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FOIA Number:
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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files

OA/ID Number: 91135
Folder ID Number: 91135-006

Folder Title:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [6]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Cable	Re: Summary on China Crisis (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01b. Cable	Re: U/S Kimmit Meeting with PRC Ambassador Han Xu - June 14 (5 pp.)	6/15/89	(b)(1)	S
01c. Cable	Re: Secretary-Han June 12 Discussion (3 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	TS
01d. Cable	Re: Kimmitt-Han Discussion of Embassy Security (5 pp.)	6/11/89	(b)(1)	S
01e. Cable	Re: Secretary-Han Discussion (5 pp.)	6/12/89	(b)(1)	TS
01f. Cable	Re: Secretary Baker's Meeting with Han Xu (6 pp.)	6/8/89	(b)(1)	S
02a. Coversheet	General Scowcroft to Military Aide Re: Eyes Only for the President (1 pp.)	6/17/89	(b)(1)	TS
02b. Note	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS (1 pp.)	6/17/89	(b)(1)	S
02c. Cable	Re: Summary on China Crisis (4 pp.)	6/17/89	(b)(1)	S
02d. Cable	Re: U/S Kimmitt Meeting with PRC Ambassador Han Xu - June 14 (5 pp.)	6/15/89	(b)(1)	S
02e. Cable	Re: Secretary - Han June 12 Discussion (3 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [6]

Pinksheet Number: cap1124
OA/ID Number: 91135-006
Date Closed: 5/6/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02f. Cable	Re: Kimmitt - Han Discussion of Embassy Security (5 pp.)	6/11/89	(b)(1)	S
02g. Cable	Re: Secretary - Han Discussion (5 pp.)	6/12/89	(b)(1)	TS
02h. Cable	Re: Secretary Baker's Meeting with Han Xu (6 pp.)	6/8/89	(b)(1)	S
03. Memcon	Re: Meeting Between Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and National Security Advisor Scowcroft (12 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S
04. Memcon	Re: Private Meeting of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qicen (5 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	S
05. Memcon	Re: Private Meeting of National Security Advisor Scowcroft with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qicen (6 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S
06. Memcon	Re: Meeting Between General Secretary Jiang Zemin and National Security Advisor Scowcroft (7 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	S
07. Memcon	Re: Meeting Between Premier Li Peng, and National Security Advisor Scowcroft (8 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	S
08. Memcon	Re: Meeting Between Deng Xiaoping and National Security Advisor Scowcroft (5 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:	
Record Group:	Bush Presidential Records
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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ORIGIN OFFICE EAP-01

INFO SSS-01 SWO-01 SSI-01 SSO-01 TF3-01 INR-01 P-01 D-01

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INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY: EAP/CM: MWONG
APPROVED BY: EAP: RL WILLIAMS
P: JSTROTZ
S/S: JFCOLLINS

P: RKIMMITT
S/S-O: WMENOLD

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NODIS

E. O. 12356: ADR

TAGS: US, CH, PREL, SHUM

SUBJECT: U/S KIMMITT MEETING WITH PRC AMBASSADOR
HAN XU - JUNE 14

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.
2. UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT CALLED IN PRC AMBASSADOR HAN XU ON JUNE 14 TO PROTEST STRONGLY AND FORMALLY CHINA'S EXPULSION OF THE AMERICAN JOURNALISTS EARLIER THAT DAY. AMBASSADOR HAN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR XIAO HOUE AND EMBASSY INTERPRETER CHEN MINGMING. U/S KIMMITT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY EAP ACTING DAS WILLIAMS. P - SPECIAL ASSISTANT STROTZ AND EAP/CM NOTETAKER WONG.
3. U/S KIMMITT BEGAN THE MEETING BY NOTING THAT THE SECRETARY HAD INSTRUCTED THAT AMBASSADOR HAN BE SUMMONED TO THE DEPARTMENT IN ORDER TO FOLLOW UP ON THE STATEMENTS MADE DURING THE JUNE 14 WHITE HOUSE AND DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFINGS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE EXPULSION OF THE AMERICAN JOURNALISTS EARLIER THAT DAY. U/S KIMMITT THEN DELIVERED

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THE FOLLOWING PREPARED STATEMENT:

--THE UNITED STATES VIGOROUSLY PROTESTS THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TODAY TO EXPEL AMERICAN JOURNALISTS. THE AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS WERE PERFORMING FUNCTIONS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE FOR THEIR STATUS. THEY POSSESSED VALID JOURNALISTS' VISAS.

4. NOTING THE END OF HIS FORMAL PRESENTATION, U/S KIMMITT SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY WERE TRYING TO MANAGE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PRC AT THIS TIME IN A MANNER THAT WILL ALLOW US TO RESTORE AND ADVANCE THAT RELATIONSHIP. THE PRC ACTION TO EXPEL THE JOURNALISTS--AND THE WIDE PUBLICITY THIS HAD RECEIVED IN THE US MEDIA--MADE THE TASK OF MANAGING THE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP EXCEEDINGLY MORE DIFFICULT. THAT IS WHY HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY TO VIGOROUSLY PROTEST CHINA'S EXPULSION OF THE JOURNALISTS AND TO ASK THAT THIS BE COMMUNICATED TO THE GOVERNMENT IN BEIJING.

5. AMBASSADOR HAN RESPONDED THAT THE TWO AMERICAN JOURNALISTS HAD VIOLATED CHINESE LAWS AND REGULATIONS, AND THAT ACCORDINGLY, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WAS JUSTIFIED IN ASKING THEM TO LEAVE. THEREFORE, HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE US PROTEST. HOWEVER, HE WOULD CONVEY IT TO HIS GOVERNMENT. WITH RESPECT TO THE SECRETARY'S SENTIMENTS ON US-CHINA RELATIONS, HE WISHED TO POINT OUT AGAIN THAT CHINA ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THEREFORE, IT WAS CHINA'S HOPE THAT AMERICAN JOURNALISTS WOULD REFRAIN FROM DOING ANYTHING THAT VIOLATED CHINESE LAWS AND REGULATIONS.

6. U/S KIMMITT NOTED THAT THE US ALSO ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND WAS TRYING TO

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RESTORE THE FOUNDATION ON WHICH RELATIONS COULD BE BUILT. EACH SIDE HAD TRIED TO RESPECT THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. HE ADDED THAT THE PRC WAS WELL AWARE OF THE TRADITION OF ALLOWING JOURNALISTS ACCESS UNDER THE LAWS OF THE COUNTRY WHERE THEY ARE ASSIGNED. THE STATUS OF JOURNALISTS AND THE ACCREDITATION OF JOURNALISTS IS TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY IN THIS COUNTRY. WE BELIEVED THAT THE AMERICAN JOURNALISTS HAD ACTED ENTIRELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUS GRANTED BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT, AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IN THAT CAPACITY. THEIR EXPULSION WOULD ONLY SERVE TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON DIFFERENCES IN OUR RELATIONS AT THIS POINT, INSTEAD OF ALLOWING US TO GET BACK TO RESTORING THE RELATIONSHIP. KIMMITT SAID HE WOULD CONVEY WHAT HAN HAD SAID TO THE SECRETARY.

7. AMB. HAN RESPONDED THAT WHEN THE JOURNALISTS WERE EXPELLED, THE PRC GOVERNMENT HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WERE FOUND NOT TO BE ACTING IN A MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR STATUS AS JOURNALISTS, AND THEY WERE INFORMED AS TO WHICH CHINESE LAWS THEY HAD VIOLATED. MR. KIMMITT STATED THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD A DIFFERENCE ON THAT POINT AND HE WOULD COMMUNICATE THAT TO THE SECRETARY. HE ADDED THAT INCIDENTS LIKE THIS NEEDED TO BE AVOIDED TO GET THE FOCUS AWAY FROM DIFFERENCES, WHICH THE PRESS TENDED TO MAGNIFY, AND BACK TO THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT EXIST. WE WERE TRYING TO HANDLE OUR RELATIONS IN AS LOW-KEY AND QUIET A MANNER AS POSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY WHERE WE HAD DIFFERENCES. OTHERWISE, IT WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO HANDLE PROBLEMS IN A WAY THAT BEST SERVED OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS.

8. AMB. HAN SAID IT WAS CLEARLY STATED IN THE MESSAGE SENT TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM CHINA'S LEADERS THAT IT WAS

IMPERATIVE THAT BOTH COUNTRIES WORK TO ENHANCE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. HIS HOPE WAS THAT THE US SIDE WOULD

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RESPECT CHINESE LAW AND THE CHINESE POSITION. U/S
KIMMITT SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THIS TO THE SECRETARY.

9. ACTION REQUEST: THE AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO
APPROACH THE MFA AT AN APPROPRIATE SENIOR LEVEL TO MAKE
DEMARCHE DRAWING ON POINTS MADE BY U/S KIMMITT. (NOTE:
DEPARTMENT SPOKESWOMAN ANNOUNCED AT JUNE 14 NOON BRIEFING
THAT US WOULD PROTEST THIS ACTION IN BEIJING "TODAY" --
JUNE 15 BEIJING TIME.) BAKER

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01c. Cable	Re: Secretary-Han June 12 Discussion (3 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	TS

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TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING NIACT IMMEDIATE

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NODIS

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR LILLEY FROM U/S KIMMIT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL ASEC CVIS PHUM CH (FANG LIZHI)

SUBJECT: TFCH01: KIMMITT-HAN DISCUSSION OF EMBASSY
SECURITY

REF: BEIJING 15831

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. U/S KIMMITT CALLED IN AMBASSADOR HAN XU AT 1300 JUNE 11 TO ASSERT US CONCERN ABOUT THE XINHUA PRESS BULLETIN ANNOUNCING THE ARREST WARRANT FOR FANG LIZHI AND ADVISING OF HIS PRESENCE AT THE US EMBASSY. COUPLING THIS WITH THE RECENT ANTI-FOREIGN TONE OF RECENT CHINESE MEDIA COMMENTARY, KIMMITT EMPHASIZED THAT ANY INTRUSION INTO OUR EMBASSY OFFICES OR RESIDENCES UNDER ANY PRETEXT WOULD INCUR A PROFOUND AND WIDESPREAD CRITICAL REACTION IN THE U.S. THUS MAKING SUBSTANTIALLY

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MORE DIFFICULT EFFORTS TO RESTORE AND ADVANCE SINO-US RELATIONS. HAN INDICATED HOPE THAT THE U. S. WOULD REFRAIN FROM FURTHER INTERFERENCE IN CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND SAID PROTECTION WAS GUARANTEED AS LONG AS U. S. DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL OBSERVE THE LAWS OF CHINA. KIMMITT REITERATED SECRETARY'S POINTS ABOUT U. S. INTEREST IN FINDING WAY WITH THE PRC TO WORK TOWARD SOLUTIONS THAT ADVANCE MUTUAL GOALS. HAN RECIPROCATED. HAN CONCLUDED NOTING AN INCIDENT OUTSIDE HIS RESIDENCE WHEREIN HE INDICATED A PERSON HAD KNOCKED ON HIS DOOR DEMANDING TO SEE THE AMBASSADOR. WHILE POLICE DID NOTHING TO STOP HIM. END SUMMARY

3. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID WE HAD JUST RECEIVED A XINHUA REPORT WHICH STATED THAT THE BEIJING PUBLIC SECURITY DEPARTMENT HAD ISSUED A WANTED CIRCULAR FOR THE ARREST OF FANG LIZHI AND HIS WIFE LI SHUXIAN. AND THAT IT REPORTED THAT THE COUPLE HAD TAKEN REFUGE IN THE US EMBASSY IN BEIJING. HE INDICATE WE WERE CONCERNED THAT THIS REPORT, COUPLED WITH THE ANTI-FOREIGN TONE OF SOME RECENT CHINESE MEDIA COMMENTARY, MIGHT STIMULATE ACTION THREATENING TO OUR EMBASSY OR ITS PERSONNEL.

4. CONTINUING. KIMMITT SAID WE WERE AWARE THAT POLICE PROTECTION HAD BEEN STRENGTHENED IN BEIJING'S DIPLOMATIC AREAS. BUT NONETHELESS WE WERE CONCERNED THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO DETER LARGE SCALE MOB ACTIVITY. THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED HIM, AND KIMMITT HAD SPOKEN WITH MR. GATES AT THE WHITE HOUSE ABOUT IT. TO CALL TO THE CHINESE SIDE'S ATTENTION THAT ANY INTRUSION INTO OUR EMBASSY OFFICES OR RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS. IN CONNECTION WITH THE FANG ISSUE THE SECRETARY HAD RAISED WITH THE AMBASSADOR LAST EVENING OR FOR ANY OTHER REASON WOULD

PRODUCE A WIDESPREAD AND PROFOUND CRITICAL REACTION IN THE US.

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5. THIS REACTION WOULD MAKE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE DIFFICULT THE RESTORATION AND ADVANCEMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, WHICH AS THE SECRETARY NOTED LAST EVENING WAS THE GOAL OF THE PRESIDENT AND, WE BELIEVED, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT. WE HOPED THE AMBASSADOR WOULD CONVEY THESE VIEWS TO HIS GOVERNMENT, AS IT CONSIDERED ITS RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST OF LAST NIGHT FOR SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE FANG ISSUE.

6. HAN RESPONDED THAT HE WISHED TO MAKE TWO POINTS:

-- HE HOPED THE US WOULD REFRAIN FROM FURTHER INTERFERENCE INTO CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. AND

-- SO LONG AS US DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL OBEYED THE LAWS OF CHINA, THEIR SECURITY WOULD BE GUARANTEED.

HE WOULD CERTAINLY CONVEY THE UNDER SECRETARY'S REMARKS TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND WOULD CONVEY A RESPONSE AS SOON AS

IT WAS RECEIVED.

7. KIMMITT SAID WE UNDERSTOOD THE CHINESE SIDE'S POSITION REGARDING THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CHINA. AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE LOOKING FOR A WAY MUTUALLY TO RESTORE THE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP. WE COULD NOT ESCAPE THE FACT THAT EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN BEIJING WOULD AFFECT OUR EFFORTS TOWARD THIS GOAL. OUR INTEREST IN THIS GOAL WAS MUTUAL AND WE HOPED TO WORK WITH THE CHINESE SIDE TO ACHIEVE IT. HE WOULD REPORT TO THE SECRETARY AND MR. GATES ON HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE AMBASSADOR.

8. HAN SAID HE WOULD NOT REPEAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON FANG LIZHI BECAUSE THE VICE

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FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ALREADY STATED THAT TO AMBASSADOR LILLEY IN BEIJING. HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE CHINESE SIDE VALUED ITS US RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD EXERT THE GREATEST EFFORT TO PREVENT SINO-US RELATIONS FROM BEING UNDERMINED. HOWEVER, SUCCESS DID NOT HINGE ON CHINESE EFFORTS ALONE; COOPERATION BY THE US SIDE WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL.

9. WE SHARE THIS GOAL. KIMMITT AGREED. AS THE SECRETARY HAD SAID LAST NIGHT, THE RELATIONSHIP WAS OF IMMENSE IMPORTANCE TO BOTH COUNTRIES. WE WANTED TO WORK COOPERATIVELY WITH THE CHINESE SIDE TO ADVANCE SOLUTIONS SERVING OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS.

10. HAN SAID HE WISHED ALSO TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROTECTION OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY IN THIS COUNTRY. THIS MORNING A MAN HAD KNOCKED ON HIS RESIDENCE DOOR AND DEMANDED TO SEE THE AMBASSADOR. THIS WAS IN THE PRESENCE OF SECRET SERVICE PEOPLE WHO DID NOTHING TO STOP HIM. AS HE HAD BEEN HANGING AROUND THE EMBASSY FOR SEVERAL DAYS, THE SECRET SERVICE PEOPLE MUST HAVE KNOWN THAT HE SEEMED TO BE MENTALLY DISORDERED. AND YET THEY DID NOTHING.

11. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT BUT WOULD PROMPTLY CHECK IN TO IT. WE WERE AWARE OF OUR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHANCERY AND RESIDENCES AND WOULD TAKE ALL MEASURES NECESSARY TO FULFILL THEM.

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01e. Cable	Re: Secretary-Han Discussion (5 pp.)	6/12/89	(b)(1)	TS

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitve) [6]

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- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



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C20/25 005752 NOD145

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2010-2778-MA
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DRAFTED BY: TFCH01:JBADER:JB
APPROVED BY: S: THE SECRETARY

S/S-0: WMENOLD

EAP: WCLARK

EAP: RWILLIAMS

S/S: JSROY

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

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TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 180968

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL CH US

SUBJECT: TFCH01: SECRETARY BAKER'S MEETING WITH HAN XU

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. SECRETARY BAKER CALLED IN AMBASSADOR HAN XU THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 7 AND MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

--THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THE SECRETARY TO SPEAK TO AMBASSADOR HAN. THE PRESIDENT AND ALL AMERICANS ARE DISTRESSED AND SADDENED OVER EVENTS IN CHINA. THE CARNAGE WAS CLEAR FOR ALL TO SEE. DESPITE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY:

--THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT INTERFERE IN CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND IS ANXIOUS TO HOLD THE US-CHINA

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RELATIONSHIP INTACT. HE HAS BEEN UNDER PRESSURE TO TAKE ACTIONS FAR EXCEEDING THOSE ALREADY TAKEN. AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THOSE WHO BELIEVE IN FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE HEARD FROM.

--WE THOUGHT THE CHINESE POSTPONEMENT OF FM QIAN'S VISIT WAS A GOOD IDEA. HE WOULD HAVE FACED PROTESTS IN THE US.

--THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THE SECRETARY TO SEEK ASSURANCES THE PRC WOULD TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO PROTECT US INTERESTS AND CITIZENS. AMBASSADOR LILLEY WOULD BE CALLING ON PRC OFFICIALS THE MORNING OF JUNE 8 TO REQUEST CLEARANCE FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO EVACUATE AMERICANS SHOULD IT PROVE NECESSARY. THIS WAS ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS ONLY. IF COMMERCIAL CHARTERS PROVED INSUFFICIENT.

AMBASSADOR HAN REPLIED THAT HE WOULD REPORT THE REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO BEIJING. HE NOTED THE PRC'S HOPE THAT FRIENDLY COUNTRIES WOULD NOT INTERFERE IN THE PRC'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE ALSO SAID THAT CHINA WOULD MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY AND OPEN DOOR AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN MIND AS THE PRC TRIES TO FIND ITS OWN SOLUTION TO THE CURRENT SITUATION. END SUMMARY.

3. PRC AMBASSADOR HAN XU WAS CALLED IN URGENTLY FOR A MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY AT 4:40 P.M. ON JUNE 7.

4. AFTER THANKING AMBASSADOR HAN FOR COMING IN ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE, THE SECRETARY TOLD HAN HOW DISTRESSED WE ARE OVER EVENTS IN CHINA. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD

CALLED IN THE AMBASSADOR AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT, WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN AT NOON. THE

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PRESIDENT WANTED HIM TO CONVEY OUR SENTIMENTS. THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR HE WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CHINA, WHERE HE HAD SERVED. IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW THAT OTHER QUESTIONS ARE INVOLVED IN THIS INSTANCE. THE CARNAGE IN BEIJING HAS BEEN OVERWHELMING, AND ALL THE WORLD CAN SEE THIS. OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN HAVE BEEN DENYING THIS, BUT WE ALL KNOW IT HAPPENED. WE ARE GREATLY SADDENED BY THESE EVENTS.

5. THE SECRETARY SAID THE PRESIDENT IS ANXIOUS TO HOLD US-PRC RELATIONS TOGETHER; HE HAS PUT A LOT OF EFFORT INTO BUILDING THEM. HE REGARDS OUR RELATIONSHIP AS VERY IMPORTANT TO OUR TWO PEOPLES. THE SECRETARY NOTED THE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURES ON THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THE US ON THIS ISSUE. THE US HAS EXPERIENCED 213 YEARS OF DEMOCRACY WITH PEACEFUL PROTESTS AND PEACEFUL TRANSITIONS OF POWER.

6. THE SECRETARY SAID WE THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN A GOOD IDEA FOR FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN TO DELAY HIS VISIT. HAD HE COME, HE WOULD HAVE ENCOUNTERED MANY PROTESTS, SO THE POSTPONEMENT WAS WISE. THE SECRETARY TOOK PARTICULAR NOTE THAT THE VISIT WAS POSTPONED NOT CANCELED.

7. SECRETARY BAKER ASKED HAN TO CONTACT HIS GOVERNMENT TO ASSURE THAT IT TOOK ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO PROTECT US INTERESTS AND CITIZENS. HE SAID AMBASSADOR LILLEY WILL BE GOING IN THE MORNING OF JUNE 8 TO REQUEST CLEARANCE ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO EVACUATE AMERICANS FROM BEIJING. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THERE ARE US COMMERCIAL CHARTER AIRCRAFT ARRIVING SHORTLY, BUT WE ARE REQUESTING ADVANCE CLEARANCE SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY TO BRING IN A MILITARY CHARTER.

8. THE SECRETARY NOTED OUR APPRECIATION OF THE FACT

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Department of State



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THAT VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHU HAD SEEN THE AMBASSADOR SO QUICKLY WHEN THE SHOOTINGS OCCURRED IN THE JIANGUOMENWAI DIPLOMATIC COMPOUND. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT OTHERS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO SEE THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER. AND WE WERE APPRECIATIVE OF THE QUICK RESPONSE IN OUR CASE.

9. AMBASSADOR HAN RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT HE HAD EXPLAINED THE PRC'S POSITION TWICE TO UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT IN EARLIER MEETINGS AND SAW NO NECESSITY TO REITERATE THAT VIEW WHICH WAS KNOWN TO THE US. HE HAD SAID THAT CHINA WOULD TRY TO FIND ITS OWN SOLUTION TO THE SITUATION. CHINA HOPED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE PRC WOULD NOT INTERFERE. HAN PROMISED TO REPORT OUR REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT.

10. THE SECRETARY REITERATED WE WILL ONLY ASK FOR PERMISSION FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO LAND IF IT PROVES NECESSARY. HE SAID WE HAVE TWO MILITARY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IN YOKOTA READY FOR USE. WE HAVE NO PLANS TO USE THEM NOW BUT WE WERE MERELY REQUESTING ADVANCE PERMISSION IF NECESSARY SHOULD THE SITUATION DETERIORATE.

11. AMBASSADOR HAN REPLIED THAT HIS GOAL WAS TO PROTECT US-CHINA RELATIONS. AND THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD KEEP LONG-TERM AS WELL AS SHORT-TERM CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND. WE HAVE WORKED VERY HARD TO BUILD THAT RELATIONSHIP. AND THIS IS A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE PERIOD. CHINA MUST FIND ITS OWN WAY. WHICH MIGHT NOT BE IN CONFORMITY WITH OUR WAY. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE

IMPORTANCE OF LONG-TERM CONSIDERATIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING THE RELATIONSHIP. WHICH IS WHY THE PRESIDENT WANTED HIM TO TALK WITH HAN. THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO PRESERVE OUR RELATIONSHIP AND HE HAS RESISTED PRESSURES TO TAKE ACTIONS FAR EXCEEDING THOSE

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TAKEN. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP CONTINUE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT ALSO WAS IMPORTANT FOR THOSE WHO BELIEVE IN FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE HEARD FROM. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY REITERATING HOW DISTRESSED AND SADDENED AMERICANS WERE, AND OUR HOPE THAT THE SITUATION WILL STABILIZE AND CALM DOWN, THAT CHINA WILL MOVE TOWARD MORE OPEN AND PLURALISTIC POLICIES, AND THAT WE CAN GET OUR RELATIONSHIP BACK ON TRACK. HAN SAID CHINA WOULD CONTINUE ITS INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY AND MAINTAIN ITS OPEN DOOR TO THE OUTSIDE.

12. PARTICIPANTS AT THE MEETING WERE: US--THE SECRETARY, U/S KIMMITT, PA ASSISTANT SECRETARY TUTWILER, EAP ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY CLARK, EAP ACTING DAS WILLIAMS, AND EAP/CM ACTING DIRECTOR BADER; PRC--AMBASSADOR HAN XU, POLITICAL COUNSELOR XIAO HOUDE, INTERPRETER CHEN MINGMING, BAKER

~~SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~
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CONTAINS CODEWORD

CLASSIFICATION

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IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

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ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 29

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RELEASER JH

FROM/LOCATION

1. GENERAL SCOWCROFT

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Military Aide — EYES ONLY for The President

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

- 1. _____
- 2. _____

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2009-1040-MR
10/10/2014 MM

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Note	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS (1 pp.)	6/17/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [6]

Date Closed: 5/6/2009	OA/ID Number: 91135-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Cable	Re: Summary on China Crisis (4 pp.)	6/17/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [6]

Date Closed: 5/6/2009	OA/ID Number: 91135-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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INFO SSS-01 SWO-01 SSI-01 SSO-01 TF3-01 INR-01 P-01 D-01

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INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY: EAP/CM: MWONG
APPROVED BY: EAP: RLWILLIAMS
P: JSTROTZ
S/S: JFCOLLINSP: RKIMMITT
S/S-O: WMENOLD

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING NIACT IMMEDIATE~~SECRET~~ STATE 189751

NODIS

E. O. 12356: ADR

TAGS: US, CH, PREL, SHUM

SUBJECT: U/S KIMMITT MEETING WITH PRC AMBASSADOR
HAN XU - JUNE 14

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.
2. UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT CALLED IN PRC AMBASSADOR HAN XU ON JUNE 14 TO PROTEST STRONGLY AND FORMALLY CHINA'S EXPULSION OF THE AMERICAN JOURNALISTS EARLIER THAT DAY. AMBASSADOR HAN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR XIAO HOUE AND EMBASSY INTERPRETER CHEN MINGMING. U/S KIMMITT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY EAP ACTING DAS WILLIAMS. P - SPECIAL ASSISTANT STROTZ AND EAP/CM NOTETAKER WONG.
3. U/S KIMMITT BEGAN THE MEETING BY NOTING THAT THE SECRETARY HAD INSTRUCTED THAT AMBASSADOR HAN BE SUMMONED TO THE DEPARTMENT IN ORDER TO FOLLOW UP ON THE STATEMENTS MADE DURING THE JUNE 14 WHITE HOUSE AND DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFINGS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE EXPULSION OF THE AMERICAN JOURNALISTS EARLIER THAT DAY. U/S KIMMITT THEN DELIVERED

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THE FOLLOWING PREPARED STATEMENT:

--THE UNITED STATES VIGOROUSLY PROTESTS THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TODAY TO EXPEL AMERICAN JOURNALISTS. THE AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS WERE PERFORMING FUNCTIONS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE FOR THEIR STATUS. THEY POSSESSED VALID JOURNALISTS' VISAS.

4. NOTING THE END OF HIS FORMAL PRESENTATION, U/S KIMMITT SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY WERE TRYING TO MANAGE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PRC AT THIS TIME IN A MANNER THAT WILL ALLOW US TO RESTORE AND ADVANCE THAT RELATIONSHIP. THE PRC ACTION TO EXPEL THE JOURNALISTS--AND THE WIDE PUBLICITY THIS HAD RECEIVED IN THE US MEDIA--MADE THE TASK OF MANAGING THE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP EXCEEDINGLY MORE DIFFICULT. THAT IS WHY HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY TO VIGOROUSLY PROTEST CHINA'S EXPULSION OF THE JOURNALISTS AND TO ASK THAT THIS BE COMMUNICATED TO THE GOVERNMENT IN BEIJING.

5. AMBASSADOR HAN RESPONDED THAT THE TWO AMERICAN JOURNALISTS HAD VIOLATED CHINESE LAWS AND REGULATIONS, AND THAT ACCORDINGLY, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WAS JUSTIFIED IN ASKING THEM TO LEAVE. THEREFORE, HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE US PROTEST. HOWEVER, HE WOULD CONVEY IT TO HIS GOVERNMENT. WITH RESPECT TO THE SECRETARY'S SENTIMENTS ON US-CHINA RELATIONS, HE WISHED TO POINT OUT AGAIN THAT CHINA ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THEREFORE, IT WAS CHINA'S HOPE THAT AMERICAN JOURNALISTS WOULD REFRAIN FROM DOING ANYTHING THAT VIOLATED CHINESE LAWS AND REGULATIONS.

6. U/S KIMMITT NOTED THAT THE US ALSO ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND WAS TRYING TO

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RESTORE THE FOUNDATION ON WHICH RELATIONS COULD BE BUILT. EACH SIDE HAD TRIED TO RESPECT THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. HE ADDED THAT THE PRC WAS WELL AWARE OF THE TRADITION OF ALLOWING JOURNALISTS ACCESS UNDER THE LAWS OF THE COUNTRY WHERE THEY ARE ASSIGNED. THE STATUS OF JOURNALISTS AND THE ACCREDITATION OF JOURNALISTS IS TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY IN THIS COUNTRY. WE BELIEVED THAT THE AMERICAN JOURNALISTS HAD ACTED ENTIRELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUS GRANTED BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT, AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IN THAT CAPACITY. THEIR EXPULSION WOULD ONLY SERVE TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON DIFFERENCES IN OUR RELATIONS AT THIS POINT, INSTEAD OF ALLOWING US TO GET BACK TO RESTORING THE RELATIONSHIP. KIMMITT SAID HE WOULD CONVEY WHAT HAN HAD SAID TO THE SECRETARY.

7. AMB. HAN RESPONDED THAT WHEN THE JOURNALISTS WERE EXPELLED, THE PRC GOVERNMENT HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WERE FOUND NOT TO BE ACTING IN A MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR STATUS AS JOURNALISTS AND THEY WERE INFORMED AS TO WHICH CHINESE LAWS THEY HAD VIOLATED. MR. KIMMITT STATED THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD A DIFFERENCE ON THAT POINT AND HE WOULD COMMUNICATE THAT TO THE SECRETARY. HE ADDED THAT INCIDENTS LIKE THIS NEEDED TO BE AVOIDED TO GET THE FOCUS AWAY FROM DIFFERENCES, WHICH THE PRESS TENDED TO MAGNIFY, AND BACK TO THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT EXIST. WE WERE TRYING TO HANDLE OUR RELATIONS IN AS LOW-KEY AND QUIET A MANNER AS POSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY WHERE WE HAD DIFFERENCES. OTHERWISE, IT WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO HANDLE PROBLEMS IN A WAY THAT BEST SERVED OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS.

8. AMB. HAN SAID IT WAS CLEARLY STATED IN THE MESSAGE SENT TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM CHINA'S LEADERS THAT IT WAS

IMPERATIVE THAT BOTH COUNTRIES WORK TO ENHANCE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. HIS HOPE WAS THAT THE US SIDE WOULD

~~SECRET~~*Department of State*S/S-0
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RESPECT CHINESE LAW AND THE CHINESE POSITION. U/S
KIMMITT SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THIS TO THE SECRETARY.

9. ACTION REQUEST: THE AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO
APPROACH THE MFA AT AN APPROPRIATE SENIOR LEVEL TO MAKE
DEMARCHE DRAWING ON POINTS MADE BY U/S KIMMITT. (NOTE:
DEPARTMENT SPOKESWOMAN ANNOUNCED AT JUNE 14 NOON BRIEFING
THAT US WOULD PROTEST THIS ACTION IN BEIJING "TODAY" --
JUNE 15 BEIJING TIME.) BAKER

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02e. Cable	Re: Secretary - Han June 12 Discussion (3 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitve) [6]

Date Closed: 5/6/2009	OA/ID Number: 91135-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02f. Cable	Re: Kimmitt - Han Discussion of Embassy Security (5 pp.)	6/11/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [6]

Date Closed: 5/6/2009	OA/ID Number: 91135-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [6]

Date Closed: 5/6/2009	OA/ID Number: 91135-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
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AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
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S/S-O: WMENOLD

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TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING NIACT IMMEDIATE

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NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL CH US

SUBJECT: TFCH01: SECRETARY BAKER'S MEETING WITH HAN XU

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. SECRETARY BAKER CALLED IN AMBASSADOR HAN XU THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 7 AND MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

--THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THE SECRETARY TO SPEAK TO AMBASSADOR HAN. THE PRESIDENT AND ALL AMERICANS ARE DISTRESSED AND SADDENED OVER EVENTS IN CHINA. THE CARNAGE WAS CLEAR FOR ALL TO SEE, DESPITE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY:

--THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT INTERFERE IN CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND IS ANXIOUS TO HOLD THE US-CHINA

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RELATIONSHIP INTACT. HE HAS BEEN UNDER PRESSURE TO TAKE ACTIONS FAR EXCEEDING THOSE ALREADY TAKEN. AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THOSE WHO BELIEVE IN FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE HEARD FROM:

-- WE THOUGHT THE CHINESE POSTPONEMENT OF FM QIAN'S VISIT WAS A GOOD IDEA. HE WOULD HAVE FACED PROTESTS IN THE US:

-- THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THE SECRETARY TO SEEK ASSURANCES THE PRC WOULD TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO PROTECT US INTERESTS AND CITIZENS. AMBASSADOR LILLEY WOULD BE CALLING ON PRC OFFICIALS THE MORNING OF JUNE 8 TO REQUEST CLEARANCE FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO EVACUATE AMERICANS SHOULD IT PROVE NECESSARY. THIS WAS ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS ONLY. IF COMMERCIAL CHARTERS PROVED INSUFFICIENT.

AMBASSADOR HAN REPLIED THAT HE WOULD REPORT THE REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO BEIJING. HE NOTED THE PRC'S HOPE THAT FRIENDLY COUNTRIES WOULD NOT INTERFERE IN THE PRC'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE ALSO SAID THAT CHINA WOULD MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY AND OPEN DOOR, AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN MIND AS THE PRC TRIES TO FIND ITS OWN SOLUTION TO THE CURRENT SITUATION. END SUMMARY.

3. PRC AMBASSADOR HAN XU WAS CALLED IN URGENTLY FOR A MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY AT 4:40 P.M. ON JUNE 7.

4. AFTER THANKING AMBASSADOR HAN FOR COMING IN ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE, THE SECRETARY TOLD HAN HOW DISTRESSED WE ARE OVER EVENTS IN CHINA. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD

CALLED IN THE AMBASSADOR AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN AT NOON. THE

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PRESIDENT WANTED HIM TO CONVEY OUR SENTIMENTS. THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR HE WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CHINA, WHERE HE HAD SERVED. IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW THAT OTHER QUESTIONS ARE INVOLVED IN THIS INSTANCE. THE CARNAGE IN BEIJING HAS BEEN OVERWHELMING, AND ALL THE WORLD CAN SEE THIS. OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN HAVE BEEN DENYING THIS, BUT WE ALL KNOW IT HAPPENED. WE ARE GREATLY SADDENED BY THESE EVENTS.

5. THE SECRETARY SAID THE PRESIDENT IS ANXIOUS TO HOLD US-PRC RELATIONS TOGETHER; HE HAS PUT A LOT OF EFFORT INTO BUILDING THEM. HE REGARDS OUR RELATIONSHIP AS VERY IMPORTANT TO OUR TWO PEOPLES. THE SECRETARY NOTED THE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURES ON THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THE US ON THIS ISSUE. THE US HAS EXPERIENCED 213 YEARS OF DEMOCRACY WITH PEACEFUL PROTESTS AND PEACEFUL TRANSITIONS OF POWER.

6. THE SECRETARY SAID WE THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN A GOOD IDEA FOR FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN TO DELAY HIS VISIT. HAD HE COME HE WOULD HAVE ENCOUNTERED MANY PROTESTS, SO THE POSTPONEMENT WAS WISE. THE SECRETARY TOOK PARTICULAR NOTE THAT THE VISIT WAS POSTPONED NOT CANCELED.

7. SECRETARY BAKER ASKED HAN TO CONTACT HIS GOVERNMENT TO ASSURE THAT IT TOOK ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO PROTECT US INTERESTS AND CITIZENS. HE SAID AMBASSADOR LILLEY WILL BE GOING IN THE MORNING OF JUNE 8 TO REQUEST CLEARANCE ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO EVACUATE AMERICANS FROM BEIJING. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THERE ARE US COMMERCIAL CHARTER AIRCRAFT ARRIVING SHORTLY, BUT WE ARE REQUESTING ADVANCE CLEARANCE SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY TO BRING IN A MILITARY CHARTER.

8. THE SECRETARY NOTED OUR APPRECIATION OF THE FACT

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THAT VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHU HAD SEEN THE AMBASSADOR SO QUICKLY WHEN THE SHOOTINGS OCCURRED IN THE JIANGUOMENWAI DIPLOMATIC COMPOUND. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT OTHERS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO SEE THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER. AND WE WERE APPRECIATIVE OF THE QUICK RESPONSE IN OUR CASE.

9. AMBASSADOR HAN RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT HE HAD EXPLAINED THE PRC'S POSITION TWICE TO UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT IN EARLIER MEETINGS AND SAW NO NECESSITY TO REITERATE THAT VIEW WHICH WAS KNOWN TO THE US. HE HAD SAID THAT CHINA WOULD TRY TO FIND ITS OWN SOLUTION TO THE SITUATION. CHINA HOPED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE PRC WOULD NOT INTERFERE. HAN PROMISED TO REPORT OUR REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT.

10. THE SECRETARY REITERATED WE WILL ONLY ASK FOR PERMISSION FOR A MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO LAND IF IT PROVES NECESSARY. HE SAID WE HAVE TWO MILITARY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IN YOKOTA READY FOR USE. WE HAVE NO PLANS TO USE THEM NOW. BUT WE WERE MERELY REQUESTING ADVANCE PERMISSION IF NECESSARY SHOULD THE SITUATION DETERIORATE.

11. AMBASSADOR HAN REPLIED THAT HIS GOAL WAS TO PROTECT US-CHINA RELATIONS. AND THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD KEEP LONG-TERM AS WELL AS SHORT-TERM CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND. WE HAVE WORKED VERY HARD TO BUILD THAT RELATIONSHIP AND THIS IS A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE PERIOD. CHINA MUST FIND ITS OWN WAY. WHICH MIGHT NOT BE IN CONFORMITY WITH OUR WAY. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE

IMPORTANCE OF LONG-TERM CONSIDERATIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH IS WHY THE PRESIDENT WANTED HIM TO TALK WITH HAN. THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO PRESERVE OUR RELATIONSHIP AND HE HAS RESISTED PRESSURES TO TAKE ACTIONS FAR EXCEEDING THOSE

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TAKEN. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP CONTINUE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT ALSO WAS IMPORTANT FOR THOSE WHO BELIEVE IN FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE HEARD FROM. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY REITERATING HOW DISTRESSED AND SADDENED AMERICANS WERE, AND OUR HOPE THAT THE SITUATION WILL STABILIZE AND CALM DOWN, THAT CHINA WILL MOVE TOWARD MORE OPEN AND PLURALISTIC POLICIES, AND THAT WE CAN GET OUR RELATIONSHIP BACK ON TRACK. HAN SAID CHINA WOULD CONTINUE ITS INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY AND MAINTAIN ITS OPEN DOOR TO THE OUTSIDE.

12. PARTICIPANTS AT THE MEETING WERE: US--THE SECRETARY, U/S KIMMITT, PA ASSISTANT SECRETARY TUTWILER, EAP ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY CLARK, EAP ACTING DAS WILLIAMS, AND EAP/CM ACTING DIRECTOR BADER; PRC--AMBASSADOR HAN XU POLITICAL COUNSELOR XIAO HOUE, INTERPRETER CHEN MINGMING, BAKER

TOAST BY THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

BEIJING, DECEMBER 9, 1989

MR FOREIGN MINISTER, DISTINGUISHED GUESTS, LADIES
AND GENTLEMEN:

MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE COME HERE TODAY AS
FRIENDS, TO RESUME OUR IMPORTANT DIALOGUE ON
INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS OF VITAL INTEREST TO BOTH
OUR NATIONS. THIS IS A DIALOGUE WHICH WE BELIEVE
HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE HISTORIC, PEACE, STABILITY,
AND PROSPERITY OF ASIA AND THE WORLD.

LAST WEEKEND, IN ANOTHER CORNER OF THE WORLD,
PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV HELD TALKS ON THE
GREAT ISSUES OF OUR DAY. AFTERWARDS, PRESIDENT

2

BUSH INSTRUCTED ME TO COME TO CHINA AND INFORM OUR
CHINESE HOSTS ABOUT THE TALKS IN MALTA. THERE IS
NOTHING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET
UNION THAT NEEDS TO BE HIDDEN FROM THE GOVERNMENT
OF CHINA. THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE WORLD ARE
ENHANCED BY THIS DIALOGUE.

WE ALSO COME TODAY TO BRING NEW IMPETUS AND VIGOR
INTO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND SEEK NEW AREAS
OF AGREEMENT -- ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND STRATEGIC.
AND WE COME TO REDUCE THE NEGATIVE INFLUENCE OF
IRRITANTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP.


WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT EXHAUST
OURSELVES IN PLACING BLAME FOR PROBLEMS THAT EXIST.
RATHER, BY WORKING TOGETHER -- WITHIN THE VALUES OF
OUR DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS -- WE SHOULD SEEK TO
SOLVE COMMON PROBLEMS AND REMOVE IRRITANTS.

3

IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG DESIRE TO SEE THESE
TALKS MAKE PROGRESS AND LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE
SOLUTIONS WE SEEK.

SPEAKING AS A FRIEND, I WOULD NOT BE HONEST IF I
DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WE HAVE PROFOUND AREAS OF
DISAGREEMENT -- ON THE EVENTS AT TIANANMEN, ON THE
SWEEPING CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE. WE SEE YOUR
COMPLAINTS ABOUT US IN THE PAGES OF PEOPLE'S DAILY.

BUT I RECALL THAT WHEN WE HAVE FOUND WAYS TO WORK
TOGETHER, THE WORLD HAS BEEN CHANGED FOR THE
BETTER; AND WHEN WE HAVE BEEN AT ODDS, NEEDLESS
TENSION AND SUFFERING WERE THE RESULT.
IN BOTH OUR SOCIETIES THERE ARE VOICES OF THOSE WHO
SEEK TO REDIRECT OR FRUSTRATE OUR COOPERATION. WE
BOTH MUST TAKE BOLD MEASURES TO OVERCOME THESE
NEGATIVE FORCES.




IN THESE MEETINGS WE SEEK TO OUTLINE BROAD AREAS WHERE AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE, AND TO ISOLATE FOR ANOTHER TIME THOSE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT. THE SOONER WE SET ABOUT THIS TASK, THE BETTER. THE PATH AHEAD WILL NOT BE SMOOTH AND IT WILL NOT BE SHORT.

BUT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED MUCH WHEN WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER IN THE PAST. I CAN CITE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES, THE DEPARTURE OF SOVIET COMBAT FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN, LIMITS ON MISSILE PROLIFERATION, PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THE WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAM'S COMBAT FORCES FROM CAMBODIA, MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, SCHOLARLY EXCHANGES, AND MORE. WE -- BOTH SIDES -- MUST PERSEVERE. NOW MORE THAN EVER.

WE ARE NOT CHINA'S PRIME ENEMY OR THREAT, AS SOME WOULD CLAIM. BUT, LIKE YOU, WE ARE TRUE TO OUR OWN VALUES, OUR HERITAGE AND TRADITIONS. WE CAN BE NO OTHER WAY. WE EXTEND OUR HAND IN FRIENDSHIP, AND HOPE YOU WILL DO THE SAME.

NOW MAY I PROPOSE A TOAST TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

- TO THE HEALTH OF PRESIDENT YANG
 - TO THE GREAT CHINESE PEOPLE
 - AND TO U.S.-CHINESE FRIENDSHIP.
- 

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting Between Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
and National Security Advisor Scowcroft

DATE & TIME: Saturday, December 9, 1989 - 5:00 p.m.

PLACE: Diaoyutai State Guesthouse - Villa No. 12
Beijing, PRC

PARTICIPANTS:

US Side: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary
of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Douglas S. Paal, Director, Asian Affairs
National Security Council
Vivian Chang, Interpreter
Florence Gantt, Notetaker
Mildred Leatherman, Notetaker

PRC Side: Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu
Director, Department of American and Oceanian
Affairs, Zhang Yijun
Director, Office of American Affairs,
Ma Wenzheng
Deputy Director, Zha Peixin
Ma Yunsung, Interpreter
Lian Shengbao, Notetaker

Foreign Minister Qian Qichen: We are glad to have the pleasure
of meeting with you again. We very much appreciate the decision
of sending you as the President's personal emissary to Beijing.
We can exchange views on a wide range of subjects -- especially
listen to your report.

General Scowcroft: Thank you very much, Mr. Foreign Minister.
It is a great pleasure to be back again with my party and to have
a chance to meet with you and exchange views on a wide variety of
issues.

Foreign Minister Qian Qichen: You have a very brief visit so we
have to start working.

General Scowcroft: We are all ready to start, Mr. Foreign
Minister.

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Foreign Minister Qian Qichen: After the press leaves, I will invite you to brief me on the Malta summit. I think before the banquet we can listen to the briefing on the meeting and also we can exchange views on some issues.

General Scowcroft: Very good. Thank you very much. As I said, we are really very pleased to be here. President Bush has made a very special gesture in sending me and Secretary Eagleburger here to consult with you. Since 1972 the two sides have developed a practice of consulting together on major issues and developments in world affairs. The strategic relationship which has developed between us as a consequence of this practice has been a valuable one for the United States and we hope for the Chinese side as well. And, as I said, it is in the spirit of that relationship over the past years that the President has sent us to discuss a major event in the course of US-Soviet relations. The President also wanted to make this gesture to underscore his own personal interest in putting our relationship back on a positive rather than a negative track. I would just note now and we can discuss this later that the President by sending Secretary Eagleburger and me here and by his action on the Polesi bill which he vetoed has taken major political risks in the United States. *

Now, if I may, I will discuss the events of the recent summit with the Soviets. And let me start by describing just briefly President Bush's attitude toward a summit with the Soviet Union and how it evolved since the earlier days of his Presidency. The President was initially very skeptical of the wisdom of having an early summit with the Soviet Union on the grounds that those summits come to be envisaged by the press with so much publicity and so much of what the Americans would call hype. They come to be blown up in the press as major media events. The press tends to want to write who won, who lost, was the summit a success, was it a failure. And therefore before one goes into an event like that the President would want to make sure what the outcome was going to be in order that the event itself not produce unexpected results. For that reason he tended to want to wait until negotiations on a variety of issues such as arms control had developed so that it would be profitable to hold such a meeting. As this year moved on, though, and especially in the light of his trip to Poland and Hungary in July, and the subsequent economic summit meeting with the 7 European and Japanese in Paris, he began to change his mind. A visit to Poland and Hungary convinced him that there were events taking place in Eastern Europe which were of a very fundamental character -- a major event in the history of the world since World War II. In view of the sensitive nature of the events in the Eastern European countries and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the President felt that some discussion of events taking place both there and in the Soviet Union itself would be worthwhile. His colleagues

urged him to meet early on with Chairman Gorbachev and not to wait until a regular summit would have been appropriate.

It was at that time that we wrote to Chairman Gorbachev and suggested the possibility of a meeting. But at the same time he had not changed his attitude toward the dangers of a summit without very careful and long preparation and therefore we sought an occasion and an environment for a meeting which could clearly be labelled as a meeting and not a summit out of which there would be no expectations of decisions, negotiations and communique. And that's how Malta occurred.

The President's objectives, as I have already indicated, were to provide for an exchange of views with Chairman Gorbachev on the rapidly evolving world scene and on U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations, especially in order to reduce possible misunderstandings in the circumstances of these matters. The meeting itself was scheduled for a day and a half, alternating on U.S. and Soviet warships in the harbor at Malta. The weather, however, was most uncooperative and forced the cancellation of one of the meetings and the dinner, so exchanges were shortened below what the two sides had expected. This was unfortunate because as rapidly as events were moving when the President first decided to fix such a meeting, by late November they were moving much more rapidly and of course they have not slowed down even now.

At the meeting itself the President made an initial presentation covering a number of major issues both in events in the world and in bilateral or multilateral relations between the two powers, and I will just go down briefly the issues that he brought up and if you wish to discuss them in more detail, I will be happy to.

On arms control the President proposed that the two sides bring more political effort to the START (or the Strategic Arms Talks) to plan a course of reviewing the major issues still in dispute between the two sides so that all those major issues could be resolved by the time of the regular summit which the two scheduled for sometime in the last two weeks in June. As I saw, the hope was that the major issues would all be resolved by then and a treaty completed if not then, certainly by the end of next year.

On the conventional arms negotiations which, of course, is the negotiation between NATO members and the Warsaw Pact, the President proposed again giving a political impetus to those negotiations with the hope that they would be completed and could be signed at a summit meeting sometime next year. At the time the President proposed conventional negotiations last May in the conference at NATO, he said they should be able to be completed

within a year. We will not make that, but hopefully they can be completed sometime next year. With respect to chemical warfare, the President in his address to the United Nations last September had made proposals modifying U.S. position on chemical warfare and urging the conclusion of a multilateral convention on chemical warfare.

At the Malta meeting, he revised that proposal and suggested that the United States would be prepared to renounce any modernization of its chemical stocks, which had been proposed to make them more safe, if the Soviet Union would accept the remainder of the proposal at the United Nations for the reduction and eventual elimination of all chemical weapons. The goal of this proposal was not only to reduce early on the very large chemical stocks held by the Soviet Union but really to advance the possibility of successful attempts to prevent the proliferation of chemical warfare, both weapons and capability to build which, as you know, is spreading fairly rapidly through a number of nations of the world.

The President also proposed that final negotiation on the threshold test Ban treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions which actually had been signed by President Nixon in 1974, be completed so they could be signed at the summit next June. He also suggested that the Soviet government make a unilateral statement in support of the Missile Technology Control, which is a combination of United States and European powers to prevent the spread of ballistic missile technology. And the last point on arms control or military areas -- he suggested the Soviet Union make public much more data on their military budgets, on their spending on different weapons systems, and provided Gorbachev a stack of material which the United States makes public about our budget and military expenditures. This, of course, was not a negotiating meeting, but the Soviets indicated support for the President's suggestion about accelerated negotiation on the various arms control treaties that were under way and said they would study chemical warfare proposals. *Regime*

On economic affairs, the President suggested the negotiation of a trade agreement between the two sides toward the providing of ~~Soviet Union~~ Most Favored Nation status which would then allow the President to waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment prohibiting Most Favored Nation, which he said he would do after the Soviet Union had passed a law providing freedom of emigration. Chairman Gorbachev had earlier made clear to us that he was very interested in bringing the Soviet economy into the world economy and out of its very autarkic and isolated position, so the President said he would be prepared to support the position of observer status for the Soviet Union at the GATT (General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) system following (negotiation on) the Uruguay Round of tariff agreements.

With respect to human rights, the President proposed that the two sides clear up all the issues of divided families, of which there are quite a number, by the time of the summit next June.

On environmental matters the President told the Chairman that he was proposing a White House meeting of experts on science, environment and economics in climate change next spring, and that later in the year he would be hosting a conference on global climate change with a view toward completing a treaty; this conference would be held after a report of the UN Committee of the IPCC (International Project on Climate Change), and suggested that the Soviets might want to be affiliated with it. Since they are chairing the panel on the second, he was telling him of the conference he was going to hold.

And in the last of the major issues that the President put forth, he proposed a U.S.-Soviet student exchange, focusing on undergraduate students; the proposal was for 1,000 students a year U.S. and Soviet which hopefully could be expanded later on.

Mr. Gorbachev responded in a very general way to this presentation, stating that while the United States had rhetorically stated its support of perestroika, there had been no visible evidence of it, but that with this presentation Mr. Gorbachev said he believed now that the United States was sincerely supporting his efforts at perestroika.

Mr. Gorbachev really had three major topics which he raised in his own opening remarks. The first was a rather lengthy discussion on the theme that the reliance of the cold war on force and on military superiority had been wrong and that in the future the two sides should abandon such notions and deal with the situation as it is now and not as it was in an earlier era.

He pointed out that we were moving out of the world of the cold war of the super power conflict into a multipolar political world in which there was first of all a Europe which was close to becoming unified, a Japanese growing strength, China and India. He said that the United States and the Soviet Union must develop patterns of cooperation between the two of them to deal with these new realities. He said he was not suggesting a U.S.-Soviet condominium but simply a recognition of the new shape of the world.

He then turned to a discussion of Europe, both East and West, and that he supported the changes taking place both toward the economic unity of Western Europe and greater autonomy and

pluralism in Eastern Europe. He objected to the U.S. formulation that involved ending the separation of Europe on the basis of Western values, stating that the term "Western values" was an ideological formulation which was inappropriate. After a long discussion in which President Bush carefully pointed out that there was nothing ideological about the term but the values had been historically identified with the West; that is, democracy, pluralism, individual rights, and so on, the two agreed that ending separation on the basis of "democratic" values would be acceptable. Chairman Gorbachev, as I say, did indicate support for the changes taking place in Eastern Europe. Indeed at one point he indicated that he had stimulated them and he went on to say that the Soviet Union would not intervene in Eastern Europe. He stated that each country had the right to make its own choices of its political system and affiliation and to change those choices if it sought to. He indicated a hope that the evolution in Eastern Europe would go at a moderate pace, however, and reemphasized that in his comments about German reunification. As you know, before the meeting at Malta the Soviet had made statements indicating that the two German states should be a permanent feature of Europe. He modified that somewhat in the formulation he expressed to President Bush. He stated that history had created the two German states, that the world had inherited them as the outcome of World War II, and that we would leave it to history to resolve the issue of the German states and not try to force the people in any particular direction or at all.

With respect to NATO and the Warsaw Pact, he also modified the formulation he had earlier used which was that the Pacts should be abandoned. Instead he said that the two Pacts should add a political dimension to their activities and gradually increase the extend of their political activities, reduce that of the military until the two became wholly political associations which could deal with each other.

He then turned to Soviet internal developments and spoke at some length about some of the problems and hopes in that area. One of his main efforts was to develop a means of disposing of the means of production in the Soviet Union through such devices as leasing, the development of cooperatives, or of stockholding. He pointed out that different societies develop social systems to deal with the control of the means of production in different ways, and he cited the United States, Sweden and other countries who looked at them differently and he said at this point he did not want to foreclose any options on how it should be done. He said at the present time they are focusing on leasing, leasing -- leasing equipment and leasing land to individuals with the right to pass on the land up to 50 years to heirs. He discussed the need eventually to make the ruble convertible and to establish a

market-oriented system of pricing. He said that one of the major impediments to such development was the national overhang of rubles, that is the fact that the Soviet Union had printed excess rubles over the past years and they had to figure out a way to keep those rubles from flooding the market, creating inflation before they could move to do some of the economic monetary reforms they had proposed. He said one of his major philosophical problems with the perestroika reforms was what he called the leveling principle, that is the notion among the Soviet citizens that all should be equal and therefore there was no incentive for anyone to work harder to improve his own position.

The only separate arms control issue he raised was the question of naval arms control and in that connection he brought out a map which showed the Soviet Union completely encircled by United States bases and especially naval combatants. He said he understood that geography had made the United States a naval power to an extent that the Soviet Union was not but that this kind of dramatic asymmetry was not right and he focused on the area of sea-launch cruise missiles. He didn't make a specific proposal to deal with sea-launch cruise missiles but suggested that the United States' notion that verification was so difficult we should not try to control them, gives the United States the ability to circumvent other (nuclear arms) limits by employing additional sea-launch cruise missiles.

Much of the time which would have been devoted to regional issues didn't take place because it was in the meeting which had to be cancelled. But there were two or three regional issues which were raised. Perhaps the most controversial discussion related to Central America, where President Bush complained particularly about arms supplies to Nicaragua and to the rebels in El Salvador, provided by Nicaragua in the Salvadoran case and by Cuba or allies of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had provided us with assurances that from Nicaragua they were not providing military equipment to the rebels in El Salvador. We have obtained and provided to the Soviets irrefutable proof of Soviet shipments of military equipment to Nicaragua and the President forcefully said that was unacceptable. Mr. Gorbachev's general response (which the President found unsatisfactory) was that the Soviet Union had no interest in building a bridgehead in Central America, that Nicaragua was certainly not a Marxist regime in any sense of the word and indeed Nicaragua and Cuba had the right to pursue their own policy. Mr. Gorbachev said that he had pointed out to Mr. Castro last spring that he should follow the lead of some of the Eastern European states, but that when Mr. Castro demurred he said he had the right to follow his own policy. As I say, President Bush found this exchange unsatisfactory. Mr. Gorbachev followed this up in the same vein with an attack on

U.S. support for President Aquino on the occasion of the recent attempted coup d'etat and said that this was intervention in the internal affairs of another country and President Bush was replacing the Brezhnev doctrine with the Bush doctrine. Mr. Bush, of course, strongly disagreed and said that we were supporting a democratically elected government struggling to bring true democracy to the Philippines to resist a colonel trying to shoot his way into power.

The other major regional issue which was discussed was Afghanistan. Mr. Gorbachev said that the two sides should stop their mutual recriminations about who was doing what and who was right and who was wrong and instead deal with the current situation. The current situation, he said, was that the Najibullah regime was getting stronger and that the Mujahedin was in some disarray and were already talking to Najibullah. The President disagreed with that evaluation of the situation in every respect and reiterated the unacceptability of Najibullah and associates to the Mujahedin. Mr. Gorbachev proposed an interim Afghanistan dialogue designed to set up an interim council which would prepare elections in Afghanistan under UN supervision and he said that was supported by both the Kabul regime and the old King Zahir. Mr. Gorbachev said that he was willing for a ceasefire in Afghanistan and a cessation of arms aid by both sides. I think it is fair to say that there was no progress made in the discussions on Afghanistan.

The other major issue which was dealt with but not at great length was the Middle East and the two agreed on support for the new President of Lebanon, President Hwari, and agreed to lend their efforts to his support and to get President Aoun to cease his operations and the Syrians to refrain from attack. There was a brief reference to the Arab-Israel dispute, with Mr. Gorbachev saying that we should take advantage of Yasir Arafat and his moderation; if he were to leave there would be a more radical Arab approach to the problem and a solution therefore would be less possible. Let me conclude with just a couple of words about Chairman Gorbachev himself. He seemed clearly to want the meeting to be perceived to be successful. He was very warm and genial, kept himself under careful control and even at points where the dispute became heated, he did not react as sharply as he has been known to on previous occasions. He seemed to be aware of the magnitude of the problems facing him, both economic(s) and ethnic, within the Soviet Union, but he was clearly self-confident and showed no sense of self-doubt about what he was doing.

And that is a general summary of what happened at Malta, Mr. Foreign Minister. I would be happy to expand on any issue you wish or go into other issues. The NATO meeting which followed

Malta was basically a report by the President to his NATO colleagues and led to a discussion later in the day of the future of the NATO alliance and a ringing endorsement on the part of all the members that the alliance was still a vitally important institution for peace and cooperation in Europe. As you can see, what was notably missing was a discussion of Asian regional issues which unfortunately fell out because of the shortened meeting. There were really no discussions of Korea, Cambodia or, except for the brief mention of the Philippines, others in Southeast Asia.

Foreign Minister Qian Qichen: Thank you very much for your account. I want to ask a few more questions and I would very much appreciate it if you can make some more comments.

General Scowcroft: Certainly.

Foreign Minister Qian Qichen: First is that Gorbachev has been saying that the cold war is over. What is the United States' evaluation of his comments? May I put 3 questions and then you answer them.

General Scowcroft: Certainly.

Foreign Minister Qian Qichen: During the meeting both sides seem to have focused on German issues. Are there any differences and what is the difference? And ultimately talk about your impression of Mr. Gorbachev and where the Soviet Union is now. What is American evaluation of Mr. Gorbachev and his comments about the prospects for overcoming his difficulties and about his own position and his own growth. I would very much appreciate it if you could make some comments on these questions.

General Scowcroft: About the cold war -- is it or is it not over? President Bush's evaluation on that is that he would rather not get into the position of discussing slogans. There were many hopeful signs in the attitude of Mr. Gorbachev on the Soviet Union, if you will, an apparent willingness to let the situation in Eastern Europe be resolved on the basis of the self-determination of ~~(interest of)~~ the people involved, but especially in many regional issues there were indications that some of the old thinking had not really changed; after, for example, initial hopeful signs in Afghanistan, that does not appear so promising. Perhaps the same in Cambodia, although that may be premature. And certainly from the United States' point of view in Central America, the kind of behavior that could be expected from the Soviet Union in the days when clearly there was cold war is still in evidence. This is a very complicated question and an answer depends in part on trying to look at two separate aspects of

Soviet behavior. The first is that which clearly developed in the Stalinist days after World War II with deliberate Soviet expansionism which threatened all of its neighbors and virtually the entire world. I think that one must admit the possibility -- whether from a changed attitude or simply from economic problems -- of a Soviet Union that may have changed or at least moderated.

The other is a Russian manifestation about which Chairman Deng spoke so eloquently last February and that is sort of historical impulse, the Russians have a definite aggressive, expansionist character to them. And therefore, I guess I would say on balance that it is premature to come to any lasting or optimistic conclusion but that we must be careful for the possibility of a reversal of the present apparent attitudes.

The next question was on Eastern Europe and especially on Germany. I guess with respect to the Eastern European states, Gorbachev had pretty much given up and that barring some severely destabilizing event, ~~that~~ he was not inclined to interfere any more.

On Germany it is apparent that Gorbachev is extremely reluctant to see much progress or certainly progress on a culmination of the unity of the two Germanies. The U.S. attitude toward German reunification is that it should be done if it is done on the basis of self-determination of the German people with no particular preconceived notion as to what should take place or how. Any move toward reunification has to take sure account of West Germany's membership in NATO and in the West European Economic Community and the legal obligations of the allied powers for Germany, especially Berlin. We certainly believe that reunification should only be in accordance with the declaration of the Final Act of CSCE (The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) which says no ^{practices} practices can be changed by force in Europe but they can be by peaceful means. I guess in the final statement on that, I would say the United States will not stand in the way of German reunification.

On the evaluation of Gorbachev and his prospects I think one has to be pessimistic. He faces enormous problems in his announced goal of the transition of that economic system. He himself does not appear to have a very sophisticated attitude about the economic system, of some of the issues in moving to a market economy or changing the fundamentals from a command to a commodity economy. He admits he faces severe ethnic problems (with miners) in the Soviet Union and says he is prepared to try to find any kind of arrangement which is mutually agreeable, some kind of autonomy, federalism, what have you, but I think clearly would stop at granting independence to those areas. While his challenges are formidable to say the least, it is not our view

that he faces any internal challenge to his leadership or any alternative choices to the policy that he is pursuing. And his economic approach seems highly experimental and not so carefully thought out so that he continues to follow a fixed course. Faced with problems he seems quite prepared to abandon an approach to try something else. That could be good or bad.

Foreign Minister Qian Qichen: Thank you very much for your additional comments. I think your detailed briefing will surely help us to understand better the discussion at Malta. It is our impression that a very important agenda item of that meeting is the discussion of the attitude of both the United States and the Soviet Union on the drastic changes in Eastern Europe. That is the most important change occurring since the Second World War and it is developing at such a rapid speed that every week we have something new. Naturally those events belong to the internal affairs of the countries. I think it is a good thing that both the Soviet Union and the United States show their willingness to refrain from any intervening. It is a good principle but I don't think it is a principle that is absolute any more and actually it is because Europe is farther away from us so our concern is mainly in the studies we have conducted about these developments. We have dealt on the basis of ~~8~~ Principles, especially nonintervention in others' internal affairs. And we also hope to have stability in Eastern Europe, because instability in Europe will give rise to many problems. I think as we approach the end of the 1980s there is now a high frequency of diplomatic activities and the Malta high-level meeting is one of them and so are the Warsaw summit and the NATO summit. Then there is something between the French and the Soviet Union. Also Mr. Genscher, the Foreign Minister of West Germany, is now explaining their positions. Many leaders have been paying visits to Berlin. The European Community is also in meetings. It seems to me that all are sending officials to these diplomatic activities, or nearly, and we are observing the developments at a distance. So what you have said just now will be of great help to us. the Five ✓

Now to return to some remarks you made in the beginning of your account. The sending by President Bush of you as personal emissary is a very important political gesture, especially you make mention of the fact that ever since 1972, there have been exchanges between our two sides on major international developments and that the United States regards its relations with China as one of great strategic importance and this is also the approach adopted by China. And we also very much appreciate President Bush's idea of bringing our relations back to a positive track and this is something we share with him. At this time your briefing itself will be of help to us and also the fact that you have been sent by the President to brief us on the Malta

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meeting is of great significance. I would therefore like to express our thanks again to you. We will go to short banquet and meet this evening. ✓

General Scowcroft: If I could, just in response briefly to your last comment, it very much expresses the American sentiment. The world is changing very rapidly and especially the character perhaps of the Soviet Union and the threat it has posed for some time to the rest of the world. It is possible, for example, that because of the changes in Eastern Europe the military threat to NATO may be diminishing. It may well represent a general diminishing of the Soviet threat in all areas. It is too early to see. But in this connection one also has to look at a time of change like this of other international alliances which could conceivably develop such as that, for example, between the Soviet Union and Japan. The possibility of significant instability which could develop either in Eastern Europe or other parts of the world just underscores the value of the strategic relationship that we have with China, between two countries who do not constitute threats to each other, whose cooperation in the past on specific issues such as Cambodia, Afghanistan, has produced major results. The relationship is perhaps even more valuable while perhaps changed somewhat in character from the time we originally started out. ✓

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Memorandum of Conversation

Private Meeting of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft with
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen

Beijing, Diaoyutai Guesthouse No 9

Sunday December 10, 1989, 2:13 p.m. - 2:50 p.m. (Beijing Standard
Time)

Participants:

U.S. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Douglas H. Paal, NSC, Notetaker
Vivian Chang, Interpreter

PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen

Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu

Director, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, Zhang
Yijun

Director, Office of American Affairs, Ma Wenzheng

Deputy Director, Zha Peixin

Ma Yunsung, Interpreter

Lian Shengbao, notetaker

General Scowcroft: I would like Secretary Eagleburger to speak
now because he will be in charge of negotiations on the package.

Secretary Eagleburger: Before we leave I want to establish a few
points on where we will go next. As the diplomat on this trip,
let me be undiplomatic. My impression is that you and we are
engaged in a kabuki dance. You say, and we accept, that there
has to be movement on our side before you can move. We say to
you, and are sincere, that there has to be movement on your side.
We are now circling each other, each waiting for the other to
move. There is no purpose served arguing over who moves first.

From our side, we are faced with the realities of dates on which
decisions must be made. The first decision we must make will be
on December 15, on the agreement to satellite launchings.
Congress returns on January 23. Certainly when they come back,
assuming no movement, the Pelosi Bill and whatever other
legislation they decide will be reintroduced.

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While we have not given you our final word on the package you gave us yesterday, I can tell you now that it will not work as now structured. All of us on the American side agree it will not work, largely because the linkage between sanctions and the release of Fang Lizhi is so direct that at home we politically cannot manage it.

Let me emphasize that this is not the official government response, but General Scowcroft and I agree that when we get back to Washington and get together to formulate a detailed response, we will have to say the same thing to you.

We will pull a small group together. We will get a counterproposal to you by the end of the week, and hopefully give it to your ambassador. Without describing what the details of the package will include, I can indicate that they will include such issues as martial law, the release of Fang Lizhi, World Bank loans, and the sanctions. We will try to find how to fit all these pieces into that package.

I would like to make one specific point on Fang Lizhi. One proposal we will make will include that, because from our view his release will have the greatest impact of all the actions you might take and will make the rest of the package easier to do. We may also give you a second proposal which does not deal with this issue. If it is difficult to do the other things, we are prepared to set the issue of Fang aside, and after the atmosphere in our relations improves, we will be prepared to come back to that issue.

Again, we will examine your proposal back in Washington. Fang Lizhi is not necessarily the sine qua non to improving the atmosphere and undoing the damage collectively done over the last months.

With regard to who goes first, there is no need to have an argument, but from the Washington perspective, we have taken steps already, not least that we are here already.

On the Pelosi veto, you may not be satisfied with the President's decision. But it was politically costly for him, and it will be so when we go back. I was personally involved in granting an

exception for the export of inertial guidance equipment for the sale of the Boeing aircraft. And the Peace Pearl project is moving forward. These are some steps we have taken. Again, I raise this not to get into an argument or because I feel they are adequate. I raise them to demonstrate that the President is trying to take steps to improve the atmosphere. I should also tell you, if we heard the Premier right this morning, I thought he said that the Chinese government would make clear its unhappiness with the President's administrative measures regarding the Chinese students in the United States after we go home, if that is the threat I think I heard (nervous laughter from Chinese), the impact in the U.S. will undo whatever we have done by coming here yesterday and today, undo that completely. At a minimum we will not be able to improve the atmosphere as we say we want.

On the issue of the satellite launch, we face a decision date, December 15. I am not making a linkage, but we have to tell you that we have information, which some members of Congress have access to, that there are some lower level Chinese officials who are talking of sales of ballistic missiles, particularly to the Middle East. We do not question the statement of your Foreign Ministry spokesman on November 23, but some in the Congress will doubt it. It will be much easier on December 15, if we have a reaffirmation of the November 23 statement, plus some indication that missiles ~~will~~ will not be sold to regions of particular instability. We do not expect an answer now, but will need it by December 15.

surface to surface
Let me make two points. We are anxious with regard to the atmosphere to make some small moves on each side, even before we get the package response to you by the end of next week. We are looking for small steps to convince the Chinese people that it is wise to begin the process of improving relations and to help us with the Congress. I would like to leave a couple of ideas with you. For example, just for example, if your side could possibly stop jamming VOA or permit a VOA correspondent to come to China, in an unconnected fashion, we could remove the travel advisory.

Perhaps these are not the specific steps, but what we are searching for are beginnings in these next days before Congress returns. They are steps both sides can take without one or the other looking like one prevailing over the other. This will help with military sales, the banks, and convince the American and Chinese publics that it is wise to move in this direction.

We would like to suggest for your consideration, for Ambassador Lilley and your designee to work out details on when and how the Fangs may leave. It appears all of us agree on the need to solve this issue. Totally off the record, and ad referendum, we need to agree that both of us want to see his release.

With regard to our response to your package and the counterproposal, that can be done here or to your ambassador in Washington as you prefer. We would prefer Washington, but do not insist on it, assuming it is an effort we jointly want to accomplish.

Mr. Minister, in the U.S. we have the tradition of the good cop and the bad cop. You have had a full day of the good cop, and only fifteen minutes of the bad cop.

Ambassador Lilley: I would like to add one thing, if I may. Whatever we do on Fang Lizhi will help to improve the atmosphere on a broad range of issues. Vice Minister Liu Huaqiu has helped three get out already, and can do the talks.

Secretary Eagleburger: That is if we are prepared to settle the issue. If it is to put it off to one side, that is another matter.

Ambassador Lilley: One other matter that might be raised with Ambassador Zhu, that is to move to eliminate artificial constraints on the embassies, for example, the military attachés at our embassy are not permitted to join attaché trips. Resolving this would help to move our atmosphere along.

Foreign Minister Qian: I think, Mr. Secretary Eagleburger, that I understand your remarks are not a response, and that you will respond next week as a counterproposal. First, both sides agree on a package solution, and while this is in process, the general public should not get the impression of any package deal. It should seem that both sides seek to improve relations.

I also agree we should not leave the impression of which side gains or does not gain, wins or loses, or moves first. I agree Vice Minister Liu and Ambassador Lilley should meet to discuss the details on Fang Lizhi. These negotiations can begin without waiting a response to the package. Naturally, implementation will come after your response.

I also agree that after your formal response in Washington the discussions can take place between Ambassador Zhu and your State Department officials. I also agree both sides should consider which steps both sides can take to improve relations between our countries and the atmosphere.

I would like to raise a few points. Our Peace Pearl project is underway, and we regard this as positive. We hope to see it continue without further setbacks. Not long ago, due to the temporary suspension, the actual cost of the program exceeded the budget for it. We hope the American side will consider that the Chinese side can hardly bear this burden. Also, in terms of military cooperation, which includes torpedoes, large-caliber artillery shells, radar, there are some problems, and they should also include timely delivery. ✓

You made mention of Premier Li Peng's remarks regarding the measures taken by president Bush with the Pelosi veto. This is a misunderstanding on your side. You know very well, the American side made lots of effort, but the Chinese government cannot justify this action to the people without reacting. We have already made our reaction.

Secretary Eagleburger: We noticed.

Foreign Minister Qian: After you leave, we will publish no more reaction. By reaction, as Vice Foreign Minister Liu already made clear to your embassy, the Ministry of Education will take action to send no more graduate students to your country. In the statement issued by the State Education Commission, this comment did not appear in the press. So in implementing this measure, we will take some notice of the impact on the U.S. and we hope the U.S. will do the same.

As for the sale of intermediate-range missiles, China's position is very clear. The U.S. is very aware of it. The Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a clear declaration. In the days to come, when similar questions are raised we will make clear our position in the same way.

These are my points. I will add that through this visit we can start our joint efforts. Both sides should work collectively and separately.

Secretary Eagleburger: Done.

Foreign Minister Qian: Very good.

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PROGRAM FOR VISIT TO CHINA BY MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT,
U.S. PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL EMISSARY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

9 December (Saturday)

15:00 Arrive Beijing by American special plane Boeing
707 (Southern Apron, Capital Airport)

15:10 Leave Airport for Diaoyutai State Guesthouse
(Guesthouse)

15:50 Arrive Villa No. 9, Guesthouse

16:55 Leave Villa No. 9 for Villa No.12

~~✓~~ 17:00 Talks with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
(Villa No. 12, Guesthouse)

LILLEY
TRANS.

19:00 Welcoming banquet by Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen (Villa No.12)

✓ 20:30 Private talks between Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen and National Security Advisor
Scowcroft (Villa No. 12)

LILLEY
TRANS.
NOTE

10 December (Sunday)

7:30 Breakfast

8:20 Leave Guesthouse for Zhongnanhai
(Through northwestern entrance)

✓ 8:30 Meeting with Premier Li Peng
(Ziguangge, Zhongnanhai)

✓ 9:45 Meeting with General Secretary Jiang Zeming
(Room 202, Zhongnanhai)

✓ 11:00 Meeting with Comrade Deng Xiaoping
(Fujian Room, Great Hall of the People, through
northern entrance)

~~✓~~ 12:00 Working lunch with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
(Villa No. 9, Guesthouse)

14:20 Leave Guesthouse for Capital Airport
(Southern Apron)

15:00 Leave Beijing by American special plane
Boeing 707

TOAST BY THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

BEIJING, DECEMBER 9, 1989

MR FOREIGN MINISTER, DISTINGUISHED GUESTS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE COME HERE TODAY AS FRIENDS, TO RESUME OUR IMPORTANT DIALOGUE ON INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS OF VITAL INTEREST TO BOTH OUR NATIONS. THIS IS A DIALOGUE WHICH WE BELIEVE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE HISTORIC, PEACE, STABILITY, AND PROSPERITY OF ASIA AND THE WORLD.

LAST WEEKEND, IN ANOTHER CORNER OF THE WORLD, PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV HELD TALKS ON THE GREAT ISSUES OF OUR DAY. AFTERWARDS, PRESIDENT BUSH INSTRUCTED ME TO COME TO CHINA AND INFORM OUR CHINESE HOSTS ABOUT THE TALKS IN MALTA. THERE IS NOTHING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION THAT NEEDS TO BE HIDDEN FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA. THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE WORLD ARE ENHANCED BY THIS DIALOGUE.

WE ALSO COME TODAY TO BRING NEW IMPETUS AND VIGOR INTO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND SEEK NEW AREAS OF AGREEMENT -- ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND STRATEGIC. AND WE COME TO REDUCE THE NEGATIVE INFLUENCE OF IRRITANTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP.

WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT EXHAUST OURSELVES IN PLACING BLAME FOR PROBLEMS THAT EXIST. RATHER, BY WORKING TOGETHER -- WITHIN THE VALUES OF OUR DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS -- WE SHOULD SEEK TO SOLVE COMMON PROBLEMS AND REMOVE IRRITANTS.

IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG DESIRE TO SEE THESE TALKS MAKE PROGRESS AND LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE SOLUTIONS WE SEEK.

SPEAKING AS A FRIEND, I WOULD NOT BE HONEST IF I DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WE HAVE PROFOUND AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT -- ON THE EVENTS AT TIANANMEN, ON THE SWEEPING CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE. WE SEE YOUR COMPLAINTS ABOUT US IN THE PAGES OF PEOPLE'S DAILY.

BUT I RECALL THAT WHEN WE HAVE FOUND WAYS TO WORK TOGETHER, THE WORLD HAS BEEN CHANGED FOR THE BETTER; AND WHEN WE HAVE BEEN AT ODDS, NEEDLESS TENSION AND SUFFERING WERE THE RESULT. IN BOTH OUR SOCIETIES THERE ARE VOICES OF THOSE WHO SEEK TO REDIRECT OR FRUSTRATE OUR COOPERATION. WE BOTH MUST TAKE BOLD MEASURES TO OVERCOME THESE NEGATIVE FORCES.

IN THESE MEETINGS WE SEEK TO OUTLINE BROAD AREAS WHERE AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE, AND TO ISOLATE FOR ANOTHER TIME THOSE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT. THE SOONER WE SET ABOUT THIS TASK, THE BETTER. THE PATH AHEAD WILL NOT BE SMOOTH AND IT WILL NOT BE SHORT.

BUT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED MUCH WHEN WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER IN THE PAST. I CAN CITE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES, THE DEPARTURE OF SOVIET COMBAT FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN, LIMITS ON MISSILE PROLIFERATION, PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THE WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAM'S COMBAT FORCES FROM CAMBODIA, MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, SCHOLARLY EXCHANGES, AND MORE. WE -- BOTH SIDES -- MUST PERSEVERE. NOW MORE THAN EVER.

WE ARE NOT CHINA'S PRIME ENEMY OR THREAT, AS SOME WOULD CLAIM. BUT, LIKE YOU, WE ARE TRUE TO OUR OWN VALUES, OUR HERITAGE AND TRADITIONS. WE CAN BE NO OTHER WAY. WE EXTEND OUR HAND IN FRIENDSHIP, AND HOPE YOU WILL DO THE SAME.

NOW MAY I PROPOSE A TOAST TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
-- TO THE HEALTH OF PRESIDENT YANG
-- TO THE GREAT CHINESE PEOPLE
-- AND TO U.S.-CHINESE FRIENDSHIP.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Memcon	Re: Private Meeting of National Security Advisor Scowcroft with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qicen (6 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitve) [6]

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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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2000-0116-F/2
JL 8/14/07

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting Between General Secretary Jiang Zemin
and National Security Advisor Scowcroft

DATE & TIME: Sunday, December 10, 1989 - 9:45AM - 10:47AM
(Beijing Standard Time)

PLACE: Room 202, Zhongnanhai - Beijing, PRC

PARTICIPANTS:

US Side: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary
of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Douglas S. Paal, Director, Asian Affairs
National Security Council
Vivian Chang, Interpreter
Florence Gantt, Notetaker
Mildred Leatherman, Notetaker

PRC Side: Jiang Zemin, General Secretary
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu
Director, Department of American and Oceanian
Affairs, Zhang Yijun
Director, Office of American Affairs,
Ma Wenzheng
Deputy Director, Zha Peixin
Ma Yunsung, Interpreter
Lian Shengbao, Notetaker
(plus one unidentified official)

General Secretary Jiang: (Welcoming pleasantries.)

General Scowcroft: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much being here and having the opportunity to meet you and to exchange views. It is very nice to be here. I appreciate very much the opportunity to meet you. I bring you greetings and best wishes from President Bush. I must say on a personal note the first word I heard when you became General Secretary was from Mr. Trammell Crowe.

General Secretary Jiang: (In English) My good friend. Many years friendship. My good friend.

General Scowcroft: He called to say what a wonderful person you are and to say how good it is for US-China relations.

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General Secretary Jiang: He is a strong supporter.

General Scowcroft: Let me say that President Bush has asked Secretary Eagleburger and me to come here in the spirit of the relationship which has developed between our two countries to share our perspectives on issues of major world significance. Over the years, that has resulted in the development of a strategic relationship which the U. S. feels is of great value to us and to the interest of world stability. And it is in that spirit that President Bush asked Secretary Eagleburger and me to come to discuss with you a significant event in US-Soviet relations, that is the meeting in Malta. ✓

The President also wanted to take this step to underscore his strong personal interest in putting our relationship back on a positive track away from the negativism of recent months. In doing this and in his recent action of vetoing the Pelosi Bill, he has undertaken some considerable political risks to himself. The initial reports in the United States of the announcement of our trip here has aroused strong negative press comments in some circles. I cite this simply to explain that the President definitely does want to move forward on our relationship but there are significant impediments in the United States.

The Foreign Minister last night, for example, presented a thoughtful package of alternatives on which we might be able to proceed. We have some problems with that formulation, not with the objectives, with which we concur, but with the approach. We can go back and review it and respond in due course. Certainly there is a strong desire on the part of the United States to move forward but we do have domestic difficulties, strong political costs.

If I could just explain briefly why President Bush felt the need to meet with Chairman Gorbachev, something of the meeting and of the situation in which we feel the world finds itself at the moment.

His original notion of the timing for a US-Soviet Summit was after the completion of the various negotiations we have underway on different aspects of arms control and different elements in our bilateral relationship. After his visit to Poland and Hungary last summer, however, he came to the conclusion that there were very fundamental, very important and accelerating movements taking place in that area and that it was important to discuss those trends and developments in Eastern Europe at the point of convergence of US and Soviet forces.

The meeting was designed not to negotiate specific issues, not to come to agreements, or issue communiques, but simply to exchange

views on developments taking place in the world and on the possible consequences of those movements in order that there not be misunderstandings between the two leaders. At the meeting the two agreed to try to accelerate negotiations on arms control but the focus of the meeting really was on developments in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union, and the discussion we had on certain regional issues. That discussion was briefer than anticipated because the weather did not cooperate and we had to cancel one meeting and dinner between the two sides.

Chairman Gorbachev seemed to us to be fully aware of the enormous problems he faced in his attempt to restructure the Soviet economy. He was, however, full of self-confidence in what he was about but to us he seemed to have perhaps only superficial understanding of some of the economic aspects of the efforts he was making to introduce market economics into the Soviet system.

With respect to Eastern Europe, Chairman Gorbachev seemed not only to be approving of developments there but indeed took some credit for what was happening in Eastern Europe. He made it quite clear that he had no intention of intervening in the developments in Eastern Europe although he evidenced some disquiet at the possible pace of developments which could introduce instabilities.

With respect to the issue of German reunification, he softened somewhat the formulation which the Soviet Union had been using; that is that there were two Germanies and that was the way it had to remain. He presented to President Bush a more ambiguous formulation, that is that history had given us the two Germanies as the result of the aftermath of World War II and that since we had inherited that situation from history, we should let history solve it and the pace of developments should not be influenced by the outside. He remained obviously reluctant about the possibility of German reunification but did not pose an absolute prohibition on it.

For his part, President Bush pointed out that the United States had since the 50's supported eventual German reunification and we would not oppose such an event.

With respect to the discussion of regional issues, there was a very strong exchange about the situation in Central America in which President Bush objected strongly to the role of Nicaragua in supporting the rebels in El Salvador and of Cuba in providing military support to Nicaraguan-armed forces, which were far larger than any in that region and far larger than any legitimate national defense needs would require.

Chairman Gorbachev indicated that during his visit to Cuba last

spring he had suggested that Castro should begin to emulate the countries of Eastern Europe and modernize his system, but he said that in line with Soviet policy not to interfere in the internal developments and in the right of each country to make its own choice and to change its mind if it wished, that he was not going to interfere with Mr. Castro.

Mudheden
President Bush did not find the discussion of Central America to be satisfactory. The other major regional issue discussed was Afghanistan, which was raised by Chairman Gorbachev. He stated that the two sides should stop arguing about the past and deal with the current situation which he described as one in which the Najibullah and Kabul regime was getting stronger and the ~~Mudheden~~ were in disarray and were already beginning talks with the Najibullah regime. President Bush disagreed with the appraisal and the two leaders then turned to the discussion of possible ways to get discussions going. The position of Najibullah still remains a major impediment to getting those talks going. Chairman Gorbachev would propose the notion of a ceasefire in Afghanistan and a cessation of military supplies to both sides. I believe it is fair to say that there was no progress made in discussions about Afghanistan.

Time prevented a discussion of any other of the major regional issues -- in Asia, for example. There was a brief discussion of the Middle East focussing on the situation in Lebanon and the new Government, ~~and~~ which both agreed they would support.

Our appraisal of the meeting and of the situation at the present time is that Chairman Gorbachev is facing very serious troubles at home, troubles which he perhaps does not fully understand how to deal with; that he has largely given up on Eastern Europe and is prepared to let it go with the possible exception of development of serious instability potentially with East Germany or Czechoslovakia.

There seems no doubt that the world is in a rapid state of flux at the present time. The Soviet Union has reduced its conventional forces and in part its spending on military forces. It, however, has shown little if any diminution in spending on its strategic and nuclear forces. The changes in conventional forces to in fact reduce the threat around the Soviet border of a surprise massive conventional attack across those borders and the situation in Eastern Europe with the certain instability of the forces of those countries does significantly change the character of the trend of the Warsaw Pact to NATO defenses.

I believe it is premature, however, to come to any final historical conclusions that the ambitions of the Soviet Union -- either those ambitions coming out of a Stalinist drive for

expansion after World War II or the fundamental Russian impulse toward expansion -- have been significantly lessened or eliminated.

Chairman Gorbachev pointed out that the world was becoming a multi-polar one with a rapidly unifying Europe, a strengthening Japan, China and potentially India as great powers of the world. He suggested the necessity of a US-Soviet cooperative approach to this new multi-polar world while disclaiming any notion of a US-Soviet condominium.

While the United States has no particular interest in such an approach, there is no question that the world is changing rapidly, that a different coalition of forces and powers is possible. In these circumstances a strategic relationship has developed over the years between the United States and China, who have no points of direct conflict with each other in strategic matters. While that relationship may alter somewhat with respect to the Soviet Union in the future, depending on how the situation develops, in the United States' view, it is as important now or perhaps more so to deal with this uncertain world of today. In the areas where the United States and China have cooperated closely, such as Afghanistan and Cambodia, the results have been very positive, both for the two countries and for the world as a whole. And the United States looks forward to resolving the current problems between us in order that we can continue and accelerate such a relationship.

General Secretary Jiang: Thank you very much, General Scowcroft, for your detailed account. Because time is so short today I will just briefly touch on several issues. I can fully understand ~~that~~ the fact that President Bush has sent Your Excellency to China and also that some of his previous measures are aimed at improving the current Sino-^{US}relations. I can also understand another point that struck me -- that President Bush was now in a rather difficult position. I don't say that I have a full grasp of the relationship between Congressional activities and power of the Presidency but I think, with my background, I have some understanding of this because I began to receive an American and British-style education when I was a young student.

First of all, I want to say that both sides are now proceeding in their own interests, as was the case when President Nixon came here on his first visit to reestablish Sino-US relations. I am especially aware of the fact that you came here with the advance team in 1972 and together with President Nixon. Events have come a long way since 1972 and at that time our leader Zhou Enlai was still alive and he had a very important principle: to find common interest -- or a Chinese saying that we should find the common ground while reserving minor differences.

Just now you have briefed me on your views of international developments and also on the Malta meeting between President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev and the analyses that the two made during the meeting. This reminds me of some remarks which are quite common, cliches -- a story from the Three Kingdoms that under the sun everything will become united after a long time of separation and after a long time of unity they will certainly be separated. I am not saying this is so but that the world situation is in constant flux. I think both China and the United States are committed to peace in the world and I think we can both agree on two major themes: peace and development.

The second point is that in the Asia-Pacific region our two countries share several common points. In terms of economic development in the future, this Asia-Pacific area will develop very rapidly in the years to come. So we share a common interest.

The third point is that China is a country with 1.1 billion people, therefore come what may China will develop more trade potential and this will provide us for a number of opportunities for cooperation in the future market. China will be a great market. Ever since 1972 when China and the United States issued the Shanghai Joint Communique, I can't say there have been no differences between us. Actually Taiwan was the major difference. And in regard to Taiwan, our position has always been a clear one. That is a principle of one country, two systems. So I think in general terms the tendency is increasing exchanges, even in peoples coming to the mainland to visit their brothers, and now many visit here. One country, two systems has always been our consistent ^{basic} principle. At a recent press conference, a reporter (~~we were~~) asked if China would abandon use of force against Taiwan. We said we couldn't make such a commitment. Naturally we ^{hope} for a peaceful resolution, with Taiwan returning to the motherland. Some of my classmates are now working in Taiwan in some rather high posts. Secondly, there is a question of ideology. Your ^{being} a capitalist country and ^{we are} our being a socialist country, but I don't think this should constitute an obstacle because we have always stood for the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Ideological differences should not lead to any obstacles to our relations. When Mr. Nixon came last time he said that he found it quite ^{different} to understand how China can promote reform and oppose bourgeois liberalism. We will stick to reform, but by bourgeois liberalism, we mean that there are some difficulties. We welcome Western investment, but oppose some influences, such as prostitution, gambling, pornography, drug taking, etc. We oppose bourgeois liberalization, but are willing to learn and acquire advanced technologies and know-how from your country.

Concerning the developments in Eastern Europe, I want to make several points especially clear. By comparing China with Eastern Europe you can find several differences. The first is our party has been developing and growing in all kinds of struggles since the May 4th movement in 1919. Second, our Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has been developing under the leadership of the Communist Party of China through all kinds of struggles, including the anti-Japan war. Third, the Chinese people liberated themselves by themselves. ^A Fourth, difference is ~~because of~~ geographic location and the historical background and tradition of China -- because it tends to ~~revisit~~ foreign aggression.

RESIST

In February of this year, when President Bush came to China, Deng told him about aggression made by Russia against China. Also there is the 8-year anti-Japanese war which left a very permanent impression on the Chinese mind. Also the Chinese people want to maintain friendly relations with the Japanese people but an 8-year war still remains vivid on their minds and cannot be so easily wiped from the minds of the people. So I think after I have explained the above points I believe that our two sides can find many common interests in the current turbulent situation. I think we should adopt a forward-looking approach with a sincere desire to work for common interests. Our efforts to improve bilateral relations will be successful.

Give my best regards to President Bush and Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger.

General Scowcroft: I certainly will. Both President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger spoke very highly of their visit here. President Bush invited both of them to the White House immediately upon their return to have discussions on their meetings.

General Secretary Jiang: Time is limited. We had a long time to talk with Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger. I hope next time we can have a longer time to talk.

General Scowcroft: Thank you very, very much. I enjoyed meeting you.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting Between Premier Li Peng, and National Security Advisor Scowcroft

DATE & TIME: Sunday, December 10, 1989 - 8:45 am - 9:40 am (Beijing Standard Time)

PLACE: Ziguangge, Zhongnanhai - Beijing, PRC

PARTICIPANTS:

US Side: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Douglas S. Paal, Director, Asian Affairs ✓
National Security Council
Vivian Chang, Interpreter
Florence Gantt, Notetaker
Mildred Leatherman, Notetaker

PRC Side: Li Peng, Premier
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu
Director, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, Zhang Yijun
Director, Office of American Affairs, Ma Wenzheng
Deputy Director, Zha Peixin
Ma Yunsung, Interpreter
Lian Shengbao, Notetaker

Premier Li Peng: At a quarter to ten you will be meeting with the General Secretary so there is still an hour to go and I hope we can make good use of this one hour for an exchange of views. Here I want to listen to your views because you are our guest. Yesterday you already had a meeting with our Foreign Minister. Today we are going to talk on the basis of those meeting you had last night. Your thinking is of particular concern to us as to the evaluation of the United States with regard to the general situation after the Malta high-level meeting. Does Your Excellency think the cold war has ended or not ended? As far as China is concerned, it does not pose a threat to any country or any region. We are devoting ourselves to the goal of doubling our GNP by the end of this century so that our people can lead a more comfortable life. We want a peaceful international alignment and a stable political situation. So here I would like to listen to your views about the international situation.

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General Scowcroft: Thank you very much, Premier Li. May I say again it is a pleasure to be back and I bring you greetings from President Bush, who remembers with appreciation your hospitality for his visit last February.

I appreciate very much your opening comment and question because it underscores the very reason that President Bush asked me to come here. Since 1972 we have developed a practice of consulting together on major world developments. And this practice, we believe, has been of great value to both sides and to world stability as a whole. And it is in the spirit of that relationship that I am here with Secretary Eagleburger to discuss a major event in US-Soviet relations. President Bush wanted to make this gesture to underscore his strong interest in putting our relationship back on a positive track rather than a negative one. I would just say that in taking this step of sending us here and of his act in vetoing the Pelosi Bill, which passed the Congress unanimously, President Bush has not only made a gesture but has done so at considerable risk to himself, and initial reports from the United States with the announcement of the news of our visit has been sharply negative^{ve} in some quarters.

It is important that as we seek to restore the relationship that you understand the problems the President faces in being able to move forward. I take the time to state this to you personally because I believe that at our last meeting we had a very good exchange on the attitudes between us and a very good understanding of each other's problems. So I did want you to understand the current situation with the President.

You asked for our appraisal of the world situation at the current time. And pointed out China's position and objectives. Let me say that it is our judgment that a great many very fundamental currents are moving in the world today, that events are taking place with great rapidity and it is difficult to predict the future course of those events. In our judgment Mr. Gorbachev came to power feeling strongly that the Soviet economy was stagnant and in serious need of reform. His goal was basically to improve the efficiency of production and the efficiency and effectiveness of manpower. As he ran into trouble in his efforts to bring economic change and reform to the Soviet structure, he turned more and more to political and social measures to bring pressure to get his economic reforms adopted. He has tended to go more and more in that direction as the pressures increased and indeed the political and social changes have far exceeded the economic changes he has been able to impose.

This policy has at the same time unleashed forces both inside the Soviet Union and especially in Eastern Europe which have created

a momentum of their own, perhaps far beyond anything that Mr. Gorbachev anticipated. Inside the Soviet Union which, after all is in some sense an empire of many peoples, he has encouraged sentiments of nationalism among the minority peoples and also the demand of the peoples for greater economic and political representations of their own needs and demands.

In Eastern Europe the results have been even more dramatic. In those societies in many cases the regimes were imposed rather than native to the cultures and unrest was waiting just beneath the surface.

In Poland and Hungary the nationalist impulse was already underway and in those two countries change has been more gradual and more moderate and we are seeing in both countries now a coalition between Communist and non-Communist parties trying to deal with this new phenomenon. In those countries therefore there is still a considerable amount of stability and one can hope that the situation will progress at a measured pace not creating enormous problems. In other countries, however, especially East Germany and Czechoslovakia there was a severe resistance by the leadership to any of the current of change. When in the course of implementing his internal reforms, Mr. Gorbachev in a sense encouraged those kinds of reforms in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The result has been a very rapid movement, a rejection of current leadership almost totally, and the result is the possibility of a collapse of authority of any kind inside those societies with the consequence of severe and troubling instability.

Mr. Gorbachev made it clear to us that he does not intend to interfere in the affairs of Eastern Europe. He believes that they must find their own way at their own pace. The possible exception to that is the issue of German reunification. Whereas before our meeting at Malta, the Soviet policy seemed to be a rejection of the possibility of German reunification, Mr. Gorbachev formulated that question to President Bush in a slightly different way. He said that history had created the two German states in the aftermath of World War II, that the present world had inherited those two states and that history should determine the resolution of that situation, that it was not up to the world leadership to force either the pace or the direction of that movement. Clearly he is reluctant about German reunification but has moved off his position of absolute rejection of that possibility.

That is a very long background leading up to the question which you posed. Internally, inside the Soviet Union Mr. Gorbachev is facing severe problems. His economic situation is bad and has perhaps been made worse by the reforms that he has adopted.

Economically he seems to have no clear, at least no sophisticated, understanding of how to introduce the market economics which he seems to want to employ. He is at the same time, at least in his conventional military forces making some cutbacks both in the size of the forces and in procurement, especially in tanks, for example, apparently in an attempt to shift resources from the military into the civilian economy. His increasing preoccupation with his economic problems and his shifting of resources to the civilian economy do, in fact, have a military impact. Certainly with respect to NATO and I think presumably in the East it does reduce^{the} capability of the Soviet Union to mount a massive surprise attack across the border. In Eastern Europe there has been another change with respect to the Warsaw Pact and the threat it constitutes to NATO. The rapid change in the political circumstances in the states of Eastern Europe has certainly made a significant change in the kind of threat that NATO would have to face from the Warsaw Pact. Of that there is no doubt. Mr. Gorbachev seems to have given up on Eastern Europe in the sense of trying to influence developments there. Whether or not that change means a turning of greater attention to the East or whether this is a part of a general relaxation it is probably too early to say.

With respect to the question about the cold war, President Bush has taken a position that the term "cold war" is a slogan, an emotional slogan, and he would prefer dealing with the facts and realities as we have been discussing rather than to deal with the slogan itself. In that respect, I think we have to look at two aspects of the manifestation of Soviet expansionism.

The first is that which came out of World War II, out of Stalinism, if you will, which constituted a direct threat to all of the countries, both those surrounding the Soviet Union and in the Third World at large, in the ideological expansionism of Soviet Communism. Indications both of developments inside the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe are that there may have been some lessening, if not termination, of that kind of impulse and yet in certain regional areas of the world there are still signs that there has been no diminution of that impulse to expansionism. But underneath this surface, if you will, in historic terms, this drive towards expansionism, there is a deeper historical thrust and this is that the Russian state itself goes back far before the Revolution of 1917.

I remember Chairman Deng in February eloquently describing some of the manifestations of that historical impulse to expansionism. I think in answering the question, one has to look at both of these impulses and I believe that history has yet to reveal the ultimate consequences of the activities taking place at the present time. This is a rapidly moving world at the present time.

Mr. Gorbachev suggested to President Bush at Malta that the world was becoming a multi-polar world, moving away from the bi-polar world of the early post-war period. And that such entities as a rapidly unifying Europe, a growing strengthening of Japan, of China and potentially of India meant a very different world. He suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union needed to develop a cooperative approach to dealing with this world while at the same time disclaiming any ideas of condominium.

May I just close by suggesting that in this rapidly changing world the strategic relationship between the United States and China, while perhaps modifying somewhat in respect to changes in the Soviet Union, may be even more important as one looks at the possibility of a different alignment of forces, for example between Japan and the Soviet Union and that therefore while it may change somewhat in character from the U.S. point of view, it is perhaps even more important than it was at the time that we began.

Premier Li Peng: Thank you very much for the detailed account of your views of the international situation. I want to take this opportunity to brief you on my views.

The history of the world did not repeat itself but it may have some striking similarities. The present developments of Eastern Europe may not necessarily be good. For example, German reunification, with two German states reuniting, the German state will emerge as the strongest nation in Europe. And this will certainly exert some influence on Europe both economically speaking and in the future in other areas. Take the Soviet Union, for example, it is now no threat to NATO and the United States. I don't share this view because I believe with all the changes that the threat will still be there so you can't depend on any particular person. For example, Chairman Gorbachev is devoted to detente and new thinking, but you have to look at the entire nation and entire leadership. We can't make any prediction about prospects for Mr. Gorbachev but after all he is faced with many difficulties.

It is our view that the economy is the base while the politics is the manifestation. Without economic stability you cannot enjoy political stability for a long time. And also diplomacy is a continuation of internal affairs of a country. If your internal affairs are in a mess, such diplomacy will be weak. Also with the growing economic strengthening of Japan there will be growing friction between Japan and Europe and the United States. You see, the Japanese are saying little but are quietly doing a lot by themselves. Why should they speak so little? Because

(interpreter stumbling) they have a bad reputation from an earlier time. But they are doing things. We are not surprised by current developments in Eastern Europe because of all of that which used to take place in China. You see when China was in the Cultural Revolution we had a similar case, that is chaos emerged in just a few days time. Had we not adopted resolute measures on June 4, the present situation in China would even be more turbulent today. So a rift in the Communist Party in China would lead to a civil war.

I do not require you to accept my views now but please remember my remarks. In five or ten years time you will see that events will prove our views, our measures are constructive in China and even ~~to~~ contributed stability of the world.

Bring a message back to the masses in the United States that the political situation in China is stable. This year we had a Fourth Plenary¹ committee meeting in June and then in November we had a Fifth Plenary session of that committee. These were two very important meetings in which we reached decisions on personnel and policy. Now the objective, the specific steps and the line of China are very clear. So in making an analysis of the situation in China you should not listen to the views of the radical intellectuals but rather to the broad masses of peasants, workers, and members of the Communist Party of China because our party has a total membership of 40 million. I believe it is worthwhile to deal with such a stable leadership of China and once more the present China leadership, with Jiang Zemin as the core, is reliable.

I don't deny that in China there are opposition forces and some people who complain about the present government of China. There are indeed such elements but those complaints come from two sources. We have lapses in our work and some forces hostile to the socialist system, but they are not in the mainstream in China and they cannot develop into the mainstream. So similar events as in Eastern Europe will not occur in China. As for the economic situation in China I think there are both good things and bad things. But the good news is more than ^{the} bad news. Our inflation rate has now been brought below the double digit figure. The ~~cost~~ ^{cost} is a slowdown in our production growth rate. But only with this production rate slowdown can we achieve restructuring. Only with such a restructuring can we make progress. Now the general public in China is very pleased with the fact that prices are quite stable and we have an abundance of commodities -- not like the Soviet Union where their shelves are empty. Our shelves are full and this can be proved by Ambassador Lilley. I am not saying that we have more supplies or better commodities than in the United States but I am saying as compared with the Soviet Union or as compared with China during the same

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period last year when we had panic buying.

You were right in saying Chinese reform started with economic reforms and have been coordinated with political reforms. So China's economy is going through a vicious cycle and we are constantly encountering all kinds of difficulties. You mention market forces. We also introduced market mechanism. At the same time we have preserved the planned economy. We tried to bring about a combination of the two. So even in the process of our economic overhaul and economic retrenchment, some major reform measures will still be worked out and will still be implemented. So the analysis that in China's economy we have stopped reforms, that we are now reverting to ten years ago -- this analysis is wrong. So you can wait and see and observe our development and gradually come to a fair conclusion. But I estimate that the slowdown in China's economic growth rate will continue for some time and then achieve a more stable balance.

And finally I want to touch upon Sino-US relations. As far as China is concerned, it is ready to improve Sino-US relations. We have taken the initiative to preserve our relations. We can understand your repeated explanation of the predicament and difficulties faced by President Bush. But on the other hand, the Chinese Government and leadership are also faced with difficulties and are also under some restraints. We are ready and not reluctant to solve the problem of Fang Lizhi because this question has also created a lot of trouble for us. So if in the future we should release Fang Lizhi, then we have to do a lot of persuasion toward our people. President Bush has on the one hand vetoed the Pelosi Bill but on the other hand has taken some administrative measures which are in essence the same as the legislation. So the Chinese people really find it difficult to understand this. The US may think this is drastic action but to China it is like old wine in a new bottle. You see China is a developing country and by sending one student to study abroad we have to spend \$10,000 each year on each student. This amount of money can enable us to bring out ten graduates. So I think if certain individuals don't come back it is okay. If none of them come back then this would not do. Because the government cannot justify this before the people. Therefore we have to make a strong reaction to these administrative measures taken by President Bush. So after you go back home we will have to make some strong reactions but while you are here we will not make such reaction. I think you can understand we will have to make such strong reaction so I think it would be best if we can solve the problem of US-Chinese relations at one stroke because we share common interests. That is, on the other hand we should not rule out the possibility that both sides taken some practical steps. That is to say we should do some solid things. For example, I don't think it would create any difficulty for

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President Bush to send students back to China. It would not prove difficult for President Bush to ask the World Bank to extend loans to China because although President Bush does not control the bank, he can exert some influence.

And actually I very much appreciate your visit at this time because I regard it as a new beginning in improving our relations. The Americans are the most pragmatic people. But perhaps both sides can take practical steps to improve our relations. You will now meet General Secretary Jiang since you have never met him before. In years to come he will be #1. I'll be supporting him. Our cooperation is better than my cooperation with Zhao Ziyang. This is for your private use. Later you will meet with Chairman Deng.

(Exiting, to Ambassador Lilley) Don't act like Ambassador Lord and go meeting with our radicals.

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see improvement of relations. I think we share the common desire and common need. I think we can find a solution.

General Scowcroft: I agree with you completely. While the excuse of my coming is to explain the discussions we had with the Soviet Union in Malta, in fact it is an expression of both the strategic relationship that we have developed and the President's interest in discussing with the Chinese leadership the important developments of the world, but even more his interest in returning the relationship to a positive rather than a negative track that recent developments have put us on.

Deng Xiaoping: So please convey my best wishes and warm regards to President Bush. I know that he has done a lot in trying to find a solution to this problem. And actually, he has run into some difficulties but I think generally speaking we can see that the Chinese leaders are faced with even more difficulties. The main difficulty in our minds lies in the fact that we must justify ourselves in the eyes of the Chinese people so that the Chinese people will be more at ease after this problem is settled.

And also internationally speaking, if we cannot find a proper solution to the problem, then our international prestige will be affected. Take the Japanese, for example, in the past Japan was quite modest in the face of China because it has a deep debt to China because of its past history. But it has been very active against China in putting sanctions on China and it regards extending loans as a precondition (in Chinese: it has preconditions for extending the loans). This time they are very active in putting sanctions on China and they regard extending loans as a precondition. Recently they said they will not sell steel to China. That's all right. We can find it on the international market. And we can do without their loans. the Japanese in their relations with China have grown very much complacent.

As far as Europe is concerned, I am very much dissatisfied with the attitude of the French. Internationally speaking China can indeed exert special influence. So instability in China will create a lot of problems. And surely those problems will not be confined to a regional nature. At least it will result in chaos in the Asia-Pacific region. So this will certainly not be a blessing for the United States and China.

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About the world situation, I want to ask my friend privately and unofficially about Malta. What kind of world outcome will this lead to? What kind of outcome will this meeting have with respect to Eastern Europe?

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This turmoil is even more serious than had occurred in China in June. It is very difficult to predict the implications and consequences. I think in these circumstances the Soviets have scored no points and even if the United States has scored any points, it can't be much. So it is someone else who scored the points. It is the rivals of the United States who scored points.

China can do no damage to the United States. China posed no threat to the United States. So the United States should not antagonize China. China does not consider the United States as a rival. Ever since 1972, we have done nothing to hurt the interests or feelings of the United States. Naturally there have been some incidents in a technical sense but not in a political sense.

Over the past 17 years since 1972, the international situation has enjoyed stability and in this regard the excellent development of Sino-US relations has played a major role. It has carried great weight. I am not clear about the possible outcome of the present turmoil in Eastern Europe but I believe Sino-US cooperation will be very important for peace. So I think China and the United States should refrain from fighting each other. Naturally by fighting I do not mean war -- I mean verbal attacks.

I would like you to bring this message to President Bush. We should try to put an end to our dispute by taking into consideration the interests of the other side by both sides. We should not just take into consideration in carrying out the sincere cooperation the interest of one side. Both sides need to be considered. So in this way in the final analysis we can find solutions.

General Scowcroft, I know you are a trouble shooter (literally, "you have many ways"). Many of our friends in the United States are friends of yours. Dr. Kissinger can count as one. So I think since there are so many people with excellent ideas they can surely find ways that are mutually acceptable. I think if both sides can make concessions to solve the difficulties this question can be resolved, by enabling you to deal with Congress and to deal with the people. I asked Dr. Kissinger to tell President Bush that if we can find a proper solution to our problems, then at an appropriate time next year you can arrange for a visit to the United States by General Secretary Jiang. That visit should take place when there is a good atmosphere with all the problems resolved in Sino-US relations. Otherwise why should he just go there? Just for wrangling? I think that visit should symbolize that we have put an end to the dispute and we should go forward together.

Now I am really, truly in retirement. I have made up my mind not

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to interfere in the work of the new leadership because that is not good. I hope the new leadership can make better progress. But I am still a citizen of the Peoples Republic of China and a member of the Communist Party of China, and I am still interested in the stability of China and I am interested in the security and stability of the world situation. Please tell President Bush that he should not forget the fact that in Beijing, in the Orient, there is an old man who is very much interested in the excellent development and the improvement of Sino-US relations. In his recent letter to me he said that although I have retired he still regards me as a friend and I share his views. So in spite of the differences between our two countries we are still friends and I think it would be useful if we can deal with disputes between our countries and stay as friends. I propose that after we have settled the recent disputes, then ~~the~~ General Secretary Jiang will pay a visit to the United States and during the visit, President Bush and the General Secretary can find themselves congenial and make new friends with each other. As for friends, you can never have too many (laughing). So I am making these remarks as a friend. Chairman Jiang and Li Peng will speak on behalf of the party and government of China. So today although we are holding this talk in the protocol sense of the word, they speak for the government. Actually I still have some substantive ~~issues~~^{views}. Do you have any comments?

General Scowcroft: I thank you very much for your comments and may I say that President Bush agrees with you completely both in your appraisal of Sino-US relations, the steps we need to take and also in terms of the strategic picture in the world. He has never moved from his objective of sustaining and even improving the strategic relationship between the United States and China. During the difficult period of the last several months, in fact, he tried his best to restrain friends and allies both in Europe and Japan from taking actions even more extreme than they did.

Deng Xiaoping: I know this.

General Scowcroft: He faces now big problems with the American Congress and in our political system. On some events when the Congress and the President are so opposed, the President has very little power against the Congress.

Deng Xiaoping: That is why I have said on many occasions that China cannot adopt the US system. I have said this many times. We cannot interfere. Some Americans say the US system is good, but I myself will say that we can't adopt such a system. Should we put an end to our meeting or do you have any more comments?

General Scowcroft: May I just end by saying that the President is determined to restore our relationship and he agrees with the

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goal of having Chairman Jiang visit the United States in an atmosphere of cooperation.

Deng Xiaoping: Your side should extend a formal invitation otherwise it would not do ~~otherwise it would not do~~ for the General Secretary of our party to go.

General Scowcroft: We still have work to do but that is what we are working toward. In connection with our strategic relationship, the President agrees completely that at a time when there is much turmoil in the world and events are moving rapidly that the strategic relationship between the US and China, who have no fundamental interests against ~~to~~ each other, it is perhaps even more important than it was in the past 17 years.

Deng Xiaoping: Both sides should make efforts and this must not be a protracted process. A protracted process does not serve the interest of either party. That is exactly what I meant now. Some misconceptions might occur in these circumstances. So it is very important to make a sober-minded analysis of the situation. Sometimes you have to wait for a year or two years before you can come to understand the nature and substance of the changes and direction and pattern of such changes. If someone can claim that they can give the final say on the analysis of a situation, then I shall regard him as boasting.

General Scowcroft: One final personal note. President Bush considers you ~~and~~ old and very dear friend. He knows that you are retired. He doesn't want to bother you but he would like to be able from time to time to write you a letter if that is all right with you.

Deng Xiaoping: But naturally I will be glad to accept. I will be glad to receive those letters but I might not necessarily reply to those letters because I cannot speak on behalf of the party and the people. The letters may touch on some substantive issues and I may not speak on the issues. But I would write letters conveying personal greetings. Please convey my best wishes to President and Mrs. Bush saying we are indeed still friends. So in spite of the temporary disputes the two of us are still friends. Our friendship is not ~~inactive~~ affected (X).

General Scowcroft: Good.

Deng Xiaoping: So our friendship should last for a long time.

General Scowcroft: Very good.

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