

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91152
Folder ID Number: 91152-004

Folder Title:
Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	7	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Cable	To White House, Re: Bob Strauss to General Scowcroft [171400Z Oct 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	10/17/91	(b)(1)	S
02. Cable	Abdin Palace to White House Re: Message from President Mubarak to President Bush (2 pp.)	10/19/91	(b)(1)	TS
03. Cable	White House for Chief of Staff Sununu and NSC Advisor Scowcroft Re: Recommend President Drop in Meeting of ACB Tauran with Scowcroft (2 pp.)	10/22/91	(b)(1)	C
04. Memo	Abdin Palace to White House Re: No Subject Found (2 pp.)	11/23/91	(b)(1)	TS
05. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Mr. Stephen Wall from Brent Scowcroft (6 pp.)	10/24/91	(b)(1)	S
06. Cable	White House to Abdin Palace Re: Message to President Mubarak from President Bush (2 pp.)	11/28/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Cable	To The White House Re: Message to President Bush from President Mubarak (2 pp.)	11/28/91	(b)(1)	C
08. Memo	From White House Situation Room Re: Visit of Opposition Leader Chretien (2 pp.)	11/27/91	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Pinksheet Number: cap1266
OA/ID Number: 91152-004
Date Closed: 7/27/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09a. Cable	Prime Minister Andreotti to President Bush Re: Department of State Office of Language Services Transalting Division (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
09b. Cable	Chigi Palace to White House Re: From Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to President George Bush (2 pp.)	11/28/91	(b)(1)	S
10a. Cable	Prime Minister Andreotti to President Bush Re: Department of State Office of Language Services Transalting Division (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10b. Cable	Chigi Palace to White House Re: From Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to President George Bush (2 pp.)	11/28/91	(b)(1)	S
10c. Cable	Chigi Palace to White House Re: From Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to President George Bush (2 pp.)	11/28/91	(b)(1)	S
11a. Cable	The White House to US Mission US NATO Brussels Re: Message to Ambassador Taft from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	11/29/91	(b)(1)	C
11b. Draft Cable	Re: Message to Ambassador Taft from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
11c. Cable	US Mission US NATO to White House Re: Official - Informal (2 pp.)	11/27/91	(b)(1)	C

Page 2 of 4

Collection:	
Record Group:	Bush Presidential Records
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12. Cable	Re: Presidential Letter to Chnacellor Kohl (4 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(1)	C
13. Cable	Re: Presidential Letter to Prime Minister Lubbers (4 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(1)	C
14. Cable	Re: Presidential Letter to Prime Minister John Major (4 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(1)	C
15. Cable	Re: Presidential Letter to EC President Jacques (4 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(1)	C
16a. Draft Cable	Re: Brent Scowcroft to Robert Zoellick (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
16b. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Robert Zoellick from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	12/21/91	(b)(1)	S
17a. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Robert Zoellick from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	12/21/91	(b)(1)	S
17b. Draft Cable	Re: Brent Scowcroft to Robert Zoellick (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
18. Cable	Abdin Palace to White House Re: President Mubarak to President Bush (1 pp.)	12/23/91	(b)(1)	C
19. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to James A. Baker Re: I discussed with the President... (2 pp.)	12/18/91	(b)(1)	C
20. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to DCM Collins fro Mikhail Gorbachev from President Bush [251813Z Dec 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	12/25/91	(b)(1)	C

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
21. Cable	Canberra to The White House Re: From Ambassador Sembler to the White House for the President (2 pp.)	12/24/91	(b)(1)	S
22. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Prime Minister Hawke from the President (2 pp.)	12/23/91	(b)(1)	C
23. Message	Re: Presidential Message to Prime Minister Major (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
24. Cable	From White House, Re: Charge Collins to General Scowcroft and Ed Hewitt [261100Z Dec 91] [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	12/26/91	(b)(1), (b)(6)	S
25. Draft Cable	Charge Collins to General Scowcroft and Ed Hewitt [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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01. Cable	To White House, Re: Bob Strauss to General Scowcroft [171400Z Oct 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	10/17/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/14/2022

Date Closed: 7/27/2009	OA/ID Number: 91152-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0698-MR(500)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 6/29/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile


Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT: GANTI GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN
SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 171400Z OCT 91

1.4(c)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: BOB STRAUSS

JIM COLLINS, BACK FROM HOSPITAL AND WELL MENDED, SAW CHERNYAYEV TODAY. AMONG OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED CHERNYAYEV ASKED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT PLANS TO ATTEND THE OPENING OF A MID-EAST PEACE CONFERENCE IF IT IS CONVENED. HE SAID GORBACHEV, PANKIN AND HE HAD DISCUSSED GORBACHEV'S POSSIBLE ATTENDANCE THIS MORNING, AND GORBACHEV SAID HE WOULD ATTEND IF PRESIDENT BUSH DOES SO. COLLINS THANKED CHERNYAYEV FOR THE ADVANCE WORD; HE SAID AT THE MOMENT WE HAD NOTHING ON THE PRESIDENT'S PLANS BEYOND THE REMARKS MARLIN FITZWATER MADE YESTERDAY TO THE PRESS, AND WE WOULD PASS ON GORBACHEV'S THINKING AT ONCE. CHERNYAYEV SAID ANY WORD WE MIGHT HAVE ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S PLANS WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATED.

IF THERE IS ANYTHING WE CAN PASS ON ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S PLANS TO CHERNYAYEV, I KNOW HE AND GORBACHEV WOULD APPRECIATE IT. I WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR IMMEDIATELY SHARING THE ABOVE WITH JIM BAKER.

REGARDS, BOB

END TEXT
DECL OADR
#0017

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0698-MR
MM 6/29/2015

~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

UNCLAS EFTO
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: GANTT GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: WHSR^DUP HOTLINE^IN PRES^MSGs

<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> UNCLAS EFTO <DTG> 171315Z OCT 91

FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

UNCLAS HANDLE VIA CABINET CHANNELS ONLY
QQQQ

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
DEAR GEORGE,

NORMA AND I WERE HORRIFIED TO HEAR OF THE WANTON KILLING IN
KILLEN YESTERDAY. OUR THOUGHTS ARE WITH YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF
TEXAS AT THIS TRAGIC TIME. WE EXPRESS OUR DEEPEST SYMPATHY TO ALL
THOSE WHO HAVE LOST LOVED ONES OR BEEN INJURED IN THE INCIDENT.

YOURS EVER,

JOHN

BT
#0045

UNCLAS EFTO

IMMEDIATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

APNSA Has Seen

PAGE 01 OF 02

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0735-MR
MM 11/23/2016

PRT: GANTI GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: HOTLINE IN

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~TOP SECRET~~ <DTG> 192008Z OCT 91

FM ABDIN PALACE

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~TOP SECRET~~ VIA SUNSHINE CHANNELS

0000

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO PRESIDENT BUSH
CONGRATULATION ON THE SPECTACULAR SUCCESS OF
YOUR EFFORTS. THE FORTHCOMING CONVENING OF THE
PEACE CONFERENCE CONSTITUTES THE CORONATION OF
THE CONCERTED AND RELENTLESS ENDEAVOR WHICH YOU
LED FOR MONTHS. YOUR DETERMINATION AND
PERSEVERANCE EARNED YOU AND THE NATION YOU LEAD
THE WELL DESERVED RESPECT AND ADMIRATION OF
VARIOUS PEOPLES AROUND THE WORLD. SECRETARY
BAKER PLAYED AN INDISPENSABLE PART, TOO, AS YOUR
REPRESENTATIVE AND PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT ON THAT
MATTER. AS WE ALWAYS DID IN THE PAST, WE SHALL
WORK TOGETHER WITH YOU UNTIL WE REALIZE OUR
CHERISHED GOAL, NAMELY TO PAVE THE WAY FOR THE
SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE FULLY AWARE
OF THE DIFFICULTIES AND OBSTACLES WHICH LAY
AHEAD OF US, HOWEVER, WE HOPE THAT THE PARTIES
WILL REALIZE THAT STAKES ARE HIGH FOR ALL OF
THOSE CONCERNED. WHILE NO ONE CAN GUARANTEE A
SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME WITH CERTAINTY, WE SHALL DO
ALL WHAT WE CAN TO MAKE THE ENDS MEET.

DEAR FRIEND

I WANTED TO TELL YOU ALSO THAT I MET WITH
CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL TWO DAYS AGO IN BONN. AS
YOU MIGHT EXPECT, THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

~~TOP SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

FIGURED HIGHLY ON THE AGENDA OF OUR TALKS. HE PROMISED TO EXERT MAXIMUM EFFORTS IN ORDER TO HELP. I WAS VERY PLEASED TO NOTICE THAT HE ADMIRES YOU IMMENSELY. HE SPOKE EXTENSIVELY ABOUT YOU AND DESCRIBED YOU AS A STATESMEN OF VISION AND COURAGE. HE ADDED THAT YOU ARE A LEADER ONE CAN TRUST AND CONFIDE TO. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT YOU KNOW THAT I SHARE THIS ADMIRATION AND MORE.

AGAIN, CONGRATULATIONS AND MAY GOD GUIDE YOUR STEPS AND ILLUMINATE YOUR PATH. THE CONFIRMATION OF JUDGE THOMAS WAS ANOTHER STROKE OF SUCCESS. BEFORE I CONCLUDE, I NEED NOT REMIND YOU OF THE CANDIDACY OF DR. BOUTROS GHALI.

WITH BEST WISHES AND REGARDS TO ALL OF YOU
SINCERELY

#0011

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0698-MR
MM 6/29/2015

PRT: GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SITTMANN SUNUNU
SIT: FILE GOMPERT SIT VAX WHSR△IN

<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 220946Z OCT 91

FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9570

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ROME 19144
WHITE HOUSE FOR CHIEF OF STAFF SUNUNU AND
NSC ADVISOR SCOWCROFT
FROM AMBASSADOR MELADY
FROM EMBASSY VATICAN/MESSAGE NO. 947/91
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PINR, OVIP, VT (TAURAN, JEAN-LOUIS)
SUBJECT: RECOMMEND PRESIDENT DROP IN ON MEETING
OF ACB TAURAN WITH SCOWCROFT
1. ARCHBISHOP JEAN-LOUIS TAURAN, FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE HOLY SEE, IS SCHEDULED TO MEET
WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR BRENT SCOWCROFT ON
OCTOBER 24 AT 14:00 HOURS.
2. I RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT CONSIDER
"DROPPING IN" ON THE MEETING.
3. ACB TAURAN, A FRENCHMAN, IS A NEW AND VERY
INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE POPE'S TOP POLICY
GROUP. ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, THE POPE TURNS
TO TAURAN AND HEAD OF GOVERNMENT CARDINAL
SODANO. TAURAN IS BRIGHT, WELL-INFORMED, WITTY,
AND FLUENT IN ENGLISH. HE HAS SERVED IN THE
NUNCIATURE IN BEIRUT AND RETAINS A PARTICULAR
INTEREST IN LEBANON AND THE MIDDLE EAST. TAURAN
WAS THE HOLY SEE'S CSCE REPRESENTATIVE FOR MANY
YEARS. HIS EXPERTISE THUS COVERS AREAS OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

PRIMARY CONCERN TO THE POPE: THE MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE. FIVE MINUTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S TIME WILL SHOW U.S. INTEREST IN VATICAN CONCERNS IN ANTICIPATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE POPE NEXT MONTH.

MELADY

BT

#9144

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

23-Nov-1991 07:15 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM: (WHSR_ROUTER@WHSR)

SUBJECT: NO SUBJECT FOUND

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0735-MR

MM 11/23/2016

<DIST>

PRT: GANTT SCOWCROFT SIT SCOWCROFT
SIT: GANTT HOTLINE_IN FILE

<PREC>

IMMEDIATE

<CLAS>

~~TOP SECRET~~

<OSRI>

YSUNSHI

<DTG>

231130Z NOV 91

<ORIG>

FM ABDIN PALACE

<TO>

TO WHITE HOUSE

<TEXT>

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ VIA SUNSHINE CHANNELS

QQQQ

NOVEMBER 23RD ,1991.

DEAR GEORGE ,

I WISH TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE APPRECIATION AND
THAT OF THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE , FOR THE SUPPORT
YOU HAVE SHOWN FOR AND HAS LEAD TO THE ELECTION
OF DR , BOUTROS GHALI,S FOR THE POST OF
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS .
AS I MENTIONED IN MY PREVIOUS LETTER IN THIS
CONNECTION THE WORLD IS UNDERGOING DRAMATIC
CHANGES OF UNSURPASSED DIMENTIONS. HIGH HOPES
EXIST THAT FUTURE GENERATIONS WILL SEE BETTER
TIMES . THIS IS WITH GREAT MEASURE DUE TO YOUR
PRINCIPLED AND COURAGEOUS LEADERSHIP AND
FORSIGHTEDNESS .

THE UNITED NATIONS WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE
TO PLAY IN THE YEARS TO COME . I AM CONFIDENT

THAT DR GHALI, S REKNOWNED QUALIFICATIONS SHALL
SERVE THE ORGANISATION AND THE WORLD WELL IN
THESE CHALLENGING TIMES . WITH YOUR HELP AND
THAT OF OTHER WORLD LEADERS , I AM CONFIDENT
THAT HE SHALL BE ABLE TO ENSURE A CONSTRUCTIVE
CONTRIBUTION BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN CHARTING
OUR FUTURE .

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS ,
SINCERELY ,
HOSNI MUBARAK
#0001

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 01

<SSN>

0001

<TOR>

911123070900 MSG000312188939

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 06

PRT: GANTT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 241544Z OCT 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

0000

SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR. STEPHEN WALL FROM
BRENT SCOWCROFT.

OCTOBER 24, 1991

DEAR STEPHEN:

HERE ARE COPIES OF LETTERS THE PRESIDENT HAS JUST SENT TO
CHANCELLOR KOHL AND PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. SINCE THEY ARE
CONFIDENTIAL LETTERS, I WOULD HOPE YOU WOULD LIMIT ACCESS TO
JUST THE PRIME MINISTER AND DOUGLAS HURD.

OUR HOPE IS THAT THROUGH SUCH A DIRECT CONFIDENTIAL
APPROACH, COMBINED WITH A MORE SUBTLE PUBLIC STANCE, WE CAN
MAKE THE ESSENTIAL POINT THAT THE FRANCO-GERMAN PROPOSAL
MUST NOT BE MEANT TO SUBSTITUTE FOR NATO, EVEN IN THE LONG-RUN
AND THUS STEER THIS THING IN THE DIRECTION THE GERMANS CLAIM
THEY HAD INTENDED: TO CONNECT THE FRENCH MORE TIGHTLY TO THE
ALLIANCE (AS OPPOSED TO THE CURRENT PERCEPTION THAT THE GERMANS
ARE MOVING AWAY FROM THE ALLIANCE).

WARM REGARDS,

BRENT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0754-MR
1/9/2012 MM

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 06

ATTACHMENT - TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHANCELLOR KOHL.

DEAR HELMUT:

I KNOW YOU REMAIN COMMITTED TO YOUR SHARED VIEW THAT NATO SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY. WITH THAT GOAL IN MIND, I APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORT TO GIVE SHAPE TO THIS IDENTITY AS THE ROME AND MAASTRICHT SUMMITS APPROACH AND TO ENGAGE THE FRENCH IN THIS ENDEAVOR. IT WAS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I READ THE PROPOSAL THAT YOU AND FRANCOIS MADE TO YOUR EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES.

HOWEVER, I AM CONCERNED THAT A PERCEPTION HAS BEEN CREATED THAT GERMANY MAY BE SHIFTING TOWARD THE VIEW THAT EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF NATO MUST HAVE THE MEANS TO

DEFEND THEMSELVES SEPARATE FROM THE ALLIANCE. WHILE THE PROPOSAL YOU HAVE JOINTLY MADE WITH FRANCOIS POINTS TOWARD SOME PRACTICAL LINKS BETWEEN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN PILLAR, BY FAR THE STRONGEST PUBLIC IMPRESSION, AT LEAST IN THE UNITED STATES, CREATED BY THE PROPOSAL IS THAT GERMANY AND FRANCE ARE CALLING FOR A "EUROPEAN ARMY" INDEPENDENT OF NATO -- INDEED, AS A POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE TO NATO. THIS IMPRESSION RESULTS FROM THE POSTSCRIPT IN THE ATTACHMENT TO YOUR LETTER TO RUDD LUBBERS, IN WHICH YOU CALL FOR A EUROPEAN CORPS TO WHICH OTHER WEU MEMBERS COULD CONTRIBUTE FORCES. TO SAY, AS SOME HAVE THAT THIS IS MERELY A LONG-TERM PROPOSAL ONLY REINFORCES, EVEN IF INADVERTENTLY, THE THOUGHT THAT THIS INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN MILITARY STRUCTURE WILL ONE DAY REPLACE THE ALLIANCE.

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 06

IF YOU CONTINUE TO BELIEVE WITH ME THAT THE HISTORY OF THIS CENTURY HAS DEMONSTRATED BEYOND A SHADOW OF DOUBT THAT THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF EUROPE MUST BE INTIMATELY LINKED, THEN GREAT CARE MUST BE TAKEN TO ASSURE THE CLOSEST OF TIES THROUGH THE NATO ALLIANCE. AMERICA WILL MAINTAIN IN EUROPE THE FORCES NECESSARY TO HONOR OUR COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. BUT THAT WILL BE POSSIBLE ONLY SO LONG AS EUROPE DESIRES IT. IN THIS CONNECTION, LET ME SAY QUITE FRANKLY THAT SUGGESTIONS OF A EUROPEAN ARMY OUTSIDE OF NATO DO NOT HELP AS WE ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE CONGRESS TO RETAIN A STRONG U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE. WHILE WE APPRECIATE THE PRIVATE ASSURANCES WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM YOUR ADVISORS, I BELIEVE WE MUST STILL MOVE PROMPTLY TO AVOID DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OF THE SORT THAT APPEARED AT THE RECENT NPG MEETING. WE NEED TO REAFFIRM THE DECISIONS REACHED AT COPENHAGEN. I MIGHT SUGGEST THAT A GOOD STARTING POINT WOULD BE FOR YOU TO ADDRESS PUBLICLY SOME OF THE QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN RAISED ABOUT YOUR PROPOSAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE. PERHAPS YOU MIGHT CLARIFY THAT THE PROPOSED CORPS WOULD NOT TAKE OVER ALLIANCE RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THAT THE GERMAN FORCES CONTRIBUTED TO THE CORPS WOULD BE PART OF NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMAND.

I AM NOT SEEKING TO CREATE A PROBLEM WITH OR FOR FRANCOIS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO RESPECT FRANCE'S INDEPENDENT POSITION. BUT I BELIEVE THAT PUBLIC CLARIFICATIONS BY YOU WILL GO A LONG WAY TOWARD CONFIRMING THAT YOUR JOINT PROPOSAL DOES NOT SEEK TO CREATE A SEPARATE MILITARY STRUCTURE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF NATO, EVEN IN THE LONG RUN. WE HAVE ALSO DISCUSSED WITH YOUR SENIOR OFFICIALS OTHER ASPECTS OF YOUR PROPOSAL ABOUT WHICH WE HAVE SOME

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 06

CONCERN, ESPECIALLY THE IMBALANCE IN TIES BETWEEN THE WEU AND THE EC ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE WEU AND NATO ON THE OTHER. WE HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THE CONCEPT OF THE WEU SERVING AS A DEFENSE IDENTITY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION, AS LONG AS IT ALSO SERVES AS THE EUROPEAN PILLAR WITHIN NATO. WE CAN ENSURE THIS RESULT BY SEEING TO IT THAT INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS AMONG THESE ORGANIZATIONS REFLECT THIS FUNDAMENTAL SYMMETRY. AGAIN, I APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TO WORK WITH FRANCE,

AND STRONGLY FAVOR THE CREATION OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY WITHIN BOTH THE ALLIANCE AND THE POLITICAL UNION. INDEED, WE ARE PREPARED TO BEGIN DISCUSSING THE DETAILS OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN PROPOSAL AND THE OTHER IDEAS THAT HAVE BEEN OFFERED. THIS IS WHY OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT YOUR PROPOSAL HAVE NOT BEEN CRITICAL. AND WE HAVE RESERVED OUR CONCERNS FOR PRIVATE CHANNELS.

#0133

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

BUT I BELIEVE THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR YOU TO LAY TO REST THE PERCEPTION THAT THE FRANCO-GERMAN INITIATIVE ENVISIONS AN ALTERNATIVE TO NATO.

ATTACHMENT - TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I READ WITH INTEREST THE PROPOSAL YOU AND HELMUT HAVE MADE CONCERNING EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE. YOU KNOW THAT I ALWAYS WELCOME AND PLACE GREAT WEIGHT ON YOUR IDEAS, INCLUDING THESE.

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 06

I AM CONCERNED, HOWEVER, ABOUT REPORTS THAT A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS DIVISION IN THE ALLIANCE HAS RESULTED FROM THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE PURPOSE OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN FORCE. AS YOU MAY HAVE SEEN, THE PRESS IS REPORTING YOUR INITIATIVE AS A CALL FOR THE CREATION OF A "EUROPEAN ARMY" SEPARATE FROM NATO -- INDEED AS A POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE TO NATO. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS CONTROVERSY HAS MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO ENGAGE ON THE VERY IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF HOW TO CREATE A EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY THAT CAN BE BOTH THE DEFENSE ELEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN PILLAR OF THE ALLIANCE -- A QUESTION WHICH THE MAIN PART OF YOUR INITIATIVE ADDRESSES.

THE RECENT CONSULTATIONS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS BROUGHT OUT A GREAT DEAL OF CONVERGENCE, WHILE ALSO REVEALING THAT THERE ARE, NOT SURPRISINGLY, SOME POINTS THAT NEED FURTHER DISCUSSION. WE CERTAINLY SAW THE POTENTIAL FOR DEVELOPING A PARALLEL APPROACH, WHICH WOULD HELP SET THE STAGE FOR SUCCESSFUL SUMMITS AT BOTH ROME AND MAASTRICHT.

WITH THIS IN MIND, AND BECAUSE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, WE HAVE AVOIDED PUBLIC CRITICISM ABOUT THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN FORCE, EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE SOME SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT ANYTHING THAT COULD BE VIEWED AS INTENDED TO REPLACE OR DUPLICATE NATO. I WOULD ONLY ASK YOU TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING YOU CAN DO OR SAY TO CONFIRM THAT IT IS NOT YOUR INTENTION TO OFFER A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ALLIANCE, EVEN IN THE LONG RUN. I FULLY UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT FRANCE'S INDEPENDENT POSITION. MY ONLY WISH IS TO PREVENT A FISSURE IN THE

ALLIANCE OVER THE QUESTION OF WHETHER NATO REMAINS

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 06 OF 06

ESSENTIAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE.

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0134

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT SCOWCROFT SIT

SIT: GANTT HOTLINE OUT FILE SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 280037Z NOV 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ABDIN PALACE

~~SECRET~~ VIA SUNSHINE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT

HOSNI,

BOB PELLETREAU HAS REPORTED FULLY TO ME ON YOUR MEETING NOV. 27, INCLUDING THE PLANNED VISIT OF QADHAFI TO CAIRO AND YOUR THOUGHTS ON DEMANDS. I HAVE APPRECIATED OUR ABILITY TO CONSULT ON THIS PROBLEM STARTING WITH MY RECENT MESSAGE TO YOU AND SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS HERE IN WASHINGTON WITH AMBASSADOR EL REEDY AND IN CAIRO WITH AMBASSADOR PELLETREAU. WE HAVE NOTED, IN PARTICULAR, YOUR COUNSEL AGAINST USE OF FORCE. IN RESPONSE, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WHILE WE ARE NOT EAGER TO USE FORCE NEITHER CAN WE RULE IT OUT. HOWEVER, FOR NOW, WE PREFER AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE THAT EFFECTIVELY MEETS THE DEMANDS OF JUSTICE IN THIS CASE AND GETS QADHAFI OUT OF THE BUSINESS OF TERRORISM ONCE AND FOR ALL. THE DEMANDS WHICH WE HAVE FORMULATED WITH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH ARE THE MINIMUM WE CAN ACCEPT IN THIS REGARD. QADHAFI MUST KNOW THIS. HE MUST KNOW THAT HE CANNOT ESCAPE THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACTIONS BY TURNING TO THIS OR THAT MEDIATOR. IN THIS VEIN, I MUST BE CANDID, HOSNI, AND SAY THAT I HAVE GRAVE DOUBTS WHETHER A

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2009-0734-MA
8/24/2012 MM

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

VISIT BY QADHAFI TO CAIRO -- HIS FIRST TRAVEL OUTSIDE LIBYA SINCE THE INDICTMENTS WERE HANDED DOWN BY U.S. AND UK JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES -- SERVES ANYONE'S INTERESTS. WHATEVER THE CONTENT OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS, AN IMPRESSION MAY BE CREATED THAT EGYPT IS SERVING AS HIS DEFENDER AFTER AN INDEFENSIBLE SERIES OF ACTS. IN ANY CASE, WE ALL NEED TO IMPRESS UPON QADHAFI THE ABSOLUTE NEED TO BE COMPLETELY RESPONSIVE TO THE LEGITIMATE DEMANDS OF THE UK, FRANCE AND OURSELVES. IT IS THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH HE CAN AVOID EVEN MORE ONEROUS MEASURES ON THE PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

I HOPE, HOSNI, THAT WE CAN REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS ISSUE.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0155

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

File

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GANIT SCOWCROFT *Q. R. HARRIS*

SIT: FILE SIT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 281852Z NOV 91

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ HANDLE VIA SUNSHINE CHANNELS
OOOO

"THIS TRANSMISSION IS CLASSIFIED TO PROTECT THE PRIVACY
OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS. THE TEXT OF THE FOLLOW-
ING MESSAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED."

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM PRESIDENT
MUBARAK.

NOVEMBER 28 TH, 1991

GEORGE,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE WHICH I RECEIVED
EARLY THIS MORNING.

AS YOU KNOW, MY POSITION ON TERRORISM, AND IN
PARTICULAR THE LOCKERBIE ATROCITY, IS ABUNDANTLY
CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL. I CANNOT CONDONE SUCH A
CRIME OR ACCEPT THAT ITS PERPETRATORS ESCAPE
THEIR RESPONSIBILITY.

I ACKNOWLEDGE WITH APPRECIATION THAT YOU HAVE
RECOGNIZED MY CONCERN REGARDING THE USE OF FORCE
AND AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE DEMANDS OF JUSTICE
IN THE CASE AT HAND HAVE TO BE MET.

TO THAT END I DECIDED TO INVITE COLONEL
GADHAFI FOR A FRANK FACE TO FACE DISCUSSION OF
THE SITUATION. I BELIEVE IT WAS USEFUL TO HAVE
HAD THOSE TALKS WHICH LASTED FOR A COUPLE OF
HOURS.

I EXPLAINED THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES IF
LIBYA DOES NOT DEAL OBJECTIVELY AND SERIOUSLY
WITH THE CASE. I ADDED IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS
THAT THE DEMANDS OF JUSTICE SHOULD BE FULLY

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2009-0735-MR
SCS 4/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

MET, THAT LIBYA SHOULD DISSOCIATE HERSELF
DEFINITELY AND CONCRETELY FROM ANY ACTIONS
THAT ARE RELATED TO OR CONSTRUED AS TERRORISTIC
AND I ASKED HIM TO EMBARK IMMEDIATELY ON ACTIONS
THAT WOULD MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CASE.

FOREIGN MINISTER MOUSSA WILL INFORM
AMBASSADOR PELLETREAU OF THE DETAILS OF THE
TALKS.

I SHARE YOUR HOPE THAT WE SHALL REMAIN IN
CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS ISSUE.

SINCERELY
HOSNI

#0013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

27-Nov-1991 17:03 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

(WHSR_ROUTER@WHSR)

~~SUBDEEAM~~

VISIT OF OPPOSITION LEADER CHRETEN

<DIST>

PRT: SCOWCROFT SIT

SIT: GANTT GOMPERT LOWENKRON FILE SIT SUM SUM2 VAX WHSR_IN

<PREC>

PRIORITY

<CLAS>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<OSRI>

RUEHOT

<DTG>

272155Z NOV 91

<ORIG>

FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

<TO>

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6156

RUEADWW/THE WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY

<SUBJ>

VISIT OF OPPOSITION LEADER CHRETEN

<TEXT>

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OTTAWA 07817

NOFORN

NSC FOR SCOWCROFT FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CA, US, PGOV

SUBJECT: VISIT OF OPPOSITION LEADER CHRETEN

REF: OTTAWA 7808

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUBSEQUENT TO DISPATCH OF REFTTEL, LIBERAL LEADER JEAN CHRETEN'S OFFICE PROVIDED A QUICK OUTLINE OF SUBJECTS HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRESIDENT AS FOLLOWS: 1) "CANADA'S FUTURE AND ITS ECONOMIC PROSPECTS": WHETHER CANADA IS GOING TO BREAK UP AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THE NATIONAL UNITY PROBLEM; 2) HOW CHRETEN PERCEIVES

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2010-0698-MR

mm 6/29/2015

CANADA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD; 3) "THE CANADA/U.S. PARTNERSHIP - WHAT CHALLENGES WE SEE COMING UP, BOTH POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY AND HOW CANADA MAY FIT IN TO A VERY CHANGED WORLD."

3. CHRETIEN'S STAFF ADMITTED THAT TIME CONSTRAINTS WOULD MAKE THESE TOPICS A RATHER LARGE ORDER BUT HOPED THE INFORMATION MIGHT BE OF SOME USE. THEY WOULD WELCOME ANY INDICATION OF TOPICS OF INTEREST TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR THE MEETING.

NEY

BT

#7817

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 01

<SSN>

7817

<TOR>

911127165723 MSG000312569843

~~SECRET~~

File

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

Translating Division

LS No. 136840
BL
Italian

The Prime Minister
of the Republic of Italy
Palazzo Chigi

To President George Bush

Dear George:

I received your message and want to tell you right away that the information you made public on the development in the investigations concerning PanAm flight 103 has made an enormous impression on public opinion in Italy.

I decided to send Col. Qadhafi immediately the message I am enclosing for you, to induce him in what seems to me the most effective way to cooperate with the law in order to shed full light on the Lockerbie incident.

As you can see, I also wanted to remind him of the declaration we signed on the occasion of the visit I made to Tripoli on June 5, and of which I informed you at the time. I especially made a point of stressing in that context that Libya must not deny an extradition request which arises from an exhaustive investigation pursued jointly by the English courts and the American authorities.

~~SECRET~~

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2010-0698-MR
MM 6/29/2015

~~SECRET~~

I want to inform you that I also raised the question in the course of the conversations I had the day before yesterday in Rome with King Hassan II of Marocco, urging him to intervene in the most firm and effective manner with Colonel Qadhafi to press him to cooperate fully with your requests.

Best wishes,

Giulio Andreotti

Dear Colonel:

I am writing you in this rather delicate moment which has arisen as a consequence of the results of the investigations into the Lockerbie incident in which hundreds of people lost their lives.

The revelations which have also appeared in the press concerning the presumed perpetrators have not failed to create perturbation and indignation in the public opinion of our countries.

Certainly, before responsibility is attributed and definite judgments are issued, it is necessary to conduct a regular trial in accordance with what is prescribed by all our legal orders and with the guarantees of the law and of the defense recognized by our legislations.

I would, however, like to stress that not to cooperate, or even worse, not to accede to the requests of the Scottish judges, could contribute to furnishing arguments to those who

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

see in this event political responsibilities of the government and authorities of your country. The Scottish magistrates who have been working to discover the truth have conducted an exhaustive preliminary investigation and are sure that they are prepared to prove also to a Libyan judge the motivations which caused them to issue the arrest warrants and extradition requests.

I recall in this respect that in the course of the talks we had on the occasion of my visit to Tripoli on June 5, you had occasion to condemn terrorism and distance yourself from those Palestinian groups, like that of Abu Nidal, which have been responsible for terrorist actions.

In the important declaration which we signed together on that occasion, we reconfirmed the commitment of our two countries to contributing to peace and security in the region.

I also want to refer to this declaration to express once more to you my firm wish that you will seize this occasion to demonstrate your concrete commitment to combatting terroristic phenomena which can in no way be justified and to cooperating with the authorities of the United States and the other European countries in the search for the truth in this tragic case.

With best wishes,

Giulio Andreotti

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09b. Cable	Chigi Palace to White House Re: From Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to President George Bush (2 pp.)	11/28/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

Translating Division

LS No. 136840
BL
Italian

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of the Republic of Italy
Palazzo Chigi

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0698-MR
MM 6/29/2015

~~SECRET~~

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Best wishes,

Giulio Andreotti

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~~SECRET~~

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With best wishes,

Giulio Andreotti

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10b. Cable	Chigi Palace to White House Re: From Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to President George Bush (2 pp.)	11/28/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Date Closed: 7/27/2009	OA/ID Number: 91152-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10c. Cable	Chigi Palace to White House Re: From Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to President George Bush (2 pp.)	11/28/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS EFTO
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: GANTT SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: HOTLINE IN

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> UNCLAS EFTO <DTG> 061610Z DEC 91

FM THE CHANCELLORY//CHEF DES BUNDESKANZLERAMTES

TO WHITE HOUSE//MR. SAMUEL K. SKINNER//

UNCLAS VIA SKIPPER CHANNELS ONLY

QQQQ

DEAR MR. SKINNER,

I WISH TO CONGRATULATE YOU MOST WARMLY UPON
YOUR APPOINTMENT TO THE OFFICE OF WHITE HOUSE
CHIEF OF STAFF.

I LOOK FORWARD TO A CLOSE COOPERATION BASED
ON MUTAL TRUST IN OUR COMMON TASK TO
CONSOLIDATE AND FURTHER EXPAND THE TRADITIONALLY
FRIENDLY GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

YOURS SINCERELY,

FRIEDRICH BOHL

FEDERAL MINISTER

HEAD OF THE FEDERAL CHANCELLORY

END OF MESSAGE

BT

#1650

UNCLAS EFTO

~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

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2010-0699-MR
mm 5/11/2015

PRT: GANTI

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 291727Z NOV 91

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASH DC

TO USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR TAFT FROM
BRENT SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR WILL:

I RECEIVED YOUR NOTE, AND I MUST SAY I AM PERPLEXED ABOUT YOUR
COMPLAINT REGARDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS
CONFERENCE IN ROME.

MANFRED TOLD ME HE WANTED THE PRESIDENT TO HOLD HIS PRESS
CONFERENCE AT THE SITE OF THE SUMMIT, AND THAT BARRING THAT,
PAGE 02 RHEHAAA0550 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HE WANTED ENOUGH OF A TIME GAP BETWEEN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE
AND THE PRESIDENT'S SO THAT THE PRESS WOULD STAY AT THE SITE
FOR HIS. AS YOU WELL KNOW, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO HOLD THE
PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE SITE, GIVEN THE SCHEDULED MEETING WITH
THE POPE -- THE ONLY TIME AVAILABLE TO US. GIVEN THIS CONSTRAINT,
WE MADE CERTAIN THAT THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TIME FOR REPORTERS
TO COVER MANFRED'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND THEN RETURN TO VILLA
TAVERNA TO COVER THE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE IF THEY SO DESIRED.

I CAN TELL YOU THAT WE DID NOT TREAT THIS LIGHTLY -- MANFRED
RAISED IT WITH ME AND WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND YOU YOURSELF WROTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

TO ME ON THIS MATTER. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, WE SUCCEEDED IN
ACCOMMODATING MANFRED'S CONCERNS. IF, IN YOUR ESTIMATION, OUR
ATTEMPTS TO ACCOMMODATE MANFRED COST US THE OPPORTUNITY TO GET
OUR NATO STORY OUT. YOUR IDEAS FOR ALTERNATE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD
HAVE BEEN MOST WELCOME.

SINCERELY,

PAGE 03 RHEHAAA0550 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT:

BT

#0550

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Will:

I received your note, and I must say I am perplexed about your complaint regarding arrangements for the President's press conference in Rome.

~~Our understanding had been that~~ Manfred ^{told me he} wanted the President to hold his press conference at the site of the Summit, and that barring that, he wanted enough of a time gap between his press conference and the President's so that the press would stay at the site for his. As you well know, it was impossible for us to hold the press conference at the site, given the scheduled meeting with the Pope -- the only time available to us. Given this constraint, we made certain that there would be sufficient time for reporters to cover Manfred's press conference and then return to Villa Taverna to cover the President's conference if they so desired.

I can tell you that we did not treat this lightly -- Manfred raised it with me and with the President, and you yourself wrote to me on this matter. From our perspective, we succeeded in accommodating Manfred's concerns. If, in your estimation, our attempts to accommodate Manfred cost us the opportunity to get our NATO story out, your ideas for alternate arrangements would have been most welcome.

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2010-0699-MR
MM 5/11/2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

✓ SCOWCROFT	✓ GOMPERT	MCNAMARA
HOWE	HEWETT	BEERS
SITTMANN	BURNS	KANSTEINER
HILL	HOLL	CANAS
SUNUNU	HUTCHINGS	DYKE
CARD	LOWENKRON	NEEDEL
JACKSON	WAYNE	STETTNER
VP MILADV		
LAMPLEY	GORDON	DEAL
POPADUOK	CHELLIS	BARTH
ROSTOW	DAVIS	MELBY
	FRY	
HAASS	JONES	
HULL	PILLING	WORKING
RIEDEL	PONEMAN	KITCHEN
	TOBEY	PAVITT
PAAL		
CARNEY		O'LEARY
PATTERSON		SIGLER
	PRYCE	COMMS
✓ FITZWATER	MORLEY	NSA ANALYST
	MCSHANE	NSC ANALYST
		PEOC

ROUTINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GANTT

<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 271623Z NOV 91

FM USMISSION USNATO

TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USNATO 05490

WHITE HOUSE FOR PRESS SECRETARY MARLIN FITZWATER AND
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BRENT SCOWCROFT ONLY FROM
AMBASSADOR TAFT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: AMGT

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

BRENT, MARLIN:

FOLLOWING ROME'S VERY REAL SUCCESSES, I WANTED BRIEFLY
TO SHARE WITH YOU A THOUGHT ABOUT THE EUROPEAN MEDIA
COVERAGE OF THE PRESIDENT AT THE SUMMIT. WHATEVER MAY
HAVE BEEN THE CASE IN THE U.S., OUR POSITIONS DID NOT
GET THE KIND OF EXPOSURE THEY DESERVED IN THE PRESS IN
EUROPE. ON TELEVISION AND IN PRINT, EUROPEAN NEWS
PORTRAYED U.S. POSITIONS LARGELY AS THEY WERE
CHARACTERIZED BY EUROPEAN LEADERS, NOT IN THE
PRESIDENT'S WORDS.

THERE SEEM TO ME TO BE TWO EXPLANATIONS FOR THIS.

ONE IS THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE
DID NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL TWO HOURS AFTER THE END OF THE
SUMMIT. IN THAT PERIOD ALL THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS HAD
MET WITH REPORTERS AND MANY REPORTS HAD ALREADY BEEN
FILED. IT'S HARD TO CATCH UP IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION.
SECOND, VERY FEW EUROPEAN REPORTERS WERE ADMITTED TO THE
PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE; AND MOST OF THOSE WHO WERE
ADMITTED WERE NOT THEIR PAPER'S OR NETWORK'S PRINCIPAL
CORRESPONDENT FOR THE ALLIANCE. THIS MAY IN PART
ACCOUNT FOR THE FACT THAT FEWER THAN ONE-THIRD OF THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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QUESTIONS AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE CONCERNED THE SUMMIT.
I DO NOT EXPECT ANOTHER SUMMIT DURING MY WATCH AT NATO.
I DID, HOWEVER, WANT TO REGISTER MY STRONG FEELING THAT
AN OPPORTUNITY WAS MISSED IN ROME TO GET THE U. S.
MESSAGE ACROSS TO EUROPEAN PUBLICS BY DELAYING THE
PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND THEN MINIMIZING
EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENTS' PARTICIPATION. I RECOMMEND WE
REVERSE BOTH PRACTICES IN THE FUTURE. WILL.

TAFT

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#5490

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0699-MR
MM 5/11/2015

PRT: GANTI SDO WHSR^SPEC

SIT: FICKLIN GOMPERT PRES^MSGs WAYNE

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 130212Z DEC 91

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 405236

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ETRD, EAGR, EEC

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. POST IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CHANCELLOR KOHL BEFORE OOB DECEMBER 13. WE UNDERSTAND THAT PRIME MINISTER MAJOR PLANS TO CALL CHANCELLOR KOHL EARLY MORNING 12/13 AND THAT PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS WILL CALL EC PRESIDENT DELORS AND PRESIDENT BUSH EARLY 12/13. THE LETTER SHOULD BE DELIVERED BEFORE THOSE EXCHANGES TAKE PLACE. THEREFORE, POST IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE LETTER AS EARLY AS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT KOHL RECEIVES IT BEFORE OPENING OF BUSINESS. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

DEAR HELMUT:

I WANT TO CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR SPLENDID SUCCESS AT MAASTRICHT. AS WITH GERMAN UNIFICATION, YOUR VISION LEADERSHIP, AND PERSEVERANCE HAVE CARRIED THE DAY. I KNOW HOW MUCH THIS MEANS TO YOU AND TO GERMANY, AND I COULD NOT BE MORE PLEASED FOR YOU. WE TRIED TO BE HELPFUL AT THE ROME SUMMIT AND IN OTHER WAYS IN CLEARING THE PATH FOR YOUR SUCCESS. I HAVE ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT WELCOMING THE MAASTRICHT DECISIONS AND PRAISING EUROPE'S BOLD MOVE. MY PURPOSE IN WRITING IS TO ENGAGE YOU ONCE AGAIN DIRECTLY ON THE URGENT AND VITAL MATTER OF THE URUGUAY ROUND.

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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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WHILE I HAVE BEEN KEEPING YOU INFORMED OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUUD LUBBERS AND JACQUES DELORS, I HAVE NOT UNTIL NOW ASKED YOU TO INTERVENE. YOUR FOCUS, UNDERSTANDABLY, HAS BEEN ON MAASTRICHT, AND I CHOSE NOT TO BURDEN YOUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER EC LEADERS IN ANY WAY AT SUCH A DELICATE MOMENT. NOW, IN FULL RECOGNITION OF THE KEY ROLE YOU HAVE PLAYED IN EC DELIBERATIONS ON THESE ISSUES, I ASK YOU TO JOIN ME IN TAKING THE STEPS NEEDED TO SAVE THE WORLD TRADE NEGOTIATIONS FROM FAILURE.

ONE BY ONE, WE ARE SETTling U.S.-EC DIFFERENCES OUTSIDE THE AGRICULTURE AREA. AS YOU KNOW THE EC SOUGHT U.S. FLEXIBILITY IN THESE OTHER AREAS, AND WE HAVE SHOWN IT. AS A CONSEQUENCE, AFTER OUR DISCUSSIONS LAST WEEK WITH RUUD LUBBERS AND THE COMMISSION, THE LEAD EC NEGOTIATOR REPORTED TO RUUD THAT WE COULD PROBABLY RESOLVE OUR REMAINING DIFFERENCES IN THESE NON-AGRICULTURAL AREAS FAIRLY QUICKLY.

THE U.S. MIGHT HAVE WORRIED THAT MAKING CONCESSIONS IN OTHER AREAS WOULD WEAKEN OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION, BUT WE ACCEPTED THE EC ASSURANCES THAT U.S. FLEXIBILITY IN OTHER AREAS WOULD RESULT IN EC MOVEMENT IN AGRICULTURE. AFTER ALL, WE ARE NEGOTIATING IN TRUST AS PARTNERS COMMITTED TO THE SAME PURPOSE.

WE ARE NEARING THE POINT AT WHICH EC AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES, ESPECIALLY EXPORT SUBSIDIES, COULD BY THEMSELVES BLOCK SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE URUGUAY ROUND. YET THE TIME AVAILABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT HAS NEARLY EXPIRED. GATT DIRECTOR DUNKEL WILL ISSUE A FINAL DRAFT AGREEMENT ON DECEMBER 20. FRANKLY, GIVEN THE VIEWS OF MOST COUNTRIES ON AGRICULTURE, THIS WILL BUILD PRESSURE ON THE EC. WE REMAIN PREPARED TO RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES DIRECTLY. BUT, IF WE CANNOT RESOLVE THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES SOON, AGREEMENT THIS YEAR WILL BECOME IMPOSSIBLE. THE PROSPECTS FOR CONCLUDING THE ROUND WILL DECLINE SHARPLY ONCE 1991 PASSES, MAKING IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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OBTAIN CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF AN AGREEMENT IN AN ELECTION YEAR.

I WANT TO BE SURE YOU ARE AWARE OF WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DOING TO ACHIEVE A COMPROMISE WITH THE EC IN AGRICULTURE. WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMMODATE EC WISHES TO EXEMPT PAYMENTS UNDER THE CAP REFORM PROGRAM FROM THE REDUCTIONS IN INTERNAL SUPPORTS REQUIRED AS PART OF A NEW AGREEMENT. WE HAVE ALSO INDICATED FLEXIBILITY IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS. BUT EVEN IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN THESE TWO CATEGORIES -- AND IT WILL REQUIRE MORE EC FLEXIBILITY THAN WE HAVE SEEN TO DATE -- THE EFFECT WILL BE NO PRACTICAL BENEFIT FOR US OR OTHERS. THERE IS NO WAY, THEREFORE, THAT WE COULD ACCEPT THE EC'S POSITION IN THE THIRD CATEGORY, EXPORT SUBSIDIES, AND STILL SECURE NECESSARY SUPPORT FOR THE AGREED PACKAGE. THE REST OF THE WORLD, NOT TO MENTION THE U.S. CONGRESS, ADAMANTLY OBJECTS TO THE EC'S PRACTICE OF MASSIVE SUBSIDIZED AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS. THIS IS WHY, AT THE END OF THE DAY, THE EC MUST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT OF ITS TRADING PARTNERS TO CUT THE VOLUME OF SUBSIDIZED EXPORTS SIGNIFICANTLY, OR THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT. THE FACT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMMODATE THE EC ON MARKET ACCESS AND INTERNAL SUPPORTS MAKES AN ADEQUATE REDUCTION IN SUBSIDIZED EXPORTS ALL THE MORE IMPERATIVE. THIS IS NOT THE PLACE TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE SPECIFICALLY WHAT IS NEEDED. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, EC AGRICULTURE COMMISSIONER MACSHARRY HAS PUT FORWARD IDEAS THAT WOULD AT LEAST ESTABLISH A CREDIBLE POINT FROM WHICH TO NEGOTIATE. HOWEVER, THE FORMAL EC POSITION, WHICH WOULD STILL LEAVE SUBSIDIZED WHEAT EXPORTS AT 15 MILLION TONS AFTER SIX YEARS, IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO WORK FROM - ESPECIALLY AFTER BEING TOLD THAT OUR FLEXIBILITY IN OTHER AREAS WOULD RESULT IN EC MOVEMENT IN AGRICULTURE. YOUR POSITION ON THIS PIVOTAL ISSUE WILL BE DECISIVE. IF YOU CAN MAKE KNOWN TO RUUD LUBBERS AND JACQUES DELORS THAT GERMANY WILL SUPPORT AN EC COMMITMENT TO REDUCE SUBSIDIZED

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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EXPORTS TO A LEVEL APPROACHING OUR NEEDS, I AM CONFIDENT WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT. OTHERWISE, I AM AFRAID WE MAY HAVE COME TO THE END OF THE ROAD IN THE URUGUAY ROUND. I AM AWARE THAT NOT EVERY MEMBER OF THE EC WILL ENDORSE SUCH A POSITION. HOWEVER, THE FATE OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AND THE DIRECTION OF U.S.-EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS HANG IN THE BALANCE. YOU KNOW AS WELL AS ANYONE HOW GREAT THE DANGER IS THAT PROTECTIONISM AND ISOLATIONISM WILL GAIN THE UPPER HAND ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. GIVEN THE TURMOIL TO THE EAST A BREACH IN TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION COULD NOT COME AT A WORSE TIME. THE U.S. AND EUROPE COULD BE DRIVEN APART AT THE VERY

MOMENT WE NEED THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE BONDS. WHILE THE DECISION IS NOT EASY, YOU AND I ARE NO STRANGERS TO DIFFICULT DECISIONS. WE HAVE MADE SEVERAL TOGETHER IN THE PAST THREE YEARS. BUT NONE WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THIS -- FOR EUROPE AND AMERICA FOR OUR ECONOMIES, FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND FOR ME.

I AM ALSO WRITING TO RUUD LUBBERS AND JOHN MAJOR IN THIS VEIN. IT IS MY SENSE THAT THE KEY LIES WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF YOU THREE -- BUT ABOVE ALL YOU. I HAVE ALSO SHARED MY VIEW OF THE STATE OF PLAY IN US-EC TALKS WITH JACQUES DELORS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH BAKER

BT

#5236

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0699-MR
MM 5/11/2015

PRT: GANTT SDO

SIT: FICKLIN GOMPERT PRES^MSGS WAYNE WHSR^SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 130207Z DEC 91

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 405226

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ETRD, EAGR, EEC

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. POST IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS BEFORE OOB DECEMBER 13. WE UNDERSTAND THAT PRIME MINISTER MAJOR PLANS TO CALL CHANCELLOR KOHL EARLY MORNING 12/13, AND THAT PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS WILL CALL EC PRESIDENT DELORS AND PRESIDENT BUSH EARLY 12/13. THE LETTER SHOULD BE DELIVERED BEFORE THOSE EXCHANGES TAKE PLACE. THEREFORE, POST IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE LETTER AS EARLY AS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS RECEIVES IT BEFORE OPENING OF BUSINESS. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

DEAR RUUD:

I WANT TO CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR SUCCESS AT MAASTRICHT. YOU DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB AT GUIDING THE SUMMIT TO AGREEMENT. I HOPE YOU SAW MY STATEMENT WELCOMING THE RESULTS. I WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY SUPPORTS THESE STEPS TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. MY PURPOSE IN WRITING, HOWEVER, IS TO TRY TO BREAK THE IMPASSE THAT HAS DEVELOPED IN US-EC TALKS ON THE URUGUAY ROUND. I APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TO DATE. BUT WITH MAASTRICHT BEHIND YOU AND YOUR PRESIDENCY DRAWING TO AN

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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END. WE MUST MAKE AN ALL OUT EFFORT TO BRIDGE OUR DIFFERENCES OR FACE THE PROSPECT OF FAILURE BOTH IN OUR BILATERAL EFFORTS AND IN THE BROADER WORLD TRADE NEGOTIATIONS.

ONE BY ONE, WE ARE NARROWING AND SETTLING U.S.-EC DIFFERENCES OUTSIDE THE AGRICULTURE AREA. YOU SOUGHT U.S. FLEXIBILITY IN THESE OTHER AREAS, AND WE HAVE SHOWN IT. AFTER THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE HAGUE LAST WEEK WITH YOU AND THE COMMISSION, I UNDERSTAND THE LEAD EC NEGOTIATOR REPORTED TO YOU THAT WE COULD PROBABLY RESOLVE OUR REMAINING DIFFERENCES IN THESE AREAS WITHIN A FEW WEEKS. THE U.S. MIGHT HAVE WORRIED THAT MAKING CONCESSIONS IN OTHER AREAS WOULD WEAKEN OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION, BUT WE ACCEPTED YOUR ASSURANCES THAT U.S. FLEXIBILITY IN OTHER AREAS WOULD RESULT IN EC MOVEMENT IN AGRICULTURE. AFTER ALL, WE ARE NEGOTIATING IN TRUST AS PARTNERS COMMITTED TO THE SAME PURPOSE.

WE ARE NEARING THE POINT AT WHICH EC AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES, ESPECIALLY EXPORT SUBSIDIES, COULD BY THEMSELVES BLOCK SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE URUGUAY ROUND. YET THE TIME AVAILABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT HAS NEARLY EXPIRED. GATT DIRECTOR DUNKEL WILL ISSUE A FINAL DRAFT AGREEMENT ON DECEMBER 20. FRANKLY GIVEN THE VIEWS

OF MOST COUNTRIES ON AGRICULTURE, THIS WILL BUILD PRESSURE ON THE EC. WE REMAIN PREPARED TO RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES DIRECTLY. BUT IF WE CANNOT RESOLVE THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES SOON, AGREEMENT THIS YEAR WILL BECOME IMPOSSIBLE. THE PROSPECTS FOR CONCLUDING THE ROUND WILL DECLINE SHARPLY ONCE 1991 PASSES.

AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN MAKING A SERIOUS EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A COMPROMISE WITH THE EC IN AGRICULTURE. WE SENT UNDER SECRETARY CROWDER TO BRUSSELS TO TRY TO ACCOMMODATE EC WISHES TO EXEMPT PAYMENTS UNDER THE CAP REFORM PROGRAM FROM THE REDUCTIONS IN INTERNAL SUPPORTS REQUIRED AS PART OF A NEW AGREEMENT. WE HAVE ALSO INDICATED FLEXIBILITY IN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS. UNFORTUNATELY, MR. CROWDER FOUND LITTLE INTEREST IN OUR IDEAS ON INTERNAL SUPPORTS AND COULD MAKE NO PROGRESS ON MARKET ACCESS.

BUT EVEN IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN THESE TWO CATEGORIES -- AND IT WILL REQUIRE MORE EC FLEXIBILITY THAN WE HAVE SEEN TO DATE -- THE EFFECT WILL BE NO PRACTICAL BENEFIT FOR US OR OTHERS.

THERE IS NO WAY THEREFORE, THAT WE COULD ACCEPT THE EC'S POSITION IN THE THIRD CATEGORY, EXPORT SUBSIDIES, AND STILL SECURE NECESSARY SUPPORT FOR THE AGREED PACKAGE. I HOPE YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD, NOT TO MENTION THE U.S. CONGRESS, ADAMANTLY OBJECTS TO THE EC'S PRACTICE OF MASSIVE SUBSIDIZED AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS. THIS IS WHY, AT THE END OF THE DAY, THE EC MUST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT OF ITS TRADING PARTNERS TO CUT THE VOLUME OF SUBSIDIZED EXPORTS SIGNIFICANTLY, OR THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT. THE FACT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMMODATE THE EC ON MARKET ACCESS AND INTERNAL SUPPORTS MAKES AN ADEQUATE REDUCTION IN SUBSIDIZED EXPORTS ALL THE MORE IMPERATIVE.

THIS IS NOT THE PLACE TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE SPECIFICALLY WHAT IS NEEDED. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, EC AGRICULTURE COMMISSIONER MACSHARRY HAS PUT FORWARD IDEAS THAT WOULD AT LEAST ESTABLISH A CREDIBLE POINT FROM WHICH TO NEGOTIATE. HOWEVER, THE FORMAL EC POSITION, WHICH WOULD STILL LEAVE SUBSIDIZED WHEAT EXPORTS AT 15 MILLION TONS AFTER SIX YEARS, IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO WORK FROM -- ESPECIALLY AFTER BEING TOLD THAT OUR FLEXIBILITY IN OTHER AREAS WOULD RESULT IN EC MOVEMENT IN AGRICULTURE.

YOUR POSITION ON THIS PIVOTAL ISSUE WILL BE DECISIVE. I AM ALSO COMMUNICATING WITH HELMUT KOHL AND JOHN MAJOR IN THIS SAME VEIN. I HOPE YOU WILL DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH THEM AND WORK TO ACHIEVE AN EC COMMITMENT TO REDUCE SUBSIDIZED EXPORTS TO A LEVEL APPROACHING OUR NEEDS. WITH THAT, I AM CONFIDENT WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT. OTHERWISE, I

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AM AFRAID WE MAY HAVE COME TO THE END OF THE ROAD IN THE URUGUAY ROUND.

I AM AWARE THAT NOT EVERY MEMBER OF THE EC WILL ENDORSE SUCH A POSITION. HOWEVER, THE FATE OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AND THE DIRECTION OF U.S.-EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS HANG IN THE BALANCE. YOU KNOW AS WELL AS ANYONE HOW GREAT THE DANGER IS THAT PROTECTIONISM AND ISOLATIONISM WILL GAIN THE UPPER HAND ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. GIVEN THE TURMOIL TO THE EAST A BREACH IN TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION COULD NOT COME AT A WORSE TIME. WHILE THE DECISION IS NOT EASY, WE ARE NO STRANGERS TO DIFFICULT DECISIONS. BUT NONE WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN

THIS -- FOR EUROPE AND AMERICA, FOR OUR ECONOMIES, FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND FOR ME.

I HAVE ALSO WRITTEN TO JACQUES DELORS APPRISING HIM OF MY ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE AND URGING MOVEMENT.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH BAKER

BT

#5226

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: GANTI SDO

SIT: GOMPERT PRES MSGS WAYNE WHSR SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 130209Z DEC 91

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 405229

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ETRD, EAGR, EEC

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. POST IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE
PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR BEFORE OOB DECEMBER

13. WE UNDERSTAND THAT PRIME MINISTER MAJOR PLANS TO CALL
CHANCELLOR KOHL EARLY MORNING 12/13, AND THAT PRIME

MINISTER LUBBERS WILL CALL EC PRESIDENT DELORS AND

PRESIDENT BUSH EARLY 12/13. THE LETTER SHOULD BE

DELIVERED BEFORE THOSE EXCHANGES TAKE PLACE. THEREFORE,

POST IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE LETTER AS EARLY AS

NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT PRIME MINISTER MAJOR RECEIVES IT

BEFORE OPENING OF BUSINESS. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL

FOLLOW.

DEAR JOHN:

I WANT TO CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR SUCCESS AT MAASTRICHT.

YOU WALKED THROUGH THAT MINEFIELD WITH APLOMB AND CAME OUT

LOOKING LIKE A CHAMPION. I PARTICULARLY APPRECIATED THE

SOLID LANGUAGE AFFECTING THE ALLIANCE, BUT I WAS ALSO GLAD

THAT AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. I HOPE YOU SAW MY STATEMENT

ON MAASTRICHT'S RESULTS. I WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE

UNITED STATES FULLY SUPPORTS EUROPE'S STEPS TOWARD

INTEGRATION AND AN EVEN STRONGER ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP.

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mm 5/11/2015

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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BUT MY PURPOSE IN WRITING IS TO ENGAGE YOU DIRECTLY ON THE URGENT AND VITAL MATTER OF THE URUGUAY ROUND. WHILE I HAVE BEEN KEEPING YOU INFORMED OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUUD LUBBERS AND JACQUES DELORS, I HAVE NOT UNTIL NOW ASKED YOU TO INTERVENE IN THE US-EC NEGOTIATIONS. YOUR FOCUS, UNDERSTANDABLY, HAS BEEN ON MAASTRICHT IN RECENT DAYS. AND I CHOSE NOT TO BURDEN YOUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER EC LEADERS IN ANY WAY AT SUCH A DELICATE MOMENT. NOW, HOWEVER, I ASK YOU TO JOIN ME IN TAKING THE STEPS NEEDED TO SAVE THE WORLD TRADE NEGOTIATIONS FROM FAILURE. ONE BY ONE, WE ARE NARROWING AND SETTling U.S.-EC DIFFERENCES OUTSIDE THE AGRICULTURE AREA. AS YOU KNOW, THE EC SOUGHT U.S. FLEXIBILITY IN THESE OTHER AREAS, AND WE HAVE SHOWN IT. AS A CONSEQUENCE, AFTER OUR DISCUSSIONS LAST WEEK WITH RUUD LUBBERS AND THE COMMISSION, THE LEAD EC NEGOTIATOR REPORTED TO RUUD THAT WE COULD PROBABLY RESOLVE OUR REMAINING DIFFERENCES IN THESE AREAS WITHIN A FEW WEEKS.

THE U.S. MIGHT HAVE WORRIED THAT MAKING CONCESSIONS IN OTHER AREAS WOULD WEAKEN OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION, BUT WE ACCEPTED THE EC ASSURANCES THAT U.S. FLEXIBILITY IN OTHER AREAS WOULD RESULT IN EC MOVEMENT IN AGRICULTURE. AFTER ALL, WE ARE NEGOTIATING IN TRUST AS PARTNERS COMMITTED TO

THE SAME PURPOSE.

WE ARE NEARING THE POINT AT WHICH EC AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES, ESPECIALLY EXPORT SUBSIDIES, COULD BY THEMSELVES BLOCK SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE URUGUAY ROUND. YET THE TIME AVAILABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT HAS NEARLY EXPIRED. GATT DIRECTOR DUNKEL WILL ISSUE A FINAL DRAFT AGREEMENT ON DECEMBER 20. FRANKLY, GIVEN THE VIEWS OF MOST COUNTRIES ON AGRICULTURE, THIS WILL BUILD PRESSURE ON THE EC. WE REMAIN PREPARED TO RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES DIRECTLY. BUT, IF WE CANNOT RESOLVE THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES SOON, AGREEMENT THIS YEAR WILL BECOME IMPOSSIBLE. THE PROSPECTS FOR CONCLUDING THE ROUND WILL DECLINE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SHARPLY ONCE 1991 PASSES.

I WANT YOU TO BE AWARE OF WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DOING TO ACHIEVE A COMPROMISE WITH THE EC IN AGRICULTURE. WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMMODATE EC WISHES TO EXEMPT PAYMENTS UNDER THE CAP REFORM PROGRAM FROM THE REDUCTIONS IN INTERNAL SUPPORTS REQUIRED AS PART OF A NEW AGREEMENT. WE HAVE ALSO INDICATED FLEXIBILITY IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE SENT AGRICULTURE UNDER SECRETARY CROWDER TO BRUSSELS THIS WEEK. UNFORTUNATELY, HE FOUND LITTLE INTEREST IN OUR IDEAS. BUT EVEN IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN INTERNAL SUPPORTS AND MARKET ACCESS -- AND IT WILL REQUIRE MORE EC FLEXIBILITY THAN WE HAVE SEEN TO DATE -- THE EFFECT WILL BE NO PRACTICAL BENEFIT FOR US OR OTHERS. THERE IS NO WAY, THEREFORE, THAT WE COULD ACCEPT THE EC'S POSITION IN THE THIRD CATEGORY, EXPORT SUBSIDIES, AND STILL SECURE NECESSARY DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE AGREED PACKAGE.

I HOPE YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD, NOT TO MENTION THE U.S. CONGRESS, ADAMANTLY OBJECTS TO THE EC'S PRACTICE OF MASSIVE SUBSIDIZED AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS. THIS IS WHY, AT THE END OF THE DAY, THE EC MUST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT OF ITS TRADING PARTNERS TO CUT THE VOLUME OF SUBSIDIZED EXPORTS SIGNIFICANTLY, OR THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT. THE FACT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMMODATE THE EC ON MARKET ACCESS AND INTERNAL SUPPORTS MAKES AN ADEQUATE REDUCTION IN SUBSIDIZED EXPORTS ALL THE MORE IMPERATIVE.

THIS IS NOT THE PLACE TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE SPECIFICALLY WHAT IS NEEDED. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, EC AGRICULTURE COMMISSIONER MACSHARRY HAS PUT FORWARD IDEAS THAT WOULD AT LEAST ESTABLISH A CREDIBLE POINT FROM WHICH TO NEGOTIATE. HOWEVER, THE FORMAL EC POSITION, WHICH WOULD STILL LEAVE SUBSIDIZED WHEAT EXPORTS AT 15 MILLION TONS AFTER SIX YEARS, IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO WORK FROM -- ESPECIALLY AFTER BEING TOLD THAT OUR FLEXIBILITY IN OTHER AREAS WOULD RESULT IN EC MOVEMENT IN AGRICULTURE.

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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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I AM ALSO WRITING TO RUUD LUBBERS AND HELMUT KOHL IN THIS VEIN (AND IN A DIFFERENT MANNER, I HAVE COMMUNICATED MY GENERAL VIEW OF THE STATE OF PLAY IN U.S.-EC TALKS TO JACQUES DELORS). BUT, YOUR POSITION ON THIS PIVOTAL ISSUE WILL BE DECISIVE. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONTACT RUUD AND HELMUT AND MAKE THE DECISIONS URGENTLY NEEDED TO FIND A SOLUTION. IF THE EC WILL MAKE A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE SUBSIDIZED EXPORTS TO A LEVEL APPROACHING OUR NEEDS, I AM CONFIDENT WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT. OTHERWISE, I AM AFRAID WE MAY HAVE COME TO THE END OF THE ROAD IN THE URUGUAY ROUND.

I AM AWARE THAT NOT EVERY MEMBER OF THE EC WILL ENDORSE

SUCH A POSITION. HOWEVER, THE FATE OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AND THE DIRECTION OF U.S.-EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS HANG IN THE BALANCE. YOU KNOW AS WELL AS ANYONE HOW GREAT THE DANGER IS THAT PROTECTIONISM AND ISOLATIONISM WILL GAIN THE UPPER HAND ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. GIVEN THE TURMOIL TO THE EAST, A BREACH IN TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION COULD NOT COME AT A WORSE TIME. THE DECISIONS WILL NOT BE EASY. BUT YOU AND I ARE NO STRANGERS TO DIFFICULT DECISIONS, AND YOU HAVE JUST DEMONSTRATED AGAIN YOUR ABILITY TO MAKE TOUGH CHOICES AND PREVAIL AGAINST DIFFICULT ODDS. I VENTURE TO SAY THAT THIS ISSUE IS AS IMPORTANT AS ANY WE HAVE ON OUR AGENDA -- FOR EUROPE AND AMERICA, FOR OUR ECONOMIES, FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND FOR ME.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH BAKER

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0699-MR
MM 5/11/2015

PRT: GANTT SDO

SIT: GOMPERT PRES^MSGS WAYNE WHSR^SPECIAL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 130211Z DEC 91

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 405235

NODIS

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ETRD, EAGR EEC

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO EC PRESIDENT JACQUES
DELORS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. POST IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE
PRESIDENT TO EC PRESIDENT JACQUES DELORS BEFORE 00B
DECEMBER 13. WE UNDERSTAND THAT PRIME MINISTER MAJOR
PLANS TO CALL CHANCELLOR KOHL EARLY MORNING 12/13, AND
THAT PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS WILL CALL DELORS AND PRESIDENT
BUSH EARLY 12/13. THE LETTER SHOULD BE DELIVERED BEFORE
THOSE EXCHANGES TAKE PLACE. THEREFORE, POST IS REQUESTED
TO DELIVER THE LETTER AS EARLY AS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT
DELORS RECEIVES IT BEFORE OPENING OF BUSINESS. NO SIGNED
ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

DEAR JACQUES:

FIRST, LET ME OFFER MY CONGRATULATIONS FOR THE SUCCESS AT
MAASTRICHT. I HOPE YOU HAVE SEEN MY STATEMENT WELCOMING
THE RESULTS. I WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE U.S.
SUPPORTS FULLY THESE STEPS TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.
BUT I AM WRITING YOU TODAY ON A MORE SOMBER NOTE. I AM
VERY DISTURBED WITH THE IMPASSE IN OUR DISCUSSIONS ON THE
URUGUAY ROUND. I THINK THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE GREAT
EFFORTS TO BE FLEXIBLE, BUT THAT MOVEMENT HAS NOT BEEN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

RECIPROCATED BY THE EC, ESPECIALLY IN AGRICULTURE. CLEARLY, IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY HOPE OF SUCCESS IN GENEVA THIS YEAR, WE MUST ACT NOW.

LET ME SHARE MY ASSESSMENT OF WHERE WE STAND. LAST YEAR, THE EC URGED THE U.S. TO LOOK BEYOND AGRICULTURE. AT THE LONDON SUMMIT, WE AGREED TO TREAT THREE OTHER ISSUES AS PRIORITIES ALONG WITH AGRICULTURE. AFTER OUR MEETING IN THE HAGUE, RUUD WROTE ME THAT U.S. FLEXIBILITY ON THE NON-AGRICULTURAL ISSUES COULD ENABLE THE EC TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON AGRICULTURE. AND, WE RESPONDED.

I THINK IT IS NOW CLEAR TO RUUD AND TO SENIOR COMMISSION OFFICIALS THAT WE HAVE PUT FORWARD SOME USEFUL IDEAS -- AND DEMONSTRATED FLEXIBILITY, AS THE EC HAD URGED US TO DO. INDEED, IN THE PRIVATE SUMMING UP FOR RUUD AT THE LATEST TALKS IN THE HAGUE, THE EC NEGOTIATOR SAID HE BELIEVED THE EC AND THE U.S. COULD RESOLVE OUR REMAINING DIFFERENCES ON THE NON-AGRICULTURAL ISSUES DISCUSSED FAIRLY QUICKLY. WE STILL HAVE HARD WORK AHEAD ON THOSE SUBJECTS, BUT I SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE NON-AGRICULTURAL ISSUES SHOULD NOT BLOCK THE COMPLETION OF THE ROUND, AT LEAST INSOFAR AS THE U.S. AND THE EC ARE CONCERNED. LAST WEEKEND ED MADIGAN'S TALKS WITH RAY MACSHARRY FURTHER CLARIFIED THE GAPS BETWEEN US, BUT IT WAS CLEAR

THAT MACSHARRY HAD NO FLEXIBILITY EVEN TO EXPLORE SOLUTIONS.

AS YOU RECALL, WE HAVE ALL AGREED TO CUT AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES IN THREE AREAS: MARKET ACCESS; INTERNAL SPENDING ON FARM PROGRAMS RELATED TO PRODUCTION; AND EXPORT SUBSIDIES. ALTHOUGH THE EC HAS REFERRED TO CUTS OF 35 PERCENT IN ALL THREE CATEGORIES, THE EFFECT OF RESULTS IN MARKET ACCESS AND INTERNAL SUPPORTS WILL BE LESS SIGNIFICANT AND WILL NOT HELP ME BUILD SUPPORT AT HOME FOR ANY AGREEMENT.

IN MARKET ACCESS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE EC IS CHANGING ITS OLD SYSTEM INTO A TARIFF SYSTEM. THE NEW TARIFFS WILL BE SO

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

HIGH -- OFTEN BETWEEN 100 AND 200 PERCENT OR MORE -- THAT EVEN AFTER THE CUTS MOST IMPORTS WILL BE KEPT OUT OF THE EC MARKET. FROM A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE HOWEVER, THE EC OFFER WILL NOT GIVE ME (OR OTHER LEADERS) VERY MUCH TO USE TO WIN SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT AS A WHOLE.

IN THE SECOND CATEGORY, INTERNAL SUPPORTS, RAY MACSHARRY MADE CLEAR THAT HE WANTS TO ENSURE THAT THE PAYMENTS UNDER THE EC'S CAP REFORM ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE 35 PERCENT CUT. WE WOULD PREFER TO SUBJECT INTERNAL SUPPORTS -- YOUR AND OURS -- TO THE CUT, BUT WE ARE WILLING TO TRY TO ACCOMMODATE THE EC. THUS WE SENT UNDER SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE CROWDER TO BRUSSELS TO EXPLORE MEANS TO ACHIEVE YOUR OBJECTIVE IN A WAY THAT MOVES CLOSER TO DELINKAGE BETWEEN PAYMENTS AND PRODUCTION AND WHICH TREATS OUR PROGRAMS THE SAME WAY.

UNFORTUNATELY, EVEN OUR EFFORTS TO FIND WAYS TO ACCOMMODATE THE EC IN THESE TWO CATEGORIES HAVE BEEN LARGELY FUTILE DUE TO EC INFLEXIBILITY. BUT LET ME MAKE CLEAR THAT WITH WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY OFFERED THE EC ON INTERNAL SUPPORTS AND MARKET ACCESS WE NEED A COMMITMENT TO A SUBSTANTIAL VOLUME REDUCTION IN SUBSIDIZED EXPORTS OR WE WOULD HAVE NO REAL GAIN TO USE TO WIN DOMESTIC SUPPORT. WITHOUT SUCH A COMMITMENT, KEY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WILL ARGUE THAT THE EC IS OFFERING NOTHING THAT WOULD NOT OCCUR ANYWAY WITH CAP REFORM. INSTEAD OF SUPPORTING THE AGREEMENT, THEY WOULD OPPOSE IT, AND I WILL LIKELY FACE NEW PRESSURES FOR ADDITIONAL EXPORT SUBSIDIES. TO SUM UP, WE HAVE BEEN FLEXIBLE ON NON-AGRICULTURAL ISSUES, AND DEMONSTRATED WITH CONCRETE IDEAS OUR DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL TO THE EC ON MARKET ACCESS AND INTERNAL SUPPORTS FOR AGRICULTURE. IT THEREFORE SEEMS TO ME THAT IT IS TIME FOR THE EC TO ADDRESS WHAT WE MUST HAVE ON EXPORT SUBSIDIES -- A SERIOUS COMMITMENT TO REDUCE SUBSTANTIALLY THE VOLUME OF YOUR SUBSIDIZED EXPORTS. AND I HOPE YOU APPRECIATE THAT WE CANNOT GIVE UP OUR PRESENT RIGHTS OF MARKET ACCESS THROUGH "REBALANCING" IN ORDER TO

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

ACHIEVE OUR ONE REAL GAIN IN THE AGRICULTURAL AREA.
THE EC WILL NEED TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THESE POINTS NOT JUST
FOR US BUT TO BRING ALONG THE DEVELOPING NATIONS, TOO.
THEY WILL NOT OFFER WHAT WE BOTH WANT ON SERVICES,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND SO FORTH WITHOUT MORE EC GIVE
ON AGRICULTURE.

IF WE ARE TO BRIDGE OUR DIFFERENCES IN THE SHORT TIME
REMAINING, EC NEGOTIATORS WILL NEED MORE FREEDOM TO
NEGOTIATE IN AGRICULTURE AND PARTICULARLY TO CUT EXPORT
SUBSIDIES. YOUR EFFORTS WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO TAKE THE
FINAL STEPS NEEDED TO BRING A PACKAGE TOGETHER.

IF WE CAN NOT FIND AGREEMENT, WE WILL BE FACED WITH THE

UNPLEASANT TASK OF MANAGING THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE.
WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE HOW SERIOUS THEY WOULD BE. IN
THE SHORT-TERM, A FAILED ROUND WILL SEVERELY UNDERMINE
CONFIDENCE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY AS WELL AS IN THE NEW
US-EC RELATIONSHIP WE ARE TRYING TO BUILD. IN THE
LONGER-TERM, FAILURE WILL FUEL THE FORCES OF PROTECTIONISM
WHICH COULD PUSH US INTO DESTRUCTIVE TRADE WARS.

I WILL REMAIN PERSONALLY ENGAGED AND HOPE YOU DO, TOO.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BAKER

BT

#5235

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16a. Draft Cable	Re: Brent Scowcroft to Robert Zoellick (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16b. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Robert Zoellick from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	12/21/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

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17a. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Robert Zoellick from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	12/21/91	(b)(1)	S

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
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RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17b. Draft Cable	Re: Brent Scowcroft to Robert Zoellick (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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ROUTINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT GANTT HOWE SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT HOTLINE IN

<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 231415Z DEC 91

FM ABDIN PALACE

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA SUNSHINE CHANNELS

QQQQ

DEAR GEORGE ,

ON THE OCCASION OF THE GLORIOUS HOLIDAYS, PLEASE
ACCEPT OUR HEART-FELT GREETINGS . TOGETHER WITH
OUR BEST WISHES FOR A MERRY CHRISTMAS AND A
HAPPY NEW YEAR . WE HOPE THAT THE COMING YEAR
WILL WITNESS GREATER ACHIEVMENTS AND
FULLFILLMENT FOR YOU AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE .
AS WE PRAY TO GOD ALMIGHTY TO GUIDE OUR STEPS
TOWARDS A BETTER FUTURE FOR MANKIND , WE CALL
UPON ALL NATIONS TO ABIDE BY THE SPIRIT OF
UNIVERSAL FRIENDSHIP AND FRATERNITY WHICH IS
SYMBOLIZED BY THESE HOLIDAYS . WE NOW TO
CONTINUE THE EFFORTS WE ARE EXERTING TOGETHER IN
ORDER TO MAKE THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WHOLE
WORLD MORE PEACEFUL AND SECURE .

ALL OF US WISH YOU AND YOUR FAMILY FULL SUCCESS
AND HAPPINESS .

HOSNI MOUBARAK

#0001

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 9/8/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/SENSITIVE

December 18, 1991

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Dear Jim:

I discussed with the President this morning your draft letter for him to send inviting participants to a coordination conference. He was frankly concerned about the optics of what was being proposed. The idea of calling for a massive world-wide effort to provide humanitarian assistance to the Soviet Union on the very eve of the State of the Union address, thereby putting it in apparent stark contrast to the modest efforts proposed to deal with our domestic problems, made him nervous.

He had several suggestions. The first was to separate the conference in time as far as possible from the State of the Union address. He asked why it could not be held while he was on the Asian trip. I told him that your notion had been that he should open the conference. He also suggested that phrases such as "massive effort" be eliminated or tempered. He thought that the conference should be made clearly a coordinating rather than a pledging conference and therefore that the paragraph asking for additional or new assistance be dropped. He suggests that

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DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/4/84

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/SENSITIVE

including the Eastern Europeans as participants is something of an anomaly, especially since most of them think they should be the primary recipients of an effort such as this, not potential donors. Finally, he would prefer that his letter be a very brief note to the heads of government inviting (urging) participation and stating that you would be writing a letter providing all the details. The draft letter you sent in would then become your letter.

I have communicated the gist of this to Larry but I thought you should get the President's views directly. We will be moving along the above lines unless we hear further from you.

Warm regards,

Brent

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/SENSITIVE

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
20. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to DCM Collins fro Mikhail Gorbachev from President Bush [251813Z Dec 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	12/25/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/8/2016

Date Closed:	7/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-0700-MR(519)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	2/25/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FLASH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT GANTT HILL HOWE COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN
SIT BURNS HEWETT FILE PRIVACY OUT SIT SUM SUM2

PREC FLASH CLAS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG 251813Z DEC 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

1.4(c)

2010-0700-MR
2/25/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO DCM COLLINS FOR IMMEDIATE
DELIVERY TO MIKHAIL GORBACHEV FROM PRESIDENT BUSH. SIGNED
ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

-
BEGIN TEXT:
-

-
DEAR MIKHAIL:
-

AS YOU MAY HAVE SEEN, I HAVE ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT TODAY
PRAISING YOUR EXTRAORDINARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO GLOBAL PEACE
AND RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. BUT, IN ADDITION,
I WANTED TO SEND A MORE PERSONAL NOTE IN LIGHT OF OUR
LONG-STANDING, AND CLOSE, RELATIONSHIP.

-
YOU AND I HAVE FORMED THE TYPE OF PARTNERSHIP MANY SAID
COULD NEVER BE. WE SAT DOWN AND TALKED FRANKLY, WITHOUT
POSTURING. AS LEADERS OF TWO GREAT NATIONS WHOSE PEOPLES
HAVE A NATURAL AFFINITY FOR EACH OTHER. YOUR NO-NONSENSE
APPROACH WAS A BREATH OF FRESH AIR TO AMERICANS AND SOVIETS
WHO HAD GROWN WEARY OF THE SEEMINGLY ENDLESS US-SOVIET
CONFRONTATION OVER EVERYTHING FROM IDEOLOGY TO WEAPONS.

-
IT IS EXTRAORDINARY TO THINK WHAT YOU HAVE ACCOMPLISHED IN
WHAT WOULD BE SOMETHING LESS THAN TWO TERMS FOR AN AMERICAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FLASH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

PRESIDENT YOU CAME TO POWER IN A ONE-PARTY STATE DOMINATED BY A HUGE BUREAUCRACY INTENT ON HOLDING ON TO ITS AUTHORITY. NO MATTER WHAT THE COST. AND EQUALLY INTENT ON USING CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. TO JUSTIFY THE HEAVY MILITARY BURDEN IMPOSED ON THE SOVIET PEOPLE YET OVER THE SPACE OF A FEW YEARS. YOU MANAGED TO CONVINCE THOSE SAME BUREAUCRATS TO PULL BACK FROM CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST. AND TO VOLUNTARILY GIVE UP THE POWER THEY SO JEALOUSLY GUARDED. THE WORLD OWES YOU AN ENORMOUS DEBT FOR YOUR TENACITY. OPTIMISM. AND VISION IN WHAT IS UNDOUBTEDLY ONE OF THE GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.

OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP IS A SPECIAL ONE FOR ME. AND I HOPE WE CAN PRESERVE IT DURING THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD. YOU AND I SPENT COUNTLESS HOURS TALKING ABOUT YOUR PLANS FOR THE SOVIET UNION. AND ABOUT HOW WE COULD WORK JOINTLY FOR A MORE PEACEFUL WORLD IN WHICH THE USSR WOULD BE A PARTNER. NOT AN ADVERSARY. TO THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY. I LEARNED MUCH IN THOSE CONVERSATIONS. AND THE ACTIONS YOU AND I AGREED UPON TRANSFORMED THE WORLD WE LIVE IN. WORKING TOGETHER. WE SAW THE LIBERATION OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY. WE SAW THE DEFEAT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HELPED BRING PEACE TO NICARAGUA AND CAMBODIA. BUT. PERHAPS MOST

IMPORTANT OF ALL. WAS THE LIBERATION OF OUR PEOPLES FROM THE U.S. -SOVIET CONFRONTATION WHICH HAD POISONED OUR RELATIONS AND THREATENED WORLD PEACE.

I KNOW YOU HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE VIABILITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH WHICH HAS EMERGED. BUT I ALSO KNOW THAT YOU HOPE YOU ARE WRONG. ALL OF US--YOU. BORIS YELTSIN. THE LEADERS OF THE OTHER REPUBLICS. AND WE IN THE WEST--HAVE EVERY REASON TO HOPE THAT THIS NEW ENTITY WILL SUPPORT THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY AND MARKET ECONOMICS IN THE REPUBLICS. I LOOK FORWARD TO STAYING IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH YOU IN THE MONTHS AHEAD AS THE U.S. WORKS TO SUPPORT THIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FLASH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

PROCESS.

-
AT THIS VERY SPECIAL TIME OF YEAR WE WISH YOU GREAT
HAPPINESS AND PEACE. WE SEND YOU OUR WARMEST HOLIDAY
GREETINGS. AND WE SAY TO YOU. OUR ESTEEMED FRIEND. "WELL
DONE " NOW ON TO THE FUTURE. WE HOPE THAT AT SOME POINT IN
THE NEAR FUTURE YOU WILL VISIT US IN THE U.S. IN THE
MEANTIME I WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE TO RELY UPON YOUR ADVICE
AND COUNSEL ON THESE HISTORIC DEVELOPMENTS.

-
SINCERELY, GEORGE BUSH
-

-
END TEXT.
-

HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW
-

DECLAS: OADR
#0050

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
21. Cable	Canberra to The White House Re: From Ambassador Sembler to the White House for the President (2 pp.)	12/24/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
22. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Prime Minister Hawke from the President (2 pp.)	12/23/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Date Closed: 7/27/2009 **OA/ID Number:** 91152-004

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

AR Case #:

AR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

Appeal Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

Disposition Date:

MR Case #:

MR Disposition:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
23. Message	Re: Presidential Message to Prime Minister Major (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
Special Message Routing

Cable:

X	SCOWCROFT		McNAMARA
X	HOWE		DEAL
	GOMPERT		GORDON
X	HEWETT (dona)		PAAL
	HAASS		PRYCE
		X	GANTT (File)

NSC External Distribution:

	Vice President		Sec State
	Chief of Staff		Sec Defense
			Sec Treasury
			Attorney General

Return to WHSR for Distribution

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
24. Cable	From White House, Re: Charge Collins to General Scowcroft and Ed Hewitt [261100Z Dec 91] [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	12/26/91	(b)(1), (b)(6)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 1/28/2016

Date Closed: 7/27/2009	OA/ID Number: 91152-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-1063-MR(517)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/2/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 03

PT GANTT HEWETT HOWE SCOWCROFT
SIT FILE 1.4(c) IN SIT

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~

DTG 261100Z DEC 91

FM 1.4(c)

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 1.4(c)

0000

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND ED HEWITT

FROM: CHARGE COLLINS

BEGIN TEXT:

ON THE EVE OF THE CHRISTMAS DAY STATEMENTS BY GORBACHEV. THE
PRESIDENT AND YELTSIN. (b)(6)

(b)(6) ASKED CHARGE TO MEET HIM PRIVATELY AT HIS OFFICE TO
DISCUSS THE CONDUCT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP DURING THE TRANSITION
PERIOD FOLLOWING U.S. RECOGNITION OF RUSSIA. (b)(6)

MESSAGE WAS THE FOLLOWING:

-- IN THE WAKE OF GORBACHEV'S RESIGNATION AND A U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT
REGARDING RECOGNITION OF RUSSIA. THERE WILL BE A PERIOD OF
TRANSITION FOR THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

-- DURING THAT PERIOD THE LOGIC OF THE TRANSITION WILL
INVOLVE CHANGES OF PERSONNEL. (NOTE: (b)(6) SAID HE WAS
NOT AT LIBERTY TO DISCUSS THE COMING CHANGES IN PART
BECAUSE THE DIMENSIONS OF THE CHANGE WERE NOT YET DECIDED.
HOWEVER, HE IMPLIED THAT KOMPLEKTOV WILL BE RECALLED AND
THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE "SOVIET" TEAM ARE PROBABLY
GOING TO BE REPLACED.)

-- THE CHANGE FROM SOVIET TO RUSSIAN EMBASSY MANAGEMENT
AND DIRECTION WILL POSE SOME DELICATE PROBLEMS AMONG
THE EMBASSY STAFF. HE HAD RECENTLY TALKED TO KOLOSOVSKY
ABOUT THIS AND UNDERSTOOD KOLOSOVSKY HAD DISCUSSED THIS
ISSUE WITH ED HEWETT.

-- IN LIGHT OF THE COMPLICATED CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1063-MR
5/2/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR THE PERIOD OF THE TRANSITION IF THE USG USED THE U.S. AMBASSADOR/ CHARGE AND EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AS THE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO SENIOR LEVELS OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT.

-- (b)(6) AND KOLOSOVSKY HAD DISCUSSED THE FOREGOING. HOWEVER, THE ARRANGEMENT PROPOSED IS A SENSITIVE MATTER AND (b)(6) SAID HE HOPED I COULD CONVEY IT DIRECTLY AND UNOFFICIALLY TO WASHINGTON.

I TOLD (b)(6) I WOULD, OF COURSE, PASS HIS COMMENTS AND ADVICE ON TO WASHINGTON DISCREETLY. WITHOUT COMMITTING TO DO MORE THAN THAT. I TOLD HIM THAT I DID UNDERSTAND THAT THE TRANSITION FROM A SOVIET TO A RUSSIAN MISSION WOULD POSE A VARIETY OF DELICATE PROBLEMS. AND THAT I WAS CERTAIN THE USG WOULD WANT TO BE SURE THOSE PROBLEMS DID NOT INTERFERE WITH A SMOOTH TRANSITION IN THE CONDUCT OF OUR RELATIONS.

COMMENT: THERE IS CLEARLY A SELF SERVING ELEMENT IN ALL OF THIS IN THAT (b)(6) AS THE CHANNEL TO US ON THINGS AMERICAN AND SEE U.S. RELIANCE ON OUR EMBASSY HERE AS THE CHANNEL TO THE NEW RUSSIAN MFA -- AS OPPOSED TO THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON -- AS THE MOST LIKELY WAY TO ENSURE THE FUTURE RELEVANCE AND SURVIVAL OF THE U.S. AND CANADA

DIVISION.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE SUSPECT THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP HERE IS UNCERTAIN ABOUT SOME OF THE WASHINGTON STAFF. KOLOSOVSKY IS THEIR MAN. BUT HE IS NOT RUNNING THE PLACE; NOR, WE ASSUME, DOES HE HAVE PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT RELATIONS OUTSIDE THE EXISTING EMBASSY STRUCTURE (I.E. AMB KOMPLEKTOV AND HIS STAFF WHOSE FUTURE POSITION HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED). IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS, THEREFORE, PROBABLE THAT OUR BEST AND MOST RELIABLE MEANS OF CONVEYING U.S. VIEWS AND POSITIONS TO THE NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS TO DO SO DIRECTLY IN MOSCOW. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD ENSURE THAT KOLOSOVSKY IS KEPT FULLY

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

IN THE LOOP ON WHAT WE DO HERE. FOR THE PRESENT THIS
WILL ENSURE THAT WE KNOW THE RECIPIENT AND HAVE THE ABILITY
TO ENSURE CLARITY

I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SHARING THIS MESSAGE WITH DEPUTY
SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

END TEXT.

DECLAS: OADR

-1065

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
25. Draft Cable	Charge Collins to General Scowcroft and Ed Hewitt [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (July - December) 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/1/2016

Date Closed:	7/27/2009	OA/ID Number:	91152-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-1064-MR(500)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/11/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



~~SECRET~~

FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND ED HEWITT
FROM: CHARGE COLLINS

BEGIN TEXT:

ON THE EVE OF THE CHRISTMAS DAY STATEMENTS BY GORBACHEV, THE PRESIDENT AND YELTSIN, [1.4(d)]

[1.4(d)] ASKED CHARGE TO MEET HIM PRIVATELY AT HIS OFFICE TO DISCUSS THE CONDUCT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD FOLLOWING U.S. RECOGNITION OF RUSSIA. [1.4(d)] MESSAGE WAS THE FOLLOWING:

-- IN THE WAKE OF GORBACHEV'S RESIGNATION AND A U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING RECOGNITION OF RUSSIA, THERE WILL BE A PERIOD OF TRANSITION FOR THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

-- DURING THAT PERIOD THE LOGIC OF THE TRANSITION WILL INVOLVE CHANGES OF PERSONNEL. (NOTE: [1.4(d)] SAID HE WAS NOT AT LIBERTY TO DISCUSS THE COMING CHANGES IN PART BECAUSE THE DIMENSIONS OF THE CHANGE WERE NOT YET DECIDED. HOWEVER, HE IMPLIED THAT KOMPLEKTOV WILL BE RECALLED AND THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE "SOVIET" TEAM ARE PROBABLY GOING TO BE REPLACED.)

-- THE CHANGE FROM SOVIET TO RUSSIAN EMBASSY MANAGEMENT AND DIRECTION WILL POSE SOME DELICATE PROBLEMS AMONG THE EMBASSY STAFF. HE HAD RECENTLY TALKED TO KOLOSOVSKY ABOUT THIS AND UNDERSTOOD KOLOSOVSKY HAD DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH ED HEWETT.

-- IN LIGHT OF THE COMPLICATED CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR THE PERIOD OF THE TRANSITION IF THE USG USED THE U.S. AMBASSADOR/CHARGE AND EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AS THE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO SENIOR LEVELS OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT.

-- [1.4(d)] AND KOLOSOVSKY HAD DISCUSSED THE FOREGOING. HOWEVER, THE ARRANGEMENT PROPOSED IS A SENSITIVE MATTER AND [1.4(d)] SAID HE HOPED I COULD CONVEY IT DIRECTLY AND UNOFFICIALLY TO WASHINGTON.

I TOLD [1.4(d)] I WOULD, OF COURSE, PASS HIS COMMENTS AND ADVICE ON TO WASHINGTON DISCREETLY. WITHOUT COMMITTING TO DO MORE THAN THAT, I TOLD HIM THAT I DID UNDERSTAND THAT THE TRANSITION FROM A SOVIET TO A RUSSIAN MISSION WOULD POSE A VARIETY OF DELICATE PROBLEMS, AND THAT I WAS CERTAIN THE USG WOULD WANT TO BE SURE THOSE PROBLEMS DID NOT INTERFERE WITH A SMOOTH TRANSITION IN THE CONDUCT OF OUR RELATIONS.

COMMENT: THERE IS CLEARLY A SELF SERVING ELEMENT IN ALL OF THIS IN THAT [1.4(d)] SEEKING TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES FIRMLY HERE AS THE CHANNEL TO US ON THINGS AMERICAN AND SEE U.S. RELIANCE ON OUR EMBASSY HERE AS THE CHANNEL TO THE NEW RUSSIAN MFA -- AS OPPOSED TO THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON -- AS THE MOST LIKELY WAY TO ENSURE THE FUTURE RELEVANCE AND SURVIVAL OF [1.4(d)]

[1.4(d)]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1064-MA
4/11/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

-2-

AT THE SAME TIME, WE SUSPECT THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP HERE IS UNCERTAIN ABOUT SOME OF THE WASHINGTON STAFF. KOLOSOVSKY IS THEIR MAN, BUT HE IS NOT RUNNING THE PLACE; NOR, WE ASSUME, DOES HE HAVE PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT RELATIONS OUTSIDE THE EXISTING EMBASSY STRUCTURE (I.E. AMB KOMPLEKTOV AND HIS STAFF WHOSE FUTURE POSITION HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED). IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS, THEREFORE, PROBABLE THAT OUR BEST AND MOST RELIABLE MEANS OF CONVEYING U.S. VIEWS AND POSITIONS TO THE NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS TO DO SO DIRECTLY IN MOSCOW. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD ENSURE THAT KOLOSOVSKY IS KEPT FULLY IN THE LOOP ON WHAT WE DO HERE. FOR THE PRESENT THIS WILL ENSURE THAT WE KNOW THE RECIPIENT AND HAVE THE ABILITY TO ENSURE CLARITY.

I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SHARING THIS MESSAGE WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
END TEXT.
DECLAS: OADR