

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files

OA/ID Number: 91157
Folder ID Number: 91157-001

Folder Title:
Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	49	1	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Francois Mitterrand of France (6 pp.)	1/3/93	(b)(1)	C
01b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Mitterrand (9 pp.)	1/3/93	(b)(1)	
02. Telcon	Re: Informal Memorandum of Conversation President Bush-Prime Minister Major Call (3 pp.)	1/16/93	(b)(1)	S
03. Telcon	Re: Informal Memorandum of Conversation President Bush/Prime Minister Major (1 pp.)	1/17/92	(b)(1)	
04. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation: President Bush and President Mitterrand (1 pp.)	1/17/93	(b)(1)	
05. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Kravchuk of Ikraine on December 24th, 1992 (2 pp.)	12/24/92	(b)(1)	C
06a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan (3 pp.)	12/16/92	(b)(1)	C
06b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/King Hussein (4 pp.)	12/16/92	(b)(1)	
07. Telcon	Re: [President Bush/Prime Minister Major] Telecon (1 pp.)	1/13/93	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 3

Collection:	
Record Group:	Bush Presidential Records
Office:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Meetings Files
Subseries:	Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:	
File Location:	Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]
Pinksheet Number:	cap1301
OA/ID Number:	91157-001
Date Closed:	8/5/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:	2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/King Fahd (7 pp.)	12/31/92	(b)(1)	
09. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Havel 1-on-1 (2 pp.)	10/22/91	(b)(1)	
10. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (3 pp.)	7/28/92	(b)(1)	S
11. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva of Portugal and EC President Delors (3 pp.)	4/22/92	(b)(1)	S
12a. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Prime Minister Calfa from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	4/20/92	(b)(1)	TS
12b. Draft Cable	From Brent Scowcroft Re: To Prime Minister Calfa (1 pp.)	4/20/92	(b)(1)	TS
12c. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Calfa of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (2 pp.)	4/10/92	(b)(1)	TS
13a. Letter	President Leonid Kravchuk to President Bush Re: Translation from Ukrainian (2 pp.)	4/10/92	(b)(1)	
13b. Letter	President Leonid Kravchuk to President Bush Re: Ukrainian (3 pp.)	4/10/92	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1301
OA/ID Number: 91157-001
Date Closed: 8/5/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
13c. Letter	President Vaclav Havel to President Bush Re: [English] (2 pp.)	4/7/92	(b)(1)	
13d. Letter	President Vaclav Havel to President Bush Re: [English] (2 pp.)	4/7/92	(b)(1)	
14. Memcon	Re: Page 3 [President Bush/Prime Minister Calfa] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS
15. Letter	President Vaclav Havel to President Bush Re: [English] (2 pp.)	4/7/92	(b)(1)	
16. Report	Re: Informace (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
17a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan (4 pp.)	5/19/92	(b)(1)	TS
17b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Nazerbayev (7 pp.)	5/19/92	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1301
OA/ID Number: 91157-001
Date Closed: 8/5/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Francois Mitterrand
of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Walter Curley, U.S. Ambassador
James Baker, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor

Francois Mitterrand, President
Roland Dumas, Foreign Minister
Hubert Vedrine, Elysee Secretary General
Christian Quesnot, Elysee Military Advisor
Anne Lauvergeon, Elysee Economic Advisor

DATE, TIME January 3, 1993, 4:30-6:20 p.m.
AND PLACE: Elysee Palace, Paris, France

The President: Thank you for receiving me on Sunday. We will have a total changeover on January 20. But I want you to know that I think Clinton will be a good man to work with. In the campaign he spoke a lot about domestic matters, but I think he knows that he can't neglect foreign affairs. He has recently been supportive of what we are doing, and his team is experienced. (The President then described Clinton's international affairs team.) (U)

President Mitterrand: I do not know him at all. I have never met him. I called him after the election to give him my best wishes. We know his team a little. We'll see. In political life one must adjust. (C)

The President: Clinton is a very smart man. They have been in touch and supportive on Somalia. I am sure they will be good on foreign policy. (The President then described his visit to Somalia.) I met your commander and troops there and was very impressed. (U)

President Mitterrand: I knew you before you were president. It was a very pleasant circumstance. I remember that you and your press were worried about Communists in the government. I said don't worry. The press exaggerated. (C)

The President: And how they still do it is ugly. (C)

President Mitterrand: Yes, it is serious. They are powerful and disagreeable to us all. There is an anti-democratic aspect to their power. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0540MR
Eg 51115

(Mitterrand remarked that the French economy was doing well. He noted that during his two terms in office the French inflation rate had gone from 14 percent to only 3 percent. He asked whether reports of a U.S. economic upturn were correct. The President indicated that he felt the reports were accurate, and that he was now being told that his earlier estimate of 2.7 percent economic growth in the last quarter was conservative -- the actual rate might be 3.4 percent.)

(Dumas raised a question about the conduct of the American media during the election campaign. The President noted the propensity of the media to highlight the negative rather than the positive. Mitterrand felt that the French press had grown worse, becoming intransigent and unaccountable. Based on conversations with other leaders, this problem was evident elsewhere as well. He saw the media as having gotten almost to the point of being out of control. Participants on both sides then traded stories about specific problems that they had encountered.) (C)

President Mitterrand: What conclusions do you draw from your stop in Moscow. It seems pretty unstable. (C)

The President: Yes, but Yeltsin is ebullient. (The President noted that Yeltsin is an optimist, a trait that helps one prevail at difficult times.) Yeltsin said they would get through the winter without strikes. He said they wanted more agricultural credits and I explained our legal limits on doing so without payments of money due and rescheduling. He said it was not a new government, but only a government with four new ministers. He said the new Prime Minister would do everything he wants. (However, the President had not felt as comfortable with the new Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.) (C)

President Mitterrand: Yes, he's not a smiling person. He reminds me of earlier times. (C)

The President: Yeltsin spoke of elections in '96 and said he wouldn't run. He said Gorbachev was only at 2 percent in the polls and he was at 59 percent. (Mitterrand commented that there was no love loss between Yeltsin and Gorbachev.) He spoke highly of Gaydar. (The President noted that he found the Russian economy spooky, and that its problems were very deep indeed. Mitterrand agreed, saying that if Russia doesn't reach an accord soon with the IMF and make progress with other economic reforms, the situation would become even more difficult.) (C)

President Mitterrand: I am worried about Ukraine. Kazakhstan also concerns me, but Ukraine is my prime concern. (C)

The President: You mean about whether they will give up their nuclear weapons? (C)

President Mitterrand: Yes, Ukraine wants to assure its total independence from Russia. In 1986, I went to Kiev with Gorbachev. He pointed to Kravchuk and said "He is a hardliner.

You have to be careful whenever you see him around." I fear that their may well be a conflict between Russia and Ukraine in the next ten years. (Ø)

Chief of Staff Baker: I think the CIS states can be made to live up to their commitments if the West insists. (U)

President Mitterrand: I am less worried about Kazakstan. Nazerbayev is the most reliable of the lot. He was a communist too. All the communists have become nationalists to make the people forget their concerns. I admire your agreements but, I worry about our nuclear agreements (whether they will be implemented), which I admire. (Ø)

The President: I spoke to Kravchuk about ten days ago and he gave me every assurance that the START treaty would be ratified. I asked Yeltsin if he is worried about the development of Islamic fundamentalism. He said he is and he is catering to Iran to keep them moderate. That is disturbing. (The President noted that we have abiding worries about Iran and that nothing on the horizon has made us any more optimistic.) (Ø)

President Mitterrand: I think Iran is working toward development of nuclear weapons. We have relations with them (and have maintained trade ties), but I feel their policy hasn't really changed. Rafsanjani seems to be in charge, but the instructions coming out of Tehran are not reassuring. (Mitterrand mentioned that many Arabs seemed worried about Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons. The President agreed with that observation, adding that many Arab states saw Iran as mounting a problem in 1993 and beyond.) (Ø)

The President: China seems to be working with Iran also in the nuclear area. I was attacked during the campaign for my China policy. But if we mishandle China they could make big trouble for us, especially in the UN. (The President said he had tried to convince Mr. Clinton that there are other considerations to take into account in dealing with China than just human rights. Mitterrand agreed with the President's observations.) (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Our relations with China are not so good. The Soviet Union worked to change the political system in order to change the economy and China has done it just the opposite way. (Ø)

The President: What is you China trade? (U)

President Mitterrand: You can sell what you want to Taiwan, but we sell some fighters to Taiwan and China cuts down our relations. They probably wont do much more that to close one of our consulates, though. (Ø)

The President: Are there problems other than the Mirage sale? (Ø)

President Mitterrand: No, but they did it in such an imperial manner. (Ø)

Chief of Staff Baker: (Talked about the difficult challenge posed by thousands of Haitian boats being built for refugees to head for the U.S. once the new administration takes office. Mitterrand joked that it was important to look on the bright side: There would be that many more Americans who speak French. Mitterrand and The President discussed the problems with Aristide and Mitterrand commented that Barzin only exists because he has U.S. support. Baker mentioned France's historic ties to Haiti and suggested that the U.S. might need French help in the months ahead.) (Ø)

The President: How do we solve the Yugoslav problem? (Ø)

President Mitterrand: This came up in June 1991 in the EC. Slovenia and Croatia wanted immediate independence. I argued eventually yes, immediately no. I believed there must first be a guarantee of human rights. For years there were no big problems in Bosnia. But from June 1991, there was a German campaign revealing lingering sympathy for the Austro-Hungarian Empire. There was a cleavage between Croatia and Serbia dating back to the split between the Eastern and Western churches. So the Germans said the Slovenes and the Croats are us. The Pope, who is usually very careful, agreed. So the status of the minorities went out the window. There was no preparation. And few even knew what Bosnia was -- much more mixed than the others. The Moslem cities are separated from each other. There is little Moslem territory, even where they are most numerous. (Mitterrand used several maps to show how Moslem-dominated territory had declined over the years and especially since the war in Bosnia began. He argued that the Moslems could not win a military campaign and repeated the need for a diplomatic or political solution five times.) So there is no good solution, except Tito's solution. The Vance-Owen solution is a nice carving up of the territory. It is well thought out, but it is hard to see it working. The Moslems are really converted Serbs and the Serbs are trying to get historical revenge. (Ø)

The President: Ozal says that if the West threatens Milosevic with force he will back down. I'm not sure. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: I don't think he will. This situation could go on for ages. The Croats and Serbs are three-fifths of the population and they are not going to leave. But there can't be a solution by war. What is happening is a horror, but war is not the solution. Perhaps some very limited military action could work. Maybe creating Sarajevo as an open, neutralized city. They violate the no-fly zone, but they don't fly bombers now. Shooting down a couple of helicopters doesn't change much. What we should do is to prevent it from spreading. That involves the so-called French idea on Macedonia. (Ø)

The President: Tell us about this proposal. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Dumas: This idea for arbitration over the name is a Greek idea which the Macedonians don't much like. (Dumas gave some more details and acknowledged the French were trying to promote the idea. Mitterrand waved this discussion off by noting that he had had many discussions with Greek Prime Ministers over the years, all of them difficult. General Scowcroft recalled that there had been a proposal to refer to Macedonia as "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," perhaps that name might be useful in a solution.) (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Gligorov was a Nazi and then a Communist and now a good democrat. He has good experience. Bosnia can't be solved. Macedonia is not in that position and so there is no logical reason that it should not be recognized. (Ø)

The President: We are being pressed to get tough on Bosnia. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: I am prepared to look at action in specific places. But UNPROFOR forces could be put in jeopardy. I am prepared to talk about it, but I am not sure what can be solved by it. Forget Bosnia. (An internal agreement among the parties is needed, as the situation is not susceptible to international pressure.) On Kosovo, it is Serbian territory. I think Serbia and Albania are capable of talking this one out. Roland thinks so. (Dumas explains that the real problem in the French view is Macedonia and that troops are needed on the border. Baker and Scowcroft reiterated U.S. views of the dangers of expanding the conflict via events in Kosovo.) There is also Sandzak and Macedonia. We should do everything possible to prevent Serbian action in Macedonia. We should put a cordon around Macedonia so the war won't move south. There are not many Serbs in Macedonia. But we should still close the frontier, even though I don't think Milosevic would attack. The Serbs and the Albanians can take care of Kosovo. (Ø)

The President: The Greeks say their government would fall and be replaced by a bad government if they mishandle Macedonia. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: No Greek government can accept the Macedonian name. There has never been a Macedonia. We have to recognize that it runs against the trend of history. (Ø)

The President: How would you vote in the UN? (U)

President Mitterrand: I would abstain, and I think the British would too. The wise solution would be to use the name "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" and take it to arbitration. (Ø)

The President: Are we together on the no-fly zone? (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Yes, because it is reasonable. But at best it won't do much. I think Serbia is close to accomplishing its goals. They occupy 70 percent of Bosnia. If presented right, they would abandon about 20 percent.

Foreign Minister Dumas: The Serbs and Croats are close to agreement in opposing the Moslems. And the Moslem world is beginning to put two and two together. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: (Pointing to a map brought out by Quesnot) The Moslems have lost. (Ø)

The President: Yeltsin was reassuring on Bosnia and even said he would send a squadron of planes to participate in no-fly zone enforcement. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: (Mitterrand indicated that Yeltsin may be offering because he doesn't think it will happen.) We won't say no, but I don't think it would be expedient. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Dumas: (Briefed on his understanding of the three Russian conditions for supporting the no-fly zone.) (Ø)

President Mitterrand: If one wants to make a demonstration in the air to show the Serbs that they can't go too far, I'll support it. But the solution can not be military, and we must seal off Macedonia. This is the most serious problem. (Ø)

The President: Couldn't Kosovo create some problems? (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Discussions can solve that, and we all can help. We'd better go see the press and then to dinner. (Ø)

The President: (As the group prepares to end the meeting and address the press, the President points out that they had not yet talked about the Uruguay Round and the benefit that would come from completing the negotiations. Mitterrand grimaces. The President says at least they must tell the press that it was discussed it.) (Ø)

President Mitterrand: (Suggests that they tell the press they discussed the Uruguay Round but had not reached a decision the President agrees.) (Ø)

G: MITCONU
.103

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

P/Mitterand 1/3/93

mt comu. 103

P Thank you for receiving me on Sunday
On to your Total Curator I think
Clinton will be good man to work w/
In campaign he spoke a lot ~~about~~ about
domestic matters but I think he
knows better. He has recently been
supportive. It is known is ~~approved~~
(Described a person)
Clinton is a right man

M I don't know him at all. Never
met him. I called him after
election. His team we know a
little - well see. In political
life one must adapt.

P He will have strong ideas. Supports
our goals on Somalia. Need your
Cdr & Troop there

M I know you long before you
were P. It was very pleasant
circumstances. Then you & your
press ~~and~~ worried about events
in Cont. I said don't worry - a
press spaggealer

P At home they still do it is
ugly.

M It is serious. They are pro-
free & accountable to the word.
There is anti-democratic

(More press disapproval)

What conclusions do you draw from this case. Pretty unstable?

P Yes. Beet Yeltsin is brilliant. Said they would get three winters w/o strikes. Wanted survey, couldn't tell him couldn't w/o resched. He said no new govt - same w/ 4 new ministers. Said new PM would do everything I want.

M He's a scary person. Reminds of earlier times.

P He spoke elections in '96. Said he wouldn't run. Said Gore only 2% in polls - he was at 55%. Spoke highly of Gaidar. Don't know how much is bluff & how much his quote

M I worried about Ukraine. Also Kozak, but more about Ukraine.

P You were about Russia.

M Yes. Ukraine wants to assert total independence of Russia. In '86 I went to Kiev as /Gorb. He pointed to Krawchenko & said "he is a hard liner. Have to be careful where we see w/ him around." Not sure there won't be conflict bet c 2 w/ in next 10 yrs.

- B I think C/S can be made to live up to their commitments if - self insists.
- M I less worried about Kozak. Nazim is pro - most reliable of C/S. He was a C/S too. All C/Ss have become nationalists - to make people forget their C/Ss.
- I worry about future of your agreements - which I admire.
- P I spoke to Kraw & O'Byrne & he gave me every assurance. I asked Yeltoev if he would about fund mobilization & he said yes & he was entering to Jace to keep them moderate. That is dubious.
- M I think Jace is working towards new uprs. We have relations but I feel their policy hasn't really changed. Rappaport seems in charge, but instructions coming out of Tbruce are not reassuring.
- P China is working w/ Jace also. I was attached during campaign for China policy. But if we can't handle China they could make big trouble for us - esp in UN.
- M Our relations w/ China not so good. SC wanted to change pol

system w/o changing economy &
China did it just opposite.

Q What is your China trade

M You can sell what you want - we
sell some pts + they cut us down.
They prob won't do much more
then to close a consulate.

P Are there other probs than Unigal
sale?

M No. And they did it in such an
imperial manner.
(Harti)

Aristide honest. Buzin only credit
was US support.

P How do we solve a 4 reqd prob.

M For years EC was not reasonable. Came
up in June 91. Slovenia/Croatia
wanted unioned triple. I was against
eventually yes, should no. Then, it
should be guarantee of human
rights. For years there were no big
probs in Bosnia. Go ~~Sloven~~ Bet June
to Nov there was a serious campaign -
beginning signs for US - Hungarian
Empire. There was cleavage bet
Croatia & Serbia was there then +
went clear back to E is W Church.
Go c ~~Communes~~ said Slovenia/Croatia
that's us. The Pope - usually careful.

agreed. So status of minority ~~went~~^{went}
out - window. There was no
preparation. And worse even than
what Bosnia was - much more violent
than others. The Muslim cities
are separated from each other - there is
little Muslim territory even tho they
are most numerous. So there is
no good solution - except Tito's solution.
The Vance-Owen solution is a war
carving up of territory. Well that's not
but had to see it working. The Muslims
are really converted Serbs & Serbs are
trying to get historical revenge.

P Ozal said if a West threatens whose side
of face he will back down - I not
sure

M I don't think he will. This situation
could last for ages. 3/5 are Serbs & Croats
& they aren't going to leave. There can't
be a solution by war. What is happening
is a horror, but ~~of~~ war not a solution.
Perhaps some ~~very~~ very limited action
could work. Make Sarajevo an open
neutralized city. They inside a no fly
zone but they don't fly bombers now. ~~If~~
Ghorsting & some couple of helos doesn't
change much. What we should
do is prevent it spreading.

"French" proposal on Macedonia,
D This is a Czech idea which -
Macedonians don't much like.

M Coligors was a Nazi, then a Croat
& now a good democrat. Has good
experience.

Bosnia can't be solved. Macedonia
is not in that position & there no
logical reason why it shouldn't
be solved.

P We being pressured to get Troop
on Bosnia.

M I prepared to look at action in specific
places. But UNPROFOR forces could be
jeopardized. I prepared to talk about
it but not sure what can be
solved by it. Forget Bosnia. On
Kosovo - it is Serbian territory.
I think Serbia & Albania are capable
of talking this one out. Roland thinks
so.

✓ There is also a Guelzack - and
Macedonia. We should do everything
possible to prevent Serbian
action in ~~Kosovo~~ ^{Macedonia} Guelzack. We
should put a cord ^{across} ~~to~~ ^{across} Macedonia
can't run south. Not many
Serbs in Macedonia but should
still close a frontier (but doesn't think

Milozovic would attack it. The Serbs & Albanians can take care of Kosovo.

P The Croats say their coat would fall & be replaced by bad coat

M Any Creek coat can't accept Macedonian name. There has never been a Macedonia. We have a red coat but it ~~run~~ runs against a trend of history.

P How would you vote in a UN

M I would abstain. I think a British word.

The wise solution would be to use "former..." and take it to arbitration.

P Are we together on a reply zone

M Yes. Because it is reasonable. But it won't do much.

I think Serbia is close to accomplishing its goals. They occupy 70% of Bosnia. ^{with} In present report, they would abandon about 20%.

D Serbs & Croats are close to agreement against a Muslim. And a Muslim would be trying to put 2 & 2 together.

M (Shows map) The Muslim land lost.

P Yeltsin was reasserting on Bosnia. Said would need a sign.

M We won't say no, but it won't be useful.

D Coase & 3 Russian conditions for ~~separating~~ ^{separating} ~~us~~ ^{us}

M If ~~we~~ one wants to make a demo on
can to show a good Serbia not to
go too far, OK. But solution can not
be military. And not must send
Macedonia. This is a worst scenario
period.

P ~~to~~ Couldn't Kosovo create some prob.
M Discussions can solve that - and we
all can help.

~~SECRET~~

Informal Memorandum of Conversation:

President Bush-Prime Minister Major call

16 January 1993

Call initiated at 0731 EST. Call terminated at 0741

BUSH: Good Morning, Can you hear me?

MAJOR: Hello George, yes I can.

BUSH: Our people have been talking and I wanted to touch base with you. The sand is running through the hourglass on Saddam.

MAJOR: Glad to have a word with you. A half baked reply we got. I was sorry last night's activities were canceled.

BUSH: I feel we made the right decision.

MAJOR: I'm glad that's the way it turned out. A half-hearted reply would have diminished our chances for future decisive action. I agree our response should be unequivocal...it is a shame we can't get UNSCOM to give an earlier deadline. A strong P-3 statement would be an attractive option.

BUSH: What concerns me is that he will find some new way to move again. We must find a way to stop this and go ahead with the same plan as before.

MAJOR: A statement by the Perm Three gives us belts and braces in case Ekeus and others are less than fulsome in their response.

BUSH: Yes. Brent didn't mention that option to me...I think it's a great idea. Have you spoken with the French?

MAJOR: I believe the French are coming on board. I haven't spoken to Mitterrand, but Wall has spoken to them.

BUSH: We need their support. I think it should stay on schedule -- possibly set back 24 hours. Saddam keeps pushing the limits. I'm sure you have heard the reports of Iraqi planes scrambling against our aircraft this morning in the north. They are also not dismantling the police posts in Kuwaiti territory. Brent spoke with the French and didn't feel they would have any problems with the new plan.

MAJOR: I am content with it. One timing ripple that makes situation more difficult is the possible arrival of the UNSCOM inspection team. Until the UNSCOM flight takes off at 2:00 in the morning, it will be difficult to fire prior to that.

BUSH: Well, why don't we see what happens with the Perm Three.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-2402-MR
11/22/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MAJOR: UNSCOM needs clearance at 9:00 PM your time, I believe. Is that correct?

BUSH: I'm not sure. Regardless, I think we should go ahead on the same time frame as tonight.

MAJOR: We'll put details to Brent and Jon Howe. We don't want to commit to an irrevocable action and then see that he grants flight clearances to UNSCOM.

BUSH: Well, I hadn't focused on that...if there is a delay, we will have address the problem.

MAJOR: According to the latest information we received about a half hour ago, UNSCOM is prepared to request an "urgent" response, but the statement does not give any specific time.

BUSH: Oh I see...

MAJOR: If you need to speak with me further, I'll be around today.

BUSH: That's a good point. I don't know if UNSCOM has given him a deadline on the inspection flight.

MAJOR: I think that is true.

MAJOR: Have you thought of using the second barrel...returning to the South?

BUSH: I thought you had problems with any further action in the South.

MAJOR: We'd be happy to add Al Kut and Al Jarrah as targets.

BUSH: I think we are on the same wavelength. I think we should go ahead, with Ekeus' support. I think we need to do this. It will take pressure off my successor. I felt the operation in the South was successful, but we still have some unfinished business. The plan to go into the daylight. We liked to do it. But you had some legal problems. We'd like to do it mostly if they are reinforcing the batteries.

MAJOR: We could still go South...the problem is that we have 70 UNSCOM inspectors while we would be there.

BUSH: Yes.

MAJOR: We'll have to regroup after we see what happens on the first event.

BUSH: I worry about the possible UNSCOM presence too. There's a connection there...will cause people to worry. If we had no concern of that we would have gone ahead on the SA-2 and so forth...that complicates things on how this will be read.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MAJOR: I don't think people will see the distinction between the two. We don't want public opinion to go to his side.

BUSH: Exactly. I think that's right. We were worried about Arab reactions...but it looks to me as being supportive as we predicted.

MAJOR: How do you think the Turks will respond in the North?

BUSH: I don't know. I haven't talked to them. I think they will be supportive.

MAJOR: I'm pleased to hear that.

BUSH: That's a guess. They are getting pressure from the Arab world. Glad we had this talk...We'll talk and get in touch again.

MAJOR: Lovely. God Bless.

Prepared by Situation Room.

~~SECRET~~

Informal Memorandum of Conversation

President Bush / Prime Minister Major

Sunday, January 17 1992

Call initiated 0708, call terminated 0711

President: ...so we will proceed this evening Iraq time. We will go north and knock out the remainder in the south.

PM Major: I entirely agree. That's fine. The difference with not attacking the North is that there would be no connection with UNSCOM, and I'm glad to see that's resolved. In the south, there's a different set of provocations. We'll need to get the PR right for the south. If we attack both, I think that's right.

President: You don't have any idea how we should handle Mitterrand? You've been right before.

PM Major: I have no advice on Mitterrand as of this morning.

President: So we'd better give him a call. I think he'll come around...maybe we should call his people first.

PM Major: I believe he'll be O.K. What I think caused all the trouble Friday was that he received some reports from his military that caused some consternation.

President: You're probably right. Let's get the signals moving forward. We'll give General Hoar the signal to wind up the missiles and go south once I've talked to you.

PM Major: That sounds absolutely fine.

President: How are you doing? How's the weather over there?

PM Major: I'm sitting here at your air base in Alconbury.

President: I've still got Mulroney here. We'll cross the t's and dot the i's with Steven.

PM Major: Good man...hope you're doing all right.

President: All the best. Good-bye.

PM Major: Best.

Telephone Conversation:

President Bush and President Mitterrand

17 January 1993

0816-0822 EST

Bush: Francois, sorry to be bothering you again. Just talked to John Major. Hope you're military briefed you about what it is that I would like your support for what we want to do. Very displeased with Saddam Husayn's actions. There was air activity in the North last night and also action in the South again last night. Also the UN (person) says we can't accept this.

Mitterrand: Yes, but I've already accepted to go ahead with operation of the other day.

Bush: This is good news. They hadn't gotten back to me. I'm very pleased. We have to do what we have to do.

Mitterrand: It would have to restart with where we left off the other day. Operations with same objective.

Bush: Yes, that's correct.

Mitterrand: Yes, for that I've given my military order to go ahead.

Bush: Very Good, Very Good.

Mitterrand: Also heard there were new objectives, target and thought it was not worthwhile. We should try not to increase difficulties we have with Arab countries. Support same targets as the other day and complete them successfully.

Bush: That is correct. Then there's one other facet we can't talk about here. Our military's are fully aware. Another that doesn't deal with French, UK or US pilots or aircraft.

Mitterrand: We are aware of that. Go ahead with operations we had taken the other day and restart them.

Bush: Very good.

Mitterrand: You work on Sunday too.

Bush: (Laugh) Yes, well it's early here. We have big football games to watch this afternoon.

Mitterrand: Yes, very good.

Prepared by Situation Room

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9253

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Kravchuk of Ukraine on
December 24th, 1992

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Kravchuk
Interpreter: Marta Zielyuk
Notetaker: Christine Potts

DATE, TIME: December 24th, 1992 at 10:58 to 11:10
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Hello, Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Kravchuk: Good day, I am glad to hear from you. (U)

The President: Merry Christmas. I am glad to hear from you. (U)

President Kravchuk: Mr. President, I want to congratulate you and wish you a Merry Christmas. We wish you peace and prosperity. (U)

The President: Thank you. I am only sorry I won't be in the job next year to work with you as in the past. (Ø)

President Kravchuk: Thank you and never mind. I would be glad to be the host of you and Barbara to my country. (Ø)

The President: That's nice. What business do we have to conduct here? (Ø)

President Kravchuk: I would like to confirm the letter I received from you on December 4th and express gratitude for your promise to help us get rid of our nuclear weapons. (Ø)

The President: I'm sure the new administration will also agree. (Ø)

President Kravchuk: Both myself and the government and key ministries -- including Defense, Foreign Affairs, and the National Security Council -- all want to confirm that we will stick to the course as I agreed with you in May of this year. (Ø)

I also want to say that the Supreme Rada and various committees have conducted two sittings to analyze the documents. There is not any delay on our part. We are just studying the question, as necessary, to be sure all documents are adopted. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0540-MR
98 511115

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

The President: Is there any way for you to make a public statement of your commitment to START and the NPT, and also to call for positive Rada action on the earliest possible date? That would be good, and it would calm any concern here and in Europe on this nuclear issue. Are you confident that the Rada will go along with the government? (Ø)

President Kravchuk: Yes, I am sure that the Supreme Rada will adopt the documents because they have more elements of a deeper understanding. We are still studying the financial issue. We are talking with Russia on the question of compensation. The Rada is now feeling better about adopting the treaties. (Ø)

The President: Obviously, if there is anything I can do before leaving office, please let me know. It is a very important issue to the world and your leadership is vital. (Ø)

President Kravchuk: The key problem is reaching an agreement with Russia, but we are working on it. (Ø)

The President: Maybe we can help there, but good luck. I surely appreciate the call. (Ø)

President Kravchuk: Thank you. As we are approaching the end of the year, I am satisfied with the processes started in May and I hope the next administration will also support this process. (Ø)

The President: As we come to year's end, I'd like to make a simple press statement -- no details -- to show that we are in close contact if you agree. (Ø)

President Kravchuk: I support your idea, especially the part dealing with the essence of our course, that we are prepared to go on adopting START and the NPT to convince parliament to adopt these two treaties as soon as possible. (Ø)

The President: Do you want to say that; do you want me to say that; or do you just want a general press statement? (Ø)

President Kravchuk: I think it is good that you tell it in your own country and I will tell my press as well. (Ø)

The President: That's fine. Have a wonderful New Year and give my best to your family. (Ø)

President Kravchuk: The same to you, Mr. President. Please give my best to Barbara and all the good people of America. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Chief of Staff
to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, Notetaker

King Hussein

DATE, TIME December 16, 1992; 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Where do we stand? We are having the [peace process] delegations over Friday. (U)

King Hussein: There is a feeling within the region that the situation demands continuation. I understand they won't meet again until late January. (Ø)

The President: Do we have a problem about the delegations? (Ø)

King Hussein: Yes. [The President and the King then worked out an arrangement in which a meeting with the joint Jordan-Palestinian delegation would be followed by a meeting with only the Jordanians.] (Ø)

The President: I wish I could tell you how Clinton will come down on the Middle East. In the campaign there were AIPAC-like statements, but I don't think Clinton wants that. The Israeli election makes that easier for him. (Ø)

King Hussein: Things look promising. It is slow. Extremists in the territories are making trouble. They are financed by Iran and others. But [those in] the territories are more and more reaching their own decisions. Rabin is helping, but his extremists are making trouble for him. (Ø)

The President: I hope it goes well. How are things at home? (Ø)

King Hussein: The fundamentalists have been shown as people without solutions. We are moving ahead, but there is still a lot of poverty. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0540-MR
E8 5/11/15

The President: That is good news. There is also very good news about your health. How do you feel about Saddam Hussein? (Ø)

King Hussein: His problems are growing. There is no control in the north and almost the same in the south. Conditions are deteriorating. [The King then described in detail the assassination of the Iraqi scientist.] The borders are sealed tight against exports to Iraq, but we are worried about arms coming out. (Ø)

The President: We haven't changed our thinking. We are keeping the sanctions tight, but I don't know over time. (Ø)

King Hussein: He [Saddam] thinks sanctions will erode. They are just trying to hang on. (Ø)

The President: Do you think Tariq Aziz is more moderate than his brief? (Ø)

Mr. Baker: I really think so. [Baker then described his meetings with Tariq Aziz.] (U)

The President: May I ask about Bosnia and charges that we don't care about Muslims? The same was said about Somalia and we went in. That has helped, but is there still this feeling about Muslims in Bosnia? We are frustrated, but it is very difficult to do anything effective. Then there is a transition which complicates things. It is a real dilemma. (Ø)

King Hussein: I know some Croations. The more one is in touch the more one feels its impossibility. Arming Muslims would just heighten the war. Problems from early this century are resurfacing. The Serbian army is a powerful force. A few arms won't do it. (Ø)

The President: We worry about Kosovo. (Ø)

King Hussein: That is a bigger disaster than Bosnia. We must try to correct it. Then there are Albanians and Greeks in Macedonia. We are being asked to double our force on the Croatia border. We will do it. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: [Notes Jordan's contribution to the military effort in Somalia.] (U)

The President: We are ever grateful. The Pentagon says things are going well there. Are you going there? (Ø)

King Hussein: Not this time. But joint exercises are resuming. Our militaries are very close to each other. (Ø)

The President: We have regretted the estrangement. We have a bit of a problem with Boutros Boutros Ghali. [The President describes issue of seizure of weapons in Somalia.] We are trying to do our job, take what arms are in our way and get out. I just wanted to explain this to you. We will try to work it out with him. He also wants us to go North but we don't feel the situation is that critical. Do you know that area? (Ø)

King Hussein: Not well. I knew Siad Barre. It would be very difficult to get all the arms there. The situation is so chaotic. (Ø)

The President: It's a troubled world. I'm sorry to think that we won't be working on these problems together. (Ø)

King Hussein: As old friends I would hope that you would come to visit. (Ø)

The President: I hope you will remember the way to Houston. I want to help your work in any way. I won't second guess Clinton but if there is any way to be helpful.... (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

- A+M speech
- Burtis - w/press/north

P/ ~~H~~ King Hussein
12/16/92

P Where do we stand - we are having
a delegation over Friday.

H Feeling w/ in a region that
situation demands continuation.
I understood they would meet
again until Jan (late).

P Do we have prob. a wavy a
delegation.

H Yes.

(Worked it out - I went
out - then met w/
Jordanians

P Wish I could tell you how
Clinton will come down in ME.
In campaign there were A.P.A.C.
like statements. But I don't
think Clinton wants that. I think
election makes that easier for
him.

H Looks promising. It is slow.
Extremists in territories except
are making trouble - I'm worried
by Iran, etc - but territories
more & more are reaching their
own decisions. Ruben is helping
but his extremists are making
trouble for him.

P Hope it goes well - It does

Things at hand.

H Fundamentalists have been shown
as people w/o solutions. I care
we are moving ahead. Still a
lot of poverty tho.

P That is good news. Very good
news about your health!

H How do you feel about it?
His probs are growing. No
control in N, & almost same
in S. Deterioration of conditions.
(Described areas of Iraqi scientist)
Borders are sealed tight about
X to Iraq. We worried about arms
etc coming out.

P We haven't changed our drinking
We keeping sanctions tight
but I don't know over time

H He thinks sanctions will work.
They are just trying to hang on.

P Do you think Terry Cez is
more moderate than his brief

B I really think so. (Describes
his talks w/ T.A.)

H ~~He has~~

P May I ask about Bosnia & charges
that we dress are about Muslims.
Some on Gorbachev & we went in.
That has helped, but is there still

feeling about Muslims in Bosnia?
We frustrated but it very diff.
to do any thing effective, Then
there is a transition which
complicates things.

It is a real dilemma.

H I know some Croatians. The
more one is in touch & more
one puts its impossibilities. Among
Muslims would just bring about
a war. Bodo of early in century
are reemerging. The Serbian
army is presentable force. A
few armies won't do it.

P We worry about Kosovo

H That is a big just disaster than
Bosnia. Must try to prevent
it. Then there is Albania
& Greeks on Macedonia

H We are ~~not~~ being asked to
double our force on Croatian
border. We will do it

S (Contributor to Summit)

P We are very grateful. Pentagon
says things are going well then
are you going there?

H Not this time. But joint operations
are resuming, & we will
we very close to each other

P we have regretted a estrangement.
We have a lot of prob w/ BBK.
(Describes seizure of wpus)
Trying to do our job, take what
arms are in our way, get out.
I just wanted to explain to you.
We'll try to work it out w/ him.
He ~~already was~~ also wants us to
go north - we don't feel a sit is
that critical. Do you know that
area

H Not well. I know Sand Base.
It would be very diff to get all
arms there. The sit is so chaotic.

P It troubled world. Sorry to think
we won't be working on these probs
together.

H As old friends, I hope you will
come to visit.

P I hope you will remember a way
to Houston.

I want to help your work in any
way. I won't 2nd guess Clinton
but if any way to be helpful...

*Tele Con Wednesday, Jan 13, 1993
4:32-4:36 PM - Oval ofc.*

Bush: Hello John, how are you?

Major: Good, how are you? Everything seems to have gone well.

Bush: Yes, everybody did their duty, and the mission seems to have been accomplished. We probably won't have any damage assessment for a while, but everything went according to schedule.

Major: Yes, as far as we know, we accomplished what we wanted to. We have reconnaissance going out in the morning that will tell us more. But from what the pilots tell us...the crews all came back safely, and their reports so far are quite good.

Bush: That is very encouraging. You know, I lectured the press about leaks, about talking about what might be done, that I wanted no lives lost from them talking about military plans before they are done. But all went well.

Major: Looks like everything went as planned.

Bush: That's right. I hope he will be easier to deal with in the future.

Major: Yes, I hope he learned his lesson, but I doubt he has. We may have to talk about what more we might have to do. But we'd have to talk on a different line.

Bush: Yes, we need a different phone for that conversation!

Major: Well, as usual, good job...job well done.

Bush: Well, it was a team effort, and I'm glad for your help.

Major: Many congratulations: I guess you will want to be going now...it's been a long day.

Bush: Well, I'm just trying to get the hell out of here...I'm like to have some grace and style in leaving!

Major: As I'm sure you will. Well, I'm sure we will be talking.

Bush: I'll miss you. Thanks for calling.

Major: Goodbye.

P / King Fahd 12/31/92

- Photo op.
- P Somalia is a diff situation because there no govt, no law. We grateful for your role. we don't want to stay any longer than possible.
- F Somali people are very grateful.
- P I would like your thinking on Bosnia. We are very troubled.
- F We are well never achieved anything - I told Aided and al Mehdie(?) Yes I would like to discuss Bosnia I believe if a settle gets usy that force would be used seriously they would stop. Otherwise I fear a trouble will spread. They must get usy that they must comply w/ UN or Americas force will be used. Otherwise a carnage will continue.
- P We are contemplating action. Our mind are concerned about use of ground force. Ground is very diff.
- F I don't believe ground force are cause. But air power could be used.
- P We are looking at that. But are worried about safety of their troops.

F What sit are their faces in
P response to U3 at a few hours ago.
He said for more amenable use
to use of force. I am of very
wary & negative about use of force
Ther is collateral concern I have.
That US does not care when
Muslims are in trouble, &
knows & would help in the
region, but I sensitive about
this point

F Muslims are scripture. Actions
must be appropriate but I
don't think US ~~is~~ is in any
way at fault here

~~#~~ I am concerned that you
will pursue a worst course
of action

P We are focusing on it & I keep
Clinton advised on what we
are thinking.

Would appreciate your view
on what S H up to. We considering
a sharper response in case
he continues his process
soon.

F S H knows only a case of force.
The shootdown was a very
good step.

P If he continues, just shutting down
an old way, not be enough.
We may need to take out some
different ground.

F He knows only a use of force

P We also concerned in a north,
Is he trying to oppress a Kurds
a whole?

F He still thinks a old way, that
force is a best way to proceed. He
is punishing a people who do not
support him. His personality is
fine oriented.

P There is a wide anticipation that
he will test my successor.

F I agree, but I think he got a
way.

P I don't think Clinton will change
this policy.

F No one should change your
policy because it is in interest
of whole world. I say that not
just because you are here -
I was impressed you with
w/Clinton

P It is important to pass on
my thinking. I told him this
was one of most important
relationships a US has.

F I sure you explained how
important our relationship
is

P I certainly have, if not almost from
F I expected what is happening in
Iran - seebman's & seeing
me up me. Those leaders
do not understand thinking
in a modern world. There
are some who ~~do~~ know a
new way of thinking in a
world but they not in auth-
ority.

They have more problems.
People are deprived & they speak
on radios. They think Islam
can be like a revolution. Their
thinking is not like that in
Arab countries but they are
penetrating in areas like Algeria.
But I think Algeria getting
better now. People in power
are moderates. They are spending
a lot of money on propaganda,
but it does not work. They are
taking a path away from Islam.
They know the leadership of
Islam is S.A. They know
Islam comes in S.A.

But they having some success in
Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia
They are preaching a dangerous
wpm in central Asia (?)

P We are trying to work w/ a-7
in that area.

F The pros in Egypt are coming
mostly from Sudan, I will
see Medvedev soon in Tunisia

P He a good man.

F Fortunately our pros w/ Qatar
have gone away.

P One Iraqi opposition. You met
w/ them?

F I did and will meet w/ them
again.

P That good. My notes indicate
you have deposited 30 & we
have received. We hope you
won't use a proceeds from a
unopposed Iraqi oil
(missed something here)

P Are Iran & Iraq getting along
better

F We don't know of any contact

P Serious reports of one Iraqi plane
defecting

F We heard that but neither side

said anything.
Said There is no official traffic
across Iran-Iraq border but
nothing official.

F SA can not remove

P We keep saying that but he
hangs on + hurts his people.
(Makes pitch about commercial
relations + US firms + a
Sababagh case)

Said (Explained Sababagh case)

F We will stay in touch w/
Mr. Embury ~~is~~ on a case

P The child should be w/ its
mother.

In another area of interest, I
fear a Israeli deportation case
set back a peace process.

F I hope Israeli PM will be
wise enough to see that this
does not help.

P We have made representations
but, of course, they point to
a violence against Israeli
people. We answer that by saying
taking illegal steps is not a
success. But this PM is a
good man. Not like his pred.
F He was impossible to deal w.

F I believe a negot taking place w/
a num PM are very important.
We support a make process.

P I met w/ all a delegations, I hope
they stay engaged

F It is important that a peace
process continue.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Havel 1-on-1 (2 pp.)	10/22/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]

Date Closed:	8/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91157-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

5915

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Boris Yeltsin of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin
Interpreter: Dmitri Zarechnak
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME July 28, 1992, 9:55-10:10 a.m.
AND PLACE Oval Office

The President: Boris, how are you, sir? (U)

President Yeltsin: Good morning, George. (U)

The President: I am calling with nothing special, but I wanted to see how you are and up-date you on a few issues from our end. Bob Strauss was in to see me and gave me a good report on how hard you are working. One point of substance: the Freedom Support Act, which has passed the Senate, will now get a straight up and down vote before the Republican convention. It may be next week. I am confident this will be a positive message for you. (S)

I had the Congressional leadership in yesterday. They, the House leadership, agreed to a straight vote without encumbering amendments on the Freedom Support Act. So, without bothering you with the procedures, I think this is good news. We are confident that we can get it passed next week. (S)

In the course of the debate, they will know how strongly our Administration supports you and your team. You have a good program. And you have our unqualified support--that will certainly come out in the debate. (S)

The only other thing is that I am grateful for Andrei Kozyrev's call to Jim Baker. We need to be sure that Saddam complies with the UN resolutions. It was a wonderful call, and I know you were behind it. (S)

The real purpose of this call is just checking up on a friend. How are you doing? (U)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-1334-F/1
3/27/2008 MM

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

President Yeltsin: Thanks, George. I thank you for your friendly attention and your appreciation of our difficulties. Thanks for the good news on the Freedom Support Act. (U)

Our reforms are proceeding but some people are mentioning that, since my visit, the act has not been adopted. We face an opposition. You and I have an opposition and they often act in opposition. (S)

Recently, I visited several regions in Russia including Krasnodar and Omsk in Siberia. I saw that people still support our efforts. They face enormous difficulties but I think there are no grounds that major, unfortunate events will happen in the future. I am saying this in order to make you feel confident during your campaign. Rest assured that Russia and the Russian President won't let you down. Our personal relations and reform will help you in the election campaign. (S)

The President: That is a wonderful thing to say. I appreciate that very much. Your comments here were extraordinarily helpful in the campaign respect. (S)

President Yeltsin: Concerning Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya, we think they are giving in and will comply with the demands of the international community. But we will have to judge them by their deeds, not their words. If their assurances are just words and deceptions, then Russia will completely support the U.S. in adopting the strictest measures. We will be together with you up to and including a decision to send our naval vessels there. We have stopped economic support for them and I signed a decree suspending all trade with these countries. (S)

It may be of interest to you that I plan to meet President Kravchuk in Crimea at Yalta on August 3. We plan to discuss how to implement the Dagomys agreement. Major items will be the Black Sea fleet and the problem of strategic nuclear weapons. I hope to reach an agreement with Kravchuk on that. (S)

George, when will your Republican convention take place? (S)

The President: Three weeks from now on the 18th, 19th and 20th of August. Right now we have some difficulties but the convention will help us. I feel confident, quietly confident. We have a big fight on our hands but I think we will win. (S)

President Yeltsin: I have the same feeling. The tradition in your country is that, in the final stages, your party always strengthens and leads. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

~~SECRET~~

The President: Boris, thank you very much. I am glad to get this report and let's stay in touch. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thanks, George. I am very grateful for your call particularly since I decided last night to call you and was surprised this morning to learn from my associates that you wanted to call me. It occurred to me this morning that the thoughts of great people often coincide. (U)

Please give my best to Barbara Bush from me and from Naina. I give you a friendly hug and let you know my sympathy for you. I am confident that everything will turn out okay. I also feel that you support Russia and the Russian President. (U)

The President: I sure do. Give our love to Naina. She is so natural and down to earth. Thanks again and good luck. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thanks. All the best to you. Thank you. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0541-MR

MM 4/14/2016

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva of
Portugal and EC President Delors

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister of Portugal
Jacques Delors, President of the EC
Commission of the Europeans Communities
Martins da Cruz, Diplomatic Advisor to the
Prime Minister
Pascal Lamy, Chief of Staff of the President
of the Commission of the European
Communities

DATE, TIME April 22, 1992, 11:00am - 11:30am
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: I meant what I said. Although this is an election, I don't want to hold back or delay the Uruguay Round negotiations. It would send a disastrous signal around the world. I feel very strongly about this. I want to clear the air on that. Now, welcome. We can stay in here, or we can go into the Cabinet Room, sending a group off to negotiate if that seems appropriate. (Ø)

Prime Minister Silva: We would like to stay here for 5 minutes. We must do our best. We have to worry about the message we are sending about the world trading system. Even in the CIS and Latin America, people are depending on us. We must try to compromise. (Ø)

President Delors: I feel that this is the last chance. We have on the table various proposals. It is difficult to prove to you that we will reform the common agricultural policy, that we will have less production, less exports and less support. Among friends, let me say I take responsibility to resolve both the CAP and GATT. I have two solutions to suggest: a best and a second best. The first is as follows: The EC has not accepted the Dunkel paper. If you will be willing to amend it a little, I will modify our position on export subsidies, but not to the

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Dunkel level. The safe box offers a possibility, but without a link to production. The peace clause is not difficult. Until today the EC hasn't accepted physical restrictions on production. I will defend physical reductions but not to 24%. (S)

The President: It depends on what level. I am not an expert. We accepted Dunkel, but I want to emphasize we weren't happy with all of it. (S)

President Delors: I know. (U)

The President: We would have to know more about the level. (U)

President Delors: I think we would agree to somewhere between 15% and 18%, but I have not yet brokered this with the ministers. (S)

The President: What else? (U)

President Delors: On rebalancing perhaps there could be a symbolic gesture. On the safe box we can make it. The big issue is physical reductions on exports. (S)

Secretary Baker: What is your idea on internal restraint? You said no links to production. (S)

President Delors: No. With links to production. (S)

Secretary Baker: So it is our basic safe box. (S)

President Delors: Yes. And on rebalancing, some general statement on the relationship between export subsidies and rebalancing. (S)

Secretary Baker: On the peace clause? (S)

President Delors: A general agreement to follow cooperative measures rather than unilateral. (S)

Secretary Baker: In other words, agreement to cooperative measures with respect to the issues in the agreement but not everything else? (S)

President Delors: Yes. (U)

The President: How would we do all of this? (U)

President Delors: My target is to get a breakthrough to permit the negotiations to continue. I would like to tell the press that negotiations will continue, and to do it in a way we can put the spotlight on negotiations in Geneva. (S)

The President: What is the EC view in general about going forward now? (S)

President Delors: If we can get an agreement, it is better. Our goal is not to get a U.S.-EC agreement at the expense of the rest of the world. But an agreement between the EC and the United States would let us go forward on the other issues. For internal reasons we need to reform the CAP. (e)

My second solution is this. We would agree to the safe box, but leave export subsidies, rebalancing and the peace clause for a period to see what the effect of CAP reform is. We would have a review clause to discuss these other issues in two years. (e)

Secretary Baker: The Cairns group would be upset about that. It looks like we would be ducking the issues. (e)

President Delors: But the EC price reductions would go forward, just not agreement to reduce physical volume. (e)

-- End of Conversation --

Oldřich ČERNÝ

Nat. Sec. Advisor
to the Pres.

Off. 536377

h.: 536890

Kancelář prezidenta CSFR
Office of the President of CSFR
119 08 Praha - Hrad (Prague Castle)

Tel.: 3117151
2101/5364
Fax: 3115229

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4/13/92

Florence -

Enclosed is the
memo of the President's
April 10 meeting with
Prime Minister Calfa
of Czechoslovakia. Because
of the sensitivity of the
subject matter, I have
not put this into the
system. Please check
with the General to see
how he wishes to handle.

Thanks.

Bob Hutchings

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12a. Cable	From White House Re: Message to Prime Minister Calfa from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	4/20/92	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]

Date Closed:	8/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91157-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12b. Draft Cable	From Brent Scowcroft Re: To Prime Minister Calfa (1 pp.)	4/20/92	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]

Date Closed:	8/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91157-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12c. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Calfa of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (2 pp.)	4/10/92	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]

Date Closed:	8/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91157-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13a. Letter	President Leonid Kravchuk to President Bush Re: Translation from Ukrainian (2 pp.)	4/10/92	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]

Date Closed: 8/5/2009	OA/ID Number: 91157-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13b. Letter	President Leonid Kravchuk to President Bush Re: Ukrainian (3 pp.)	4/10/92	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]

Date Closed:	8/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91157-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Oldřich ČERNÝ

Nat. Sec. Advisor to the Pres. Off 536377
h.: 536640

Kancelář prezidenta ČSFR
Office of the President of CSFR
119 08 Praha - Hrad (Prague Castle)

Tel.: ~~3117151~~
2101/4364
Fax: 3115229

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13c. Letter	President Vaclav Havel to President Bush Re: [English] (2 pp.)	4/7/92	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]

Date Closed: 8/5/2009	OA/ID Number: 91157-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13d. Letter	President Vaclav Havel to President Bush Re: [English] (2 pp.)	4/7/92	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]

Date Closed:	8/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91157-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14. Memcon	Re: Page 3 [President Bush/Prime Minister Calfa] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]

Date Closed:	8/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91157-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15. Letter	President Vaclav Havel to President Bush Re: [English] (2 pp.)	4/7/92	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]

Date Closed:	8/5/2009	OA/ID Number:	91157-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16. Report	Re: Informace (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January 1992 - January 1993) [1]

Date Closed: 8/5/2009	OA/ID Number: 91157-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Major of
the United Kingdom on April 10, 1992

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Major
Notetaker: Roy Whitman
Mary Wadsworth

DATE, TIME April 10, 1992, 1:21pm - 1:24 EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Just wanted to call to congratulate you on your victory.

Prime Minister Major: I thought from the very beginning we would win. We won with an overall majority of 22; so we're perfect, safe and dry for another five years.

The President: Well that's just wonderful. I loved the headline "Good Guys Finish First," it just flashed up on the screen this morning.

Prime Minister Major: We pulled more vote for the Conservative Party than in any election. It will be a great prelude for November.

The President: I hope so. Barbara and I wanted to send our love, and I'll let you get back down to earth from cloud nine.

Prime Minister Major: Thank you.

The President: I want to compliment you on the way you kept on going after you got that egg on your face. That was really something.

Prime Minister Major: Thanks again. Please give my best to Barbara.

The President: Good luck.

Hetzengahn Patriot report

P/Schneier 3/31/92

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- Religion is growing fast in China.
- Bush China policy right on target
- Apr 26 Auschwitz Memorial Ceremony.
- Use Cheney as conf. building measure.
- P- Upset at Obolment/Hetzengahn statements
- S- Say you will invite winner of election to visit - one week after.
- S- Meet mother & father of diplomat^{son} killed by terrorists live in NY.
- P- I would like to see them
Tell me when they return.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0542-MR
3c 5/16/11

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Nursultan Nazarbayev
of Kazakhstan (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan

DATE, TIME May 19, 1992, 11:00am - 12:00pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Every one is anxious to hear from you. After the discussion, we will have a working lunch then signing and statements. If there is anything you wish to discuss privately we should do so now. I want you and Jim to fill us in on START. I hope at Lisbon you will have a high level representative. (S)

President Nazarbayev: I believe we have overcome new obstacles. I want to express my own feeling. I am grateful for your kind attitude toward Kazakhstan from the great state of the United States. At the moment the CIS is not working. Meetings like a President's club. The Soviet Union continues to disintegrate. Problems within Russia accelerate and that is dangerous. The main concern is that Russia doesn't control the course of reform - it is being done at the local level. Why? We shifted from totalitarianism to freedom instantaneously. We should have sorted out the economy first. Destroyed the center in Bolshevik manner. We sign documents and they are meaningless. Russians exert pressure on many areas. I have told Yeltsin what I am telling you. We should keep Yeltsin, for all his faults he is sincere. If you and I prompt him - he pays no attention to anyone else - including our help. I am talking about his drinking. He says what can I do - look what surrounds me. But that is not the way out. (S)

The President: How did he respond to your drinking comment? (S)

President Nazarbayev: All right. There are many problems. The Black Sea Fleet, for example. I could solve it. But there are many people around Yeltsin with territorial claims. There is no

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
2

united army. Everyone knows that. We have our own army - so do the others. There is mistrust of Russia. Other republics are willing to go under the protection of the West but not Russia. Only Kazakhstan may be able to prevent fundamentalism in Tadjikistan related to Massood. The CIS is collapsing. I am working hard to preserve it, but it is useless. We signed an international security pact. (Describes). I signed that merely to prevent fundamentalist interference. We have enough resources and industry so we won't be the last to get out of the crisis. But we need aid now. It should not be delayed - including Russia and the others. Crisis is reaching an apex. We can't afford to be late. We could have a catastrophe. There is total disintegration in the Russian countryside. Now Kazakhstan is OK. We have a choice. Representatives of all Arab states have visited, including Iran. They have promised to provide what we need. But that would put Kazakhstan under their influence. Kazakhstan has Turkic base so I would be honored - but I won't do that but I will support democracy. There will be instability between the Central Asian republics because there are territorial and racial disputes. It is important to stabilize Afghanistan to defend against fundamentalism. There are 3 aggressor S _____, Dustum... (S)

The President: Massood is more moderate isn't he? (S)

President Nazarbayev: Yes. Our task is security and democracy. We have the resources. We have begun our work with Chevron. We want American Companies to come over and invest. (Opens Map). Look at the central location of Kazakhstan. (Describes). We want your military to come over and train our military - a military cadre. I want a grand and powerful US presence. That is the reason for Chevron and that is only the beginning. I closed a nuclear testing site. Nevada is still operating but I won't criticize (laughs). Here is a powerful base. (points) Here we work on nuclear rocket engines. I want to cooperate on high technology. (S)

The President: We could send Dan Golden. (S)

President Nazarbayev: Here - this could be a landing site for shuttle in an emergency. (S)

The President: Is Russia sensitive about all this belonging to you? (S)

President Nazarbayev: We have an agreement. We are prepared to lease some of these - they are all on Kazakhstan territory. Please exempt Kazakhstan from COCOM. We want preferential treatment, like you give Israel. It's not clear what will happen in Russia. In China some of their books show part of our territory as Chinese. To the south is fundamentalism. What are we to do? That is why we wish to be close to the U.S. This is why we wanted to remain temporarily a nuclear state. I want Kazakhstan to become a bastion of democratic principles as a lesson to the world. I will hand out books in New York with 135

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

opportunities, with all the economic details, legislation on market economy, our achievements. (S)

The President: OPIC? (S)

General Scowcroft: You will sign the treaty? (S)

President Nazarbayev: I am not coming empty handed. I come with projects and opportunity! (Describes minerals, etc). Kazakhstan exports 5 billion annually. Gold and diamonds. Will put gold in Swiss banks as security. (S)

Secretary Baker: Kazakhstan can get its own currency sooner than most. Should put some in the Federal Reserve Bank. (S)

President Nazarbayev: We'll do that. I just wanted to brief you on our situation. Our position is peacemaker between Christians and Muslims. Want to be close to the U.S. I want to extend an invitation to you to visit. (S)

The President: It is difficult this election year. But I'd love to do it, so let's leave it open. I think I'll win and would love to come. Do we need to resolve any more business? (S)

Secretary Baker: Where and when can we sign this protocol? The Museum of Art is good. (S)

President Nazarbayev: How about Minsk? That is the capitol of the CIS. (S)

Secretary Baker: Can't you send someone to Lisbon? We are running out of time to start hearings. (S)

President Nazarbayev: We can't send someone on the 24th. If you have arranged it with the other 3 - why not do it in Minsk on the 25th. (S)

Secretary Baker: Someone would be ready on the 25th to go anywhere? (S)

President Nazarbayev: We are signing a treaty at 6 p.m. in Moscow on the 24th. (S)

Secretary Baker: OK. We need to move to get it ratified. (S)

President Nazarbayev: What do you think of on Kazakhstan? (S)

The President: Scientific cooperation is great, business incentives are great, nuclear business is running along and we take seriously our responsibilities under NPT, NALL, etc. (S)

President Nazarbayev: How about the military? (S)

Secretary Baker: We could do some training. (S)

The President: Military to military visits would be good. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
4

President Nazarbayev: My security ... is US/UN. (S)

The President: We can discuss. (U)

President Nazarbayev: Scientific cooperation, business, military, etc. (S)

Secretary Baker: The biggest help to Kazakhstan would be business investments. Resolutions of nuclear issues open the way. (S)

The President: Your deal with Chevron will really open the doors. Cut contract with our smaller businesses. They can move more capacity. Won't Eagleburger mission apply? (S)

Secretary Baker: Yes. (U)

President Nazarbayev: Last - happy to know the U.S. is providing \$500 million in CCC. We need cattlefeed. Here is my request for this. (S)

Secretary Baker: Also have some funds for destruction of nuclear weapons. Ukraine asks for some and we should find a way to get some to Kazakhstan. (S)

President Nazarbayev: That would help. We have a lot of tanks and small arms. Want your help to sell them. (S)

Secretary Baker: Our public ... to CIS making and selling weapons to Burma, Libya, etc. (S)

President Nazarbayev: We don't make them - just want to dispose of the ones we have. (S)

The President: We just missed our Cabinet meeting. Let's wash up and go to lunch. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

P/Nazarbayev ~~P/Nazarbayev~~ 5/19/92

(1)

P Everyone anxious to hear from you after discussion, a working lunch then signing & statements. Anything you wish to discuss privately we should do now. I want your time to fill in on start. Hope at historical you would have a high level rep.

14

I believe we have overcome some obstacles. Want to express my own feeling. I appreciate for kind attitude toward K from great state of US. At moment CIS is not working. Not like a P's Club & V continues to disintegrate. Pros w/in Russia accelerate & that dangerous. Main concern is Russian do not control caused refugee - being forced at local level. Why? We stepped forward Total. To freedom instantaneously should have tested out even 1st. Destroyed center in Bolshevik manner. We sign docs. & they meaningless. Russians spent premiere in many ways. I have told Yeltsin what I telling you. We should keep Yeltsin, for all his faults he is sincere. If you

Q I corrupt him - he pays no attention
to anyone else - me even. I
talking about drinking. He says
what can I do - look at what surrounds
me. But that's not a way out.
P How did he respond to your drinking
comment?

N All right. Many probs. Black Sea
fleet, for example. I could solve it.
But many people are ~~as~~ yellow
w/ internal claims. There is no
united army. Everyone knows
that. We have our own army - to
do - others. There is no trust
of Russia. Other republics are willing
to go under protection of West
but not Russia. Only Ruzh.
many leaders to prevent fundamentalist
Tadjik related to Moscow. CIS
is collapsing. I work in that
to preserve it, but it's useless.
We signed int. security pact.
(Describes). I signed that only to
prevent fundamentalist interference.
We have some resources & ultimately
we would be left to get out of a
crisis. But we could deal with it. It
should not be delayed - real
Russia & others. Crisis is reaching

again, we can't afford to be late
We could have catastrophe. Total
disintegration in Rus countryside
Now Kazakh. We have a choice.

Reps of all Arab states have visited,
will discuss. Promised to provide what we need.
But that would put R under
their influence. R has Tenbice^{Turk}
case so I would be honored - but
I want to do that but will support
dmeso. There will be instability
but let C. A. Republics handle their
territorial & racial disputes.

Important to stabilize Cyprus so
no. to defend against fundamentalists

There are 3 groups: unija,
Dostom

Dostom

Massoud P
N

Massoud more moderate isn't he
~~no~~ Yes. Our task is security & ~~stability~~
dmeso. We have a reserves.

Began our work w/ Chevron.
Want Mr. Carrasco to come over
& visit. (Opens map). Look at
central location of R. (Describes).

Want your visiting to come over
& trace our mission - a civil
order. I want a general & perhaps
US presence. That response for
Chevron & that only beginning.

I closed a nice testing seth. Zurada
still operating but I want to intrige
(hangbo). Here is proofed base. (Hav)
Here we work on our engines
I want to coop on high tech
We can all see Dan Coblen ^{Golden}
Here - this could be a landing
site for shuttle in emergency.
Do Russia sensitive about all
this belong to you.

P

N

P

N

We have an agreement. We
proposed to lease some of these - they
all on K territory

Please exempt K from COCOM. Wean
preferential treatment, like you give
Israel. Not clear what will happen in
Rus. In China some of their books
show part of our territory as Chinese.
To a South is fundamentalism.
What are we to do? That why we
wish to be close to U.S. This way
we want to remain temp. semi
state. I want K to become a
bastion of demo ~~pr~~ principles as
beacon to world. I will and not
lose in N Y U/135 opportunities,
w/all the even details. Key on unib
emerging, our achievements
OIC?

P

- S You will sign today
 N I not coming empty handed. I come w/ projects & oppor. (Describes university etc). K x \$5 bil annually. Gold & diamonds will put gold in Swiss banks so secure
 B K can get its own currency sooner than most. Should put some in Fed Res. B
 N Will do that. ~~I~~ I just wanted to bring you more sit.

~~Our~~ Our position is peacekeeper bet Christians & Muslims. Want to be close to US. Want to extend invitation to go to visit.

- P Dif. this election year. But I'd love to do it so let's leave it open. I think I'd win & would love to come.

Do we need to resolve any unbusiness?

- B Where & when we can sign this protocol. Muslims not good

N Hundreds Univ? That capital of CIS

- B Can't you send someone to K. colon?

We running out of time to start leaving

- N Can't send someone on 24th if you have arranged it w/ c other 3 - why not do it on Monday on c 25th

- B Someone would be ready on 25th to go anywhere?

- N We signing treaty at 4 pm in

Mozambique on 24th

B OK. we need a sumo to get it ~~it~~ ratified
 N what do you think of my say on it

P Scientific coop great, businessmen inventing
 up great, new businesses are coming
 along & we take seriously our resp
 under NPT, N/AEC, etc.

N How about military?

B We need to some training.

P Mil-mil issues would be good.

N My security cover is w/ me.

P We can discuss

N Scientific coop, business, mil, etc.

B Biggest help to K would be business men

P ~~at~~ You deal w/ Chevron will really
 open doors. Get contact w/ our small
 businesses. They can move more rapid
 Wint Eagleburger mission apply?

B Yes

N List - happy to know US providing 500
 mil CCC. We need cattle feed. Here
 is my request for this.

B Also need some funds for distribution of seeds
 Ukraine asks for some & we should find
 a way to get some to K.

N That would help. We have a lot of
 tanks & small arms. Want your help
 to sell them.

- B Am public not sympathetic to CIA, ^{Washington} selling
 copies to Berne, Italy, etc
- N We don't make them - just want to dispose
 of copies and money.
- P We just missed ~~one~~ cabinet meeting.
 Let's wait up to go to China.