

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91152
Folder ID Number: 91152-008

Folder Title:
Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	7	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Cable	Hubert Vedrine, Secretary General of the Presidency of the Republic of France to Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor [English] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01b. Cable	Elysee Palace to White House Re: Hubert Vedrine to Brent Scowcroft [French] (2 pp.)	4/3/92	(b)(1)	TS
02. Cable	The Chancellory to White House Re: Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President George Bush (4 pp.)	4/3/92	(b)(1)	
03a. Cable	White House to Federal Chancellory Re: Message to Chancellor Kohl from President Bush (3 pp.)	3/31/92	(b)(1)	S
03b. Note	President Bush to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	3/30/92	(b)(1)	
04. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Prime Minister Major from President Bush (3 pp.)	3/31/92	(b)(1)	S
05. Cable	The Chancellory to The White House Re: Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush (3 pp.)	3/25/92	(b)(1)	S
06. Cable	White House to Elysee Palace Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	3/16/92	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 5

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Special Separate Channel Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Pinksheet Number: cap1270

OA/ID Number: 91152-008

Date Closed: 7/28/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07. Cable	The Chancellory to The White House//The Honourable Mr. George Bush Re: Chancellor Kohl to President Bush (1 pp.)	3/9/92	(b)(1)	S
08. Cable	The White House to American Embassy Brussels Re: Letter from President Bush to President Delors (3 pp.)	3/7/92	(b)(1)	C
09. Cable	Re: Chemical Weapons (CW): Making Policy is Too Hard, So Everybody Wants To Be a Negotiator (3 pp.)	3/7/92	(b)(1)	C
10a. Cable	Palazzo Chigi to White House Re: Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to President George Bush [English] (1 pp.)	3/9/92	(b)(1)	
10b. Cable	Palazzo Chigi to White House Re: From Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to President George Bush [Italian] (1 pp.)	3/9/92	(b)(1)	S
11. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Mr. Stephen Wall from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	3/4/92	(b)(1)	S
12. Cable	White House to Federal Chancellory Re: Message to Chancellor Kohl from President Bush (2 pp.)	2/28/92	(b)(1)	C
13. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Under Secretary Zoellick, with a Copy to Ambassador Simons, from David Gompert [291955Z Feb 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	2/29/92	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 5

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
14. Cable	American Embassy Copenhagen to The White House Re: From Ambassador Richard B. Stone to the White House for the President (2 pp.)	2/21/92	(b)(1)	S
15. Cable	American Embassy Ankara to The White House Re: Ambassador Barkley to the White House for President Bush (1 pp.)	2/20/92	(b)(1)	S
16. Letter	Prime Minister Andreotti to President Bush Re: Department of State Office of Language Services Translating Division [English] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
17. Cable	From White House, Re: Message from President Bush to Prime Minister Demirel [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
18. Cable	From White House, Re: Message from President Bush to Prime Minister Demirel [190143Z Feb 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	2/19/92	(b)(1)	S
19. Cable	Canberra to White House Re: From Charge Canberra to the White House, for the President (1 pp.)	2/18/92	(b)(1)	S
20. Cable	Re: Memorandum for the President (3 pp.)	2/16/92	(b)(1)	S
21. Cable	The Hague to White House Re: Message from Ambassador Wilkins to the White House (2 pp.)	2/13/92	(b)(1)	S

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22. Cable	Re: Memorandum for the President: February 16, 1992 (3 pp.)	2/16/92	(b)(1)	S
23a. Cable	Elysee Palace to White House Re: President Mitterrand to President Bush [French] (4 pp.)	2/17/92	(b)(1)	TS
23b. Cable	President Mitterrand to President Bush Re: Unofficial Situation Room Translation (2 pp.)	2/17/92	(b)(1)	TS
24. Cable	Cabinet Office London to The White House Re: Message from the Prime Minister to the President of the United States (2 pp.)	2/17/92	(b)(1)	S
25. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Robert Strauss from Brent Scowcroft [150453Z Feb 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (8 pp.)	2/15/92	(b)(1)	C
26. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Secretary Baker's Party from Brent Scowcroft [171500Z Feb 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	2/17/92	(b)(1)	S
27. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Ambassador Edward Gnehm, Jr. from Brent Scowcroft [redacted] (2 pp.)	2/15/92	(b)(1)	C
28. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to James A. Baker Re: Further to my cable of yesterday... (1 pp.)	2/14/92	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
29. Cable	To White House Re: General Scowcroft and Admiral Howe from David Gompert, London [redacted] (3 pp.)	2/14/92	(b)(1)	S
30. Cable	From White House Re: To The White House for General Scowcroft from Ambassador Taft for General Scowcroft [redacted] (2 pp.)	2/14/92	(b)(1)	S

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~~SECRET~~

From: Hubert Vedrine, Secretary General of the Presidency of the Republic of France

To: Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor

Dear Brent:

I received your message relative to our bilateral negotiations on civil aviation. You know that our forecasts differ as far as the overall capacity of traffic for the summer season of 1992. In addition the fact that certain of your airline companies can operate under the protection of chapter 11 of your bankruptcy law is liable to warp the conditions of competition with Air France. Nevertheless, your proposition concerning the three companies (Northwest, TWA, United) could be acceptable. However, it could only be acceptable (be inscribed) within the limits of our objective for increasing the overall capacity of traffic 15% in relation to the summer of 1991.

If you can confirm immediately your acceptance of this objective we would be able to examine in this framework of your detailed propositions the allocation between the different airline companies and the different destinations for the summer season. Best to you, Hubert Vedrine

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0638-MR

MM 7/28/2016

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Cable	Elysee Palace to White House Re: Hubert Vedrine to Brent Scowcroft [French] (2 pp.)	4/3/92	(b)(1)	TS

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Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
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Date Closed: 7/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91152-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Cable	The Chancellory to White House Re: Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President George Bush (4 pp.)	4/3/92	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
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Date Closed:	7/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Copy to Skinner 9/31

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Msg went last
night. He got
word at 10:10
this morning that
Kohl was happy
to do it but
timing at this
point is unclear.

Att'd is copy
of msg to Kohl

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: GANTI GOMPERT HEWETT COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT HOWE SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: HOTLINE OUT FILE SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 310222Z MAR 92

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO FEDERAL CHANCELLORY

~~SECRET~~ VIA SKIPPER CHANNELS

QQQQ

-
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ FOR TRANSMISSION
PURPOSES. THE ACTUAL CLASSIFICATION IS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

-
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KOHL FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH.

-
BEGIN TEXT:

-
DEAR HELMUT:

-
AS A FOLLOW-UP TO OUR VERY PRODUCTIVE MEETING AT CAMP DAVID, I WANT
TO LET YOU KNOW THAT I WILL MEET WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP
ON APRIL 1 TO OUTLINE OUR NEW EFFORT TO EXPAND AMERICAN ASSISTANCE
TO RUSSIA AND THE OTHER CIS STATES, AND WILL MAKE A PUBLIC
STATEMENT ON THIS ISSUE THE SAME DAY. I AM WRITING SIMULTANEOUSLY
TODAY TO JOHN MAJOR AND WILL BE COMMUNICATING WITH OUR OTHER
PARTNERS BEFORE THIS NEWS BECOMES PUBLIC.

-
I PLAN TO MAKE FOUR MAJOR POINTS IN THE MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL
LEADERS AND IN MY STATEMENT. THEY ARE ALL ALONG THE LINES OF OUR
DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT AT CAMP DAVID.

-
FIRST, I PLAN TO MAKE A STRONG ARGUMENT THAT IT IS IN AMERICA'S

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0705-MR

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

NATIONAL INTEREST TO ENGAGE ITSELF FULLY IN ASSISTING YELTSIN AND THE OTHER REFORMERS WITH FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND CONTINUED HUMANITARIAN FOOD AID. I WILL SAY THAT THIS EFFORT SHOULD HAVE BIPARTISAN SUPPORT AND THAT I AM PREPARED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE CONGRESS TO MAKE IT HAPPEN. AS YOU KNOW, YELTSIN HAS ASKED FOR A STRONG MESSAGE OF SUPPORT FROM US ALL BEFORE HIS APRIL 6 CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES MEETING. THIS WILL BE MY ATTEMPT TO HELP HIM.

-

SECOND, I WILL DECLARE U.S. SUPPORT FOR A \$6 BILLION CURRENCY STABILIZATION FUND ALONG THE LINES AGREED UPON BY G-7 DEPUTIES. I WILL ALSO SAY THE U.S. WILL WORK WITH ITS ALLIES TO DEVELOP A SEPARATE \$18 BILLION PROGRAM TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA IN 1992 THROUGH THE IMF, WORLD BANK AND EBRD. HELMUT, I WOULD ENCOURAGE YOU, AS G-7 CHAIRMAN, TO TAKE THE LEAD IN PULLING TOGETHER A G-7 CONSENSUS ON THESE INITIATIVES. I WOULD WELCOME A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THIS MATTER THIS WEEK, THE EARLIER THE BETTER.

-

THIRD, I WILL PRESENT TO THE CONGRESS A NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE BILL, THE SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM ACT, THAT WILL GIVE ME AUTHORITY TO ACT VIGOROUSLY TO EXTEND U.S. SUPPORT TO RUSSIA AND THE OTHER STATES. SOME OF THE MAJOR FEATURES OF THE BILL WOULD: AUTHORIZE A \$12

BILLION U.S. REPLENISHMENT OF THE IMF, GIVE ME AUTHORITY TO HAVE THE U.S. PARTICIPATE IN THE STABILIZATION FUND AND OTHER FINANCIAL PROGRAMS; REPEAL COLD WAR LEGISLATION THAT CURRENTLY IMPEDES U.S. TRADE WITH THE FORMER USSR; BROADEN USE OF THE \$500 MILLION APPROPRIATED BY CONGRESS LAST YEAR FOR DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO INCLUDE DEFENSE CONVERSION, DEMILITARIZATION AND NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY; AND ESTABLISH A MAJOR EXCHANGE PROGRAM BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE COMMONWEALTH STATES.

-

FOURTH, I WILL ALSO ANNOUNCE THAT THE U.S. WILL EXTEND AN ADDITIONAL \$1.1 BILLION IN CREDIT GUARANTEES FOR THE PURCHASE OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. THIS WILL MEET ALL OF YELTSIN'S

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

REQUEST FOR \$600 MILLION TO COVER THE PERIOD MAY-JULY OF THIS YEAR, AND WILL EXTEND \$500 MILLION FOR OTHER CIS STATES (OF WHICH UKRAINE WILL RECEIVE \$200 MILLION).

-

AS I MENTIONED AT CAMP DAVID, THIS IS NOT THE EASIEST TIME FOR ANY OF US TO BE LAUNCHING A MAJOR NEW ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, BUT I HOPE THESE INITIATIVES WILL HELP PAVE THE WAY FOR A COMMON G-7 EFFORT TO HELP YELTSIN AND HIS REFORMS. I WOULD OF COURSE WELCOME ANY IDEAS YOU HAVE TOWARD THAT END.

-

I VERY MUCH APPRECIATED OUR TALKS AT CAMP DAVID AND YOUR LETTER OF MARCH 25, WHICH I WILL BE ANSWERING SHORTLY.

-

WITH WARM REGARDS,

-

SINCERELY,

-

GEORGE BUSH

-

END TEXT

-

DECL: OADR

#0137

~~SECRET~~



March 30, 1992

Brent:

Are we all set on Soviet 'Package'?

Baker hopes we can do it Wednesday AM, but that will mean moving Philly meeting..

Also Brady says Kohl not going out Monday with G-7 letter. That is important, since I'd like to get our whole deal out before the G-7 tries to get credit.

cc: Sam

Brent

Will we have a Kohl
"Holt" letter or announcement
for Wednesday?

Sam

FROM THE PRESIDENT

~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: CANTI COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT HOWE SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT HOTLINE OUT FILE SUM SUM2

~~PREC~~ IMMEDIATE ~~CLAS~~ ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 310244Z MAR 92

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

0000

THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ FOR TRANSMISSION
PURPOSES. THE ACTUAL CLASSIFICATION IS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR JOHN:

I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW THAT I WILL MEET WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL
LEADERSHIP ON APRIL 1 TO OUTLINE OUR NEW EFFORT TO EXPAND AMERICAN
ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA AND THE OTHER CIS STATES, AND WILL MAKE A
PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THIS ISSUE THE SAME DAY. I AM WRITING
SIMULTANEOUSLY TODAY TO HELMUT KOHL AND WILL BE COMMUNICATING WITH
OUR OTHER PARTNERS BEFORE THIS NEWS BECOMES PUBLIC.

I PLAN TO MAKE FOUR MAJOR POINTS IN THE MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL
LEADERS AND IN MY STATEMENT.

FIRST, I PLAN TO MAKE A STRONG ARGUMENT THAT IT IS IN AMERICA'S
NATIONAL INTEREST TO ENGAGE ITSELF FULLY IN ASSISTING YELTSIN AND
THE OTHER REFORMERS WITH FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0755-MR
1/9/2012 MM

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

CONTINUED HUMANITARIAN FOOD AID. I WILL SAY THAT THIS EFFORT SHOULD HAVE BIPARTISAN SUPPORT AND THAT I AM PREPARED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE CONGRESS TO MAKE IT HAPPEN. AS YOU KNOW, YELTSIN HAS ASKED FOR A STRONG MESSAGE OF SUPPORT FROM US ALL BEFORE HIS APRIL 6 CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES MEETING. THIS WILL BE MY ATTEMPT TO HELP HIM.

-
SECOND, I WILL DECLARE U.S. SUPPORT FOR A \$6 BILLION CURRENCY STABILIZATION FUND ALONG THE LINES AGREED UPON BY G-7 DEPUTIES. I WILL ALSO SAY THE U.S. WILL WORK WITH ITS ALLIES TO DEVELOP A SEPARATE \$18 BILLION PROGRAM TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA IN 1992 THROUGH THE IMF, WORLD BANK AND EBRD. I HAVE SUGGESTED TO HELMUT KOHL THAT HE TAKE THE LEAD IN PULLING TOGETHER THESE G-7 INITIATIVES. I HAVE ENCOURAGED HIM TO MAKE A STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR THEM THIS WEEK, AND SUGGEST YOU MIGHT ALSO WANT TO CONSIDER ADDING YOUR WEIGHT TO THIS EFFORT.

-
THIRD, I WILL PRESENT TO THE CONGRESS A NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE BILL, THE SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM ACT, THAT WILL GIVE ME AUTHORITY TO ACT VIGOROUSLY TO EXTEND U.S. SUPPORT TO RUSSIA AND THE OTHER STATES. SOME OF THE MAJOR FEATURES OF THE BILL WOULD: AUTHORIZE A \$12 BILLION U.S. REPLENISHMENT OF THE IMF, GIVE ME AUTHORITY TO HAVE THE U.S. PARTICIPATE IN THE STABILIZATION FUND AND OTHER FINANCIAL

PROGRAMS; REPEAL COLD WAR LEGISLATION THAT CURRENTLY IMPEDES U.S. TRADE WITH THE FORMER USSR; BROADEN USE OF THE \$500 MILLION APPROPRIATED BY CONGRESS LAST YEAR FOR DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO INCLUDE DEFENSE CONVERSION, DEMILITARIZATION AND NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY; AND ESTABLISH A MAJOR EXCHANGE PROGRAM BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE COMMONWEALTH STATES.

-
FOURTH, I WILL ALSO ANNOUNCE THAT THE U.S. WILL EXTEND AN ADDITIONAL \$1.1 BILLION IN CREDIT GUARANTEES FOR THE PURCHASE OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. THIS WILL MEET ALL OF YELTSIN'S REQUEST FOR \$600 MILLION TO COVER THE PERIOD MAY-JULY OF THIS YEAR, AND WILL EXTEND \$500 MILLION FOR OTHER CIS STATES (OF WHICH UKRAINE

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

WILL RECEIVE \$200 MILLION).

-
THIS IS NOT THE EASIEST TIME FOR ANY OF US TO BE LAUNCHING A MAJOR NEW ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, BUT I HOPE THESE INITIATIVES WILL HELP PAVE THE WAY FOR A COMMON G-7 EFFORT TO HELP YELTSIN AND HIS REFORMS. I WOULD OF COURSE WELCOME ANY IDEAS YOU HAVE TOWARD THAT END.

-
THE EMPHASIS I HAVE PUT ON WORKING THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND IN SUPPORTING A STABILIZATION FUND REFLECT OUR PAST CONVERSATIONS. CONCERTED WESTERN EFFORTS IN REACHING OUT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND IN SUPPORTING REFORM EFFORTS THROUGHOUT THE CIS ARE DUE IN NO SMALL MEASURE TO YOUR STEWARDSHIP OF THE G-7 LAST YEAR AS WELL AS YOUR CONTINUED AND ACTIVE ROLE IN RESPONDING TO THE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITIES WE FACE TODAY.

-
WITH WARM REGARDS,

-
SINCERELY,

-
GEORGE BUSH

-
END TEXT

-
DECL: OADR

#0138

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Cable	The Chancellory to The White House Re: Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush (3 pp.)	3/25/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GANTT COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT HOWE SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: HOTLINE^{OUT} FILE SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 161507Z MAR 92

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ELYSEE PALACE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
Q000

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

AS WE MOVE INTO A CRUCIAL PHASE OF OUR JOINT EFFORT TO PASS
A SECOND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE PAN AM AND UTA
BOMBINGS, I WANTED TO ENSURE THAT WE COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY ON THIS
VITAL MATTER. THE ABILITY OF FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM TO MAINTAIN UNITY OF PURPOSE HAS BEEN, WE ALL
RECOGNIZE, CENTRAL TO OUR SUCCESS TO DATE AND REMAINS ESSENTIAL
TO ACHIEVING OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES.

LIBYA HAS MADE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO SPLIT FRANCE FROM THE U.S. AND
THE UK, AND I APPRECIATE YOUR STEADFASTNESS IN INSISTING ON FULL
LIBYAN COMPLIANCE WHICH HAS BLUNTED QADHAFI'S MANEUVERS. LIBYA,
HOWEVER, WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO ESCAPE THE COSTS OF ITS SUPPORT
FOR TERRORISM BY DELAYING TACTICS AND OTHER MANEUVERING, SUCH AS
SEEKING TO INVOLVE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.

WHILE I KNOW IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO WIN UNANIMOUS SUPPORT
FOR A SECOND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IMPOSING SANCTIONS, THE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0728-MR
5/16/2011 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

INITIAL RESULTS OF OUR JOINT DEMARCHES ARE ENCOURAGING. BY WORKING TOGETHER, WE HAVE CREATED THE MOMENTUM, AND I AM SURE WE WILL CARRY THE DAY.

THE KIND OF LEADERSHIP YOU HAVE DEMONSTRATED THUS FAR WILL CONTINUE TO BE CRITICAL TO OUR SUCCESS. KING HASSAN WILL BE HESITANT TO JOIN US ON THE SECOND RESOLUTION, FOR EXAMPLE. GIVEN FRANCE'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MOROCCO, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS AND ENCOURAGE YOUR EFFORTS TO WIN THE KING'S SUPPORT. BE ASSURED THAT I WILL ALSO STAY ENGAGED WITH MOROCCO AND OTHERS TO ASSURE PASSAGE OF THE SECOND RESOLUTION.

ALL MY BEST WISHES.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

DECL: OADR

END TEXT:

#0079

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Cable	The Chancellory to The White House//The Honourable Mr. George Bush Re: Chancellor Kohl to President Bush (1 pp.)	3/9/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Date Closed:	7/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0638-MR
mm 7/28/2016

PRT: DEAL GANTT GOMPERT HOWE SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRES^MSGs SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 070451Z MAR 92

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASH DC

TO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS//NIACT//
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR DOBBINS AT EARLIEST WAKING HOUR.

AMBASSADOR DOBBINS: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT DELORS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE -- BEFORE
OOB MONDAY IF APPROPRIATE.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JACQUES:

OUR TRADE NEGOTIATORS HAVE BEEN TALKING QUIETLY OVER THE PAST
SEVERAL WEEKS IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES ON
PAGE 02 RHEHAAA0136 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
AGRICULTURE.

LIKE YOU, WE HAVE MAINTAINED THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE TALKS.
BECAUSE WE HAVE AVOIDED PUBLICITY, SOME MEMBER STATES HAVE INFERRED
THAT THE U.S. HAS CHOSEN TO LET THE URUGUAY ROUND COAST FOR NOW. I
WANT THERE TO BE NO DOUBT IN YOUR MIND THAT WE SEEK AN EARLY
BREAKTHROUGH AND THAT I WILL STAY ENGAGED.

I AM SENSITIVE TO THE PROBLEM THE EC FACES IN TRYING TO REFORM THE
CAP WHILE CONCLUDING A GATT AGREEMENT. WE HAVE WORKED VERY HARD TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

UNDERSTAND YOUR NEW PROGRAMS AND TO HELP SOLVE THE PROBLEM BY DEVELOPING AN APPROACH TO INTERNAL SUPPORTS WHICH WOULD ACCOMMODATE YOUR NEEDS WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE INTEGRITY OF A GATT ACCORD ON AGRICULTURE.

AS A RESULT, OUR NEGOTIATORS HAVE PROPOSED A "SAFE BOX" FOR PAYMENTS LIKE THOSE PROPOSED UNDER CAP REFORM AND HAVE SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME ELABORATING THIS IDEA WITH EC NEGOTIATORS. THIS SAFE BOX WOULD ENABLE THE COMMUNITY TO PROTECT ITS INTERNAL SUPPORT PAYMENTS FROM REDUCTION EVEN THOUGH OUR PAYMENTS WOULD BE CUT. I

PAGE 03 RHEHAAA0136 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONSIDER THIS A MAJOR CONCESSION.

TIME IS SHORT. THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS BETWEEN OUR NEGOTIATORS WILL BE CRUCIAL FOR REACHING A U.S.-EC AGREEMENT THAT WOULD PERMIT AN OVERALL GATT ACCORD THIS YEAR. MY NEGOTIATORS WILL BE PREPARED TO STAY AT IT AS LONG AS IT TAKES TO HELP THE EC SOLVE THE INTERNAL SUPPORTS PROBLEM. I HOPE THAT THE EC NEGOTIATORS WILL COME TO THE TABLE WITH SPECIFIC IDEAS FOR A SOLUTION AND WITH THE AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS ISSUE AT THE UPCOMING MEETING.

I WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE THIS MY CLOSE PERSONAL ATTENTION. I KNOW YOU WILL TOO. THE U.S. AND THE EC ARE THE WORLD'S ECONOMIC LEADERS, WHICH PLACES UPON US A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY TO REACH AGREEMENT. RATHER THAN VIEWING THE URUGUAY ROUND AS AN IMPENDING U.S.-EC CRISIS, WE SHOULD SEE IT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE OUR LEADERSHIP AND OUR PARTNERSHIP.

IF I CAN BE HELPFUL IN REACHING AGREEMENT OR IN SECURING SUPPORT FOR IT ONCE REACHED, YOU SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO BE IN TOUCH WITH ME.

PAGE 04 RHEHAAA0136 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SINCERELY,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

GEORGE BUSH
HIS EXCELLENCY
JACQUES DELORS
PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
BRUSSELS

END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
BT
#0136

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

PRT: GANNI HOWE SCOWCROFT

SIT: FILE SIT

2010-0639-UR
MM 9/18/2015

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 071109Z MAR 92

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECDEF WASH DC
INFO SECSTATE//ACDA WASH DC
CIA WASH DC
DOE WASH DC
JCS WASH DC
THE WHITE HOUSE//NSC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 071109Z MAR 92 PRIVACY CHANNEL

FROM: USMISSION GENEVA 8470

TO: SECDEF, IMMEDIATE, PERSONAL FOR ACTION BY UNDERSECRETARY WOLFOWITZ.

INFO: EYES ONLY ACDA FOR LEHMAN, NSC FOR HOWE, STATE FOR BARTHOLOMEW,
DOE FOR ALESSI, CIA FOR MACEACHIN.

EXDIS

FROM STEVE LEDOGAR

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): MAKING POLICY IS
TOO HARD, SO EVERYBODY WANTS TO BE A
NEGOTIATOR.

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. PAUL, WE HAVE A SERIOUS PROBLEM THAT NEEDS YOUR
PERSONAL ATTENTION. THE FATE OF THE PRESIDENT'S
CHEMICAL WEAPONS POLICY IS AT STAKE.
3. MY CLOSE ALLIES IN THIS NEGOTIATION, SPECIFICALLY
THE FRENCH, BRITISH, AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES -- ALLIES
WITH WHOM WE HAVE HAD SERIOUS SUBSTANTIVE
DIFFERENCES -- HAVE RECENTLY BEEN WAVING IN MY FACE
PAPERS WHICH THEY CLAIM TO BE DRAFTS OF INSTRUCTIONS
SOON TO BE SENT HERE. THEY GLEEFULLY REPORT IN
EXQUISITE DETAIL NEGOTIATIONS ON KEY CW ISSUES BEING
CARRIED ON BY SOME OF YOUR MID-LEVEL EMPLOYEES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

ACCORDING TO MY COLLEAGUES, BOTH THEIR EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON AND SENIOR OFFICIALS IN THEIR CAPITALS ARE INVOLVED. ACCORDING TO THESE COUNTERPARTS, THE AMERICAN OFFICIALS IMPLICATED ARE SOMETIMES TRYING TO CUT TEXT-SPECIFIC DEALS ON A PERSONAL BASIS, SOMETIMES WORKING ON A SPECULATIVE BASIS ("IF YOU CAN AGREE TO THIS, I'M CONFIDENT I CAN DELIVER THE PENTAGON"), AND WORST OF ALL, SOMETIMES CLAIMING THEY ARE SPEAKING FOR THE ENTIRE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

4. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN IS THE BELIEF OF THESE ALLIED AMBASSADORS HERE THAT THE ISSUES IN THOSE BEHIND-MY-BACK NEGOTIATIONS ARE BEING DEALT WITH IN RELATION TO OBSOLETE TEXTS AND IN ISOLATION FROM OTHER ISSUES THAT ARE DIRECTLY RELATED. THE FRENCH COLLEAGUE, FOR EXAMPLE, IS LICKING HIS CHOPS AT THE PROSPECT OF SUPERSESSION OF SEVERAL CONCESSIONS HE WAS REQUIRED TO MAKE TO U.S. FRONT CHANNEL DIPLOMACY.

5. I ASKED MY SENIOR DEFENSE ADVISOR, THE SECDEF'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE ON MY DELEGATION, DR. RON NELSON, TO TELL ME WHAT WAS GOING ON. HE TOO HAS BEEN KEPT TOTALLY IN THE DARK. AT MY BEHEST NELSON MADE SOME CALLS TO ISP AND WAS TOLD IN EFFECT THAT IT WAS NOT OSD'S RESPONSIBILITY TO KEEP ME INFORMED OF WHAT

WAS GOING ON.

6. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS THAT INDIVIDUALS FROM SOME OTHER AGENCIES AND FROM THE WHITE HOUSE ARE IN ON THESE EFFORTS TO UNDERCUT ME AND MY DELEGATION.

7. FOR ALL ADDRESSEES:

IF THERE IS SOME TRUTH TO THESE ALLEGATIONS, I THINK I HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEMAND THAT YOU COLLECTIVELY PUT A STOP TO SUCH PRACTICES. I THINK THAT GOOD ORDER AND THE NATION'S INTERESTS ALSO REQUIRE THAT A FULL REPORT OF WHAT HAS TRANSPIRED BEHIND THE BACKS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION BE SENT TO US SO THAT THE PLAYING FIELD MIGHT BE LEVELED, AND PROPER NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

8. FOR THE FUTURE, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WHEN YOUR PEOPLE SUMMON POL-MIL OFFICIALS FROM ALLIED EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON OR MAKE OVERSEAS TELEPHONE CALLS TO ALLIED CAPITALS TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC ISSUES UNDER NEGOTIATION, MINIMAL PROFESSIONALISM (NOT TO MENTION COMMON COURTESY) SUGGESTS THAT MEMCONS SHOULD BE DRAFTED AND SENT TO FELLOW U.S. OFFICIALS WITH A NEED TO KNOW WHAT WAS SAID AND WHAT COMMITMENTS WERE MADE.
9. I APOLOGIZE FOR BRINGING THIS CONTEMPTIBLE MATTER TO YOUR ATTENTION BUT IT REQUIRES YOUR INTERVENTION. YOU SHOULD BEGIN BY AWAKENING THOSE JUNIOR G-MEN TO THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE THEY ARE, BY THOSE PRACTICES, DOING TO U.S. INTERESTS. THEN YOU MIGHT CONSIDER UNPLUGGING THEIR OVERSEAS TELEPHONES, TAKING THEIR PASSPORTS AWAY AND INSTRUCTING THEM TO TURN THEIR ENERGIES TO THEIR PROPER JOBS OF DEVELOPING FOREIGN POLICY. THE ONLY THING I CAN THINK OF THAT WOULD BE MORE DAMAGING TO THE PRESIDENT'S CW POLICY THAN THE SYSTEMATIC UNDERCUTTING OF HIS NEGOTIATOR IN THE FIELD, WOULD BE FOR HIS NEGOTIATORS TO START TRYING TO DO THE JOBS OF THESE POLICY OFFICIALS. A GOOD WAY TO START THEIR REORIENTATION WOULD BE TO INSTRUCT THEM TO RESPOND TO OUR REQUESTS FOR GUIDANCE. AT A MINIMUM THEY MIGHT READ OUR REPORTS, ACKNOWLEDGE THEM, AND INFORM THEMSELVES OF THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY.
10. WARM REGARDS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#8470

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Palazzo Chigi

To: White House

Date: 090845Z MAR 92

From Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti
To President George Bush

Dear George:

We know that the French keep bringing up the proposal of holding a four-party meeting on the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union. The French add that on this subject they have the agreement of the main European partners, with whom they say they have discussed this initiative.

I would mention that we have dealt with this question in our meeting at Rome on November 7, before the start of the NATO summit.

I would like to confirm to you that our opposition to the idea of a four-party meeting remains unchanged, with the additional reason that we are more convinced than ever that an initiative of this type would certainly cause harm /?--garbled word/ to the cohesiveness of the Alliance. We are all agreed that the subject is of interest to all the Allies, and therefore it ought to be dealt with in the NATO context. In expectation of having an opportunity to see you again soon, I send you the most cordial greetings.

-Giulio Andreotti

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10b. Cable	Palazzo Chigi to White House Re: From Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to President George Bush [Italian] (1 pp.)	3/9/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Date Closed: 7/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91152-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
SIT: HOTLINE[^]OUT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0639-MR
MM 9/18/2015

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 042046Z MAR 92

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

0000

-

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR. STEPHEN WALL
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

-

BEGIN TEXT:

-

-

DEAR STEPHEN,

-

I AM SURE YOU SHARE OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE UPCOMING REFERENDUM IN
SOUTH AFRICA. THIS IS A REAL TURNING POINT FOR SOUTH AFRICA, AND
PRESIDENT DE KLERK COULD FACE A TOUGH CHALLENGE IN THIS CRUCIAL
VOTE. WE OF COURSE DO NOT WANT TO INTERFERE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS
-- AND WE CERTAINLY DO NOT WANT THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY TO USE US
AS AN ELECTION ISSUE. BUT WE DO WANT TO MAKE OUR PRO-NEGOTIATION
POSITION CLEAR AND, BY IMPLICATION, BE SUPPORTIVE OF DE KLERK.

-

WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING A FEW OPTIONS ON THIS INCLUDING THE
POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT (OR IF MORE ADVANTAGEOUS, PARALLEL)
STATEMENTS ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

-

-- THE U.S. AND THE U.K. HAVE CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED THE SEARCH
FOR A PEACEFUL AGREEMENT THAT WOULD LEAD TO A NON-RACIAL,
DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA.

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

-

-- SOUTH AFRICA HAS SEEN REMARKABLE CHANGES AND HAS MADE GREAT PROGRESS IN THE PAST TWO YEARS. WE SUPPORT THE CONTINUATION OF THIS PROGRESS WHICH IS AIMED AT A NEW CONSTITUTION THROUGH NEGOTIATION.

-

-- THE CONVENTION FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA (CODESA) PROCESS NOW HOLDS A GREAT DEAL OF HOPE FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AND BECOME RE-INTEGRATED INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

-

-- WE ALSO SUPPORT STRONG ECONOMIC GROWTH THAT WILL BE REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND MEET THE NEEDS OF ALL SOUTH AFRICANS.

-

PLEASE LET ME KNOW YOUR THOUGHTS.

-

SINCERELY,

-

BRENT SCOWCROFT

-

END TEXT

-

DECL: OADR

#0014

~~SECRET~~

~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0767-MR
SCS 3/1/13

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
SIT: HOTLINE OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 282256Z FEB 92

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO FEDERAL CHANCELLORY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA SKIPPER CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KOHL
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HELMUT,

I WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS -- AGAIN, IN AN INFORMAL WAY -- ABOUT THE UPCOMING MUNICH SUMMIT. WE WILL HAVE A LOT ON OUR PLATES, BUT I THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT WE SET ASIDE SPACE TO REAFFIRM OUR COMMITMENT TO THE SUCCESS OF POLAND AND THE OTHER NEW DEMOCRACIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. I WAS PLEASED THAT YOU MADE THAT VERY POINT IN A RECENT INTERVIEW.

NO ONE HAS DONE MORE THAN GERMANY TO SUPPORT THESE NEW DEMOCRACIES, AND NO ONE HAS SHOWN MORE LEADERSHIP THAN YOU. AND I AM SURE YOU AGREE THAT OUR STAKE IN THEIR SUCCESS IS GREATER THAN EVER, JUST AS THE CONSEQUENCES OF STALLED REFORM IN POLAND ARE GREATER, IN LIGHT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES FARTHER EAST.

AFTER READING EXCERPTS FROM LECH WALESZA'S SPEECH IN STRASBOURG, I WROTE HIM A SUPPORTIVE LETTER SUGGESTING WAYS THE U.S. MIGHT BE HELPFUL. I OUTLINED STEPS THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO TAKE TO STRENGTHEN U.S. INVESTMENT, INCLUDING SENDING A TEAM OF U.S. BUSINESS EXPERTS TO HELP BRING TO CONCLUSION SOME OF THE MANY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

U.S. INVESTMENT PROJECTS THAT HAVE BEEN LANGUISHING FOR MONTHS. I ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WERE SOME STEPS THAT ONLY POLAND CAN TAKE, ABOVE ALL RETURNING TO AN ECONOMIC PROGRAM THAT WINS IMF SUPPORT AND RESTORES THE CONFIDENCE OF FOREIGN INVESTORS.

I DO NOT HAVE A PRECONCEIVED PLAN FOR G-7 ACTION, BUT I DO THINK IT WOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO TAKE STOCK OF WHAT WE HAVE DONE SO FAR WITH REGARD TO MARKET ACCESS AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, AS WELL AS TO REVIEW THE PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS OF THESE NEW DEMOCRACIES. PERHAPS WE CAN ALSO GENERATE MORE SUPPORT FROM THOSE WHO HAVE NOT BEEN AS ENGAGED AS GERMANY AND THE U.S. AS CHAIRMAN, YOU MAY HAVE SOME OTHER IDEAS ABOUT THE NEXT STEPS THAT ARE NEEDED FOR A SUCCESSFUL TRANSFORMATION IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE. WE MIGHT ALSO ADD THIS TO OUR AGENDA FOR CAMP DAVID.

BARBARA JOINS ME IN SENDING BEST WISHES TO YOU AND ESPECIALLY TO HANNELORE, WHOM WE HOPE IS NOW ON THE MEND.

SINCERELY, GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0216

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Under Secretary Zoellick, with a Copy to Ambassador Simons, from David Gompert [291955Z Feb 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	2/29/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/13/2022

Date Closed: 7/28/2009 FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S Re-review Case #: P-2/P-5 Review Case #: AR Case #: AR Disposition: AR Disposition Date:	OA/ID Number: 91152-008 Appeal Case #: Appeal Disposition: Disposition Date: MR Case #: 2010-0639-MR(512) MR Disposition: Released in Part MR Disposition Date: 9/18/2015
---	--

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: GANTT HOWE HUTCHINGS COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT: PRIVACY[^]OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 291955Z FEB 92

FM WHITE HOUSE

1.4(c)

NIACT//

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER AT EARLIEST WAKING HOUR TO UNDER SECRETARY
ZOELLICK, WITH A COPY TO AMBASSADOR SIMONS, FROM DAVID GOMPERT.

BEGIN TEXT:

BOB:

YOU WILL SEE THAT WE HAVE A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO WALES, SUPPLEMENTED BY A FRONT-CHANNEL CABLE, TO STRENGTHEN YOUR LEVERAGE AND YOUR ARGUMENTS WITH THE POLES. I WANT TO ADD SOME PERSONAL THOUGHTS. DO WITH THEM WHAT YOU WANT.

THE POLES, AS WELL AS SOME OF OUR OWN ANALYSTS, ARE TRYING TO DOWNPLAY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEPARTURE OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT FROM THE AGGRESSIVE REFORM STRATEGY -- BY OFFERING REASSURING WORDS, BY EUPHEMISTICALLY CHARACTERIZING THE "CORRECTIVES" AS A KIND OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, AND/OR BY SAYING THAT POLITICAL CONDITIONS LEAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO SLOW DOWN TO A MORE MEASURED PACE. WHILE I WOULD NOT CATEGORICALLY REJECT SUCH AN ANALYSIS, NOR JUDGE EVERY ASPECT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY AS ANTI-REFORM, I BELIEVE THAT THE POLES ARE AT A WATERSHED. ONCE THEY START DOWN THE PATH OF EASING PAIN AND ACCOMMODATING UNCOMPETITIVE SEGMENTS -- WITH EASIER MONEY, LARGER DEFICITS, SLOW-DOWN IN EXPOSING OLD ENTERPRISES TO THE MARKETPLACE, ETC. -- THE NEXT STEP DOWN THAT PATH WILL ALWAYS SEEM EASIER FOR THEM

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MM 9/18/2015

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

THAN THE FIRST STEP BACK IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. AS THEY HEAD DOWN THE SLOPE, WE WILL SEE ACCELERATING INFLATION (AND MONEY-PRINTING), AN INCREASED REAL COST OF CAPITAL, GREATER HESITATION ON THE PART OF FOREIGN INVESTORS, AND EVENTUALLY TROUBLE WITH CREDITORS. THE LARGER GOALS OF COMPETITIVENESS AND INTEGRATION IN THE "WESTERN" ECONOMY, IN ANY MEANINGFUL SENSE, WILL RECEDE.

OF COURSE, EXPLAINING THE FOLLY IN PURELY ECONOMIC TERMS DOES NOT ANSWER THE QUESTION: HOW CAN WE PROCEED IN THE FACE OF GROWING POPULAR RESISTANCE AND POTENTIAL SOCIO-POLITICAL TURMOIL? THE LEADERS OF REFORM ARE NOW ALL OUT OF POWER -- IN LARGE PART BECAUSE REFORM IS SO UNPOPULAR. AND WALESIA, WHO HAS IN THE PAST PROVIDED CLOSE IN SUPPORT FOR THE REFORMERS, IS SILENT (EXCEPT FOR LASHING OUT AGAINST THE WEST). IN SHORT, WHILE SHOWING UNDERSTANDING FOR THEIR PREDICAMENT, WE OWE THEM (AND OURSELVES) AN UNVARNISHED MESSAGE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF RETREAT FROM REFORM.

A RELATED PROBLEM, OF COURSE, IS AMBIVALENCE ABOUT FOREIGN INVESTMENT. AS THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER SAYS, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IS NOT PART OF THE PROBLEM BUT PART OF THE SOLUTION. BUT WALESIA SEEMS TO VIEW INVESTMENT AS SOMETHING POLAND DESERVES, AS OPPOSED TO SOMETHING POLAND MUST AGGRESSIVELY ATTRACT.

THUS, OUR TWO-PART MESSAGE IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND YOUR VISITS: (A) GET BACK ON THE REFORM TRACK; AND (B) GO ON THE OFFENSIVE TO SECURE INVESTMENT.

THE POLES WILL FIND AT LEAST TWO FAULTS WITH OUR MESSAGE. FIRST, THEY WILL SEE NO NEW AID, E.G., HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEES. THE ANSWER TO THIS, OF COURSE, IS THAT WHAT THEY REALLY NEED IS WHAT COMES WITH INVESTMENT (JOBS, SKILLS, CAPITAL). SECOND, EVEN IF WE COULD CONVINCE THEM THAT GETTING BACK IN GOOD GRACES WITH THE IMF IS IMPORTANT, THEY WILL NOT KNOW HOW TO EXECUTE AN ABOUT-FACE. THE ANSWER TO THIS IS THAT THIS IS PRECISELY WHY WE ARE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

OFFERING ADVISORY ASSISTANCE IN HOW TO GET BACK ON TRACK.

AS FOR THE INVESTMENT "SWAT TEAM" AND STAY-BEHIND OMBUDSMAN, WE ARE COMMITTED TO MAKING THIS APPROACH SUCCESSFUL -- NOT JUST ANOTHER "MISSION" WITH NO FOLLOW-UP. THIS ONE IS FOR REAL: AN INTENSIVE EFFORT TO BREAK THE INVESTMENT LOG-JAM, AND STRONG FOLLOW-UP.

GIVEN THAT YOU ARE BRINGING NO REAL GOODIES, THIS WILL NOT BE AN EASY SELL. WHILE YOU WILL BE IN NO POSITION TO COME ON STRONG, I RECOMMEND AGAINST EXCESSIVE SUBTLETY.

REGARDS,

DAVID

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

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2010-0639-MR
MM 9/18/2015

PRT: GANTI HOWE SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 211038Z FEB 92

FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 211038Z FEB 92 PRIVACY CHANNELS

FROM AMBASSADOR RICHARD B. STONE, COPENHAGEN 002

TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT, IMMEDIATE

1. I RECEIVED LAST NIGHT A COPY OF THE RESPONSE FROM PRIME MINISTER SCHLUETER TO YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 12. THE RESPONSE WAS SENT IN THE FORM OF A LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 17 DIRECTLY TO YOU AT THE WHITE HOUSE. THE TEXT OF THE LETTER FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

THE HONOURABLE

GEORGE BUSH

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: (DEAR GEORGE)

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 12 ON YOUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN CONCERNING A POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR PROTECTION AGAINST LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACKS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH PRESIDENT YELTSIN NOW SEEMS PREPARED TO ADDRESS SECURITY CONCERNS IN A SPIRIT OF PARTNERSHIP IS TRULY REMARKABLE. I FULLY SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE PROLIFERATION OF ADVANCED MISSILE TECHNOLOGY AND MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION POSES A MOST SERIOUS THREAT TO US IN THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD. THIS IS INDEED A PROBLEM WHICH NEEDS URGENT ATTENTION AND SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ALONG MANY AVENUES OF APPROACH.

I, THEREFORE, WELCOME YOUR PROPOSAL TO HOLD CONSULTATIONS IN THE ALLIANCE. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT MY GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO JOIN THE DELIBERATIONS ON THESE IMPORTANT ISSUES.

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

YOURS SINCERELY,

/S/

PAUL SCHLUETER

END TEXT

2. I AM MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER SCHLUETER THIS MORNING
AT WHICH TIME I WILL BE PASSING ON YOUR PERSONAL NOTE TO HIM.

3. WITH WARMEST REGARDS. STONE.

DECL OADR

#0938

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PRIORITY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: ~~HOWE~~ SCOWCROFT FLO
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 201550Z FEB 92

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 201550Z FEB 92 PRIVACY CHANNELS
FROM: AMBASSADOR BARKLEY, ANKARA 966
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE FOR PRESIDENT BUSH
I SAW DEMIREL AT NOON ON FEBRUARY 19 AND PASSED HIM THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT ON CREATING WITH THE RUSSIANS A PROTECTIVE REGIME AGAINST LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACKS. DEMIREL READ THE MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY AND SAID HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH VIA THE NAC IF TURKEY HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS WHICH MAY BE HELPFUL TO OUR EFFORTS. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT A SIMILAR MESSAGE HAD BEEN SENT TO PRESIDENT OZAL IN VIEW OF THE BROAD SCALED IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE. DEMIREL SAID HE HAD BRIEFED OZAL THAT MORNING ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO THE STATES AND IMPLIED HE WAS AWARE THAT WE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH OZAL. HE SAID THAT OZAL STILL SEEMED TO HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY IN ACCEPTING THE FACT THAT HE (OZAL) WAS NO LONGER "IN CHARGE OF EVERYTHING," BUT DEMIREL INDICATED THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT HE COULD MAINTAIN PROPER CONTROL OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY WITHOUT PROVOKING A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS WITH OZAL OVER THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT.

BARKLEY

END OF TEXT

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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2010-0639-MR
MM 9/18/2015

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

Translating Division

LS No. 137481
BL
Italian

The Prime Minister
of the Republic of Italy

Dear George:

I noted with great interest the prospects for collaboration for the purpose of the establishment of a collective defense system against limited ballistic attacks in collaboration with the Russian Republic which you outlined in your letter of February 12.

The Italian side has always been sensitive to the opportuneness of accentuating the largely defensive aspects of the Western strategic order vis-à-vis the clearly offensive ones. I recall in this respect that from the time of the beginning of the Strategic Defense Initiative, President Reagan evoked possible lines of collaboration with the Soviets in that sector, which we viewed with positive attention.

The events of the last two years in Central Europe and in the former Soviet Union have radically changed the framework of the missile threat and increased the risks of proliferation of technologies for the development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile systems in the Third World. It is logical that similar concerns to ours are also felt by the newly

democratic countries, whose perception of their own security needs is becoming ever more like ours. Such a convergence will probably be even more clearly in evidence after the imminent CSCE consultations in Helsinki, which must aim at a cooperative security system extended to all European countries, and in which non-proliferation in the missile sector as well as in that of armaments of mass destruction must figure as a point of first priority on the agenda.

Meanwhile, I look to the initiative of which you gave me advance notice with great hope for a future characterized by consolidated security conditions on the entire European continent.

It will certainly be necessary to resolve a series of important questions of a political and technical character: among them the possibility of extending the joint preventive system to other countries, for instance the Asian republics of the CIS; the determination of which segments of the updated GPALS system can be realized cooperatively, and which will be left to the discretion of the individual participating countries. Such a far-reaching project furthermore presents not indifferent economic implications, on which intensive consultation among the allies will be indispensable before the aspects of the collaboration with former Soviet and Eastern European countries can be put in place.

While assuring you of the support of the Italian government for the initiative, I want to inform you that instructions have already been issued to Italy's permanent representative with NATO to take a position along the lines of this letter of mine

in the debate which will soon begin on this matter within the alliance.

Best wishes,
Giulio Andreotti

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

19-Feb-1992 23:09 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

(WHSR_ROUTER@WHSR)

SUBJECT:

LETTER FROM NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SCOWCROFT

<DIST>

PRT: HILL HOWE SCOWCROFT SITTMANN
SIT: GANTT FILE PRYCE SIT VAX

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<ORIG>

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>

TO AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 6421

<SUBJ>

LETTER FROM NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SCOWCROFT

<TEXT>

BT

UNCLAS STATE 051619

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPDC, VE

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SCOWCROFT

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR SCOWCROFT TO MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY
RANGEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO
RELEASE TEXT OF MESSAGE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF GOV WISHES
TO DO SO. SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW BY POUCH.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

FEBRUARY 18, 1991

DEAR BEATRICE:

IN YOUR LETTER OF JANUARY 23, 1992, YOU ASKED FOR OUR
COOPERATION IN ALLOWING A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT TEAM TO
VISIT OUR FACILITIES AS PART OF A PROJECT DESIGNED TO

MODERNIZE VENEZUELA'S PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONMAKING
PROCESS. I AM DELIGHTED TO OFFER YOU APPROPRIATE
ASSISTANCE IN THIS REGARD. WHEN YOUR TEAM IS READY TO
VISIT OUR FACILITIES, PLEASE HAVE YOUR EMBASSY IN
WASHINGTON CONTACT BILL PRYCE, WHO WILL MAKE THE NECESSARY
ARRANGEMENTS.

WE WERE ALL DISMAYED TO HEAR THE NEWS TUESDAY MORNING
(FEBRUARY 4) OF AN ATTEMPTED COUP IN VENEZUELA, BUT
DELIGHTED THAT THINGS TURNED OUT WELL. THE PRESIDENT
CALLED PRESIDENT PEREZ TWICE, AS YOU KNOW, TO EXPRESS OUR
CONCERN AND ASSURE HIM OF OUR COMPLETE SUPPORT FOR HIM AND
FOR THE LEGITIMATE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN VENEZUELA
AND THEN TO EXPRESS OUR RELIEF. PLEASE ASSURE PRESIDENT
PEREZ HE HAS OUR CONTINUING SUPPORT DURING THE DIFFICULT
DAYS AHEAD.

SINCERELY,
BRENT SCOWCROFT
BEATRICE RANGEL MANTILLA
MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY
REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA
CARACAS
END TEXT.

BAKER

BT
#1619

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 01

<SSN>

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<TOR>

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17. Cable	From White House, Re: Message from President Bush to Prime Minister Demirel [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By mm on 7/13/21

Date Closed:	7/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-0640-MR(517)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/30/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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WHITE HOUSE

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~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02

1.4(c)

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR BARKLEY
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
TO PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL. AMBASSADOR SHOULD ALSO MAKE
IT KNOWN TO DEMIREL'S OFFICE THAT BECAUSE OF THE
IMPORTANCE THAT THE PRESIDENT ATTACHES TO THIS SUBJECT,
PRESIDENT OZAL HAS RECEIVED A SIMILAR LETTER.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR SULEYMAN:

I HOPE THAT THE REST OF YOUR VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES
WAS AS PRODUCTIVE AS OUR MEETING. I AM WRITING TO YOU
NOW ON A MATTER OF GREAT POTENTIAL VALUE FOR
THE SECURITY OF OUR NATIONS, OUR ALLIANCE, AND EVEN THE
WORLD, AND I WANTED TO AWAIT YOUR RETURN TO TURKEY
TO RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH YOU. I
AM ALSO SENDING SIMILAR LETTERS TO OTHER KEY
ALLIES. AS A RESULT OF THE FRESH THINKING OF THE NEW
RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP, WE MAY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN
CREATING A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR PROTECTION
AGAINST LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACKS. SUCH A REGIME
WOULD ENABLE US TO DEFEND AGAINST A RANGE OF NEW BALLISTIC
MISSILE THREATS WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE CREDIBILITY OF LONG
STANDING DETERRENT FORCES. ONE OF THE CORNERSTONES OF THIS
COOPERATIVE EFFORT COULD BE THE ALLIANCE, WITH ITS PROVEN
PRINCIPLE OF INDIVISIBLE SECURITY AND SUCCESSFUL PRACTICE OF
STRATEGIC COOPERATION. OUR PRINCIPAL PARTNER COULD BE
RUSSIA ITSELF, THANKS TO THE OPENING PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAS
NOW OFFERED.

AT CAMP DAVID, PRESIDENT YELTSIN INDICATED CLEAR INTEREST
IN A COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO GLOBAL MISSILE DEFENSE.
JIM BAKER IS ON HIS WAY BACK FROM RUSSIA AND OTHER
NEW INDEPENDENT STATES WHERE HE PURSUED OUR COMMON
AGENDA, INCLUDING THE REDUCTION AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE, AND OUR READINESS TO BRING
THESE SOCIETIES INTO OUR COMMUNITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND VALUES.
IN MOSCOW, JIM ALSO EXPLORED THE IDEA THAT WAS RAISED AT
CAMP DAVID IN ORDER TO SEIZE, IF POSSIBLE, THIS OPPORTUNITY
TO BEGIN LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR A COOPERATIVE
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH.

AMERICAN OFFICIALS AND EXPERTS HAVE BRIEFED THEIR ALLIED
COUNTERPARTS OVER THE PAST YEAR ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR WHAT
WE CALL GPALS (GLOBAL PROTECTION AGAINST LIMITED STRIKES).
NOW I WANT TO EXPLAIN TO YOU PERSONALLY WHY I BELIEVE THIS
IS SUCH AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY.

THE GOAL OF EFFECTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST LIMITED BALLISTIC
MISSILE ATTACKS HAS BECOME BOTH MORE COMPELLING AND MORE
FEASIBLE. DESPITE OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO IMPEDE
PROLIFERATION, WE ARE EXPERIENCING A STEADY SPREAD OF THE



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2010-0640-MR
MM 4/30/2015

TECHNOLOGY OF BOTH BALLISTIC MISSILES AND DEVICES OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND TERROR. THE MOST VIVID EXAMPLE OF THIS PERIL IS IRAQ -- BEFORE, DURING, AND SINCE THE GULF WAR. BUT THE NUMBER OF CASES WHERE DANGEROUS REGIMES MIGHT COME TO POSSESS DANGEROUS WEAPONS IS GROWING. WE CANNOT LEAVE OUR SOCIETIES EXPOSED TO THREATS WE CANNOT BE SURE OF DETERRING.

AT THE SAME TIME, TWO DEVELOPMENTS HAVE MADE IT POSSIBLE TO CREATE THE MEANS OF PROTECTION, AND TO DO SO ON A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL BASIS. WE HAVE BEEN MAKING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON THE TECHNOLOGIES NEEDED FOR DEFENSE AGAINST LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE STRIKES. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO DEPLOY LIMITED DEFENSES AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES. NOW, PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAS BROUGHT A NEW RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE: A CONCERN, LIKE OURS, ABOUT THE DANGERS CAUSED BY PROLIFERATION, COMBINED WITH A READINESS TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT IN COOPERATION WITH US.

THE IDEA WE NOW WOULD PROPOSE TO EXPLORE WITH OUR ALLIES, WITH RUSSIA, AND POSSIBLY WITH OTHER FRIENDLY NATIONS, IS A STAGED APPROACH TO A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL REGIME, IN WHICH A SHARED EARLY WARNING SYSTEM WOULD BE CREATED, THE POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF TECHNOLOGIES AMONG PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES WOULD BE PURSUED, AND THE PARTICIPANTS WOULD DEVELOP A CONCEPT FOR A GLOBAL BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING AND PROTECTION REGIME. IN ADDITION, THE UNITED STATES IS READY TO DISCUSS HOW, AND THROUGH WHAT FORMS OF COOPERATION, AMERICAN EARLY WARNING AND DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO OUR ALLIES.

ALL OF THIS IS STILL EXPLORATORY, THOUGH THE OPPORTUNITY TO PLAN FIRST STEPS IS VERY REAL, THANKS TO THE NEW POSITIVE ATTITUDE IN MOSCOW. BECAUSE WE SEE ALLIED COOPERATION AS A KEY ELEMENT, AND BECAUSE OUR SECURITY TRULY IS AS INDIVISIBLE TODAY AS IT HAS BEEN FOR OVER FORTY YEARS, WE WANT TO PROCEED ON THIS PATH TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIANCE PARTNERS. WE WILL THEREFORE, OF COURSE, KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED OF WHAT JIM LEARNS IN MOSCOW REGARDING THIS CONCEPT. I SUGGEST WE AND OTHER ALLIES BEGIN SYSTEMATICALLY TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITIES, THE IMPLICATIONS, AND I HOPE A COMMON PLAN. WITH RUSSIA AS A PARTNER IN THIS ENDEAVOR, WE CAN EXERCISE LEADERSHIP AMONG A WIDER COMMUNITY OF TRUSTED FRIENDS.

I THINK THIS IDEA HOLDS GREAT PROMISE. WE WILL NEED TO WORK TOGETHER AT EVERY POINT. I HAVE ASKED JIM BAKER AND DICK CHENEY TO DEVELOP AND OFFER TO THEIR ALLIED COUNTERPARTS A PLAN FOR EARLY CONSULTATION AND LONG-TERM COOPERATION. LET ME ASK YOU IN RETURN TO ENCOURAGE YOUR MINISTERS AND STAFFS TO BEGIN TO EMBARK WITH US ON THE CONSIDERATION OF WHAT COULD PROVE TO BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT DIVIDENDS OF THE ALLIANCE'S POLITICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL SUCCESS.

WE ARE PLANNING EARLY CONSULTATIONS IN THE ALLIANCE, BEGINNING WITH THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 18. I WOULD NATURALLY WELCOME YOUR PERSONAL THOUGHTS AND QUESTIONS AT ANY TIME.

SINCERELY,

.
GEORGE BUSH

.
END TEXT.
DECL: OADR
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
18. Cable	From White House, Re: Message from President Bush to Prime Minister Demirel [190143Z Feb 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	2/19/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/13/2022

Date Closed: 7/28/2009 FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S Re-review Case #: P-2/P-5 Review Case #: AR Case #: AR Disposition: AR Disposition Date:	OA/ID Number: 91152-008 Appeal Case #: Appeal Disposition: Disposition Date: MR Case #: 2010-0640-MR(517) MR Disposition: Released in Part MR Disposition Date: 4/30/2015
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RESTRICTION CODES

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Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER

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PER E.O. 13526

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~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

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SECTION 01 OF 02

1.4(c)

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR BARKLEY

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
TO PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL AT OPENING OF BUSINESS.

AMBASSADOR SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT KNOWN TO DEMIREL'S OFFICE
THAT BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE PRESIDENT ATTACHES
TO THIS SUBJECT, PRESIDENT OZAL HAS RECEIVED A SIMILAR LETTER.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR SULEYMAN:

I HOPE THAT THE REST OF YOUR VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES
WAS AS PRODUCTIVE AS OUR MEETING. I AM WRITING TO YOU
NOW ON A MATTER OF GREAT POTENTIAL VALUE FOR
THE SECURITY OF OUR NATIONS, OUR ALLIANCE, AND EVEN THE
WORLD, AND I WANTED TO AWAIT YOUR RETURN TO TURKEY
TO RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH YOU. I AM ALSO SENDING SIMILAR
LETTERS TO OTHER KEY ALLIES. AS A RESULT OF THE FRESH
THINKING OF THE NEW RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP, WE MAY HAVE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN CREATING A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL
REGIME FOR PROTECTION AGAINST LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACKS.
SUCH A REGIME WOULD ENABLE US TO DEFEND AGAINST A RANGE OF NEW
BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE CREDIBILITY OF

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

LONG STANDING DETERRENT FORCES. ONE OF THE CORNERSTONES OF THIS COOPERATIVE EFFORT COULD BE THE ALLIANCE, WITH ITS PROVEN PRINCIPLE OF INDIVISIBLE SECURITY AND SUCCESSFUL PRACTICE OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION. OUR PRINCIPAL PARTNER COULD BE RUSSIA ITSELF, THANKS TO THE OPENING PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAS NOW OFFERED.

AT CAMP DAVID, PRESIDENT YELTSIN INDICATED CLEAR INTEREST IN A COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO GLOBAL MISSILE DEFENSE. JIM BAKER IS ON HIS WAY BACK FROM RUSSIA AND OTHER NEW INDEPENDENT STATES WHERE HE PURSUED OUR COMMON AGENDA, INCLUDING THE REDUCTION AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE, AND OUR READINESS TO BRING THESE SOCIETIES INTO OUR COMMUNITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND VALUES. IN MOSCOW, JIM ALSO EXPLORED THE IDEA THAT WAS RAISED AT CAMP DAVID IN ORDER TO SEIZE, IF POSSIBLE, THIS OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH.

AMERICAN OFFICIALS AND EXPERTS HAVE BRIEFED THEIR ALLIED COUNTERPARTS OVER THE PAST YEAR ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR WHAT WE CALL GPALS (GLOBAL PROTECTION AGAINST LIMITED STRIKES). NOW I WANT TO EXPLAIN TO YOU PERSONALLY WHY I BELIEVE THIS IS SUCH AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY.

THE GOAL OF EFFECTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACKS HAS BECOME BOTH MORE COMPELLING AND MORE FEASIBLE. DESPITE OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO IMPEDE PROLIFERATION, WE ARE EXPERIENCING A STEADY SPREAD OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF BOTH BALLISTIC MISSILES AND DEVICES OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND TERROR. THE MOST VIVID EXAMPLE OF THIS PERIL IS IRAQ -- BEFORE, DURING, AND SINCE THE GULF WAR. BUT THE NUMBER OF CASES WHERE DANGEROUS REGIMES MIGHT COME TO POSSESS DANGEROUS WEAPONS IS GROWING. WE CANNOT LEAVE OUR SOCIETIES EXPOSED TO THREATS WE CANNOT BE SURE OF

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

DETECTING.

AT THE SAME TIME, TWO DEVELOPMENTS HAVE MADE IT POSSIBLE TO CREATE THE MEANS OF PROTECTION, AND TO DO SO ON A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL BASIS. WE HAVE BEEN MAKING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON THE TECHNOLOGIES NEEDED FOR DEFENSE AGAINST LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE STRIKES. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO DEPLOY LIMITED DEFENSES AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES. NOW, PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAS BROUGHT A NEW RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE: A CONCERN, LIKE OURS, ABOUT THE DANGERS CAUSED BY PROLIFERATION, COMBINED WITH A READINESS TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT IN COOPERATION WITH US.

THE IDEA WE NOW WOULD PROPOSE TO EXPLORE WITH OUR ALLIES, WITH RUSSIA, AND POSSIBLY WITH OTHER FRIENDLY NATIONS, IS A STAGED APPROACH TO A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL REGIME, IN WHICH A SHARED EARLY WARNING SYSTEM WOULD BE CREATED, THE POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF TECHNOLOGIES AMONG PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES WOULD BE PURSUED, AND THE PARTICIPANTS WOULD DEVELOP A CONCEPT FOR A GLOBAL BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING AND PROTECTION REGIME. IN ADDITION, THE UNITED STATES IS READY TO DISCUSS HOW, AND THROUGH WHAT FORMS OF COOPERATION, AMERICAN EARLY WARNING AND DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO OUR ALLIES.

ALL OF THIS IS STILL EXPLORATORY, THOUGH THE OPPORTUNITY TO PLAN FIRST STEPS IS VERY REAL, THANKS TO THE NEW POSITIVE ATTITUDE IN MOSCOW. BECAUSE WE SEE ALLIED COOPERATION AS A KEY ELEMENT, AND BECAUSE OUR SECURITY TRULY IS AS INDIVISIBLE TODAY AS IT HAS BEEN FOR OVER FORTY YEARS, WE WANT TO PROCEED ON THIS PATH TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIANCE PARTNERS. WE WILL THEREFORE, OF COURSE, KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED OF WHAT JIM LEARNS IN MOSCOW REGARDING THIS CONCEPT. I SUGGEST WE AND OTHER ALLIES BEGIN SYSTEMATICALLY TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITIES, THE IMPLICATIONS, AND I HOPE A COMMON PLAN. WITH RUSSIA AS A

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

PARTNER IN THIS ENDEAVOR, WE CAN EXERCISE LEADERSHIP AMONG A WIDER COMMUNITY OF TRUSTED FRIENDS.

I THINK THIS IDEA HOLDS GREAT PROMISE. WE WILL NEED TO WORK TOGETHER AT EVERY POINT. I HAVE ASKED JIM BAKER AND DICK CHENEY TO DEVELOP AND OFFER TO THEIR ALLIED COUNTERPARTS A PLAN FOR EARLY CONSULTATION AND LONG-TERM COOPERATION. LET

#0174

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

WE ASK YOU IN RETURN TO ENCOURAGE YOUR MINISTERS AND STAFFS TO BEGIN TO EMBARK WITH US ON THE CONSIDERATION OF WHAT COULD PROVE TO BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT DIVIDENDS OF THE ALLIANCE'S POLITICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL SUCCESS.

WE ARE PLANNING EARLY CONSULTATIONS IN THE ALLIANCE, BEGINNING WITH THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 18. I WOULD NATURALLY WELCOME YOUR PERSONAL THOUGHTS AND QUESTIONS AT ANY TIME.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

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FM CANBERRA

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 180718Z FEB 92 PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FROM CHARGE CANBERRA

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR THE PRESIDENT IMMEDIATE
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

FURTHER TO REF. STATUS OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S COMMUNICATION OF
12 FEBRUARY 1992 TO PRIME MINISTER KEATING, EMBASSY WAS
PROVIDED A COPY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER OF REPLY WHICH
WE UNDERSTAND WAS TO HAVE BEEN DELIVERED ON 14 FEBRUARY TO THE
WHITE HOUSE BY THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. PLEASE
ADVISE WHETHER COPIES OF THE AUSTRALIAN RESPONSE WILL BE
PROVIDED TO STATE AND DEFENSE OR WHETHER THE EMBASSY SHOULD
RETRANSMIT THE TEXT OF THE REPLY TO THESE DEPARTMENTS.

#0850

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0640-MR
MM 4/30/2015

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VIA BACK CHANNEL

UNCLASSIFIED

February 14, 1992



FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMBASSADOR ROBERT STRAUSS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

Dear Bob:

Apropos your phone call yesterday, here is some material
from the Vice President's office.

Warm regards,

Brent

(Copy text of attachments)



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

February 14, 1992

To the Editor:

I was pleased to read that Vice President Quayle had convinced Jim Hoagland that U.S. support for a currency stabilization fund in Russia would be effective only if appropriate fiscal and monetary reforms were taken.

However, in his February 11 column "Little Help for Yeltsin," Mr. Hoagland drew an erroneous inference of non-support from his conversation with the Vice President. Mr. Quayle made the point that the U.S. is committed to supporting Mr. Yeltsin because "that's good for Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Europe, and the United States." In fact, Mr. Quayle stressed that democracy itself in Russia might be jeopardized if Mr. Yeltsin failed.

Mr. Hoagland's overall conclusion that the Bush Administration is uninterested in helping the Russian government is simply incorrect. Secretary Baker convened a 47-nation Coordinating Conference on assistance to the C.I.S. on January 22-23. On February 10, the U.S. began to airlift 4.5 million pounds of food and medical supplies. In all, the U.S. government is providing more than \$5 billion in expenditures and credits this year to the former Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Karl D. Jackson".

Karl D. Jackson
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

**VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE
PRESS ROUNDTABLE
MUNICH, GERMANY**

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1992

[Verbatim extract of the relevant portions of the press roundtable.]

Q. How do you answer Europeans who say that the United States should be paying more for the reconstruction of Eastern Europe and should be more involved in the reconstruction of the former Soviet Union than it has?

A. It's one that we have been very involved in. In the reconstruction of eastern and central Europe, we are involved in trying to help Boris Yeltsin, Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union. So often this is quantified as to how much money you want to spend. You break it down among other contributions and there are obviously large other contributions for Russian troops going home, especially German. We are back absorbing a lot of costs ourselves as we begin to ratchet down our numbers, this is not a free situation; it's quite costly to transfer our troops or to relocate our troops, as well. Perhaps they are not quite as costly, but this is certainly a major factor. We have direct assistance; we have enterprise funds. We have, as far as the Soviet Union, an additional \$400 million to deal with scientists, nuclear weapons, especially with tactical nuclear weapons. There are negotiations going on with Russia and our people on what a stabilization plan should or should not look like. So I'd say we're heavily involved. The effort of involvement should not be described only by the total amount of contributions. There are other ways one can make contributions to reform and to get Russia back up on its feet.

We'd like to have an economy in Russia that is growing. There's another problem with the Baltic nations. Some of its food is not getting out as quickly as possible, and then you get beyond food and any of the other goods that they produce or they produced for the Russian market. Well, producing goods for the Russian market is simply not going to be as competitive as producing goods for the German market or the American market. They can't compete on quality and they can't compete on price. They've been used to a guaranteed market and this is a great shift.

They (the Baltic nations) are interested in joining and becoming part of the European family. We'll be talking to those in Europe, I'm sure, about this. There was the idea to talk about back and forth if that didn't work out; perhaps they (the Baltic countries) should look to establish a free trade zone, or have a free trade agreement with the

United States. The model would be the way we do it with Israel. There is a very strong Baltic community in the United States. This is clearly at the idea stage; they haven't even decided if that is a good idea to make that suggestion to us.

Q. If I could follow-up sir? To what extent, if any, is the Administration policy in this area inhibited by the fact that the United States itself is in recession? And to put a fine point on it, it is an election year. In other words if the economy were stronger and perhaps if you didn't have to stand for reelection would you be doing things now that politically make it difficult to do?

A. I don't think so. I'm one of those people who have a little different view point of what foreign policy and national defense does for electing the President of the United States. I know what we call conventional wisdom (CW) in especially the political world to some extent and I know in the media, that the President just has to spend 95 percent of his time on domestic matters. And right now he's spending a lot on domestic matters, much more than he is on foreign policy matters. But he hasn't neglected foreign policy matters. Notice that even a couple of days after his State of the Union address, he fulfilled his responsibility to go to the UN to meet with various leaders. He had Boris Yeltsin at Camp David.

When the American people vote for a President, they vote for leadership. One of the requirements of being able to lead a country is to have an understanding of foreign policy. So, therefore, I don't think there would be any significant change of what we would do election year versus a non-election year.

I did notice in Secretary Baker's testimony on the Hill, there was bipartisan support for the recent amount of money that we have asked for helping the Soviet Union.

Now, on the other side, which was widely reported, there was some criticism. "How can you come up here and ask for this amount of money when there are homeless here in the United States, unemployment is staying the same, at too high a level, it may be even going up. How many times do we have to tell you to focus on domestic problems?" And his response says "Look, you know we have a foreign policy agenda, as well. We are an international power. We are the only superpower remaining. We want to maintain our engaged policies in Europe and in Asia, and when you have a policy that's constructive and provides peace, you're going to have to pay for it."

Furthermore, he pointed out that this is an historic opportunity to try to help Russia along. Who knows what is going to happen to Russia. We hope that reforms are adopted. We hope democracy is maintained. We were talking about this earlier today. We knew who was behind Gorbachev: Yeltsin. But who are the competing forces behind Boris Yeltsin? I'd say that there the picture is less clear. Boris Yeltsin is certainly committed to a reform agenda and a reform package and the road to reform. That's good for Russia, the Russian people. It's good for the Commonwealth of Independent States. It's good for Europe. It's good for the United States.

- Q.** Are you trying to imply that the fact that you don't know who's behind some of these figures is in any putting a brake on your desire, or otherwise to help more, is there uncertainty in your mind and is therefore the willingness to commit more funds or resources and has that to do with the fact that this seems to be a transitory set of leaders and you're not sure as it were who you're committing yourself to then?
- A.** Well, what you want to do is to help those who are willing to help themselves, and by helping themselves, help us. Boris Yeltsin is certainly in that category. What he wants to do economically, politically, even militarily are in his interests and they are in our interests. Therefore, when you have this opportunity, you ought to work with him so he can be successful.
- Q.** You're not particularly holding back aid or anything like that because you don't know if those leaders now in power are going to last?
- A.** Oh the meeting between Yeltsin and President Bush was very good. The read-out was not only that they are friends, but there is a policy based on trust. The press conference that they had afterward was a very warm press conference -- one where you can see a genuine relationship beginning to develop, and a commitment on our part to work with Boris Yeltsin and to try to help him in these very difficult times.
- Q.** Could you expand a little bit on the stabilization fund and the Administration's attitude towards it. Yeltsin has repeatedly identified this as an urgent priority. Up to now, our public statements have not supported that sense of urgency.
- A.** I think where we would probably disagree is, if just creating the stabilization fund today is going to solve, satisfy or take care of the economic problems that Russia

has. This is a block-building type of approach that many of the reforms that you adopt affects the way that you are going to deal with the ruble, and how the economy is going to expand.

What you want to do is sort of along the lines of the Polish model that you have the reforms take place, you build up toward a stabilization fund, you finally get a stabilization fund, but then you don't have to use the stabilization fund. It's there to provide stability to your currency, and the same type of approach has to happen in Russia. I think there is this viewpoint that it's a panacea, that if you just create a stabilization fund, announce a stabilization fund that all is well.

Well, they have to deal with far more fundamental, difficult political issues like how far are they going to go on privatization? How far are they going to go in allowing their businesses to operate in the market without state control? How far are they willing to go to real decentralization? These are fundamental questions that have to be answered along the way to creating the stabilization fund. But their people and our Treasury people were instructed after the Camp David meeting to continue their talks. They're talking, as far as I know even as of today, on how this will come about. So I'd say there's more serious talk about it. But please understand that you build blocks underneath, you have to build the foundation that would create a stabilization fund. It's not necessarily from the top down.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: GANTT HOWE PRESIDENT SCOWCROFT
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2010-0640-MR
MM 4/30/2015

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DEPARTMENT FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY

E.G. 12356: DECL: ODR

TAGS: OVIP BAKER, JAMES A., III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR PHE PRESIDENT: FEBRUARY 16,
1992

1. ~~SECRET~~ (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. TODAY I FINISHED MY ROUND OF THE REE CENTRAL ASIAN
REPUBLICS (TURKMENISTAN, TAJIKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN)
WHOSE INDEPENDENCE WE HAVE RECOGNIZED ALONG WITH THE
OTHER REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION BUT WITH
WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

3. ON FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15 WHEN ALL THE LEADERS OF THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION WERE MEETING IN MINSK, I VISITED THE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN LABORATORY CHELYABINSK 70, WHICH
IS EQUIVALENT TO OUR LABS AT LOS ALAMOS AND LIVERMORE.
THE FACT OF MY VISIT WAS A HISTORIC EVENT BY ANY
STANDARD, AND REFLECTS THE EXTRAORDINARY CHANGES
UNDERWAY IN THIS COUNTRY. THE SCIENTISTS THERE, ONE OF
THE REAL ELITES OF THE FORMER FORMER SOVIET UNION, ARE
CLEARLY FACING HARD TIMES AS THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN
BUSINESS HERE, FORTUNATELY, GOES SOUTH. THE SCIENTIST
AND ENGINEER THERE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN COOPERATIVE
PROJECTS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER WESTERN
COUNTRIES. TOMORROW IN MOSCOW WE WILL BE ANNOUNCING

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

WITH THE USSIANS THE INITIATIVE TO ESTABLISH A SCIENTIFIC CE"TR IN RUSSIA THAT CAN SERVE AS THE CLEARING HOUSE AND MANAGER OF PROPOSALS TO PUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERKENCE OF THERE PEOPLE TO PECUFULØ AND CHALLENGING USE. THE GERMANS WILL BE MAKING A SEPARATE ANNOUNCEMELT IN BONN. THIS FOLLOWS UP ON THE PROPOSAL YELTSIN MADE AT CAMP DAVID WITH WHICH YOU AGREED.

4. AS FAR AS THE CENTRAL ASIANS ARE CONCERNED, I FOUND IN ALL THREE CAPITALS A GREAT INTEREST IN DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, IMPARATIVE AN (ELEMNT OF SUPPORT FOR THEIR SOVERIGNLY AND INDEPENDENCE. WHILE THESE GOVERNMENTS ALL HAVE A WAY TO GO IN THEIR AFFORTS TO ESTABLISH DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS AND ESTABLISH MARKET BASED ECONOMIES, THE WILL TO MAKE THE EFFORT SEEMS PRESENT EVERYWHERE AND IS DESERVING OF OUR SUPPORT. I BELIEVE VE SHOULD MOVE AHEAD ON DIPLOMATIC RECONDITION OF THESE THREE REPUBLICS, MOLDOVA AND AZERBAIJAN SHORTLY AFTER MY RETURN. THERE ARE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. BUSINESSMEN IN THESE NEW COUNTRIES WHICH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WILL ENHANCE. IF WE ARE ON THE GROUND HERE WITH OUR EMBASSIS, WE CAN INFUENCE THE ROCESS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, A POINT

VERY HELPFULLY MADE AT A JOINT PRESS MEETING TODAY BY ONE OF THD UZBEK OPPOSITION LEADERS WITH WHOM I MET.

5. THESE LEADERS WANT TO BE ACCEPTED BY THE UNITED STATES. I WENT OVER UZBEK PRESIDENT KARIMOV PRETTY HARD AT OUR MEETING ON FREEDOM FOR OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES, AND HE TOLD ME THAT IN RESPONSE HE WILL LIGHTEN UP ON THEM.

6. ALL OF THE GOVERNMENTS HERE FELL THREATENED BY THE EFFORTS OF THE IRANIANS TO ENCOURAGE THE GROWTH OF TBEOR FUNDAMENTALIST APPROACH IN CENTRAL ASIA. THE TURKS ARE SEEN AS THE PREFERRED MODEL, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTEP CUTHN WILL BE MAKING A SWING

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

THROUGH THIS REGION SIMILAR TO MINE NEXT WEEK. SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD WILL BE THERE AT ABOUT THE SOME TIME, AND THE COMBINATION OF TURKISH CONTACTS, UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGY AND SAUDI MONEY COULD BE A POTENT ONE. HIS FLOOD OF VISITORS INDICATES THAT THIS AREA WILL BE ONE OF THE FOCAL POINTS OF INTERNATIONAL INTEREST AS THESE NEW COUNTRIES BEGIN THEIR INDEPENDENCE EXISTENCE. I THINK IT WAS USEFUL THAT I WAS ABLE TO BE ONE OF THE FIRST TO CALL ON THEM, AND I BELIEVE THAT PROMPT ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WILL SURVIVE OF NATIONAL INTERESTS, BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

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2010-0640-WP
MM 4/30/2015

PRT: HOWE SCOWCROFT
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FM THE HAGUE

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 131613Z FEB 92 PRIVACY CHANNELS

WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM

AMBASSADOR WILKINS TO THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PM LUBBERS ON GPALS:

POSITIVE DUTCH REACTIONS

REF: WHITE HOUSE MSG DTG 120454Z FEB 92

ON FEBRUARY 12 THE EMBASSY DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON GPALS TO DUTCH PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS. LATER IN THE DAY WE RECEIVED SOME INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE LETTER FROM VARIOUS DUTCH OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN SECURITY POLICY. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR FOR ATLANTIC COOPERATION AND SECURITY VAN EENENNAAM INDICATED GROWING SUPPORT IN THE MFA FOR GPALS. HIS OWN DIVISION IS POSITIVE. APPARENTLY THERE IS AN INTERNAL MFA DEBATE WHICH VAN EENENNAAM SAID IS GOING FAVORABLY, WITH MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR VAN WALSUM DEMONSTRATING BACKING FOR GPALS. VAN EENENNAAM SAID HIS DIVISION HAD BEEN SEEKING A VEHICLE FOR A MEMO TO VAN DEN BROEK TO SEEK HIS SUPPORT FOR GPALS, AND THEY WILL USE THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AS A BASIS FOR THAT. VAN EENENNAAM EXPECTED THE GON WOULD SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL AT THE FEBRUARY 18 NAC.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR FOR GENERAL POLICY AFFAIRS BARTH ALSO RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THE LETTER AND EXPECTED DEFMIN TER BEEK TO DO LIKEWISE. HE REITERATED COMMENTS HE MADE TO A VISITING GPALS BRIEFING TEAM FEBRUARY 11, CONFIRMING THAT THE EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

AND OF THE SDI/GPALS PROGRAM ITSELF HAS ERASED HIS EARLIER SKEPTICISM ABOUT GPALS' UTILITY AND FEASIBILITY. HE FORECAST AN ACTIVE, POSITIVE GON ROLE AT THE FEBRUARY 18 NAC AND ON GPALS GENERALLY. AS THE DUTCH HIGH LEVEL GROUP REPRESENTATIVE, BARTH SUGGESTED THAT THE USG ALSO CONSIDER PUTTING GPALS ONTO THE HLG'S AGENDA.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

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PRT: GANTT HOWE PRESIDENT SCOWCROFT

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DEPARTMENT FOR S AND S/S - EYES ONLY

E.G. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP BAKER, JAMES A., III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: FEBRUARY 16,
1992

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

THROUGH THIS REGION SIMILAR TO MINE NEXT WEEK. SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD WILL BE THERE AT ABOUT THE SOME TIME, AND THE COMBINATION OF TURKISH CONTACTS, UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGY AND SAUDI MONEY COULD BE A POTENT ONE. HIS FLOOD OF VISITORS INDICATES THAT THIS AREA WILL BE ONE OF THE FOCAL POINTS OF INTERNATIONAL INTEREST AS THESE NEW COUNTRIES BEGIN THEIR INDEPENDENCE EXISTENCE. I THINK IT WAS USEFUL THAT I WAS ABLE TO BE ONE OF THE FIRST TO CALL ON THEM, AND I BELIEVE THAT PROMPT ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WILL SURVIVE OF NATIONAL INTERESTS, BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
23a. Cable	Elysee Palace to White House Re: President Mitterrand to President Bush [French] (4 pp.)	2/17/92	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Date Closed: 7/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91152-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
23b. Cable	President Mitterrand to President Bush Re: Unofficial Situation Room Translation (2 pp.)	2/17/92	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Date Closed:	7/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
24. Cable	Cabinet Office London to The White House Re: Message from the Prime Minister to the President of the United States (2 pp.)	2/17/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Date Closed:	7/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
25. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Robert Strauss from Brent Scowcroft [150453Z Feb 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (8 pp.)	2/15/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/13/2022

Date Closed: 7/28/2009 FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S Re-review Case #: P-2/P-5 Review Case #: AR Case #: AR Disposition: AR Disposition Date:	OA/ID Number: 91152-008 Appeal Case #: Appeal Disposition: Disposition Date: MR Case #: 2010-0640-MR(524) MR Disposition: Released in Part MR Disposition Date: 4/30/2015
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RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 08

PRT: GANTT HOWE COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: FILE PRIVACY²OUT SIT SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 150453Z FEB 92

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SECTION 01 OF 03

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THIS MESSAGE IS CLASSIFIED FOR TRANSMISSION PURPOSES ONLY.
THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS UNCLASSIFIED.

-
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR ROBERT STRAUSS
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT.

-
BEGIN TEXT:

FEBRUARY 14, 1992

-
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

-
TO: AMBASSADOR ROBERT STRAUSS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

DEAR BOB:

-
APROPOS YOUR PHONE CALL YESTERDAY, HERE IS SOME MATERIAL
FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE.

-
WARM REGARDS,

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0640-mR
mm 4/30/2015

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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BRENT

(COPY TEXT OF ATTACHMENTS)

TO THE EDITOR:

I WAS PLEASED TO READ THAT VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE HAD CONVINCED JIM HOAGLAND THAT U.S. SUPPORT FOR A CURRENCY STABILIZATION FUND IN RUSSIA WOULD BE EFFECTIVE ONLY IF APPROPRIATE FISCAL AND MONETARY REFORMS WERE TAKEN.

HOWEVER, IN HIS FEBRUARY 11 COLUMN "LITTLE HELP FOR YELTSIN," MR. HOAGLAND DREW AN ERRONEOUS INFERENCE OF NON-SUPPORT FROM HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT. MR. QUAYLE MADE THE POINT THAT THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING MR. YELTSIN BECAUSE "THAT'S GOOD FOR RUSSIA, THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES, EUROPE, AND THE UNITED STATES." IN FACT, MR. QUAYLE STRESSED THAT DEMOCRACY ITSELF IN RUSSIA MIGHT BE JEOPARDIZED IF MR. YELTSIN FAILED.

MR. HOAGLAND'S OVERALL CONCLUSION THAT THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION IS UNINTERESTED IN HELPING THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS SIMPLY INCORRECT. SECRETARY BAKER CONVENED A 47-NATION COORDINATING CONFERENCE ON ASSISTANCE TO THE C. I. S. ON JANUARY 22-23. ON FEBRUARY 10, THE U.S. BEGAN TO AIRLIFT 4.5 MILLION POUNDS OF FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES. IN ALL, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS PROVIDING MORE THAN \$5 BILLION IN EXPENDITURES AND CREDITS THIS YEAR TO THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.

SINCERELY,

KARL D. JACKSON
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE
PRESS ROUNDTABLE
MUNICH, GERMANY

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1992
(VERBATIM EXTRACT OF THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE PRESS
ROUNDTABLE.)

Q. HOW DO YOU ANSWER EUROPEANS WHO SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE PAYING MORE FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EASTERN EUROPE AND SHOULD BE MORE INVOLVED IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION THAN IT HAS?

A. IT'S ONE THAT WE HAVE BEEN VERY INVOLVED IN. IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE, WE ARE INVOLVED IN TRYING TO HELP BORIS YELTSIN, RUSSIA AND THE OTHER REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. SO OFTEN THIS IS QUANTIFIED AS TO HOW MUCH MONEY YOU WANT TO SPEND. YOU BREAK IT DOWN AMONG OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS AND THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY LARGE OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS FOR RUSSIAN TROOPS GOING HOME, ESPECIALLY GERMAN. WE ARE BACK ABSORBING A LOT OF COSTS OURSELVES AS WE BEGIN TO RACHET DOWN OUR NUMBERS, THIS IS NOT A FREE SITUATION; IT'S QUITE COSTLY TO TRANSFER OUR TROOPS OR TO RELOCATE OUR TROOPS, AS WELL. PERHAPS THEY ARE NOT QUITE AS COSTLY, BUT THIS IS CERTAINLY A MAJOR FACTOR. WE HAVE DIRECT ASSISTANCE; WE HAVE ENTERPRISE FUNDS. WE HAVE, AS FAR AS THE SOVIET UNION, AN ADDITIONAL \$400 MILLION TO DEAL WITH SCIENTISTS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ESPECIALLY WITH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THERE ARE NEGOTIATIONS GOING ON WITH RUSSIA AND OUR PEOPLE ON WHAT A STABILIZATION PLAN SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT LOOK LIKE. SO I'D SAY WE'RE HEAVILY INVOLVED. THE EFFORT OF INVOLVEMENT SHOULD NOT BE DESCRIBED ONLY BY THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF CONTRIBUTIONS. THERE ARE OTHER

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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WAYS ONE CAN MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS TO REFORM AND TO GET RUSSIA BACK UP ON ITS FEET.

WE'D LIKE TO HAVE AN ECONOMY IN RUSSIA THAT IS GROWING. THERE'S ANOTHER PROBLEM WITH THE BALTIC NATIONS. SOME OF ITS FOOD IS NOT GETTING OUT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, AND THEN YOU GET BEYOND FOOD AND ANY OF THE OTHER GOODS THAT THEY PRODUCE OR THEY PRODUCED FOR THE RUSSIAN MARKET. WELL, PRODUCING GOODS FOR THE RUSSIAN MARKET IS SIMPLY NOT GOING TO BE AS COMPETITIVE AS PRODUCING GOODS FOR THE GERMAN MARKET OR THE AMERICAN MARKET. THEY CAN'T COMPETE ON QUALITY AND THEY CAN'T COMPETE ON PRICE. THEY'VE BEEN USED TO A GUARANTEED

MARKET AND THIS IS A GREAT SHIFT.

THEY (THE BALTIC NATIONS) ARE INTERESTED IN JOINING AND BECOMING PART OF THE EUROPEAN FAMILY. WE'LL BE TALKING TO THOSE IN EUROPE, I'M SURE, ABOUT THIS. THERE WAS THE IDEA TO TALK ABOUT BACK AND FORTH IF THAT DIDN'T WORK OUT; PERHAPS THEY (THE BALTIC COUNTRIES) SHOULD LOOK TO ESTABLISH A FREE TRADE ZONE, OR HAVE A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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SECTION 02 OF 03

UNITED STATES. THE MODEL WOULD BE THE WAY WE DO IT WITH ISRAEL. THERE IS A VERY STRONG BALTIC COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS CLEARLY AT THE IDEA STAGE; THEY HAVEN'T EVEN DECIDED IF THAT IS A GOOD IDEA TO MAKE THAT SUGGESTION TO US.

Q. IF I COULD FOLLOW-UP SIR? TO WHAT EXTENT, IF ANY, IS THE ADMINISTRATION POLICY IN THIS AREA INHIBITED BY THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES ITSELF IS IN RECESSION? AND TO PUT A

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FINE POINT ON IT, IT IS AN ELECTION YEAR. IN OTHER WORDS IF THE ECONOMY WERE STRONGER AND PERHAPS IF YOU DIDN'T HAVE TO STAND FOR REELECTION WOULD YOU BE DOING THINGS NOW THAT POLITICALLY MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO DO?

A. I DON'T THINK SO. I'M ONE OF THOSE PEOPLE WHO HAVE A LITTLE DIFFERENT VIEW POINT OF WHAT FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE DOES FOR ELECTING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. I KNOW WHAT WE CALL CONVENTIONAL WISDOM (CW) IN ESPECIALLY THE POLITICAL WORLD TO SOME EXTENT AND I KNOW IN THE MEDIA, THAT THE PRESIDENT JUST HAS TO SPEND 95 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON DOMESTIC MATTERS. AND RIGHT NOW HE'S SPENDING A LOT ON DOMESTIC MATTERS, MUCH MORE THAN HE IS ON FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS. BUT HE HASN'T NEGLECTED FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS. NOTICE THAT EVEN A COUPLE OF DAYS AFTER HIS STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS, HE FULFILLED HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO GO TO THE UN TO MEET WITH VARIOUS LEADERS. HE HAD BORIS YELTSIN AT CAMP DAVID.

WHEN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE VOTE FOR A PRESIDENT, THEY VOTE FOR LEADERSHIP. ONE OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF BEING ABLE TO LEAD A COUNTRY IS TO HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF FOREIGN POLICY. SO, THEREFORE, I DON'T THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OF WHAT WE WOULD DO ELECTION YEAR VERSUS A NON-ELECTION YEAR.

I DID NOTICE IN SECRETARY BAKER'S TESTIMONY ON THE HILL, THERE WAS BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR THE RECENT AMOUNT OF MONEY THAT WE HAVE ASKED FOR HELPING THE SOVIET UNION.

NOW, ON THE OTHER SIDE, WHICH WAS WIDELY REPORTED, THERE WAS SOME CRITICISM. "HOW CAN YOU COME UP HERE AND ASK FOR THIS AMOUNT OF MONEY WHEN THERE ARE HOMELESS HERE IN THE UNITED STATES, UNEMPLOYMENT IS STAYING THE SAME, AT TOO HIGH A LEVEL, IT MAY BE EVEN GOING UP. HOW MANY TIMES DO WE HAVE TO TELL YOU TO FOCUS ON DOMESTIC PROBLEMS?" AND HIS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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RESPONSE SAYS "LOOK, YOU KNOW WE HAVE A FOREIGN POLICY

AGENDA, AS WELL. WE ARE AN INTERNATIONAL POWER. WE ARE THE ONLY SUPERPOWER REMAINING. WE WANT TO MAINTAIN OUR ENGAGED POLICIES IN EUROPE AND IN ASIA. AND WHEN YOU HAVE A POLICY THAT'S CONSTRUCTIVE AND PROVIDES PEACE, YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE TO PAY FOR IT."

FURTHERMORE, HE POINTED OUT THAT THIS IS AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO HELP RUSSIA ALONG. WHO KNOWS WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN TO RUSSIA. WE HOPE THAT REFORMS ARE ADOPTED.

WE HOPE DEMOCRACY IS MAINTAINED. WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THIS EARLIER TODAY. WE KNEW WHO WAS BEHIND GORBACHEV: YELTSIN. BUT WHO ARE THE COMPETING FORCES BEHIND BORIS YELTSIN? I'D SAY THAT THERE THE PICTURE IS LESS CLEAR. BORIS YELTSIN IS CERTAINLY COMMITTED TO A REFORM AGENDA AND A REFORM PACKAGE AND THE ROAD TO REFORM. THAT'S GOOD FOR RUSSIA, THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE. IT'S GOOD FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES. IT IS GOOD FOR EUROPE. IT IS GOOD FOR THE UNITED STATES.

Q. ARE YOU TRYING TO IMPLY THAT THE FACT THAT YOU DON'T KNOW WHO'S BEHIND SOME OF THESE FIGURES IS IN ANY PUTTING A BRAKE ON YOUR DESIRE, OR OTHERWISE TO HELP MORE, IS THERE UNCERTAINTY IN YOUR MIND AND IS THEREFORE THE WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT MORE FUNDS OR RESOURCES AND HAS THAT TO DO WITH THE FACT THAT THIS SEEMS TO BE A TRANSITORY SET OF LEADERS AND YOU'RE NOT SURE AS IT WERE WHO YOU'RE COMMITTING YOURSELF TO THEN?

A. WELL, WHAT YOU WANT TO DO IS TO HELP THOSE WHO ARE WILLING TO HELP THEMSELVES, AND BY HELPING THEMSELVES, HELP US. BORIS YELTSIN IS CERTAINLY IN THAT CATEGORY. WHAT HE WANTS TO DO ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY, EVEN MILITARILY ARE IN HIS INTERESTS AND THEY ARE IN OUR INTERESTS. THEREFORE, WHEN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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YOU HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY, YOU OUGHT TO WORK WITH HIM SO HE CAN BE SUCCESSFUL.

Q. YOU'RE NOT PARTICULARLY HOLDING BACK AID OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT BECAUSE YOU DON'T KNOW IF THOSE LEADERS NOW IN POWER ARE GOING TO LAST?

A. OH THE MEETING BETWEEN YELTSIN, AND PRESIDENT BUSH WAS VERY GOOD. THE READ-OUT WAS NOT ONLY THAT THEY ARE FRIENDS, BUT THERE IS A POLICY BASED ON TRUST. THE PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THEY HAD AFTERWARD WAS A VERY WARM PRESS CONFERENCE -- ONE WHERE YOU CAN SEE A GENUINE RELATIONSHIP BEGINNING TO DEVELOP, AND A COMMITMENT ON OUR PART TO WORK WITH BORIS YELTSIN AND TO TRY TO HELP HIM IN THESE VERY DIFFICULT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

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FINAL SECTION OF 03
TIMES.

Q. COULD YOU EXPAND A LITTLE BIT ON THE STABILIZATION FUND AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS IT. YELTSIN HAS REPEATEDLY IDENTIFIED THIS AS AN URGENT PRIORITY. UP TO

NOW, OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAVE NOT SUPPORTED THAT SENSE OF URGENCY.

A. I THINK WHERE WE WOULD PROBABLY DISAGREE IS, IF JUST CREATING THE STABILIZATION FUND TODAY IS GOING TO SOLVE, SATISFY OR TAKE CARE OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS THAT RUSSIA HAS. THIS IS A BLOCK-BUILDING TYPE OF APPROACH THAT MANY OF THE REFORMS THAT YOU ADOPT AFFECTS THE WAY THAT YOU ARE GOING TO DEAL WITH THE RUBLE, AND HOW THE ECONOMY IS GOING

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TO EXPAND.

WHAT YOU WANT TO DO IS SORT OF ALONG THE LINES OF THE POLISH MODEL THAT YOU HAVE THE REFORMS TAKE PLACE, YOU BUILD UP TOWARD A STABILIZATION FUND, YOU FINALLY GET A STABILIZATION FUND, BUT THEN YOU DON'T HAVE TO USE THE STABILIZATION FUND. IT'S THERE TO PROVIDE STABILITY TO YOUR CURRENCY, AND THE SAME TYPE OF APPROACH HAS TO HAPPEN IN RUSSIA. I THINK THERE IS THIS VIEWPOINT THAT IT'S A PANACEA, THAT IF YOU JUST CREATE A STABILIZATION FUND, ANNOUNCE A STABILIZATION FUND THAT ALL IS WELL.

WELL, THEY HAVE TO DEAL WITH FAR MORE FUNDAMENTAL, DIFFICULT POLITICAL ISSUES LIKE HOW FAR ARE THEY GOING TO GO ON PRIVATIZATION? HOW FAR ARE THEY GOING TO GO IN ALLOWING THEIR BUSINESSES TO OPERATE IN THE MARKET WITHOUT STATE CONTROL? HOW FAR ARE THEY WILLING TO GO TO REAL DECENTRALIZATION? THESE ARE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS THAT HAVE TO BE ANSWERED ALONG THE WAY TO CREATING THE STABILIZATION FUND. BUT THEIR PEOPLE AND OUR TREASURY PEOPLE WERE INSTRUCTED AFTER THE CAMP DAVID MEETING TO CONTINUE THEIR TALKS. THEY'RE TALKING, AS FAR AS I KNOW EVEN AS OF TODAY, ON HOW THIS WILL COME ABOUT. SO I'D SAY THERE'S MORE SERIOUS TALK ABOUT IT. BUT PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT YOU BUILD BLOCKS UNDERNEATH, YOU HAVE TO BUILD THE FOUNDATION THAT WOULD CREATE A STABILIZATION FUND. IT'S NOT NECESSARILY FROM THE TOP DOWN.

END TEXT

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
26. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Secretary Baker's Party from Brent Scowcroft [171500Z Feb 92] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	2/17/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate Channel Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/13/2022

Date Closed: 7/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91152-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0640-MR(525)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/30/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile


Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: GANTI COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT: PRIVACY OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 171500Z FEB 92

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~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
OOOO

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SECRETARY BAKER'S PARTY
IN A ENVELOPED MARKED "EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY" FROM BRENT
SCOWCROFT. ALSO PROVIDE A COPY IN A SEALED ENVELOPE MARKED "EYES
ONLY TO JOHN GORDON AND ED HEWETT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL STAFF TRAVELING WITH THE SECRETARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES.

DEAR GEORGE,

I WAS GRATEFUL FOR YOUR LETTER OF 12 FEBRUARY LETTING ME KNOW YOUR
THINKING ABOUT GPALS AND ABOUT HOW YOU PLAN TO TAKE FORWARD THE
DISCUSSION YOU AND BORIS YELTSIN HAD AT CAMP DAVID. SINCE THEN,
BRENT SCOWCROFT AND STEPHEN WALL HAVE TALKED, NOT LEAST ABOUT THE
DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS FOR US, AND BRENT KINDLY SENT DAVID GOMPERT
TO GIVE US MORE DETAILS.

I WILL NOT IN THIS LETTER GO OVER ALL THAT GROUND AGAIN. BRIEFLY,
MY THINKING IS AS FOLLOWS.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0640-MR
MM 4/30/2015

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

I. BORIS YELTSIN DOES SEEM TO WANT TO CO-OPERATE IN A WAY WHICH EVEN GORBACHEV WAS NOT PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE. WE SHOULD BUILD ON THAT. WE SHOULD DO NOTHING TO UNDERMINE HIS POSITION. BUT WE SHOULD EQUALLY NOT ASSUME THAT HE IS SECURE OR THAT RUSSIA COULD NOT STILL POSE A THREAT.

II. IT IS RIGHT TO THINK BOLDLY, AS YOU ARE DOING. A MIXTURE OF DETERRENCE AND NON-PROLIFERATION HAS WORKED WELL FOR US, BUT PREVENTING PROLIFERATION IS GOING TO BE HARDER FROM NOW ON, SO I AM NOT AGAINST THE GPALS IDEA AT ALL.

III. GPAS WOULD, HOWEVER, BE VERY FAR-REACHING. IT WOULD CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE, DIVIDING THE WORLD EFFECTIVELY BETWEEN THOSE WHO WERE UNDER THE GPAS UMBRELLA AND THOSE WHO WERE NOT.

IV. THERE ARE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR DETERRENT ABOUT WHICH OUR EXPERTS AND YOURS ARE NOT YET IN AGREEMENT. EVEN WHEN THE UNITED KINGDOM TRIDENT FULLY ENTERS SERVICE, ITS CREDIBILITY WILL BE SENSITIVE TO IMPROVEMENTS IN RUSSIAN ABM DEFENCES. OUR OFFICIALS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN EXCHANGES

AIMED AT AGREEING A COMMON ANALYSIS OF WHAT DEVELOPMENTS WOULD, AND WOULD NOT, AFFECT OUR STRATEGIC CAPABILITY. BUT WE DO NOT YET HAVE AN AGREED ANALYSIS. IT IS CLEARLY VERY IMPORTANT THAT NO COMMITMENTS WHICH COULD HAVE A BEARING ON THIS ISSUE ARE MADE TO THIRD PARTIES UNTIL THIS WORK HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

V. THE ISSUES OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND CONTROL OVER THE SYSTEM ARE VERY SENSITIVE ONES. I KNOW YOU ENVISAGE U S CONTROL OVER ANY GPALS SYSTEM BUT THAT IS SOMETHING THE RUSSIANS WOULD CLEARLY WANT TO HAGGLE OVER.

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

YOU HAVE DONE MORE THAN ANYONE TO CARRY THE ALLIANCE THROUGH A VERY TRICKY PERIOD. IF ANYTHING, IT IS STRONGER THAN BEFORE. THE HANDLING OF THIS INITIATIVE COULD STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE, OR IT COULD WEAKEN IT. I CERTAINLY THINK IT WOULD BE DAMAGING TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE ON AN EQUALLY PRIVILEGED FOOTING TO THE ALLIES, AND I THINK IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO SAY ANYTHING TO EITHER THE RUSSIANS OR THE OTHER ALLIES - BEYOND THE GENERAL INTENTION OF FOLLOWING UP YELTSIN'S IDEAS - UNTIL WE HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO WORK THROUGH SOME OF THE TRICKY QUESTIONS I HAVE MENTIONED.

I AM RELIEVED TO THINK THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO TAKE THIS IN SLIGHTLY SLOWER TIME - GIVING A POSITIVE BUT GENERAL SIGNAL OF INTENT TO THE RUSSIANS AND SIMPLY TELLING THE NAC ON 18 FEBRUARY THAT YOU ARE INTERESTED IN THE RUSSIAN IDEAS AND WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THEM IN DETAIL OVER THE COMING WEEKS.

YOURS EVER,

JOHN

END TEXT:

#0164

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
27. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Ambassador Edward Gnehm, Jr. from Brent Scowcroft [redacted] (2 pp.)	2/15/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 11/6/2013

Date Closed:	7/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-0641-MR (500)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	6/5/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GANTI COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
SIT: PRIVACY[△]OUT SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 150435Z FEB 92

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO

(b)(1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(1)

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-

THIS MESSAGE IS CLASSIFIED FOR TRANSMISSION PURPOSES ONLY.
THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS UNCLASSIFIED.

-

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR EDWARD
GNEHM, JR. FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.

-

BEGIN TEXT

-

-

FEBRUARY 14, 1992

-

SUBJECT: MARVIN BUSH

-

-

DEAR SKIP:

-

AS I PRESUME YOU KNOW, THE PRESIDENT'S SON, MARVIN BUSH,
WILL SHORTLY BE VISITING KUWAIT. THIS IS A COMPLETELY PRIVATE
BUSINESS VISIT AND THE PRESIDENT PREFERS THAT THERE BE NO
PUBLICITY OR PUBLIC EVENTS OF ANY KIND. IF YOU HAVE ANY
QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO MARVIN'S VISIT, PLEASE
DO NOT HESITATE TO CALL.

-

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0641-MR
SCS 6/5/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

REGARDS,

BRENT

END TEXT

#0156

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VIA BACK CHANNEL

UNCLASSIFIED

February 14, 1992



FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMBASSADOR ROBERT STRAUSS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

Dear Bob:

Apropos your phone call yesterday, here is some material
from the Vice President's office.

Warm regards,

Brent

(Copy text of attachments)



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

February 14, 1992

To the Editor:

I was pleased to read that Vice President Quayle had convinced Jim Hoagland that U.S. support for a currency stabilization fund in Russia would be effective only if appropriate fiscal and monetary reforms were taken.

However, in his February 11 column "Little Help for Yeltsin," Mr. Hoagland drew an erroneous inference of non-support from his conversation with the Vice President. Mr. Quayle made the point that the U.S. is committed to supporting Mr. Yeltsin because "that's good for Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Europe, and the United States." In fact, Mr. Quayle stressed that democracy itself in Russia might be jeopardized if Mr. Yeltsin failed.

Mr. Hoagland's overall conclusion that the Bush Administration is uninterested in helping the Russian government is simply incorrect. Secretary Baker convened a 47-nation Coordinating Conference on assistance to the C.I.S. on January 22-23. On February 10, the U.S. began to airlift 4.5 million pounds of food and medical supplies. In all, the U.S. government is providing more than \$5 billion in expenditures and credits this year to the former Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Karl D. Jackson".

Karl D. Jackson
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE
PRESS ROUNDTABLE
MUNICH, GERMANY

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1992

[Verbatim extract of the relevant portions of the press roundtable.]

Q. How do you answer Europeans who say that the United States should be paying more for the reconstruction of Eastern Europe and should be more involved in the reconstruction of the former Soviet Union than it has?

A. It's one that we have been very involved in. In the reconstruction of eastern and central Europe, we are involved in trying to help Boris Yeltsin, Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union. So often this is quantified as to how much money you want to spend. You break it down among other contributions and there are obviously large other contributions for Russian troops going home, especially German. We are back absorbing a lot of costs ourselves as we begin to ratchet down our numbers, this is not a free situation; it's quite costly to transfer our troops or to relocate our troops, as well. Perhaps they are not quite as costly, but this is certainly a major factor. We have direct assistance; we have enterprise funds. We have, as far as the Soviet Union, an additional \$400 million to deal with scientists, nuclear weapons, especially with tactical nuclear weapons. There are negotiations going on with Russia and our people on what a stabilization plan should or should not look like. So I'd say we're heavily involved. The effort of involvement should not be described only by the total amount of contributions. There are other ways one can make contributions to reform and to get Russia back up on its feet.

We'd like to have an economy in Russia that is growing. There's another problem with the Baltic nations. Some of its food is not getting out as quickly as possible, and then you get beyond food and any of the other goods that they produce or they produced for the Russian market. Well, producing goods for the Russian market is simply not going to be as competitive as producing goods for the German market or the American market. They can't compete on quality and they can't compete on price. They've been used to a guaranteed market and this is a great shift.

They (the Baltic nations) are interested in joining and becoming part of the European family. We'll be talking to those in Europe, I'm sure, about this. There was the idea to talk about back and forth if that didn't work out; perhaps they (the Baltic countries) should look to establish a free trade zone, or have a free trade agreement with the

United States. The model would be the way we do it with Israel. There is a very strong Baltic community in the United States. This is clearly at the idea stage; they haven't even decided if that is a good idea to make that suggestion to us.

Q. If I could follow-up sir? To what extent, if any, is the Administration policy in this area inhibited by the fact that the United States itself is in recession? And to put a fine point on it, it is an election year. In other words if the economy were stronger and perhaps if you didn't have to stand for reelection would you be doing things now that politically make it difficult to do?

A. I don't think so. I'm one of those people who have a little different view point of what foreign policy and national defense does for electing the President of the United States. I know what we call conventional wisdom (CW) in especially the political world to some extent and I know in the media, that the President just has to spend 95 percent of his time on domestic matters. And right now he's spending a lot on domestic matters, much more than he is on foreign policy matters. But he hasn't neglected foreign policy matters. Notice that even a couple of days after his State of the Union address, he fulfilled his responsibility to go to the UN to meet with various leaders. He had Boris Yeltsin at Camp David.

When the American people vote for a President, they vote for leadership. One of the requirements of being able to lead a country is to have an understanding of foreign policy. So, therefore, I don't think there would be any significant change of what we would do election year versus a non-election year.

I did notice in Secretary Baker's testimony on the Hill, there was bipartisan support for the recent amount of money that we have asked for helping the Soviet Union.

Now, on the other side, which was widely reported, there was some criticism. "How can you come up here and ask for this amount of money when there are homeless here in the United States, unemployment is staying the same, at too high a level, it may be even going up. How many times do we have to tell you to focus on domestic problems?" And his response says "Look, you know we have a foreign policy agenda, as well. We are an international power. We are the only superpower remaining. We want to maintain our engaged policies in Europe and in Asia, and when you have a policy that's constructive and provides peace, you're going to have to pay for it."

Furthermore, he pointed out that this is an historic opportunity to try to help Russia along. Who knows what is going to happen to Russia. We hope that reforms are adopted. We hope democracy is maintained. We were talking about this earlier today. We knew who was behind Gorbachev: Yeltsin. But who are the competing forces behind Boris Yeltsin? I'd say that there the picture is less clear. Boris Yeltsin is certainly committed to a reform agenda and a reform package and the road to reform. That's good for Russia, the Russian people. It's good for the Commonwealth of Independent States. It's good for Europe. It's good for the United States.

- Q.** Are you trying to imply that the fact that you don't know who's behind some of these figures is in any putting a brake on your desire, or otherwise to help more, is there uncertainty in your mind and is therefore the willingness to commit more funds or resources and has that to do with the fact that this seems to be a transitory set of leaders and you're not sure as it were who you're committing yourself to then?
- A.** Well, what you want to do is to help those who are willing to help themselves, and by helping themselves, help us. Boris Yeltsin is certainly in that category. What he wants to do economically, politically, even militarily are in his interests and they are in our interests. Therefore, when you have this opportunity, you ought to work with him so he can be successful.
- Q.** You're not particularly holding back aid or anything like that because you don't know if those leaders now in power are going to last?
- A.** Oh the meeting between Yeltsin and President Bush was very good. The read-out was not only that they are friends, but there is a policy based on trust. The press conference that they had afterward was a very warm press conference -- one where you can see a genuine relationship beginning to develop, and a commitment on our part to work with Boris Yeltsin and to try to help him in these very difficult times.
- Q.** Could you expand a little bit on the stabilization fund and the Administration's attitude towards it. Yeltsin has repeatedly identified this as an urgent priority. Up to now, our public statements have not supported that sense of urgency.
- A.** I think where we would probably disagree is, if just creating the stabilization fund today is going to solve, satisfy or take care of the economic problems that Russia

has. This is a block-building type of approach that many of the reforms that you adopt affects the way that you are going to deal with the ruble, and how the economy is going to expand.

What you want to do is sort of along the lines of the Polish model that you have the reforms take place, you build up toward a stabilization fund, you finally get a stabilization fund, but then you don't have to use the stabilization fund. It's there to provide stability to your currency, and the same type of approach has to happen in Russia. I think there is this viewpoint that it's a panacea, that if you just create a stabilization fund, announce a stabilization fund that all is well.

Well, they have to deal with far more fundamental, difficult political issues like how far are they going to go on privatization? How far are they going to go in allowing their businesses to operate in the market without state control? How far are they willing to go to real decentralization? These are fundamental questions that have to be answered along the way to creating the stabilization fund. But their people and our Treasury people were instructed after the Camp David meeting to continue their talks. They're talking, as far as I know even as of today, on how this will come about. So I'd say there's more serious talk about it. But please understand that you build blocks underneath, you have to build the foundation that would create a stabilization fund. It's not necessarily from the top down.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
28. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to James A. Baker Re: Further to my cable of yesterday... (1 pp.)	2/14/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 10/31/12

Date Closed: 7/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91152-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0641-MR (501)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 7/2/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

February 14, 1992



FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: JAMES A. BAKER
SECRETARY OF STATE

Dear Jim:

Further to my cable of yesterday on British concern with Russian cooperation on GPALS, Stephen Wall today was somewhat more specific in describing their areas of concern. The British are comfortable with an investigation of a joint warning system and with deliberate and careful consideration of possible areas of technology cooperation and exchange. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

It seems to me that if we approach the overall program in stages, which might make the most sense in any event, we can focus on early warning and technology exchange in a way which will keep the Russians engaged and satisfied (b)(1)

(b)(1)

Warm regards,

Brent Scowcroft

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0641-MR

SCS 7/2/11

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
29. Cable	To White House Re: General Scowcroft and Admiral Howe from David Gompert, London [redacted] (3 pp.)	2/14/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 11/6/2013

Date Closed:	7/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-0641-MR (502)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	6/5/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: GANTT HOWE SCOWCROFT

SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 141545Z FEB 92

FM (b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 141545Z FEB 92

(b)(1)

WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND ADMIRAL HOWE
FROM DAVID GOMPERT, LONDON
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
AND ADMIRAL HOWE IMMEDIATE

ACCOMPANIED BY RAY SEITZ, I SPENT AN HOUR WITH STEPHEN WALL AND
PERCY CRADOCK ON GPALS. WE DEALT WITH BOTH THE SUBSTANCE AND THE
TACTICS OF OUR INTENTIONS CONCERNING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS,
DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, AND PUBLIC TREATMENT.

WALL AND CRADOCK WERE GENUINELY GRATEFUL FOR THE CONSULTATION, FOR
OUR OPENNESS WITH THEM, AND FOR OUR SENSITIVITY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S
IMMEDIATE POLITICAL CONCERNS. I ASSURED THEM THAT THE PRESIDENT WANTS
TO SEE THIS HANDLED IN A MANNER THAT CAUSES THE PRIME MINISTER NO
DIFFICULTY. I STEPPED THEM THROUGH THE FACTORS THAT BROUGHT US TO
THIS POINT: OUR INTENTION TO PROCEED WITH GPALS, AND WHY; THE
ENTHUSIASTIC OFFER MADE BY YELTSIN AT CAMP DAVID; OUR DESIRE TO PURSUE
THE NEW OPPORTUNITY; AND OUR WISH THAT ALLIES UNDERSTAND THAT ANY
COOPERATION THAT MIGHT RESULT WITH THE RUSSIANS WOULD OF COURSE BE
COMPLETELY OPEN TO ALLIANCE PARTICIPATION AS WELL. I EXPLAINED THAT
WE WERE ALREADY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THEIR DESIRE THAT DISCUSSIONS IN
BOTH MOSCOW AND THE NAC BE EXPLORATORY AND WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT
PUBLICITY LET ALONE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A NEW AGREEMENT.

(b)(1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0641-MR
SCS 6/5/12

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

(b)(1)

I WALKED THEM THROUGH THE THREE ELEMENTS OF OUR CONCEPT. THEY ARE COMFORTABLE WITH INVESTIGATION OF A JOINT WARNING SYSTEM AND DELIBERATE, CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE AREAS OF TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGE.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

THEY AGREED

ENTIRELY THAT ALLIES SHOULD BE INVITED TO COOPERATE IN WHATEVER WE MIGHT PURSUE WITH RUSSIA, WITH THE SAME PROVISIO THAT DISCUSSIONS BE KEPT EXPLORATORY, LOW-PROFILE, AND LIMITED TO THE WARNING AND TECHNOLOGY-SHARING ELEMENTS.

AS TO THE SUBSTANCE, THEY ARE OPEN-MINDED BUT HAVE SOME DOUBTS, NOT ONLY ABOUT THE IMPACT ON THEIR DETERRENT BUT ABOUT THE BROADER STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS. AS WE DISCUSSED SOME OF THE ISSUES INFORMALLY, WALL AND CRADOCK SAID THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME WE HAD ENGAGED IN MORE THAN A TECHNICAL TREATMENT OF WHAT WE HAD IN MIND. EVEN THE MORE NARROW BRIEFINGS GIVEN BY DOD HAD LEFT THE MOD "NOT REASSURED." POST ELECTION, THEY WOULD WELCOME A SERIOUS STRATEGIC DISCUSSION AND THOUGHT THAT OTHER ALLIES WOULD NEED THE SAME.

FOR NOW, THEY URGE US TO GO SLOW, BE VAGUE, AND AVOID DISCUSSION OF A GLOBAL SYSTEM.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

I HAVE NOT COMMUNICATED ANY OF THIS TO THE SECRETARY'S PARTY OR TO JOHN GORDON. AT A MINIMUM, I RECOMMEND DROPPING THE REFERENCE IN THE BAKER POINTS TO THE CONCEPT OF A GLOBAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM. IT SHOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY RESPONSIVE, FOR NOW, TO TELL THE RUSSIANS WE FAVOR CONCENTRATING ON POSSIBILITIES IN THE AREAS OF WARNING AND TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGE, WHICH ARE IN ANY CASE THE AREAS IN WHICH THEIR UNDEREMPLOYED SCIENTISTS CAN BE ENGAGED.

I ASSUME YOU WILL COMMUNICATE FURTHER WITH THE SECRETARY ABOUT

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

WHAT IS SAID IN MOSCOW AND IN THE NAC, AS YOU SEE FIT.

#2683

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
30. Cable	From White House Re: To The White House for General Scowcroft from Ambassador Taft for General Scowcroft [redacted] (2 pp.)	2/14/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 11/6/2013

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1992 [4]

Date Closed: 7/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91152-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0641-MR (503)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 6/5/2012

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT. GANTT HOWE SCOWCROFT

SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 141630Z FEB 92

FM

(b)(1)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 141610Z FEB 92

(b)(1)

TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT


FM USNATO

TO WHITE HOUSE

FROM AMBASSADOR TAFT FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

1. (X) WE CONVEYED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER ON FEBRUARY 12. I MET WITH HIM ON THE 13TH, AT WHICH TIME HE GAVE ME A PAPER WITH THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:
2. (X) BEGIN TEXT:

(b)(1)



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0641-MR
SCS 6/5/12

~~SECRET~~


IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

(b)(1)



END TEXT

BEST REGARDS, WILL TAFT

DECL OADR

#0212

~~SECRET~~