

Scowcroft. Thank you very much Premier Li. May I say again it is a pleasure to be back and I bring you greetings from President Bush who remembers with appreciation your hospitality for his visit last February. I appreciate very much your opening comment and question because it underscores the very reason that President Bush asked me to come here. Since 1972 we have developed a practice of consulting together on major world developments. And this practice we believe has been of great value to both sides and to world stability as a whole. And it is in the spirit of that relationship that I am here with Secretary Eagleburger to discuss a major event in US-Soviet relations. The President wanted to make this gesture to underscore his strong interest in putting our relationship back on a positive track rather than a negative one.

I would just say that in taking this step of sending us here and of his act in vetoeing the Pelosi Bill, which passed the Congres unanimously, the President is not only made a gesture but has done so at considerable risk to himself, and intial reports from the United States with the announcement of the news of our visit has been sharply negative in some quarters. It is important thatas we seek to restore the relationship that you understand the problems the President faces in being able to move forward. I take the time to state this to you personally because I believe that our last m-eting we had a very good exchange on the attitudes between us and a very good understanding of each other's problems. So I did want you to understand the current situation with the President. You asked for our appraisal of the world situation at the current time. And pointed out China's position and objectives. Let me say that it is our judgment that a great many very fundamental currents are moving in the world today, that events are taking place with great rapidity and it is difficult to predict the future course of those events. In our judgment Mr. Gorbachev came to power feeling strongly that the Soviet economy was stagnant and in serious need of reform. His goal was basically to improve the efficiency of production and the efficiency and effectiveness of manpower. As he ran into trouble in his efforts to bring economic change and reform to the Soviet structure, he turned more and more to political and social measures to bring pressure to get his economic reforms adopted. He has tended to go more and more in that direction as the pressures increased and indeed the political and social changes have far exceeded the economic changes he has been able to impose. This policy has at the same time unleashed forces both inside the Soviet Union and especially in Eastern Europe which have created a momentum of their own, perhaps far beyond anything that Mr. Gorbachev anticipated. Inside the Soviet Union which, after all is in some sense an empire of

many peoples, he has encouraged/unleashed sentiments of nationalism among the minority peoples and also _____ the demand of the peoples for greater economic and political representations of their own needs and demands. In Eastern Europe the results have been even more dramatic. In those socieities in many cases the regimes were imposed rather than native to the cultures and unrest was waiting just beneath the surface. In Poland and Hungary the nationalist impulse was already underway and in those two countries change has been more gradual and more moderate and we are seeing in both countries now a coalition between Communist and Non-Communist parties trying to deal with this new phenomenon. In those countries therefore there is still a considerable amount of stability and one can hope that the situation will progress at a measured pace not creating enormous problems. In other countries however especially East Germany and Czechoslovakia there was a severe resistance by the leadership to any of the currents of change. When in the course of implementing his internal reforms Mr. Gorbachev in a sense encouraged those kinds of reforms in East Germany and in Czechoslovakia, the result has been a very rapid movement, a rejection of current leadership almost totally, and the result is the possibility of a collapse of authority of any kind inside those societies with the consequence of severe and troubling instability. Mr. Gorbachev made it clear to us that he does not intend to interfere in the affairs of Eastern Europe. He believes that they must find their own way at their own pace. The possible exception to that is the issue of German reunification. Whereas before our meeting at Malta, the Soviet policy seemed to be a rejection of the possibility of German reunification, Mr. Gorbachev reformulated that question to President Bush in a slightly different way. He said that history had created the two German states in the aftermath of World War II, that the present world had inherited those two states and that history should determine the resolution of that situation, that it was not up to the world leadership

to force either the pace or the direction of that movement. Clearly he is reluctant about German reunification but has moved off his position of absolute rejection of that possibility. That is a very long background leading up to the question which you posed. Internally inside the Soviet Union Mr. Gorbachev is facing severe problems. His economic situation is bad and has perhaps been made worse by the reforms that he has adopted. Economically he seems to have no clear, at least no sophisticated, understanding of how to introduce the market economics which he seems to want to employ. He is at the same time at least in his conventional military forces making some cutbacks both in the size of the forces and in the procurement, especially in tanks, for example, apparently in an attempt to shift resources from the military into the civilian economy. His increasing preoccupation with his economic problems and his shifting of resources to the civilian economy do, in fact, have a military impact. Certainly with respect to NATO and I think presumably in the East it does reduce capability of the Soviet Union to mount a massive surprise attack across the border. In Eastern Europe there has been another change with respect to the Warsaw Pact and the threat it constitutes to NATO. The rapid change in the political circumstances in the states of Eastern Europe has certainly made a significant change in the kind of threat that NATO would have to face from the Warsaw Pact. Of that there is no doubt. Mr. Gorbachev seems to have given up on Eastern Europe in the sense of trying to influence developments there. Whether or not that change means a turning of greater attention to the East or whether this is a part of a general relaxation it is probably to early to say. With respect to the question about the cold war, President Bush has taken a position that the term "cold war" is a slogan, an emotional slogan, and he would prefer dealing with the facts and realities as we have been discussing rather than to deal with the slogan itself. In that respect

I think we have to look at two aspects of the manifestation of Soviet exapnsionism. The first is that which came out of World War II, out of Satlinism if you will, which constituted a direct threat to all of the countries, both those surrounding the Soviet Union and in the Third World at large, in the ideological expansionism of Soviet Communism. Indications both of developments inside the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe are that theremmay have been some lessening, if not termination, of that kind of impulse and yet in certain regional areas of the world there are still signs that there has been no dimunition of that impulse to expansionism. But underneath this surface, if you will, in historic terms, this ~~xxxfxxxx~~ drive towards expansionism, there is deeper historical thrust and that is that the Russian state itself goes back far before the revolution of 1917. I remember Chairman Deng in February eloquently describing some of the manifestations of that historical impulse to expansionism. I think in answering the question, one has to look at both of these impulses and I believe that history has yet to reveal the ultimate consequences of the activities taking place at the present time. This is a rapidly moving world at the present time. MR. Gorbachev suggested to President Bush at Malta that the world was becoming a multipolar world moving away from the bipolar world of the early post-war period. And that such entities as a rapidly unifying EUROPE, a growing strengthening of Japan, of China and potentially of India meant a very different world. He suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union needed to develop a cooperative approach to dealing with this world while at the same time disclaiming any ideas of condominium. May I just close by suggesting that in this rapidly changing world the strategic relationship between the United States and China, while perhaps modifying somewhat in respect to changes in the Soviet Union, may be even more important as one looks at the possibility of different alignment of forces, for example _____ _____

between Japan and the Soviet Union and that therefore while it may change somewhat in character from the U.S. point of views it is perhaps even more important than it was at the time that we began.

Li Peng - Thank you very much for the detailed account of your views of the international situation. I want to take this opportunity to brief you on my views. The history of the world did not repeat itself but it may have some striking similarities. The present developments of Eastern Europe may not necessarily be good. For example German reunification , with two German states reuniting the German state will emerge as the strongest nation in Europe And this will certainly ~~have~~exert some influence on Europe both economically speaking and in the future in other areas. Take the Soviet Union for example is now no threat to NATO and the US. I don't share this view because I believe with _____ that the threat will be there/So You can't depend on any particular person. For example, Chairman Gorbachev who is devoted to detente and new thinking , but you have to look at the entire national and entire ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ leadership. We can't make any prediction about prospects for Mr. Gorbachev but afterall he his faced with many difficulties. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT the economy is _____ while the _____ is the manifestation of political _____, without economic stability it cannot enjoy political stability for a long time. And also diplomacy is a continuation of interal affairs of a country. Even if your internal affairs are in a mess, such diplomacy will be weak. Also with the growing economic strengthening of Japan there will be growing friction between Japan and Europe and the United States. You see, Japanese are saying little but are quietly doing a lot by themselves. Why should they speak so little -- because they _____ have prestige. But they are doing things. We are not surprised by current developments in Eastern Europe because of all of that that used to take place in China. You see when China was in the

Cultural Revolution we had a similar case, that is chaos emerged in just a few days time. Had we not adopted measures on June 4 the present situation in China would even be more turbulent today. So a rift in the Communist party in China would lead to a civil war. I do not require you to accept my views now but please remember then in five or ten years time you will see that events will prove our views are measures are constructive in China and even to stability to the world. Bring a message back to the United Stqates that the political situation in China is stable. This year we had full plenary committee meeting and then in November we had a 5th plenary session of that commitee. These were two very important meetings in which we reach agreement. Now the objective, the specific steps and the line of China are very clear. So in making an analysis of the situation in China you should not listen to views of the radical but rather to the broad masses of peasants, workers, and members of the Communist party of China because our party has a total membership of 40 million. I believe it is worthwhile to deal with such a stable leadership of China and once more the present China leadership of Z_____ is dependable.

I don't deny that in China there are opposition forces and some people who complain about the present government of China. There are indeed such elements but those complaints come from two sources. We have _____ _____ in the present social system but they are not in the mainstream in China and they cannot develop into the mainstream. So similar events will not occur in China. As for the economic situation in China I think there are both good things and bad things. But the good news is more than bad news. Our inflation rate has now been brought below the double digit figure. The slowdown in our production growth rate. But only with this production rate slowdown have we any reduction. Only with such a restructuring can we bring it down to make progress. Now the general public in China is very pleased with the fact that prices are quite stable and we have an abundance of stocks -- not like the Soviet Union where their shelves are empty. Our shelves are full and this can be proved by Ambassador Lilley. I am not saying that we have more supplies or better commodities than in the United States but I am saying as compared with the Soviet Union or as compared with China during the same period last year when we had panic buying. You were right in saying Chinese reform started with economic reforms and have been coordinated with economic reforms. So China's economy is developing into a vicious cycle and we are constantly overcoming all kinds of difficulties. You mention market _____. We also introduced market mechanism. At the same time we have preserved the economy. We tried to

bring about a combination of the two. So even in the process of our economic overhaul and economic retrenchment major reform measures will still be worked out and will still be implemented. So the analysis that in China's economy we have stopped reforms that we are now reverting to ten years ago -- this analysis is wrong. So you can wait and see and observe our development and gradually come to a fair conclusion. But I estimate that the slowdown in China's economic growth rate will continue for some time and then achieve more. And finally I want to touch upon Sino-US relations. As far as China is concerned it is ready to improve Sino-US relations. We have taken the initiative to preserve our relations. We can understand your repeated explanation of the predicament and difficulties faced by President Bush. But on the other hand the Chinese Government and leadership are also faced with difficulties and are also under some restraint. We are ready and not reluctant to solve the problem of Fang Lizhi(?) because this question has also created a lot of trouble for us. So if in the future we should release Fang Lizhi then we have to do a lot of persuasion toward our people. President Bush has on the one hand vetoed the Pelosi Bill but on the other hand has taken some administrative measures which are in essense the same as the legislation. So the Chinese people really find it difficult to understand this. The US may think this is drastic action but to China it is like old wine in a new bottle. You see China is a developing country and by sending one student to study abroad we have to spend $10,000 each

year on each student. This amount of money can enable us to bring out ten graduates. So I think If certain individuals don't come back it is okay. If none of them come back then this would not do. Because the government cannot justify this before the people. Therefore we have to make a strong request to these administrative measures taken by President Bush. So after you go back home we will have to make some reaction but while you are here we will not make such reaction. I think you can understand we will have to make such strong reaction so I think it would be best if we can solve the problem of US-Chinese relations because we share common interests. That is, on the other hand we should not rule out the possibility that both sides taken some practical steps. That is to say we should do some solid things. For example, I don't think it would create any difficulty for President Bush to send students back to China. It would not prove difficult for President Bush to ask the World Bank to extend _____ to China because President Bush does not control the bank but he can exert influence. And actually I very much appreciate your visit at this time because I regard it as a new beginning in improving our relations. The Americans are the most pragmatic people. But perhaps both sides can take practical steps to improve our relations. You will now meet the General Secretary since you have never met him before. In years to come he will be #1. Later you will meet with Chairman Deng.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting Between Premier Li Peng, and National Security Advisor Scowcroft

DATE & TIME: Sunday, December 10, 1989 - 8:45 am - 9:40 am (Beijing Standard Time)

PLACE: Ziguangge, Zhongnanhai - Beijing, PRC

PARTICIPANTS:

US Side: Brent Scwocroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Douglas Paal, Director, Asian Affairs, National Security Council
Vivian Chang, Interpreter
Florence Gantt, Notetaker
Mildred Leatherman, Notetaker

PRC Side: Li Peng, Premier
(GET OTHER NAMES)

Premier Li Peng: At a quarter to ten you will be meeting with the General Secretary so there is still an hour to go and I hope we can make good use of this one hour for an exchange of views. Here I want to listen to your views because you are our guest. Yesterday you already had a meeting with our Foreign Minister. Today we are going to talk on the basis of those meeting you had last night. Your thinking is of particular concern to us as to the evaluation of the United States with regard to the general situation after the Malta high-level meeting. Does Your Excellency think the cold war has ended or not ended? As far as China is concerned, it does not pose a threat to any country or any region. We are devoting ourselves to the goal of doubling our GNP by the end of this century so that our people can lead a more comfortable life. We want a peaceful international alignment and a stable political situation. So here I would like to listen to your views about the international situation.

General Scowcroft: Thank you very much, Premier Li. May I say again it is a pleasure to be back and I bring you greetings from President Bush, who remembers with appreciation your hospitality for his visit last February.

I appreciate very much your opening comment and question because it underscores the very reason that President Bush asked me to come here. Since 1972 we have developed a practice of consulting

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together on major world developments. And this practice, we believe, has been of great value to both sides and to world stability as a whole. And it is in the spirit of that relationship that I am here with Secretary Eagleburger to discuss a major event in US-Soviet relations. President Bush wanted to make this gesture to underscore his strong interest in putting our relationship back on a positive track rather than a negative one. I would just say that in taking this step of sending us here and of his act in vetoing the Pelosi Bill, which passed the Congress unanimously, President Bush has not only made a gesture but has done so at considerable risk to himself, and initial reports from the United States with the announcement of the news of our visit has been sharply negative in some quarters.

It is important that as we seek to restore the relationship that you understand the problems the President faces in being able to move forward. I take the time to state this to you personally because I believe that at our last meeting we had a very good exchange on the attitudes between us and a very good understanding of each other's problems. So I did want you to understand the current situation with the President.

You asked for our appraisal of the world situation at the current time. And pointed out China's position and objectives. Let me say that it is our judgment that a great many very fundamental currents are moving in the world today, that events are taking place with great rapidity and it is difficult to predict the future course of those events. In our judgment Mr. Gorbachev came to power feeling strongly that the Soviet economy was stagnant and in serious need of reform. His goal was basically to improve the efficiency of production and the efficiency and effectiveness of manpower. As he ran into trouble in his efforts to bring economic change and reform to the Soviet structure, he turned more and more to political and social measures to bring pressure to get his economic reforms adopted. He has tended to go more and more in that direction as the pressures increased and indeed the political and social changes have far exceeded the economic changes he has been able to impose.

This policy has at the same time unleashed forces both inside the Soviet Union and especially in Eastern Europe which have created a momentum of their own, perhaps far beyond anything that Mr. Gorbachev anticipated. Inside the Soviet Union which, after all is in some sense an empire of many peoples, he has encouraged sentiments of nationalism among the minority peoples and also the demand of the peoples for greater economic and political representations of their own needs and demands.

In Eastern Europe the results have been even more dramatic. In those societies in many cases the regimes were imposed rather

than native to the cultures and unrest was waiting just beneath the surface.

In Poland and Hungary the nationalist impulse was already underway and in those two countries change has been more gradual and more moderate and we are seeing in both countries now a coalition between Communist and non-Communist parties trying to deal with this new phenomenon. In those countries therefore there is still a considerable amount of stability and one can hope that the situation will progress at a measured pace not creating enormous problems. In other countries, however, especially East Germany and Czechoslovakia there was a severe resistance by the leadership to any of the current of change. When in the course of implementing his internal reforms, Mr. Gorbachev in a sense encouraged those kinds of reforms in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The result has been a very rapid movement, a rejection of current leadership almost totally, and the result is the possibility of a collapse of authority of any kind inside those societies with the consequence of severe and troubling instability.

Mr. Gorbachev made it clear to us that he does not intend to interfere in the affairs of Eastern Europe. He believes that they must find their own way at their own pace. The possible exception to that is the issue of German reunification. Whereas before our meeting at Malta, the Soviet policy seemed to be a rejection of the possibility of German reunification, Mr. Gorbachev formulated that question to President Bush in a slightly different way. He said that history had created the two German states in the aftermath of World War II, that the present world had inherited those two states and that history should determine the resolution of that situation, that it was not up to the world leadership to force either the pace or the direction of that movement. Clearly he is reluctant about German reunification but has moved off his position of absolute rejection of that possibility.

That is a very long background leading up to the question which you posed. Internally, inside the Soviet Union Mr. Gorbachev is facing severe problems. His economic situation is bad and has perhaps been made worse by the reforms that he has adopted. Economically he seems to have no clear, at least no sophisticated, understanding of how to introduce the market economics which he seems to want to employ. He is at the same time, at least in his conventional military forces making some cutbacks both in the size of the forces and in procurement, especially in tanks, for example, apparently in an attempt to shift resources from the military into the civilian economy. His increasing preoccupation with his economic problems and his shifting of resources to the civilian economy do, in fact, have a

military impact. Certainly with respect to NATO and I think presumably in the East it does reduce capability of the Soviet Union to mount a massive surprise attack across the border. In Eastern Europe there has been another change with respect to the Warsaw Pact and the threat it constitutes to NATO. The rapid change in the political circumstances in the states of Eastern Europe has certainly made a significant change in the kind of threat that NATO would have to face from the Warsaw Pact. Of that there is no doubt. Mr. Gorbachev seems to have given up on Eastern Europe in the sense of trying to influence developments there. Whether or not that change means a turning of greater attention to the East or whether this is a part of a general relaxation it is probably too early to say.

With respect to the question about the cold war, President Bush has taken a position that the term "cold war" is a slogan, an emotional slogan, and he would prefer dealing with the facts and realities as we have been discussing rather than to deal with the slogan itself. In that respect, I think we have to look at two aspects of the manifestation of Soviet expansionism.

The first is that which came out of World War II, out of Stalinism, if you will, which constituted a direct threat to all of the countries, both those surrounding the Soviet Union and in the Third World at large, in the ideological expansionism of Soviet Communism. Indications both of developments inside the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe are that there may have been some lessening, if not termination, of that kind of impulse and yet in certain regional areas of the world there are still signs that there has been no diminution of that impulse to expansionism. But underneath this surface, if you will, in historic terms, this drive towards expansionism, there is a deeper historical thrust and this is that the Russian state itself goes back far before the Revolution of 1917.

I remember Chairman Deng in February eloquently describing some of the manifestations of that historical impulse to expansionism. I think in answering the question, one has to look at both of these impulses and I believe that history has yet to reveal the ultimate consequences of the activities taking place at the present time. this is a rapidly moving world at the present time.

Mr. Gorbachev suggested to President Bush at Malta that the world was becoming a multi-polar world, moving away from the bi-polar world of the early post-war period. And that such entities as a rapidly unifying Europe, a growing strengthening of Japan, of China and potentially of India meant a very different world. He suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union needed to develop a cooperative approach to dealing with this world while

at the same time disclaiming any ideas of condominium.

May I just close by suggesting that in this rapidly changing world the strategic relationship between the United States and China, while perhaps modifying somewhat in respect to changes in the Soviet Union, may be even more important as one looks at the possibility of different alignment of forces, for example _____ _____ between Japan and the Soviet Union and that therefore while it may change somewhat in character from the U.S. point of view, it is perhaps even more important than it was at the time that we began.

Premier Li Peng: Thank you very much for the detailed account of your views of the international situation. I want to take this opportunity to brief you on my views.

The history of the world did not repeat itself but it may have some striking similarities. The present developments of Eastern Europe may not necessarily be good. For example, German reunification, with two German states reuniting, the German state will emerge as the strongest nation in Europe. And this will certainly exert some influence on Europe both economically speaking and in the future in other areas. Take the Soviet Union, for example, it is now no threat to NATO and the United States. I don't share this view because I believe with all the changes that the threat will still be there so you can't depend on any particular person. For example, Chairman Gorbachev, is devoted to detente and new thinking, but you have to look at the entire nation and entire leadership. We can't make any prediction about prospects for Mr. Gorbachev but afterall he is faced with many difficulties.

It is our view that the economy is the base while the politics is the manifestation. Without economic stability you cannot enjoy political stability for a long time. And also diplomacy is a continuation of internal affairs of a country. If your internal affairs are in a mess, such diplomacy will be weak. Also with the growing economic strengthening of Japan there will be growing friction between Japan and Europe and the United States. You see, the Japanese are saying little but are quietly doing a lot by themselves. Why should they speak so little? Because (interpreter stumbling) they have a bad reputation from an earlier time. But they are doing things. We are not surprised by current developments in Eastern Europe because of all of that which used to take place in China. You see when China was in the Cultural Revolution we had a similar case, that is chaos emerged in just a few days time. Had we not adopted resolute measures on June 4, the present situation in China would even be more turbulent today. So a rift in the Communist Party in China would lead to a civil war.

I do not require you to accept my views now but please remember my remarks. In five or ten years time you will see that events will prove our views, our measures are constructive in China and even to contributed stability of the world.

Bring a message back to the masses in the United States that the political situation in China is stable. This year we had a Fourth Plenary committee meeting in June and then in November we had a Fifth Plenary session of that committee. These were two very important meetings in which we reached decisions on personnel and policy. Now the objective, the specific steps and the line of China are very clear. So in making an analysis of the situation in China you should not listen to the views of the radical intellectuals but rather to the broad masses of peasants, workers, and members of the Communist Party of China because our party has a total membership of 40 million. I believe it is worthwhile to deal with such a stable leadership of China and once more the present China leadership, with Jiang Zemin as the core, is reliable.

I don't deny that in China there are opposition forces and some people who complain about the present government of China. There are indeed such elements but those complaints come from two sources. We have lapses in our work and some forces hostile to the socialist system, but they are not in the mainstream in China and they cannot develop into the mainstream. So similar events as in Eastern Europe will not occur in China. As for the economic situation in China I think there are both good things and bad things. But the good news is more than bad news. Our inflation rate has now been brought below the double digit figure. The ciost is a slowdown in our production growth rate. But only with this production rate slowdown can we achieve restructuring. Only with such a restructuring can we make progress. Now the general public in China is very pleased with the fact that prices are quite stable and we have an abundance of commodities -- not like the Soviet Union where their shelves are empty. Our shelves are full and this can be proved by Ambassador Lilley. I am not saying that we have more supplies or better commodities than in the United States but I am saying as compared with the Soviet Union or as compared with China during the same period last year when we had panic buying.

You were right in saying Chinese reform started with economic reforms and have been coordinated with political reforms. So China's economy is going through a vicious cycle and we are constantly encountering all kinds of difficulties. You mention market forces. We also introduced market mechanism. At the same time we have preserved the planned economy. We tried to bring about a combination of the two. So even in the process of

our economic overhaul and economic retrenchment, some major reform measures will still be worked out and will still be implemented. So the analysis that in China's economy we have stopped reforms, that we are now reverting to ten years ago -- this analysis is wrong. So you can wait and see and observe our development and gradually come to a fair conclusion. But I estimate that the slowdown in China's economic growth rate will continue for some time and then achieve a more stable balance.

And finally I want to touch upon Sino-US relations. As far as China is concerned it is ready to improve Sino-US relations. We have taken the initiative to preserve our relations. We can understand your repeated explanation of the predicament and difficulties faced by President Bush. But on the other hand the Chinese Government and leadership are also faced with difficulties and are also under some restraints. We are ready and not reluctant to solve the problem of Fang Lizhi because this question has also created a lot of trouble for us. So if in the future we should release Fang Lizhi, then we have to do a lot of persuasion toward our people. President Bush has on the one hand vetoed the Pelosi Bill but on the other hand has taken some administrative measures which are in essence the same as the legislation. So the Chinese people really find it difficult to understand this. The US may think this is drastic action but to China it is like old wine in a new bottle. You see China is a developing country and by sending one student to study abroad we have to spend $10,000 each year on each student. This amount of money can enable us to bring out ten graduates. So I think If certain individuals don't come back it is okay. If none of them come back then this would not do. Because the government cannot justify this before the people. Therefore we have to make a strong reaction to these administrative measures taken by President Bush. So after you go back home we will have to make some strong reactions but while you are here we will not make such reaction. I think you can understand we will have to make such strong reaction so I think it would be best if we can solve the problem of US-Chinese relations at one stroke because we share common interests. That is, on the other hand we should not rule out the possibility that both sides taken some practical steps. That is to say we should do some solid things. For example, I don't think it would create any difficulty for President Bush to send students back to China. It would not prove difficult for President Bush to ask the World Bank to extend loans to China because although President Bush does not control the bank, he can exert some influence.

And actually I very much appreciate your visit at this time because I regard it as a new beginning in improving our relations. The Americans are the most pragmatic people. But perhaps both sides can take practical steps to improve our

relations. You will now meet General Secretary Jiang since you have never met him before. In years to come he will be #1. I'll be supporting him. Our cooperation is better than my cooperation with Zhao Ziyang. This is for your private use. Later you will meet with Chairman Deng.
(Exiting, to Ambassador Lilley) Don't act like Ambassador Lord and go meeting with our radicals.

check w/ Dowr

December 10, 1989 11:05 a.m.

Deng Xiaoping

D: Welcome to China. Despite the differences between us Sino-US relations must improve for world stability. I think it is impolite and unreasonable for me not to receive the personal emmissary of my friend President Bush.

S: On behalf of the President may I say I appreciate it very much, especially on Sunday and especially when one is retired to takethe time to receive us.

D: General Scowcroft you have come to brief us on the Malta meeting but in reality I think I should say it is in the common interest on both sides to see improvement of relations. I think we share the common desire and common need. I think we can find a solution.

S: I agree with you completely. While the excuse of my coming is to explain the discussions we had with the Soviet Union in Malta, in fact it is an expression of the stratetic relationship that we have developed and the President's interest in discussing with the Chinese leadership the important developments of the world but even more his interest in returning the relationship to a positive rather than a negative track that recent difficulties have put us on.

D: So please convey my best wishes and warm regards to Prsident Bush. I know that he has done alot in trying to find a solution to this problem. And actually he has tun into some difficulties but I think generally speaking we can see that the Chinese leaders are faced with even more difficulties. The main difficulty in our minds lies in the fact that we must justify ourselves in the eyes of the Chinese people so that the Chinese people will be more at ease after this problem is settled. And also internationally speaking if we cannot find a proper solution to the problem then our international prestige will be affected. Take the Japanese for example, in the past Japan was quite modest in _____

of China because it has a deep debt to China. But it has been active against China

in the face of China due to its past history. This time they are very active in putting sanctions on China and they regard extending loans as a precondition. Recently they said they will not seell steel to China . that's all right. We an find it on the international market. And we can do without their loans. The Japanese in their relations with China have grown very much complacent. As far as Europe is concerned I am very much dissatisfied with the attiude of the French. Internationally speaking China can indeed exert special influence. So instability in Chin a will create a lot of problems. And surely those problems will not be confined to a regional nature. At least it will rsult in chaos in the Asia-Pacific region. So this will certainly not be a lessing for the US and China.

About the world situation, I want to ask my friend privately and unofficially aout Malta. Waht kind of world outcome will this lead to. What kind of outcome will this meeting have with respect to East Europe?

This turmoil is even more serious than had aoccurred in China in June It is very difficult to predict the implications and consequences. I think in these circumstances the Soviets have scored no points and even if the US have scored any points, it can't be much. So it is someone else who scored the points. It is the rivals of the US who scored points. China can do no damage to the US. China poses no threat to the US. So the US should not antagonize China. China does not ~~xxxxxxx~~ consider the US as a rival. Ever since 1972 we have done nothing to hurt the interests or feelings of the US. Naturally there have been some ~~xxx~~ incidents in a technical sense but not in a political sense.

Over the past 17 years since 1972 the international situation has enjoyed stability and in this regard the excellent development of Sino-US relations has played a major role. It has carried great weight. I am not clear about the possible outcome of the present turmoil in Eastern Europe but I believe Sino-US cooperation will be very important for peace. So I think China and the United States should refrain from fighting each other. Naturally by fighting I do not mean war -- I mean verbal attacks. I would like you to bring this message to President Bush. We should try to put an end to our dispute by taking into consideration the interests of the other side by both sides. We should not just take into consideration in carrying out the sincere cooperation the interest of one side. Both sides need to be considered. So in this way in the final analysis we can find solutions. General Scowcroft, I know you are a trouble shooter. Many of our friends in the United States have approved of my views. Dr. Kissinger is one. So I think since there are so many people with excellent ideas they can surely find ways that are mutually acceptable. I think if both sides can make concessions to solve the difficulties would not this then be resolved by enabling you to deal with Congress. I asked Dr. Kissinger to tell President Bush that if we can find a proper solution to our problems then at an appropriate time next year we can arrange for a visit to the United States by General Secretary Jiang. That visit should take place when there is a good atmosphere with all the problems resolved in Sino-US relations. Otherwise why should he just go there? I think that visit should symbolize that we have put an

end to the dispute and we should go forward together. Now I am truly in retirement. I have made up my mind not to interfere in the work of the new leadership because that is not good. I hope the new leadership can play a better role through practice.tice. But I am still a citizen of the Peoples Republic of China and I am interested in the stability of China and I am interested in the security and stability of the world situation. Please tell President Bush that he should not forget the fact that in Beijing, in the orient, there is an old man who is very much interested in the excellent development of the improvement of Sino-US relations. In his recent letter to me he said that although I have retired he still regards me as a friend and I share his views. So in spite of the differences between our two countries we are still friends and I think it would be useful if we can deal with disputes and stay as friends. I propose that after we have settled the recent disputes then the General Secretary Jiang will pay a visit to the United States and during the visit President Bush and the General Secretary can find themselves congenial and makes new friends with each other. For friends can never have too many. So I am making these remarks as a friend. Chairman Jiang and Li Peng will speak on behalf of China. So today although we are holding this talk in the critical sense of the word actually we have covered some sensitive issues. Do you have any comments?

Scowcroft: I thank you very much for your comments and may I say that President Bush agrees with you completely both in your

appraisal of Sino-US relations, the steps we need to take and also in terms of the strategic picture in the world. He has never moved from his objective of sustaining and even improving the strategic relationship between the United States and China and during the difficult period of the last several months. In fact, he tried his best to restrain friends and allies both in Europe and Japan from taking actions more extreme than they did.

Deng: I know this.

Scowcroft: He faces now big problems with the American Congress and in our political system. On some events when the Congress and the President are so opposed, the President has very little power against the Congress.

Deng: That is why I have said on many occasions that China cannot adopt the US system. I have said this many times. We cannot interfere in the fact that some Americans say the US system is good but I myself will say that we can't adopt such a system. Should we put an end to our meeting or do you have any more comments?

Scowcroft: May I just end by saying that the President is determined to restore our relationship and he agrees with the goal of having Chairman Jiang visit the United States in an atmosphere of cooperation.

Deng: Your side should extend a formal invitation otherwise it would not do -- perhaps the General Secretary of our party woudl not be pleased. (DOUG CHECK THIS)

Scowcroft: We still have work to do but that is what we are working toward. In connection with our strategic relationship the President agrees completely that at a time when there is much turmoil in the world and events are moving rapidly that the strategic relationship between the US and China, who have no fundamental reason for objection to each other, it is perhaps even more important than it was in the past 17 years.

Deng: Both sides should make efforts and this must not be a protracted process. Protracted process does not serve the interest of either party. That is exatly what I meant now. Some misconceptions might occur in these circumstances. So it is very important to make a solid analysis of the situation. Sometimes you have to wait for a year or two years before you can come to understand the nature and substance of the changes and direction and pattern of such changes. If someone can claim that they can give the final say on the analysis of a situation, then I shall regard him as boasting.

Scowcroft: One final personal note. President Bush considers you and old and very dear friend. He knows that you are retired. He doesn't want to bother you but he would liek to be able from time to time to write you a letter if that is all right with you.

Deng: But naturally I will be glad to accept. I will be glad to receive those letters but I might not necessarily reply to those letters because I cannot speak on behalf of the party and the people. The letters may touch on some substantive issues and I may not speak on the issues. But I would write letters conveying personal greetings. Please convey my best wishes to President and Mrs. Bush saying we are indeed still friends. So inspite of the temporary disputes the two of us are still friends. Our friendship is not inactive/affected(?)

Scowcroft: Good.

Deng: So our friendship should last for a long time.

Scowcroft: Very good.

11:45

Official Party

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State

Douglas H. Paal, Director for Asian Affairs, National Security Council

Others in Travelling Party

Ambassador James Lilley

Mrs. Sally Lilley

Chase Untermeyer, Assistant to the President

* Florence E. Gantt, Special Assistant to General Scowcroft

* Mildred J. Leatherman, Special Assistant to Secretary Eagleburger

* Notetakers

SCHEDULE

December 10

1830 - Aircraft arrival at Yokota Air Base

1845 - Helicopter arrival at Hardy Barracks

1900 - Arrive at Okura Hotel (baggage will be delivered by road, approximate arrival time 2030)

- Departure from hotel TBD

2030 - Dinner hosted by Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama, location TBD
U.S. participants: General Scowcroft, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, Ambassador Armacost, Mr. Untermeyer, Mr Paal
Japanese participants: Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama, Deputy Foreign Minister Owada, North American Affairs Bureau Director General Arima, EUR DG TOGO, Asia DG Tanino, notetaker

- Return to hotel, RON

December 11

0845 - Baggage pick-up at hotel

0850 - Depart hotel

0900 - Call on Prime Minister Kaifu at Prime Minister's office
Participants: General Scowcroft, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, Ambassador Armacost, Embassy notetaker

0955 - Depart

1000 - Call on Foreign Minister Nakayama at Foreign Ministry
Participants: General Scowcroft, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, Ambassador Armacost, Embassy notetaker

1145 - Depart hotel

1210 - Helicopter departs Hardy Barracks

1230 - Aircraft depart from Yokota Air Base

VEHICLE ASSIGNMENTS

Ambassador's Limo

General Scowcroft

Ambassador Armacost

Limo II

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger

Mr. Untermeyer

Ms. Leatherman

DCM Sedan

Mr. Paal

Ms. Gantt

DCM Breer

Sedan II

Mr. Brown

Mr. Frank

Poloff Price

The President sent National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary Eagleburger to China as his special emissaries because he believes, particularly after the Malta meeting, that we should not interrupt the important and long-standing dialogue between the United States and China on major developments in the international environment.

The two emissaries engaged the Chinese leadership on the strategic situation and exchanged views on the rapidly unfolding developments in Eastern Europe. They also presented the strong American reaction to the events in China in June and described the effects those events have had on American views of US-China relations.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
DETACHMENT 1, 15TH WEATHER SQUADRON (MAC)
ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20331-5000

8 DECEMBER 1989

WEATHER FORECAST

PREPARED FOR

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SCOWCROFT

ELMENDORF AFB, AK

PARTLY CLOUDY AND COLD.

WIND WILL BE LIGHT AND VARIABLE.

ARRIVAL TEMPERATURE: 10°F.

YAKOTA, JAPAN

PARTLY CLOUDY AND BREEZY.

WIND WILL BE NORTHERLY AT 15 GUSTING TO 23 KNOTS.

ARRIVAL TEMPERATURE 49°F.

BEJING, CHINA

FAIR SKIES.

WIND WILL BE NORTHWEST AT 14 GUSTING TO 28 KNOTS.

ARRIVAL TEMPERATURE 36°F.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/MARKET

Memorandum of Conversation

Private Meeting of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen

Beijing, Diaoyutai Guesthouse No 9

Sunday December 10, 1989, 2:13 p.m. - 2:50 p.m. (Beijing Stanard Time)

Participants:

U.S. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for NAtional Security Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Douglas H. Paal, NSC, Notetaker
Vivian Chang, Interpreter

PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu
Director, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, Zhang Yijun
Director, Office of American Affairs, Ma Wenzheng
Deputy Director, Zha Peixin
Ma Yunsung, Interpreter
Lian Shengbao, notetaker

General Scowcroft: I would like Secretary Eagleburger to speak now because he will be in charge of negotiations on the package.

Secretary Eagleburger: Before we leave I want to establish a few points on where we will go next. As the diplomat on this trip, let me be undiplomatic. My impression is that you and we are are engaged in a kabuki dance. You say, and we accept, that there has to be movement on our side before you can move. We say to you, and are sincere, that there has to be movement on your side. We are now circling each other, each waiting for the other to move. There is no purpose served arguing over who moves first.

From our side, we are faced with the realities of dates on which decisions must be made. The first decision we must make will be on December 15, on the agreement to satellite launchings. Congress returns on January 23. Certainly when they come back, assuming no movement, the Pelosi Bill and whatever other legislation they decide will be reintroduced.

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While we have not given you our final word on the package you gave us yesterday, I can tell you now that it will not work as now structured. All of us on the American side agree it will not work, largely because the linkage between sanctions and the release of Fang Lizhi is so direct that at home we politically cannot manage it.

Let me emphasize that this is not the official government response, but General Scowcroft and I agree that when we get back to Washington and get together to formulate a detailed response, we will have to say the same thing to you.

We will pull a small group together. We will get a counterproposal to you by the end of the week, and hopefully give it to your ambassador. Without describing what the details of the package will include, I can indicate that they will include such issues as martial law, the release of Fang Lizhi, World Bank loans, and the sanctions. We will try to find how to fit all these pieces into that package.

I would like to make one specific point on Fang Lizhi. One proposal we will make will include that, because from our view his release will have the greatest impact of all the actions you might take and will make the rest of the package easier to do. We may also give you a second proposal which does not deal with this issue. If it is difficult to do the other things, we are prepared to set the issue of Fang aside, and after the atmosphere in our relations improves, we will be prepared to come back to that issue.

Again, we will examine your proposal back in Washington. Fang Lizhi is not necessarily the sine qua non to improving the atmosphere and undoing the damage collectively done over the last months.

With regard to who goes first, there is no need to have an argument, but from the Washington perspective, we have taken steps already, not least that we are here already.

On the Pelosi veto, you may not be satisfied with the President's decision. But it was poltically costly for him, and it will be so when we go back. I was personally involved in granting an

exception for the export of inertial guidance equipment for the sale of the Boeing aircraft. And the Peace Pearl project is moving forward. These are some steps we have taken. Again, I raise this not to get into an argument or because I feel they are adequate. I raise them to demonstrate that the President is trying to take steps to improve the atmosphere. I should also tell you, if we heard the Premier right this morning, I thought he said that the Chinese government would make clear its unhappiness with the President's administrative measures regarding the Chinese students in the United States after we go home, if that is the threat I think I heard (nervous laughter from Chinese), the impact in the U.S. will undo whatever we have done by coming here yesterday and today, undo that completely. At a minimum we will not be able to improve the atmosphere as we say we want.

On the issue of the satellite launch, we face a decision date, December 15. I am not making a linkage, but we have to tell you that we have informtion, which some members of Congres have access to, that there are some lower level Chinese officials who are talking of sales of ballistic missiles, particularly to the Middle East. We do not question the statement of your Foreign Ministry spokesman on November 23, but some in the Congress will doubt it. It will be much easier on December 15, if we have a reaffirmation of the November 23 statement, plus some indication that missiles _____ will not be sold to regions of particular instability. We do not expect an answer now, but will need it by December 15.

Let me make two points. We are anxious with regard to the atmosphere to make some small moves on each side, even before we get the package response to you by the end of next week. We are looking for small steps to convince the Chinese people that it is wise to begin the process of improving relations and to help us with the Congress. I would like to leave a couple of ideas with you. For example, just for example, if your side could possibly stop jamming VOA or permit a VOA correspondent to come to China, in an unconnected fashion, we could remove the travel advisory.

Perhaps these are not the specific steps, but what we are searching for are beginnings in these next days before Congress returns. They are steps both sides can take without one or the other looking like one prevailing over the other. This will help with military sales, the banks, and convince the American and Chinese publics that it is wise to move in this direction.

We would like to suggest for your consideration, for Ambassador Lilley and your designee to work out details on when and how the Fangs may leave. It appears all of us agree on the need to solve this issue. Totally off the record, and ad referendum, we need to agree that both of us want to see his release.

With regard to our response to your package and the counterproposal, that can be done here or to your ambassador in Washington as you prefer. We would prefer Washington, but do not insist on it, assuming it is an effort we jointly want to accomplish.

Mr. Minister, in the U.S. we have the tradition of the good cop and the bad cop. You have had a full day of the good cop, and only fifteen minutes of the bad cop.

Ambassador Lilley: I would like to add one thing, if I may. Whatever we do on Fang Lizhi will help to improve the atmosphere on a broad range of issues. Vice Minister Liu Huaqiu has helped three get out already, and can do the talks.

Secretary Eagleburger: That is if we are prepared to settle the issue. If it is to put it off to one side, that is another matter.

Ambassador Lilley: One other matter that might be raised with Ambassador Zhu, that is to move to eliminate artificial constraints on the embassies, for example, the military attaches at our embassy are not permited to join attache trips. Resolving this would help to move our atmosphere along.

Foreign Minister Qian: I think, Mr.Secretary Eagleburger, that I understand your remarks are not a response, and that you will respond next week as a counterproposal. First, both sides agree on a package solution, and while this is in process, the general public should not get the impression of any package deal. It should seem that both sides seek to improve relations.

I also agree we should not leave the impression of which side gains or does not gain, wins or loses, or moves first. I agree Vice Minister Liu and Ambassador Lilley should meet to discuss the details on Famg Lizhi. These negotiations can begin without waiting a response to the package. Naturally, implementation will come after your response.

I also agree that after your formal response in Washington the discussions can take place between Ambassador Zhu and your State Department officials. I also agree both sides should consider which steps both sides can take to improve relations between our countries and the atmosphere.

I would like to raise a few points. Our Peace Pearl project is underway, and we regard this as positive. We hope to see it continue without further setbacks. Not long ago, due to the temporary suspension, the actual cost of the program exceeded the budget for it. We hope the American side will consider that the Chinese side can hardly bear this burden. Also, in terms of military cooperation, which includes torpedoes, large caliber artillery shells, radar, there are some problems, and they should also include timely delivery.

You made mention of Premier Li Peng's remarks regarding the measures taken by president Bush with the Pelosi veto. This is a misunderstanding on your side. You know very well, the American side made lots of effort, but the Chinese government cannot justify this action to the people without reacting. We have already made our reaction.

Secretary Eagleburger: We noticed.

Foreign Minister Qian: After you leave, we will publish no more reaction. By reaction, as Vice Foreign Minister Liu already made clear to your embassy, the Ministry of Education will take action to send no more graduate students to your country. In the statement issued by the State Education Commission, this comment did not appear in the press. So in implementing this measure, we will take some notice of the impact on the U.S. and we hope the U.S. will do the same.

As for the sale of intermediate range missiles, China's position is very clear. The U.S. is very aware of it. The Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a clear declaration. In the days to come, when similar questions are raised we will make clear our position in the same way.

These are my points. I will add that through this visit we can start our joint efforts. Both sides should work collectively and separately.

Secretary Eagleburger: Done.

Foreign Minister Qian: Very good.

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-1159-MR (503)
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen

Beijing, Diaoyutai State Guesthouse

Saturday, December 9, 1989, 8:15 p.m. - 9:00 p.m. (Beijing Standard Time)

Participants:

US Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Douglas Paal, NSC, Notetaker
Vivian Chang, Interpreter

PRC Qian Qichen, Foreign Minister
Liu Huaqiu, Vice Foreign Minister
Zhang Yijun, Director, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs
Ma Wenzheng, Director, Office of American Affairs
Zha Peixin, Deputy Director, Office of American Affairs
Ma Yunsung, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Qian: We are holding private talks mainly on bilateral relations. If you will agree, I will start.

General Scowcroft: I agree.

Foreign Minister Qian: First of all, Sino-U.S. relations are very important. Since June, there have been difficulties in bilateral relations. This setback is not in the interest of either side and has done damage to both of us. But I should say the leaders of our two countries have shown great concern about the status quo of the two countries. I can still recall vividly the visit you paid with Secretary Eagleburger at the beginning of July for private talks. And after that there have been several exchanges of letters between Comrade Deng Xiaoping and President Bush. All these letters testify to the determination of the two leaders to return Sino-U.S. relations to a normal course.

The Chinese leaders also praised the visits by former President Nixon and former Secretary Henry Kissinger. In meetings with Nixon and Kissinger, Deng Xiaoping set forth his views on solving


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these problems. American leaders have made a positive reaction to the proposals made by Deng Xiaoping. In a recent letter, President Bush said he would send you to discuss Sino-U.S. relations, international relations, the package solution and some clarifications of the package.

First, I want to provide some clarifications of the package. First, his main consideration is to proceed from the fundamental interests of the two countries, resolve the problems, and open up the future. Second, solutions of various problems must be brought about simultaneously or basically so. Third, should any disputes arise between the two countries, both sides should exercise restraint so as to find solutions.

So, in more specific terms, the package solution presented to Dr. Kissinger in early November includes the following four points: First, we can achieve a solution to the the Fang troubles under certain preconditions, then we can allow Fang Lizhi and his wife Li Shuxian to leave the country. Second, we should find the solution through appropriate channels. Third, both sides should make serious efforts to reach agreement on cooperative ventures in the near future. Fourth, the American side should extend an invitation for General Secretary Jiang Zemin to visit the U.S. at an appropriate time in the first half of next year. I believe this package fully testifies to the sincerity of the Chinese side to solve the problem.


On the second point, we have taken full account of the American reaction and the suggestions in the letter from President Bush. I would like to propose the folowing: on the question of Fang Lizhi and his wife Li Shuxian, we are ready to solve this problem with the American side, but it must be resolved simultaneously with lifting the sanctions.



Second, the American side should stop the sanctions declared in June, 1989. By Sanctions, we mean the five points declared by president Bush on June 5, and the two-point sanctions announced by the White House spokesman on June 20. It is up to the

American side to devise the specific ways and means of doing this. We will consider it favorably if the American side takes some actions and achieves a de facto lifting of the sanctions.

(b)(1)



The American side should know that we arrived at this solution after repeated study and that it was very difficult to reach this solution. The American side should know that if we let Fang Lizhi go abroad, this will arouse a strong reaction from the Chinese public and the government of the People's Republic of China will face strong pressure. We will have to undertake measures to deal with this strong reaction. If the American side does not take corresponding action, it will be impossible for the Chinese side to adopt this action. If we can decide on this, then we can move to a specific timetable.

If those ideas are realized, then: first, both sides should make joint efforts to realize massive joint ventures in the near future. Second, the American side should extend an invitation for General Secretary Jiang Zemin to pay a formal visitto the U.S. next year, that is, at a good time for U.S.-China relations. Both sides should do nothing harming the interests of the other side. We will never harm the interests of the U.S. side. We hope the U.S. side will not harm the interests of China. China and America should support each other. It is in the interest of peace and stability in this part of the world.

If it is possible, we hope to learn the U.S. reaction tomorrow in meetings with China's leaders. If there is not enough time, then we can receive your response at a later date. So, if the American side wants to continue discussions at a later date, I am prepared to pay a visit to the United States in January, 1989, around the time of the spring festival. That is all I want to say.

General Scowcroft: Thank you very much, Mr. Foreign Minister. We have heard your comments. it is fair to say we have a common objective. I am not prepared to give you a final answer now, but if you will allow I will present a few preliminary thoughts. It is important for you to understand the domestic situation in the U.S. and the fact that president Bush is not a free agent in these matters.

The steps he took in June to which you refer responded to a deeply felt need of the American people. Those steps were followed by specific legislation, for example the Pelosi Bill, which you know just passed the Congress. Pelosi passed the House by 403 - 0, and passed the Senate by a voice vote -- a unanimous vote. This means the legislation cannot be vetoed by President Bush except under the exceptional circumstances that existed last month. You objected to steps he took administratively in connection with his veto of Pelosi. Because the Congress adjourned shortly after (before), the President vetoed the bill. However, the Congress can reintroduce the legislation and take new actions, and the leader of the Senate has promised to do so in January.

The president's administrative action in connection with the Pelosi Bill was to try to strengthen his hand to veto that bill if it need be. In the present mood of Congress, should President Bush waive or de facto eliminate any of the sanctions of June 5 and 20, the likelihood is that they would immediately become legislation. The President will be bitterly attacked when it is announced that Secretary Eagleburger and I have come to Beijing.

What is needed in our judgment is steps by both sides that can help to reduce the emotion with which strong majorities view our relations at this time. Legislation already passed by the Congress embodies all or most of the sanctions the President already imposed. What I am describing is an American problem, a problem the President has demonstrated his interest in solving, an interest shown by sending Secretary Eagleburger and me to China. But while it is an American problem, the solution does not rest solely in American hands. Taking the actions which you requested would inflame reactions at the moment and bring about reactions we both do not wish.

The Fang Lizhi affair is important on the U.S. side principally because its resolution would be a signal to Congress that the situation between us is ameliorating and that a return to a better relationship is possible.

Were Fang Lizhi linked directly to sanctions, it could appear that the President had bought the release of Fang Lizhi by these actions. That would not produce the necessary change in attitude in Congress that we will need to solve this problem.

Some of the issues in the sanctions and some things in your list we can work on and accomplish. It would be very helpful to do things before January 23. But I fear none of these steps -- joint ventures, IFI loans -- would be possible with the structure you propose, at the beginning of this process.

It is my sense, at first looking at the proposal, that now the political climate must improve before we can move on most of these. Perhaps it would be wise if we take these back and look carefully and look carefully at them and make a counterproposal to your ambassador. What you present is a very difficult problem for us. We want to tell you very frankly what we can and cannot do.

Another alternative perhaps is to have Ambassador Lilley work with you at this end. Either way is probably satisfactory. I assure you the President is deeply interested in resolving this. The President now has very little influence in Congress on this issue. Passing legislation could make this situation worse, without a change in the climate in the Congress. Ambassaor Lilley has worked with this problem day and night.

Ambassador Lilley: I am also living with it day and night. (laughter) I would say I agree with General Scowcroft, one of the impressions I got when I was back home was the very strong reaction from friends in Congress and how limited the President is without changes in the climate.

I explained all this to Ambassador Zhu yesterday. But I can run through them briefly now to give a sense of what was discussed. I made the point to Zhu that it is very difficult to trade off anything materialistic for Fang. It would appear to be trading for hostages, which would bring enormous consequences. What I suggested to him was to break the issue into two parts. One part is reciprocal moves on each side -- end stopping our exchange programs, harassment of the Embassy, things done by the Chinese side to cause reactions. Most sensitive is Peace Pearl, we need a staged gradualism on these. Zhu said the important thing is the intention, not specific action. General Scowcroft is here on a high level visit. Already, because I want to move, I visited the World Bank. We have to coordinate with our allies. We need

something from the Chinese side. The World Bank and IFI's by our laws are linked to the domestic political situation. It requires laws to get away. This is something to think about as we move on the financial and commercial parts.

Finally, in terms of other considerations China has raised, some of the more realistic ones -- there is enthusiasm in my country in the energy sector. But we will have to do better than the Pingshuo project. It is important to have a good and enticing climate for business and investment. Only China can do that. I was pleased to see an American delegation talking to Ma Hong. they cannot come in in a negative investment climate, I think.

Second, we have lots of detailed negotiations to do with Fang Lizhi, and that can only be done here. Other cases that have been mentioned were solved here. It has to be done on the spot. For American domestic concerns, certain other practical things will have to be done in the U.S.

General Scowcroft: We will look at your proposal carefully tonight to see if some specific reponses can be given tomorrow morning. I fear it will be more difficult.

Minister Qian: I think I have made myself quite clear. If you answer tomorrow, that is alright. If later, that is alright. The proposal was made after serious consideration on our part, and after consideration of your proposals. This problem will take serious consideration, as shown up to now, and I expect you to reply after serious consideration.

So, it takes two sides to achieve a solution. You have difficulties on your side; we have some on our side. You should try to find a solution and we should. Both sides should make efforts. The package is not a deal, and we have some principles to abide by. As for treating Fang like a hostage, he is not a hostage taken by us, but one taken by you. I think this is not a good metaphor.

I propose you make serious consideration and then put forth your program which is coherent. Some issues, such as the Fulbright program and your embassy, with a settlement of this issue will be easier to solve than other problems. It takes courage and energy on your side, General Scowcroft, to come as the President's emissary, so I have taken this opportunity to brief you.

General Scowcroft: I appreciate that very much. We want to work with you. We very much share the view you have put forward to achieve a visit of General Secretary Jiang. I want to solve these problems within our democratic requirements.

30 1502GMT

NT ER174
S. PRESIDENT'S SENIOR ADVISERS TO VISIT JAPAN

O, DECEMBER 9 (XINHUA) -- A SPECIAL U.S. MISSION, LED BY
NT GEORGE BUSH'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BRENT
FT, WILL ARRIVE HERE SUNDAY TO BRIEF JAPANESE LEADERS ON
.-SOVIET SUMMIT IN MALTA, GOVERNMENT SOURCES SAID TODAY.
CROFT AND U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE LAWRENCE
RGER WILL TALK WITH SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS
EVENING AND WITH JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER TOSHIKI KAIFU
EIGN MINISTER TARO NAKAYAMA ON MONDAY.
CROFT AND EAGLEBERGER, WHO ARRVIED IN BEIJING TODAY
PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT, WILL ALSO REPORT ON THEIR MEETINGS
NIOR CHINESE OFFICIALS, THE SOURCES SAID. ENDITEM

30 1506GMT

(Translation)

Toast by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
at Dinner in Honour of
U.S. President's Personal Emissary

9 December 1989

General Scowcroft,
Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger,
Ambassador James Lilley,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It gives us great pleasure to have the opportunity of hosting this dinner to entertain General Scowcroft, U.S. President's Personal Emissary and National Security Adviser, Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and our other American friends. We wish to express our warm welcome to you, General Scowcroft, and your party on your visit to China.

General Scowcroft, you are an old friend very familiar to us all. Over the years, you have contributed a great deal to removing obstacle to Sino-U.S. relations and promoting their development by having visited China several times at the critical moments of the development of those relations. The fact that President Bush has sent you to China this time as his Personal Emissary to brief Chinese leaders on the recent U.S.-Soviet summit and to exchange views with them on issues of Sino-U.S. relations shows the importance he attaches to those relations, for which we would like to express our appreciation.

At present, the international situation is undergoing the most profound change in the post-war years. The prospects for such change and its influence on world peace and progress of mankind are a matter of concern to the people of all countries. I believe that, under these circumstances, China and the United States should frequently exchange views with each other. Undoubtedly, good Sino-U.S. relations are of great significance to world peace and stability.

Despite periods of trial, Sino-U.S. relations have all along been able to move forward, which fully testifies to their vitality. Important as our differences are, they cannot obliterate the major common interests between us. So long as our two sides make a concerted effort, we can certainly safeguard our common interests while maintaining our respective positions. In order to find ways to overcome the current difficulties, there should be increased contact and better communication between us. We in China believe that the current visit to China by General Scowcroft will certainly be helpful to promoting mutual understanding, overcoming difficulties and removing differences between us so that Sino-U.S. relations may return to normal and further develop at an early date.

Now, I propose a toast

to the health of General Scowcroft, Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger, Ambassador James Lilley and all the friends present here, and

to the resumption of normal Sino-U.S. relations and the development of these relations.

MIXED DOUBLE 18:30 (LOCAL TIME)
EDDY HARTONO/VERAWATY FAJRIN (INDONESIA) VS THOMAS LUND/PERNILLE DUPONT (DENMARK)

WOMEN'S SINGLES 19:15
HAN AIPING (CHINA) VS TANG JIUHONG (CHINA)

MEN'S SINGLES 20:00
XIONG GUOBO (CHINA) VS FOO KOK KEONG (MALAYSIA)

MEN'S DOUBLES 20:45
RAZIF SIDEK/JALANI SIDEK (MALAYSIA) VS LI YONGBO/TIAN BINGYI (CHINA)

WOMEN'S DOUBLES 21:30
NETTIE NIELSEN/DORTE KJAER (DENMARK) VS.ROSIANA TENDEAN/ERMA SULISTIANINGSIH (INDONESIA)
ENDITEM

10/12/89 0144GMT
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QL EEEE
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XNA02YCH ER021
U.S. RESEARCHERS TO PRODUCE POLLUTION CONTROL DEVICES

WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 9 (XINHUA) -- A NEW PROCESS FOR ANCHORING CATALYTIC MATERIALS ON SHEETS OF STAINLESS STEEL WILL ENABLE U.S. RESEARCHERS TO MANUFACTURE LIGHTER, MORE DURABLE FREE-BREATHING POLLUTION-CONTROL DEVICES.

ACCORDING TO JANUARY ISSUE 1990 OF POPULAR MECHANICS, STEEL WILL REPLACE CONVENTIONAL CERAMIC SUBSTRATES, WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO BREAKAGE AND LESS DURABLE. THE STEEL, WHICH IS HALF THE THICKNESS OF A SHEET OF PAPER, WILL PROVIDE MORE CATALYTIC SURFACE AREA AND PRODUCE MORE POWER-REDUCING BACK PRESSURE IN A CATALYTIC CONVERTER OF A GIVEN SIZE.

EARLIER PROBLEMS IN APPLYING CATALYSTS TO METAL ARE NO LONGER EXSIST WITH THE GROWTH OF MICROSCOPIC WHISKERS OF ALUMINUM CRYSTAL ON THE STEEL SHEETS. THE PROCESS INVOLVES ANNEALING THE METAL TO PRODUCE OXYGEN RESIDUE ON THE SURFACE AND SUBJECTING IT TO A HIGH-TEMPERATURE FIRING PROCESS TO CAUSE THE ALUMINUM IN THE STAINLESS ALLOY TO MIGRATE TOWARD THE OXYGEN AND FORM WHISKERS ON THE SURFACE.

THE PROCESS WILL INCREASE THE SURFACE AREA TWELVEFOLD.
ENDITEM CYF/TYX

10/12/89 0154GMT
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QX EEEE
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XNA7640A ER022
JIANG ZEMIN MEETS SPECIAL ENVOY OF U.S. PRESIDENT

BEIJING, DECEMBER 10 (XINHUA) -- JIANG ZEMIN, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, MET WITH BRENT SCOWCROFT, SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECRUITY AFFAIRS, AND HIS PARTY HERE THIS MORNING. ENDITEM
10/12/89 0159GMT
NNNN

INFORMAL MEDIA REACTION
SUNDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1989

The People's Daily, December 10, p. 1, reported the following news item: "Foreign Minister Qian Points Out During Meeting With President's Special Envoy Both China and the U.S. Should Strengthen Mutual Dialogue." The text is identical to the version published in Xinhua (see attached).

Other front page headlines in the People's Daily included:

"Tibet Constructs Several Key Projects,"
"County Trade Commission Election Opens,"
"Yao Yilin Meets with Hong Kong Visitors,"
"Problems of Feudalism within the Party,"
"State Education Commission Prepares Early Response to Proposals from Members of the National People's Congress,"
"On Inspection Tour in Hunan, Tian Ji Yun Emphasizes Stability of Village Cadres at the Grassroots Level,"
"Control Commission Bureau Engages First Batch of Specially Invited Control Commission Members,"
"Li Ximing and others Meet With Students in Beijing to Commemorate 12/9/54 Anniversary."

Note: Informal translations provided by Embassy officer.

ZCZC
QL EEF
.AA
XNA7632A EB158
CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER HOLDS TALKS WITH AND HOSTS BANQUET FOR SPECIAL ENVOY OF U.S. PRESIDENT

BEIJING, DECEMBER 9 (XINHUA) -- CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN AND BRENT SCOWCROFT, SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, HELD TALKS HERE TODAY.

DURING THEIR TWO-HOUR TALKS, SCOWCROFT INFORMED QIAN OF THE RECENT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT HELD IN MALTA.

QIAN THANKED SCOWCROFT FOR THE INFORMATION AND GAVE HIM AN ACCOUNT OF CHINA'S VIEWS ON CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

THE TWO SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED SINO-U.S. RELATIONS.

IN THE EVENING, QIAN HOSTED A BANQUET FOR SCOWCROFT AND HIS PARTY.

IN HIS TOAST, THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF HOSTING THE DINNER TO ENTERTAIN GENERAL SCOWCROFT, U.S. PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL EMISSARY AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER AND OTHER AMERICAN FRIENDS.

HE CALLED GENERAL SCOWCROFT +AN OLD FRIEND VERY FAMILIAR TO US ALL+, +OVER THE YEARS+, HE CONTINUED, +YOU HAVE CONTRIBUTED A GREAT DEAL TO REMOVING OBSTACLE TO SINO-U.S. RELATION AND PROMOTING THEIR DEVELOPMENT BY HAVING VISITED CHINA SEVERAL TIMES AT THE CRITICAL MOMENTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THOSE RELATIONS. THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAS SENT YOU TO CHINA THIS TIME AS HIS PERSONAL EMISSARY TO BRIEF CHINESE LEADERS ON THE RECENT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT AND TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH THEM ON ISSUES OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS SHOWS THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO THOSE RELATIONS, FOR WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION.+

AT PRESENT, THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS UNDERGOING THE MOST PROFOUND CHANGE IN THE POSR-WAR YEARS. THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCH CHANGE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON WORLD PEACE AND PROGRESS OF MANKIND ARE A MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE PEOPLE OF ALL COUNTRIES, HE SAID.

HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES SHOULD FREQUENTLY EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH EACH OTHER. UNDOURTEDLY, GOOD SINO-U.S. RELATIONS ARE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY.

DESPITE PERIODS OF TRIAL, HE SAID, SINO-U.S. RELATIONS HAVE ALL ALONG BEEN ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD, WHICH FULLY TESTIFIES TO THEIR VITALITY. +IMPORTANT AS OUR DIFFERENCES ARE, THEY CANNOT OBLITERATE THE MAJOR COMMON INTERESTS BETWEEN US+, HE SAID.

QIAN SAID THAT SO LONG AS THE TWO SIDES MAKE A CONCERTED EFFORT, THEY CAN CERTAINLY SAFEGUARD COMMON INTERESTS WHILE MAINTAINING THEIR RESPECTIVE POSTIONS. IN ORDER TO FIND WAYS TO OVERCOME THE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES, THERE SHOULD BE INCREASED CONTACT AND BETTER COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, HE SAID.

+WE IN CHINA BELIEVE THAT THE CURRENT VISIT TO CHINA BY GENERAL SCOWCROFT WILL CERTAINLY BE HELPFUL TO PROMOTING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, OVERCOMING DIFFICULTIES AND REMOVING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BOTH COUNTRIES SO THAT SINO-U.S. RELATIONS MAY RETURN TO NORMAL AND FURTHER DEVELOP AT AN EARLY DATE+, SAID THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT SAID IN HIS TOAST, +MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE COME HERE TODAY AS FRIENDS, TO RESUME OUR IMPORTANT DIALOGUE ON INTERNATIOPNAL QUESTIONS OF VITAL INTEREST TO BOTH OUR NATIONS.+

THIS DIALOGUE, HE SAID, HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE HISTORIC PEACE, STABILITY, AND PROSPERITY OF ASIA AND THE WORLD.

HE SAID HE WAS INSTRUCTED BY PRESIDENT BUSH TO COME TO AND INFORM CHINA ABOUT THE TALKS BETWEEN PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV IN MALTA LAST WEEKEND.

+WE ALSO COME TODAY,+ HE SAID, +TO BRING NEW IMPETUS AND VIGOR INTO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND SEEK NEW AREAS OF AGREEMENT -- ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND STRATEGIC. AND WE COME TO REDUCE THE NEGATIVE INFLUENCE OF IRRITANTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP.+

HE SAID IT IS PRESIDENT BUSH'S +STRONG DESIRE+ TO SEE THESE TALKS MAKE PROGRESS AND LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR SOLUTIONS.

+IN THESE MEETINGS,+ HE SAID, +WE SEEK TO OUTLINE BROAD AREAS WHERE AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE, AND TO ISOLATE FOR ANOTHER TIME THOSE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT. THE SOONER WE SET ABOUT THIS TASK, THE BETTER.+

HE SAID THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA HAVE ACCOMPLISHED MUCH WHEN THEY HAVE WORKED TOGETHER IN THE PAST.

+BOTH SIDES MUST PERSEVERE,+ HE SAID, +NOW MORE THAN EVER.+

AFTER THE BANQUET, QIAN AND SCOWCROFT HELD CLOSET TALKS ON SOME MAJOR ISSUES INTERESTED TO BOTH SIDES.

THE TALKS HELD BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES TODAY WERE DESCRIBED AS +HELPFUL+ AND +CONSTRUCTIVE.+

THE TALKS AND THE BANQUET PROCEEDED IN A +FRIENDLY, SINCERE AND FRANK+ ATMOSPHERE.

CHINESE VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER LIU HUAQIU AND U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE EAGLEBURGER WERE PRESENT AT THE TALKS. END ITEM
09/12/89 1423GMT
NNNN

(Translation)

Toast by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
at Dinner in Honour of
U.S. President's Personal Emissary

9 December 1989

General Scowcroft,
Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger,
Ambassador James Lilley,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It gives us great pleasure to have the opportunity of hosting this dinner to entertain General Scowcroft, U.S. President's Personal Emissary and National Security Adviser, Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and our other American friends. We wish to express our warm welcome to you, General Scowcroft, and your party on your visit to China.

General Scowcroft, you are an old friend very familiar to us all. Over the years, you have contributed a great deal to removing obstacle to Sino-U.S. relations and promoting their development by having visited China several times at the critical moments of the development of those relations. The fact that President Bush has sent you to China this time as his Personal Emissary to brief Chinese leaders on the recent U.S.-Soviet summit and to exchange views with them on issues of Sino-U.S. relations shows the importance he attaches to those relations, for which we would like to express our appreciation.

At present, the international situation is undergoing the most profound change in the post-war years. The prospects for such change and its influence on world peace and progress of mankind are a matter of concern to the people of all countries. I believe that, under these circumstances, China and the United States should frequently exchange views with each other. Undoubtedly, good Sino-U.S. relations are of great significance to world peace and stability.

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XNA7632A EB158
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09/12/89 1423GMT

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MIXED DOUBLE 18:30 (LOCAL TIME)
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10/12/89 0144GMT
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10/12/89 0159GMT
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U.S. PRESIDENT'S SENIOR ADVISERS TO VISIT JAPAN

KYO, DECEMBER 9 (XINHUA) -- A SPECIAL U.S. MISSION, LED BY
DENT GEORGE BUSH'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BRENT
ROFT, WILL ARRIVE HERE SUNDAY TO BRIEF JAPANESE LEADERS ON
.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT IN MALTA, GOVERNMENT SOURCES SAID TODAY.
OWCROFT AND U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE LAWRENCE
BERGER WILL TALK WITH SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS
Y EVENING AND WITH JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER TOSHIKI KAIFU
OREIGN MINISTER TARO NAKAYAMA ON MONDAY.
OWCROFT AND EAGLEBERGER, WHO ARRVIED IN BEIJING TODAY
UT PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT, WILL ALSO REPORT ON THEIR MEETINGS
SENIOR CHINESE OFFICIALS, THE SOURCES SAID. ENDITEM
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'89 1506GMT

DECEMBER 10, 1989
SUMMARY OF WESTERN PRESS ON
SCOWCROFT-EAGLEBURGER VISIT TO CHINA

FROM WASHINGTON

CNN -- "Pat Buchanan Show" with Robert Novak, Senator Malcolm Wallop, Mark Shields of the Washington Post, and others. In general discussion on Bush Administration policy towards Communist nations, China and Scowcroft-Eagleburger visit receive a great deal of criticism. Novak says it is Kissinger Associates returning to China. The wrong message is being sent to Gorbachev -- to wit, "you can break heads and the U.S. will still make nice to you."

UPI -- Lori Santos with headline, "Bush Decides to Seek Renewed Relations With China." Quotes Fitzwater as saying, "While he [the President] deplores the tragedy of Tiananmen Square last June, China nevertheless remains part of the world around us. The President has concluded that it is appropriate and in the long-term interests of the U.S. to inform the Chinese leadership of his discussions with the Soviet leader." An unnamed official is quoted as saying that the very act of dispatching the delegation demonstrates "how important we view maintaining relations" with China.

FROM BEIJING

AP -- Abrams quotes from Fitzwater's statement. Speculates that the two sides may have discussed Fang Lizhi.

UPI -- Schweisberg says the visit was kept secret even from many senior U.S. Embassy officials. Quotes from Scowcroft toast which he describes as "remarkable for its conciliatory tone." Describes Qian as "also extremely conciliatory but less effusive."

Reuters -- Dinmore describes Scowcroft as "extending a hand in friendship" and says his visit marks the end of a ban on high level contacts with China. Quotes from Scowcroft toast and Fitzwater statement.

FROM TOKYO

The early reading from our Embassy in Tokyo is that the visit is getting prominent coverage and is being described as "friendly."

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BUSH DECIDES TO SEEK RENEWED RELATIONS WITH CHINA

BY LORI SANTOS

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- PRESIDENT BUSH, IN DISPATCHING A HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION TO BEIJING, HAS DECIDED TO SPUR CHINA TO TAKE THE NEXT STEP IN RENEWING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAID SATURDAY.

ANNOUNCING BUSH'S CLOSELY HELD DECISION TO SEND THE DELEGATION TO CHINA, WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN MARLIN FITZWATER SAID THE PRESIDENT WAS TRYING TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES THAT WERE STRAINED BY THE CHINESE CRACKDOWN IN TIANAMEN SQUARE LAST JUNE.

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BRENT SCOWCROFT AND THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER, WENT TO CHINA THIS WEEKEND TO REPORT ON LAST WEEKEND'S SUPERPOWER SUMMIT MEETING IN MALTA.

"THE PRESIDENT VIEWS CHINA AS AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY IN WORLD AFFAIRS," FITZWATER SAID IN A STATEMENT RELEASED IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS. "WHILE HE DEPLORES THE TRAGEDY OF TIANAMEN SQUARE LAST JUNE, CHINA NEVERTHELESS REMAINS PART OF THE WORLD AROUND US.

"THE PRESIDENT HAS CONCLUDED THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE AND IN THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO INFORM THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET LEADER," FITZWATER SAID.

ANOTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL, SPEAKING ON THE GROUNDS HE NOT BE IDENTIFIED, SAID THAT BY EMBRACING CHINA BACK IN THE TRADITIONAL CIRCLE OF POST-SUMMIT CONSULTATIONS, BUSH WAS MAKING THE FIRST EFFORT TO RENEW RELATIONS BUT FELT IT WAS UP TO THE CHINESE TO TAKE THE NEXT STEP.

"WE CAN TAKE THAT FIRST STEP BUT IT'S REALLY UP TO THE CHINESE TO TAKE THE NEXT STEP TOWARD NORMALIZING RELATIONS," THE OFFICIAL SAID.

WITHOUT PRESENTING THE SPECIFICS THAT WERE TO BE DISCUSSED DURING THE DAYLONG TALKS WITH THE CHINESE LEADERS, THE OFFICIAL SAID THE JUNE MASSACRE REMAINED THE KEY OBSTACLE AND THAT CHINESE ASSURANCES THAT SUCH A CRACKDOWN ON DISSENT WOULD NOT HAPPEN AGAIN WOULD HAVE TO BE PART OF ANY RESUMPTION OF FRIENDLY TIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

THE VERY ACT OF DISPATCHING THE DELEGATION, THE OFFICIAL SAID, WAS MADE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE LEADERSHIP "HOW IMPORTANT WE VIEW MAINTAINING RELATIONS" WITH CHINA.

BUSH ALSO RECENTLY VETOED A LAW PASSED BY CONGRESS THAT WOULD HAVE KEPT IN PLACE SANCTIONS INVOKED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CHINESE CRACKDOWN ON STUDENTS CALLS FOR DEMOCRACY.

THE DELEGATION ALSO WILL TRAVEL TO JAPAN AFTER THE MEETINGS IN BEIJING, TO CONSULT WITH THE JAPANESE LEADERSHIP ON THE MALTA MEETINGS WITH SOVIET LEADER MIKHAIL GORBACHEV. THE GROUP IS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON ON MONDAY.

AFTER,THE TWO DAYS OF SHIPBOARD TALKS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, BUSH BRIEFED THE NATO ALLIES IN BRUSSELS BEFORE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON.

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-Summit-China-Japan;0499

Bush Rides Visit Beijing Despite Announced U.S. Ban on Contacts

By JIM ABRAMS

Associated Press Writer

BEIJING (AP) - Two of President Bush's top advisers arrived today for talks with Chinese leaders. They are the highest-ranking U.S. officials to visit since the military crushed the pro-democracy movement in June.

National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Laurence Eagleberger were to brief Chinese leaders on the U.S.-Soviet summit in Malta, said White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater in Washington.

''The two officials will continue the U.S. practice of keeping the Chinese leadership informed of major developments in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations,'' Fitzwater said in a statement issued early today.

The two arrived by special plane, the Foreign Ministry said. Scowcroft was scheduled to meet with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen later today.

The U.S. Embassy refused comment on the visit and how it reconciled with Bush's ban on high-level contacts imposed after the Chinese government's violent suppression of pro-democracy dissent.

Fitzwater said that while Bush, a former ambassador to China, ''deplores the tragedy of Tiananmen Square last June, China nevertheless remains part of the world around us. The president views China as an important country in world affairs.

''The president has concluded that it is appropriate and in the long-term interest of the United States to inform the Chinese leadership of his discussions with the Soviet leader,'' Fitzwater added.

There was speculation in Beijing that the two sides may discuss how to resolve the situation of astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, the pro-democracy dissident who has been hiding in the U.S. Embassy with his wife, Li Shuxian, since the June crackdown. The Chinese side has branded the couple as counterrevolutionaries and issued warrants for their arrest.

The Chinese government says 300 people, mostly soldiers, died during the violent suppression of pro-democracy demonstrators in Beijing on June 3-4. Witnesses and Western sources say hundreds or even thousands died, most of the victims unarmed civilians.

Following meetings in China, Scowcroft and Eagleberger will travel to Japan before returning to Washington on Monday, said Fitzwater.

Bush spokesman Bill Harlow said he wasn't sure when the president directed Scowcroft and Eagleberger to travel to the two countries.

Relations between Beijing and Washington have hit a low since the political turmoil of this spring, with China saying U.S. criticisms of its handling of demonstrators is interference in China's internal affairs.

In the past three years, our Foreign M-

IN THE PAST THREE WEEKS, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS LODGED THREE OFFICIAL PROTESTS WITH THE UNITED STATES OVER CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS TO EXPAND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CHINA AND ALLOW CHINESE STUDENTS TO EXTEND THEIR STAYS IN THE UNITED STATES.

CHINESE LEADERS, IN RECENT MEETINGS WITH FORMER PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER, HAVE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE STRAIN IN RELATIONS CAN BE RESOLVED.

HOWEVER, THE CHINESE HAVE INSISTED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS AT FAULT FOR THE FRICTION AND SAID WASHINGTON MUST TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN NORMALIZING RELATIONS.

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(BANQUET SPEECHES, MEETING WITH LEADERS)
HIGH-LEVEL U.S. DELEGATION IN BEIJING FOR SURPRISE VISIT
BY DAVID R. SCHWEISBERG

BEIJING (UPI) -- NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BRENT SCOWCROFT ON SATURDAY LED THE FIRST HIGH-LEVEL U.S. MISSION TO BEIJING SINCE THE CHINESE CRACKDOWN ON THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT AND SAID PRESIDENT BUSH HOPED THE TRIP WOULD "LAY THE GROUNDWORK" FOR RESTORING RELATIONS.

THE UNEXPECTED TRIP WAS A SURPRISE INITIATIVE BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION TO HALT A CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF TIES WITH CHINA. SCOWCROFT'S DELEGATION WILL MEET SUNDAY WITH TOP CHINESE OFFICIALS, INCLUDING SENIOR LEADER DENG XIAOPING.

•THE DELEGATION, INCLUDING DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER, ARRIVED IN BEIJING AT MID-AFTERNOON AND IMMEDIATELY MET WITH CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN, WHO LATER HOSTED A DINNER FOR THEM.

THE VISIT WAS KEPT SECRET EVEN FROM MANY SENIOR U.S. EMBASSY OFFICIALS AND ANNOUNCED BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ONLY AFTER THE DELEGATION LANDED AT THE BEIJING AIRPORT. SPOKESMEN SAID THE GROUP WILL LEAVE CHINA SUNDAY AFTERNOON.

SCOWCROFT AND EAGLEBURGER ARE THE FIRST SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS TO VISIT CHINA SINCE BUSH SUSPENDED HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS AND IMPOSED SANCTIONS AFTER THE CHINESE ARMY'S BLOODY ASSAULT ON PRO-DEMOCRACY DEMONSTRATORS IN BEIJING LAST JUNE 3-4.

HUNDREDS AND POSSIBLY THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE DIED IN THE ATTACK AND AN ENSUING CITYWIDE UPRISING FOLLOWING SIX WEEKS OF STUDENT-LED PROTESTS FOR GREATER FREEDOM THAT SWEPT THE COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT HAS SINCE ALSO WAGED AN INTENSE CRACKDOWN ON DISSENT.

IN A TOAST AT THE EVENING DINNER, SCOWCROFT INDICATED THE WHITE HOUSE EXPECTED THE VISIT TO "OUTLINE BROAD AREAS WHERE AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE AND TO ISOLATE FOR ANOTHER TIME THOSE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT."

"IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG DESIRE TO SEE THESE TALKS MAKE PROGRESS AND LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE SOLUTIONS WE SEEK," SCOWCROFT TOLD QIAN AND OTHER CHINESE OFFICIALS IN A SPEECH REMARKABLE FOR ITS CONCILIATORY TONE.

BUT SCOWCROFT NOTED "PROFOUND" DISAGREEMENTS, INCLUDING THE EVENTS LAST JUNE AROUND TIANANMEN SQUARE AND CHINA'S CRITICISM OF THE LIBERALIZATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND WARNED "WE ARE TRUE TO OUR OWN VALUES, OUR HERITAGE AND TRADITION."

QIAN WAS ALSO EXTREMELY CONCILIATORY BUT LESS EFFUSIVE, SAYING THE VISIT "WILL CERTAINLY BE HELPFUL" SO THAT RELATIONS "MAY RETURN TO NORMAL AND FURTHER DEVELOP AT AN EARLY DATE."

RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE THE CHILLIEST SINCE THEY WERE NORMALIZED IN 1979. BEIJING HAS BEEN ENRAGED BY THE U.S. HALT OF MILITARY SALES AND OTHER SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY BUSH AND BY ADDITIONAL MEASURES PASSED BY CONGRESS.

CHINESE PROPAGANDA HAS CAST THE UNITED STATES AS THE CHIEF VILLAIN ABROAD AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS JAMMED VOICE OF AMERICA BROADCASTS. MEETING WITH FORMER PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON LAST MONTH, DENG ACCUSED WASHINGTON OF HAVING WHIPPED UP THE SPRING PROTESTS.

AS LATE AS FRIDAY, CHINA ISSUED VEILED THREATS THAT A NEW U.S. POLICY MAKING IT EASIER FOR CHINESE STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES TO REMAIN THERE HAS ENDANGERED OVERALL ACADEMIC EXCHANGES. THE STUDENTS HAVE VOICED FEARS OF PERSECUTION IF THEY RETURN HOME.

BUSH HAS OPPOSED FURTHER SANCTIONS SINCE HE SUSPENDED MILITARY SALES AND IMPOSED THE HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT BAN, WHICH HAS BEEN BROKEN ONLY IN TWO MEETINGS BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER AND THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER, PURPORTEDLY TO DISCUSS CAMBODIA.

BUT A SWEEPING CHINESE GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN ON DISSENT IN WHICH AT LEAST 20 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN EXECUTED AND TENS OF THOUSANDS REPORTED ARRESTED HAS PROMPTED THE CONGRESS TO APPROVE ADDITIONAL MILITARY AND

BUT A SWEEPING CHINESE GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN ON DISSENT IN WHICH AT LEAST 20 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN EXECUTED AND TENS OF THOUSANDS REPORTED ARRESTED HAS PROMPTED THE CONGRESS TO APPROVE ADDITIONAL MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. FURTHER ENRAGING BEIJING.

WESTERN NATIONS HAVE SUSPENDED GOVERNMENT LENDING TO CHINA AND TOURISM AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT HAVE FALLEN OFF. CHINESE LEADERS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THE ACTIONS ARE HURTING THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY.

A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO BE RESOLVED IS THE U.S. EMBASSY REFUGE OF CHINA'S LEADING DISSIDENT, ASTROPHYSICIST FANG LIZHI, AND HIS WIFE, WHO HAVE BEEN SHELTERED IN THE COMPOUND SINCE JUNE. BOTH ARE NAMED IN ARREST WARRANTS BY CHINESE POLICE.

U.S. DIPLOMATS IN BEIJING HAVE ALSO COMPLAINED OF STEPPED-UP SECURITY AND HARASSMENT. CHINESE SECRET POLICE ARE MAINTAINING A 24-HOUR VIGIL OUTSIDE EMBASSY COMPOUNDS.

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BC-CHINA-AMERICAN (PICTURE)
HIGHEST LEVEL U.S. OFFICIALS VISIT CHINA SINCE JUNE KILLINGS
By Guy Dinmore

PEKING, Dec 9, Reuter - Two senior U.S. officials arrived unexpectedly in Peking on Saturday, offering reconciliation to China in the highest level talks between the two sides since Chinese troops crushed pro-democracy protests in June.

National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft extended a ''hand in friendship'' to Peking. His visit marked the end of a ban on high level contacts with China ordered by President George Bush.

Scowcroft was scheduled on Sunday to meet senior leader Deng Xiaoping, Communist Party head Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng.

A U.S. spokesman declined to comment on whether Scowcroft's visit was a breakthrough in restoring ties which have slumped to their lowest point since being established in 1979.

In June Bush condemned the use of violence to end the peaceful protests for democracy in Tiananmen Square and China's senior leader Deng Xiaoping later accused Washington of being deeply involved in the unrest which swept the country.

Scowcroft tackled this sensitive issue in a speech at a banquet hosted by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.

''Speaking as a friend I would not be honest if I did not acknowledge that we have profound areas of disagreement -- on the events of Tiananmen, on the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe. We see your complaints about us in the People's Daily.''

But the overall tone of his speech was conciliatory, urging China to join the United States in efforts to improve relations, an answer to Peking's repeated insistence that Washington make the initiative.

''My colleagues and I have come here today as friends to resume our important dialogue on international questions of vital interest to both our nations,'' Scowcroft said.

Bush had instructed the delegation to brief China on the the U.S.-Soviet summit held off Malta a week ago, he said.

''There is nothing between the United States and the Soviet Union that needs to be hidden from the government of China. The peace and stability of the world are enhanced by this dialogue.''

It was Bush's ''strong desire'' to see the Peking talks make progress and lay the groundwork for solutions, Scowcroft said.

''In both our societies there are voices of those who seek to redirect or frustrate our cooperation. We both must take bold measures to overcome these negative forces,'' he added.

''We extend our hand in friendship and hope you will do the same,'' Scowcroft said in his toast.

Scowcroft was accompanied by Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and other officials.

In Washington, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater justified the Peking mission.

''The president views China as an important country in world affairs. While he deplores the tragedy of Tiananmen Square last June, China, nevertheless, remains part of the world around us,'' he said.

''The president has concluded that it is appropriate and in the long-term interest of the United States to inform the Chinese leadership of his discussions with the Soviet leader.''

Qian expressed ''warm welcome'' to Scowcroft at their banquet.

''At present the international situation is undergoing the most

profound change in the post-war years,'' Qian said.

''Under these circumstances, China and the United States should frequently exchange views with each other. Undoubtedly good Sino-U.S. relations are of great significance to world peace and stability,'' Qian continued.

''Important as our differences are they cannot obliterate the major common interests between us,'' he said, speaking of the need for the two sides to make a ''concerted effort'' -- an apparent shift in China's previous hardline stance.

Qian concluded by toasting the resumption and development of normal Sino-U.S. relations.

Western diplomats said there still remained tough issues to be resolved -- limited economic sanctions still in force, a U.S. ban on military cooperation with China and Bush's decision to extend visas of overseas Chinese students fearing persecution.

A Chinese legislative committee described the U.S. sanctions recently as ''a disgusting performance of power politics.''

U.S. acting envoy in Peking, B. Lynn Pascoe, was summoned to the Foreign Ministry on Friday to receive what China called a strong protest over the student visa measures.

Relations have also been aggravated by the U.S. embassy's sheltering of China's most wanted dissident, Fang Lizhi.

Fang, an astrophysicist, is wanted by police on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes and has been given protection in the embassy since June. Police keep a constant vigil outside.

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JIANG ZEMIN MEETS SPECIAL ENVOY OF U.S. PRESIDENT

BEIJING, DECEMBER 10 (XINHUA) -- JIANG ZEMIN, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, MET WITH BRENT SCOWCROFT, SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECRUITY AFFAIRS, AND HIS PARTY HERE THIS MORNING. ENDITEM
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U.S. PRESIDENT'S SENIOR ADVISERS TO VISIT JAPAN

TOKYO, DECEMBER 9 (XINHUA) -- A SPECIAL U.S. MISSION, LED BY PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BRENT SCOWCROFT, WILL ARRIVE HERE SUNDAY TO BRIEF JAPANESE LEADERS ON THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT IN MALTA, GOVERNMENT SOURCES SAID TODAY.

SCOWCROFT AND U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE LAWRENCE EAGLEBERGER WILL TALK WITH SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS SUNDAY EVENING AND WITH JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER TOSHIKI KAIFU AND FOREIGN MINISTER TARO NAKAYAMA ON MONDAY.

SCOWCROFT AND EAGLEBERGER, WHO ARRVIED IN BEIJING TODAY WITHOUT PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT, WILL ALSO REPORT ON THEIR MEETINGS WITH SENIOR CHINESE OFFICIALS, THE SOURCES SAID. ENDITEM
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LI PENG MEETS SPECIAL ENVOY OF U.S. PRESIDENT

BEIJING, DECEMBER 10 (XINHUA) -- CHINESE PREMIER LI PENG WITH MET BRENT SCOWCROFT, SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECRUITY AFFAIRS, AND HIS PARTY HERE THIS MORNING. ENDITEM
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Meeting Between General Secretary Jiang Zemin et al

Sunday, December 10, 1989 - 9:45 a.m. - 10:47 a.m.

Beijing, China

Participants:

General Secretary Jiang: (Welcoming pleasantries.)

General Scowcroft: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much being here and having the opportunity to meet you and to exchange views. It is very nice to be here. I appreciate very much the opportunity to meet you. I bring you greetings and best wishes from President Bush. I must say on a personal note the first word I heard when you became General Secretary ~~premier~~ was from Mr. Trammel Crowe.

General Secretary Jiang: (in English) My good friend. Many years friendship. My good friend.

General Scowcroft: He called to say what a wonderful person you are and to say how good it is for US-China relations.

General Secretary Jiang: He is a strong supporter.

General Scowcroft: Let me say that President Bush has asked Secretary Eagleburger and me to come here in the spirit of the

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relationship which has developed between our two countries to share our perspectives on issues of major world significance. Over the years that has resulted in the development of a strategic relationship which the U. S. feels is of great value to us and to the interest of world stability. And it is in that spirit that President Bush asked Secretary Eagleburger and me to come to discuss with you a significant event in US-Soviet relations, that is the meeting in Malta.

The President also wanted to take this step to underscore his strong personal interest in putting our relationship back on a positive track away from the negativism of recent months. In doing this and in his recent action of vetoing the Pelosi Bill, he has undertaken some considerable political risks to himself. The initial reports in the United States of the announcement of our trip here has aroused strong negative press comments in some circles. I cite this simply to explain that the President definitely does want to move forward on our relationship but there are significant impediments in the United States.

The Foreign Minister last night, for example, presented a thoughtful package of alternatives on which we might be able to proceed. We have some problems with that formulation, not with the objectives, with which we concur, but with the approach. We can go back and review it and respond in due course. Certainly

there is a strong desire on the part of the United States to move forward but we do have domestic difficulties, strong political costs.

If I could just explain briefly why President Bush felt the need to meet with Chairman Gorbachev, something of the meeting and of the situation in which we feel the world finds itself at the moment.

His original notion of the timing for a US-Soviet Summit was after the completion of the various negotiations we have underway on different aspects of arms control and different elements in our bilateral relationship. After his visit to Poland and Hungary last summer, however, he came to the conclusion that there were very fundamental, very important and accelerating movements taking place in that area and that it was important to discuss those trends and developments in Eastern Europe at the point of convergence of US and Soviet forces.

The meeting was designed not to negotiate specific issues, not to come to agreements, or issue communiques, but simply to exchange views on developments taking place in the world and on the possible consequences of those movements in order that there not be misunderstandings between the two leaders. At the meeting the two agreed to try to accelerate negotiations on arms control but

the focus of the meeting really was on developments in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union, and the discussion we had on certain regional issues. That discussion was briefer than anticipated because the weather did not cooperate and we had to cancel one meeting and dinner between the two sides.

Chairman Gorbachev seemed to us to be fully aware of the enormous problems he faced in his attempt to restructure the Soviet economy. He was, however, full of self-confidence in what he was about, but to us he seemed to have perhaps only superficial understanding of some of the economic aspects of the efforts he was making to introduce market economics into the Soviet system.

With respect to Eastern Europe, Chairman Gorbachev seemed not only to be approving of developments there but indeed took some credit for what was happening in Eastern Europe. He made it quite clear that he had no intention of intervening ~~(interfering)~~ in the developments in Eastern Europe although he evidenced some disquiet at the possible pace of developments which could introduce instabilities.

With respect to the issue of German reunification, he softened somewhat the formulation which the Soviet Union had been using; that is that there were two Germanies and that was the way it had to remain. He presented to President Bush a more ambiguous

formulation, that is that history had given us the two Germanies as the result of the aftermath of World War II and that since we had inherited that situation from history, we should let history solve it and the pace of developments should not be influenced by the outside. He remained obviously reluctant about the possibility of German reunification but did not pose an absolute prohibition on it.

For his part, President Bush pointed out that the United States had since the 50's supported eventual German reunification and we would not oppose such an event.

With respect to the discussion of regional issues, there was a very strong exchange about the situation in Central America in which President Bush objected strongly to the role of Nicaragua in supporting the rebels in El Salvador and of Cuba in providing military support to Nicaraguan-armed forces, which were far larger than any in that region and far larger than any legitimate national defense needs would require.

Chairman Gorbachev indicated that during his visit to Cuba last spring he had suggested that Castro should begin to emulate the countries of Eastern Europe and modernize his system, but he said that in line with Soviet policy not to interfere in the internal developments and in the right of each country to make its own

choice and to change its mind if it wished, that he was not going to interfere with Mr. Castro.

President Bush did not find the discussion of Central America to be satisfactory. The other major regional issue discussed was Afghanistan which was raised by Chairman Gorbachev. He stated that the two sides should stop arguing about the past and deal with the current situation which he described as one in which the Najibullah and Kabul regime was getting stronger and the Mudeheden were in disarray and were already beginning talks with the Najibullah regime. President Bush disagreed with the appraisal and the two leaders then turned to the discussion of possible ways to get discussions going. The position of Najibullah still remains a major impediment to getting those talks going. Chairman Gorbachev would propose the notion of a ceasefire in Afghanistan and a cessation of military supplies to both sides. I believe it is fair to say that there was no progress made in discussions about Afghanistan.

Time prevented a discussion of any other of the major regional issues -- in Asia, for example. There was a brief discussion of the Middle East focussing on the situation in Lebanon and the new Government and which both agreed they would support.

Our appraisal of the meeting and of the situation at the present

time is that Chairman Gorbachev is facing very serious troubles at home, troubles which he perhaps does not fully understand how to deal with; that he has largely given up on Eastern Europe and is prepared to let it go with the possible exception of development of serious instability potentially with East Germany or Czechoslovakia.

There seems no doubt that the world is in a rapid state of flux at the present time. The Soviet Union has reduced its conventional forces and in part its spending on military forces. It, however, has shown little if any diminution in spending on its strategic and nuclear forces. The changes in conventional forces to in fact reduce the threat around the Soviet border of a surprise massive conventional attack across those borders and the situation in Eastern Europe with the certain instability(?) of the forces of those countries does significantly change the character of the trend of the Warsaw Pact to NATO defenses.

I believe it is premature, however, to come to any final historical conclusions that the ambitions of the Soviet Union -- either those ambitions coming out of a Stalinist drive for expansion after World War II or the fundamental Russian impulse toward expansion -- have been significantly lessened or eliminated.

Chairman Gorbachev pointed out that the world was becoming a multi-polar one with a rapidly unifying Europe, a strengthening Japan, China and potentially India as great powers of the world. He suggested the necessity of a US-Soviet cooperative approach to this new multi-polar world while disclaiming any notion of a US-Soviet condominium.

While the United States has no particular interest in such an approach, there is no question that the world is changing rapidly, that a different coalition of forces and powers ~~are~~ is possible. In these circumstances a strategic relationship has developed over the years between the United States and China, who have no points of direct conflict with each other in strategic matters. While that relationship may alter somewhat with respect to the Soviet Union in the future, depending on how the situation develops, in the United States' view, it is as important now or perhaps more so to deal with this uncertain world of today. In the areas where the United States and China have cooperated closely, such as Afghanistan and Cambodia, the results have been very positive, both for the two countries and for the world as a whole. And the United States looks forward to resolving the current problems between us in order that we can continue and accelerate such a relationship.

General Secretary Jiang: Thank you very much, General Scowcroft,

for your detailed account. Because time is so short today I will just briefly touch on several issues. I can fully understand that the fact that President Bush has sent Your Excellency to China and also that some of his previous measures are aimed at improving the current Sino relations. I can also understand another point that struck me -- that President Bush was now in a rather difficult position. I don't say that I have a full grasp of the relationship between Congressional activities and power of the Presidency but I think, with my background, I have some understanding of this because I began to receive an American and British style education when I was a young student.

First of all I want to say that both sides are now proceeding in their own interests, as was the case when President Nixon came here on his first visit to reestablish Sino-US relations. I am especially aware of the fact that you came here with the advance team in 1972 and together with President Nixon. Events have come a long way since 1972 and at that time our leader ~~Chou En Lai~~ Zhou Enlai was still alive and he had a very important principle: to find common interest -- or a Chinese saying that we should find the common ground while reserving minor differences.

Just now you have briefed me on your views of international developments and also on the Malta meeting between President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev and the analyses that the two made during

the meeting. This reminds me of some remarks which are quite common -- a story ~~of~~ three kingdoms that under the sun everything will become united after a long time of separation and after a long time of unity they will certainly be separated. I am not saying this is so but that the world situation is in constant flux. I think both China and the United States are committed to peace in the world and I think we can both agree on two major themes: peace and development.

The second point is that in the Asia-Pacific region our two countries share several common points. In terms of economic development in the future, this Asia-Pacific area will develop very rapidly in the years to come. So we share a common interest.

The third point is China is a country with 1.1 billion people, therefore come what may China will develop more trade potential and this will provide us for a number of opportunities in the future market. Ever since 1972 when China and the United States issued the Joint Shanghai Communique, I can't say there have been no differences between us. Actually Taiwan was the major difference. And in regard to Taiwan, our position has always been a clear one. That is a principle of one country, two systems. so I think in general terms the tendency is increasing, even in peoples coming to the mainland to visit their brothers,

and now many visit here. One country, two systems has always been our consistent principle. At a recent press conference ~~(?)~~ ~~we were~~ a reporter asked if China would abandon use of force against Taiwan. We said we couldn't make such a commitment. Naturally we hope for a peaceful ~~conclusion/solution~~ resolution, with Taiwan returning to the motherland. Some of my classmates are now working in Taiwan in some rather high posts. Secondly, there is a question of ideology. Your being a capitalist country and our being a socialist country, but I don't think this should constitute an obstacle because we have always stood for the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Ideological differences should not lead to any obstacles to our relations. When Mr. Nixon came last time he said that he found it quite different to understand how China can (~~DOUG, WE NEED YOUR HELP HERE~~>) promote reform and oppose bourgeois liberalism. We will stick to reform, but by bourgeois liberalism, we mean that there are some difficulties. We welcome Western investment, but oppose some influences, such as prostitution, gambling, pornography, etc. Concerning the developments in Eastern Europe, I want to make several points especially clear. By comparing China with Eastern Europe you can find several differences. The first is our party has been developing and growing in all kinds of struggles since the May 4th Movement in 1919 (~~?~~). Second, our Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has been developing under the leadership of the Communist Party of China through all kinds of struggles, including the anti-Japan war. Third, the Chinese people liberated themselves by themselves. Fourth, difference is because of geographic location and the historical background and tradition of China -- because it tends

We oppose bourgeois liberalization, but are willing to learn and acquire advanced technologies and know-how from your country.

to ~~repeat~~. resist foreign aggression.

In February of this year, when President Bush came to China, Deng told him about ~~a gesture~~ aggression made by Russia against China. Also there is the 8-year anti-Japanese war which left a very permanent impression on the Chinese mind. also the Chinese people want to maintain friendly relations with the Japanese people but an 8-year war still remains vivid on their minds and cannot be so easily wiped ~~out of~~ from the minds of the people. So I think after I have explained the above points I believe that our two sides can find many common interests in the current turbulent situation. I think we should adopt a forward-looking approach with a sincere desire to work for common interests. Our efforts to improve bilateral relations will be successful.

Give my best regards to President Bush and Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger.

General Scowcroft: I certainly will. Both President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger spoke very highly of their visit here. President Bush invited both of them to the White House immediately upon their return to have discussions on their meetings.

General Secretary Jiang: Time is limited. We had a long time to talk with Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger. I hope next time we can

have a longer time to talk.

General Scowcroft: Thank you very, very much. I enjoyed meeting you.

~~9:45~~ 9:

Sunday, December 10, 1989 - ~~10:45~~ 10:45

GENERAL SECRETARY JIANG ZEMIN

Jiang: Welcoming pleasantries.

Scowcroft: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much being hereand having the opportunity to meet you and to excnange views. It is very nice to be here. I appreciate very much the opportunity to meet you. I bring you greetings and best wishes from PRESIDENT BUSH. I must say on a personal note the first world I heard when you became premier was from Mr. Trammel Crowe.

Jiang: My good friend.

Scowcroft: He called to say what a wonderful person you are and to say how good it is for US-China relations.

Jiang: He is a strong supporter.

Scowcroft: Let me say that President Busn has asked Secretary Eagleburger and I to come here in the spirit of the relationship which has developed between our two countries to share our perspectives on issues of major world significance. Over the years that has resulted in the development of strategic relationship which the US feels is of great value to us and to the interest of world STABILITY. And it is in that spirit that President Bush asked Secretary Eagleburger and I to come to discuss with you a significant event in US-Soviet relations, that is the meeting at Malta. The President also wanted to take this step to underscore his strong personal interest in putting our relationship back on a postive track away from the negativism of recent months. In doing this and in his recent action of vetoing the Pelosi Bill, he has undertaken some considerable political risks to himself. The initial reports in the US of the announcement of our trip here has aroused strong negative press comment in some circles. I cite this simply to explain that the

President definitely does want to move forward on our relationship but there are significant impediments in the United States. The Foreign Minister last night, for example, presented a thoughtful package of alternatives on which we might be able to proceed. We have some problems with that formulation not with the objective, [illegible] with which we concur, but with the approach. We can go back and review it and respond in due course. Certainly there is a strong desire on thepart of the United States to move forward but we do have [illegible] domestic difficulties, strong political costs. If I could just explain briefly why President Bush felt the need to meet with Chairman Gorbachev, something of the meeting and of the situation in which we feel the world finds itself at the moment. His original notion of the timing for a US-Soviet Summit was after the completion of the various negotiatons we have underway on different aspects of arms control and different elements in our bilateral relationship. After his visit to Poland and Hungary last summer, however, he came to the conclusion that there were very fundamental, very important and accelerating movements taking place in that area and that it was important to discuss those trends and developments in Eastern Europe at the point of convergence of US and Soviet forces. The meeting was designed not to negotiate specific issues, not to come to agreements, or issue Communiques, but simply to exchange views on developments taking place in the world and on the possible consequences of those movements in order that there be musunderstandings between the two leaders. At the meeting the two agreed to try to accelerate negotiations on arms control but the focus of the meeting really was on developments in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union, and the discussion we had on certain regional issues.

That discussion was briefer than anticipated because the weather did not cooperate and we had to cancel one meeting and dinner between thw two sides. Chairman Gorbachev seemed to us to be fully aware of the enormous problems he faced in his attempt to restructure the Soviet economy. He was, however, full of self-confidence in what he was about but to us he seemed to have perhaps only superficial understanding of some of the economic aspects of the efforts he was making to introduce market economics in to the Soviet system. With respect to Eastern Europe Chairman Gorbachev seemed not only to be approving of developments there but indeed took some credit for what was happening in Eastern Europe. He made it quite clear that he had no intention of intervening/interferring in the developments in Eastern Europe although he evidences some disquiet at the possible pace of developments which could introduce instabilities. WITH RESPECT TO the issue of German reunification he softened somewhat the formulation which the Soviet Union had been using; that is that there wre two Germanies and that was the way it had to remain. He presented to President Bush a more ambiguous formulation, that is that history had given us the two Germanies as the result of the aftermath of World War II and that since we had inherited that situation from history, we should let history solve it and the pace of developments should not be influenced by the outside. He remained obviously reluctant about the possibility of German reunification but did not pose an absolute prohibition on it. For his part, President Bush ~~wanted to know~~ pointed out that the United States had since the 50's supported eventual German reunification and we would not oppose such an event. With respect to the discussion of regional issues, there was a very strong exchange about the situation in Central American in which President Bush objected strongly to the role of Nicaragua in supporting the rebels in El Salvador and of Cuba in providing military support to Nicaraguan-armed forces

which were far larger than any in that region and far larger than any legitimate national defense needs would require. Chairman Gorbachev indicated that during his visit to Cuba last spring he had suggested that Castro should begin to emulate the countries of Eastern EUROPE AND MODERNIZE HIS SYSTEM, BUT HE SAID THAT in line with Soviet policy not to interfere in the internal developments and in the right of each country to make its own choice and to change it's mind if it wished, that he was not going to interfer with Mr. Castro. President Bush did not find the discussion of Central America to be satisfactory. The other major regional issues discussed was Afghanistan which was raised by Chairman Gorbachev. He stated that the two sides should stop arguing about the past and deal with the current situation which he described as one in which Najibullah and Kabul regime was getting stronger and the Mujehedin were in disarray and were already beginning talks with the Najibullah regime. The President disagreed with that appraisal and the two leaders then turned to the discussion of possible ways to get discussions going. The position of Najibullah still remains a major impediment to getting those talks going. Chairman Gorbachev would pro pose the notion of a ceasefire in Afghanistan and a cessation of military supplies to both sides. I believe it is far to say that there was no progress made in discussions about afghanistan. Time prevented a discussion of any other of the major regional issues,in Asia for example. There was a brief discussion of the Middle East focussing on the situation in Lebanon.and the new Government and which both agreed they would support. Our appraisal of the meeting and of the situation at the present time is that Chairman Gorbachev is facing very serious troubles at home, troubles which he perhaps does not fully understand how to deal with. That he has largely given up on Eastern Europe and is prepared to let it go wit the possible exception of development of serious instability [illegible] potentially with either East Germany or Czechoslovakia.

There seems no doubt that the world is in a rapid state of fluex at the present time. The Soviet Union has reduced its conventional forces and in part its spending military forces. It however has shown little if any diminunition in spending on its strategic and nuclear forces. The changes in conventional forces do in fact reduce the threat around the Soviet border of a surprise massive conventional attack across those borders and the situation in Eastern Europe with the certain un_____ability of the forces of those countries does significantly change the character of the trend of the Warsaw Pact to NATO defenses. I believe it is premature, however, to come to any final historical conclusions that the ambitions of the Soviet Union -- either those ambitions coming out of Stalinist drive for expansion after World War II or the fundamental Russian impulse toward expansion -- have been significantly lessened or eliminated. Chairman Gorbachev pointed out that the world was becoming a multi-polar one with a rapidly unifying Europe, a strengthening Japan, China and potentially India as great powers of the world. He suggested the necessity of a US-Soviet cooperative approach to this new multi-polar world while disclaiming any notion of a US-Soviet condominium. While the US has no particular interest in such an approach, there is no question that the world is changing rapidly, that different coalition of forces and powers are possible. In these circumstances the strategic relationship which has developed over the years between the US and China, who have no points of direct conflict with each other in ~~the~~ strategic matters. While that relationship may alter somewhat with respect to the Soviet Union in the future, depending on how the situation develops, in the United States view it is as important or pernaps more so to deal with this uncertain world of today. In the areas where the United States and China have cooperated closely, such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, the results have been very positive, both for the two countries and for the world as a whole. And the US looks forward to

resolving the current problems between us in order that we can continue and accelerate such a relationship.

Jiang - Thank you very much General Scowcroft for your detailed account. Because time is so short today I will just briefly touch on several issues. I can fully understand that the fact that President Bush has sent your excellency to China and also some of his previous measures are aimed at improving the current Sino relations. I can also understand another point that struck me that President Bush was now in a rather difficult position. I don't say that I have full grasp of the relationship between Congressional activities and power of the PRESIDENT but I think with my background I have some understanding of this/ because I began to receive American/British/education style when I was a young student. First of all I want to say that both ~~students. Both~~ sides are now proceeding in their own interests, as was the case when President Nixon came here on his first visit to reestablish Sino relations. I am especially aware of the fact that you came here with the advance team in 1972 and together with President Nixon. Events have come a long way since 1972 and at that time our leader Chou en lai was still alive and he had a very important principle to find common interest or a Chinese saying we should find the common ground while reserving minor differences. Just know you have briefed me on your views of international developments and also on the Malta meeting between Prsident Bush and Chairman Gorbachev and the analyses that the two made during the meeting. This reminds me of some remarks which are quite common -- a story of three kingdoms that under the sun everything will become united after a long time of separation and after a long time of unity they will certainly be separated. I am not saying this is so but that the world situation is in constant/kind of flux. I think both China and the United States are committed to peace in the world and I think we can both agree on two major themes, peace and development

The second point is that in the Asia-Pacific region our two countries share several common points. In terms of economic development in the future this Asia-Pacific area will develop very rapidily in the years to come. So we share a common interest. The third point is China is a country with 1.1 billion people therefore come what may China will develop more trade potential and this will provide us for a number of opportunities in the future market. Ever since 1972 when China and the US issued the joint Shanghai Communique I can't say there have been no differences between us. Actually Taiwan was the major difference. And in regard to Taiwan, our position has always been a clear one. That is a principle of one country, two systems. So I think in general terms the tendency is increasing, even in peoples coming to the mainland to visit their brothers, and now many visit there. One country, two systems has always been our consistent principle. At a recent press??? conference??? asked if China would abandon use of force against Taiwan said we couldn't make such a commitment. Naturally we hope for a peaceful conclusion/solution with Taiwan returning to the motherland. Some of
]
my classmates are now working in Taiwan in some rather high posts.
Secondly, there is a question of ideology.
Your being a capitalist country and our being a socialist country but I don't think this should constitute an obstacles because we have always stood for the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Ideological differences should not lead to any obstacles to our relations. When Mr. Nixon came last time he said that he found it quite difficult to understand how China can (something missing)

Concerning the developments in Eastern Euopre I want to make several points especially clear by comparing China with Eastern Europe you can find several differences. The first is our party has been developing and growing in all kinds of struggles since May 4 1919. Second our Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has been developing under the leadership of the Communist Party of China through all kinds of struggles/trouble including anti-Japan war. Third, the Chinese people liberated themselves by themselves. Fourth, difference is because of geographic location and the histroical background and tradition of China Because it tends to repeat?? In February of this year, when President Bush came to China, Deng told his about xxxxxxx gesture made by Russia against china. Also there is the 8-year anti-Japanese war xxxxxx

1830 - Aircraft arrival at Yokota Air Base

1845 - Helicopter arrival at Hardy Barracks

1900 - Arrive at Okura Hotel (baggage will be delivered by road, approximate arrival time 2030)

- Departure from hotel TBD

2030 - Dinner hosted by Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama, location TBD
U.S. participants: General Scowcroft, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, Ambassador Armacost, Mr. Untermeyer, Mr Paal
Japanese participants: Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama, Deputy Foreign Minister Owada, North American Affairs Bureau Director General Arima, EUR DG Togo, Asia DG Tanino, notetaker

- Return to hotel, RON

December 11

0845 - Baggage pick-up at hotel

0850 - Depart hotel

0900 - Call on Prime Minister Kaifu at Prime Minister's office
Participants: General Scowcroft, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, Ambassador Armacost, Embassy notetaker

0955 - Depart

1000 - Call on Foreign Minister Nakayama at Foreign Ministry
Participants: General Scowcroft, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, Ambassador Armacost, Embassy notetaker

1145 - Depart hotel

1210 - Helicopter departs Hardy Barracks

1230 - Aircraft depart from Yokota Air Base

Ambassador's Limo

General Scowcroft

Ambassador Armacost

Limo II

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger

Mr. Untermeyer

Ms. Leatherman

DCM Sedan

Mr. Paal

Ms. Gantt

DCM Breer

Sedan II

Mr. Brown

Mr. Frank

Poloff Price

Friday, December 8, 1989

2:15 AM Dep Andrews (7 Hrs 30 Min -4 Hrs)

5:45 AM Ar Elmendorf (2 hours refuel)

7:45 AM Dep Elmendorf (7 Hrs 50 Min +18 Hrs)

Saturday, December 9, 1989

9:30 AM Ar Yokota (2 Hrs refuel)

11:30 AM Dep Yokota (4 Hrs 30 Min -1 Hr)

3:00 PM Ar Beijing (Crew must have 15 hours rest)

Evening Meeting in Beijing - Saturday

Sunday, December 10, 1989

Late Morning or Noon Meeting in Beijing - Sunday

3:00 PM Dep Beijing (3 Hrs 25 Min +1 Hr)

7:30 PM Ar Yokota - Helo to downtown Tokyo (15 minutes)

Evening Meeting in Tokyo w/Dep 1ForMin Owada & Mr. Kuriyama

Monday, December 11, 1989

9:00 AM Meeting w/Prime Minister

10:00 AM Meeting w/Foreign Minister

Helo to Yokota

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Schedule	Re: Appointment Schedule/Brent Scowcroft [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (7 pp.)	2/5/90	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [3]

Date Closed:	5/7/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91136-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 02/05/90

November

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

December

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

January

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

Friday 12/08/89

1:30AM		Dep Residence f/Andrews AFB
2:15AM		Dep Andrews AFB (7 hrs 30 mins, -4 hrs)
5:45AM		Arr Elmendorf AFB (2 hrs refuel)
7:45AM		Dep Elmendorf AFB (7 hrs 50 mins, +18 hrs)
11:45AM		(P/Arrive Camp David)

Saturday 12/09/89

9:30AM		Arr Yakota AB, Japan (2 hrs refuel)
11:30AM		Dep Yakota AB, Japan (4 hrs 30 mins, -1 hr)
3:00PM		Arr Beijing, China
		EVENING MEETING IN BEIJING - SATURDAY
NOTES:		P/CD

Sunday 12/10/89

		LATE MORNING OR NOON MEETING IN BEIJING - SUNDAY
3:00PM		Dep Beijing, China (3 hrs 25 mins, +1 hr)
7:30PM		Arr Yakota AB, Japan
		Helo to downtown Tokyo (15 mins)
		EVENING MEETING IN TOKYO W/DEP FORMIN OWADA & MR. KURIYAMA

Monday 12/11/89

9:00AM		MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
10:00AM		MEETING W/FOREIGN MINISTER
		Helo to Yokota AB
12:30PM		Dep Yokota AB (6 hrs 25 mins, -18 hrs)
1:00PM		Arr Elmendorf AFB (2 hrs refuel)
3:00PM		Dep Elmendorf (6 hrs 30 mins, +4 hrs)
		1:30 pm - Arr Andrews AFB
		2:00 pm - Arr White House
		2:30-4:00 pm - P/Budget Review (NASA/Energy/Science) - Oval
5:00PM	5:30PM	Senior Staff Meeting - Sit Rm ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
8:00PM		P/BLK TIE Cong'l Ball - State Floor
NOTES:		(Baker OOT)

Tuesday 12/12/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer - [redacted] C
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - [redacted] C - Oval

Bush Library Photocopy

Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 02/05/90

Tuesday 12/12/89 (continued)

8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
9:45AM	10:45AM	P/Cheney-Powell-Jt Chiefs Mtg on Post-Malta - Oval
11:00AM	NOON	P/Budget Review - Oval
1:15PM	1:45PM	(P/Mtg w/Core Business Group Ldrship - Roos Rm)
2:00PM	3:30PM	P/Budget Review - Oval
3:30PM		Photo-Op w/Shirin Tahir-Kheli (338-2761) + 4 others Jeff x4974) ORDER PHOTOG
4:00PM		Interview - John Newhouse re Baker Profile (Popadiuk)
~~4:15PM~~	~~5:15PM~~	~~P/NSC Mtg re L - Cabinet Room (per Welch) (TUES OR WED ?)~~
6:30PM		(P/Christmas Reception - St Floor)
8:30PM		(P/American Cardinals' Dinner - Nat'l Bldg Museum)
NOTES:		(Baker OOT)

move to Tues 12/13 @ 3PM

Wednesday 12/13/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:05AM	7:15AM	PDB Briefer - Hank Appelbaum
7:15AM	8:00AM	B-S-C Bkfst - Here (CONFIRM/ORDER SET UP - BAKER OOT)
7:30AM	8:00AM	(WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room - RG TO HANDLE)
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - [redacted] C - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
10:00AM	10:10AM	P/Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan - Oval
10:15AM	10:30AM	Jack Stein (516-938-6012) GET DOB
10:45AM	11:45AM	P/Budget Review - Oval
2:00PM	3:00PM	P/Budget Review - Oval
4:00PM		Mtg w/Council of Presidents of National Arab-American Organizations (Welch)
6:30PM		(P/Christmas Reception - St Floor)
NOTES:		Secy Baker Out of Town
NOTES:		(Baker OOT)

3:00 - NSC Mtg (L) -

Thursday 12/14/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer - [redacted] C
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - [redacted] C - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
10:20AM	10:30AM	P/Pre-briefing f/Wire Services Intv - Oval
10:30AM	10:50AM	(P/Wire Services Interview - Oval)
11:00AM	NOON	P/Budget Review - Oval
1:30PM	2:00PM	P/Mtg w/Core Conservative Group Ldrship - Roos Rm
2:15PM	3:15PM	(P/Domestic Policy Council Mtg - Cabinet Rm)
3:30PM		Professor Richard Gardner [redacted] C 7-9-27
4:00PM	4:20PM	Press Interviews (Popadiuk)
4:30PM		Steve Ledogar, US Amb to Conf on Disarmament, w/Kanter & Mahley
5:00PM	6:00PM	DCI and DDCI Meeting
5:15PM		(P/Tree Lighting Ceremony - Ellipse)
6:30PM		(P/Christmas Reception - State Floor)
NOTES:		(Baker OOT)

Bush Library Photocopy

Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 02/05/90

Friday 12/15/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer - [redacted] C
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - [redacted] C - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
10:00AM	11:00AM	P/Budget Review - Oval
1:30PM	2:00PM	P/Sec Baker - Oval
3:00PM	6:00PM	Host NSC Christmas Party - Indian Treaty Room (Whitley)
6:10PM	10:30PM	P/TO NEW YORK & RTN TO WH
NOTES:		(Baker OOT)

Saturday 12/16/89

6:20AM	6:30PM	P/Marine One depart WH f/Andrews AFB
6:35AM	11:35AM	P/Air Force One depart Andrews AFB f/St Martin
11:40AM		P/Arrival Ceremony
NOON		P/Meeting w/President Mitterrand
1:15PM		P/Working Lunch w/President Mitterrand
3:15PM		P/Joint Press Conference
4:30PM	7:30PM	P/Air Force One depart St Martin f/Andrews AFB
7:35PM	7:45PM	P/Marine One depart Andrews AFB f/WH

Sunday 12/17/89

NOON		(P/Family Brunch)

Monday 12/18/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer -
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
11:00AM	11:30AM	P/Pre-brief f/Media Interview - Oval
11:30AM	11:50AM	(P/Interview w/US News&World Report - Oval)
1:15PM	1:40PM	P/Pre-brief f/Media Interview - Oval
1:40PM	2:10PM	(P/Interview & Photo Session w/Newsweek - Oval)
2:15PM	3:15PM	P/Diplomatic Credentials Ceremony - State Floor
4:00PM		Gen Robert Pursley (320-2169) 11-23-27
5:00PM	5:30PM	Senior Staff Meeting - Sit Rm
6:30PM		(P/WH Staff Christmas Reception - St Floor)

Tuesday 12/19/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer -
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
11:15AM	11:30AM	P/Pre-brief f/Media Interview - Oval
11:30AM	11:50AM	(P/Interview w/Time Magazine - Oval)
2:00PM		Argentine Amb Guido di Tella (Pryce)
6:30PM		(P/Christmas Reception - State Floor

Bush Library Photocopy

Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 02/05/90

Wednesday 12/20/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:05AM	7:15AM	PDB Briefer -
7:15AM	8:00AM	B-S-C Bkfst - Here (CONFIRM/ORDER SET UP)
7:30AM	8:00AM	(WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room - RG TO HANDLE)
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
11:00AM	11:30AM	Address FEMA at FEMA HQTRS - 6th & C Streets, NW (Pilling)
1:30PM	2:00PM	P/Sec Baker - Oval
2:00PM	3:00PM	P/Diplomatic Credentials Ceremony - State Floor
6:30PM		(P/Press Christmas Reception - State Floor)

Thursday 12/21/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer -
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
2:45PM	4:00PM	P/Diplomatic Credentials - State Floor
4:00PM	4:20PM	Press Interviews (Popadiuk)
5:00PM	6:00PM	DCI and DDCI Meeting
6:30PM		(P/Residence Staff Party)

Friday 12/22/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer -
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
1:30PM	2:00PM	P/Sec Baker - Oval
NOTES:		P/Camp David

Saturday 12/23/89

NOTES: P/Camp David

Sunday 12/24/89

NOTES: P/Camp David

Monday 12/25/89

NOTES: HOLIDAY - Christmas Day
NOTES: P/Camp David

Tuesday 12/26/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer -
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
NOTES:		P/Camp David

Bush Library Photocopy

Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 02/05/90

Wednesday 12/27/89
6:45AM 7:05AM Dep residence en route office
7:05AM 7:15AM PDB Briefer -
7:15AM 8:00AM B-S-C Bkfst - Here (CONFIRM/ORDER SET UP)
7:30AM 8:00AM (WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room - RG TO HANDLE)
NOTES: (P/TO BEEVILLE, TX - RON)

Thursday 12/28/89
6:45AM 7:05AM Dep residence en route office
7:15AM 7:30AM PDB Briefer -
7:30AM 8:00AM WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
4:00PM 4:20PM Press Interviews (Popadiuk)
5:00PM 6:00PM DCI and DDCI Meeting
NOTES: (P/BEEVILLE, TX - RON)

Friday 12/29/89
6:45AM 7:05AM Dep residence en route office
7:15AM 7:30AM PDB Briefer -
7:30AM 8:00AM WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
NOTES: (P/BEEVILLE, TX - RON)

Saturday 12/30/89
8:00AM (P/DEPART BEEVILLE F/MONTGOMERY, AL)
7:00PM (P/DEPART MONTGOMERY FOR CAMP DAVID - RON)

Monday 01/01/90
NOTES: HOLIDAY - New Year's Day

Tuesday 01/02/90

Wednesday 01/03/90
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval

Thursday 01/04/90
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Oval

Friday 01/05/90
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval

Sunday 01/07/90
5:30PM (P/First Pres't Lecture Series on the Presidency Lecture)

Monday 01/08/90
3:30PM 4:00PM P/Sec Cheney - Oval

Tuesday 01/09/90
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Cabinet Room

Bush Library Photocopy

Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 02/05/90

Wednesday 01/10/90
10:45AM 11:00AM P/Pre-brief f/Media Intv - Oval
11:00AM (P/Media Intv - Oval)
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval

Thursday 01/11/90
11:00AM NOON P/Meeting w/Portuguese PM Silva - Oval/Cabinet
NOON 1:00PM P/Lunch w/PM Silva - Old Family Dining Rm
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Oval

Friday 01/12/90
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval

Monday 01/15/90
NOTES: HOLIDAY - Martin Luther King's B-Day

Tuesday 01/16/90
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Cabinet Room

Wednesday 01/17/90
10:00AM 10:30AM P/Arrival Ceremony IHO Nigerian Pres Babangida - So Lawn
10:30AM 11:30AM P/Meeting w/President Babangida - Ova/Cabinet
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval
7:30PM P/BLK TIE Dinner IHO Nigerian Pres Babangida - Residence
NOTES: BRING IN BLACK TIE

Thursday 01/18/90
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Oval

Friday 01/19/90
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval
NOTES: P/TO MIAMI FLORIDA & RETURN TO WH)

Monday 01/22/90
3:30PM 4:00PM P/Sec Brady - Oval

Tuesday 01/23/90
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Cabinet Room

Wednesday 01/24/90
10:00AM 10:30AM P/Arrival Ceremony f/President Ali Abdallah Salih of Yemen Arab Republic - So Lawn
10:30AM 11:30AM P/Meeting w/President Abdallah - Oval/Cabinet Rm
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval
7:15PM (P/BLK TIE State Dinner IHO President Abdallah - Res)
NOTES: BRING IN BLACK TIE

Thursday 01/25/90
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Oval

Bush Library Photocopy

Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 02/05/90

Friday 01/26/90
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval

Saturday 01/27/90
NOTES: (TBD) P/Blk Tie Alfalfa Dinner)

Monday 01/29/90
3:30PM 4:00PM P/Sec Cheney - Oval
8:00PM (P/BLK TIE Republican Eagles Inaugural Gala)

Tuesday 01/30/90
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Cabinet Room
9:00PM P/State of the Union Adress - Capitol

Wednesday 01/31/90
9:15AM Dep West Basement f/For Service Inst, 1400 Key Blvd, Rosslyn
9:30AM 10:05AM Address FSI Senior Exec Seminar (Col David Giddens will meet you at entrance 875-5354) (15 mins fol by Qs & As) If it is more convenient, group (30) can come here
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval

Thursday 02/01/90

Friday 02/02/90

Monday 02/05/90
3:30PM P/Mtg w/Sec Cheney - Oval

Bush Library Photocopy

Friday, December 8, 1989

2:15 AM Dep Andrews (7 Hrs 30 Min -4 Hrs)

5:45 AM Ar Elmendorf (2 hours refuel)

7:45 AM Dep Elmendorf (7 Hrs 50 Min +18 Hrs)

Saturday, December 9, 1989

9:30 AM Ar Yokota (2 Hrs refuel)

11:30 AM Dep Yokota (4 Hrs 30 Min -1 Hr)

3:00 PM Ar Beijing (Crew must have 15 hours rest)

Evening Meeting in Beijing - Saturday

Sunday, December 10, 1989

Late Morning or Noon Meeting in Beijing - Sunday

3:00 PM Dep Beijing (3 Hrs 25 Min +1 Hr)

7:30 PM Ar Yokota - Helo to downtown Tokyo (15 minutes)

Evening Meeting in Tokyo w/Dep ForMin Owada & Mr. Kuriyama

Monday, December 11, 1989

9:00 AM Meeting w/Prime Minister

10:00 AM Meeting w/Foreign Minister

Helo to Yokota

12:30 PM Dep Yokota (6 Hrs 25 Min -18 Hrs);

1:00 AM Ar Elmendorf (2 Hrs refuel)

3:00 AM Dep Elmendorf (6 Hrs 30 Min +4 Hrs)

1:30 PM Ar Andrews

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3:00 AM Dep Elmendorf (6 Hrs 30 Min +4 Hrs)

1:30 PM Ar Andrews

Chase has been to China several times with the President and has attended each social event that the Bushes attended with Han Hsu at Chinese Embassy or at V.P. residence

12-5-89 5:20 PM

Brent

GB

Chase would like to go.

Hell bring his passport

in

Might be good to

mention to their Ambassador.

Chase, very close to President,

will be going with you.

The President has asked

him to look up Han Hsu

and "Tiger" Yang.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08a. Handwritten Note	Re: Doug told… [50 U.S.C.403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [3]

Date Closed:	5/7/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91136-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12/5/89
1755

Florence:

I just received word from Doug Paal that he would the General to clear on this crosshatch.

At this point Paal, Jackson and Blackwill clear with no changes.

Thank you!

Wendy

Doug is concerned — wanted you to see — before it goes — or you may wish to squelch

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

S/S # 044531

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 2

FROM: ELIZABETH MCKUNE (Officer name) | S/S (Office symbol) | 647-8448 (Extension) | 7224 (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: TELEGRAM TO TOKYO RE BRIEFING THE JAPANESE ON MALTA

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	G. PHILIP HUGHES	2224	GFWW
NSCS	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	SITTMANN		
	JACKSON		
	PAAL		
	BLACKWILL		

FOR: CLEARANCE [x] INFORMATION [ ] PER REQUEST [ ] COMMENT [ ]

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: 12/5 ASAP HAS TO GO TONIGHT

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By CoP NARA, Date 5/7/09

S/S Officer: Elizabeth McKune

ELIZABETH MCKUNE

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COPY

INITIALS 12/3

APPR: RMK

DRAFT: DA

OTHER: MVK

OTHER: S/S

OTHER: SSO

OTHER: NSCS

OTHER:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EAP:DANDERSON:BP
12/05/89 76600
P:RMKIMMITT

D:MVKENNEDY
S/S-O

S/S
NSC/S

EAP ONLY

NIACT IMMEDIATE TOKYO

NODIS
ONLY FOR AMB. ARMACOST AND A/S SOLOMON FROM BOB KIMMITT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, JP

SUBJECT: BRIEFING THE JAPANESE ON MALTA

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO SEND BRENT SCOWCROFT AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER TO TOKYO TO DEBRIEF THE JAPANESE ON MALTA. DETAILS ARE STILL BEING WORKED OUT, BUT THEY WILL LIKELY DEPART WASHINGTON FRIDAY, DECEMBER 8. AS A RESULT OF THIS DECISION, ASSISTANT SECRETARY SOLOMON SHOULD CONDUCT NO FURTHER DEBRIEFINGS WITH THE GOJ AND SHOULD PROCEED IMMEDIATELY DECEMBER 6 A.M. TO SEOUL AND THEN TO CANBERRA TO DEBRIEF THE KOREANS AND AUSTRALIANS. IF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE JAPANESE ON OTHER SUBJECTS ARE REQUIRED OF OR DESIRED BY A/S SOLOMON IN TOKYO, HE SHOULD CONDUCT THOSE DISCUSSIONS AFTER THE DEPARTURE FROM TOKYO OF THE SCOWCROFT/EAGLEBURGER PARTY.

3. THE AMBASSADOR IS AUTHORIZED TO INFORM THE GOJ THAT NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER SCOWCROFT AND DEPUTY SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER PLAN TO VISIT TOKYO FOR DEBRIEFING ON MALTA. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE EXTREMELY CLOSELY HELD UNTIL DETAILS ARE WORKED OUT. THE GOVERNMENT OF

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1159-MR
9/22/2014 MM

JAPAN SHOULD MAKE NO ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS VISIT AT THIS POINT.
WW