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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files

OA/ID Number: 91135
Folder ID Number: 91135-002

Folder Title:
China 1989 (Sensitive) [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	4	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Handwritten Notes	Re: Jiang Memcon (1 pp.)	12/89	(b)(1)	
02. Cable	Ambassador Lilley to Brent Scowcroft and James A. Baker, III Re: Begin Text (2 pp.)	12/19/89	(b)(1)	S
03a. Cable	From the White House Re: Message to Ambassador Lilley from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	12/22/89	(b)(1)	S
03b. Draft Cable	Re: Lilley from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04. Non-Paper	Re: Chinese Non-Paper (1 pp.)	12/18	(b)(1)	
05. Outline	Re: The Package settlement… (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
06. Draft Cable	White House to American Embassy Beijing Re: Eyes Only for Ambassador James R. Lilley, American Embassy from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
07. Note	Doug Paal to General [Scowcroft] (1 pp.)	12/13	(b)(1)	S
08a. Report	Re: The U.S. side… (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08b. Report	Re: Schedule of Action (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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WHORM Cat.:
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Pinksheet Number: cap1120
OA/ID Number: 91135-002
Date Closed: 5/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08c. Report	Re: The U.S. side… (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08d. Report	Re: Schedule of Action (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08e. Report	Re: The U.S. side (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08f. Report	Re: Schedule of Action (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08g. Report	Re: The U.S. side… (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08h. Report	Re: Schedule of Action (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09. Memcon	Re: Deputy Secretary's Meeting with the Chinese Ambassador to the United States (3 pp.)	12/12/89	(b)(1)	S
10. Memcon	Re: Working Luncheon Between Foreign Minister Qian Qichan and National Security Advisor Scowcroft (5 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	S
11a. Handwritten Note	Brent [Scowcroft] to Dick (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
11b. Report	Re: The U.S. side… (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
11c. Report	Re: Schedule of Action (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
11d. Outline	Re: The package settlement… (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12a. Addendum	Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichan, December 9, 1989 (1 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S
12b. Addendum	Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichan, December 9, 1989 (1 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S
12c. Memcon	Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichan (5 pp.)	12/10/89	(b)(1)	S
12d. Memcon	Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichan (6 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S
13. Letter	Chairman Deng Xiaoping to President Bush [English] (1 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	
14a. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Deng Xiaoping (2 pp.)	11/6/89	(b)(1)	
14b. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Deng Xiaoping (2 pp.)	11/6/89	(b)(1)	
14c. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Deng Xiaoping (2 pp.)	11/6	(b)(1)	
15. Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador James R. Lilley Re: Eyes Only for Ambassador Lilley [redacted] (2 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1), (b)(6)	S

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
16a. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (2 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	TS
16b. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (3 pp.)	11/8/89	(b)(1)	S
17a. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Deng Xiaoping (5 pp.)	7/21/89	(b)(1)	
17b. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Deng Xiaoping (10 pp.)	7/18/89	(b)(1)	

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OFFICE OF RICHARD NIXON

June 21, 1989

Hon. Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear General Scowcroft,

President Nixon instructed me to send you this advance copy of his article about the situation in China, which will appear on Sunday in the Washington Post and Los Angeles Times and on Monday in a variety of other papers here and abroad.

With respect,

Sincerely,

John H. Taylor

ARTICLE FOR LA TIMES SYNDICATE (release: 6/25/89)

by Richard Nixon

The worldwide revulsion against the brutal repression of demonstrators for democracy in China is unquestionably justified. It is critically important, however, that we not let our revulsion lead us to adopt policies of reprisal that would isolate the Chinese government. They would not be in the interests of the Chinese people. They would not be in the interests of the hundreds of thousands of Chinese in China and all over the world who have demonstrated for political reform. And they would not be in the interests of the United States.

In view of the cruelty and stupidity that led the Chinese government to resort to repression, lashing back with punitive policies would be politically popular and emotionally satisfying for the great majority of the American people. But while such policies might make us feel better, they would dash the Chinese people's chances for further economic progress and eventual political reform. If in our anger we drive China back into the shadows of the Soviet Union and the oppressive economic system Deng Xiaoping has tried to reform, those who fell in Tiananmen Square will truly have died in vain.

To see where we should go in our policy toward China, we should first look back and see where we have been.

When I went to China in 1972, I was criticized by the far right and praised by the far left, both for the wrong reasons. The far right believed I had betrayed my anti-communist principles. The far left rejoiced because they thought I had outgrown them. In fact, my decision had nothing to do with my attitude toward communism.

The first reason I went to China was the Soviet threat. Both the Soviet Union and China had communist governments. Both were supporting our enemies in North Vietnam. But there was a crucial difference. The Soviet Union, as a nuclear superpower, was a potential threat to the United States. China was not. It had broken away from the Soviets and was in the position to play a more constructive international role. It made both moral and strategic sense for the United States to have relations with any nation that did not threaten our fundamental interests.

Today, a strong, stable China is as vital as ever to the security interests of the United States and to peace in the Pacific. A weak, fractured China would leave the Soviet Union as the dominant military power in Asia and Japan as the dominant economic power. Whatever happens in the

future, it is imperative that Sino-American relations remain strong so the United States can help maintain the balance among China, Japan, and the Soviet Union.

President Bush will be pressured to take harsher action by a strange coalition of China-bashers. Those on the far right who oppose any relations with China will demand economic and diplomatic sanctions. So will the human rights lobby, which calls for punishing every regime that does not live up to our standards regardless of our interests or those of the millions living under those regimes whom sanctions would hurt the most. The Bush Administration should continue to ignore these extremist voices and stay the prudent course it has already set.

Many who criticized the President's measured response to the Beijing crackdown were strangely silent about the deafening silence from Mikhail Gorbachev. He may have refrained from condemning the Chinese leaders because he fears that he too will continue to be faced with pro-democracy and anti-Moscow regional movements, such as the one in Georgia this spring where hundreds were massacred by troops using poison gas. In stark contrast to the massive coverage of the tragedy in Tiananmen Square, American television cameras and reporters were not present for that massacre, which is one reason Gorbachev's popularity rating in the West remains high while Deng's is plunging. But the Soviet leader cannot push his luck by condemning Deng for taking steps that he has taken already and may have to take again.

Gorbachev also knows a freeze between Washington and Beijing will hasten the thaw between Moscow and Beijing. Nearly forgotten in the aftermath of Tinanemen Square is an equally important event that occurred in Beijing just days before: the normalization of relations between Moscow and Beijing. Hardline Communist leaders in Beijing, some of whom were suspicious of the Americans to begin with, are probably saying today that if the United States adopts further sanctions, in effect closing the door to China that we opened in 1972, the Kremlin gates now stand open again.

China's leaders want to continue to have economic progress, and they know the best way to encourage them is through continued access to Western technology and investment. They neither like nor trust the Russians, and the Russians have little to offer them compared to the West. But political factors can override economic realities. The Chinese got along without the West for a quarter-century, and they could do so again. If we force them back into their angry isolation from the West, we risk prompting a potentially disastrous entente between the two great communist powers that would be in nobody's interests but

Gorbachev's.

The second reason I went to China had nothing to do with the Soviet Union. Even if there had been no Soviet threat, it was essential that we have relations with a government that was a member of the nuclear club. And today, how can we launch a worldwide attack on the environmental crisis without the cooperation of a government ruling over one-fourth of all people on earth?

Despite the fundamental national self-interest behind our rapprochement with China, many Americans have gone overboard and turned it into a romance. China has a limitless capacity to fascinate. But it is not Disneyland. It is, as it has been since 1949, a communist dictatorship held together by brute force. No one who knows China should be surprised when its leaders turn to violence to pursue their political goals. They have done far worse before Tiananmen Square. One overly excited journalist wrote last week that the crackdown transformed "the Woodstock-like encampment of young students...into the bloodiest killing ground in Communist China's history." He apparently was not aware that many times more people died -- hundreds of thousands, and some Chinese claim millions -- in Mao's Cultural Revolution. Twenty million died in the wake of the brutal forced collectivization known as the Great Leap Forward. Attacks on unarmed civilians are never justified. But in condemning them, we should not pretend that we did not know that China's leaders were capable of using violence for political purposes.

Since Tiananmen Square, some pundits have said it is ironic that the same Deng Xiaopeng who beguiled millions, including an army of journalists, during his state visit to the United States in 1979 is the same man who ordered the crackdown. What is more ironic is that many of the same pundits were willing to believe that the dedicated communist who had fought and bled his way through the Long March and the bloody Chinese civil war was just a cuddly teddy bear with a cute smile. Those who insist on romanticizing relations between nations will always be disappointed when the realities of national interest and survival inevitably intrude.

But while we should be realistic about China, its leaders, and the strategic reasons our relationship must continue, we should not lose sight of the benefits the Chinese people have derived from that relationship, particularly the economic progress that has come along with it. If we can restore a close relationship with China, the greatest beneficiaries will be the people of China themselves.

Some of the Beijing demonstrators carried banners reading, "In the Soviet Union they have Gorbachev -- who do

we have?" They have leaders who have made life better for hundreds of millions of Chinese. In the ten years since Deng instituted his economic reforms and an intensive campaign to attract Western investment, the income of the average Chinese has doubled. In the five years since Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, despite the rave reviews he has received for his political reforms, the income of the average Russian has stagnated or even gone down.

In 1972 there were no Chinese students from the PRC studying in the United States. Since that time, 62,500 have done so. In that same period only a few hundred Russian students have studied here. Gorbachev's glasnost, or "openness," notwithstanding, television and press coverage of the events in Tiananmen Square has been far greater than that of comparable events in the Soviet Union.

On June 2nd, two days before the crackdown, a Chinese student who is studying in New York City mailed a letter to my office. He wrote, "Please tell President Nixon that we young people from China really appreciate what he has done to open up China to the outside world. Just look at the Statue of Liberty that the Chinese students carried when demonstrating on the streets for democracy. It would be impossible without his courageous visit to China."

As I watched the aftermath of that night's events, I took little comfort from his message. China's new fascination with the West and the dramatic economic reforms Deng adopted were both welcome developments. But they also entailed great dangers. By giving their people a better life economically and permitting their brightest young people to study in the United States and other Western countries, China's leaders ran the risk that the people's rising expectations would eventually lead to demands for political reforms that would challenge the authority of the Communist Party. The further tragedy is that the suppression of the pro-democracy challenge has dealt a massive setback to his economic policies.

A fundamental goal of our China policy should be to influence its leaders to get the economic reforms back on track and also to go forward with peaceful political reforms. Our influence will be squandered if we make pious pronouncements in public about what the Chinese leaders should or should not do. It would be far better to urge them through private channels to show restraint in dealing with pro-democracy activists and eventually to find a way to better accommodate dissent within the system.

In 1972 I met with a group of congressmen and Senators who opposed our new relationship with the Soviet Union because of its policies against Jewish immigration. I said, "The walls of the Kremlin are very thick. It is difficult

to be heard even when you are inside the walls. It is impossible to be heard when you are outside." When we opened lines of communication to the Kremlin and and made our views known privately, the number of Jews allowed to leave the Soviet Union increased from 600 the year before I came to office in 1969 to 37,000 in 1973.

We face a similar dilemma in China today. The Great Wall of China is very thick. We may not always be heard when we are inside. If we withdraw back outside the Wall again, we will not be heard at all, and the Chinese people's dreams of more democracy and a better life will almost certainly die.

END

Beijing: The Army Moves In

ıt China Protests; as Students Fight

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anger as he watched the body of student being carted away, his head blown away by bullets.

"Maybe we'll fail today," he said. "Maybe we'll fail tomorrow. But someday we'll succeed. It's a historical inevitabilty."

On Saturday the police had used tear gas and beat dozens of demonstrators near the Communist Party headquarters in Zhongnanhai, while soldiers and workers hurled bricks at each other behind the Great Hall of the People. Dozens of people were wounded, but exact numbers could not be confirmed.

It appeared to be the first use of tear gas ever in the Chinese capital, and the violence seemed to radicalize the crowds that filled Tiananmen Square and Changan Avenue in the center of the city. The clashes also appeared to contribute to the public bitterness against the Government of Prime Minister Li.

The violence on both sides seemed to mark a milestone in the democracy movement, and the streets in the center of the city were a kaleidescope of scenes rarely if ever seen in the Chinese capital: furious crowds smashed and overturned army vehicles in front of Zhongnanhai, and then stoned the Great Hall of the People; grim-faced young soldiers clutching submachine guns tried to push their way through thick crowds of demonstrators near the Beijing train station; and the police charged a crowd near Zhongnanhai and used truncheons to beat men and women disabled by tear gas.

A Changing View of the Army

"In 1949, we welcomed the army into Beijing," said an old man on the Jianguomenwai bridge, referring to the crowds who hailed the arrival of Communist troops at the end of the Communist revolution. Then he waved toward a line of 50 army trucks that were blocked in a sea of more than 10,000 angry men and women, and added, "Now we're fighting to keep them out."

Most Chinese seemed convinced that the tanks and troops had been ordered into the city to crush the pro-democracy demonstrations once and for all. The immediate result of the first clashes was to revitalize the pro-democracy movement, which had been losing momentum over the last 10 days, and to erase the sense that life in the capital was returning to normal. But the use of tanks and guns came later,and it was not clear if they would succeed in extinguishing the movement or would lead to such measures as a general strike.

The tension was exacerbated by an extraordinary announcement on television Saturday night, ordering citizens to "stay at home to protect your lives." In particular, the announcement ordered people to stay off the streets and away from Tiananmen Square.

"The situation in Beijing at present is very serious," the Government warned in another urgent notice read on television. "A handful of ruffians are wantonly making rumors to instigate the masses to openly insult, denounce, beat and kidnap soldiers in the People's Liberation Army, to seize arms, surround and block Zhongnanhai, attack the Great Hall of the People, and attempt to gather together various forces. More serious riots can occur at any time."

There were some reports that the Communist Party's ruling Politburo had met Friday and given the Beijing municipality the authority to clear the square and end the protests. The People's Daily and the television news on Saturday took a hard line against the unrest, and the evening news warned that "armed police and troops have the right to use all means to dispose of troublemakers who act willfully to defy the law."

The clashes and enormous outpouring of support for the students were an unexpected turnaround for the democracy movement. Just a few days ago, the number of students occupying Tiananmen Square had dropped to a few thousand, and students seemed to be having difficulty mobilizing large numbers of citizens to take to the streets. The Government's strategy, of waiting for the students to become bored and go home, seemed to be leading to the possibility of a resolution to the difficulty.

Cyclists Killed

Then a police van crashed into four bicyclists late Friday night, generating new outrage against the Government. One cyclist was killed instantly, and two died in the hospital Saturday, while the fourth seemed less seriously hurt.

Rumors were less meticulous about detail, and word spread early Saturday morning through the capital that four people had been killed by the police. Tens of thousands of people took to the streets to protest, and immediately found themselves confronting more than 2,000 unarmed troops who were marching toward Tiananmen Square.

The troops retreated, but that confrontation seemed to set the tone for the massive demonstrations later Saturday and early today.



Reuters

Demonstrators in Beijing scuffling with a soldier who was marching toward Tiananmen Square yesterday.



Associated Press

Students atop an armored vehicle they disabled in Tiananmen Square

The Beijing Spring: From Heady Defiance to Repression

Demonstrations by students and workers demanding greater democracy and an end to Government corruption went on for more than six weeks in Beijing's central Tiananmen Square before the authorities resorted to armed force to suppress them. Here are the high points of the sustained protest, which has come to be regarded as a turning point for China:

April 18 Several thousand students march through the capital in predawn hours, chanting democratic slogans, singing revolutionary songs and mourning the ousted Communist Party leader, Hu Yaobang, who died April 15.

April 22 Defying a ban on public protests, more than 100,000 gather in Tiananmen Square to press demands for more democracy. Tens of thousands of university students begin camping all night in the square, foiling Government plans to close off the area.

May 13 About 2,000 students begin a hunger strike at Tiananmen Square.

May 14 An unannounced Politburo meeting reportedly endorses the moderate line of the Communist Party leader, Zhao Ziyang, including more discussions with the students and limited steps toward greater democracy.

May 15 Mikhail S. Gorbachev arrives in Beijing to seal the reconciliation of the two Communist nations. Hunger strikers camped out in the square refuse to end their vigil, forcing the authorities to move their welcoming ceremony for the Soviet leader to the airport.

May 19 Prime Minister Li Peng warns that chaos in Beijing is spreading all over the country. The Government capitulates on a key student demand by arranging a nationally televised meeting between Mr. Li and leaders of the protest. "We've come too late," a tearful Mr. Zhao says at the meeting. "You have good in-

of thousands of people rush out of their homes blocking troops from reaching demonstrators in the central square. Later in the day, about one million Chinese take to the streets to defy martial law.

Reports circulate that Zhao Ziyang has been stripped of all power, retaining only his title of General Secretary of the party.

May 25 Mr. Li declares that his Government is in control and sends a letter to troops encircling Beijing, expressing the hope that "the troops will overcome the difficulties confronting them" and "successfully impose martial law."

May 27 Some student leaders call for an end to their occupation of Tiananmen Square, but say they will continue to hold large-scale demonstrations to press for greater democracy and the resignation of Prime Minister Li.

June 2 Unarmed troops try to march on the

PRESIDENT ASSAILS SHOOTINGS IN CHINA

Baker Silent on Requests for Economic Curbs by Helms and Rights Groups

By ROBERT PEAR
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 3 — President Bush said today that he deeply deplored the shooting of protesters by Chinese troops.

The President said it was "clear that the Chinese Government has chosen to use force against Chinese citizens who were making a peaceful statement in favor of democracy."

"I deeply deplore the decision to use force against peaceful demonstrators and the consequent loss of life," said Mr. Bush, who was spending the weekend in Kennebunkport, Me. "We have been urging and continue to urge nonviolence, restraint and dialogue. Tragically, another course has been chosen. Again, I urge a return to non-violent means for dealing with the current situation."

Baker Is Careful

Secretary of State Baker, appearing on the CNN television program "Newsmaker Saturday," declined to say whether the Bush Administration would seek to penalize China by such steps as cutting off sales of American arms to Beijing.

Appearing on the CNN television program "Newsmaker Saturday," Mr. Baker said that the Chinese Government and the thousands of protesters seeking greater democracy had displayed "a significant amount of restraint" over the last few weeks.

But today, he said, "it would appear that there may be some violence being used here on both sides," not only by Chinese soldiers, but also by students throwing firebombs.

Comments Called Stronger

Mr. Baker said that his comments today were "considerably stronger than what we've said heretofore." But they did not go as far as many members of Congress and human rights groups say the Administration should have gone in expressing concern.

Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressed alarm at China's effort to suppress the student protests.

"The Chinese Communist leaders apparently are not willing to cease their historic repression of human rights," Mr. Helms said from his home in Raleigh. "I will be working with my colleagues to insure that, as a first response against this brutality, all U.S. military cooperation and sharing of technology with the Communist Government must be terminated."

In a letter to President Bush this week, Freedom House, a human rights organization founded in 1941, said the United States should condemn China for "any significant violations of political rights and civil liberties."

Kampelman's Argument

The chairman of Freedom House, Max M. Kampelman, said that such violations would justify an immediate review of the full range of economic and military cooperation between Washington and Beijing.

Secretary Baker said today, "The army of China calls itself the army of the people, and we think it would be unfortunate indeed if the army of the people were used to suppress the people."

Mr. Baker declined to say if the United States should impose sanctions against China. He said that the shooting of demonstrators by troops today was "the first really significant use of force" since the student protests began seven weeks ago.

"Before we get into hypothetical situations, let's see how this most recent and extremely deplorable development unfolds," Mr. Baker said. "Let's see what happens over the course of the next few days before we start hypothesizing about what we



Reuters

ıstrators in Beijing scuffling with a soldier who was marching toward Tiananmen Square yesterday.



Associated Press

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PRESIDENT ASSAILS SHOOTINGS IN CHINA

Baker Silent on Requests for Economic Curbs by Helms and Rights Groups

By ROBERT PEAR
Special to The New York Times

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Kampelman's Argument

The chairman of Freedom House, Max M. Kampelman, said that such violations would justify an immediate review of the full range of economic and military cooperation between Washington and Beijing.

Secretary Baker said today, "The army of China calls itself the army of the people, and we think it would be unfortunate indeed if the army of the people were used to suppress the people."

Mr. Baker declined to say if the United States should impose sanctions against China. He said that the shooting of demonstrators by troops today was "the first really significant use of force" since the student protests began seven weeks ago.

"Before we get into hypothetical situations, let's see how this most recent and extremely deplorable development unfolds," Mr. Baker said. "Let's see what happens over the course of the next few days before we start hypothesizing about what we might or might not do in the future."

Mr. Baker said that the State Department had ordered employees of the American Embassy in Beijing to avoid Tiananmen Square, the site of the demonstrations where soldiers opened fire today. In addition, he said, the department has issued a notice urging Americans to avoid travel to China at this time.

ı Heady Defiance to Repression

ıt 2,000 students begin a hunger
ımen Square.

ınannounced Politburo meeting
ɔrses the moderate line of the
ːty leader, Zhao Ziyang, includ-
ˌsions with the students and lim-
ːd greater democracy.

ıail S. Gorbachev arrives in Bei-
reconciliation of the two Com-
Hunger strikers camped out in
ıse to end their vigil, forcing the
ıove their welcoming ceremony
ader to the airport.

ne Minister Li Peng warns that
g is spreading all over the coun-
nment capitulates on a key stu-
ɔy arranging a nationally tele-
ɔetween Mr. Li and leaders of the
e come too late," a tearful Mr.
he meeting. "You have good in-
vant our country to become bet-
ms you have raised will eventu-
ɪ."

ɔps are called into the capital and
ɪmposed in parts of the city as the
ttempts crack down. "We must
d resolute measures to end the
'," Prime Minister Li says. Tens of thousands of people rush out of their homes blocking troops from reaching demonstrators in the central square. Later in the day, about one million Chinese take to the streets to defy martial law.

Reports circulate that Zhao Ziyang has been stripped of all power, retaining only his title of General Secretary of the party.


May 25 Mr. Li declares that his Government is in control and sends a letter to troops encircling Beijing, expressing the hope that "the troops will overcome the difficulties confronting them" and "successfully impose martial law."

May 27 Some student leaders call for an end to their occupation of Tiananmen Square, but say they will continue to hold large-scale demonstrations to press for greater democracy and the resignation of Prime Minister Li.

June 2 Unarmed troops try to march on the square but are driven back by thousands of citizens.

June 3 A violent confrontation begins as as troops again march on square, beating dozens of protesters before retreating.

June 4 Troops and tanks return to the square, opening fire on throngs and destroying barricades.



The New York Times/June 4, 1989

green helmets, sweating in their heavy green uniforms under the pelting sun.

Some citizens gathered in small huddles around people they thought

how far the Government would go.

"They are simply ruffians and bandits," said a young well-dressed woman who had gotten caught in the cross-fire of bricks and stones as she

comfort her. "We are shocked," he said. "We thought that this kind of thing only happened during the reign of the corrupt Government of the Kuomintang. Yet this happened in

An Open Letter to President George Bush from Chinese Students in the United States

May 20, 1989

Mr. George Herbert Walker Bush
President of the United States of America
Kennebunkport, Maine

Dear Mr. President:

As we are writing this open letter to you, a violent and bloody crackdown on the pro-democracy movement is in progress in Beijing. Blood is flowing in the very streets that you visited three months ago. The Chinese government headed by Mr. Deng Xiaoping and Mr. Li Peng has massed assault troops and police forces, some of which have been, since yesterday, conducting a systematic and brutal campaign of repression. Additional troops are being sent to Beijing. A massacre of peaceful demonstrators is imminent. Right now millions of Beijing residents have temporarily blocked the advance of army units and managed to prevent the government's order from being executed. In addition, since last night the Chinese government has imposed a news blackout against Western, primarily American, television news organizations which had been reporting the gripping story of a heroic people struggling to free itself from a deteriorating dictatorship.

Many signs indicate that the Chinese government is about to employ much greater violence against non-violent and orderly demonstrators. First, Mr. Zhao Ziyang, formerly the Secretary General of the Communist Party who was a moderating influence within the top Chinese leadership, has resigned. His resignation yesterday was accompanied by an immediate escalation of tension and violence in Beijing, with the arrival of troops now armed with assault rifles. Second, the Chinese government's news blackout also indicates that it is going to hide, from the eyes of the people of the world, the increasing atrocities it is committing or about to commit. Finally, by violently suppressing peaceful pro-democracy demonstrators in China, the government under Deng has violated all the accepted codes of conduct in the civilized world. It has violated the relevant clauses of the United Nations' Human Rights Charter, to which the People's Republic of China is an official signatory. It has abrogated the television transmission contracts its representatives signed with American and other Western news organizations. It has openly

challenged the civilized world, and particularly Western democracies.

The current Deng-Li regime in China has lost its legitimacy and the support of the Chinese society. Its foundation is eroding fast. It no longer has any credibility with its own people. Even the Communist Party has been torn apart, with the defection from the regime by many party members and government officials, including Mr. Zhao. The rift between the Chinese society and the Deng regime, and the rift within the regime are widening. If a significant portion of the military withdraws their support for the regime and turns against it, an all-out civil war will break out. If most of the military refuses to carry out repressive orders, the regime will collapse quickly. The situation in China indicates that both possibilities are increasing.

Most importantly, all the major social groups in China, including students, government officials, workers, professionals and urban residents, have fundamentally rejected the current Deng-Li regime. They shall make efforts to resist, in various ways, the new campaign of repression by the Deng-Li regime. The combination of these factors will further de-stabilize the already volatile situation in China; in the long-run, the Deng-Li regime will inevitably collapse, perhaps as soon as the aging Deng is struck by natural infirmities.

This raises the issue of the position of the United States government on the deteriorating situation in China. As one of the greatest democracies in the world, it is the duty of the United States to support the democratic movement in China today. The U.S. government's reticence about or weak response to the Chinese government's violent suppression of the democratic movement will be construed, both by the people of the world and particularly the Chinese people, as condoning the atrocities of the Deng-Li regime, the survival of which now is an open question. On the other hand, the public withdrawal of American support from this disintegrating regime is both in the interests of the United States and in keeping with the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The practical effect of the American official condemnation of the Deng-Li regime will demonstrate to the people of the world, and especially the Chinese people, that an evil regime has no allies or friends in the democratic world. As Chinese nationals now living in this free land, we strongly believe that this is also the will of the American people.

Human rights and democracy are universal values that know no artificial boundaries of states. It is part of the obligations of the governments of the free world to condemn -- and punish-- a foreign government which is beating, murdering and enslaving its own people.

We strongly urge you, Mr. President, and the other leaders of the free world to take prompt actions to ensure that the government-sponsored violence against peaceful demonstrators be ceased immediately, that the freedom-loving people of China receive all the moral and material support from the free peoples and their governments in other parts of the world, and that the violent dictatorship under Deng be roundly condemned throughout the civilized world.

Respectfully,

The Chinese Students Studying in the United States

Principal organizers of this open letter (signatures are being collected across the United States)

Harvard University

Gong Xiaoxia (617) 666-9055
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Wang Jing 625-1992

Boston University

Lu Kuanghui (617) 498-6312
Cai Jinyong
Lin Suo 625-9455

Jiang Memcon
Dec 89

- Crowe talks w/ Bush in diff position.

= Reported To & Hon Exchai - Try to find common ground while dealing w/ minor diff.

- 3 hangdowns - security + separation.

- Asia-Pac will develop rapidly in coming years
  - China will develop into big market providing opportunity for coop.

- Discussed Shanghai communique
  - Some of my classmates took high positions in Taiwan.
  - US/PRC diff systems should not be a bar to coop.

Econ
- ** Reform & open to outside & avoiding bourgeois liberalization.
  - We opposed to c negative aspects
    - Prostitution, etc.

** - EE - Diff w/ China
  - Mentioned Deng comment on Korea Japan

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT QUESTIONS

1) Now that you've taken the first step toward restoring relations with China, what do you hope to see from them? What is your reaction to the beating of student demonstrators yesterday?

2) Why did you go along with the Chinese request to keep the Scowcroft/Eagleburger mission secret?

3) What have been your biggest disappointments in the area of foreign affairs in your first year in office?

4) You said it would be inappropriate for you to go to Berlin at this time, why then, was it appropriate for your Secretary of State to do so?

5) Did you influence the Salvadorans to release Jennifer Casolo; and, do you think she was guilty? Will you send her back if they reopen the case?

6) Won't your planned trip to Cartegena require the Colombians to devote extraordinary police and military attention to your safety which otherwise could be devoted to the drug war?

7) Several former, high-level Defense officials have testifies that the DoD budget can be cut in half in the next decade due to the diminished Soviet threat. Do you envision this size cut?

8) What are your priorities or main goals for the '90s?

9) How do you see the abortion issue affecting next year's elections?

10) If the FY'90 budget comes down to a real crunch, what programs will be put before others; and, will you consider using the sequester again?

11) What do you hope will be the tone of your administration in 1990?

12) Do you still expect to be able to maintain your conciliatory approach to Congress and keep bipartisanship alive?

13) What are your greatest accomplishments and failures in your first year in office?

1) Does Scowcroft's visit indicate a change in U.S. policy toward China?

2) Why did you take the first step when you said the Chinese would have to?

3) What do you expect from the Chinese? Doesn't this mean the U.S. protest is meaningless?

4) What does this say about your Human Rights policy?

5) Are the four power talks on Berlin an attempt by the Soviets to block German Reunification?

6) What is your reaction to the Soviet request for, and Arias' support of, a joint U.S.-Soviet effort regarding the peace process in Central America?

THE SUN

8A

DECEMBER 12, 1989 BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

J.R.L. STERNE, Editorial Page Editor • REG MURPHY, Publisher • JAMES I. HOUCK, Managing Editor

Mission to Beijing

President Bush was right to send two ranking emissaries to brief Chinese Communist leaders on his Malta summit with Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. China has one-fifth the world's population, nuclear bombs and a national interest in the U.S.-Soviet relationship that translates into a right to be informed. Keeping China isolated would only undercut efforts by the two leaders to lessen world tensions. As Mr. Bush told a group of editorial-page editors yesterday, "I do not want to isolate the Chinese people." He seeks to reopen lines of communication rather than keeping them shut, as Democrats stridently urge, in retaliation for last summer's crackdown on Chinese demonstrators.

This imperative overrides President Bush's suspension of high-level contacts last June in response to the regime's butchery of peaceful demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. It is more important than the congressional sniping at the mission. China was no democracy when President Nixon and national security adviser Henry Kissinger opened the Sino-American dialogue. Its human rights practice improved afterward, leading to the false optimism of last May. China still will need a human rights improvement to end sanctions imposed last June, to rekindle ceremonial summitry or to restart the flow of U.S. investment. But it takes diplomatic contact, such as the mission of National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, to keep reiterating that to its leaders.

The U.S. needs to talk to China to dissuade it from selling sophisticated missiles to the likes of Libya and Syria; to bring Cambodia to true independence without the reimposition of the ghastly horrors of the China-backed Khmer Rouge; to protect the Americans resident in China; to bring freedom in exile for dissident scientist Fang Lizhi and his wife, now sheltering in the U.S. embassy. And lastly, it was reported that Deng Xiaoping, through an interpreter, expressed satisfaction with President *Carter* for sending Messrs. Scowcroft and Eagleburger. Mr. Deng is 85, nominally retired but the leader still, and clearly slipping in his personal faculties. His imminent departure and the consequent uncertainty shrouding the gerontocracy are reasons enough to keep in touch.

Democrats complain that the U.S. should not kowtow, and so it should not. The homage to the Middle Kingdom, inherited from emperors with self-delusions of ruling the world, must be replaced by symmetrical exchanges of visits. The presidential veto of a bill to grant automatic extensions of visas to Chinese students was an unnecessary and unwise solicitude to Beijing. But none of that is involved in the perfectly sensible mission to Beijing. Not to have undertaken this task would have been dereliction.

2/12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

[redacted]

General Scowcroft,

This is a private memo from two scholars — Glaser and Garrett. It reports a conversation with Zhang Deguang — the sharpest officer in the Chinese Embassy here.

I think you'll find it worth reading.

VR,

Doug Paal

[redacted]

[redacted]

Bonnie Glaser/Banning Garrett
Memcon
Zhang Deguang
Political Counsellor
Chinese Embassy
December 19, 1989

Sino-American Relations

The visit to China by General Scowcroft is viewed as a major gesture to China by the United States. Some Chinese scholars may view the visit as vindicating their prediction that the U.S. would come crawling back to China if Beijing is patient enough to wait, but I don't think that the leadership sees it this way. Deng does not hold the view that the U.S. needs China more than China needs the U.S. He sees U.S.-Chinese relations as extremely important to both countries as well as to world peace.

Deng is a strategic thinker. He sees the U.S. as the most important country to China and has attached great importance to improving and developing the Sino-American relationship. The visit demonstrates that Deng still plays the most important role in foreign policy decisionmaking. It was critical that U.S.-Chinese relations be restored while Deng is still alive and continues have great influence. Jiang Zemin is not yet powerful enough. He lacks a broad base of support.

I disagree with those who view the sanctions as hurting the hardliners and strengthening the moderates in China. In my view, the sanctions have only strengthened the position of the hardliners. Scowcroft's visit will strengthen the position of Deng and the moderates.

I think that President Bush was "courageous" to send Scowcroft to China since he certainly must have anticipated the storm of criticism that such a step would likely evoke from Congress and the American public. The visit will likely mark an historical turning point in Sino-American relations. China will respond positively to the Scowcroft visit to push Sino-U.S. relations forward. We should help President Bush. Deng told Nixon when he visited that if the U.S. takes the first step, China would respond. Now the U.S. has taken that step, China is compelled to take positive steps. I think that the Fulbright program will be reinstated, student exchanges will be resumed and Fang Lizhi and his wife will be released to a third country. It is also possible that martial law will be lifted. Deng said during Scowcroft's visit that China should do something to make the Chinese people happy in the new year. I don't know what he meant by this, but my speculation is that martial law might be lifted on January 1.

Chinese propaganda attacks on the U.S. in the media have already subsided considerably. I think that these attacks were a response to the U.S. sanctions. The stress on ideology and class struggle in foreign policy was also a reaction to the West and will likely diminish now, assuming that U.S.-Chinese relations get back on track and the sanctions are eventually lifted. The calls by some Chinese leaders for greater self-reliance were not viewed as the optimal situation for China--they were intended to send the message that China could endure international isolation if necessary, but this was never considered to be the preferred option, not even by the hardliners.

The statement made by Li Peng last summer calling for a distinction between China's relations with countries which have similar ideologies, values and social sytems, and relations with countries which have different ideologies, values and social systems was never repeated by any other Chinese leader. This view was not shared by Deng and did not accurately represent Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy.

Do you think that these steps will be sufficient to satisfy congress? How will congress view the release of Fang Lizhi? [In response to the suggestion that China cease jamming VOA:] I have been told that most of southern China can still hear VOA broadcasts in Chinese, and of course, China is not jamming the English language broadcasts. I don't think that such importance should be attached to the jamming of VOA.

The U.S.--and especially congress--should not expect too much from China in a short period of time. Only certain steps can be taken at the present time. The situation in China cannot be transformed overnight. The internal repression will be eased only gradually. Concerning the demand by some Americans that China acknowledge that the June events were a tragedy, I don't think that this will happen. I personally don't understand why the Chinese government refuses to acknowledge this since any loss of life can be termed a tragedy.

Have you heard whether China will curtail or cut off sending students to the U.S. in response to Bush's decision to take administrative measures to allow students from China to remain in the U.S. instead of compelling them to return for two years? I have heard contradictory information. Some people say that China will not send more students, while others say that the policy has not changed. Perhaps the Scowcroft visit will affect this decision.

A conference was recently held in China to discuss ways of improving working conditions for student returnees to China. I think this is a positive development. It would be a great loss for China if 40,000 students in the U.S. did not return. In my view, most students here have nothing to fear if they return home. The vast majority will not be persecuted. Only the small handful of activists and organizers of anti-China groups would be punished.

In the Chinese embassy, personnel at the level of political counsellor and above knew about Scowcroft's July visit to China.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

The outcome of the Malta summit was not surprising to me. Prior to the summit I had many meetings with Soviet experts and read articles on the issues to be discussed and the likely results of the summit.

Bush and Gorbachev shared many common interests at the summit. Most importantly, they expressed a shared interest in maintaining stability in Eastern Europe and in supporting a gradual continuation of reform in East European countries. They also held common views on German reunification.

I think there are good prospects for greater U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the future. There is now a debate in China about whether we are entering a new post-cold war era in U.S.-Soviet relations in which cooperation will be the dominant factor in the superpower relationship. The majority may still view the U.S.-Soviet rivalry as the more important factor, however. The latter view rejects the theory that the cold war is over and holds that there are inherent contradictions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that will not be easily eliminated. From Deng Xiaoping's statements during General Scowcroft's visit, it is apparent that he does not accept the view that the cold war is over and a new era in U.S.-Soviet relations is emerging. Perhaps Chinese leaders do not wish to accept this view because such a development would not serve Chinese interests--it would diminish China's status in the triangle. But even Deng is not conclusive and has adopted a wait-and-see attitude. So the debate is still continuing on this question.

Prior to the Malta summit, the White House spokesman Fitzwater said that China was on a list of "regional conflicts" to be discussed along with Central America. I don't think that China was discussed between Bush and Gorbachev, but during Baker's meeting with Shevardnadze in Wyoming China was likely touched on.

I had lunch today with Condoleeza Rice (NSC expert on the Soviet Union) and Douglas Paal. I asked her what her assessment was of the progress of reform in the Soviet Union, the survivability of Gorbachev in the next 1-2 years, the possibility of a multi-party system emerging in the Soviet Union and prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations. I concluded from the discussion that President Bush does not want to hasten reforms in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. The U.S. wants to see stability maintained and supports slow-paced progress. In addition, the U.S. hopes that Gorbachev will remain in power.

Sino-Soviet Relations

[In response to a question about a Kyodo report that Jiang Zemin's planned visit to Moscow in 1990 has been postponed:]

Now that the U.S. and China have begun to restore relations, there is no urgent need for China to send Jiang to Moscow. Moreover, there are differences in Chinese and Soviet viewpoints on reform and developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. China "blames" Gorbachev for accelerating the pace of change in Eastern Europe. This will affect Sino-Soviet relations. It will slow political contacts and exchanges between our two countries. China is not anxious to send many students to the Soviet Union now. In fact, it is likely that U.S.-Soviet student exchanges will soon exceed Sino-Soviet student exchanges. Bush and Gorbachev agreed at Malta to exchange 1,000 students.

The first round of talks between diplomatic and military experts on demilitarization of the border made some achievements. The two sides agreed on principles to guide the reductions. For example, it was agreed that force reductions should be made on the basis of equal security. This means that reductions will not necessarily be equal on both sides--the country that has more weapons/troops will have to cut its weapons/troops more. The result should be equal security not equal numbers. The first round did not discuss numbers of troops or categories and types of weapons, but this may be discussed in future rounds. The next round will be held in February. I don't know if an agreement will be produced that resembles U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements which obligate both sides to adhere to certain limits. I think, however, that any agreement will deal with specifics, not just generalities. Verification measures will have to be adopted and I wonder how China will feel about having Soviet inspectors at Chinese facilities.

The progress in the talks aimed at demilitarizing the border will be affected by the progress in U.S.-Soviet global arms control, especially START and CFE, and in the progress in easing the U.S.-Soviet military competition in Asia. [Zhang agreed with the following:] China does not want to be left out of the process of disarmament, nor does it want to be seen as out in front of the United States.

In the last round of border talks progress was made on only a very small area. In fact, no substantial progress is being made in these talks. There has been no movement on the impasse over Heixiazi island. No treaty is likely to be reached in the near future.

Soviet Union: Internal Situation

Gorbachev fears the possibility of inflation and economic chaos in the Soviet Union. He doesn't want to make the same mistakes that China made, so he will move slowly to implement reform. I disagree with the view put forward by many American scholars on the Soviet Union that Soviet economic reforms have suffered a setback with the announcement of the 13th Five Year Plan. It is true that Moscow will continue to rely primarily on central planning, but I think that the current plan is intended to create a stronger basis for moving ahead with price reform. Progress in economic reform will continue, but only at a slow pace. This is Gorbachev's preference.

Eventually, Gorbachev may agree to a multi-party system in the Soviet Union. He has not rejected such a possibility, but he does not want it to occur too soon nor too quickly.

Implications of East European and Soviet Reforms for China

China does not see the reforms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as posing a grave threat to China. There are major differences between the situation in China and in many East European countries. In the Soviet Union there is glasnost and perestroika, but no food on the table nor consumer goods on the shelves. In Poland the economic situation is terrible and there is no evidence that a more open political system will improve the economy. East Germany and Czechoslavakia are considered to be relatively prosperous, but there is doubt as to whether the political changes there can further improve the economic situation. So there is no certainty that any model is appropriate to China's situation and can ensure continued economic progress. Most Chinese people view the situation in Eastern Europe as chaotic and do not wish to see similar chaos in China.

Japanese Policy Toward the Soviet Union

The improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations and in overall East-West ties has weakened Japan's global position. I think that the Japanese may play a Soviet card to shore up its global influence. They may invite Gorbachev to visit Japan and step up investment in Siberia.

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Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
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FM AMBASSADOR LILLEY, BEIJING 008
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR LTG SCOWCROFT AND EYES ONLY TO SECRETARY BAKER
BEGIN TEXT

I'M FLAGGING THREE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA NOT BECAUSE I WANT TO BE SOME SECOND-RATE CASSANDRA, BUT BECAUSE I'M FRANKLY WORRIED. I FLAG THESE PROBLEMS AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF YOUR SUCCESSFUL TRIP. YOU TOOK HEAT BACK THERE, BUT IT HAS SURELY IMPROVED THE ATMOSPHERE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP HERE.

(b)(1)



THE SECOND PROBLEM IS OUR MILITARY SALES PROGRAM. I DETECTED THE MOST HOSTILITY AT HOME AGAINST RESUMING OUR MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE CHINESE, IN CONGRESS, IN DOD, AND AMONG WELL-INFORMED CHINA BUFFS WHO NORMALLY SUPPORT US. THE ISSUE MAY COME TO A HEAD IN LATE FEBRUARY 1990 WHEN WE MEET WITH THE CHINESE AND ASSESS THEM COSTS FOR SUSPENSION (INITIATED BY US) OF THE MILITARY PROGRAMS. THE EXTRA COSTS WILL BE IN THE MILLIONS AND THEY HAVE SERVED NOTICE FREQUENTLY AND FORCEFULLY THAT THEY WON'T PAY THESE COSTS, AND THEY WANT DELIVERIES RESUMED ON ITEMS THEY HAVE ALREADY PAID FOR, SUCH AS

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gs 2/14/13

TORPEDOES, ARTILLERY RADARS. WE HAVE POSTPONED THE ISSUE THUS FAR BY VAGUE ASSURANCES, BUT THIS PROBABLY CANNOT LAST. A CHINESE PAYMENT WAS DUE ON 15 DECEMBER. WE HOPE THEY MAKE IT. IF OUR MILITARY DELIVERIES DON'T TAKE PLACE AND WE ASSESS THE CHINESE COSTS FOR THE SUSPENSION, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE A SHOWDOWN. IF IT GOES AGAINST THE CHINESE AND THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP DESTRUCTS, THEN YANG SHANGKUN AND POSSIBLY DENG MAY HAVE TO TURN AGAINST US. WE THEREFORE MUST BEGIN TO FOCUS ON A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM NOW AT A POLICY LEVEL. LOWER LEVELS WERE FLOUNDERING WHEN I WAS HOME EARLIER THIS MONTH.

THE THIRD PROBLEM IS BROADER. WE ARE GOING UP AGAINST SOME TOUGH COOKIES, CHINESE LEADERS WHO ARE HANGING ON TO POWER BY WIDE-SREAD SUPPRESSION, INDOCTRINATION, ISOLATION OF THEIR PEOPLE, AND BY THREAT OF ARMED FORCE (SPELLED PLA). (b)(1) (b)(1) WE HAVE TO TAKE ON THIS REGIME ON DEMOCRACY AND ON THE UNIVERSAL RIGHTS OF HUMAN BEINGS, WHICH INCLUDES THE CHINESE PEOPLE. OUR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT SHOULD REINFORCE THIS, BUT WILL CERTAINLY ANGER THE REGIME HERE. IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, TO THE SELLING OF OUR CHINA POLICY THAT IN SOME AREAS WE OPPOSE THEM VIGOROUSLY, AS IT IS WIDELY KNOWN THAT THEIR SUPPRESION IS BRUTAL AND PERVASIVE. WE HAVE TO GET A CAREFUL MIX WHERE THEY WORK WITH US TO IMPROVE THEIR IMAGE AND THEIR PERFORMANCE SO THAT WE CAN REINSTITUTE SOME OF OUR MORE CONTROVERSIAL PROGRAMS, I.E. MILITARY DELIVERIES. (b)(1) (b)(1)

THE CHINESE DILEMMA IS--THE MORE THEY OPEN UP, THE MORE THEIR HOLD ON POWER WEAKENS. SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPE DEVELOPMENTS ARE WELL KNOWN AMONG THE LEADERSHIP HERE. WE WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BUILD ANY KIND OF STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH A CHINA THAT PERSISTS IN ITS CURRENT POLICIES. BUT WE MUST KEEP TRYING TO GAIN AN IMPROVED MIX. I WILL BE MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS ON THIS.

END TEXT

DECL: OADR.

#0190

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0190 <TOR> 891219023409 MSG000251346849

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Cable	From the White House Re: Message to Ambassador Lilley from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	12/22/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [2]

Date Closed:	5/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91135-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

22/12

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

OK

General —

I'd like to send this msg to Jim Lilley. Larry Eagleburger knows the info; I'm not sure about Baker.

This may die quietly as an option, but if it catches on, it can be handled subsequently in State channels.

Doug Paal

VACY CHANNELS

R LILLEY FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT

EE KUAN YEW HAS SENT ME A MESSAGE OFFERING
E REFUGE FOR FANG LIZHI AND FAMILY. IF THE
TO SINGAPORE, LEE WOULD ALLOW HIM FULL
R THE FIRST TWO WEEKS, BUT WOULD
TO "COOL IT."

INVITED FANG TO SINGAPORE, WHERE HE
T SINGAPORE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY. THIS
OFFER IS GOH'S IDEA. PRIME MINISTER LEE WILL NOT TAKE FURTHER ACTION ON THIS PROPOSAL WITHOUT HEARING MY APPROVAL.

I HAVE SENT A MESSAGE BACK TO LEE, THANKING HIM AND ASKING THAT THIS OPTION BE KEPT IN RESERVE. You might wish to ~~PLEASE~~ RAISE THIS PERSONALLY WITH FANG AND LI SHUXIAN TO OBTAIN THEIR REACTION.

I AM SHARING THIS INFORMATION WITH STATE. IF YOU FIND IT AN AVENUE WORTH PURSUING, PLEASE REPORT BACK TO STATE THROUGH NODIS/MARKET CHANNELS.

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1035-NR
ES 12/11/15

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

NOTICE TO THE PRESS

December 18, 1989

CNN reported today that General Brent Scowcroft visited China in July 1989 on behalf of President Bush. General Scowcroft did undertake a mission to China for President Bush in July to personally underscore the United States' shock and concern about the violence in Tiananmen Square, and to impress upon the Chinese Government the seriousness with which this incident was viewed in the United States.

The President felt this face-to-face mission, like the one recently completed by General Scowcroft, was necessary to show the sense of purpose and direction of the United States Government.

# # #

Draft reply to
Chinese non-paper
of Dec 18.
D Paal

The US side appreciates the generally positive message received from the Chinese side on December 18. Having established our respective positions, the US side sees no need to repeat at this time the proposed schedule of action. The US side believes the Chinese side knows well what needs to be done to achieve our shared objectives.

The US side is pleased that the Chinese side is willing to consult on the US-China Friendship Volunteer program under the Peace Corps. The US side hopes that the Chinese side will strive to create conditions for lifting martial law as soon as possible and that credible, visible efforts can be made that will demonstrate that the Chinese side takes the most lenient possible approach to those involved in the incidents around June 4.

The US side notes that the Chinese side has referred to "slanted anti-China reporting" by VOA. While the US in no way accepts that it is the policy of VOA to present slanted reporting, mechanisms exist for addressing issues that the Chinese side may wish to clarify. Should the Chinese side wish to do so, the US side will give due consideration and take corrective action if warranted.

The US side wishes to emphasize once again the importance of speedy action. January 1 is an important date in our system, and actions by then will have a greater beneficial impact than those taken later.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Outline	Re: The Package settlement... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING

~~SECRET~~ _____ PRIVACY CHANNELS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR JAMES R. LILLEY, AMEMBASSY BEIJING

FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT

BEGIN TEXT

JIM, THE PRESIDENT WOULD APPRECIATE ~~ANY~~ YOUR THOUGHTS, OBSERVATIONS ~~OR~~ AND INSIGHTS ~~YOU MAY HAVE HAD~~ more that a week has gone by SINCE OUR TRIP TO BEIJING ~~LAST WEEKEND~~. He would ~~appreciate~~ be grateful for ~~PLEASE SEND~~ A WRAP-UP OF ~~YOUR IDEAS AND~~ REFLECTIONS ON ~~THE WEEK'S~~ EVENTS ~~SOONEST,~~ THROUGH ~~THE PRIVACY~~ this CHANNEL. I WILL SHARE IT WITH SECRETARY BAKER. THANKS AND WARM REGARDS,

BRENT

END TEXT

the situation and your reflections on it,

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1035-MR
ES 12/11/15

<DIST>SIT: PAAL MOORER
<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 891214095158

<TEXT>FBIS 085
UNCLAS 1B

(WHSR: PLEASE PASS TO DOUG PAAL, NSC)

PRC: SPOKESMAN TERMS SCOWCROFT VISIT 'CONSTRUCTIVE'

HK1412103689 BEIJING XINHUA IN ENGLISH 1032 GMT 14 DEC 89

["FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN ON CHINA TOUR OF SPECIAL ENVOY OF U.S. PRESIDENT"--XINHUA HEADLINE]

[TEXT] BEIJING, DECEMBER 14 (XINHUA)--THE RECENT VISIT TO CHINA BY THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS BRENT SCOWCROFT HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE AND USEFUL, A CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SAID HERE TODAY.

THIS VISIT, SPOKESMAN JIN GUIHUA SAID, HAS HELPED INCREASE THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CHINA AND THE U.S. AND IS CONDUCIVE TO OVERCOMING THE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES IN SINO-U.S. RELATIONS AND TO THE GRADUAL RESTORATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BILATERAL TIES.

JIN MADE THE REMARKS AT A WEEKLY NEWS BRIEFING HERE THIS AFTERNOON IN RESPONSE TO REPORTERS' QUESTIONS ON SCOWCROFT'S VISIT TO CHINA.

HE SAID BOTH SIDES ARE SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS ACHIEVED DURING THE VISIT.

JIN SAID CHINA WELCOMES SCOWCROFT'S VISIT TO CHINA. UNDER THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS UNDERGOING THE MOST PROFOUND CHANGES SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, THE CONSTANT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IS BOTH NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL.

DURING THE VISIT, JIN CONTINUED, SCOWCROFT BRIEFED THE CHINESE LEADERS ON THE RECENT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT AND THEY HAD EXTENSIVE AND INDEPTH EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND ON THE ISSUES IN BILATERAL RELATIONS.

JIN NOTED THAT THE RESULTS OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SHOW THAT THERE ARE STILL SOME DIFFERENCES OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. HOWEVER, HE SAID, BOTH AGREED THAT CHINA AND THE U.S. HAVE MAJOR COMMON INTERESTS IN A WIDE RANGE OF AREAS.

THE IMPROVEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY, HE SAID.

THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS THAT GOOD SINO-U.S. RELATIONS ARE OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE TO WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY, HE SAID. SO LONG AS THE TWO SIDES WORK TOGETHER AND OBSERVE STRICTLY THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE AND THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE THREE JOINT COMMUNIQUES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND SO LONG AS THEY MAKE MORE PRACTICAL EFFORTS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR RELATIONS, IT WILL ENTIRELY POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO MAINTAIN THEIR MUTUAL INTERESTS WHILE RETAINING THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS AND OVERCOME THE EXISTING DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THE SINO-U.S. RELATIONS WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN TO NORMAL AND EVEN FURTHER DEVELOPED THIS WAY, JIN CONCLUDED.

14 DEC 1453Z AMS

<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 891214060432

<TEXT>UNCLAS 1A

PRC: SCOWCROFT VISIT DESCRIBED AS 'CONSTRUCTIVE, USEFUL'

OW1412105189 BEIJING XINHUA IN ENGLISH 1030 GMT 14 DEC 89

[TEXT] BEIJING, DECEMBER 14 (XINHUA) -- THE RECENT VISIT TO CHINA BY THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS BRENT SCOWCROFT HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE AND USEFUL, A CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SAID HERE TODAY.

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DURING THE VISIT, JIN CONTINUED, SCOWCROFT BRIEFED THE CHINESE LEADERS ON THE RECENT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT AND THEY HAD EXTENSIVE AND IN-DEPTH EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND ON THE ISSUES IN BILATERAL RELATIONS.

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14 DEC 1103Z AJF

NNNN

<DIST>SIT: PAAL MOORER
<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 891214101647

<TEXT>FBIS UNNUMBERED
UNCLAS 1B

(WHSR: PLS PASS TO DOUG PAAL, NSC)

PRC: RADIO BEIJING NOTES BUSH'S REMARKS ON TIES WITH PRC

OW1312144389 BEIJING IN ENGLISH TO NORTH AMERICA 0300 GMT 13 DEC 89

[TEXT] U.S. PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH SAID HE IS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO FIND A COMMON GROUND WITH CHINA IN A HOPE OF IMPROVING RELATIONS. RADIO BEIJING'S CORRESPONDENT IN WASHINGTON CHEN DONONG REPORTS:

PRESIDENT BUSH SAID HE MADE THE RIGHT DECISION IN SENDING A HIGH-LEVEL MISSION TO CHINA IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT CHINA FROM REMAINING TOTALLY ISOLATED.

IN A SPEECH TO NEWSPAPERS' EDITORIAL WRITERS AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON MONDAY, PRESIDENT BUSH SAID HE WANTS TO SEEK A COMMON GROUND WITH CHINA AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HE COULD IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP. HE SAID HE REALIZED THE DIFFICULTY OF THIS RELATIONSHIP, BUT HE DOES NOT WANT TO MAKE IT ANY WORSE. HE WOULD LIKE TO THINK IT WOULD IMPROVE.

OFFICIAL OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION SAID: THE SCOWCROFT-EAGLEBURGER MISSION WAS CLEARLY DESIGNED TO MOVE THE TWO COUNTRIES TOWARD MORE NORMALIZED RELATIONS.

THE SOURCES SAID: PRESIDENT BUSH WAS DETERMINED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE EFFORT EVEN THOUGH SOME SENIOR ADVISERS HAD FEARED A BACKLASH AT HOME. THEY SAID FORMER PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER SERVED AS IMPORTANT CHANNELS LEADING UP TO BUSH'S OVERTURE. THEY ALSO SAID PROFESSOR T.D. LEE OF COLOMBIA UNIVERSITY ALSO PLAYED A ROLE IN HIS REPORT TO BUSH THAT CHINA'S LEADERSHIP WANTED TO BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

14 DEC 1518Z AMS

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13 December

General:

Here are draft non-papers to present to the Chinese ambassador, preferably tomorrow. You may want to discuss them with Secretary E' burger today before taking them to the Presiden

One paper includes what we would do and expect the Chinese to do if Fang is released. The other does not go into detail on Fang.

Please avoid issuing the Presidential waiver on thessatellites until next week. We can use it in the conversation with Zhu tomorrow for added leverage. Same for the Exim waiver.

Doug Paal

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
EG 12/11/15
2009-1035-MR

Fang

The U.S. side has closely examined the package proposal as detailed by Foreign Minister Qian and wishes to present a response.

As discussed in preliminary form during the visit to China of National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, the U.S. side is willing, in principle, to accept each of the four elements proposed in the package presented by Deng Xiaoping and Foreign Minister Qian, with some qualifications detailed below.

First, as discussed in Beijing, the U.S. side believes it is important that the details involved in the release of Dr. Fang Lizhi and his family and their safe departure for a third country be discussed between Ambassador Lilley and your representative in Beijing to satisfy the mutual interests of all concerned. To the extent possible, the issue of the Fang family should be kept separate and distinct from other measures intended to lead eventually to normalization of U.S.-China relations. The U.S. side believes it has received Chinese agreement to these two points.

Second, other aspects of relations between the U.S. and China should be discussed through your ambassador and U.S. representatives in Washington.

Third, the U.S. side agrees in principle to make serious efforts to reach agreement on cooperative ventures and would welcome proposals from the Chinese side on the ventures.

Fourth, the U.S. side agrees in principle to extend an invitation for General Secretary Jiang Zemin to visit the United States at an appropriate time next year as the culmination of the process of normalization of relations.

Fifth, the U.S. side wishes to present its proposal for a schedule of actions by both sides that would facilitate normalization of relations.

SCHEDULE OF ACTION

The US side has already agreed to measures regarding the Peace Pearl project, vetoed the Pelosi Bill and sent special Presidential emissaries to China for a public visit. The US side notes that the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman has spoken on missile sales to the Middle East and that anti-US propaganda has [stopped appearing] [abated] in the Chinese media.

With a view to further step-by-step progress toward a normalization of relations the US side proposes the following sequence of actions for consideration by the government of the PRC:

The U.S. side will issue a Presidential waiver for the licensing of the Aussat and Asiasat satellites to be launched on Chinese rockets. The U.S. side will also issue a Presidential waiver for Exim Bank lending for China.

The US side expects the Chinese side to cease its jamming of VOA and to grant visas for resident VOA correspondents in China. The US believes that these steps will mark a step forward in our relations recognizable by a broad portion of the US and Chinese people.

The US side will be prepared to consider modification of the Department of State's travel "warning" in connection with a resumption of Fulbright and student exchanges, and implementation of the Peace Corps pilot project.

The US side believes that amnesty before January 1, 1990, for those Chinese involved in the activities surrounding the events of June 3-4 in China, would permit the US side to include that significant development in its Human Rights Report to Congress for 1989 due in late January. The US side expects the Congress to draw heavily on the Human Rights Report, a factual compilation of data required by law on this subject, in considering any legislation relevant to the PRC. Moreover, following such an improvement in the atmosphere, the US side would not continue to discourage lending by international financial institutions to the PRC.

The US side believes that the release of Dr. Fang Lizhi and his family during or before the Christmas season would be a major step toward improving the atmosphere between the two countries. In the short term, such a step would permit the US to take a positive attitude toward FMS talks in February. It would also permit the US side not only no longer to discourage, but also to begin to encourage consideration of lending to China by

international financial institutions, although US votes in those financial institutions will continue to be governed by US law.

The US side would also be willing to meet with the Chinese Foreign Minister early in the New Year, with a view to determining a date for the visit of the General Secretary and to identifying prospective joint ventures. The US would also be willing to resume military sales and high level contacts after successful negotiation of the February FMS talks. The US would be similarly prepared to sign a Science and Technology Agreement, subject to the successful completion of the negotiations of the agreement.

The US side has noted the remarks of a Chinese leader to the effect that martial law will not be lifted before January 27, 1990. The US side believes that martial law should be lifted in Beijing and Tibet. If martial law can be lifted on or before January 27, 1990, the US side will be in a position to cancel any travel advisory to China. If it were lifted before January 1, 1990, that significant development could also be included in the 1989 Human Rights Report.

The U.S. side has closely examined the package proposal as detailed by Foreign Minister Qian and wishes to present a response.

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No Fang's

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First, as discussed in Beijing, the U.S. side believes it is important that the details involved in the release of Dr. Fang Lizhi and his family and their safe departure for a third country be discussed between Ambassador Lilley and your representative in Beijing to satisfy the mutual interests of all concerned. To the extent possible, the issue of the Fang family should be kept separate and distinct from other measures intended to lead eventually to normalization of U.S.-China relations. The U.S. side believes it has received Chinese agreement to these two points.

Second, other aspects of relations between the U.S. and China should be discussed through your ambassador and U.S. representatives in Washington.

Third, the U.S. side agrees in principle to make serious efforts to reach agreement on cooperative ventures and would welcome proposals from the Chinese side on the ventures.

Fourth, the U.S. side agrees in principle to extend an invitation for General Secretary Jiang Zemin to visit the United States at an appropriate time next year as the culmination of the process of normalization of relations.

Fifth, the U.S. side wishes to present its proposal for a schedule of actions by both sides that would facilitate normalization of relations.

SCHEDULE OF ACTION

The US side has already agreed to measures regarding the Peace Pearl project, vetoed the Pelosi Bill and sent special Presidential emissaries to China for a public visit. The US side notes that the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman has spoken on missile sales to the Middle East and that anti-US propaganda has [stopped appearing] [abated] in the Chinese media.

With a view to further step-by-step progress toward a normalization of relations the US side proposes the following sequence of actions for consideration by the government of the PRC:

The U.S. side will issue a Presidential waiver for the licensing of the Aussat and Asiasat satellites to be launched on Chinese rockets. The U.S. side will also issue a Presidential waiver for Exim Bank lending for China.

The US side expects the Chinese side to cease its jamming of VOA and to grant visas for resident VOA correspondents in China. The US believes that these steps will mark a step forward in our relations recognizable by a broad portion of the US and Chinese people.

The US side will be prepared to consider modification of the Department of State's travel "warning" in connection with a resumption of Fulbright and student exchanges, and implementation of the Peace Corps pilot project.

The US side believes that amnesty before January 1, 1990, for those Chinese involved in the activities surrounding the events of June 3-4 in China, would permit the US side to include that significant development in its Human Rights Report to Congress for 1989 due in late January. The US side expects the Congress to draw heavily on the Human Rights Report, a factual compilation of data required by law on this subject, in considering any legislation relevant to the PRC. Moreover, following such an improvement in the atmosphere, the US side would not continue to discourage lending by international financial institutions to the PRC.

The US side has noted the remarks of a Chinese leader to the effect that martial law will not be lifted before January 27, 1990. The US side believes that martial law should be lifted in Beijing and Tibet. If martial law can be lifted on or before January 27, 1990, the US side will be in a position to cancel any travel advisory to China. If it were lifted before January 1, 1990, that significant development could also be included in the 1989 Human Rights Report.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

December 12, 1989

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Deputy Secretary's Meeting with the Chinese Ambassador to the United States

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger met today for thirty minutes with the Chinese Ambassador to follow-up on discussions held this past weekend in Beijing. Also present at the meeting were Under Secretary for Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon; Kenneth Juster, Senior Adviser to the Deputy Secretary (notetaker); and a notetaker for the Chinese. The conversation proceeded as follows:

EAGLEBURGER: I wanted to talk a bit about our trip and what we plan to do. I assume you have already gotten reports from Beijing. I also want to pass on to you a message from President Bush.

As we indicated when General Scowcroft and I were in Beijing, there is every intention on the part of the Bush Administration to find ways to reestablish a more normal relationship with China. In that regard, your Foreign Minister gave us a "package" for settling our differences. I told him that, although I could not give him an official response at the time, I doubted that the package provided to us would work.

We will provide you with a counter-proposal. I am not prepared to provide any detailed comment on your package, except to say that it requires too much from us up front. We will aim to give you our counter-proposal on Friday. It will have been reviewed by the President. It will contain two different approaches - one that involves the release of Fang Lizhi, and one that avoids that issue as being too difficult to resolve. Indeed, the future of our relationship cannot be made to depend on one man. There are substantive issues that we need to deal with, and Fang Lizhi cannot hold up such issues.

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2009-1035-MR
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In preparing our package, I want to emphasize that it will be done with the utmost of discretion. Although we call it a "package," I do not want to imply that our public actions and your public actions should make it look like a package.

In our judgment, it makes no sense for either of us to continue to talk about who needs to move first. Let us deal with the substantive issues instead. Nonetheless, we do feel that we have already moved substantially, including the visit this past weekend by General Scowcroft and myself, which, as you know, has been almost universally attacked here. Indeed, the President is paying a substantial political price for the trip. We have taken other steps to move forward as well, including the transactions involving Boeing. But the bridge of who goes first has already been crossed.

We were grateful for the quick comment out of Beijing on the missile issue. The President felt that he had to say something in public about that because of all of the publicity generated by our trip.

Finally, I want to let you know that the President called me this morning. He stated that everyone should understand that this (relations with China) is a fight that he is prepared to make because it is the "right" thing to do. He then said that I should tell the Chinese Ambassador how very important it is that we see some steps and some progress from the Chinese with regard to the issue of human rights. He did not give me any specifics. However, in light of the public reaction to the trip by General Scowcroft and myself, and the fact that Congress returns on approximately January 23, we have only until then to do as much as we can to put the President in a position to defeat efforts in Congress to impose sanctions on the Chinese. The President needs some assistance from the Chinese in terms of progress on human rights issues in order to allow him to carry through on his policy. Of course, we understand that your government cannot take actions in a vacuum.

We will have our suggestions to you by the end of the week and will be ready to work with you over the Christmas holiday to move forward as quickly as possible.

CHINESE AMBASSADOR: Thank you very much, Mr. Eagleburger. The Chinese side feels that the talks were very constructive, positive, and useful. It is time for the two sides to move forward to put our relations on a normal track. I will await your counter-proposal, as I know we do not have much time. You know our position and our willingness to see normalization. I am ready to work with you and move forward.

EAGLEBURGER: It is easier for us to do the discussions and negotiations in Washington rather than Beijing. We would like to do it that way if that is okay with you.

CHINESE AMBASSADOR: That is fine. We can discuss it here, except for details on Fang Lizhi, which will be discussed in Beijing.

EAGLEBURGER: On Fang Lizhi, that is very much an issue of the details as to how to arrange his release, and those discussions will take place in Beijing.

CHINESE AMBASSADOR: Yes, but I understand that the resolution of that issue depends on our discussion on other issues as well.

End of meeting.

Drafted:D:KJuster:su 12/12/89
ext. 78931 #2642

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Good afternoon. I want to open my remarks with a few comments on the importance of strategic relations between the United States and China. As you know, this weekend my National Security Adviser, General Brent Scowcroft, traveled to China to explore the possibilities of dialogue with Chinese leaders. Some have characterized this trip as amounting to a normalization of relations. That is not the case. Our human rights concerns are as strong today as they were when we expressed our outrage over the situation in Tiananmen Square. It still remains for the Chinese to address themselves to the problems inherent in that episode.

But we cannot allow a country of approximately one billion people to be isolated from the world. To keep China isolated serves neither stability nor reform. It is in the interest of the United States and all countries of the world, to know the position of China on the changes taking place in other countries.

I said last June, and I repeat today, that the United States should not take actions which hurt the Chinese people. That is a yardstick I continue to use in measuring progress as we move toward constructive dialogue. I am hopeful that China is ready to "do more practical work" to improve our relations. Those are the words used by Premier Li Peng this morning. It remains to be seen if changes will occur, but I believe it is time to foster those opportunities.

# # #

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Working Luncheon Between Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and National Security Advisor Scowcroft

DATE & TIME: Sunday, December 10, 1989 - 12:15 pm

PLACE: Diaoyutai State Guesthouse - Villa No. 9
Beijing, PRC

PARTICIPANTS:

US Side:
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Chase Untermeyer, Assistant to the President
Douglas H. Paal, Director, Asian Affairs National Security Council
Vivian Chang, Interpreter
Florence Gantt, Notetaker
Mildred Leatherman, Notetaker

PRC Side:
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu
Director, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, Zhang Yijun
Director, Office of American Affairs Ma Wenzheng
Deputy Director, Zha Peixin
Ma Yunsung, Interpreter
Lian Shengbao, Notetaker

Foreign Minister Qian Qichen: If the press asks, how should I characterize the meetings?

General Scowcroft: I would say that the visit was positive in the sense that all sides understand that each side has domestic problems that have to be worked out and we need to work to take reciprocal gestures in order to restore the relationship and that our general view of the world in a broad sense and of recent developments is parallel. The need to react to a changing world is understood.

Ambassador Lilley: I would suggest that you might want to say that because of changing situations, relationship might not be the same but it is still very important.

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0116-F/2
8/14/07

General Scowcroft: I guess I would say there were three elements to visit: (1) realization of continuing need to evaluate our strategic relationship; (2) telling you the results of the Malta meeting and (3) discussion of how we can deal with the bilateral relationship.

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: There are differences but we agreed to work toward improvement of the relationship.

General Scowcroft: We would be interested in your view of the visit.

Foreign Minister Qian: In spite of our differences both sides agree that we have common interest. So this visit has served to enhance and deepen the common desire to return our relations to normal. Both sides agree that Sino-U.S. relations are of vital importance to world stability. So I think we share similar view of that issue.

General Scowcroft: We do indeed. Now all we have to do is overcome the differences.

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: Mr. Untermeyer, what did you accomplish while we were working?

Mr. Untermeyer: Improved the Chinese economy by spending money.

Foreign Minister Qian: I consider it is very important in the world that we resume discussion on sending loans to China. I do recall that Secretary of State Baker said the American side would take some measures. In a technical sense both the World Bank and IMF have indicated their operations are free of political consideration. I think it is difficult for their operation to be completely immune to political considerations. It is almost the same as saying the weather should not affect U.S.-Soviet relations, but, in fact, the weather in the Port of Malta did affect the relations because they had to cancel a meeting.

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: It proves there is a power higher than the President of the United States and Chairman Gorbachev. While I might think that, I am not trying to impose it on you.

Foreign Minister Qian: Gorbachev said then those warships served no purpose and they should be destroyed.

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: Let's not go too far.

General Scowcroft: He's reluctant to destroy his warships. Any time the Russians want to destroy their warships, ---

Ambassador Lilley: In terms of the World Bank they have just conducted a mission here. They have done research and I have read their report on their visit here. Although political situations do affect the situation, like in terms of the weather, I think they are concerned that there may be, although you said otherwise, some concrete evidence that you are going the other way. It is important that it not become politicized. Of great concern is we are not jumping to any conclusions but we have to work with preliminary indicators in cases like this. And this affects the decision on World Bank and we have been examining it already.

Foreign Minister Qian: China's reforms will continue. No doubt about it, but it must be a gradual process under the prevailing economic conditions. The biggest challenge is such a large population. So right now we have to try to bring down the inflation rate and stabilize. Although the rating of China has been lowered somewhat on the Japanese market, China will have no trouble in repaying. The total foreign debt of China is the same as that of Poland. Yet we have (a) much larger ~~(ban)~~ export than Poland. So I think the U.S. will face much less of a problem when they come to invest in China than they do in Poland.

Ambassador Lilley: The U.S. has more money invested in China than any other country in the world. One of the reasons we suggested a brief meeting after lunch is that, while we do not have answer to your package, it is important to have some preliminary discussion as to needs and how we see it developing so we lose no time in how we deal with things.

Foreign Minister Qian: That is to say, after the lunch we will have a short visit.

Ambassador Lilley: Mr. Qian is one of the foremost experts on Soviets.

General Scowcroft: Yes. You have listened to us for 24 hours. What is your appraisal of what has been happening?

Foreign Minister Qian: Gorbachev would like to maintain a balance in everything. There is balance between East and West and balance between United States and Soviet Union. So he just concentrates on this balance but he cannot continue balancing everything, for example in economic affairs. He can't try just to strike a balance; for example, balance between economic and political affairs. How can he achieve a balance if he cannot turn profit? So I really share your view that Gorbachev does not know economy very ~~much~~. Ambassador Lilley mentioned the fact that the Soviets want to make the ruble convertible. This is an objective but to be realized it will be very remote. Gorbachev

can say a lot of things that are really difficult to be achieved. So I think the Soviets are faced with two major problems: the ethnic issue and the economic issue. These two problems will result in prolonged turmoil in the Soviet Union. I have not seen Gorbachev taking any measures.

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: Don't you believe that he began political reform only when he decided he needed it to make the economic reform work -- that it was not an original plan of his.

Foreign Minister Qian: Maybe so at the beginning. Because last year and the year before last I had opportunities to meet with Mr. Gorbachev and at that time he explained to me that because he ran into obstacles in perestroika he wanted to make political reform.

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: That is the reason for glasnost.

Foreign Minister Qian: But of late he seems to have gradually developed more of a pattern for political reforms. Many use political reforms as a means of removing those who hold opposing views. Then the Eastern European countries are adopting the same attitude on a much larger scale. In the Soviet Union they are used to seeing a hundred members of the Committee resign. Now you have in Eastern Europe the entire membership resigning.

Ambassador Lilley: Some problems are being resolved while differences remain. Another problem to resolve is the reduction of troops along the border.

Foreign Minister Qian: Troops along the border within a certain scope. So in this regard we are starting first by talking about general principles. We will have to make it clear that we will have to avoid deployment along the border so as to avoid border clashes. We have not decided as yet as to the scope of such areas to be demilitarized, whether it should be 100km on each side or 200. The talks are next month.

Ambassador Lilley: We have mutual means of verifying that, don't we?

Foreign Minister Qian: We agreed on principles. Gorbachev has called on the Chinese side to provide consumer necessities. First of all we can provide consumer goods and they will pay back in raw materials. They also wants loans. We were quite taken aback when they first raised this. We have agreed to extend some money to them.

Ambassador Lilley: Also technology transfer. You are teaching them how to grow soy beans.

Foreign Minister Qian: Their farmers are very unmotivated. After sowing the seeds in the ground then they prepare to sharpen their sickles. We have sent some vegetable farmers to the Soviet Union because the Soviets don't know how to grow vegetables. They call potatoes vegetables. They have no other vegetables.

Ambassador Lilley: Any more on Soviet side re Vietnam?

Foreign Minister Qian: Results are not very good. They seem to be more interested in Cambodia than in Eastern Europe and I don't know why. Just as they are more interested in Nicaragua, Central America and Cuba than in Eastern Europe. So I presume that maybe they want to keep some trouble spots around China and around the United States. And Eastern Europe is next to them. I have the impression that Eastern Europe is a great burden on the Soviets. Generally speaking, every year it has to provide 70 million tons of petroleum, plus natural gas equivalent to 30 million tons, totalling 100 million tons of petroleum. No other Eastern European country has so much natural resources. So this is a great burden on the Soviets. I wonder whether Western Europe is now ready to take on this burden. I should say that Western Europe does not have natural energy nor does it have abundant natural resources.

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: The Minister has raised a very important point in terms of where they can go in the future. Much of their finances is in clearing arrangements, not hard currency. That is not easily accessible to them somewhere else. The Soviets have a leverage that the West can forget. It is a burden but a leverage with Eastern Europe. It is not something we could fill in tomorrow morning if the Soviets should cut.

Foreign Minister Qian: How is Secretary Baker?

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: He is fine. I talked with him this morning. He leaves sometime today for Berlin and then he has the Group of 24 meeting to talk about aid to Poland and Hungary.

Foreign Minister Qian: Money?

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: No money; just promise.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dick -

This is the practical outcome of my China trip. It remains to be seen whether they will actually go through with it.

Please keep to yourself for now & return the papers after you have read

Brent

The U.S. side has closely examined the package proposal as detailed by Foreign Minister Qian and wishes to present a response.

As discussed in preliminary form during the visit to China of National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, the U.S. side is willing, in principle, to accept each of the four elements proposed in the package presented by Deng Xiaoping and Foreign Minister Qian, with some qualifications detailed below.

First, as discussed in Beijing, the U.S. side believes it is important that the details involved in the release of Dr. Fang Lizhi and his family and their safe departure for a third country be discussed between Ambassador Lilley and your representative in Beijing to satisfy the mutual interests of all concerned. To the extent possible, the issue of the Fang family should be kept separate and distinct from other measures intended to lead eventually to normalization of U.S.-China relations. The U.S. side believes it has received Chinese agreement to these two points.

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Fifth, the U.S. side wishes to present its proposal for a schedule of actions by both sides that would facilitate normalization of relations.

SCHEDULE OF ACTION

The US side has already taken a major step by sending special Presidential emissaries to China for a public visit, and also agreed to measures regarding the Peace Pearl project and vetoed the Pelosi Bill. The US side notes that the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman has spoken on missile sales to the Middle East, that anti-US propaganda has abated in the Chinese media, that the PRC has accredited a VOA correspondent, and that the PRC has indicated a desire to discuss the Fulbright Program with the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.

The US wishes to inform the Chinese side that the President has decided to issue waivers for the licensing of the Aussat and Asiasat satellites to be launched on Chinese rockets and for Exim Bank lending for China. The Department of State, moreover, will soon modify its travel warning for China.

With a view to further step-by-step progress toward a normalization of relations the US side proposes the following sequence of actions for consideration by the government of the PRC:

The Chinese side would cease its jamming of VOA, resume Fulbright and student exchanges, and implement the Peace Corps pilot project. The US believes that these steps will mark a step forward in our relations recognizable by a broad portion of the US and Chinese people.

The US side believes that amnesty before January 1, 1990, for those Chinese involved in the activities surrounding the events of June 3-4 in China, would permit the US side to include that significant development in its Human Rights Report to Congress for 1989 due in late January. The US side expects the Congress to draw heavily on the Human Rights Report, a factual compilation of data required by law on this subject, in considering any legislation relevant to the PRC. Moreover, following such an improvement in the atmosphere, the US side would not continue to discourage lending by international financial institutions to the PRC.

The US side believes that the release of Dr. Fang Lizhi and his family during or before the Christmas season would be a major step toward improving the atmosphere between the two countries. In the short term, such a step would permit the US to take a positive attitude toward FMS talks in February. It would also permit the US side to begin encouraging consideration of lending to China by international financial institutions, although US votes in those financial institutions will continue to be governed by US law.

At an appropriate time, the US side would also be willing to meet with the Chinese Foreign Minister with a view to determining a date for the visit of the General Secretary and to identifying prospective joint ventures. The US would be similarly prepared to sign a Science and Technology Agreement, subject to the successful completion of the negotiations of the agreement.

The US side has noted the remarks of a Chinese leader to the effect that martial law will not be lifted before January 27, 1990. The US side believes that martial law should be lifted in Beijing and Tibet. If martial law is lifted on or before January 27, 1990, the US side will be in a position to cancel any travel advisory to China. If it were lifted before January 1, 1990, that significant development could also be included in the 1989 Human Rights Report. The US would also be willing to resume military sales and contacts and high level exchanges after successful negotiation of the February FMS talks.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11d. Outline	Re: The package settlement... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [2]

Date Closed:	5/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91135-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12a. Addendum	Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichan, December 9, 1989 (1 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
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Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12b. Addendum	Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichan, December 9, 1989 (1 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [2]

Date Closed:	5/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91135-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/MARKET

Memorandum of Conversation

Private Meeting of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen

Beijing, Diaoyutai Guesthouse No 9

Sunday December 10, 1989, 2:13 p.m. - 2:50 p.m. (Beijing Stanard Time)

Participants:

U.S. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for NAtional Security Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Ambassador James R. Lilley
Douglas H. Paal, NSC, Notetaker
Vivian Chang, Interpreter

PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu
Director, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, Zhang Yijun
Director, Office of American Affairs, Ma Wenzheng
Deputy Director, Zha Peixin
Ma Yunsung, Interpreter
Lian Shengbao, notetaker

General Scowcroft: I would like Secretary Eagleburger to speak now because he will be in charge of negotiations on the package.

Secretary Eagleburger: Before we leave I want to establish a few points on where we will go next. As the diplomat on this trip, let me be undiplomatic. My impression is that you and we are are engaged in a kabuki dance. You say, and we accept, that there has to be movement on our side before you can move. We say to you, and are sincere, that there has to be movement on your side. We are now circling each other, each waiting for the other to move. There is no purpose served arguing over who moves first.

From our side, we are faced with the realities of dates on which decisions must be made. The first decision we must make will be on December 15, on the agreement to satellite launchings. Congress returns on January 23. Certainly when they come back, assuming no movement, the Pelosi Bill and whatever other legislation they decide will be reintroduced.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2632-MR
SCS 7/12/13

Declassify on: OADR

While we have not given you our final word on the package you gave us yesterday, I can tell you now that it will not work as now structured. All of us on the American side agree it will not work, largely because the linkage between sanctions and the release of Fang Lizhi is so direct that at home we politically cannot manage it.

Let me emphasize that this is not the official government response, but General Scowcroft and I agree that when we get back to Washington and get together to formulate a detailed response, we will have to say the same thing to you.

We will pull a small group together. We will get a counterproposal to you by the end of the week, and hopefully give it to your ambassador. Without describing what the details of the package will include, I can indicate that they will include such issues as martial law, the release of Fang Lizhi, World Bank loans, and the sanctions. We will try to find how to fit all these pieces into that package.

I would like to make one specific point on Fang Lizhi. One proposal we will make will include that, because from our view his release will have the greatest impact of all the actions you might take and will make the rest of the package easier to do. We may also give you a second proposal which does not deal with this issue. If it is difficult to do the other things, we are prepared to set the issue of Fang aside, and after the atmosphere in our relations improves, we will be prepared to come back to that issue.

Again, we will examine your proposal back in Washington. Fang Lizhi is not necessarily the sine qua non to improving the atmosphere and undoing the damage collectively done over the last months.

With regard to who goes first, there is no need to have an argument, but from the Washington perspective, we have taken steps already, not least that we are here already.

On the Pelosi veto, you may not be satisfied with the President's decision. But it was poltically costly for him, and it will be so when we go back. I was personally involved in granting an

exception for the export of inertial guidance equipment for the sale of the Boeing aircraft. And the Peace Pearl project is moving forward. These are some steps we have taken. Again, I raise this not to get into an argument or because I feel they are adequate. I raise them to demonstrate that the President is trying to take steps to improve the atmosphere. I should also tell you, if we heard the Premier right this morning, I thought he said that the Chinese government would make clear its unhappiness with the President's administrative measures regarding the Chinese students in the United States after we go home, if that is the threat I think I heard (nervous laughter from Chinese), the impact in the U.S. will undo whatever we have done by coming here yesterday and today, undo that completely. At a minimum we will not be able to improve the atmosphere as we say we want.

On the issue of the satellite launch, we face a decision date, December 15. I am not making a linkage, but we have to tell you that we have informtion, which some members of Congres have access to, that there are some lower level Chinese officials who are talking of sales of ballistic missiles, particularly to the Middle East. We do not question the statement of your Foreign Ministry spokesman on November 23, but some in the Congress will doubt it. It will be much easier on December 15, if we have a reaffirmation of the November 23 statement, plus some indication that missiles _____ will not be sold to regions of particular instability. We do not expect an answer now, but will need it by December 15.

Let me make two points. We are anxious with regard to the atmosphere to make some small moves on each side, even before we get the package response to you by the end of next week. We are looking for small steps to convince the Chinese people that it is wise to begin the process of improving relations and to help us with the Congress. I would like to leave a couple of ideas with you. For example, just for example, if your side could possibly stop jamming VOA or permit a VOA correspondent to come to China, in an unconnected fashion, we could remove the travel advisory.

Perhaps these are not the specific steps, but what we are searching for are beginnings in these next days before Congress returns. They are steps both sides can take without one or the other looking like one prevailing over the other. This will help with military sales, the banks, and convince the American and Chinese publics that it is wise to move in this direction.

We would like to suggest for your consideration, for Ambassador Lilley and your designee to work out details on when and how the Fangs may leave. It appears all of us agree on the need to solve this issue. Totally off the record, and ad referendum, we need to agree that both of us want to see his release.

With regard to our response to your package and the counterproposal, that can be done here or to your ambassador in Washington as you prefer. We would prefer Washington, but do not insist on it, assuming it is an effort we jointly want to accomplish.

Mr. Minister, in the U.S. we have the tradition of the good cop and the bad cop. You have had a full day of the good cop, and only fifteen minutes of the bad cop.

Ambassador Lilley: I would like to add one thing, if I may. Whatever we do on Fang Lizhi will help to improve the atmosphere on a broad range of issues. Vice Minister Liu Huaqiu has helped three get out already, and can do the talks.

Secretary Eagleburger: That is if we are prepared to settle the issue. If it is to put it off to one side, that is another matter.

Ambassador Lilley: One other matter that might be raised with Ambassador Zhu, that is to move to eliminate artificial constraints on the embassies, for example, the military attaches at our embassy are not permited to join attache trips. Resolving this would help to move our atmosphere along.

Foreign Minister Qian: I think, Mr.Secretary Eagleburger, that I understand your remarks are not a response, and that you will respond next week as a counterproposal. First, both sides agree on a package solution, and while this is in process, the general public should not get the impression of any package deal. It should seem that both sides seek to improve relations.

I also agree we should not leave the impression of which side gains or does not gain, wins or loses, or moves first. I agree Vice Minister Liu and Ambassador Lilley should meet to discuss the details on Famg Lizhi. These negotiations can begin without waiting a response to the package. Naturally, implementation will come after your response.

I also agree that after your formal response in Washington the discussions can take place between Ambassador Zhu and your State Department officials. I also agree both sides should consider which steps both sides can take to improve relations between our countries and the atmosphere.

I would like to raise a few points. Our Peace Pearl project is underway, and we regard this as positive. We hope to see it continue without further setbacks. Not long ago, due to the temporary suspension, the actual cost of the program exceeded the budget for it. We hope the American side will consider that the Chinese side can hardly bear this burden. Also, in terms of military cooperation, which includes torpedoes, large caliber artillery shells, radar, there are some problems, and they should also include timely delivery.

You made mention of Premier Li Peng's remarks regarding the measures taken by president Bush with the Pelosi veto. This is a misunderstanding on your side. You know very well, the American side made lots of effort, but the Chinese government cannot justify this action to the people without reacting. We have already made our reaction.

Secretary Eagleburger: We noticed.

Foreign Minister Qian: After you leave, we will publish no more reaction. By reaction, as Vice Foreign Minister Liu already made clear to your embassy, the Ministry of Education will take action to send no more graduate students to your country. In the statement issued by the State Education Commission, this comment did not appear in the press. So in implementing this measure, we will take some notice of the impact on the U.S. and we hope the U.S. will do the same.

As for the sale of intermediate range missiles, China's position is very clear. The U.S. is very aware of it. The Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a clear declaration. In the days to come, when similar questions are raised we will make clear our position in the same way.

These are my points. I will add that through this visit we can start our joint efforts. Both sides should work collectively and separately.

Secretary Eagleburger: Done.

Foreign Minister Qian: Very good.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12d. Memcon	Re: Private Meeting Between National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichan (6 pp.)	12/9/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [2]

Date Closed:	5/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91135-002
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13. Letter	Chairman Deng Xiaoping to President Bush [English] (1 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [2]

Date Closed:	5/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91135-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
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From the desk of

George Bush

Brent

we need to
a) hold close
b) be sure JAB knows
c) Lilly? - draw

WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Greetings to my friend.

Last night at the White House, former President Nixon debriefed me and some of my top associates on his visit to China. He appreciated the manner in which he was received there. My personal view is that his visit to China was helpful.

I scheduled this meeting immediately upon his return from China, hoping that this will signal to you, to the people here at home, and to the rest of the world that I want to find a way to work out the major difficulties that have darkened our relationship. I will be carefully considering everything Mr. Nixon told me.

Now, for a different subject. Soon I will be meeting President Gorbachev at a non-Summit meeting, in other words at a meeting without a set agenda. Though our relations with the Soviet Union are more free of tensions than at times past, enormous problems still remain. At a time of rapidly moving events in many areas of the world, this meeting is designed, not to reach major decisions, but to reduce the chances of misunderstandings on issues of significance. I want to assure you that nothing will take place at this meeting that will be detrimental to China's interests.

In my view the geo-political reasons that prompted Richard Nixon to come to China in the first place are still valid. I see many areas of importance today where China and the U.S. have similar interests.

With these considerations in mind I would propose sending a personal emissary to China after the December 2-3 meetings with President Gorbachev. That emissary would be prepared to fill you in on the details of the meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev. If that is agreeable in principle we can decide later who the emissary should be and who might receive him. If, prior to the US-Soviet meeting you have any concerns or thoughts to convey to me, I would welcome hearing from you.

On the broader subject that is a constant concern to me, how to normalize relations between us, I will continue to try to find some answers. With respect, I hope China will try to do the same. In this regard, I think the discussions that you had with President Nixon and with the physicist, Dr. Tsung-Dao Lee, were extremely helpful.

On October 26, it was a pleasure to receive your able new Ambassador a few days after he arrived and before formal presentations of credentials. By receiving him in this manner, I wanted you to know that I remain personally involved in emphasizing the importance I ascribe to our relationship and in trying to resolve our differences.

Respectfully,

Most sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency
Deng Xiaoping
Chairman, Central Military Committee
People's Republic of China
Beijing

approved, with changes
GB

November 6, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Greetings.

Last night at the White House, former President Nixon debriefed me and some of my top associates on his visit to China. He appreciated the manner in which he was received there. My personal view is that his visit to China was helpful.

I [wanted to hear from him] **scheduled this meeting** immediately upon his return from China, hoping that this will signal to you, to the people here at home, and to the rest of the world that I want to find a way to work out the major difficulties that have darkened our relationship. I will be carefully considering everything Mr. Nixon told me.

Now, for a different subject. Soon I will be meeting President Gorbachev at a non-Summit meeting, in other words at a meeting without a set agenda. Though our relations with the Soviet Union are more free of tensions than at times past, enormous problems still remain. **At a time of rapidly moving events in many areas of the world, this meeting is designed, not to reach major decisions, but to reduce the chances of misunderstandings on issues of significance.** I want to assure you that nothing will take place at this meeting that will be detrimental to China's interests.

In my view the geo-political reasons that prompted Richard Nixon to come to China in the first place are still valid. I see many areas **of importance** today where China and the U.S. have similar interests.

With [this] **these considerations** in mind I would [like to send] **propose sending** a personal emissary to China after the December 2-3 meetings with President Gorbachev. That emissary would be prepared to fill you in on the details of the meetings **with General Secretary Gorbachev.** If that is agreeable in principle we can decide later who the emissary should be and who might receive him. If, prior to the **US-Soviet** meeting you have any concerns or thoughts to convey to me, I would welcome hearing from you.

On the broader subject that **is a constant concern to** [concerns] me [greatly], how to normalize relations between us, I will continue to try to find some answers. [and,] **With** respect, I hope China will try to do the same. In this regard, I think the discussions ~~with~~ that you had with President Nixon and with the physicist Dr Lee were extremely helpful.

On November ___ it was a pleasure to receive your able new Ambassador **a few days after he arrived and** before formal presentations of credentials. By receiving him in this manner, I wanted you to know that I remain personally involved **in emphasizing the importance I ascribe to our relationship and** in trying to resolve our differences.

Respectfully,

Most sincerely,

7:30 A.M.
Thursday
OCT 26, 1989

George Bush 11-6

Brent
Little pride of
authorship so
chop away!!
GS

Novembe

Dear Mr Chairman ~~or Deng Xioping~~:

Greetings.

Last night at the White House, former President Nixon de-briefed me and some of my top associates on his visit to China. He appreciated the manner in which he was received there. My personal view is that his visit to China was helpful.

I wanted to hear from him immediately upon his return from China, hoping that this will signal to you, to the people here at home, and to the rest of the world that I want to find a way to work out the major difficulties that have darkened our relationship. I will be carefully considering everything Mr. Nixon told me.

Now, for a ~~difficult~~ different subject. Soon I will be meeting President Gorbachev at a Non-Summit meeting, in other words at a meeting without a set agenda. Though our relations with the Soviet Union are more free of tensions than at times past, enormous problems still remain.

I want to assure you that nothing will take place at this meeting that will be detrimental to China's interests.

geo-political

In my view the reasons that prompted Richard Nixon to come to China in the first place are still valid. I see many areas today where China and the U.S. have similar interests.

With this in mind I would like to send a personal emissary to China after the December 2-3 meetings with President Gorbachev. That emissary would be prepared to fill you in on the details of the meetings If that is agreeable in principle we can decide later who the emissary should be and who might receive him. If ~~in the meantime~~ prior to the meetings you have any concerns or thoughts to convey to me, I would welcome hearing from you.

On the broader subject that concerns me greatly - how to normalize relations between us, I will continue to try to find some answers; and, with respect I hope China will try to do the same. In this regard, I think the discussions with President Nixon were extremely helpful.

On November ____ it was a pleasure to receive your able new Ambassador before formal presentations of credentials. By receiving him in this manner I wanted ~~him~~ you to know that I remain personally involved in trying to resolve our differences.

Respectfully.

Most sincerely,

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15. Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador James R. Lilley Re: Eyes Only for Ambassador Lilley [redacted] (2 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1), (b)(6)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate China Notes Files
Subseries: China Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: China 1989 (Sensitive) [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 11/21/14

Date Closed:	5/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91135-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-2782-MR (502)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	10/24/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET <OSRI> (b)(1) <DTG> 231851Z OCT 89

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

GEORGE H.W. BUSH
502
PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

<TEXT>ZEM
S E C R E T SENSITIVE (b)(1)
QQQQ
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR LILLEY, FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISDOR TO THE PRESIDENT.
.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
.
BEGIN TEXT:
.
OCTOBER 23, 1989
.
FOR: AMBASSADOR JAMES R. LILLEY
BEIJING
.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
.
EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LILLEY
.
1. JIM, FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO YOU (ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED). IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS, THE ONLY OTHER COPY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO SECRETARY OF STATE JIM BAKER FOR HIS EYES ONLY.
.
(COPY ATTACHED TEXT.)
.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

.
OCTOBER 23, 1989
.
DEAR JIM:
.
I TALKED TO PRESIDENT NIXON ON OCTOBER 21ST. DOUG PAAL WILL BRIEF HIM ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1989. HE PLANS TO CHECK IN WITH YOU. I ASKED HIM TO CONTACT (b)(6)
(b)(6)
.
I TOLD PRESIDENT NIXON WE WOULD HANDLE THE PRESS INQUIRIES IN ACCORD WITH HIS SUGGESTIONS BELOW. FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY I AM SENDING THE PARTS OF HIS OCTOBER 17TH LETTER TO ME THAT RELATE TO HIS COMING VISIT.
.
"I PLAN TO BE IN BEIJING FROM OCTOBER 25 TO THE 31ST. I WILL BE TRAVELLING ALONE, WITH ONLY MIKE ENDICOTT, MY PRIVATE SECURITY AIDE ACCOMPANYING ME; AS YOU KNOW I GAVE UP SECRET SERVICE FIVE YEARS AGO. I WILL BE REPRESENTING NO CLIENTS, AND WILL BE PAYING MY OWN EXPENSES. I HAVE INFORMED THE CHINESE THAT I WILL BE DOING NO SIGHTSEEING AND NO SHOPPING AND HAVE RULED OUT PURELY SOCIAL EVENTS. I WILL BE HAVING MEETINGS WITH THE MAJOR CHINESE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-2782-MP
SCS 10/24/13

LEADERS AND HAVE ASKED THEM NOT TO PLAN PUBLIC LUNCHEONS OR DINNERS WITH THE USUAL TIPPING OF GLASSES, ETC. I WILL, OF COURSE, BE STRONGLY SUPPORTING THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES AND SHALL MAKE THE POINT THAT YOUR REFUSAL TO GO ALONG WITH EXCESSIVE SANCTIONS IS COURAGEOUS AND COSTLY POLITICALLY. THEREFORE, THEY SHOULD AVOID ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE EMBARRASSING TO YOU AND TO OTHER FRIENDS OF CHINA. WHEN I RETURN, I WILL GIVE YOU MY PRIVATE ASSESSMENT OF THE LEADERS AND THEIR POSITIONS IN WRITING.

.

WHILE I WILL NOT BE GOING AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ADMINISTRATION, I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THE PRESS OFFICE, IF QUERIED, WOULD AVOID STATEMENTS THAT MIGHT BE INTERPRETED BY OUR "FRIENDS" IN THE MEDIA AS ATTEMPTS TO DISASSOCIATE THE ADMINISTRATION FROM MY TRIP. IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN MY MEETINGS WITH THE CHINESE IF THE PRESS SPOKESMAN COULD SAY SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING: WE UNDERSTAND THAT PRESIDENT NIXON IS MAKING HIS SIXTH VISIT TO CHINA TO MEET WITH ITS TOP LEADERS. WHILE HE IS TRAVELLING AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN, PRESIDENT BUSH LOOKS FORWARD TO HEARING THE PRESIDENT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN CHINA WHEN HE RETURNS."

.

AFTER HIS VISIT BOTH JIM BAKER AND I WOULD APPRECIATE A PERSONAL UPDATE ON US-CHINA RELATIONS.

.

WARM REGARDS, AND LOVE TO SALLY.

.

SINCERELY,

.

GEORGE BUSH

.

THE HONORABLE JAMES R. LILLEY
AMERICAN ANBASSADOR
BEIJING

.

2. WARM REGARDS, BRENT.

.

END TEXT

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DECLAS: OADR
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET
SCS 3/4/13

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chinese Ambassador Zhu Qizhen (~~TS~~)

PARTICIPANTS: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Douglas Paal, Director of Asian Affairs, NSC, Notetaker

Zhu Qizhen, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China
Chen Mingming, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 15, 1989, 3:01 p.m. - 3:06 p.m. EST
Office of Brent Scowcroft

Ambassador Zhu: Thank you, General Scowcroft, for making time to see me on a busy day. (~~TS~~)

General Scowcroft: When you say it is important, then I will find the time. (~~TS~~)

Ambassador Zhu: I have been instructed to give you this letter for the President from Chairman Deng, I should say Mr. Deng, now that he has retired. The letter states that President Bush is welcome to send a personal emissary to China to brief China's leaders on the meeting in Malta. The Chinese side believes it would be preferable for the emissary to go before the meeting in December. But if it is more convenient, the emissary can come after the meeting, of course. It is the official view of the Chinese side that this person's visit need not be a secret one. It can be publicly announced and reported. (~~TS~~)

General Scowcroft: I understand exactly what you are saying. I will get the letter to the President right away. I will get back to you. We want to send a very senior person, therefore I have to see when it might be possible to go. We certainly will try to accommodate Mr. Deng's views. I will look at the schedule and get back to you. (~~TS~~)

Ambassador Zhu: As to whether the visit will be a secret one, what is the view of the American side? (~~TS~~)

General Scowcroft: We have not talked about it. I do not see a reason for it to be like some other trips. (~~TS~~)

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Ambassador Zhu: Can I give Beijing an initial response? (~~TS~~)

General Scowcroft: The formal response must come from the President. You can cite my personal reaction. (~~TS~~)

Ambassador Zhu: I understand Dr. Kissinger reported a message from his visit to Beijing and conveyed the message from Deng Xiaoping for General Secretary Jiang Zemin to meet the President. He told me you or Secretary Baker would be in touch with me. (~~TS~~)

General Scowcroft: On the particularly early issue from President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger on Mr. Fang, we will go through Ambassador Lilley to your government. I do not know if it will be through you or Lilley, but because Lilley is in touch with Fang we prefer to handle that through him. (~~TS~~)

Ambassador Zhu: We want to resolve that issue as a package. (~~TS~~)

General Scowcroft: The first step is to find out what the elements of the package are. We will be back in touch. (~~TS~~)

Ambassador Zhu: That's all I have instructions on. Is there anything else? (~~TS~~)

General Scowcroft: We had a very good discussion with Dr. Kissinger. The President saw him immediately because Deng Xiaoping said he wanted the messages conveyed quickly. They were essentially the same as Mr. Nixon's. Kissinger had a little more detail. I will get back to you shortly on the next steps. (~~TS~~)

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Meeting with Zhu Qizhen, China's Ambassador to the U.S. (S)
PARTICIPANTS:	Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs Karl Jackson, Senior Director for Asian Affairs, NSC Zhu Qizhen, China's Ambassador to the U.S. Chen Mingming, Interpreter
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	November 8, 1989, 11:15 - 11:45am EST Brent Scowcroft's Office

General Scowcroft met with Ambassador Zhu Qizhen in the General's office at 11:15 a.m. (S)

Ambassador Zhu, after exchanging pleasantries, expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to meet with the President in October, and with General Scowcroft, before presenting his credentials. Zhu also expressed appreciation for General Scowcroft's efforts "to seek early normalization of the relationship between China and the United States." Zhu read from talking points in reporting "our assessment" of the Nixon visit. The Nixon visit had "positive and useful results. He and the Chinese leaders enjoy important and long-term interests." Zhu said he was hopeful that "the current difficulties would end as soon as possible, bringing to a close the current abnormal state of U.S.-China relations." (S)

Deng believes that we should both act speedily. He has put forward an important proposition for improving U.S.-China relations. He believes that whatever is done will be favorably reciprocated by the Chinese side." (S)

General Scowcroft replied that Nixon had given a very positive assessment of his visit, emphasizing the fundamental strategic interests shared by the two sides, and the fundamental importance of normalizing relations. He cited the differences in perspective between the two sides but indicated the importance of trying to make some initial moves. "The President agrees with this assessment; however, there are very real constraints based on the Congress. Based on the Nixon message as well as yours,

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both sides must work at untying the knot now. I am not sure, based on Nixon's report, what specific initiative you referred to in your statement. The presence of Fang in our Embassy is one. We will initiate something very shortly on that. We will make some proposals on that with great care because of the sensitivities. Based on the Nixon meeting, and in view of his longstanding friendship with China, the President has written Chairman Deng a personal letter. He wrote it himself to demonstrate the importance we place on the relationship. He feels very strongly about it and wants to move as rapidly as the two sides can." (S)

The General returned to the matter of Congress and stressed that it will be influenced by two factors: "The care with which the President moves" and "events in China." "What you do is your own internal affair and we do not want to interfere, but it influences us." (S)

Zhu stated, "I am instructed to tell you that the Fang matter is a very sensitive issue. Any proposals or suggestions about Fang should be made only through official channels." (S)

General Scowcroft replied that in the Fang matter we would deal through Ambassador Lilley, use official channels only, and involve the minimum number of people. (S)

Zhu raised the sanctions legislation currently being considered by Congress. He stated, "If any amendment is passed by the Congress, it will have a very bad effect on the Chinese people. Can passage be prevented or delayed?" (S)

General Scowcroft replied that the number of votes cast in favor of the legislation indicated that it would pass over a Presidential veto. However, the important thing is that "we have a national interests waiver on all provisions. All we need to do is send a letter to Congress. This effectively renders the provisions of the bill meaningless. This automatically gives the President the ability to mitigate the effects of the legislation. We can do nothing about its passing but we can mitigate its effect." (S)

Zhu asked about the possibility of postponing it until after the holidays. (S)

General Scowcroft said that timing depended on when Congress sends the legislation to the White House. Upon receipt we have 10 days to act. "If passed over a Presidential veto, this would

enflame things in the Congress. We do not like this legislation at all. But we can make sure that it will not have any effect." (S)

Zhu replied that passage of the legislation "will not be conducive to normalization of the relations and will hurt the feelings of the Chinese people." (S)

General Scowcroft said, "we have the same objective. We will manage, within the constraints of our laws, to have the lead effect on U.S.-China relations." (S)

Zhu asked whether there was anything else. (C)

General Scowcroft replied that while Nixon was a private citizen, "the sentiments he expressed on the importance of the relationship represented the President's feelings as well. There is no difference of opinion between the two of them. In this President you have as good and understanding a friend as you could possibly have. If he sometimes does not move as rapidly as you would like, it is not because he does not value the relationship highly." (S)

Zhu remarked that Henry Kissenger was now in China. (C)

General Scowcroft noted that Kissenger will also meet with the President when he returns from China. In closing, he told Zhu, "we can always chat. Meeting does not require an important message." (C)

In escorting Ambassador Zhu to his car, a discussion of Fang and martial law ensued with Karl Jackson. Zhu remarked that China could not link normalization of relations to lifting martial law because the latter remains entirely an internal affair. Jackson replied that he hoped China would hurry to lift martial law as soon as possible so that we could both then show how unconnected this act would be to subsequent progress in normalization. Zhu smiled, laughed, and drove away. (S)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1989

Dear Chairman Deng, Dear Friend:

I use this unique form of salutation because General Scowcroft told me that if I would continue to treat you as a friend, you would welcome that -- no matter the outcome of the difficulties now between us.

Of course, I, too, want it to be that way.

First, let me thank you and Li Peng for receiving General Scowcroft and Larry Eagleburger. The minute General Scowcroft returned to the USA, he came to Maine to brief me on your talks.

I have waited to send you this letter. I wanted first to go to Eastern Europe and the Economic Summit Conference at Paris, because I wanted to listen carefully to their views on their relations with China.

Also, in waiting, I was hoping against hope that some new development would take place that would enable us both to move towards improved relations. Unfortunately, no such development has occurred.

The G-7 Communique in Paris made reference to events in China. I can tell you in total confidence that the U. S. and the Japanese removed some rather inflammatory language from the Communique. It was still a Communique which I'm sure you'd rather not have had at all, but in the final form it did not urge new action affecting China.

Brent Scowcroft told me of your reference to the Chinese proverb: "It is up to the person who tied the knot to untie the knot."

Herein lies our major dilemma. You feel we "tied the knot" by our actions, especially regarding military sales.

We feel that those actions taken against peacefully demonstrating (non-violent) students and the nationwide crackdown against those simply speaking for reform "tied the knot."

Please understand, my friend, that when I use the word "we" in the preceding sentence, I am not simply referring to the United States. Rather, I am referring to many, many countries from North and South, East and West.

Let me emphasize, if there is anyone on the World Stage who understands how China views interference in its internal affairs, it is I. Likewise, I could indeed identify with the problems China's government faced when, as Li Peng told General Scowcroft, it felt that Zhongnanhai itself might be invaded or overrun. Li Peng pointedly asked General Scowcroft how we would feel if the White House were threatened by a mob out of control.

But here's the big problem. Given the all-penetrating (but not comprehensive) nature of television, people all around the world first saw massive but peaceful demonstrations, peacefully contained. With approval and respect, they saw Chinese leaders meeting with the students. They heard authoritative voices saying, "The Army loves the People;" and they saw soldiers showing amazing restraint. And people around the world saluted China and its leaders.

It is what happened next that we believe "tied the knot." You and Li Peng frankly described what you thought happened to the character of

the demonstrations and what you felt you had to do. But people all around the world, with their own eyes, saw other happenings, too; and China, which had been praised for restraint, was widely criticized.

I have great respect for China's long-standing position about non-intervention in its internal affairs.

Because of that, I also understand that I risk straining our friendship when I make suggestions as to what might be done now. But the U.S.-China relationship, which we have both worked so hard to strengthen, demands the candor with which only a friend can speak.

If some way can be found to close the chapter on the students whose actions were those of peaceful demonstrators, that would help enormously.

General Scowcroft reported to me that many of those arrested were common criminals, repeat offenders. I am not talking about these people.

If forgiveness could be granted to the students and, yes, to their teachers, this would go a long way to restoring worldwide confidence. Such a move could well lead to improved relations with many countries. For example, it would give me the opportunity to make a statement supporting your decision. Also, if it would be helpful to China, I could then publicly dispatch a high-level emissary to Beijing thus signalling to the world that our country was prepared to work our way back towards more normal relations.

You see, rightly or wrongly, it was the students who captured the imagination of so many people around the world. They are young and, like students everywhere, they are idealistic.

In our country, as Li Peng pointed out, there was, not long ago, much student unrest. There was some force used to quell the unrest and much criticism came our way. Many countries criticized us. Perhaps China did. But the unrest disappeared in time and the students here were leniently treated, even though some of our laws were deliberately broken. We never doubted that the students, even in dissent, truly loved our country.

Perhaps the differences in our systems are so great that you will find the above analogy irrelevant. I hope not. But of this I feel certain: the Chinese students who have spoken out truly love China.

I am drafting this letter to you from 37,000 feet in the air on my way back to the USA from Poland, Hungary, France and the Netherlands. Talk of economic reform is everywhere in Poland and Hungary. Others are finding, as China has, that incentive works, that joint ventures are good, and that standards of living can be improved through economic reform.

I hope you still feel that economic contacts with the West are good. In spite of a U. S. Congress that continues to try to compel me to cut off economic ties with China, I will continue to do my best to keep the boat from rocking too much.

Please understand that this letter has been personally written, and is coming to you from one who wants to see us go forward together.

Please do not be angry with me if I have crossed the invisible threshold lying between constructive suggestion and "internal interference."

When we last met, you told me you had turned more day-to-day matters over to others; but I

turn to you now out of respect, a feeling of closeness and, yes, friendship.

You have seen it all -- you've been up and down. Now I ask you to look with me into the future. This future is one of dramatic change. The U.S. and China each has much to contribute to this exciting future. We can both do more for world peace and for the welfare of our own people if we can get our relationship back on track. I have given you my unsolicited advice. Now I earnestly solicit your advice. If there is to be a period of darkness, so be it; but let us try to light some candles.

Respectfully,

George Bush

His Excellency
Deng Xiaoping
Chairman, Central Military Committee
People's Republic of China
Beijing

P.S. As with my previous letter to you, the only copy of this letter will be in my <u>personal</u> safe, for I truly want to speak by myself from the heart, and I ask you to do the same.

July 18, 1989

Dear Chairman Deng, Dear Friend:

I use this unique form of salutation because General Scowcroft told me that if I would continue to treat you as a friend, you would welcome that -- no matter the outcome of the difficulties now between us.

Of course, I, too, want it to be that way.

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It is what happened next that ~~[has caused the problem.]~~ we believe "tied the knot." You and Li Peng frankly described ~~[what you felt happened next and explained why it happened.]~~ what you thought happened to how you felt the character of the demonstrations changed and what you felt you had to do. But people all around the world, with their own eyes, saw other happenings, too; and China, which had been praised for restraint, was widely criticized ~~for oppression.~~

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~~"What should we do?" I understand that.~~

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people around the world – like students everywhere,

of so many. They are young and they are idealistic. ~~I'll never forget the late 60's in this country – the disorder and the dissent, but just as those kids criticized the U.S. and now the young Chinese kids criticize China. They~~

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