

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91151
Folder ID Number: 91151-006

Folder Title:
Special Channel (January - June) 1991 [4]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	7	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Cable	From American Embassy The Hague to The White House, Re: Ambassador Wilkins to White House Washington DC [251555Z Mar 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/25/91	(b)(1)	C
02a. Cable	White House to Elysee Palace Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S
02b. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Prime Minister Major from President Bush (2 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S
02c. Cable	White House to The Federal Chancellory Re: Message to Chancellor Kohl from President Bush (2 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S
02d. Cable	White House to Ottawa Canada Re: Message to Prime Minister Mulroney from President Bush (2 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S
02e. Cable	White House to Distribution List Re: To the Ambassador (2 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	C
02f. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock (3 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1991 [4]

Pinksheet Number: cap1261
OA/ID Number: 91151-006
Date Closed: 7/23/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03. Cable	White House to Distribution List, Re: To the Ambassador [220618Z Mar 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	C
04. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Prime Minister Major from President Bush (3 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S
05. Cable	White House to Elysee Palace Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (3 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S
06. Cable	White House to Ottawa Canada Re: Message to Prime Minister Mulroney from President Bush (3 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Cable	White House to The Federal Chancellory Re: Message to Chancellor Kohl from President Bush (3 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S
08. Cable	Elysee Palace to White House Re: Jacques Attali to General Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S
09. Cable	White House to Elysee Palace Re: Message from General Scowcroft to Admiral Lanxade (2 pp.)	3/12/91	(b)(1)	S
10a. Letter	Admiral Lanxade to General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	3/8/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 4

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10b. Cable	Elysee Palace to White House Re: Message to General Brent Scowcroft from Admiral Jacques Lanxade [French] (2 pp.)	3/8/91	(b)(1)	C
11a. Letter	Admiral Lanxade to General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	3/8/91	(b)(1)	S
11b. Cable	Elysee Palace to White House Re: Message to General Brent Scowcroft from Admiral Jacques Lanxade (2 pp.)	3/8/91	(b)(1)	C
12. Cable	Abdin Palace to White House Re: President Mubarak to President Bush (2 pp.)	3/8/91	(b)(1)	S
13. Cable	White House to Elysee Palace Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	2/21/91	(b)(1)	S
14. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Charles Powell from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	2/21/91	(b)(1)	S
15. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Jack Matlock from Condi Rice [212229Z Feb 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	2/21/91	(b)(1)	S
16. Cable	Cabinet Office to White House Re: Message from the Prime Minister to the President (2 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S
17. Cable	Cabinet Office London to The White House Re: Message from Charles Powell for General Scowcroft (2 pp.)	2/18/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 3 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Subseries:
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Pinksheet Number: cap1261
OA/ID Number: 91151-006
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Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
18a. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Sir Charles Powell, from General Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S
18b. Draft Cable	Charles Powell to Brent Scowcroft Re: Charles-- (1 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S
18c. Draft Letter	Re: [General Letter] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
19a. Draft Cable	From Brent Scowcroft, Re: [Cable] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	
19b. Draft Cable	To London, Paris, Ankara, Cairo, Riyadh, Taif, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Rome, Canberra Re: Message from the President (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
19c. Draft Letter	Re: [General Letter] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
19d. Draft Cable	To London, Paris, Ankara, Cairo, Riyadh, Taif, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Rome, Canberra Re: Message from the President (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Cable	From American Embassy The Hague to The White House, Re: Ambassador Wilkins to White House Washington DC [251555Z Mar 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/25/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/14/2022

WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1991 [4]

Date Closed: 7/23/2009	OA/ID Number: 91151-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0681-MR(500)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 11/2/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile


Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

ROUTINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT

SIT: FILE PRIVACY IN SIT

<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 251555Z MAR 91

FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 251555Z MAR 91 1.4(c)

FROM 1.4(c)

TO WHITE HOUSE WASHDC

FROM AMBASSADOR WILKINS

REF: A. WHITE HOUSE O 220618Z MAR 91

B. THE HAGUE O 221049Z MAR 91

BEGIN TEXT:

DURING LUNCH WITH ME MARCH 25, DUTCH PM LUBBERS EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR AND AGREEMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT'S STEADFAST APPROACH ON CFE AS LAID OUT IN LAST WEEK'S LETTER (REF A). HE INDICATED THE NETHERLANDS WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD TO THE COMMON LINE IN CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

END TEXT:

#0483

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0681-MR
MM 11/2/2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 220740Z MAR 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

22 MARCH, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

WHILE IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 14-16, SECRETARY BAKER RECEIVED A
NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THEY ARGUE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO
RESOLVE THE IMPASSE OVER THEIR FAILURE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT
THE CFE TREATY. HE IS COMMUNICATING THE DETAILS TO YOUR
FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS OTHER ALLIED COUNTERPARTS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO
REVISE ITS CFE OBLIGATIONS ON THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO BE
REDUCED, AND THE WAY IT IS TO BE REDUCED. WHILE WE ARE
ENCOURAGED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SEIZED WITH THIS ISSUE AND
SEEM EAGER TO SEE IT RESOLVED, THEIR OFFER IS NOT
ACCEPTABLE FOR THE SAME BASIC REASON THAT THEIR INITIAL
STANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE: OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO IN GOOD
FAITH MUST BE HONORED AND CANNOT BE REOPENED WHENEVER A
PARTY CHOOSES.

ALL OF US MADE COMPROMISES IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THIS
TREATY AND ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION TO SIGN
IT. STILL, ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WISH TO
COMPEL THE OTHER 21 SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY TO
RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS AFTER THE FACT. IF WE ACCEPT THIS
TACTIC, WE WILL DO MORE THAN UNDERMINE THE CFE TREATY. WE
WILL ENDANGER THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL
ACROSS THE BOARD BY WEAKENING THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS,
AND UNDERMINING THE EXPECTATION THAT BARGAINING IN GOOD
FAITH WILL LEAD TO A DEFINITE, BINDING CONCLUSION.

I HAVE ALREADY OUTLINED MY CONCERNS ON THIS SUBJECT TO
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. THE CFE TREATY IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT
AND WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE IT RATIFIED AND
IMPLEMENTED. WE SEEK A PRACTICAL SOLUTION, WITH DUE
RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF ALL INVOLVED. WE ARE READY TO
EXPLORE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, SO LONG AS THEY PRESERVE THE
INTEGRITY OF THE AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, I AM PREPARED TO
WORK FOR A SOLUTION THAT COMPLIES WITH THE FOLLOWING
PRINCIPLES: FIRST, TOTAL SOVIET HOLDINGS OF TANKS,
ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES IN THE CFE ZONE
(REGARDLESS OF THE BRANCH OF THE MILITARY SERVICE TO WHICH
THEY MAY BE ASSIGNED) CANNOT EXCEED THE LIMITS SPECIFIED IN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-1389-F
1/17/2008 MM

THE TREATY. SECOND, ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF THESE LIMITS WILL HAVE TO BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED USING AGREED PROCEDURES. THIRD, THE SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE OTHER TERMS OF THE CFE TREATY (INCLUDING LIMITS ON EQUIPMENT HELD IN ACTIVE UNITS AND CEILINGS ON EQUIPMENT IN SPECIFIED ZONES) SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS. I INTEND TO CONVEY THIS POSITION TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE A PARALLEL APPROACH IN YOUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIM.

ALLIED SOLIDARITY HAS HELPED PRODUCE SOME MOVEMENT FROM MOSCOW. TO GIVE THE SOVIETS ANY REASON TO THINK WE CAN BE DIVIDED OR WEAKENED ON THIS MATTER WOULD SET BACK THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE. TOGETHER WE CAN CONTINUE TO SHOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OUR FIRM RESOLVE TO STAND BY THE AGREEMENT WE SIGNED IN PARIS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

#0020

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0020 <TOR> 910322024130 MSG000290918490

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE OUT PRES MSGS

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 220735Z MAR 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

22 MARCH, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN,

WHILE IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 14-16, SECRETARY BAKER RECEIVED A NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THEY ARGUE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO RESOLVE THE IMPASSE OVER THEIR FAILURE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT THE CFE TREATY. HE IS COMMUNICATING THE DETAILS TO YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS OTHER ALLIED COUNTERPARTS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO REVISE ITS CFE OBLIGATIONS ON THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO BE REDUCED, AND THE WAY IT IS TO BE REDUCED. WHILE WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SEIZED WITH THIS ISSUE AND SEEM EAGER TO SEE IT RESOLVED, THEIR OFFER IS NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR THE SAME BASIC REASON THAT THEIR INITIAL STANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE: OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO IN GOOD FAITH MUST BE HONORED AND CANNOT BE REOPENED WHENEVER A PARTY CHOOSES.

ALL OF US MADE COMPROMISES IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THIS TREATY AND ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION TO SIGN IT. STILL, ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WISH TO COMPEL THE OTHER 21 SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS AFTER THE FACT. IF WE ACCEPT THIS TACTIC, WE WILL DO MORE THAN UNDERMINE THE CFE TREATY. WE WILL ENDANGER THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL ACROSS THE BOARD BY WEAKENING THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND UNDERMINING THE EXPECTATION THAT BARGAINING IN GOOD FAITH WILL LEAD TO A DEFINITE, BINDING CONCLUSION.

I HAVE ALREADY OUTLINED MY CONCERNS ON THIS SUBJECT TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. THE CFE TREATY IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT AND WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE IT RATIFIED AND IMPLEMENTED. WE SEEK A PRACTICAL SOLUTION, WITH DUE RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF ALL INVOLVED. WE ARE READY TO EXPLORE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, SO LONG AS THEY PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, I AM PREPARED TO WORK FOR A SOLUTION THAT COMPLIES WITH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES: FIRST, TOTAL SOVIET HOLDINGS OF TANKS, ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES IN THE CFE ZONE (REGARDLESS OF THE BRANCH OF THE MILITARY SERVICE TO WHICH THEY MAY BE ASSIGNED) CANNOT EXCEED THE LIMITS SPECIFIED IN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-1389-F
1/17/2008 mm

THE TREATY. SECOND, ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF THESE LIMITS WILL HAVE TO BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED USING AGREED PROCEDURES. THIRD, THE SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE OTHER TERMS OF THE CFE TREATY (INCLUDING LIMITS ON EQUIPMENT HELD IN ACTIVE UNITS AND CEILINGS ON EQUIPMENT IN SPECIFIED ZONES) SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS. I INTEND TO CONVEY THIS POSITION TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE A PARALLEL APPROACH IN YOUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIM.

ALLIED SOLIDARITY HAS HELPED PRODUCE SOME MOVEMENT FROM MOSCOW. TO GIVE THE SOVIETS ANY REASON TO THINK WE CAN BE DIVIDED OR WEAKENED ON THIS MATTER WOULD SET BACK THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE. TOGETHER WE CAN CONTINUE TO SHOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OUR FIRM RESOLVE TO STAND BY THE AGREEMENT WE SIGNED IN PARIS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0019

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0019 <TOR> 910322023551 MSG000290918151

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 220729Z MAR 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO THE FEDERAL CHANCELLORY

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA SKIPPER CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KOHL FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH.

22 MARCH, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HELMUT,

WHILE IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 14-16, SECRETARY BAKER RECEIVED A
NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THEY ARGUE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO
RESOLVE THE IMPASSE OVER THEIR FAILURE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT
THE CFE TREATY. HE IS COMMUNICATING THE DETAILS TO YOUR
FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS OTHER ALLIED COUNTERPARTS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO
REVISE ITS CFE OBLIGATIONS ON THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO BE
REDUCED, AND THE WAY IT IS TO BE REDUCED. WHILE WE ARE
ENCOURAGED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SEIZED WITH THIS ISSUE AND
SEEM EAGER TO SEE IT RESOLVED, THEIR OFFER IS NOT
ACCEPTABLE FOR THE SAME BASIC REASON THAT THEIR INITIAL
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PARTY CHOOSES.

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TREATY AND ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION TO SIGN
IT. STILL, ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WISH TO
COMPEL THE OTHER 21 SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY TO
RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS AFTER THE FACT. IF WE ACCEPT THIS
TACTIC, WE WILL DO MORE THAN UNDERMINE THE CFE TREATY. WE
WILL ENDANGER THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL
ACROSS THE BOARD BY WEAKENING THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS,
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INTEGRITY OF THE AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, I AM PREPARED TO
WORK FOR A SOLUTION THAT COMPLIES WITH THE FOLLOWING
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ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES IN THE CFE ZONE
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ALLIED SOLIDARITY HAS HELPED PRODUCE SOME MOVEMENT FROM MOSCOW. TO GIVE THE SOVIETS ANY REASON TO THINK WE CAN BE DIVIDED OR WEAKENED ON THIS MATTER WOULD SET BACK THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE. TOGETHER WE CAN CONTINUE TO SHOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OUR FIRM RESOLVE TO STAND BY THE AGREEMENT WE SIGNED IN PARIS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

#0018

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0018 <TOR> 910322022915 MSG000290917755

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 220640Z MAR 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO OTTAWA CANADA

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA FEDCAN CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

22 MARCH, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BRIAN,

WHILE IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 14-16, SECRETARY BAKER RECEIVED A
NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THEY ARGUE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO
RESOLVE THE IMPASSE OVER THEIR FAILURE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT
THE CFE TREATY. HE IS COMMUNICATING THE DETAILS TO YOUR
FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS OTHER ALLIED COUNTERPARTS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO
REVISE ITS CFE OBLIGATIONS ON THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO BE
REDUCED, AND THE WAY IT IS TO BE REDUCED. WHILE WE ARE
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DECLASSIFIED
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2000-1389-F
1/17/2008 MM

THE TREATY. SECOND, ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF THESE LIMITS WILL HAVE TO BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED USING AGREED PROCEDURES. THIRD, THE SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE OTHER TERMS OF THE CFE TREATY (INCLUDING LIMITS ON EQUIPMENT HELD IN ACTIVE UNITS AND CEILINGS ON EQUIPMENT IN SPECIFIED ZONES) SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS. I INTEND TO CONVEY THIS POSITION TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE A PARALLEL APPROACH IN YOUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIM.

ALLIED SOLIDARITY HAS HELPED PRODUCE SOME MOVEMENT FROM MOSCOW. TO GIVE THE SOVIETS ANY REASON TO THINK WE CAN BE DIVIDED OR WEAKENED ON THIS MATTER WOULD SET BACK THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE. TOGETHER WE CAN CONTINUE TO SHOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OUR FIRM RESOLVE TO STAND BY THE AGREEMENT WE SIGNED IN PARIS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0016

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0016 <TOR> 910322014519 MSG000290915118

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02e. Cable	White House to Distribution List Re: To the Ambassador (2 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1991 [4]

Date Closed: 7/23/2009	OA/ID Number: 91151-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02f. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Ambassador Matlock (3 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91151-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Cable	White House to Distribution List, Re: To the Ambassador [220618Z Mar 91] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 9/16/2015

Date Closed: 7/23/2009	OA/ID Number: 91151-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2000-1389-F(241.09)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 1/17/2008

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM




PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
SIT GANTT FILE PRIVACY OUT SIT

PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 220618Z MAR 91

FM WHITE HOUSE



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
0000

PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TO THE AMBASSADOR

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO THE PRIME MINISTER AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, AFTER YOU HAVE DELIVERED SECRETARY BAKER'S LETTER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THE TEXT OF THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED WITH SECRETARY BAKER. ANY REPORTING OF DELIVERY OR REACTIONS SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH THIS CHANNEL. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

22 MARCH, 1991

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED

2000-1389-F
1/17/2008 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

DEAR:

WHILE IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 14-16, SECRETARY BAKER RECEIVED A NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THEY ARGUE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO RESOLVE THE IMPASSE OVER THEIR FAILURE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT THE CFE TREATY. HE IS COMMUNICATING THE DETAILS TO YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS OTHER ALLIED COUNTERPARTS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO REVISE ITS CFE OBLIGATIONS ON THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO BE REDUCED, AND THE WAY IT IS TO BE REDUCED. WHILE WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SEIZED WITH THIS ISSUE AND SEEM EAGER TO SEE IT RESOLVED, THEIR OFFER IS NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR THE SAME BASIC REASON THAT THEIR INITIAL STANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE: OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO IN GOOD FAITH MUST BE HONORED AND CANNOT BE REOPENED WHENEVER A PARTY CHOOSES.

ALL OF US MADE COMPROMISES IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THIS TREATY AND ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION TO SIGN IT. STILL, ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WISH TO COMPEL THE OTHER 21 SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS AFTER THE FACT. IF WE ACCEPT THIS TACTIC, WE WILL DO MORE THAN UNDERMINE THE CFE TREATY. WE WILL ENDANGER THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL ACROSS THE BOARD BY WEAKENING THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND UNDERMINING THE EXPECTATION THAT BARGAINING IN GOOD FAITH WILL LEAD TO A DEFINITE, BINDING CONCLUSION.

I HAVE ALREADY OUTLINED MY CONCERNS ON THIS SUBJECT TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. THE CFE TREATY IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT AND WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE IT RATIFIED AND IMPLEMENTED. WE SEEK A PRACTICAL SOLUTION, WITH DUE RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF ALL INVOLVED. WE ARE READY TO EXPLORE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, SO LONG AS THEY PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, I AM PREPARED TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

WORK FOR A SOLUTION THAT COMPLIES WITH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES: FIRST, TOTAL SOVIET HOLDINGS OF TANKS, ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES IN THE CFE ZONE (REGARDLESS OF THE BRANCH OF THE MILITARY SERVICE TO WHICH THEY MAY BE ASSIGNED) CANNOT EXCEED THE LIMITS SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY. SECOND, ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF THESE LIMITS WILL HAVE TO BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED USING AGREED PROCEDURES. THIRD, THE SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE OTHER TERMS OF THE CFE TREATY (INCLUDING LIMITS ON EQUIPMENT HELD IN ACTIVE UNITS AND CEILINGS ON EQUIPMENT IN SPECIFIED ZONES) SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS. I INTEND TO CONVEY THIS POSITION TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE A PARALLEL APPROACH IN YOUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIM.

ALLIED SOLIDARITY HAS HELPED PRODUCE SOME MOVEMENT FROM MOSCOW. TO GIVE THE SOVIETS ANY REASON TO THINK WE CAN BE DIVIDED OR WEAKENED ON THIS MATTER WOULD SET BACK THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE. TOGETHER WE CAN CONTINUE TO SHOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OUR FIRM RESOLVE TO STAND BY THE AGREEMENT WE SIGNED IN PARIS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0014

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE OUT PRES MSGS

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 220735Z MAR 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

OOQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

22 MARCH, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN,

WHILE IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 14-16, SECRETARY BAKER RECEIVED A
NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THEY ARGUE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO
RESOLVE THE IMPASSE OVER THEIR FAILURE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT
THE CFE TREATY. HE IS COMMUNICATING THE DETAILS TO YOUR
FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS OTHER ALLIED COUNTERPARTS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO
REVISE ITS CFE OBLIGATIONS ON THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO BE
REDUCED, AND THE WAY IT IS TO BE REDUCED. WHILE WE ARE
ENCOURAGED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SEIZED WITH THIS ISSUE AND
SEEM EAGER TO SEE IT RESOLVED, THEIR OFFER IS NOT
ACCEPTABLE FOR THE SAME BASIC REASON THAT THEIR INITIAL
STANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE: OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO IN GOOD
FAITH MUST BE HONORED AND CANNOT BE REOPENED WHENEVER A
PARTY CHOOSES.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-1389-MR
1/17/2008 MM

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

ALL OF US MADE COMPROMISES IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THIS TREATY AND ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION TO SIGN IT. STILL, ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WISH TO COMPEL THE OTHER 21 SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS AFTER THE FACT. IF WE ACCEPT THIS TACTIC, WE WILL DO MORE THAN UNDERMINE THE CFE TREATY. WE WILL ENDANGER THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL ACROSS THE BOARD BY WEAKENING THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND UNDERMINING THE EXPECTATION THAT BARGAINING IN GOOD FAITH WILL LEAD TO A DEFINITE, BINDING CONCLUSION.

I HAVE ALREADY OUTLINED MY CONCERNS ON THIS SUBJECT TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. THE CFE TREATY IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT AND WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE IT RATIFIED AND IMPLEMENTED. WE SEEK A PRACTICAL SOLUTION, WITH DUE RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF ALL INVOLVED. WE ARE READY TO EXPLORE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, SO LONG AS THEY PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, I AM PREPARED TO WORK FOR A SOLUTION THAT COMPLIES WITH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES: FIRST, TOTAL SOVIET HOLDINGS OF TANKS, ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES IN THE CFE ZONE (REGARDLESS OF THE BRANCH OF THE MILITARY SERVICE TO WHICH THEY MAY BE ASSIGNED) CANNOT EXCEED THE LIMITS SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY. SECOND, ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF THESE LIMITS WILL HAVE TO BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED USING AGREED PROCEDURES. THIRD, THE SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE OTHER TERMS OF THE CFE TREATY (INCLUDING LIMITS ON EQUIPMENT HELD IN ACTIVE UNITS AND CEILINGS ON EQUIPMENT IN SPECIFIED ZONES) SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS. I INTEND TO CONVEY THIS POSITION TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE A PARALLEL APPROACH IN YOUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIM.

ALLIED SOLIDARITY HAS HELPED PRODUCE SOME MOVEMENT FROM MOSCOW. TO GIVE THE SOVIETS ANY REASON TO THINK WE CAN BE DIVIDED OR WEAKENED ON THIS MATTER WOULD SET BACK THE

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE. TOGETHER
WE CAN CONTINUE TO SHOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OUR FIRM
RESOLVE TO STAND BY THE AGREEMENT WE SIGNED IN PARIS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0019

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 220740Z MAR 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ELYSEE PALACE

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

22 MARCH, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

WHILE IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 14-16, SECRETARY BAKER RECEIVED A
NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THEY ARGUE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO
RESOLVE THE IMPASSE OVER THEIR FAILURE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT
THE CFE TREATY. HE IS COMMUNICATING THE DETAILS TO YOUR
FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS OTHER ALLIED COUNTERPARTS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO
REVISE ITS CFE OBLIGATIONS ON THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO BE
REDUCED, AND THE WAY IT IS TO BE REDUCED. WHILE WE ARE
ENCOURAGED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SEIZED WITH THIS ISSUE AND
SEEM EAGER TO SEE IT RESOLVED, THEIR OFFER IS NOT
ACCEPTABLE FOR THE SAME BASIC REASON THAT THEIR INITIAL
STANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE: OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO IN GOOD
FAITH MUST BE HONORED AND CANNOT BE REOPENED WHENEVER A
PARTY CHOOSES.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-1389-F
1/17/2008 MM

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

ALL OF US MADE COMPROMISES IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THIS TREATY AND ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION TO SIGN IT. STILL, ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WISH TO COMPEL THE OTHER 21 SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS AFTER THE FACT. IF WE ACCEPT THIS TACTIC WE WILL DO MORE THAN UNDERMINE THE CFE TREATY. WE WILL ENDANGER THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL ACROSS THE BOARD BY WEAKENING THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND UNDERMINING THE EXPECTATION THAT BARGAINING IN GOOD FAITH WILL LEAD TO A DEFINITE, BINDING CONCLUSION.

I HAVE ALREADY OUTLINED MY CONCERNS ON THIS SUBJECT TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. THE CFE TREATY IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT AND WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE IT RATIFIED AND IMPLEMENTED. WE SEEK A PRACTICAL SOLUTION, WITH DUE RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF ALL INVOLVED. WE ARE READY TO EXPLORE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, SO LONG AS THEY PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, I AM PREPARED TO WORK FOR A SOLUTION THAT COMPLIES WITH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES: FIRST, TOTAL SOVIET HOLDINGS OF TANKS, ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES IN THE CFE ZONE (REGARDLESS OF THE BRANCH OF THE MILITARY SERVICE TO WHICH THEY MAY BE ASSIGNED) CANNOT EXCEED THE LIMITS SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY. SECOND, ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF THESE LIMITS WILL HAVE TO BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED USING AGREED PROCEDURES. THIRD, THE SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE OTHER TERMS OF THE CFE TREATY (INCLUDING LIMITS ON EQUIPMENT HELD IN ACTIVE UNITS AND CEILINGS ON EQUIPMENT IN SPECIFIED ZONES) SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS. I INTEND TO CONVEY THIS POSITION TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE A PARALLEL APPROACH IN YOUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIM.

ALLIED SOLIDARITY HAS HELPED PRODUCE SOME MOVEMENT FROM MOSCOW. TO GIVE THE SOVIETS ANY REASON TO THINK WE CAN BE DIVIDED OR WEAKENED ON THIS MATTER WOULD SET BACK THE

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE. TOGETHER
WE CAN CONTINUE TO SHOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OUR FIRM
RESOLVE TO STAND BY THE AGREEMENT WE SIGNED IN PARIS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

#0020

~~SECRET~~

~~IMMEDIATE~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 220640Z MAR 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO OTTAWA CANADA

~~SECRET~~ VIA FEDCAN CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

22 MARCH, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR BRIAN,

WHILE IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 14-16, SECRETARY BAKER RECEIVED A
NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THEY ARGUE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO
RESOLVE THE IMPASSE OVER THEIR FAILURE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT
THE CFE TREATY. HE IS COMMUNICATING THE DETAILS TO YOUR
FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS OTHER ALLIED COUNTERPARTS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO
REVISE ITS CFE OBLIGATIONS ON THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO BE
REDUCED, AND THE WAY IT IS TO BE REDUCED. WHILE WE ARE
ENCOURAGED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SEIZED WITH THIS ISSUE AND
SEEM EAGER TO SEE IT RESOLVED, THEIR OFFER IS NOT
ACCEPTABLE FOR THE SAME BASIC REASON THAT THEIR INITIAL
STANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE: OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO IN GOOD
FAITH MUST BE HONORED AND CANNOT BE REOPENED WHENEVER A
PARTY CHOOSES.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-1389-F
1/17/2008 MM

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

ALL OF US MADE COMPROMISES IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THIS TREATY AND ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION TO SIGN IT. STILL, ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WISH TO COMPEL THE OTHER 21 SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS AFTER THE FACT. IF WE ACCEPT THIS TACTIC, WE WILL DO MORE THAN UNDERMINE THE CFE TREATY. WE WILL ENDANGER THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL ACROSS THE BOARD BY WEAKENING THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND UNDERMINING THE EXPECTATION THAT BARGAINING IN GOOD FAITH WILL LEAD TO A DEFINITE, BINDING CONCLUSION.

I HAVE ALREADY OUTLINED MY CONCERNS ON THIS SUBJECT TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. THE CFE TREATY IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT AND WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE IT RATIFIED AND IMPLEMENTED. WE SEEK A PRACTICAL SOLUTION, WITH DUE RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF ALL INVOLVED. WE ARE READY TO EXPLORE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, SO LONG AS THEY PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, I AM PREPARED TO WORK FOR A SOLUTION THAT COMPLIES WITH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES: FIRST, TOTAL SOVIET HOLDINGS OF TANKS, ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES IN THE CFE ZONE (REGARDLESS OF THE BRANCH OF THE MILITARY SERVICE TO WHICH THEY MAY BE ASSIGNED) CANNOT EXCEED THE LIMITS SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY. SECOND, ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF THESE LIMITS WILL HAVE TO BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED USING AGREED PROCEDURES. THIRD, THE SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE OTHER TERMS OF THE CFE TREATY (INCLUDING LIMITS ON EQUIPMENT HELD IN ACTIVE UNITS AND CEILINGS ON EQUIPMENT IN SPECIFIED ZONES) SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS. I INTEND TO CONVEY THIS POSITION TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE A PARALLEL APPROACH IN YOUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIM.

ALLIED SOLIDARITY HAS HELPED PRODUCE SOME MOVEMENT FROM MOSCOW. TO GIVE THE SOVIETS ANY REASON TO THINK WE CAN BE DIVIDED OR WEAKENED ON THIS MATTER WOULD SET BACK THE

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE. TOGETHER
WE CAN CONTINUE TO SHOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OUR FIRM
RESOLVE TO STAND BY THE AGREEMENT WE SIGNED IN PARIS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0016

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
SIT HOTLINE OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 220729Z MAR 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO THE FEDERAL CHANCELLORY

~~SECRET~~ VIA SKIPPER CHANNELS

OOQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KOHL FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH.

22 MARCH, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HELMUT,

WHILE IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 14-16, SECRETARY BAKER RECEIVED A
NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THEY ARGUE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO
RESOLVE THE IMPASSE OVER THEIR FAILURE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT
THE CFE TREATY. HE IS COMMUNICATING THE DETAILS TO YOUR
FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS OTHER ALLIED COUNTERPARTS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO
REVISE ITS CFE OBLIGATIONS ON THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO BE
REDUCED, AND THE WAY IT IS TO BE REDUCED. WHILE WE ARE
ENCOURAGED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SEIZED WITH THIS ISSUE AND
SEEM EAGER TO SEE IT RESOLVED, THEIR OFFER IS NOT
ACCEPTABLE FOR THE SAME BASIC REASON THAT THEIR INITIAL
STANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE: OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO IN GOOD
FAITH MUST BE HONORED AND CANNOT BE REOPENED WHENEVER A
PARTY CHOOSES.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-1389-F
1/17/2008 MM

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

ALL OF US MADE COMPROMISES IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THIS TREATY AND ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION TO SIGN IT. STILL, ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WISH TO COMPEL THE OTHER 21 SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS AFTER THE FACT. IF WE ACCEPT THIS TACTIC, WE WILL DO MORE THAN UNDERMINE THE CFE TREATY. WE WILL ENDANGER THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL ACROSS THE BOARD BY WEAKENING THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND UNDERMINING THE EXPECTATION THAT BARGAINING IN GOOD FAITH WILL LEAD TO A DEFINITE, BINDING CONCLUSION.

I HAVE ALREADY OUTLINED MY CONCERNS ON THIS SUBJECT TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. THE CFE TREATY IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT AND WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE IT RATIFIED AND IMPLEMENTED. WE SEEK A PRACTICAL SOLUTION, WITH DUE RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF ALL INVOLVED. WE ARE READY TO EXPLORE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, SO LONG AS THEY PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, I AM PREPARED TO WORK FOR A SOLUTION THAT COMPLIES WITH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES: FIRST, TOTAL SOVIET HOLDINGS OF TANKS, ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES IN THE CFE ZONE (REGARDLESS OF THE BRANCH OF THE MILITARY SERVICE TO WHICH THEY MAY BE ASSIGNED) CANNOT EXCEED THE LIMITS SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY. SECOND, ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF THESE LIMITS WILL HAVE TO BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED USING AGREED PROCEDURES. THIRD, THE SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE OTHER TERMS OF THE CFE TREATY (INCLUDING LIMITS ON EQUIPMENT HELD IN ACTIVE UNITS AND CEILINGS ON EQUIPMENT IN SPECIFIED ZONES) SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS. I INTEND TO CONVEY THIS POSITION TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE A PARALLEL APPROACH IN YOUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIM.

ALLIED SOLIDARITY HAS HELPED PRODUCE SOME MOVEMENT FROM MOSCOW. TO GIVE THE SOVIETS ANY REASON TO THINK WE CAN BE DIVIDED OR WEAKENED ON THIS MATTER WOULD SET BACK THE

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE. TOGETHER
WE CAN CONTINUE TO SHOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OUR FIRM
RESOLVE TO STAND BY THE AGREEMENT WE SIGNED IN PARIS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

#0018

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Cable	Elysee Palace to White House Re: Jacques Attali to General Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91151-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT GATES SCOWCROFT

SIT FILE SIT

<PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

DTG 121330Z MAR 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ELYSEE PALACE

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT
TO ADMIRAL LANXADE FOR HIS EYES ONLY.

11 MARCH 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JACQUES:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF MARCH 8. PLEASE CONSIDER THIS BUT A
PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO THE IMPORTANT MATTERS YOU RAISED; WE SHOULD
PLAN ON GIVING THEM FURTHER CONSIDERATION IN MARTINIQUE.

IRAQ IS MAKING SOME PROGRESS TOWARD IMPLEMENTING UN SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 686; THAT SAID, WE WOULD WANT TO SEE MORE DONE
OR AT LEAST AGREED TO IN PRINCIPLE BEFORE WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO
AGREE TO A FORMAL CEASE-FIRE. IT IS OUR TENTATIVE THINKING THAT
THE TIME WOULD BE RIGHT TO MOVE TO CONSIDER SUCH A CEASE-FIRE
RESOLUTION SOME TIME THE WEEK OF MARCH 18. THAT IS, AFTER JIM BAKER
IS BACK HERE AND HAS HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE RESULTS OF
HIS TRIP WITH THE PRESIDENT. AS YOU MIGHT EXPECT, AN IMPORTANT
ELEMENT OF HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ARAB COALITION PARTNERS AND
KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA IN PARTICULAR ADDRESSES JUST THIS ISSUE.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0730-MR
4/4/2011 MH

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

AS REGARDS THE ISSUE OF POST-WAR SECURITY, IT IS OUR TENTATIVE THINKING THAT THE BULK OF THE POST-WAR SECURITY BURDEN OUGHT TO BE BORNE BY THE LOCAL STATES ALONG THE LINES OF THE DECLARATION ISSUED IN DAMASCUS ON MARCH 6 BY THE GCC, EGYPT AND SYRIA. THAT SAID, WE DO SEE A POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT ROLE FOR A UNSC FORCE, PROBABLY MORE FOR MONITORING AND OBSERVING THE CEASE-FIRE LINE THAN ANYTHING ELSE. THE IDEA THAT WESTERN FORCES MIGHT PROVIDE SECURITY DURING A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS IN EFFECT WHAT IS HAPPENING: WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF U.S. AND FRENCH TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND HOW BEST TO COORDINATE. IT IS OUR WISH AS WELL TO REMOVE OUR GROUND FORCES AND MAKE THE TRANSITION FROM WARTIME TO POST-WAR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AS QUICKLY AS CAN BE ARRANGED.

I HOPE THE ABOVE GIVES YOU A BETTER SENSE OF OUR CURRENT THINKING. MUCH REMAINS IN FLUX, AND THE UPCOMING MEETINGS COULD NOT HAVE COME AT A BETTER TIME. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU.

SINCERELY,

BRENT

END OF TEXT.

#0185

~~SECRET~~

Staff has cy

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL LANXADE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT:

Dear Brent,

I would appreciate, prior to the Martinique meeting, receiving some of your thoughts on the evolution of the situation in the Gulf and on your intentions with regard to dismantling coalition military deployments.

First, I note that Iraq appears to have fulfilled the majority of conditions which were imposed on it to permit the signing of a cease fire. Have you determined at what moment and in what form this could come into effect?

According to the reports I have received from Riyadh, it seems that you envisage installation of an international force, under UN auspices, which would ensure control of a demilitarized zone along the borders of Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Does your idea entail a real military force or simply United Nations observers?

As far as the security of the CCG countries is concerned, it seems that the Damascus meeting has advanced the plan for an Islamic force to which mostly Egypt and Syria would contribute. But I understand that you would be willing to consider the possibility of maintaining Western ground forces in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for several months while awaiting formation of that force.

I am not sure that, given the present state of the Iraqi army, there continues to exist a serious threat against Kuwait, but I would like to have your view of the situation at this point.

I would add that our own wish is to withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible and to begin the prompt repatriation of our forces. Nevertheless, we will maintain a small security detail from our embassy in Kuwait as well as our mine sweeping unit as long as necessary.

I look forward to seeing you again soon in the Antilles.

Best regards,

Jacques

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0682-MR

MM 4/7/2016

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10b. Cable	Elysee Palace to White House Re: Message to General Brent Scowcroft from Admiral Jacques Lanxade [French] (2 pp.)	3/8/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91151-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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LETTER FROM ADMIRAL LANXADE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT:

Dear Brent,

I would appreciate, prior to the Martinique meeting, receiving some of your thoughts on the evolution of the situation in the Gulf and on your intentions with regard to dismantling coalition military deployments.

First, I note that Iraq appears to have fulfilled the majority of conditions which were imposed on it to permit the signing of a cease fire. Have you determined at what moment and in what form this could come into effect?

According to the reports I have received from Riyadh, it seems that you envisage installation of an international force, under UN auspices, which would ensure control of a demilitarized zone along the borders of Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Does your idea entail a real military force or simply United Nations observers?

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I am not sure that, given the present state of the Iraqi army, there continues to exist a serious threat against Kuwait, but I would like to have your view of the situation at this point.

I would add that our own wish is to withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible and to begin the prompt repatriation of our forces. Nevertheless, we will maintain a small security detail from our embassy in Kuwait as well as our mine sweeping unit as long as necessary.

I look forward to seeing you again soon in the Antilles.

Best regards,

Jacques

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0682-MR

mm 4/7/2016

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11b. Cable	Elysee Palace to White House Re: Message to General Brent Scowcroft from Admiral Jacques Lanxade (2 pp.)	3/8/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91151-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SIT

SIT: HOTLINE IN

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 082041Z MAR 91

FM ABDIN PALACE

TO WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA SUNSHINE CHANNELS

0000

MARCH 8 , 1991

DEAR GEORGE,

CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR BRILLIANT ADDRESS TO THE CONGRESS ON MARCH. WE WERE EXTREMELY IMPRESSED AND MOVED, BOTH BY THE CONTENT OF THAT ADDRESS ,AND THE SPIRIT IN WHICH YOU SPOKE.

YOUR REAFFIRMATION OF THE U. S. COMMITMENT TO A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST REINFORCED AMERICA'S CREDIBILITY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. IT CAME AS AN ADDED PROOF THAT YOUR NATION UPHOLDS THE PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS, JUSTICE AND THE STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE RULE OF LAW IN ALL DISPUTES. IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS, YOU HAVE DONE ALL WHAT YOU COULD IN ORDER TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF LEGITIMACY AND LAWFULNESS IN OUR REGION.

YOUR ADDRESS MAKE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT YOU ARE GOING TO PURSUE THE SAME GOAL DURING THE MONTHS AHEAD FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE PRINCIPLES YOU LAID DOWN IN YOUR SPEECH AS THE BASIS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, NAMELY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, THE PRINCIPLE OF LAND FOR PEACE AND FINALLY, PROVIDING FOR THE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0736-MA
8/31/2012 MM

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

SECURITY OF ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED. INCLUDING
ISRAEL TOGETHER WITH THE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL
RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. SUCH
PRINCIPLES CONSTITUTE A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR A
JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN OUR TROUBLED REGION.

WE SHALL WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU IN THE
IMMEDIATE FUTURE AS WE DID CONSISTENTLY IN THE
PAST IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE.

I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING WITH
SECRETARY BAKER WITHIN A FEW DAYS IN ORDER TO
DISCUSS WITH HIM WAYS AND MEANS FOR ATTAINING
OUR GOAL.

WITH BEST WISHES AND REGARDS

SINCERELY

MOHAMMED HOSNY MUBARAK

#0004

~~SECRET~~

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 212105Z FEB 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ADMIRAL LAXADE FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT.

.
WE ARE PROVIDING FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION A DRAFT STATEMENT OF PROPOSED COALITION REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL SHOULD THE IRAQIS COME FORWARD WITH AN INITIATIVE REQUIRING A COALITION RESPONSE. IT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT SUGGESTIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM YOU.

.
BEGIN TEXT:

.
DRAFT STATEMENT ON IRAQI WITHDRAWAL OFFER

.
THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT WILL WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY FROM KUWAIT IS LONG OVERDUE. IF THAT DECISION IS REAL, WE WELCOME IT. WE AND OUR COALITION PARTNERS HAVE EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY OUR STRONG DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS, SO LONG AS IT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH ALL TWELVE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

.
THE WORLD HAS GOOD REASON TO TREAT IRAQI COMMITMENTS WITH SKEPTICISM. THE COALITION HAS HEARD SUCH PLEDGES FROM THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT BEFORE. IN THE FIRST WEEK AFTER ITS INVASION, IRAQ PROMISED TO WITHDRAW AND INSTEAD REINFORCED ITS MILITARY FORCES IN KUWAIT. IRAQ ALSO PLEDGED IN THE DAYS PRIOR TO AUGUST 2 NOT TO INVADE KUWAIT. THE WORLD IS NOW LIVING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF THOSE BROKEN PROMISES.

.
STRICT, PROMPT, AND UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 660 AND ALL OTHER RELEVANT UNSC RESOLUTIONS REMAINS THE ONLY PATH TO PEACE. THAT MEANS IRAQ MUST IMMEDIATELY BEGIN TO WITHDRAW ALL OF ITS FORCES FROM ALL OF KUWAIT, SO THAT KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT CAN BE RESTORED. AND IT MEANS IRAQ CAN ATTACH NO CONDITIONS TO ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. FINALLY, UNTIL IRAQ FULLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY COMPLIES, RESOLUTION 678'S AUTHORIZATION OF THE USE OF FORCE REMAINS IN EFFECT.

.
THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION MUST SEE IMMEDIATE AND CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF IRAQ'S INTENTIONS. SPECIFICALLY, WE AND OUR COALITION PARTNERS REQUIRE IRAQ TO BEGIN TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING STEPS WITHIN 12 HOURS:

.
-- BEGIN A MASSIVE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT TO BE COMPLETED IN 96 HOURS. GIVEN THE FACT THAT IRAQ INVADED AND OCCUPIED KUWAIT IN A MATTER OF HOURS, ANYTHING LONGER THAN 96 HOURS FROM THE INITIATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT MEET RESOLUTION 660'S REQUIREMENT OF IMMEDIACY.

.
-- TO ENSURE THE WITHDRAWAL WILL BE COMPLETE, IRAQ MUST, WITHIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0730-MR
4/4/2011 MM

THE FIRST 48 HOURS, REMOVE ALL ITS FORCES FROM KUWAIT CITY, FROM ALL PREPARED DEFENSES ALONG THE SAUDI-KUWAIT BORDER, FROM BUBIYAN AND WARBAH ISLANDS, AND FROM KUWAIT'S RUMAYLLAH OIL FIELD;

.
-- IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 660, ALL IRAQI FORCES MUST, WITHIN THE 96 HOURS SPECIFIED ABOVE, RETURN TO THEIR POSITIONS OF AUGUST 1. THOSE FORCES THAT WERE DEPLOYED WELL NORTH OF THE IRAQI-KUWAITI BORDER ON AUGUST 1, THEREFORE, MUST NOT ONLY LEAVE KUWAIT, BUT RESUME THEIR AUGUST 1 POSITIONS.

.
-- ARRANGE WITH THE ICRC THE RELEASE OF ALL COALITION PRISONERS OF WAR AND THIRD-COUNTRY CIVILIANS BEING HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL, AND THE RETURN OF THE REMAINS OF KILLED AND DECEASED COALITION SERVICEMEN, WITHIN 24 HOURS FROM THE INITIATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL;

.
-- REMOVE ALL EXPLOSIVES OR BOOBY-TRAPS ON KUWAITI OIL INSTALLATIONS; .

-- CEASE COMBAT AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS OVER IRAQ AND KUWAIT EXCEPT FOR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT CARRYING TROOPS OUT OF KUWAIT;

.
-- HALT ALL CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENSES IN KUWAIT;

.
-- ALLOW COALITION AIRCRAFT EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER AND USE OF ALL KUWAITI AIRSPACE;

.
-- CEASE ALL FURTHER ATTACKS, INCLUDING USE OF SCUD MISSILES AND TERRORISM BY IRAQ OR ITS SURROGATES AGAINST ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING ISRAEL;

.
-- CEASE ALL DESTRUCTIVE ACTIONS AGAINST KUWAITI CITIZENS AND PROPERTY AND RELEASE ALL KUWAITI DETAINEES; AND

.
-- DESIGNATE IRAQI MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER(S) TO WORK WITH COALITION FORCES ON THE OPERATIONAL DETAILS RELATED TO IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL, TO INCLUDE THE PROVISION OF ALL DATA ON THE LOCATION AND NATURE OF ANY LAND OR SEA MINES.

.
THE UNITED STATES AND ITS COALITION PARTNERS WISH TO REITERATE THAT THEIR FORCES WILL NOT ATTACK RETREATING IRAQI FORCES SO LONG AS WITHDRAWAL PROCEEDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE GUIDELINES. ANY BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT WILL BRING AN INSTANT AND SHARP RESPONSE FROM COALITION FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 678.

.
END TEXT

.
DECL: OADR

#0092

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0092 <TOR> 910221161848 MSG000288461928

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 212049Z FEB 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO CABINET OFFICE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

.
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL FROM
BRENT SCOWCROFT.

.
WE ARE PROVIDING FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION A DRAFT STATEMENT
OF PROPOSED COALITION REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO AN IRAQI
WITHDRAWAL SHOULD THE IRAQIS' COME FORWARD WITH AN
INITIATIVE REQUIRING A COALITION RESPONSE. IT TAKES INTO
ACCOUNT SUGGESTIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM YOU.

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BEGIN TEXT:

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DRAFT STATEMENT ON IRAQI WITHDRAWAL OFFER

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IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY FROM KUWAIT IS LONG OVERDUE.
IF THAT DECISION IS REAL, WE WELCOME IT. WE AND OUR COALITION
PARTNERS HAVE EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY OUR STRONG DESIRE FOR A
PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS, SO LONG AS IT IS FULLY
CONSISTENT WITH ALL TWELVE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

.
THE WORLD HAS GOOD REASON TO TREAT IRAQI COMMITMENTS WITH
SKEPTICISM. THE COALITION HAS HEARD SUCH PLEDGES FROM THE IRAQI
GOVERNMENT BEFORE. IN THE FIRST WEEK AFTER ITS INVASION, IRAQ
PROMISED TO WITHDRAW AND INSTEAD REINFORCED ITS MILITARY FORCES IN
KUWAIT. IRAQ ALSO PLEDGED IN THE DAYS PRIOR TO AUGUST 2 NOT
TO INVADE KUWAIT. THE WORLD IS NOW LIVING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THOSE BROKEN PROMISES.

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RESOLUTION 660 AND ALL OTHER RELEVANT UNSC RESOLUTIONS REMAINS THE
ONLY PATH TO PEACE. THAT MEANS IRAQ MUST IMMEDIATELY BEGIN
TO WITHDRAW ALL OF ITS FORCES FROM ALL OF KUWAIT, SO THAT
KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT CAN BE RESTORED.
AND IT MEANS IRAQ CAN ATTACH NO CONDITIONS TO ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM
KUWAIT. FINALLY, UNTIL IRAQ FULLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY COMPLIES,
RESOLUTION 678'S AUTHORIZATION OF THE USE OF FORCE REMAINS IN
EFFECT.

.
THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION MUST SEE IMMEDIATE AND CONCRETE
EVIDENCE OF IRAQ'S INTENTIONS. SPECIFICALLY, WE AND OUR
COALITION PARTNERS REQUIRE IRAQ TO BEGIN TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING
STEPS WITHIN 12 HOURS:

.
-- BEGIN A MASSIVE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT TO BE
COMPLETED IN 96 HOURS. GIVEN THE FACT THAT IRAQ INVADED AND
OCCUPIED KUWAIT IN A MATTER OF HOURS, ANYTHING LONGER THAN 96
HOURS FROM THE INITIATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT MEET

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0753-MA
6/6/2012 mm

RESOLUTION 660'S REQUIREMENT OF IMMEDIACY.

. -- TO ENSURE THE WITHDRAWAL WILL BE COMPLETE, IRAQ MUST, WITHIN THE FIRST 48 HOURS, REMOVE ALL ITS FORCES FROM KUWAIT CITY, FROM ALL PREPARED DEFENSES ALONG THE SAUDI-KUWAIT BORDER, FROM BUBIYAN AND WARBAH ISLANDS, AND FROM KUWAIT'S RUMAYLLAH OIL FIELD;

. -- IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 660, ALL IRAQI FORCES MUST, WITHIN THE 96 HOURS SPECIFIED ABOVE, RETURN TO THEIR POSITIONS OF AUGUST 1. THOSE FORCES THAT WERE DEPLOYED WELL NORTH OF THE IRAQI-KUWAITI BORDER ON AUGUST 1, THEREFORE, MUST NOT ONLY LEAVE KUWAIT, BUT RESUME THEIR AUGUST 1 POSITIONS.

. -- ARRANGE WITH THE ICRC THE RELEASE OF ALL COALITION PRISONERS OF WAR AND THIRD-COUNTRY CIVILIANS BEING HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL, AND THE RETURN OF THE REMAINS OF KILLED AND DECEASED COALITION SERVICEMEN, WITHIN 24 HOURS FROM THE INITIATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL;

. -- REMOVE ALL EXPLOSIVES OR BOOBY-TRAPS ON KUWAITI OIL INSTALLATIONS;

. -- CEASE COMBAT AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS OVER IRAQ AND KUWAIT EXCEPT FOR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT CARRYING TROOPS OUT OF KUWAIT;

. -- HALT ALL CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENSES IN KUWAIT;

. -- ALLOW COALITION AIRCRAFT EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER AND USE OF ALL KUWAITI AIRSPACE;

. -- CEASE ALL FURTHER ATTACKS, INCLUDING USE OF SCUD MISSILES AND TERRORISM BY IRAQ OR ITS SURROGATES AGAINST ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING ISRAEL;

. -- CEASE ALL DESTRUCTIVE ACTIONS AGAINST KUWAITI CITIZENS AND PROPERTY AND RELEASE ALL KUWAITI DETAINEES; AND

. -- DESIGNATE IRAQI MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER(S) TO WORK WITH COALITION FORCES ON THE OPERATIONAL DETAILS RELATED TO IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL, TO INCLUDE THE PROVISION OF ALL DATA ON THE LOCATION AND NATURE OF ANY LAND OR SEA MINES.

. THE UNITED STATES AND ITS COALITION PARTNERS WISH TO REITERATE THAT THEIR FORCES WILL NOT ATTACK RETREATING IRAQI FORCES SO LONG AS WITHDRAWAL PROCEEDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE GUIDELINES. ANY BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT WILL BRING AN INSTANT AND SHARP RESPONSE FROM COALITION FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 678.

. END TEXT:

. DECL: OADR
#0091

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0091 <TOR> 910221161913 MSG000288461953

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15. Cable	From White House, Re: Message to Ambassador Jack Matlock from Condi Rice [212229Z Feb 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	2/21/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/14/2022

Date Closed: 7/23/2009	OA/ID Number: 91151-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0683-MR(514)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/6/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> 1.4(c)

<DTG> 212229Z FEB 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO 1.4(c)

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ 1.4(c)

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EYES ONLY TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK FROM CONDI RICE.

JACK:

BRENT HAS ASKED THAT I SEND YOU THIS SUMMARY CABLE OF EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS WHICH WE HAVE PROVIDED TO KEY COALITION MEMBERS. PLEASE TREAT AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0683-MR

MM 4/6/2015

1. ~~SECRET~~ (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN TEXT:

I WANTED TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS AND MORE

GENERALLY ON WHERE WE STAND. I FIRST HEARD FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV YESTERDAY, FEBRUARY 18, ON THE VISIT OF IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ TO MOSCOW. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WROTE ME THAT HE HAD PROPOSED TO THE IRAQIS A PLAN IN WHICH IRAQ WOULD ANNOUNCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS FROM KUWAIT BY A DATE CERTAIN, TO BE FOLLOWED BY A TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES AND, THE NEXT DAY, BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS THEMSELVES. IRAQ WOULD RECEIVE A GUARANTEE THAT ITS TROOPS BEING WITHDRAWN WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV ALSO DEPICTED A LARGE ROLE FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, BOTH DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD AND BEYOND, IN A MANNER THAT RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF LINKAGE.

I IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S LETTER, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE THAT IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT BE UNCONDITIONAL AND IMMEDIATE AS CALLED FOR BY RESOLUTION 660. I NOTED MY CONCERN OVER THE UNSPECIFIED LENGTH OF THE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL, SUGGESTING THAT IRAQ SHOULD BE PERMITTED NO MORE THAN 96 HOURS TO COMPLETE THIS TASK. I ALSO UNDERLINED THE NECESSITY FOR IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH ALL THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS AND EXCHANGE ALL POWS AND OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL. LAST, I UNDERLINED THAT WE COULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO ANY NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL.

I HAVE SINCE SENT A SECOND MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, ONE THAT REFLECTED ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION OF HIS LETTER BY ME AND MY MOST SENIOR ADVISORS. IN ADDITION TO REITERATING THE THEMES OF MY EARLIER COMMUNICATION, I IMPRESSED UPON PRESIDENT GORBACHEV THAT THERE COULD BE NO CEASE-FIRE BEFORE A MASSIVE WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT BEGINS AND NO FORMAL CESSATION OF THE OVERALL STATE OF HOSTILITIES UNTIL THAT WITHDRAWAL WERE COMPLETED. ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENT WOULD RISK THE LIVES OF COALITION FORCES. I MADE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT ATTACK RETREATING IRAQI FORCES; AT THE SAME TIME, ANY IRAQI BREACH OF AGREEMENTS RESPECTING WITHDRAWAL WOULD BRING INSTANT AND SHARP RESPONSE. THE EXCHANGE OF POWS AND OTHER

THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 24 HOURS. FINALLY, THE IRAQIS HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT ANY USE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ON THEIR PART WOULD TRIGGER NOT ONLY A DEVASTATING COALITION MILITARY RESPONSE BUT WOULD AFFECT THE COALITION'S TREATMENT OF IRAQ IN THE WAR'S AFTERMATH.

.
IN SHORT, AND AS I SAID PUBLICLY, THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AS IT CURRENTLY STANDS DOES NOT MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS; THAT SAID, WE ARE NOT CLOSING THE DOOR ON DIPLOMACY. THE IRAQIS KNOW AS THEY HAVE FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS WHAT THEY MUST DO. IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE CONTINUING WITH OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND PREPARATIONS. I WILL ENDEAVOR TO KEEP YOU ABREAST OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS; AT THE SAME TIME, I WOULD HOPE YOU WOULD NOT HESITATE TO CONTACT ME ABOUT ANY OF THE ISSUES RAISED HERE.

.
END TEXT

.
DECL: OADR

#0093

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0093 <TOR> 910221173218 MSG000288466338

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16. Cable	Cabinet Office to White House Re: Message from the Prime Minister to the President (2 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91151-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17. Cable	Cabinet Office London to The White House Re: Message from Charles Powell for General Scowcroft (2 pp.)	2/18/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91151-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE OUT

<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 191930Z FEB 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SIR CHARLES POWELL, FROM
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

FEBRUARY 19, 1991

CHARLES --

HERE IS THE TEXT OF A GENERAL LETTER TO THE COALITION PARTNERS
WHICH WE DISCUSSED A FEW MINUTES AGO.

BRENT

BEGIN ATTACHMENT:

DEAR

I WANTED TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS
AND MORE GENERALLY ON WHERE WE STAND. I FIRST HEARD FROM PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV YESTERDAY, FEBRUARY 18, ON THE VISIT OF IRAQI FOREIGN
MINISTER AZIZ TO MOSCOW. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WROTE ME THAT HE HAD
PROPOSED TO THE IRAQIS A PLAN IN WHICH IRAQ WOULD ANNOUNCE THE
WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS FROM KUWAIT BY A DATE CERTAIN, TO BE
FOLLOWED BY A TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES AND, THE NEXT DAY, BY THE
WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS THEMSELVES. IRAQ WOULD RECEIVE A
GUARANTEE THAT ITS TROOPS BEING WITHDRAWN WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED AND
THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV ALSO DEPICTED A LARGE ROLE FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL,
BOTH DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD AND BEYOND, IN A MANNER THAT
RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF LINKAGE.

I IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S LETTER, "
EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE THAT IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT BE
UNCONDITIONAL AND IMMEDIATE AS CALLED FOR BY RESOLUTION 660. I
NOTED MY CONCERN OVER THE UNSPECIFIED LENGTH OF THE IRAQI
WITHDRAWAL, SUGGESTING THAT IRAQ SHOULD BE PERMITTED NO MORE THAN
96 HOURS TO COMPLETE THIS TASK. I ALSO UNDERLINED THE NECESSITY
FOR IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH ALL THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS
AND EXCHANGE ALL POWS AND OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS HELD
AGAINST THEIR WILL. LAST, I UNDERLINED THAT WE COULD NOT BE DRAWN
INTO ANY NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL.

I HAVE SINCE SENT A SECOND MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, ONE THAT
REFLECTED ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION OF HIS LETTER BY ME AND MY MOST
SENIOR ADVISORS. IN ADDITION TO REITERATING THE THEMES OF MY
EARLIER COMMUNICATION, I IMPRESSED UPON PRESIDENT GORBACHEV THAT
THERE COULD BE NO CEASE-FIRE BEFORE A MASSIVE WITHDRAWAL FROM
KUWAIT WAS UNDERWAY AND NO CESSATION OF THE OVERALL STATE OF

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0753-MR
6/6/2012 MM

HOSTILITIES UNTIL THAT WITHDRAWAL WERE COMPLETED. ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENT WOULD RISK THE LIVES OF COALITION FORCES. I MADE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT ATTACK RETREATING IRAQI FORCES; AT THE SAME TIME, ANY IRAQI BREACH OF WITHDRAWAL CONDITIONS WOULD BRING INSTANT AND SHARP RESPONSE. THE EXCHANGE OF POWS AND OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 24 HOURS. FINALLY, THE IRAQIS HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT ANY USE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ON THEIR PART WOULD TRIGGER NOT ONLY A MASSIVE COALITION MILITARY RESPONSE BUT WOULD AFFECT THE COALITION'S TREATMENT OF IRAQ IN THE WAR'S AFTERMATH.

IN SHORT, AND AS I SAID PUBLICLY, THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AS IT CURRENTLY STANDS DOES NOT MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS; THAT SAID, WE ARE NOT CLOSING THE DOOR ON DIPLOMACY. THE IRAQIS KNOW AS THEY HAVE FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS WHAT THEY MUST DO. IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE CONTINUING WITH OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND PREPARATIONS. I WILL ENDEAVOR TO KEEP YOU ABREAST OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS; AT THE SAME TIME, I WOULD HOPE YOU WOULD NOT HESITATE TO CONTACT ME ABOUT ANY OF THE ISSUES RAISED HERE.

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR
SECRET
#0072

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0072 <TOR> 910219143046 MSG000288282646

VIA CABINET CHANNEL

~~SECRET~~

February 19, 1991

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

FOR: CHARLES POWELL
#10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON

Charles --

Here is the text of a general letter to the coalition partners
which we discussed a few minutes ago.

Brent

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0753-MR
6/6/2012 MM

~~SECRET~~

Begin Text:

Dear

I wanted to bring you up to date on our exchanges with the Soviets and more generally on where we stand. I first heard from President Gorbachev yesterday, February 18, on the visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz to Moscow. President Gorbachev wrote me that he had proposed to the Iraqis a plan in which Iraq would announce the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait by a date certain, to be followed by a termination of hostilities and, the next day, by the withdrawal of the troops themselves. Iraq would receive a guarantee that its troops being withdrawn would not be attacked and that there would be no resumption of hostilities. President Gorbachev also depicted a large role for the UN Security Council, both during the withdrawal period and beyond, in a manner that raised serious questions of linkage.

I immediately responded to President Gorbachev's letter, emphasizing the importance that Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait be unconditional and immediate as called for by Resolution 660. I noted my concern over the unspecified length of the Iraqi withdrawal, suggesting that Iraq should be permitted no more than 96 hours to complete this task. I also underlined the necessity for Iraq to comply with all the relevant Security Council demands and exchange all POWs and other third-country nationals held against their will. Last, I underlined that we could not be drawn into any negotiations about Iraq's withdrawal.

I have since sent a second message to President Gorbachev, one that reflected additional consideration of his letter by me and my most senior advisors. In addition to reiterating the themes of my earlier communication, I impressed upon President Gorbachev that there could be no cease-fire before a massive withdrawal from Kuwait was underway and no cessation of the overall state of hostilities until that withdrawal were completed. Any other arrangement would risk the lives of coalition forces. I made clear that we would not attack retreating Iraqi forces; at the same time, any Iraqi breach of withdrawal conditions would bring instant and sharp response. The exchange of POWs and other third-country nationals would have to be completed within 24 hours. Finally, the Iraqis had to understand that any use of unconventional weapons on their part would trigger not only a massive coalition military response but would affect the coalition's treatment of Iraq in the war's aftermath.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0753-MR
6/6/2012 MM

~~SECRET~~

In short, and as I said publicly, the Soviet initiative as it currently stands does not meet our requirements; that said, we are not closing the door on diplomacy. The Iraqis know as they have for more than six months what they must do. In the meantime, we are continuing with our military activities and preparations. I will endeavor to keep you abreast of any developments; at the same time, I would hope you would not hesitate to contact me about any of the issues raised here.

~~SECRET~~

"Records temporarily restricted in accordance with the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) Interim Guidelines on Classified National Security Information Directive No. 1 (32 CFR Part 2001), Section 2001.13(e) Concerning Re-review of Previously Declassified Records at the National Archives."

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
19a. Draft Cable	From Brent Scowcroft, Re: [Cable] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1991 [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/8/2016

Date Closed:	7/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91151-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-0683-MR(518)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	2/4/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

1.4(c)

~~SECRET~~

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO:

1.4(c)

BEGIN TEXT



*A hand cc [unclear]
Lo. [unclear]*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0683-MR

2/4/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

FLASH

to London, Paris, Ankara, Cairo, Riyadh, Taif, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Rome, Canberra

1. ~~SECRET~~ (Entire Text)

2. Please pass the following message soonest from the President to the King/President/PM:

3. Begin Text:

Dear

I wanted to bring you up to date on our exchanges with the Soviets and more generally on where we stand. I first heard from President Gorbachev yesterday, February 18, on the visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz to Moscow. President Gorbachev wrote me that he had proposed to the Iraqis a plan in which Iraq would announce the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait by a date certain, to be followed by a termination of hostilities and, the next day, by the withdrawal of the troops themselves. Iraq would receive a guarantee that its troops being withdrawn would not be attacked and that there would be no resumption of hostilities. President Gorbachev also depicted a large role for the UN Security Council, both during the withdrawal period and beyond, in a manner that raised serious questions of linkage.

I immediately responded to President Gorbachev's letter, emphasizing the importance that Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait be unconditional and immediate as called for by Resolution 660. I noted my concern over the unspecified length of the Iraqi withdrawal, suggesting that Iraq should be permitted no more than 96 hours to complete this task. I also underlined the necessity for Iraq to comply with all the relevant Security Council demands and exchange all POWs and other third-country nationals held against their will. Last, I underlined that we could not be drawn into any negotiations about Iraq's withdrawal.

I have since sent a second message to President Gorbachev, one that reflected additional consideration of his letter by me and my most senior advisors. In addition to reiterating the themes of my earlier communication, I impressed upon President Gorbachev that there could be no cease-fire before a massive withdrawal from Kuwait begins and no formal cessation of the overall state of hostilities until that withdrawal were completed. Any other arrangement would risk the lives of coalition forces. I made clear that we would not attack retreating Iraqi forces; at the same time, any Iraqi breach of agreements respecting withdrawal would bring instant and sharp response. The exchange of POWs and other third-country nationals would have to be completed within 24 hours. Finally, the Iraqis had to understand that any use of unconventional weapons on their part would trigger not only a

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0753-MR
6/6/2012 MM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

devastating coalition military response but would affect the coalition's treatment of Iraq in the war's aftermath.

In short, and as I said publicly, the Soviet initiative as it currently stands does not meet our requirements; that said, we are not closing the door on diplomacy. The Iraqis know as they have for more than six months what they must do. In the meantime, we are continuing with our military activities and preparations. I will endeavor to keep you abreast of any developments; at the same time, I would hope you would not hesitate to contact me about any of the issues raised here.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Begin Text:

Dear

I wanted to bring you up to date on our exchanges with the Soviets and more generally on where we stand. I first heard from President Gorbachev yesterday, February 18, on the visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz to Moscow. President Gorbachev wrote me that he had proposed to the Iraqis a plan in which Iraq would announce the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait by a date certain, to be followed by a termination of hostilities and, the next day, by the withdrawal of the troops themselves. Iraq would receive a guarantee that its troops being withdrawn would not be attacked and that there would be no resumption of hostilities. President Gorbachev also depicted a large role for the UN Security Council, both during the withdrawal period and beyond, in a manner that raised serious questions of linkage.

I immediately responded to President Gorbachev's letter, emphasizing the importance that Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait be unconditional and immediate as called for by Resolution 660. I noted my concern over the unspecified length of the Iraqi withdrawal, suggesting that Iraq should be permitted no more than 96 hours to complete this task. I also underlined the necessity for Iraq to comply with all the relevant Security Council demands and exchange all POWs and other third-country nationals held against their will. Last, I underlined that we could not be drawn into any negotiations about Iraq's withdrawal.

X I have since sent a second message to President Gorbachev, one that reflected additional consideration of his letter by me and my most senior advisors. In addition to reiterating the themes of my earlier communication, I impressed upon President Gorbachev that there could be no cease-fire before a massive withdrawal from Kuwait ^{begins} ~~was underway~~ and no ^{from} ~~cessation~~ of the overall state of hostilities until that withdrawal were completed. Any other arrangement would risk the lives of coalition forces. I made clear that we would not attack retreating Iraqi forces; at the same time, any Iraqi breach of withdrawal ~~conditions~~ would bring instant and sharp response. The exchange of POWs and other third-country nationals would have to be completed within 24 hours. Finally, the Iraqis had to understand that any use of unconventional weapons on their part would trigger not only a ^{devastating} ~~massive~~ coalition military response but would affect the coalition's treatment of Iraq in the war's aftermath.

~~SECRET~~

agreements
respects

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2009-0753-MR
6/6/2012 MM

~~SECRET~~

In short, and as I said publicly, the Soviet initiative as it currently stands does not meet our requirements; that said, we are not closing the door on diplomacy. The Iraqis know as they have for more than six months what they must do. In the meantime, we are continuing with our military activities and preparations. I will endeavor to keep you abreast of any developments; at the same time, I would hope you would not hesitate to contact me about any of the issues raised here.

~~SECRET~~

Sent to
Cheney +
Baker
2/19
1:15 for
comment

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
19d. Draft Cable	To London, Paris, Ankara, Cairo, Riyadh, Taif, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Rome, Canberra Re: Message from the President (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Special Separate Channel Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Special Channel (January - June) 1991 [4]

Date Closed:	7/23/2009	OA/ID Number:	91151-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
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