Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

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2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files

OA/ID Number: 91135
Folder ID Number: 91135-004

Folder Title:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Schedule	Re: Appointment Schedule/Brent Scowcroft [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (7 pp.)	2/5/90	(b)(3)	
02. Cable	Re: Briefing the Japanese on Malta (2 pp.)	12/5/89	(b)(1)	C
03a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Chairman Deng Xiaoping of People's Republic of China (15 pp.)	7/2/89	(b)(1)	S
03b. Talking Points	Re: We are here.. (8 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS
03c. Draft Memcon	Re: Meeting with Chairman Deng, Premier Li Peng, Vice Premier Wu, Foreign Minister Qian Qichan and Other Chines Leaders (11 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS
03d. Draft Memcon	Re: Continuation of Meeting w/o Deng [FOIA exemptions redacted] (16 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04. Handwritten Notes	Re: [Short-hand Notes by Florence Gannt of Meeting] (131 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Pinksheet Number: cap1122
OA/ID Number: 91135-004
Date Closed: 5/5/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Friday, December 8, 1989

2:15 AM Dep Andrews (7 Hrs 30 Min -4 Hrs)

5:45 AM Ar Elmendorf (2 hours refuel)

7:45 AM Dep Elmendorf (7 Hrs 50 Min +18 Hrs)

Saturday, December 9, 1989

9:30 AM Ar Yokota (2 Hrs refuel)

11:30 AM Dep Yokota (4 Hrs 30 Min -1 Hr)

3:00 PM Ar Beijing (Crew must have 15 hours rest)

Evening Meeting in Beijing - Saturday

Sunday, December 10, 1989

Late Morning or Noon Meeting in Beijing - Sunday

3:00 PM Dep Beijing (3 Hrs 25 Min +1 Hr)

7:30 PM Ar Yokota - Helo to downtown Tokyo (15 minutes)

Evening Meeting in Tokyo w/Dep ForMin Owada & Mr. Kuriyama

Monday, December 11, 1989

9:00 AM Meeting w/Prime Minister

10:00 AM Meeting w/Foreign Minister

Helo to Yokota

12:30 PM Dep Yokota (6 Hrs 25 Min -18 Hrs);

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Chase has been to China several times with the President and has attended each social event that the Bushes attended with Han Hsu at Chinese Embassy or at V.P. residence

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Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

12/8

Dep A 2015
Ar El 2345
Dep El 0145 12/9
Ar Yokota 0330 12/10
Dep Y 0530 12/10
Ar Beij 0900 12/10
(15 hr Crew Rest)
Dep Beij 2400 12/10
Ar Jeddah 0430 12/11
Dep " (Crew Rest 2000
Ar Elm 08:30 Am 12/11
Dep E 10:30
Ar N 2100 12/11

Dep A 2:15 AM 12/8
5:45 - Dep 7:45
Ar Beij 1500 - 9 hr

Yokota 9 hr
9:30 AM
Refuel
Dep 11:30

Ar 1500
15 hr Crew Rest
12/10 Dep 10 0
Ar Tokyo 2 hr
14:30
(Crew Rest)
Dep 2200 12/10
Ar Elm 10:30 AM 12/10
Dep 12:30
Ar Ant 2300 12/10
Same

1645 - Helicopter arrival at Hardy Barracks

1900 - Arrive at Okura Hotel (baggage will be delivered by road, approximate arrival time 2030)

- Departure from hotel TBD

2030 - Dinner hosted by Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama, location TBD
U.S. participants: General Scowcroft, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, Ambassador Armacost, Mr. Untermeyer, Mr Paal
Japanese participants: Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama, Deputy Foreign Minister Owada, North American Affairs Bureau Director General Arima, EUR DG Tcco, Asia DG Tanino, notetaker

- Return to hotel, RON

December 11

0845 - Baggage pick-up at hotel

0850 - Depart hotel

0900 - Call on Prime Minister Kaifu at Prime Minister's office
Participants: General Scowcroft, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, Ambassador Armacost, Embassy notetaker

0955 - Depart

1000 - Call on Foreign Minister Nakayama at Foreign Ministry
Participants: General Scowcroft, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, Ambassador Armacost, Embassy notetaker

1145 - Depart hotel

1210 - Helicopter departs Hardy Barracks

1230 - Aircraft depart from Yokota Air Base

Ambassador's Limo

General Scowcroft

Ambassador Armacost

Limo II

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger

Mr. Untermeyer

Ms. Leatherman

DCM Sedan

Mr. Paal

Ms. Gantt

DCM Breer

Sedan II

Mr. Brown

Mr. Frank

Poloff Price

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Schedule	Re: Appointment Schedule/Brent Scowcroft [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (7 pp.)	2/5/90	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

Date Closed:	5/5/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91135-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 02/05/90

November

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

December

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

January

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

Friday 12/08/89

1:30AM		Dep Residence f/Andrews AFB
2:15AM		Dep Andrews AFB (7 hrs 30 mins, -4 hrs)
5:45AM		Arr Elmendorf AFB (2 hrs refuel)
7:45AM		Dep Elmendorf AFB (7 hrs 50 mins, +18 hrs)
11:45AM		(P/Arrive Camp David)

Saturday 12/09/89

9:30AM		Arr Yakota AB, Japan (2 hrs refuel)
11:30AM		Dep Yakota AB, Japan (4 hrs 30 mins, -1 hr)
3:00PM		Arr Beijing, China
		EVENING MEETING IN BEIJING - SATURDAY
NOTES:		P/CD

Sunday 12/10/89

		LATE MORNING OR NOON MEETING IN BEIJING - SUNDAY
3:00PM		Dep Beijing, China (3 hrs 25 mins, +1 hr)
7:30PM		Arr Yakota AB, Japan
		Helo to downtown Tokyo (15 mins)
		EVENING MEETING IN TOKYO W/DEP FORMIN OWADA & MR. KURIYAMA

Monday 12/11/89

9:00AM		MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
10:00AM		MEETING W/FOREIGN MINISTER
		Helo to Yokota AB
12:30PM		Dep Yokota AB (6 hrs 25 mins, -18 hrs)
1:00PM		Arr Elmendorf AFB (2 hrs refuel)
3:00PM		Dep Elmendorf (6 hrs 30 mins, +4 hrs)
		1:30 pm - Arr Andrews AFB
		2:00 pm - Arr White House
		2:30-4:00 pm - P/Budget Review (NASA/Energy/Science) - Oval
5:00PM	5:30PM	Senior Staff Meeting - Sit Rm ~~CONFIDENT~~
8:00PM		P/BLK TIE Cong'l Ball - State Floor
NOTES:		(Baker OOT)

Tuesday 12/12/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer - [redacted] C
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - [redacted] C - Oval

Bush Library Photocopy

Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 02/05/90

Tuesday 12/12/89 (continued)

8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
9:45AM	10:45AM	P/Cheney-Powell-Jt Chiefs Mtg on Post-Malta - Oval
11:00AM	NOON	P/Budget Review - Oval
1:15PM	1:45PM	(P/Mtg w/Core Business Group Ldrship - Roos Rm)
2:00PM	3:30PM	P/Budget Review - Oval
3:30PM		Photo-Op w/Shirin Tahir-Kheli (338-2761) + 4 others Jeff x4974) ORDER PHOTOG
4:00PM		Interview - John Newhouse re Baker Profile (Popadiuk)
~~4:15PM~~	~~5:15PM~~	~~P/NSC Mtg re L - Cabinet Room (per Welch) (TUES OR WED ?)~~
6:30PM		(P/Christmas Reception - St Floor)
8:30PM		(P/American Cardinals' Dinner - Nat'l Bldg Museum)
NOTES:		(Baker OOT)

Wednesday 12/13/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:05AM	7:15AM	PDB Briefer - [redacted]
7:15AM	8:00AM	B-S-C Bkfst - Here (CONFIRM/ORDER SET UP - BAKER OOT)
7:30AM	8:00AM	(WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room - RG TO HANDLE)
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - [redacted] - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
10:00AM	10:10AM	P/Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan - Oval
10:15AM	10:30AM	Jack Stein [redacted] GET DOB
10:45AM	11:45AM	P/Budget Review - Oval
2:00PM	3:00PM	P/Budget Review - Oval 3:00 - NSC Mtg (L) -
4:00PM		Mtg w/Council of Presidents of National Arab-American Organizations (Welch)
6:30PM		(P/Christmas Reception - St Floor)
NOTES:		Secy Baker Out of Town
NOTES:		(Baker OOT)

Thursday 12/14/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer - [redacted]
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - [redacted] - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
10:20AM	10:30AM	P/Pre-briefing f/Wire Services Intv - Oval
10:30AM	10:50AM	(P/Wire Services Interview - Oval)
11:00AM	NOON	P/Budget Review - Oval
1:30PM	2:00PM	P/Mtg w/Core Conservative Group Ldrship - Roos Rm
2:15PM	3:15PM	(P/Domestic Policy Council Mtg - Cabinet Rm)
3:30PM		Professor Richard Gardner [redacted]
4:00PM	4:20PM	Press Interviews (Popadiuk)
4:30PM		Steve Ledogar, US Amb to Conf on Disarmament, w/Kanter & Mahley
5:00PM	6:00PM	DCI and DDCI Meeting
5:15PM		(P/Tree Lighting Ceremony - Ellipse)
6:30PM		(P/Christmas Reception - State Floor)
NOTES:		(Baker OOT)

Bush Library Photocopy

Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 02/05/90

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7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - [redacted] C - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
10:00AM	11:00AM	P/Budget Review - Oval
1:30PM	2:00PM	P/Sec Baker - Oval
3:00PM	6:00PM	Host NSC Christmas Party - Indian Treaty Room (Whitley)
6:10PM	10:30PM	P/TO NEW YORK & RTN TO WH
NOTES:		(Baker OOT)

Saturday 12/16/89

6:20AM	6:30PM	P/Marine One depart WH f/Andrews AFB
6:35AM	11:35AM	P/Air Force One depart Andrews AFB f/St Martin
11:40AM		P/Arrival Ceremony
NOON		P/Meeting w/President Mitterrand
1:15PM		P/Working Lunch w/President Mitterrand
3:15PM		P/Joint Press Conference
4:30PM	7:30PM	P/Air Force One depart St Martin f/Andrews AFB
7:35PM	7:45PM	P/Marine One depart Andrews AFB f/WH

Sunday 12/17/89

NOON		(P/Family Brunch)

Monday 12/18/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer -
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
11:00AM	11:30AM	P/Pre-brief f/Media Interview - Oval
11:30AM	11:50AM	(P/Interview w/US News&World Report - Oval)
1:15PM	1:40PM	P/Pre-brief f/Media Interview - Oval
1:40PM	2:10PM	(P/Interview & Photo Session w/Newsweek - Oval)
2:15PM	3:15PM	P/Diplomatic Credentials Ceremony - State Floor
4:00PM		Gen Robert Pursley (320-2169) 11-23-27
5:00PM	5:30PM	Senior Staff Meeting - Sit Rm
6:30PM		(P/WH Staff Christmas Reception - St Floor)

Tuesday 12/19/89

6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer -
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
11:15AM	11:30AM	P/Pre-brief f/Media Interview - Oval
11:30AM	11:50AM	(P/Interview w/Time Magazine - Oval)
2:00PM		Argentine Amb Guido di Tella (Pryce)
6:30PM		(P/Christmas Reception - State Floor

Bush Library Photocopy

Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 02/05/90

Wednesday 12/20/89		
6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:05AM	7:15AM	PDB Briefer -
7:15AM	8:00AM	B-S-C Bkfst - Here (CONFIRM/ORDER SET UP)
7:30AM	8:00AM	(WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room - RG TO HANDLE)
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
11:00AM	11:30AM	Address FEMA at FEMA HQTRS - 6th & C Streets, NW (Pilling)
1:30PM	2:00PM	P/Sec Baker - Oval
2:00PM	3:00PM	P/Diplomatic Credentials Ceremony - State Floor
6:30PM		(P/Press Christmas Reception - State Floor)
Thursday 12/21/89		
6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer -
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
2:45PM	4:00PM	P/Diplomatic Credentials - State Floor
4:00PM	4:20PM	Press Interviews (Popadiuk)
5:00PM	6:00PM	DCI and DDCI Meeting
6:30PM		(P/Residence Staff Party)
Friday 12/22/89		
6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer -
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
8:00AM	8:15AM	P/PDB Briefer - Oval
8:15AM	8:45AM	P/NSB - Oval
1:30PM	2:00PM	P/Sec Baker - Oval
NOTES:		P/Camp David
Saturday 12/23/89		
NOTES:		P/Camp David
Sunday 12/24/89		
NOTES:		P/Camp David
Monday 12/25/89		
NOTES:		HOLIDAY - Christmas Day
NOTES:		P/Camp David
Tuesday 12/26/89		
6:45AM	7:05AM	Dep residence en route office
7:15AM	7:30AM	PDB Briefer -
7:30AM	8:00AM	WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
NOTES:		P/Camp David

Bush Library Photocopy

Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 02/05/90

Wednesday 12/27/89
6:45AM 7:05AM Dep residence en route office
7:05AM 7:15AM PDB Briefer -
7:15AM 8:00AM B-S-C Bkfst - Here (CONFIRM/ORDER SET UP)
7:30AM 8:00AM (WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room - RG TO HANDLE)
NOTES: (P/TO BEEVILLE, TX - RON)

Thursday 12/28/89
6:45AM 7:05AM Dep residence en route office
7:15AM 7:30AM PDB Briefer -
7:30AM 8:00AM WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
4:00PM 4:20PM Press Interviews (Popadiuk)
5:00PM 6:00PM DCI and DDCI Meeting
NOTES: (P/BEEVILLE, TX - RON)

Friday 12/29/89
6:45AM 7:05AM Dep residence en route office
7:15AM 7:30AM PDB Briefer -
7:30AM 8:00AM WH Senior Staff Meeting - Roosevelt Room
NOTES: (P/BEEVILLE, TX - RON)

Saturday 12/30/89
8:00AM (P/DEPART BEEVILLE F/MONTGOMERY, AL)
7:00PM (P/DEPART MONTGOMERY FOR CAMP DAVID - RON)

Monday 01/01/90
NOTES: HOLIDAY - New Year's Day

Tuesday 01/02/90

Wednesday 01/03/90
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval

Thursday 01/04/90
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Oval

Friday 01/05/90
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval

Sunday 01/07/90
5:30PM (P/First Pres'l Lecture Series on the Presidency Lecture)

Monday 01/08/90
3:30PM 4:00PM P/Sec Cheney - Oval

Tuesday 01/09/90
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Cabinet Room

Bush Library Photocopy

Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 02/05/90

Wednesday 01/10/90
10:45AM 11:00AM P/Pre-brief f/Media Intv - Oval
11:00AM (P/Media Intv - Oval)
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval

Thursday 01/11/90
11:00AM NOON P/Meeting w/Portuguese PM Silva - Oval/Cabinet
NOON 1:00PM P/Lunch w/PM Silva - Old Family Dining Rm
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Oval

Friday 01/12/90
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval

Monday 01/15/90
NOTES: HOLIDAY - Martin Luther King's B-Day

Tuesday 01/16/90
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Cabinet Room

Wednesday 01/17/90
10:00AM 10:30AM P/Arrival Ceremony IHO Nigerian Pres Babangida - So Lawn
10:30AM 11:30AM P/Meeting w/President Babangida - Ova/Cabinet
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval
7:30PM P/BLK TIE Dinner IHO Nigerian Pres Babangida - Residence
NOTES: BRING IN BLACK TIE

Thursday 01/18/90
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Oval

Friday 01/19/90
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval
NOTES: P/TO MIAMI FLORIDA & RETURN TO WH)

Monday 01/22/90
3:30PM 4:00PM P/Sec Brady - Oval

Tuesday 01/23/90
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Cabinet Room

Wednesday 01/24/90
10:00AM 10:30AM P/Arrival Ceremony f/President Ali Abdallah Salih of Yemen Arab Republic ~ So Lawn
10:30AM 11:30AM P/Meeting w/President Abdallah - Oval/Cabinet Rm
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval
7:15PM (P/BLK TIE State Dinner IHO President Abdallah - Res)
NOTES: BRING IN BLACK TIE

Thursday 01/25/90
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Oval

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Appointment Schedule
Brent Scowcroft
12/08/89 - 02/05/90

Friday 01/26/90
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval

Saturday 01/27/90
NOTES: (TBD) P/Blk Tie Alfalfa Dinner)

Monday 01/29/90
3:30PM 4:00PM P/Sec Cheney - Oval
8:00PM (P/BLK TIE Republican Eagles Inaugural Gala)

Tuesday 01/30/90
2:00PM 3:00PM P/Cabinet Time - Cabinet Room
9:00PM P/State of the Union Adress - Capitol

Wednesday 01/31/90
9:15AM Dep West Basement f/For Service Inst, C
9:30AM 10:05AM Address FSI Senior Exec Seminar (Col David Giddens will meet you at entrance 875-5354) (15 mins fol by Qs & As) If it is more convenient, group (30) can come here
1:30PM 2:00PM P/Sec Baker - Oval

Thursday 02/01/90

Friday 02/02/90

Monday 02/05/90
3:30PM P/Mtg w/Sec Cheney - Oval

Bush Library Photocopy

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12/5/89
1755

[redacted]

Florence:

I just received word from Doug Paal that he would the General to clear on this crosshatch.

At this point Paal, Jackson and Blackwill clear with no changes.

Thank you!

Wendy

Doug is concerned wanted you to see — before it goes — or you may want to squeeze

[redacted]

[redacted]

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

S/S # 044531

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 2

FROM: ELIZABETH MCKUNE (Officer name) | S/S (Office symbol) | 647-8448 (Extension) | 7224 (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: TELEGRAM TO TOKYO RE BRIEFING THE JAPANESE ON MALTA

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	G. PHILIP HUGHES	2224	GFWW
NSCS	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	SITTMANN		
	JACKSON		
	PAAL		
	BLACKWILL		

FOR: CLEARANCE [X] INFORMATION [ ] PER REQUEST [ ] COMMENT [ ]

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: 12/5 ASAP HAS TO GO TONIGHT

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Cap NARA, Date 5/5/09

S/S Officer: Elizabeth McKune
ELIZABETH MCKUNE

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COPY

APPR: RMK

DRAFT: DA

OTHER: MVK

OTHER: S/S

OTHER: SSO

OTHER: NSCS

OTHER:

CONFIDENTIAL

EAP:DANDERSON:BP
12/05/89 76600
P:RMKIMMITT

D:MVKENNEDY
S/S-O

S/S
NSC/S

EAP ONLY

NIACT IMMEDIATE TOKYO

NODIS
ONLY FOR AMB. ARMACOST AND A/S SOLOMON FROM BOB KIMMITT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, JP

SUBJECT: BRIEFING THE JAPANESE ON MALTA

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO SEND BRENT SCOWCROFT AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER TO TOKYO TO DEBRIEF THE JAPANESE ON MALTA. DETAILS ARE STILL BEING WORKED OUT, BUT THEY WILL LIKELY DEPART WASHINGTON FRIDAY, DECEMBER 8. AS A RESULT OF THIS DECISION, ASSISTANT SECRETARY SOLOMON SHOULD CONDUCT NO FURTHER DEBRIEFINGS WITH THE GOJ AND SHOULD PROCEED IMMEDIATELY DECEMBER 6 A.M. TO SEOUL AND THEN TO CANBERRA TO DEBRIEF THE KOREANS AND AUSTRALIANS. IF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE JAPANESE ON OTHER SUBJECTS ARE REQUIRED OF OR DESIRED BY A/S SOLOMON IN TOKYO, HE SHOULD CONDUCT THOSE DISCUSSIONS AFTER THE DEPARTURE FROM TOKYO OF THE SCOWCROFT/EAGLEBURGER PARTY.

3. THE AMBASSADOR IS AUTHORIZED TO INFORM THE GOJ THAT NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER SCOWCROFT AND DEPUTY SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER PLAN TO VISIT TOKYO FOR DEBRIEFING ON MALTA. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE EXTREMELY CLOSELY HELD UNTIL DETAILS ARE WORKED OUT. THE GOVERNMENT OF

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000.0116.F/2
1/9/06 CAP

JAPAN SHOULD MAKE NO ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS VISIT AT THIS POINT.
WW

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chairman Deng Xiaoping of People's Republic of China

PARTICIPANTS: LTG Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Florence E. Gantt, Notetaker

Deng Xiaoping, Chairman
Li Peng, Premier
Wu Xueqian, Vice Premier
Qian Qichen, Foreign Minister
Other Chinese Leaders

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2780-MR
1/20/12

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: ~~Saturday~~ Sunday, July 2, 1989 - 10:00 AM
Great Hall of the People, Beijing

Chairman Deng - How is my friend, President Bush? How is he getting along?

General Scowcroft - He is fine and he sends you his warm personal regards.

Chairman Deng - Thank you.

General Scowcroft - He remembers with great affection his meeting with you in February.

Chairman Deng - The reason I have chosen President Bush as my friend is because since the inception of my contact with him I found that his words are rather trustworthy. He doesn't say much in terms of empty words or words which are insincere. So that's

why even before your general election I expressed the hope that he would be elected as President of the United States. However, he was not all that lucky because shortly after he assumed the office of the Presidency turmoil broke out in China. This was an earthshaking event and it is very unfortunate that the United States is too deeply involved in it. In my address to the Chinese at the army level and above, the cadre of national troops, I mentioned the macro international climate. I was actually referring to the United States involvement in the events in China. We have been feeling since the outset of these events more than two months ago that the various aspects of U. S. foreign policy has actually cornered China. That's the feeling of us in China, because the aim of the counter-revolutionary rebellion was to overthrow the People's Republic of China and our socialist system. If they should succeed in obtaining that aim the world would be a different one. To be frank, this could even lead to war. I know that you, of course, have an interest in the development of Sino-US relations. I understand that you actually were personally involved in the activities in the U. S. opening to China in 1972, presided over by President Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger. We have many American friends like you. However, indeed, there are some Americans who have positioned themselves and are antagonistic towards China all the time. What they have been doing could be termed as operating a rumor mongering corporation. The largest rumor mongering corporation is the Voice of America. And the largest rumor turned out by this corporation is the so-called blood bath of Tiananmen Square. And

they played up the whole thing that in the blood bath more than 1,000 Chinese were gunned down or even more than 10,000 Chinese were gunned down. In short, if a country should formulate its policy and handle international relations on the basis of rumors this government itself would suffer a great deal. At least one can say that the U. S. Congress has taken actions of one kind or another against China on the basis of such rumors. Indeed, Sino-US relations are in a very delicate state and you can even say that it is in a very dangerous state. Such actions are leading to the break up of the relationship. On our part we so far have not seen any relaxing of such actions on the part of the U. S. In fact, the U.S. stepped up actions just three days ago when the House of Representatives passed an amendment on further sanctions against China. So, such actions are still going on. Fortunately there are still people -- some people among the leadership of our two nations -- who have adopted a rather cool-headed attitude. For example, President Bush on your side, me, myself, and other chinese leaders have adopted a cool-headed attitude toward the handling of Sino-US relations. I mean President Bush -- the fact that he has sent you, Mr. Scowcroft, as his emissary shows that he has taken a wise and cool-headed action -- an action well received by us. It seems that there is still hope to maintain our originally good relations. I believe that is the hope of President Bush. It is also the hope shared by me. However, a question of this nature cannot be solved by two persons from the perspective of being friends. President Bush has to speak on behalf of American interests. I, myself, Premier Li Peng and

other Chinese leaders have spoken on the basis of Chinese national interests -- on behalf of the interests of the Chinese people. And that is the position we take and make decisions on that basis. It is my hope that both sides will adopt an objective and an honest attitude towards the counter-revolutionary rebellion. Only in this way can both sides find a feasible way and method to settle problems arising from the two countries attitudes towards the rebellion.

The cause of the issues between China and the United States on this question is not because China has offended or impugned U. S. interests even in the least way. The question is that on a considerably large scale the United States has impugned Chinese interests, has hurt Chinese dignity. That is the crux of the matter. With regard to how to resolve this issue there is a Chinese proverb -- it is up to the one -- up to the person to tie the knot to untie the knot. Our hope is that in its future course of action the United States will seek to untie the knot.

The incidents in the United States, be it the U. S. Congress or the mass media, should no longer add fuel to the fire. China has not finished the handling of the putting down of the counter-revolutionary leaders. China will persist in punishing those instigators of the rebellion and its behind the scene boss in accordance with Chinese laws. China will by no means waiver in its resolution of this kind. Otherwise how can the PRC continue to exist; there would not be any reason for the government to

exist. There is even the likelihood that this government would no longer be in existence if China could not exercise its dignity, its right, and enjoy it dignity. Then how can China be an independent country. There is really no independence to speak of, and China would not exist as the People's Republic. If people would like to add fuel to the fire that is a simple pretext to use. With regard to the train incident in Shanghai we executed three persons -- criminals who burned an entire train in Shanghai and this incident was a loss to the state. However, even this kind of punishment could lead to trouble -- could lead to accusations from some people. How can one talk about justice, let alone the dignity of Chinese law and its sovereignty? I would like to tell you, Mr. Scowcroft, we will never allow any people to interfere in China's internal affairs. No matter what are the consequences in China. We insist on managing the internal affairs of China by ourselves. No matter what kind of disaster should fall upon us, the Chinese people will be able to hold themselves up. China can say proudly that the Chinese leaders have never said anything or done anything irrationally in terms of handling our bilateral relations with another country and there will never be such rashness in the future. However, when China's sovereignty, dignity and independence are in question then China will not mince its words.

Maybe I have gone on too long on this issue between China and the United States. It was not my original plan to come and discuss it with people from the United States, but since you, Mr.

Scowcroft, have come here as an emissary of the President I wanted to see you otherwise it would be discourteous. Just now I have told you my personal feelings on this matter and I hope you will convey my feelings to my friend, President Bush. Please convey the following to President Bush that no matter what should be the outcome of the discussions between our two governments on this issue if he would continue to treat me as his friend I would also like to do that.

As regards our further discussion on this issue, the person who is in charge of discussions on the part of China is Premier Li Peng. It is a matter up to him to decide whether in the future he would like to hold such discussions with emissaries of the American side -- himself or if he would like to have a designee on China's side.

General Scowcroft - Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You have expressed very well the reason that we are here. President Bush is a true friend, a true friend of you and of China. He is unique among American Presidents for many, many years in having the kind of direct experience he has had and intimate contact he has had with the people and leaders of your great country.

Chairman Deng - He cycled around Beijing.

General Scowcroft - It is for that reason that he wrote you recently a very personal letter which he wrote with his own hand. It is for that reason that he asked us to come here. We are deeply appreciative of your willingness to receive us this way. I understand what a rare privilege it is and for that reason, to conserve your time, I have written out the message I bring from the President. The words are mine but the thoughts are wholly those of the President. You and China could have no better friend than George Bush. He knows from personal experience how important a productive and friendly relationship built up over many years of patient effort in both Beijing and Washington -- is and has been for the world as a whole. As you have just stated, today he sees the possibility that our two countries, because of internal developments in both nations could move toward a time of disturbance beyond anything we have encountered since President Nixon first travelled to Beijing. He wrote this letter and he

has sent us here in the hope that these two acts would begin a process of finding a way to reverse the current negative trends which so disturb him. He has sent us both, in particular, because we are very close to him personally. I work just down the hall from him. I see him 5-6 times a day and I see his pre-occupation with the problem between our two countries. We both served in the Nixon Administration. We have both been for many years close associates of Henry Kissinger. I am the oldest friend of China still in the United States Government. I believe you all know the depth of my feeling for China, and for the relationship. And our presence here after a trip of many thousands of kilometers, in confidence so as not to imply anything but an attempt to communicate, is symbolic of the importance President Bush places on this relationship and the efforts he is prepared to take to preserve it.

Our two countries have made much progress since the Shanghai Communique first set us on a new course. We represent two different cultures and backgrounds, perceptions. Through diligent work on both sides we have managed to reconcile or accommodate differences arising from the very wide disparity in traditions, cultures and economic and political outlooks.

There have been many ups and downs in the relationship, but on

the whole it has been a steadily deepening one. Not only because it responded to the basic interests of both sides, but because we respect the diversity between our two societies. We have benefitted -- both sides -- strategically with respect to the Soviet Union, with respect to a number of regional events and with respect to the stability that our relationship has brought to the world as a whole. We have benefitted economically as well. The public perceptions of the strength and durability of our relationship have given economic interests the world over not just in the United States confidence to invest in the PRC, thereby contributing greatly to the economic development goals of the Chinese Government. Our bilateral trade has grown from almost nothing to over $10 billion a year. American industry has invested heavily in China and has plans for further investment in the future. On the human level, we have also benefitted. Thousands of Chinese students have studied in the United States and brought back with them to China knowledge of Western technology, methods of industrial organization and production techniques that have served, and will serve for years to come, to improve the economic well-being of the Chinese people. American tourists have travelled in ever-increasing numbers to China, bringing with them millions of tourist dollars and taking home a greater appreciation of the warmth and friendship of the Chinese people and the incredible richness of Chinese culture.

The latest chapter in the development of this relationship occurred only a few months ago with the visit of President Bush

to the People's Republic. It was a visit marked by a warmth and frankness which was the culmination over these long years of mutual effort. Finally, it should be noted that the American people have strongly supported the improvement in our ties. As those ties have developed so has our admiration for the Chinese people and the efforts of the Chinese Government to encourage economic reform grow increasingly strong. Americans have ever more strongly identified themselves with the progress they saw taking place in China.

It is onto this bilateral climate of deepening cooperation and growing sympathy that the events of Tiananmen Square have imposed themselves. What the American people perceived in the demonstrations they saw -- rightly or wrongly -- was an expression of values which represent their most deeply cherished beliefs, stemming from the American revolution.

We, like you, were born in revolution. We, like you, hold deeply to the tenets of our own struggle for independence. Our whole national experience, beginning with our revolution, has been a struggle to expand the boundaries of freedom as we define that term. We fought our revolution to establish freedom of speech, freedom to assemble, freedom from arbitrary authority. These beliefs represent American tradition and culture. Americans, naturally and inevitably, respond emotionally when they see these values promoted elsewhere.

How the Chinese Government determines it must deal with those of its citizens involved in the recent events in China is, as you have so eloquently said, a wholly internal affair of China. However, how the United States Government and the American people view that activity is, equally, an internal affair of the American people. Both will be governed by the traditions, cultures and values peculiar to each. It is an obvious fact that Chinese actions in pursuit of solutions to the recent problems of wholly internal concern in the People's Republic have produced a popular reaction that is based on and reflects our own beliefs and traditions. It has therefore produced its own internal reaction which is real and with which the President must cope. That is the crux of the problem President Bush now faces.

The President shares the feelings of the American people with regard to the recent events in China, but he also believes very deeply in preserving the relationship between our two countries. He wants to manage events in a way which will assure a healthy relationship over time. That has not been easy. It has not thus far been without cost, and it could, depending on events, become impossible for him. The actions taken by the Chinese Government to deal with the demonstrators have produced demands by the American people and the United States Congress to take steps of our own to demonstrate our disagreement with those actions.

President Bush has taken certain steps he believes both necessary and appropriate under the circumstances. You have protested

these actions of his, while the Congress and much of the U. S. press have attacked him for not acting strongly enough. You, yourself, mentioned that three days ago the U. S. House of Representatives voted to impose stiffer sanctions against the People's Republic. The President opposed that action. Despite his opposition the vote was an almost unprecedented 418-0. The President will continue to oppose such legislation but the magnitude of the vote illustrates the political realities with which he must cope. Even his veto authority is powerless against such unanimity.

The President is very sensitive to Chinese concerns regarding the actions he must take to preserve control over the course of events in the United States, but he is not omnipotent in his ability to control such events. The President's ability to control events in the United States would, beyond a doubt, be strengthened were the Chinese likewise to try to be sensitive -- as you proceed over the coming days and weeks -- to the reality that what you do and the way you do it will have a major impact on opinion in the United States and throughout the Western world.

We have not come here with any detailed set of prescriptions to guide us through the current difficulties. As I said at the outset, we have come to explain the situation in the United States, the President's efforts to articulate American concerns, and his efforts to restore, preserve and strengthen our bilateral relationship. The President is confident that with the mutual

understanding that has brought us through difficulties before we can surmount the present situation and he is deeply appreciative of your willingness to receive us to explain the dilemma in which he finds himself. That's the message from a true friend of the Chinese Government and the people of China.

Chairman Deng - I don't have much time to elaborate on the points. I just hope that United States statesmen and people will understand one point. I think that one must understand history; we have won the victory represented by the founding of the People's Republic of China by fighting a 22-year war with the cost of more than 20 million lives, a war fought by the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist Party; and if one should add the three-year war to assist Korea against U. S. aggression then it would be a 25-year effort. The second thing is that people must come to understand that China is an independent country which means no interference by foreigners. And China is not a country to be directed by the backing of another country no matter what kind of difficulties should crop up in our way. China will be able to overcome them. There is no force whatsoever which can substitute for the People's Republic of China represented by the Communist Party of China. This is not an empty word. It is something which has been proven and tested over a period of several decades of experience. We always hope that the five principles of peaceful coexistence will be observed in dealings with China, i.e., equal _____, non-interference in each other's internal affairs. So long as these

principles are observed, Sino-US relations will continue to develop on the basis of respect for such principles. If any issue should crop up the issue should be settled promptly. If that approach is not adopted then China will not be held responsible for the deterioration of relations. With regard to what you have said, Mr. Scowcroft, some of it I agree with you, but a considerable portion of it I am afraid I cannot agree with you. With regard to concluding this unhappy episode in the relations between China and the United States, let me just repeat we have to see what kind of remarks and what kind of actions the United States will take. I think those things we want to see now. You will now have a follow-up discussion with Premier Li Peng. Let me restate my greetings to be conveyed by you, Mr. Scowcroft, to President Bush and Mrs. Bush.

General Scowcroft - Mr. Chairman, I thank you sincerely for being willing to receive us and listen to the President's thoughts. He asked me to convey to you his sincere and warmest personal regards and he hopes that we can overcome the difficulties and proceed with deepening relations between our two countries.

Chairman Deng - That is also a hope of ours.

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

SENSITIVE

Deeply appreciative of your mtg w/us we brought them unbidden a gesture this is. I will make my presentation as briefly as possible - while my message is in my words, this is the President speaking - LBJ & I have spent long hours discussing this situation

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

-- We are here because ~~the~~ President ~~of the United States~~ cares

~~TOP SECRET~~

deeply about the relationship between our two countries -- a relationship he now sees under serious strain.

written by hand by him alone -

-- The letter he recently wrote to you was an intensely personal expression of both his feelings and his concerns.

He is unique among US Presidents having such intimate contact w/PRC you could have no better friend.

-- George Bush knows, from personal experience, how important a productive and friendly relationship -- a relationship built up after many years of patient effort both in Beijing and Washington -- is for both countries and for the world as a whole.

the possibility that

-- Yet today he sees, our two countries, because of internal developments in both nations, ~~moving~~ could move toward a time of disturbance unlike anything we ~~both~~ have encountered since President Nixon first travelled to Beijing.

-- He has sent us here in the hope that this act will begin a process of finding a way to reverse the current negative trends that so disturb him.

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-- Why did he send us?, in particular?

-- We are very close to Bush personally, and know intimately

of his deep concern over events of the past six weeks or so.

-- We both served in the Nixon Administration; we both were

for many years, close associates of Henry Kissinger.

-- I have been a close participant in US-Chinese events since

December 1971, when I came here in advance of the Nixon visit.

-- Our presence here, after a trip of thousands of kilometers,

is symbolic of the importance President Bush places on the

relationship and the efforts he is prepared to make to preserve

it.

-- Our two countries have made much progress since the

Shanghai Communique first set us on our new course.

-- Through diligent work on both sides we have managed to

reconcile or accommodate differences arising from the very wide

disparity in our traditions, our cultures, and our economic and

political perspectives.

-- There have been many ups and downs in the relationship, responded not only because it ~~constituted~~ to the basic interests of both sides but but on the whole it has been a steadily deepening one, because we both respected the diversity between our two societies.

-- Both our countries have benefitted strategically from our developing ties.

for example

-- There has been a substantial impact on the behavior of the Soviet Union.

It is reasonable to conclude that

-- Its behavior toward each of us has ameliorated as a result

-- Soviet efforts at the encirclement of China have been thwarted.

-- We have worked productively together on challenges in a number of areas -- Afghanistan and Cambodia, to name but two.

-- Economically we have both benefitted as well.

-- Public perceptions of the strength and durability of our relationship have given economic interests the world over (not just in the U.S.) confidence to invest in the PRC, thereby contributing greatly to th economic development goals of the Chinese Government.

-- Our bilateral trade has grown from virtually nothing 20 years ago to more than $10 billion today. American industry has invested heavily in China, and has plans for further investment in the future.

-- At another level -- the human level -- we also have benefitted. Thousands of Chinese students have studied in the United States, and brought back with them to China knowledge of Western technology, methods of industrial organization and production techniques that have served, and will serve for years to come, to improve the economic well-being of the Chinese people. Americans have travelled in increasing numbers to China as tourists, bringing with them millions of tourist dollars and taking home a greater appreciation of the warmth and friendliness of the Chinese people and the incredible richness of Chinese culture

-- The most recent chapter in the development of our relationship occurred only a few months ago with the visit of ~~George~~ President Bush to the PRC. It was a visit marked by a warmth and frankness which was the culmination of these long mutual years of effort.

-- Finally, it should be noted that the American people have strongly supported the improvement in our ties; as those ties developed our admiration for the Chinese people and the efforts of the Chinese Government to encourage economic reform grew increasingly strong. Americans ever more strongly identified themselves with the progress they saw taking place in China.

-- It is onto this bilateral climate of deepening cooperation and growing sympathy that the events of Tiannemen Square have imposed themselves.

-- What the American people perceived in the demonstrations for americans rightly or wrongly, was an expression of values they saw, ~~as a natural outcome of the process they had watched developing in China for the better part of a decade,~~ which represent their most deeply cherished beliefs stemming from the american revolution

-- We, like you, were born in revolution. We, like you, hold deeply to the tenets of our own struggle for ~~liberty.~~ independence.

-- Our whole national experience, beginning with our revolution, has been a struggle to expand the boundaries of freedom as we define that term. We ~~believe deeply in~~ fought our revolution to establish freedom of speech, freedom to assemble, freedom from arbitrary authority.

-- These represent American tradition and culture. And Americans naturally respond emotionally when they see those values promoted elsewhere.

-- How the Chinese Government determines it must deal with those of its citizens involved in recent events in China is, of course, wholly an internal affair. However, How the USG and the American people view that activity is, equally, an internal affair of the US. Both will be governed by the traditions, culture, and values peculiar to each.

-- It is a fact that Chinese actions in pursuit of solutions to the recent problems of wholly internal concern have produced a popular reaction within the United States that is based upon and reflects our deeply held beliefs and traditions. -- It has produced its own internal reaction which is real and w/which we must cope.

-- That is the crux of the problem President Bush now faces.

-- The President shares the feelings of the American people with regard to recent events in China. He also believes deeply in preserving the relationship between our two countries. He wants to manage short-term events in a way that will best assure a healthy relationship over time. But that has not been easy. It has not been without cost and could, depending on events, become impossible

-- The actions taken by the Chinese Government to deal with the demonstrators have produced demands by the American people and the U. S. Congress to take steps of our own to demonstrate our disagreement with those actions.

-- President Bush has taken certain steps he believes both necessary and appropriate under the circumstances. You have protested those actions of his, while the Congress and much of the U. S. press have attacked him for not acting strongly enough.

-- Last Thursday, for example, the House of Representatives ~~voted 418 - 0~~ to impose additional stiff sanctions against the PRC. The President opposed that legislation. The vote was overwhelming, 418-0 ~~and~~ The P will continue to oppose it, but the magnitude of the vote demonstrates the political reality ~~with~~ as with which the ~~President~~ he must contend. Even It is veto ~~pow~~ authority is powerless against such unanimity.

-- The President is very sensitive to Chinese concerns regarding the actions he must take to preserve control over the course of events in the U. S. But he is not omnipotent.

-- His ability to control events would beyond doubt be strengthened were the Chinese likewise to be sensitive, as they proceed over the coming days and weeks, to the reality that what ~~they~~ you and how they do it will have a major impact on opinion in the United States and throughout the Western world.

-- We have not come here with any detailed set of prescriptions to guide us through these current difficulties.

-- As I stated at the outset, we are here to explain the situation in the U. S., the President's efforts to articulate American concerns over the events taking place, and his efforts to restore, preserve and strengthen our bilateral relationship.

CLASSIFICATION?? ~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN DENG, PREMIER LI PENG, VICE PREMIER Yao Yilian Wan 1
FOREIGN MINISTER Qian Qichen and other Chinese Leaders

LTG BRENT SCOWCROFT, DEP ASST SEC OF STATE LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER,
FLORENCE GANTT, NOTETAKER

~~Saturday~~ Sunday, July 2, 1989 - 10:00 AM - Great Hall, Beijing, PRC

DENG - How is my friend, President Bush? How is he getting along?

SCOWCROFT - He is fine and he sends you his warm personal regards.

DENG - Thank you.

SCOWCROFT - He remembers with great affection his meeting with you in February.

DENG - The reason I have chosen President Bush as my friend is because since the inception of my [redacted] contact with him I found that His words are rather trustworthy. He doesn't say much in terms of empty words or words which are insincere. So that's why even before your general elections I expressed the hope that he would be elected as President of the United States. However, he was not all that lucky because shortly after he assumed the office of the Presidency turmoil broke out in China. This was an earthshaking event and it is very unfortunate that the United States is too deeply involved in it. In my address to the Chinese at the army level and above, the cadre of national troops, I mentioned the macro international climate. I was actually referring to the US involvement ~~to~~ in the events in China. We have been feeling since the outset of these events more than two months ago that the various aspects of the US foreign policy has actually cornered China. That's the feeling of us in China, because the aim of the counter-revolutionary rebellion was to overthrow the People's Republic of China and our socialist system. If they should succeed in obtaining that aim the world

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would be a different one. To be frank, this could even lead to war. I know that you, of course, have an interest in the development of Sino/US relations. I understand that you actually were personally involved in the activities in the US opening to China in 1972 presided over by President Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger. We have ~~but~~ many American friends like you. However, indeed, there are some Americans who have positioned themselves and are antagonistic towards China all the time. What they have been doing could be termed as operating a rumor mongering ~~corporation~~. The largest rumor monger~~ing corporation~~ is the Voice of America. And the largest rumor turned out by this corporation is the so-called blood bath of Tianamen Square. And they played up the whole thing that in the blood bath more than 1,000 Chinese were gunned down or even more than 10,000 Chinese were gunned down. In short, if a country should formulate its policy and handle international relations on the basis of rumors this government itself would suffer a great deal. At least one can say that the U. S. Congress has taken actions of one kind or another against China on the basis of such rumors. Indeed, Sino-US relations ~~is~~ are in a very delicate state and you can even say that it is in a very dangerous state. Such actions are leading Sino/US relations in a dangerous direction that can even lead to the break up of the relationship. On our part we so far have not seen any relaxing of such actions on the part of the U. S. In fact, the U. S. ~~has~~ stepped up actions just three days ago when the House of Representatives passed an Amendment on further sanctions against China. So, such actions are still going on. Fortunately there are still people -- some people among the leadership

of our two nations -- who have adopted a rather cool-headed attitude. For example, President Bush on your side, me, myself, and other Chinese leaders have adopted a cool-headed attitude toward the handling of Sino/US relations. I mean President Bush -- the fact ~~that has~~ has sent you, Mr. Scowcroft as his emissary shows that he has taken a wise and cool-headed action -- an action well received by us. It seems that there is still hope to maintain our orginally good relations. I believe that is the hope of President Bush. It is also the hope shared by me. However, a question of this nature cannot be solved by two persons from the perspective of being friends. President Bush has to speak on behalf of American interests. I myself, Premier Li Peng and other Chinese leaders have spoken on the basis of Chinese national interests. On behalf of the interests of the Chinese people. And that is the position we take and make decisions on that basis. It is my hope that both sides will adopt an objective and an honest attitude towards the counter-revolutionary rebellious Chinese and their handling of the issues arising from the attitude of the two countries -- the handling of the two countries of the rebellion. ~~--and~~ Only in this way can both sides find a feasible way and method to settle problems arising from two countries attitudes towards the rebellion. The cause of the issues between China and the US on this question is not because China has offended or impugned US interests even in the least way. The question is that on a considerably large scale the US has impugned ~~on~~ Chinese interests, has hurt Chinese dignity. That is the crux of the matter. With regard to how to resolve this issue there is a Chinese proverb -- it is up to one -- it is either the person to tie the knot ~~to~~ to untie the knot. Our hope is that in its future course of action the US will seek to untie the knot.

The incidents in the US, be it the U. S. Congress or the mass media, should no longer add fuel to the fire. China has not finished the handling of the putting down of the counter revolutionary leaders rebellious head. China will persist in punishing those instigators of the rebellion and its behind the scene boss in accordance with Chinese laws. China will by no means waiver in its resolution of this kind. Otherwise how can the PRC continue to exist and there would not be any reason for the government to exist. There is even the likelihood that this government would no longer be in existence if China could not exercise its dignity, its right, and enjoy its dignity. Then how can China be an independent country. There is really no independenc to speak of, and China would not exist as the People's Republic. If people wanted like to add fuel to the fire that is a simple pretext to use. With regard to the train incident in Shanghai we executed three persons - criminals who destroyed an entire train in Shanghai and this ——— become losses to the State /? However even this kind of punishment could lead to trouble - could lead to accusations from some people. How can one talk about justice, let alone the dignity of Chinese law and its sovereignty? I would like to tell you Mr. Scowcroft, we will never allow any people to interfere in China's internal affairs. No matter what are the consequences in China. We insist on managing the internal affairs of China by ourselve No matter what kind of disaster should fall upon us. The Chinese people will be able to hold themselves up. China can say proudly that the Chinese leaders have never said anything or done anything irrationally in terms of handling our bilateral relations with another country and there will neither be such rashness in the future. If

However, when ~~things involve~~ China's sovereignty, dignity and independance are in question then China will not mince its words. Maybe I have gone on too long ~~for~~ on this issue between China and the U. S. It was not my original plan to come and discuss it with people from the U. S., but since you, Mr. Scowcroft, have come here as an emissary of the President I wanted to see you otherwise it would be discourteous. Just now I have told you my personal feelings on this matter and I hope you will convey my feelings to my friend, President Bush. Please convey the following to President Bush that no matter what should be the outcome of the discussions between our two governments on this issue if he would continue to treat me as his friend I would also like to do that. As regards our further discussions on this issue, the person who is in charge of discussions on the part of China is Premier Li Peng It is a matter up to him to decide whether in the future he would like to hold such discussions with emissaries of the American side himself or if he would like to have a ~~dead knee of~~ designee the China side.

SCOWCROFT - That you very much Mr. Chairman. You have expressed very well the reason that we are here. President Bush is a true friend, ~~and~~ a true friend of you and of China. He is unique among American Presidents for many, many years in having the kind of direct experience he has had and intimate contact he has had with the people and leaders of your great country.

DENG - He cycled around Beijing.

SCOWCROFT - It is for that reason that he wrote you ~~personally~~ recently a very personal letter which he wrote with his own hand and it is for that reason that he asked us to come here. We are deeply appreciative of your willingness to receive us this way. I understand what a rare privilege it is and for that reason, to conserve your time, I

have written out the message I bring from the President. The words are mine but the thoughts are wholly those of the President. You and China could have no better friend than George Bush. He knows from personal experience how important a productive and friendly relationship -- a relationship built up ~~of~~ over many years of patient effort in both Beijing and Washington -- is and has been for the world as a whole. As you have just stated, today he sees the possibility that our two countries, because of internal developments in both nations could move toward a time of disturbance ~~of~~ beyond anything we have encountered since President Nixon first travelled to Beijing. He wrote his letter and he has sent us here in the hope that these two acts ~~(two acts)~~ would begin a process of finding a way to reverse the current negative trends which so disturb him. He has sent us, in particular, both because we are very close to him personally. I work just down the hall from him. I see him 5-6 times a day and I see his pre-occupation with the problem between our two countries. We both served in the Nixon Administration. We have both been for many years close associates of Henry Kissinger. I am the oldest friend of China still in the U. S. Government. I believe you all know the depth of my feeling for China, and for the relationship. And our presence here after a trip of many thousands of kilometers, in confidence, so as not to imply anything but an attempt to communicate, is symbolic of the importance President Bush places on this relationship and the efforts he is prepared to take to preserve it. Our two countries have made much progress since the Shanghai Communique first set ~~up~~ us on a new course. We represent two different cultures and backgrounds, perceptions. Through diligent work on both sides we have managed to reconcile or accommodate

differences arising from the very wide disparity in traditions, cultures and economic and political outlooks. There have been many ups and downs in the relationship, but on the whole it has been a steadily ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ deepening one. Not only because it responded to the basic interests of both sides, but because we respect the diversity between our two societies. We have benefitted both sides -- ~~both~~ strategically with respect to the Soviet Union, with respect to a number of regional events and with respect to the stability that our relationship has brought to the world as a whole. We have benefitted economically as well. The public perceptions of the strength and durability of our relationship have given economic interests the world over, not just in the U.S, confidence to invest in the PRC, thereby ~~to~~ will contribute greatly to the economic development goals of the Chinese Government. Our bilateral trade has grown from almost nothing to over $10 billion a year. American industry has invested heavily in China and has plans for further investment in the future. On the human level, we have also benefitted. Thousands of Chinese students have studied in the US and brought back with them to China knowledge of Western technology, methods of industrial organization and production techniques that have served, and will serve for years to come, to improve the economic well-being of the Chinese people. American tourists have travelled in ever-increasing numbers to China, bringing with them millions of tourist dollars and taking home a greater appreciation of the warmth and friendship of the Chinese people and the incredible richness of Chinese culture.

The latest chapter in the development of this relationship occurred only a few months ago with the visit of President Bush to the People's Republic. It was a visit marked by a warmth and frankness which was culminated over these long years of mutual effort. Finally, it should be noted that the American people have strongly supported the improvement in our ties. As those ties have developed our admiration for the Chinese people and the efforts of the Chinese government to encourage ~~new~~ reform, Americans have ever more strongly identified themselves with the progress ~~that is seen~~ in China. It is onto this bilateral climate of deepening ~~concern~~ and growing sympathy that the events of Tiananmen Square have imposed ~~itself~~. What the American people perceived in the demonstrations they saw -- rightly or wrongly -- was an expression of values which represent their most deeply cherished beliefs, stemming from the American revolution. We, like you, were born in revolution. We, like you, hold deeply to the ~~beliefs~~ tenets of our own struggle for independence. Our whole national experience, beginning with our revolution, has been a struggle to expand the boundaries of freedom as we define that term. We fought our revolution to establish freedom of speech, freedom to assemble, freedom from arbitrary authority. These beliefs represent ~~an~~ American tradition and culture. ~~An~~ American naturally and inevitably responds emotionally when they see these values promoted elsewhere. How the Chinese Government ~~deals~~ determines it must deal with those of its citizens involved in the recent events in China is, as you have so eloquently said, a wholly internal affair of China. However, how the U. S. Government and the American people view that activity is, equally, an internal affair of the American people

Both will be governed by the traditions, cultures and values peculiar to each. It is an obvious fact that Chinese actions in persuit of solutions to the recent problems of wholly internal concern/have in the People's Republic produced a popular reaction that is based on and reflects our own beliefs and traditions. ~~and~~ It has therefore produced its own internal reaction which is real and with which the President must cope. That is the crux of the ~~issue.~~ problem President Bush now faces. ¶ The President ~~does~~ shares the feelings of the American people with regard to the recent events in China, but he also believes very deeply in preserving the relationship between our two countries. He wants to manage events in a way which will assure a healthy relationship over time. That has not been easy. It has not thus far been without cost, and it could, depending on events, become impossible for him. The actions taken by the Chinese government to deal with the demonstrators have produced demands by the American people and the U. S. Congress to take steps of our own to demonstrate our disagreement with those actions. ¶ President Bush has taken certain steps he believes both necessary and appropriate under the circumstances. You have protested these actions of his , while the Congress and much of the U. S. press have attacked him for not acting strongly enough. You, yourself, mentioned that three days ago the U. S. House of Representatives voted to impose stiffer sanctions against the People's Republic. The President opposed that action. Despite his opposition the vote was an almost unprecedented 418-0. The PRESIDENT WILL CONTINUE to oppose such legislation but the magnitude of the vote illustrates the political realities with which he must cope. Even his veto authority is powerless against such unanimity. ¶ The President is very sensitive to Chinese concerns regarding the actions he must take to preserve control over the course of events in the U. S., but he is not omnipoten

in his ability to control such events. The President's ability to control events in the US would, beyond a doubt, be strengthened were the Chinese likewise to try to be sensitive, as you proceed over the coming days and weeks, to the reality that what you do and the way you do it will have a major impact on opinion in the U. S. and throughout the Western world. We have not come here with any detailed set of prescriptions to guide us through the current ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ difficulties. As I said at the outset, we have come to explain the situation in the U. S., the President's efforts to articulate American concerns, and his efforts to restore, preserve and strengthen our bilateral relationship. The President is confident that with the mutual understanding that has brought us through difficulties before we can surmount the present situation and he is deeply appreciative of your willingness to receive us to explain the dilemma in which he finds himself. That's the message from a true friend of the Chinese Government/and the people of China.

DENG - I don't have much time to elaborate on the points. I just hope that ~~the~~ US statesmen and people will understand one point. I think that one must understand ~~the~~ history; ~~that~~ we have won the victory represented by the founding of the PRC by fighting a 22-year war with the cost of more than 20 million lives, a war fought by the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist Party; and if one should add the three-year war to assist Korea against ~~xxx~~ U. S. aggression then it would be/a 25-year effort. The second thing is that people must come to understand that China is an independent country which means no interference by ~~no~~ foreigners. And China is not a country to be directed by the backing of another country no matter

what kind of difficulties should crop up in our way. China will be able to overcome them. There is no force whatsoever which can SUBSITUTE FOR the People's Republic of China represented by the Communist Party of China. This is not an empty word. It is something which has been proven and tested over a period of several decades of experience. We always hope that the five principles of peaceful coexistence will be observed in dealings with China, i.e., equal _____, non-interference in each other's internal affairs. So long as these principles are observed, Sino/US relations will continue to develop on the basis of respect for such principles. If any issue should crop up the issue should be settled promptly. If that approach is not adopted then China will not be held responsible for the deterioration of relations. With regard to what you have said, Mr. Scowcroft, ~~and~~ some of it I agree with you, but ~~a~~ considerable portion of it I am afraid I cannot agree with you. With regard to concluding this unhappy EPISODE in the relations between China and the US, let me just repeat we have to see what kind of remarks and what kind of actions the US ~~were to~~ will take ~~and make~~. I think those things we want to see now. You will now have a follow-up discussion with Premier Li Peng. Let me restate my greetings to be conveyed by you, Mr. Scowcroft, to President Bush and Mrs. Bush.

SCOWCROFT - Mr. Chairman, I thank you sincerely for being willing to receive us and listen to the President's thoughts. HE ASKED me to convey to you his sincere and warmest personal regards and he hopes that we can overcome the difficulties and proceed with deepening relations between our two countries.

DENG - That is also the hope of ours.

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03d. Draft Memcon	Re: Continuation of Meeting w/o Deng (16 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [4]

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Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
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CONTINUATION OF MEETING W/O DENG

LI PENG - Mr. Scowcroft you have come from afar. I wonder whether you have any more things to state and I will listen with attention.

SCOWCROFT - I believe, Mr. Prime Minister, that the President was not so much trying to say exactly how we could work to get out of this situation as he was to try to explain the dilemma in which he finds himself. He is expressing the hope that if we have been able to do so before that we can surmount the obvious and deep differences in our political, social and economic systems to cooperate for our mutual advantage. His hope is that through mutual understanding and mutual effort we can arrest, stop the negative trends of action, reactions which have taken place in recent weeks and to restore the positive trends which were so predominant when the President came here in February. He wanted to explain, and he hoped you would understand, how the American political system works. He is not so all-powerful within the US that he can control necessarily what happens within the US Government. He is powerful but when attitudes become so overwhelming, such as the vote that the Chairman and I both mentioned three days ago, he is powerless to control events. What he is hoping is that the relationship and the actions on both sides will be such that he can control the course of events in the US to our mutual benefit. He understands fully well that events and the actions that you have taken are wholly a matter of domestic concern of the People's Republic. He does not in any way wish even to appear to be interfering in these internal affairs. The reason we have come so confidentially even to the extent of flying in an airplane which could be refueled in the air so we do not land anywhere and perhaps be seen is that he did not want

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Reaching out

any impression that this is more than a sincere reaching out to a friend to try to bridge the differences which have arisen between us. I would simply conclude by saying again that actions which the Chinese Government takes solely in pursuit of its own internal matters do in fact create an effect within the United States which then becomes a matter of our own ~~domestic~~ internal policy. And that perhaps is the most difficult aspect that we have to deal with. If events continue in the pattern they have in recent days I feel we both will suffer and it is the President's belief that with efforts on both sides we can surmount the present difficulty and resume our path of cooperation.

LI PENG - Let me just make some comments on what you have discussed with Chairman Deng and additional remarks and also elaborate on China's policy and position. China and the US are two entirely different countries in terms of political, social and traditional values. Of course, we should all recognize that fact. Since there is such a disparity between us how come we could become friends? After all there must be common ground. I guess that both of us want to see a stable world. We want to see a peaceful world. Because ~~are~~ two peoples are friends to each other. That might be described as both our differences and our common ground. With regard to how Americans view China and the developments in China, the concern of the Americans cannot be denied. What we disagree with is the effort to affect the policy of other countries by way of American government and views. In terms of your efforts to affect the policy of other countries in the world, sometimes your actions have won you a victory and sometimes you have met with failure.

In my view the US will not succeed in such efforts vis-a-vis China. And that's the first point I wish to touch upon. Secondly, I wish to point out that any country of whatever political system and whatever government should base its policies on facts. And they should not determine their own principles and policies on the basis of inaccurate information or rumors going around in society. It is an old saying in China that emotion is no substitute for policy. My feeling is that for the recent past the American people and some decision makers, including those on Capitol Hill, have not had a clear picture of what's going on in China. They have not yet accurate information and emotion on their part has actually been whipped up by inaccurate information and rumors. I guess you might not very much appreciate what I have just told you. I could have made the explanation. I could describe to you what actually happened since April 15 through June 24. That's the concluding day of the 4th session of the 13 Party Central Committee. But that might not be of avail. There is a saying in China that the first impression is most lasting and in your mind there are already these impressions of what has happened in China and there is really no room in your minds for what I would have told you. Just like a computer -- the data is already in your computer. But there are several points I, too, wish to touch upon. First is what is the death toll in Tianemen Square. According to some US reports, the figure is 1,000 or even tens of thousands. So far the accurate figure we have brought is the total death toll is 310 something (i.e. 310-52 including the PLA (?)who died. Only 36 Beijing college students died. And this figure will be released in the official report by the State Council (HEADED BY & See former SHANGHAI) CURRENT mayor of Beijing to the Plenary Session of the 7th National People's Congress. So far we have not been

able to publish the whole name list. This is because it is difficult to make the identification of each and every person who is dead because it is likely that some people who died came from other provinces/areas -- not Beijing. However, we are now in a position to name/, give the time of the death, the cause of death and the day of death xxxxxxxxxxxx of all 36/Beijing college students. Let me me please do not forget that what is going around/in the US and the actual figures that we are going to announce are different in the weight of 2 digits. The second point I wish to stress is that it was only after 48 days of turmoil -- April 15 to June 3 -- that we started to suppress them and the PLA started to fire shots in self-defense. In these 48 days it was less critical but then developed into a turmoil and then a counter-revolution in the Chinese capital of Beijing. Beijing was plunged in total anarchy. No Government in the world, not even the US could tolerate this kind of anarchistic situation no matter what kind of social system the country has. Let me say that the H _____ xxxx may be equivalent to the White House and the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx S _____ China Gate is equivalent to the White House lawn. There were repeated efforts to try to break into the T _____ H _____ compound(?) I guess you would not permit this kind of action against the White House. Tiananmen Square is actually the largest square in the world and there were repeated incidents of occupation of Tiananmen Square by those people who participated in the longest period, May 13 to June 3. The 13th was the begining of the Hunger strike. They (the demonstrators) subsequently issued travel permits. Only those holding the permits were allowed into the square. They occupied the square for two months within which was 20 days and it was during this period of time that the ~~name~~ main transport lines of Beijing were

actually controlled by those engaged in the turmoil. They set up road blocks and motor vehicles were subject to their check, including those of government officials. I don't think that the US would call this a democratic movement. If it should happen in the U. S. you would permit demonstrations but your police actually decide the route and the scale of such demonstrations. So it does not square with the facts if one should call this event a show of peace, or of love for freedom and human rights. Let's have a look at what has been the action of the USG towards demonstrations. There is a book in the US entitled, "The Love of Hatred" -- that- might not be the proper name in English (looks at a newspaper clipping) I wonder if you have read it. After the assassination of Martin Luther King in 1968, arrests occurred in the US in many places and US troops began to be stationed in 100 US colleges. In 1968 American troops and policemen arrested a total of 1,265 people and between January and June the total number of people arrested was 4,000. In 1970 when the Nixon Administration ordered the advance of US troops into Kampuchea students in more than 60 colleges went on demonstrations. Likewise the USG stopped it with several suppressive measures. It is said that in the above student movement at least 1/2 of all colleges in the US were involved. And from May 1 to 15 a total number of 1800 students were arrested. The total number of arrested students between 1970 and 1971 was 14,500 During his recent interview with a journalist, former US President Ronald Reagan was asked about his suppression of students when he was in California. Reagan's answer was, "I did suppress them ~~xxx xxxxxx~~ but these two things are different in nature." He said that he did the suppression secure in the knowledge that there were leftist organizations involved in the demonstrations and ~~xx~~ and Communists

involved and he cited this has reason for his suppression to show its validity. I ~~said~~ say all this just to remind you of the fact that in order to maintain social stability a government has to try to adopt necessary measures to maintain public order in accordance with rights entrusted by the constitution, and no other government has any ~~reason~~ right to make comments on that. As a matter of fact, that was also the line of action taken by the US in previous years. That which reflects the above was written by an American himself. The third point ~~is~~ which I wish to speak about is the students' demand for freedom and democracy and other things -- if just confined to freedom and democracy it could be tolerated. We could have negotiations and dialogue with them but ~~they~~ they later changed ~~their~~ their slogans and ~~posters~~ posters. Their purpose was to overthrow the government, the party leadership and change the Chinese socialist system. Should the government be no good, should it fail to discharge its responsibilies and functions entrusted by the people, the government could be replaced by the Parliament. However, the street actions we witnessed were a violation of the law. Of course, I do not wish to go into further explanation of the whole matter. We have kept videotapes of the developments. Indeed, ~~China~~ China was in a very difficult situation at that time. Our camermen could not keep a full record but they have some records of the true incidents and we would like to send a copy of such a video tape to you, Mr. Scowcroft, and you might care to view it if you are interested. That might help you get the truth of the matter. Next comes the concern which you have expressed, i.e., what will be the policy of the Chinese Government after the occurrence of the rebellion. In spite of the fact that I have said repeatedly that

China's internal affairs do not brook foreign interference, I welcome the opportunity to tell you China's policy. Shortly we plan to do this in accordance with Chinese law. Punishment will be meted out in accordance with Chinese law to those organizers and parties of the rebellion and to those who committed ~~arson~~, looting, smashing and participating in the rebellion. That does not mean that every person who has committed such an offense will get a death sentence. Only a small number will be sentenced to death. It depends on the severity of the crime and on his behavior after the perpetration of the crime, if he should present himself to the police afterwards and if he should perform some meritorious acts -- leniency will be shown. One should not judge the soundness of China's policy by looking at whether a death sentence has been given out. Just like in the US there is a death sentence in Chinese law. I understand that in Western Europe in some countries it has been abolished. However, in the US it varies from State to State and because there are still high incidents of ~~xxxxx~~crime many continue to maintain death sentences. With regard to the overwhelming majority of students, we will be generous with them and we would not even ~~xxxxxxx~~ look into their responsibility. However, there is a strict demarcation line to be followed. We will figure out whether a person has committed ~~the~~ a crime or not ~~[redacted]~~ because of the numerous facts that we have come to possess. We know who are the people who actually engaged or organized the turmoil and rebellion and who are the participants. The organizers and promoters of the rebellion and turmoil are some intellectuals. Intellectuals who do not like our socialist system. In the major stages of the students' unrest, the overwhelming number of the young students who participated in the

demonstrations were freshman or sophomores between 18 and 20 and it is these people are not mature politically and ~~they are~~ easy to stir up ~~and~~ their emotions. With regard to the violence committed against the PLA, most of the offenders are actual criminals. A large number of them were found to have records kept by the police for previous offenses. So actually the combination of three different kinds of people, some from intellectuals, some from naive young students and ruffians -- like what the US calls the lumpen proletariat, like what the US calls the black society, the mafia.

If you are concerned with what happened to the three criminals in the Shanghai train incident, we might have well sent you their biographies -- and you will find those people who you are concerned about are actually repeated criminals who have committed repeated offenses. Though we on our part were not happy with the behavior of a large number of young students, the Chinese Government and the Communist Party was held responsible in this matter. We failed to do good education with them. We actually view them as our own children. There is a Chinese classic ~~xxxx~~, the beginning of which the father is responsible for the son if the son should err because the father had not done enough education. If education is lax then it is the teacher we blame. China will not resort to radical actions against their own young students. Who is to be ~~xxxxxx~~ blamed? You should ~~show them~~ know the main responsibility lies with the former Party General Secretary, Comrade Zhao. Let me not talk about his other responsibilities for failure. He is largely responsible for failing to do a good job of education among the youth. Although we have been weighing so long on this Chinese internal affair, I will tell you that under the policy we have been pursuing we will punish a very small number of criminals in accordance with Chinese law. On the other hand, we will be lenient to the over-

whelming majority of participants. I fully understand the President's feeling towards China and understand his concern about Sino/US relations and your own secret trip to China has borne out this point. We fully understand. We have no business to interfere in American values and feelings. That's the feelings which you have just elaborated. However, such feelings have already turned to actions -- you have taken actions -- some sanctions against China. You have already suspended military sales to China and suspended implementation of contracts concerning sales of weapons and arms to China and suspended technological exchanges in the military field to us. You have suspended high-level government exchanges from the level of Assistant Secretary and above that means (Assistant Foreign Minister) L _____ K _____ C _____ could not go and in spite of the fact that he has very friendly feelings toward the US. You have also prodded some international institutions on which you have influence to stop their negotiations with China on extended loans of credit to us. What we have seen here is not just an expression of one's feelings -- it has been escalated to real actions. And you have also stated that you will allow the extension of Chinese students visas. Some Western European countries have also adopted similar measures. Because they are not one and the same with regard to each country they are nevertheless actions and measures have been taken. In the Western world you take the lead in terms of attitude towards China -- a bell weather. In some cases you have given direction. Your allies are subject to your influence and we understand that. On the other hand, what would be the goal of these measures. What would be the impact and consequences. To be frank, these measures, of course, will have an impact on China in terms of China's economic development, on

international communications and diplomatic activities. If by these measures you believe you will fulfill the purpose of changing the Chinese Government's basic policy, let me just dwell on past history a little bit. Just now Chairman Deng said that the People's Republic of China founded after 25 years of war, and the death of tens of millions of people ~~and~~ also this KOREAN WAR -- in that time the Chinese were ~~week~~ weak and beset with difficulties. Nevertheless you were unable to cross the 38th Parallel and you were unable to cross the boundary river -- the Yalu River between China and Korea. And then there was this blockade imposed on China by the US and some other Western countries. Only the Soviet Government was ready to have contact with us. So China had to ~~deal~~ lean to one side It was not because we did not want to make friends with the US. It was because there was this blockade. At first we enjoyed very good relations with the Soviets. Actually many of the systems in China were things as a result of a learning process from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union helped us with 156 projects -- this help ~~has~~ laid the foundation of China's industry and those projects which are big in scale were learned by erstwhile students. And then the relations broke. There were many reasons involved. The Soviet Union attempted to interfere in our internal affairs. They applied economic sanctions against us. They withdrew their experts and tore up contracts with us and they pressed us for the repayment of loans we got from them. In the early 1960's China was under economic strains because of policies on our own part and because of ~~the~~ a three-year natural calamity. All of China's economy was on the verge of bankruptcy. A number of people died from under those circumstances. The Chinese people did not succumb to Soviet pressures. The Soviet Union even went so far as to resort to the threat of arms against China

A threat of force against China. A small battle was fought over C _____ Island _____ D[ussuri] Island (?) in the Soviet Union. As a result of the battle, still China did not succumb to the Soviet power. We tightened our belt and we tided over the difficulties. And ultimately the beginning of opening of relations between the US and China in 1971 and you were personally involved -- the secret trip of Henry Kissinger and Nixon's visit to China. And hence China's return to the world and China's contacts with the West. This struggle between Soviet pressure and China's anti-Soviet pressure went on for a good 30 years. That is until Gorbachev's visit to China because we regard the meeting between top leaders of two countries criteria for normalization of state relations. Abnormalities continued for 30 years. What was China seeking. China was seeking it's national independence and for us this is something more sacred than anything else. Perhaps economic pressure will do something in the way of slowing down China's economic development speed. If a country has no independence to enjoy what is the speed of economic growth for. That is the logic in accordance with which we view this. Now you have seen that the situation in China has again returned to normalcy after experiencing turmoil and rebellion and new Communist leaders of the country and party have been elected. The political situation in China is a steady one. The new top leadership is united. The new leadership has come into being after selection of some new comrades -- particularly Jiang Zemin of Shanghai. Judging by his performance in Shanghai in the last several years, one can say he has been pursuing a policy of contacts with the outside world. He has met quite a few Westerners with which he has come in contact. Internally

he is interested in maintaining the socialist system. I hope that the US Government will take this into account and China's political situation will be stabilized. Afterall, you will have to deal with this nation of 1.1 billion -- ~~haven't~~ won't you? I guess that it will be difficult for this nation with 9.6 million square kilometers and people to 1.1 billion to perish from this earth. I think one has to bear in mind that is the latest issue between us -- ~~is~~ not a question of China doing something to ~~us~~ the U.S. -- China has done ~~something~~ nothing unfriendly to the US. (2) Just now Chairman Deng mentioned the Chinese proverb that it takes the person who tied the ~~knew~~ knot to untie it. There is a story behind it and I am afraid there is not enough time to tell the story. Actually untying the knot means the knot around ~~the~~ a bell. The bell ~~can now~~ was sound by the wind -- but now we have electric buttons -- and also this bell is tied high up and many people tried to untie it. ~~Not~~ only the person who did the tying was able to untie it. It has always been my belief that ~~XXXXXXXX~~ President Bush is a man with vision. I hope he will see things in view of the overall, long-term interest of Sino/US relations and will curb resistence at home and do something beneficial to Sino/US relations. On the one hand, the Chinese Government is prepared to resist ~~to~~ pressure from various quarters around the world, China will not bow to such pressures. On the other hand, we on our part are prepared to do whatever we can to ~~xxxxx~~ break the present deadlock. Mr. Scowcroft, that is all I have to say.

SCOWCROFT - Thank you very much, Premier Li for the full explanation. If I could just make a couple of brief comments in response. With respect to your first point-- I guess it's no suprise that most Americans think that their political system is the best in the world.

~~SECRET~~

They do not try to impose that system on other people with different traditions but naturally respond when other ~~systems~~ peoples seem to emulate our values, but in no way do the American people seek to impose their own system on any other society. With respect to your second point, I think we both must recognize that we are the prisonersof modern technology. As you point out, Americans do not know all the facts about what happened. The fact of TV, however, which Americans see in their living rooms every night whether ~~actually~~ accurately portraying events or inaccurately portraying events produced a powerful emotional response in the American people. We appreciate your explanation of facts relating to other developments of affairs. It is, of course, as you point out one of the first requirements of any Government to maintain order. The early reaction of your government, ~~and~~, indeed, we saw on our TV, pictures of you discussing the situation with the students. Also, we appreciate your description of the application of Chinese laws to the situation and appreciate the differences in social, political and ~~judicials~~ judicial systems which we both have. And the difference that that makes in the way we handle situations. There is one very important point that I wish to make. That is that the sanctions that the US Government imposed are in no way designed to bring pressure on the Chinese Government. They are _____ _____ an American expression and reaction to events in China as interpreted by the American political experience and cultural traditions. The situation we have now is China acting in accordance with its culture and traditions and the US reacting in accordance with its culture and traditions. 3.3(b)(6) [redacted] It is his hope that the current Chairman

of action and reaction can and will be reversed, and that we will be able to bridge the differences in our systems in our mutual interests, ~~and~~ he would assure the Chinese Government and the Chinese people that we will not attempt in any way to bring pressure on them to adopt American values, American view of life or American political systems. It is my hope that this frank discussion ~~today~~ that we have had this morning has helped to creat understanding on both sides for the situation in which we find ourselves and will lay the foundation for the resumption of the relationship on which we have been engaged so successfully and so profitably for both sides for the last 17 or so years.

LI PENG - Let me just add a few words. President Bush visited China last February on which occasion there was a long discussion between Deng, President Bush, and the Foreign Minister was saying that you were also present at this session and Chairman Deng made a comparison between Sino/US and Sino/Soviet relations and he made a basic analysis. Of course we do not wish to see any change of this critical relationship between China and the US because of some misunderstood incident. We ~~do not~~ hope to see any change in the basic situation that I presented to President Bush. It is not something which we wish to see because I believe that the maintenance of good relations between China and the US and between China and the West are in accordance with interests of our two peoples and in accordance with interests of the other people in the Western world. If we could see a removal of these sanctions imposed on China that would be a sense of gratification for us.

~~TOP SECRET~~

However, a further escalation of sanctions would hurt the national feelings of the Chinese people and would bring about a further deterioration of the situation. In handling Sino/US relations what is very much needed now is restraint and cool-headed approach. Because right from the outset of Sino/US relationship, it was based on mutual concern for world peace and based on mutual benefits. In political affairs there is concern for world peace and this is the basis on which Sino/US relations are based. Therefore in handling questions of this nature, a statesman should take a view of adopting a broader perspective on this. We think President Bush is a man of vision. He refrains from taking _____ actions. I hope that that he will make further efforts in that direction so as to seek a good outcome of Sino/US relations.

SCOWCROFT - I remember the Chairman's strategic analysis last February. It made a deep impression on all of the American party. It was a very important evaluation of the reason this relationship is so important to world peace. In February the President's trip to China was applauded by the American people. There were no negative sentiments about the relationship , about China, about differences in political systems or traditions. The present situation came about solely because of recent events and the way they are perceived and therefore it should be possible for us to surmount these difficulties and resume our course. 3.3(b)(6) [redacted] But it is important that you understand he is not a free agent in this regard. Our political system limits his ability to do so. American attitudes in the end

will govern his ability to do so. You explanation of Chinese law, of the course which you intend to take I believe shows some understanding of the impact of your actions on the US internal situation and on the President's ability to manage it. And if I may speak personally, I feel good about our discussions and about frank exchange of views and our different perspectives that we have had today.

LI PENG - I think that what you have said should be interpreted in this way. The reason China handles matters strictly in accordance with Chinese law is because we want to implement only Chinese law. Our action is not for the US to look at. And we will be generous with the overwhelming majority of the participants of the demonstrations. This is required for China itself. We need to unite with the overwhelming majority including those who have made mistakes. In his address to a meeting organized by the Central Cmte (?) the Genral Secretary elaborated on this policy and so did I yesterday during our meeting with

of course we know that there can not but belimits of the authority ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ of the US President. However, he is very powerful particularly in the realm of execution of foreign policy.

SCOWCROFT - I believe we understand each other.

LI PENG - Let's continue to the table.

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