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2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
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FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files

OA/ID Number: 91157
Folder ID Number: 91157-003

Folder Title:
Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [3]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	49	1	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Handwritten Memcon	Re: Miyazawa (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva of Portugal and EC President Delors (3 pp.)	4/22/92	(b)(1)	S
02b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Silca-Delors (3 pp.)	4/22/92	(b)(1)	
03a. Draft Memcon	Re: President/Mulroney (2 pp.)	5/20/92	(b)(1)	
03b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Mulroney (3 pp.)	5/20/92	(b)(1)	
04a. Draft Memcon	Re: President/Nazarbayez (4 pp.)	5/19/92	(b)(1)	
04b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Nazarbayez (7 pp.)	5/19/92	(b)(1)	
05a. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UNSYG [United Nations Secretary General] (2 pp.)	5/12/92	(b)(1)	C
05b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Boutros-Ghali (3 pp.)	5/12/92	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1303
OA/ID Number: 91157-003
Date Closed: 8/5/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06a. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with President Kravchuk of the Ukraine (2 pp.)	5/6/92	(b)(1)	C
06b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Kravchuk (3 pp.)	5/6/92	(b)(1)	
07a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President von Weizsaecker of Germany [page 1] (1 pp.)	4/26/92	(b)(1)	S
07b. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President von Weizsaecker of Germany (2 pp.)	4/29/92	(b)(1)	S
07c. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/von Weizsaecker (3 pp.)	4/29/92	(b)(1)	
08a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)	11/8/92	(b)(1)	S
08b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Mitterrand [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (8 pp.)	11/8/92	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [3]

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

3287

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 29, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: DAVID C. GOMPERT 

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation for the President's
Meeting with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva of
Portugal and EC President Jacques Delors,
April 22, 1992

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation of the Oval Office
meeting between the President and Prime Minister Cavaco Silva and
EC President Delors.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I be filed for the
record.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 8/5/09

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262010-0541-MR
MM 4/14/2016

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva of Portugal and EC President Delors

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister of Portugal
Jacques Delors, President of the EC
Commission of the Europeans Communities
Martins da Cruz, Diplomatic Advisor to the Prime Minister
Pascal Lamy, Chief of Staff of the President of the Commission of the European Communities

DATE, TIME April 22, 1992, 11:00am - 11:30am
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: I meant what I said. Although this is an election, I don't want to hold back or delay the Uruguay Round negotiations. It would send a disastrous signal around the world. I feel very strongly about this. I want to clear the air on that. Now, welcome. We can stay in here, or we can go into the Cabinet Room, sending a group off to negotiate if that seems appropriate. (C)

Prime Minister Silva: We would like to stay here for 5 minutes. We must do our best. We have to worry about the message we are sending about the world trading system. Even in the CIS and Latin America, people are depending on us. We must try to compromise. (C)

President Delors: I feel that this is the last chance. We have on the table various proposals. It is difficult to prove to you that we will reform the common agricultural policy, that we will have less production, less exports and less support. Among friends, let me say I take responsibility to resolve both the CAP and GATT. I have two solutions to suggest: a best and a second best. The first is as follows: The EC has not accepted the Dunkel paper. If you will be willing to amend it a little, I will modify our position on export subsidies, but not to the

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Dunkel level. The safe box offers a possibility, but without a link to production. The peace clause is not difficult. Until today the EC hasn't accepted physical restrictions on production. I will defend physical reductions but not to 24%. (S)

The President: It depends on what level. I am not an expert. When we accepted Dunkel, but I want to emphasize we weren't happy with all of it. (S)

President Delors: I know. (U)

The President: We would have to know more about the level. (U)

President Delors: I think we would agree to somewhere between 15% and 18%, but I have not yet brokered this with the ministers. (S)

The President: What else? (U)

President Delors: On rebalancing perhaps there could be a symbolic gesture. On the safe box we can make it. The big issue is physical reductions on exports. (S)

Secretary Baker: What is your idea on internal restraint? You said no links to production. (S)

President Delors: No. With links to production. (S)

Secretary Baker: So it is our basic safe box. (S)

President Delors: Yes. And on rebalancing, some general statement on the relationship between export subsidies and rebalancing. (S)

Secretary Baker: On the peace clause? (S)

President Delors: A general agreement to follow cooperative measures rather than unilateral. (S)

Secretary Baker: In other words, agreement to cooperative measures with respect to the issues in the agreement but not everything else? (S)

President Delors: Yes. (U)

The President: How would we do all of this? (U)

President Delors: My target is to get a breakthrough to permit the negotiations to continue. I would like to tell the press that negotiations will continue, and to do it in a way we can put the spotlight on negotiations in Geneva. (S)

The President: What is the EC view in general about going forward now? (S)

President Delors: If we can get an agreement, it is better. Our goal is not to get a U.S.-EC agreement at the expense of the rest of the world. But an agreement between the EC and the United States would let us go forward on the other issues. For internal reasons we need to reform the CAP. (e)

My second solution is this. We would agree to the safe box, but leave export subsidies, rebalancing and the peace clause for a period to see what the effect of CAP reform is. We would have a review clause to discuss these other issues in two years. (e)

Secretary Baker: The Cairns group would be upset about that. It looks like we would be ducking the issues. (e)

President Delors: But the EC price reductions would go forward, just not agreement to reduce physical volume. (e)

-- End of Conversation --

P/Silva - de la Hous
4/22/92

P I meant what I said. This this
an election year I don't want to
hold back or delay. It would
seed disastrous regional around
world. I feel very strongly
about this. Want to clear air
on that - and now welcome.
We can stay in here or go into
the Cabinet Room - seeding a group out
to negotiate if that seems appropriate.

S We'd like to stay here for 5 min.
We must do our best - many in
C, S & H A are depending on us. We
must try to compromise

dl I feel this is last chance. We have
on table various proposals. It dif
to prove to you we will reform CAP.
Less production, less X, less support
Among friends let me say, I resp to
resolve both CAP & GATT.

I have 2 solutions - best & 2nd best.
1st is following - EC have accepted
Danzon. If you will accept it
a little I will modify position
on X - but not to Danzon level.
The safe box offers a possibility
but w/o link to production. Phase
Clause is not dif. Until today EC
has not accepted physical restriction
on production. I will defer

P physical reduction but not to 24%
D Depends on what level, I don't X put.
When we accepted Dunkel we ~~could~~ weren't
happy w/ all of it.

dl I know.

P We would have to know more about
a level.

dl I think from 15 to 18% - level I have
not yet broken w/c ministers.

P What else

dl On rebalancing perhaps a separate
gesture. On safe box ... The big
issue is physical reductions on X.

B What is your idea on ice restraint.
You said no links to production.

dl No. ice linked to production.

B So it is our basic safe box

dl Yes. And on rebalancing, some general
statement on relationship bet X + M

B Please elaborate.

dl a general agreement to follow comp
measures rather than unilateral.

(Describes an example)

B Wf report to us in a agreement,
not everything else?

dl Yes.

P How do it.

dl My target is to get a draft
to present negot to continue. Tell

the press & negot will continue & put a spotlight on negot in Geneva.

P~~at~~ What is EC mind about going forward now?

dh If we can get an agreement it is better. Goal is not to get US-EC agreement at ~~the~~ expense of a rest of world, but agreement bet EC US would let us go forward on other issues.

For internal reasons we will upping of CAP.

dh My 2nd solution: We agree on a ~~good~~ box but leave X, rebalancing & peace clause for a period to see effect of CAP reform. A review clause & discuss these others in 2 years.

B Cairns group would be up set. looks like ducking issues

dh But a pure reduction would go forward - just not agreement to reduce physical volume.

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Get
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for
Mary

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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P/Nozarbayev 5-19-92

P: Every one is anxious to hear from you. After the discussion, we will have a working lunch then signing and statements. If there is anything you wish to discuss privately we should do so now. I want you and Jim to fill us in on START. I hope at Lisbon you will have a high level representative.

N: I believe we have overcome new obstacles. I want to express my own feeling. I am grateful for your kind attitude toward Kazakhstan from the great state of the United States. At the moment the CIS is not working. Meetings like a President's club. The Soviet Union continues to disintegrate. Problems within Russia accelerate and that is dangerous. The main concern is that Russia doesn't control the course of reform - it is being done at the local level. Why? We shifted from totalitarianism to freedom instantaneously. We should have sorted out the economy first. Destroyed the center in Bolshevik manner. We sign documents and they are meaningless. Russians exert pressure on many areas. I have told Yeltsin what I am telling you. We should keep Yeltsin, for all his faults he is sincere. If you and I prompt him -he pays no attention to anyone else - including our help. I am talking about his drinking. He says what can I do - look what surrounds me. But that is not the way out.

P: How did he respond to your drinking comment?

N: All right. There are many problems. The Black Sea Fleet, for example. I could solve it. But there are many people around Yeltsin with territorial claims. There is no united army. Everyone knows that. We have our own army - so do the others. There is mistrust of Russia. Other republics are willing to go under the protection of the West but not Russia. Only Kazakhstan may be able to prevent fundamentalism in Tadjikistan related to Massood. The CIS is collapsing. I am working hard to preserve it, but it is useless. We signed an international security pact. (Describes). I signed that merely to prevent fundamentalist interference. We have enough resources and industry so we won't be the last to get out of the crisis. But we need aid now. It should not be delayed - including Russia and the others. Crisis is reaching an apex. We can't afford to be late. We could have a catastrophe. There is total disintegration in the Russian countryside. Now Kazakhstan is OK. We have a choice. Representatives of all Arabs states have visited, including Iran. They have promised to provide what we need. But that would put Kazakhstan under their influence. Kazakhstan has Turkic base so I would be honored - but I won't do that but I will support democracy. There will be instability between the Central Asian Republics because there are territorial and racial disputes. It is important to stabilize Afghanistan to defend against fundamentalism. There are 3 aggressors: _____, Dustum...

- P: Massood is more moderate isn't he?
- N: Yes. Our task is security and democracy. We have the resources. We have begun our work with Cheveron. We want American Companies to come over and invest. (Opens Map). Look at the central location of Kazakhstan. (Describes). We want your military to come over and train our military -a military cadre. I want a grand and powerful US presence. That is the reason for Cheveron and that is only the begining. I closed a nuclear testing site. Nevada is still operating but I won't criticize (laughs). Here is a powerful base. (points) Here we work on nuclear rocket engines. I want to cooperate on high technology.
- P: We could send Dan Golden.
- N: Here - this could be a landing site for shuttle in an emergency.
- P: Is Russia sensitive about all this belonging to you?
- N: We have an agreement. We are prepared to lease some of these - they are all on Kazakhstan territory. Please exempt Kazakhstan from COCOM. We want preferential treatment, like you give Israel. It's not clear what will happen in Russia. In China some of their books show part of our territory as Chinese. To the south is fundamentalism. What are we to do? That is why we wish to be close to the US. This is why we wanted to remain temporarily a nuclear state. I want Kazakhstan to become a bastion of democratic principles as a lesson to the world. I will hand out books in New York with 135 opportunities, with all the economic details, legislation on market economy, our achievements.
- P: OPIC?
- S: You will sign the treaty?
- N: I am not coming empty handed. I come with projects and opportunity! (Describes minerals, etc). Kazakhstan exports 5 billion annually. Gold and diamonds. Will put gold in Swiss banks as security.
- B: Kazakhstan can get its own currency sooner than most. Should put some in the Federal Reserve Bank.
- N: We'll do that. I just wanted to brief you on our situation. Our position is peacemaker between Christians and Muslims. Want to be close to the US. I want to extend an invitation to you to visit.

- P: It is difficult this election year. But I'd love to do it, so let's leave it open. I think I'll win and would love to come.
Do we need to resolve any more business?
- B: Where and when can we sign this protocol? The Museum of Art is good.
- N: How about Minsk? That is the capitol of the CIS.
- B: Can't you send someone to Lisbon? We are running out of time to start hearings.
- N: We Can't send someone on the 24th. If you have arranged it with the other 3 - why not do it in Minsk on the 25th.
- B: Someone would be ready on the 25th to go anywhere?
- N: We are signing a treaty at 6 p.m. in Moscow on the 24th.
- B: OK. We need to move to get it ratified.
- N: What do you think of on Kazakhstan?
- P: Scientific cooperation is great, business incentives are great, nuclear business is running along and we take seriously our responsibilities under NPT, NALL, etc.
- N: How about the military?
- B: We could do some training.
- P: Military to Military visits would be good.
- N: My security is US/UN.
- P: We can discuss.
- N: Scientific cooperation, business, military, etc.
- B: Biggest help to Kazakhstan would be business investments. Resolutions of nuclear issues open the way.
- P: Your deal with Cheveron will really open the doors. Cut contract with our smaller businesses. They can move more capacity. Won't Eagleburger mission apply?
- B: Yes
- N: Last - happy to know the US is providing 500 million in CCC. We need cattle feed. Here is my request for this.

- B: Also have some funds for distruction of nuclear weapons. Ukraine asks for some and we should find a way to get some to Kazakhstan.
- N: That would help. We have a lot of tanks and small arms. Want your help to sell them.
- B: Our public to CIS making and selling weapons to Burma, Libya, etc.
- N: We don't make them - just want to dispose of the ones we have.
- P: We just missed our Cabinet Meeting. Lets wash up and go to lunch.

P/Nazarbayev ~~P/Nazarbayev~~ 5/19/92

(1)

P Every one anxious to hear program after discussion, a working lunch then signing & statements.

Anything you wish to discuss privately we should do now. I want your time to fill in on start. Hope at historical you would have a high level rep.

14

I believe we have a core of new obstacles. Want to express my own feeling. I grateful for kind attitude toward K from great state of US. At moment CIS is not working. Works like a P's Club. EU continues to disintegrate. P's in Russia accelerate & that dangerous. Main concern is Russia doesn't control cause of refugee - being done at local level. Why? We stepped forward Total. To freedom instantaneously should have started out even 1st. Destroyed center in Bolshevik manner. We sign docs. & they meaningless. Russians spent premiere in many ways. I have told Yeltsin what I telling you. We should keep Yeltsin, for all his faults he is sincere. If you

& I corrupt him - he pays no attention
to anyone else - me even help. I
talking about drinking. He says
what can I do - look what surrounds
me. Best that not a way out.
P How did he respond to your drinking
comment?

N all right. Many probs. Black Sea
fleet, for example. I could solve it.
But many people are ~~as~~ yellow
w/ territorial claims. There is no
united army. Everyone knows
that, we have our own army - so
do others. There is mistrust
of Russia. Other republics are willing
to go under protection of West
but not Russia. Only Ruzh.
? many leaders to prevent fundamentalist
Tadjik related to Moscow. CIS
is collapsing. I work very hard
to preserve it, but it is useless.
We signed int. security pact.
(Describes). I signed that only to
prevent fundamentalist interference.
We have some resources & ultimately
we would be last to get out of a
crisis. Best we could do is save. It
should not be delayed - we
Russia & others. Crisis is reaching

anyway, we can't afford to be late
We could have eaten through. Total
disintegration in Rus country &
Trans-Kazakh. We have a choice.

Reps of all Arab states have visited,
will discuss. Promised to provide what we need.

But that would put R under
their influence. R has Tenise^{Turki}
lease so I would be honored - but
I want to do that but will support
dmes. There will be instability
but let C. A. Republic handle the
territorial & racial disputes.
Important to stabilize Cyprus so
no. to defend against fundamentalism.

There are 3 groupings: unija,
Dostom

Dustum
Massood P
N

Musood more moderate isn't he
~~no~~ Yes. Our task is security & ~~other~~
dmes. We have a reserves.

Began our work w/ Chevron.
Want Mr. Carriveto come over
& visit. (Opens map). Look at
central location of R. (Describes).
Want your visiting to come over
& train our military - a civil
cadre. I want a general & personnel
US presence. That revenue for
Chevron & that only beginning.

a rocket

④

I closed a nice testing set. Zurade
still operating but I want to increase
(Chungbo). Here is powerful base. (Hunt)
Here we work on new engines
I want to coop on high tech.
P We need see Dan Golden Golden

N Here - this could be a landing
site for shuttle in emergency.

P Do Russia sensitive about all
this belong to you.

N We have an agreement. We
proposed to lease some of them - they
all on K territory

Please exempt K from COCOM. Want
preferential treatment, like you gave
Israel. Not clear what will happen in
Rus. In China some of their books
show part of our territory as Chinese.

To a South is fundamentalism.
What are we to do? That why we
wish to be close to U.S. This way
we want to remain temp. semi

state. I want K to become a
bastion of demo ~~pr~~ principles as
lessons to world. I will hand out

books in NY w/ 135 opportunities,
w/ all the even details. begs on market
economy, our achievements

P OIC?

- S You will sign today
- N I not coming empty handed. I come w/ projects & oppor. (Describes minerals etc). K x \$5 bil annually. Gold & diamonds will put gold in Swiss banks so security
- B K can get its own currency sooner than most. Should put some in Fed Res. Bank
- N Will do that. ~~to~~ I just wanted to bring you more sit.
- ~~to~~ Our position is peace maker bet Christians & Muslims. Want to be close to US. Want to extend invitation to you to visit.
- P Dif. this election year. But I'd love to do it so let's leave it open. I think I'd win & we'd love to work.
- Do we need to resolve any new business?
- B Where & when we can sign this protocol. ~~Musica~~ not good
- N How about Munich? That capital of CIS
- B Can't you send someone to London? We running out of time to start hearing
- N Can't send someone on 24th if you have arranged it w/ the other 3 - why not do it on Munich on c 25th
- B Someone would be ready on 25th to go anywhere?
- N We signing treaty at 6 pm in

Mozzies on 24th

B OK. we need a rule to get it ~~it~~ ratified

N What do you think of my say on it

P Scientific coop great, businesses inventing
sp great, new businesses are moving
along & we take services our resp
under NPT, NACC, etc.

N How about military?

B We need to some training.

P Mil-mil issues would be good.

N My security man is w/ me.

P We can discuss

N Scientific coop, business, mil, etc.

B Biggest help to K would be business must

P ~~at~~ ~~the~~ You deal w/ Chevron will really
open doors. Get contact w/ our smaller
businesses. They can move more rapidly.
Went Eagleburger mission apply?

B Yes

N Last - happy to hear US providing 500
mil CCC. We need cattle feed. Here
is my request for this.

B Also have some funds for destruction games.
Ukraine asks for some & we should find
a way to get some to K.

N That would help. We have a lot of
tanks & small arms. Want your help
to sell them.

- B Can public not sympathize to ^{crackings} CIS, selling
up to Berne, history, etc
- N We don't make them - just want to dispose
of c ones and have.
- P We just missed one cabinet act.
lets work up to go to China.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UNSYG [United Nations Secretary General] (2 pp.)	5/12/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [3]

Date Closed: 8/5/2009	OA/ID Number: 91157-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Boutros-Ghali (3 pp.)	5/12/92	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [3]

Date Closed:	8/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91157-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06a. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with President Kravchuk of the Ukraine (2 pp.)	5/6/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [3]

Date Closed:	8/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91157-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

P/K rawchuk 5/4/92

- P If you agree, will spend a few minutes here, then Cabinet room, lunch, statements, C.D.
We can talk at C.D. but I want to show it to you.
Any sensitive subject you have we can discuss now
- K We agreed on a # of draft documents
Brought a letter on start to give you later. We working it out
- P That way important, where are we?
- B We translated Uk. text this morning.
We see 3 changes from last agreed text
Two aren't prob - one comes a prob we
tht we had last night. The one stating
a position of Uk. This translation is
acceptable to us if we can confirm it
- K I can put a right word in Uk to
satisfy you.
- B Prov in 3rd para of letter. I tht we
had agreed. "Uk shall guarantee
removal of all photocopies, incl
that of copies. That has been changed back
to state more copies. If that can be
changed back we are OK
- K Yes, of course
- P That is good. It is very important.
If no copies are something Am people
press on.

B Can I read a last para to you? (Read)
That is acceptable in terms of "position
for UK."

Z It not a prob. We accept it as you
read.

P Shall we go in?

K On occasion becoming lost. Started when
Russians started making territorial
claims. It relates to territorial dimensions. We
didn't want to put that into a document
but UK people are worried about
imperial tendencies beginning to show
in Russia. I say this because this
question will be raised in ratif.
process. I will have to show that
west won't leave UK w/o reliable
security gear.

P I understood your prob. We think
a right way to go is to strengthen bilateral
relations & multi. to integrate you
into a West like NAAC, etc. We
think that's a way to go. There are concrete
steps: H. North group - that old group should
continue. Several mil people in E. sub
in Kiev to provide trig & help in budget
& civilian control. We hope that you
& you & hope to reinforce it. I believe in
mil-mil relations & would like to set
that up. Many have been here & I would

like to reciprocate.

K I spoke to Chung today & conferred what you said. That is good.

P That is general wisdom & gesture of security & I think will help.

B Greatest guarantee of UK security is relation to West & its eventure in west. There is great sympathy in West to UK & also in NAEL, etc.

K I agree entirely, but consider 1 pay factor. UK lost millions in war & would like to know that as we get rid of nukes, one incident or something won't lead to disaster.

P That underscores Jim's point about integration w/ West.

Z I agree but important factor is Am. stand on this issue.

P We stand for peace & not only taking over anyone else.

B We have subscribed to C S C E - no change of borders w/o agreement. Also NATO guarantees (Demits). This obligation we take very seriously.

P Indeed we do. Shall we go in?

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~~SECRET~~

Non-log

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0546-MR
12/1/2014 MM

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President von Weizsaecker of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Richard von Weizsaecker, President
Andreas Meyer-Landrut, Chief of Staff of the President's Office

DATE, TIME: April 29, 1992, 10:30 - 10:55 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: It is great to have you here. If there is anything you wish to say in private.... (C)

I added that. I don't make sense without it.

President von Weizsaecker: There is perhaps one point. We are pressed with questions about the inner strength of Germany. The strength of the Right-wing in the recent Land elections, the budget deficit, and now the strikes: these are unusual for Germany. And what will happen to foreign policy post-Genscher? It is true that Chancellor Kohl's burdens are heavy. It is more difficult to be Chancellor of a coalition than to be a British Prime Minister. He has the burden of leading his party and his two coalition partners. He has pretty much taken over the CSU, but the FDP is in turmoil and disarray. The Foreign Minister's decision was not well done and will be criticized. The budget deficit is easy to explain. We have transferred 200 billion Deutsche Marks to the east for two years, yet unemployment is still rising. We are by no means through. There is much personal criticism of our behavior in the East over forty years. Genscher's departure will not mean a change in our foreign policy. We don't want a new direction. There will be absolutely no change. Genscher's successor is a good, reliable man. The mood in the foreign office is relieved. (S)

That's what it looks like, but the sentence doesn't make sense to me. I'm right to me.

The President: What happened to the woman who was first selected? (C)

President von Weizsaecker: It was a mistake of the FDP's leaders. Kinkel was head of the BND for two years; he was your counterpart. There was a division of labor between Kohl and Genscher. Now there will be more burden on Kohl. The strikes are not serious. These are actually good, because it points out to the people that we cannot raise wages in the West and ignore

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Declassify on: OADR

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~~SECRET~~

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Non-log

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0546-MR
12/1/2014 MM

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SUBJECT: Meeting with President von Weizsaecker of
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PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
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Richard von Weizsaecker, President
Andreas Meyer-Landrut, Chief of Staff of the
President's Office

DATE, TIME April 29, 1992, 10:30 - 10:55 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: It is great to have you here. If there is anything you wish to say in private.... (C)

President von Weizsaecker: There is perhaps one point. We are pressed with questions about the inner strength of Germany. The strength of the Right-wing in the recent Land elections, the budget deficit, and now the strikes: these are unusual for Germany. And what will happen to foreign policy post-Genscher? It is true that Chancellor Kohl's burdens are heavy. It is more difficult to be Chancellor of a coalition than to be a British Prime Minister. He has the burden of leading his party and his two coalition partners. He has pretty much taken over the CSU, but the FDP is in turmoil and disarray. The Foreign Minister's decision was not well done and will be criticized. The budget deficit is easy to explain. We have transferred 200 billion Deutsche Marks to the east for two years, yet unemployment is still rising. We are by no means through. There is much personal criticism of our behavior in the East over forty years. Genscher's departure will not mean a change in our foreign policy. We don't want a new direction. There will be absolutely no change. Genscher's successor is a good, reliable man. The mood in the foreign office is relieved. (S)

The President: What happened to the woman who was first selected? (C)

President von Weizsaecker: It was a mistake of the FDP's leaders. Kinkel was head of the BND for two years; he was your counterpart. There was a division of labor between Kohl and Genscher. Now there will be more burden on Kohl. The strikes are not serious. These are actually good, because it points out to the people that we cannot raise wages in the West and ignore

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Declassify on: OADR

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2

the needs of the east. Chancellor Kohl now has a great burden to carry. (S)

The President: Thank you for this insight. I will try to be alert and helpful and not to complicate his problems. There was an ugly piece on "60 Minutes" about the return of the Nazis. If we can help set the record straight, I would like your suggestion. (S)

President von Weizsaecker: It has nothing to do with the rebirth of the Nazis. It is asylum-seekers that are at the root of it. There are so many that they threaten to overwhelm us. We are the one open country. We want to make asylum a European problem, but so far it is mostly ours. The other problem is a Right-wing movement about national identity, in the context of EC integration. There is also the issue of rich versus poor in a united Europe. There is Le Pen in France, and similar movements in Italy and Germany. In Germany there is a fear that turning the Deutsche Mark into the European currency would weaken it. But none of this has anything to do with Fascism. (S)

The President: I will get a videotape of the program to you. (S)

President von Weizsaecker: There is a good U.S. movie called "Troubled Conscience" about the Resistance during the 1930s. It is very good, about an issue very little known in the U.S. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

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P/Von Weizsäcker 4/29/92

P Great to hear you here. Of there is anything you wish to say in private...

V Perhaps 1 point. We are pressed w/ questions about inner strength of Germany & Elections (right-wing) budget deficit, now strikes - unusual for Germany. And what will happen to F.P. post Weizsäcker. It's true that Kohl's burdens are heavy. More like to be Chancellor of coalition than Br PM. He has a burden of leading his party, and his 2 coalition partners. He has pretty much taken over CSU but FDP is in turmoil & disarray. The FM was not well done & will be criticized. Budget easy to explain. We have transferred 200 bil DM to east for 2 yrs - yet unemployment still rising. We by no means through. Much personal criticism over behavior in Eastover 40 yrs.

Weizsäcker's departure will not mean a change. We don't want a new direction. Absolutely no change. Weizsäcker successor a good reliable man. Mood in Fed. Off. is relaxed.

P What happened to a woman

V It was a mistake of FDP 2 leaders.
— was head of BVD for years. Your
counterpart

There was discussion of labor but Kohl
& Clausen. Now more burden on Kohl.
Strikes not serious. Actually good because
it points out to people we can't raise
wages in west & require needs of
east.

Kohl now has great burden to carry.
P Thank you for this insight. I
will try to be alert & helpful to
not complicate his job.

There was an angry piece on 60 min
about return of Nazis. If we can
help I would like your suggestion

V It has nothing to do w/ return of
Nazis. It is asylum seeking people.
That is at root of it. There are so
many & threaten to overwhelm us.
We are one open country - we want
to make asylum a Euro prob but
so far it worthy ones.

The other prob is a right wing
movement about natl identity, w/
EC integration. Also rich no prob
in a united Eur. In Ger, in
Italy, Ger. In Ger. there is fear
that throwing DM into Euro currency

60 min. send to Alice House

would ~~use~~ it. But none
of this has anything to do w/ fascism

P I will get a note to you.

V There is a good US movie "Troubled
Conscience about resistance during
c 30's. Very good about a issue
very little known in a US.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)	11/8/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/7/2016

Date Closed: 8/5/2009	OA/ID Number: 91157-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0546-MR(507)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/1/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor

Francois Mitterrand, President
Advisor (?)
Interpreter

DATE, TIME November 8, 1991,
AND PLACE: Rome, Italy

President Mitterrand: What would you like to start on? (U)

The President: This is a NATO meeting. Perhaps we should start there, if there are any lingering problems. (S)

President Mitterrand: We are not part of the integrated command. Elsewhere, things are going well. We have good U.S. military contacts, so that is not a problem. It is a problem for a nuclear power not to have full control of its arsenal. This is not a decision we can hand to anyone else. Once we argued that the British should have the same arrangement. But when the U.S. speaks, Britain tends to follow. (S)

The President: I just don't want the press to write about a rupture. (S)

President Mitterrand: The U.S. has made some proposals that we are reluctant about. It is what is not said which worries us. Out of area issues is one. Without NATO, there is no problem. We have all been friends of U.S. presence. I sometimes think the U.S. is overly suspicious of any move to a European role (in defense). (S)

The President: Let me tell you where our problems are. To the degree that the U.S. people get a feeling that the U.S. is not wanted, latent isolationism is fed. That is a concern because the worst thing for the world would be for the U.S. to go back to post-war isolationism. I think you do not want that and that is why we should talk. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0546-MR

12/1/2014 MM

President Mitterrand: What you say is true for you and several of your successors, but eventually Congress and the budget watch developments will generate pressure to reduce overseas expenses. In that event Europe is naked. How do you keep up defense expenditures? (S)

The President: I think we can do it provided Europe doesn't leave the impression that we are not wanted. That's why I want to talk this out. It's a big philosophical question. It is manageable provided we have the proper support from NATO. (S)

President Mitterrand: We suffer from a lack of enemies. (S)

The President: But there is no lack of uncertainty.

President Mitterrand: There will be 15 years of uncertainty and then probably new threats. (S)

The President: The situation in the U.S. is different from that after World War I. The U.S. today is ready to see that Europe is the first line of defense for the U.S. We will be able to maintain support for spending for European defense better than some Europeans provided there is not a European attitude which forces us out. (S)

President Mitterrand: The future holds an answer. It is not a current problem. (S)

The President: Let me talk about a different issue: Pan Am 103. (The President delivered his talking points, informing Mitterrand about the impending indictment of two Libyan officials for the bombing of Pan Am 103 and our desire to coordinate closely with the French on this, especially because of apparent Libyan involvement in the bombing of UTA 77.) (S)

President Mitterrand: Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya all support terrorism. At any moment, it could be one or the other. They have been quieter of late. It used to be that the GDR and Czechoslovakia were involved, too. (Mitterrand then described what each of the various state sponsors had done in the past.) Since the Gulf War, Qadhafi has kept a low profile. This doesn't absolve him, but he is quieter. We are trying to develop initiative with the Maghreb and do not want to establish a new hotbed for terrorism. Aside from this, we are indifferent to Libya. If the courts decide otherwise, so be it. (S)

The President: What is French public opinion over the UTA bombing? (S)

President Mitterrand: The feelings are not too extreme in France. The courts are denouncing Libya, but it is not emotional. There are now more U.S. nationals in Libya than French. What is to be done? Will you bomb Libya? The options for reprisals are limited. (S)

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3

The President: That's why we want to talk. We can't do anything. Of course, we're not trying to drag you into anything. (S)

President Mitterrand: Don't get me wrong. I am not an advocate for Qadhafi. By all means, let's have discussions. (S)

Secretary Baker: (Describes changes in the Syrian attitude toward terrorism outside of the occupied territories.) (S)

President Mitterrand: I know him (Assad) well. I would not trust him with things of importance to me. (S)

The President: How'd you find Gorbachev when he stopped through recently? (S)

President Mitterrand: Surprisingly calm. He has espoused a greater cause -- union. The others are nationalists and separatists, except Yeltsin at the beginning. But Yeltsin proves to be changing his mind and now he is just like the others. So Gorbachev in espousing union can help his cause because he is the only one above petty issues. Even if he loses, he is a bigger, wiser man than the others. (S)

The President: Burboulis is now Yeltsin's deputy. That is bad news. (S)

President Mitterrand: They might be able to get rid of Gorbachev, but historically, he will be proven to be right. The Ukraine is a special problem. 1.4(b); 1.4(d) Now, it could be added as the third nuclear power in the world. 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

A covenant without immediate application would not be a solid power in northeast Europe. If there is a powerful Germany, then there would be a vacuum. The Ukraine does not have a big population, but it is rich. This has been a concern of political commentators for two centuries. 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

So we can't just move away from the concept of Soviet Union to a notion of devolution. 1.4(b); 1.4(d) These ideas could be useful, but I can't prove any of this.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

Poland lost one-third of it's territory by decree of Stalin. If these territories were mixed with a weak Poland, who knows? It's a little hard to figure. 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

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~~SECRET~~ sify on: OADR

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4

The President: How about the resurgence of Russian nationalism and support of nationals in the Ukraine?

President Mitterrand: Yes. 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: Is Yeltsin's Russia that? (S)

President Mitterrand: No. But he is closer. I am sympathetic to Yeltsin. Thus, far but we have only seen about one half of him. Russia has always dominated, but democracies cannot be aggressive. (S)

The President: People are now rejecting the center, as it can't deliver assets. It is important to get the republics to sign on. (S)

President Mitterrand: But the greatest danger is dire poverty which could lead to a coup, if not revolution. Could we get closer on our views on the UN Secretary General? (S)

The President: Yes. China and the Africans are saying it is the Africans' turn. Mubarak called last night. We pin our hope of a deal on Boutros Ghali and Sadruddin Agga Khan, though there is some resistance on him. We don't have a horse. (S)

President Mitterrand: We know them both, as well as the Tanzanian and Zimbabwean. 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

I personally would like to see Ghali elected. He has a thorough grounding. He comes from a complex society. He is an Arab and a Christian. (S)

The President: Is he strong enough to reform the UN? (S)

President Mitterrand: It's hard to say. I haven't seen him at work. But he has the cultural background to do it. But then so does Sadruddin Khan. (S)

The President: There are other people, but they are not African, such as van den Broek and Mulroney. (S)

President Mitterrand: If it's going to be an African, Boutros Ghali is the best. Sadruddin Khan is from a Shiite offshoot. But either is acceptable to the Africans. (S)

The President: How about the non-Africans? Koh, Ali Attah, van den Broek, etc.? (S)

President Mitterrand: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: The Chinese say they will veto a non-African for a time at least. (S)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

5

Secretary Baker: And then they say they would like to go to an Asian. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Let's stay with Ghali and Khan and avoid a big mess. What about my idea for a meeting of the four nuclear powers? (Ø)

The President: Our only concern is that our allies have a stake in the nuclear area, and that we shouldn't ignore that. Jim and Roland can talk about this. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: But the Soviets are a nuclear power, and we should talk more specifically with them about the nuclear situation resulting from all the changes there. I'm not talking about disarmament discussions. (Ø)

The President: Consultations with our allies is my only problem on this. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: You should have nuclear arms to talk about them. (Ø)

The President: But not to be concerned about them. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: We don't mind being completely independent, but don't think that is best. (Ø)

-- end of Conversation --

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08b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Mitterrand [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (8 pp.)	11/8/92	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files

Document Partially Declassified
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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [3]

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FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
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AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-0546-MR(507.01)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
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2/ Mitterand 11/8/91

~~SECRET~~

M what would you like to start on
P This is a NATO meeting. Perhaps we
should start there. If there are
any big issues...

M One we do not put off indefinitely
end. Elsewhere things going
well. We have read US and
retains so that not a problem.
It prob for now please not to
keep full record of its record.
Not a decision we have made
to anyone else. I mean
agree. Br. should have seen
agreement. Best when US
speaks, Br. tend to follow.

P I just don't want press to
write about rupture.

M US has made proposals and
reluctant about. This what
is not said which worries us.
Part of area issue is not.
Within NATO, no prob. we
all been friends of US presence.
I sometimes think US is over
suspicious of any move to
a Euro role...

P Let me tell you our prob. To
degree the people get a feeling
US not wanted, latest evidence

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speaking for Euro defense better
than some Euros provided
there is not a Euro ~~as~~ alliance
which forces us out

M The picture holds a answer. It
not a current prob.

P let me talk about the issues. PA123
(Cooperation / acting points)

~~we~~ we need to coordinate

M. Inves. Supra. Inves. Libya cell
support terrorism. At any moment
could be, or other. Been finetuned
of late. Used also to be GPR + RZK.
(Describes what we ^{under. Hezeta} do)

Since GPR was Qaddafi's last chance
lower profile. Doesn't absolutely win
but he is quieter. We trying to
drop ~~structure~~ w/ Maghreb & want
to establish new hold for terrorism.

Aside from this we indiff to Libya.
If courts decide otherwise, so be it.

P What is Fr prob opinion over UTA

M Not too extreme in Fr. ~~but~~ Courts
are denouncing Libya but it not
emotional. There are now more
US notes in Libya ~~as~~ than Fr. with
what to do? ~~But~~ could you know
Libya? Option for reprisals are
limited.

~~SECRET~~

- P That's why we want to talk, we can't do nothing. Not trying to drag you into anything.
- M Don't get me wrong. I'm not an advocate for Babozi. By all means, let's have discussions (Describes Squirrels change in territories outside Territories).
- B I know him well. I wouldn't trust him w/ things of importance to me.
- P How did you find Gord?
- M Surprisingly calm. He has espoused a greater cause - union. The others are nationalists & separatists. Except Yelton at beginning. But Yelton prone to changing his mind & now he just likes Jesus. So Gord in espousing union can help his cause because he can hang out above petty issues, even if he loses. He a bigger, wiser man than others.
- P Barbours was deputy to Yelton. That's all.
- M They might be able to get rid of Gord. But historically he will be proven to be right. ^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)} [redacted] was he called 3rd man in world.

~~SECRET~~

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

Agreement w/o immediate ^{application} application.
Should be a solid power in NE
Eur. If powerful Eur, there would
be vacuum. Ukraine not big
population but rich. German
colonial communities for 2 centuries

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

So
we can't just walk away from East
SID to notice

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

Could be useful -
but I can't prove any of this.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

Poland lost 1/3 territory by lease
of Stalin. If those territories, w/ weak
Poland... with hard to handle

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

B How about a resurgence of Rus, not aim
in support of Rus. needs.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

M Yes.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

~~SECRET~~

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

- B Is Yeltsin Russia that?
- M No. But be closer. I agree. To Yeltsin
thurs for but we have only seen
about 1/2 of him. ~~For~~ Russia
has also been dominated, but
Soviet Union cannot be aggressive.
- P This has even dimensions. Right
now a center can't deliver assets.
Important to get reports. To sign on.
- M But greatest danger is civil poverty
which could lead to coup or not
revolutions.
- Could we get closer in our view
on UNISYG.
- P Yes. China & Africa saying
it Africa turn. Tubanah called
last night. We open un-til on
Ghali, Sadi H. - the same
resistance in him. We don't have
a horse.
- M We know them both. Also
Tanzania & Zambania.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

I personally
would like to Ghali. Has the
grandstanding - comes from complex

~~SECRET~~

society. He is Arab, Christian. . .

P Is he strong enough to reform M.

M Hard to say. Haven't seen him at work. But he has a cultural background to do it. But so does Sadat.

P There are other good people but they not African. Van den Brink, Unkowny

M If an African, Ghandi best. Sadat from a Shiite offshoot. Either acceptable for Africa

P How about non-Africans? Kofi, All Atlas, V d B, etc.

M

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

P Chinese say they will not non-African for a time at least

B And then they ^{say} would go Africa.

M B lets stay w/ Chatti & Sadat & avoid a big mess.

~~W~~ B True conf?

P Our only concern is that our allies ^{after} don't stab in our back we shouldn't ignore them. Jimmy R. would can talk

M But Sovs are the power & we should talk more spec. w/ them about our sit, rescaling from dumps. Not disarmament

P Consultation w/ our other allies my only prob.

M You want to have me come to talk about
them.

P Not to be concerned about them.

M We don't mind being completely
ilpt but don't think that best.