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2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memorandum of Conversations/Telephone Conversations Files

OA/ID Number: 91156
Folder ID Number: 91156-010

Folder Title:
Memcons/Telcons (January-December) 1991 [5]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	7	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Mulroney (8 pp.)	3/14/91	(b)(1)	
02a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with John Major, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (7 pp.)	3/16/91	(b)(1)	S
02b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Major [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (11 pp.)	3/16/91	(b)(1)	
02c. Memcon	Re: One-on-One Meeting with President Walesa of Poland (2 pp.)	3/20/91	(b) (1)	S
02d. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Walesa (3 pp.)	3/20/91	(b) (1)	
03. Handwritten Memcon	Re: Beatrice Rangel (7 pp.)	3/26/91	(b)(1)	
04. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Collins (Irish) (1 pp.)	3/13/91	(b)(1)	
05. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Havel Phone Call (1 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 3

Collection:	
Record Group:	Bush Presidential Records
Office:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Meetings Files
Subseries:	Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:	
File Location:	Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [5]
Pinksheet Number:	cap1300
OA/ID Number:	91156-010
Date Closed:	8/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:	2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06. Handwritten Memcon	Re: Perez de Cuellar at Camp David (6 pp.)	1/5/91	(b)(1)	
07a. Draft Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Bush and British Prime Minister Major (2 pp.)	1/27/91	(b)(1)	TS
07b. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Major (3 pp.)	1/27/91	(b)(1)	
08. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Major (2 pp.)	1/10/91	(b)(1)	
09. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister John Major (10 pp.)	12/21/90	(b)(1)	S
10. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Thatcher Breakfast Meeting (9 pp.)	1/20/91	(b)(1)	
11. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Moynihan (1 pp.)	1/11/91	(b)(1)	
12a. Draft Telcon	Re: Presidential Phone Call to Prime Minister Shamir (2 pp.)	1/19/91	(b)(1)	
12aa. Telcon	Re: Presidential Phone Call to Prime Minister Shamir (2 pp.)	1/19/91	(b)(1)	
12b. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Gorbachev (3 pp.)	1/11/91	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 3

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12c. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Shamir (3 pp.)	1/19/91	(b)(1)	
12d. Handwritten Post-It Notes	Re: From the Desk of George Bush (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
12e. Handwritten Notes	Re: Presidential Meeting (2 pp.)	1/10/90	(b)(1)	
13. Memo	Douglas H. Paal to Diane L. Edwards/Florence E. Gantt Re: Leniency (4 pp.)	1/13/90	(b)(1)	S
14. Handwritten Notes	Re: Thatcher (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
15. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Kracherck [sic] 1-on-1 (3 pp.)	8/1/91	(b)(1)	

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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
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WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [5]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 10/14/2015

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-010
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Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2012-2383-MR(128)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	10/1/2015

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with John Major, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Prime Minister John Major
Sir Charles Powell, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister

DATE, TIME March 16, 1991 (9:45a.m. -11:45a.m.)
AND PLACE: Government House, Bermuda

The President: Thank you for all your fine cooperation on the Gulf. What do you think is going to happen to Saddam Hussein and Iraq now? (S)

Prime Minister Major: He is certainly not doing too well in the North but he might be prevailing in the South. If he stays, I have made it clear that he must be punished. But it will be very bad he if stays. (S)

The President: Is there anything we can do about it? I hate to see our clear military victory eroded by this messy situation. (S)

Prime Minister Major: Congratulations on the entire war effort including the way you managed the United Nations. (S)

The President: How do we keep this situation from eroding? We must go forward in three main areas, the Gulf, the Arab/Israeli conflict, and finally Lebanon. The Israelis aren't showing much flexibility. I fear that this will be principally a U.S. problem to solve. (S)

Prime Minister Major: The Europeans will be difficult on Israel, especially the French. They will be keen on having a conference and using the United Nations. You are the only one with the clout to move Israel. I think if we push hard on a conference it will make Israel dig in even more. France is asking for a meeting "to see what lessons there are from the Gulf" but it is a way to get the EC going on a conference. (S)

The President: When is that? (U)

Prime Minister Major: April 8th. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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The President: Mitterrand did not press the conference issue with me in Martinique. He did mention the United Nations Security Council summit but he was not pressing it. He tried hard to be congenial. He talked alot about Palestinians and Jordan. (S)

Prime Minister Major: The Soviets will want to be involved alone with the French, and that points to UNSC Perm Reps. But is that the best way to proceed? (S)

The President: What did Gorbachev tell you? (S)

Prime Minister Major: He wants to be involved, but he didn't push any particular scheme. (S)

The President: Now or later I will have to do something. Shamir won't like it but we have to do what is right. I want you to know that at the right moment Israel must be pushed. Jim Baker and I are both suspect, compared to Ronald Reagan. I would like to get your views and those of others. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I will have a clearer European picture on the 8th. There is not a consensus in Great Britain on proceeding separately from our UN role. But I would like to see what can be done bilaterally. (S)

The President: Jim Baker is exploring a two track idea. The problem with the UN I feel is that it is wholly against Israel. It is a very difficult problem. Believe it or not Shamir is a moderate.

Prime Minister Major: Arafat came out badly. But I question who would replace him. We are suggesting no funding as long as he is there. (S)

The President: Jim Baker had a good meeting with the Palestinians. But they made clear that Tunis (Arafat) said it was okay. How about King Hussein? (S)

Prime Minister Major: I don't think we have a better alternative than Hussein. 1.4(b); 1.4(d) (S)

The President: We have held back on Jordan because of sensitivities of the Arabs. But we will move slowly. (S)

Prime Minister Major: Should I try to get the Europeans to give Baker a few months before they press for a UN initiative? (S)

The President: That would be helpful. (S)

Prime Minister Major: My argument is the Arabs are now showing more flexibility. It is the Israelis who are difficult, and pressing the United Nations initiative would just make them more so.

My foreign office doesn't necessarily agree, so I wouldn't want this to get back to them.

Can we go back and discuss Iraq so more. Should we be offering any help to any of the insurgents? (S)

The President: I think the wisest thing is just to sit still, try to get a cease fire and not to get engaged in an insurrection. (S)

Prime Minister Major: What about using anti-Iraq broadcasts? Shouldn't we continue these? (S)

Brent Scowcroft: I don't think it has stopped; its just changed. But I will check again. (S)

Prime Minister Major: Should we keep the sanctions in place if Saddam Hussein does not leave? (S)

The President: I would like to, but we shouldn't move the goal post. (S)

Prime Minister Major: That's true but then how do we get rid of his nuclear biological-chemical capability? (S)

The President: I agree. What about explicitly forcing Saddam Hussein out? (S)

Prime Minister Major: I don't know if the United Nations would go for it. (S)

The President: I could be wrong about the Soviet Union and maybe about France. (S)

Prime Minister Major: But Gorbachev was scathing with to me about Saddam Hussein. We are currently pulling out British troops about 1,000 per week. (S)

The President: Are you going to leave some there? (S)

Prime Minister Major: Not ground troops. Maybe ships in the Gulf. (S)

The President: I'm not sure we have a problem within our government, but I don't want ground troops or permanent presence. Navy and air rotation, but not ground troops. (S)

Brent Scowcroft: I think we are all together now. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I think keeping troops in Kuwait with the uncertain political developments could be a problem. (S)

The President: (referring to an Arab force in Kuwait) How about Assad? I have never seen anyone so critical of Israel. But I

think we have crossed a bit of a hurdle with our own public opinion on Syria. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I think it is worth trying to bring him along. (S)

The President: We had a long discussion with Mitterrand about the Maghreb. I don't see much of a role here for the Gulf. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I agree. Is there a role for a United Nations force in the Gulf? (S)

The President: Jim Baker is working on these ideas. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I think it is very useful to keep the United Nations involved. It was incredibly useful in the crisis. And I am keen on keeping a United Nations role for that reason. (S)

The President: I agree. We should keep the United Nations involved. We just must be careful with the UN where Israel is involved. (S)

Prime Minister Major: What about arms sales? Gorbachev was quite helpful on that question both with regard to nuclear biological chemical and conventional sales. We don't want to stop defensive arms to our friends but we want to start thinking about what to do about others and in what ways the Perm 5 should get involved, since they sell most of the arms. (S)

The President: This is an important issue. One problem is Israel. I got a question on this in Ottawa which I'm afraid it fumbled. (S)

✓
✓
Prime Minister Major: I made the point with Gorbachev that we should distinguish between what is for defense and what is for offensive. I recognize that that ~~destination~~ ^{designation} doesn't carry us very far. (S)

✓
The President: I got a follow-on question about a cut off of arms and I said we'd had eliminated the biggest threat in Arabian so that the need for arms was down. I got beat up on that by my own people. But my statement has not had serious repercussions. What should we say to the press? (Discussion of press questions) (S)

Prime Minister Major: Do you think Gorbachev will survive? (S)

The President: You just saw him but I tend to think not. (The President described the flap over Baker meeting with Yeltsin) (S)

Prime Minister Major: I got criticism for not seeing Yeltsin. We have some problems with him as do you. (S)

The President: What do you think about Gorbachev? (S)

Prime Minister Major: Which way can he go? I don't see how he can re-introduce reforms. Even if he could, it would take years of pain to do any good. Neither of the two alternatives for Gorbachev look attractive. (S)

I had dinner with Shevardnadze. He was very supportive of Gorbachev. He said his statement on dictatorship didn't refer to Gorbachev but to the overall situation. (S)

The President: If Gorbachev would only do something on the Baltics then the world would be a lot different. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I approached him wrong. I should have put it that way rather than saying how much his Baltics moves were hurting him. I should handle it the way you suggest the next time I talk to him. (S)

The President: I will do that as well. (S)

Prime Minister Major: Are you going to be seeing him? (S)

The President: I don't know when. Jim Baker is telling him that if there is no progress on arms control we will not be able to have a summit. (S)

Prime Minister Major: We have our own problems left over from Thatcher, including having Gorbachev come to the London Economic Summit. We could have him to lunch just before the meeting. (S)

The President: Let me talk to Jim Baker before I reply to that idea. (Both the President and the Prime Minister were cool to the idea of having Gorbachev to lunch). (S)

Prime Minister Major: There is an increasing debate within the EC on defense role. What Delors and Mitterrand want is a direct EC role on defense. We are very negative but it has big head of steam. Kohl is supporting it. (S)

We have suggested increasing the European role in NATO but through the WEU. And we've also favored keeping an integrated command. Kohl was supportive when I talked to him but in a vacuous way. It would be useful if we could raise it with Kohl. It would help a great deal. Mitterrand is beyond hope on this. (Discussion of Mitterrand meeting). (S)

Prime Minister Major: Mitterrand can wrap Kohl around his little finger when he is at his delphic best. I like Kohl and I get along with him, but he is no match for Mitterrand. (S)

The President: We sent a demarche on which Mitterrand demurred. (S)

Sir Charles Powell: We liked your demarche. (S)

The President: Let's discuss trade. (President explained the effort to get extension of our fast-track negotiating authority). (S)

Prime Minister Major: I hope the fast-track authority comes through. We would like to finish the Uruguay Round this year. The EC agricultural reform could even come up worse than the mess we now have. The Commission needs its wings clipped badly. These two treaties on economic and political union are disastrous. I'm trying to get Kohl on my side. (S)

The President: Delors wants to be President of France. (S)

Prime Minister Major: Kohl says that he will not make it. He is too conservative for the French left.

(Discussion of Mrs. Thatcher and poll tax and Mrs. Thatcher CNN interview). She doesn't like the way I am playing with the Germans. She doesn't like Kohl. Monetary Union is a big problem. The French wanted to tie Germany into Europe and Kohl wants to show Germany is a good European. It is a bloody mess but a unified currency and a unified bank can't be done like yours. The basics are not there. (Discussion of Mrs. Thatcher and party politics). I can't win, but it must be done. If it must be done; tis better to be done quickly. (S)

Thank you for your response to my letter on South Africa. (S)

The President: (Discussion of Mandela phone call) I want to move on sanctions as fast as possible. De Klerk now deserves our support. (S)

Prime Minister Major: I agree completely. The EC is okay on this because I have Kohl with me. Other countries are reluctant. I tried to push the Commission to move, but it is not going too well.

One simple additional matter: Hong Kong refugees -- the numbers are up 200%, and we can't hold our position any longer. It will blow back to Commons shortly, and the Hong Kong lobby there is very strong. (S)

The President: Well, we've had this difference on the question of repatriation. What do you want? (S)

Prime Minister Major: I would like your acquiescence in enforceable repatriation under careful conditions. (S)

Brent Scowcroft: Is there anyway we can be sure that Congress would not object? (S)

Prime Minister Major: I could look at that. (S)

The President: We will look at the question again. (S)

Sir Charles Powell: We have some new proposals. (S)

Prime Minister Major: Let us get our people together. (S)

The President: How is Hong Kong going? (S)

Prime Minister Major: The Chinese are deeply suspicious about the involvement of Hong Kong groups in China. There is also a new airport going up and the Chinese are suspicious about that. (S)

The President: We still have a China problem. Most Favored Nation coming up soon, and if Congress kills it the Chinese will blame us. (S)

Prime Minister Major: Hong Kong will be devastated. (S)

My only other point is COCOM and telecommunications. I worry about our allies on this issue. They don't know about the intelligence value of delay. It is very important. (S)

The President: Are we okay? (S)

Brent Scowcroft: Yes, we are very close together on this.

(At this point Robert Zoellick joins the meeting to brief on Baker's meeting with Gorbachev). (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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~~P/White~~ P/ Major 3/16/91

P (Thomson in all coop on Gulf)
what is going to happen to S & Iraq
M Not doing too well in north, not looks
like he prevailing in South. By the
stamp, I have said he must be in
pariah. Bad if he stays

P What can we do about it?
I hate to see a clean edge of a
military end be eroded by this
messy sit.

M (Migrants on whole over, VN squadrone)
P How do we keep it from eroding. We
must go forward in a 3 main
areas: Gulf, A-F, Lebanon.

Israel's aren't showing much flex,
& that I fear is primarily a US prob
M The Euros will be dig on I still. Esp
French. They will be keen on with
Conf & UN. But you are only messing
about to make I. I think if you push that
hard on Conf it will make I dig in
heels even more. France is asking for
a meeting "to see what lessons from Gulf"
but it is a way to get E.C. going on a Conf.
P When is that

M April 8

P Mitterand didn't press the Conf issue.
He did mention UKSC summit but
he was not pressing it. Tried hard to

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the congressional. Talked a lot about
Palestinians + Jordan.

M The Sars will want to be involved -
French, & that points to Perm. ^{But} what
is best way to proceed?

P What did Carl tell you

M He wants to be involved, but didn't ask
for any particular scheme.

P I, now or later, will have to do
something, Shavir won't like, but
we have to do it right.

I must agree to become that the
right movement I must be pushed.

Barbaris suspect, & I as well, engaged
to R.R. But I would like to get your
views & those of others.

M I wish have a clearer European
on 8th. There is not a GB consensus
on proceeding. Much sympathy for
UN role. But would like to see what
can be done bilaterally.

P ~~From~~ Barber exploring 2 track idea.
Prob w/UN is I feels it is wholly out - I
(Discussion of Bawa meeting)
I is a very big prob. Believe it or not
Shavir is a moderate.

(Discussion of Israeli seeds)

M Craft came out badly. But Zuckerman
is who would replace him. We

suggesting no funding so long
as he is there.

P Baker had good rty w/ Poles. But they
must leave Tunis and it was K.

M How about King H. (Described set)
I don't think we have a better act.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

P We have held back on Jordan because
of sensitivities of Arabs, but we will move
slowly.

M Should I try to get Ezer to give Baker
a few months before we press a UN
initiative.

P That would be helpful

M My argument is - Arabs are now more
flex. It is - I who are dig & pressing
- UN would just wake them
did in their heels.

XX Better foreign office doesn't necessarily
agree, so I wouldn't want this to get
back to them.

Can I go back to Iraq. Should we
offer my help to Iraqis.

(Discussion, incl. below. Agreed
not really to do much since it
might back up Iraq.)

P I think a consensus is just to sit still,
try to get close fire, & not get engaged
in a intervention.

Fueller - VN note

- M How about a conti- drag broadcasts?
Shouldn't we continue.
- * S I don't think it has stopped, just changed.
~~But~~ But I will check again.
- M Should we keep samities in place
if SA doesn't leave?
- P I would like to, but we shouldn't wear
a good posts.
- M True, but how about getting rid of
NB^C capability & hypotheating his
out.
- P I agree, but how about explicitly
forcing SA out
- M I don't know if a UN would go for it
- P I would worry about SU & maybe
Fr.
- M But Coul was scathing to me about
SA
We are pulling out our troops at about
1000/week.
- P Are you going to leave now?
- M Not yet troops. Maybe ships in Gulf
- P I don't see we have uncertainty w/ in
an hour, but I don't want to get troops or
perm presence - navy & air rotation, etc
but not get troops.
- S I think we are all together now.
- M I think keeping troops in Hawaii w/ -
uncertain political elements could be

a prob

P (Pres. Qaddafi in Kuwait)

How about Assad. I have never seen anyone so anti-I. But I think we have crossed a bit of a threshold w/ our public on Syria.

M I think it is worth trying to bring him in along with now far we can get is questionable
(Terrorism)

P What else here? We had long discussion w/ Rittner and on Iraq. Don't see much of a role here for Gulf

M I agree. Do there a role for a UN force in Gulf? Do there merit in a demilitarized zone?

P I think Baker is working on both.

M I think it is very useful to keep UN involved. They ^{are} ~~are~~ ^{are} incredibly useful in a crisis ~~that~~ I can be on keeping a UN role for that reason.

P I agree & we should keep UN involved. We just must be careful where it is involved.

M How about arms sales? Gorb was quite helpful on that, both w/ ABC and conventional sales. We don't want to stop defensive arms to our friends but we must start thinking

about what to do about them & in what
venue - maybe Peru & since they
sell most of cars.

P Important essent. One prob is I, which is a mass state. I got a question in Ottawa which I formulated.

24 I made a point w/ Cove that we should distinguish between growth for defense & that for offense. That doesn't actually carry you far.

P I got a follow-up about cutoff & I said we had eliminated a biggest threat so a need was down. Got beat upon by my people, but haven't heard serious repercussions. What shall we say to the press.

(Discussion of press questions.

34 Do you think Carb will survive?

P You just saw him, but I tend to
think not.

(P discussed yellow flag)

M I got criticism for not seeing yet sin.

Ⓟ we have same probs w/ time as you.

P What about Gorb?

M Where can he go? I don't see how he
can introduce reforms. Even if he could,
it will take years of painful doing good.
Neither of 2 alternatives ^{is any} look attractive
(reforms no military)

Schneidmiller.
I had dinner w/ ~~carb~~. He was
supportive of Carb. Said statement on
dictatorship didn't refer to Carb but
a overall sit.

P If ~~he~~ ^{Carb} could only do something on Baltis
his position in ~~a~~ would be ~~big~~.

M I approached him wrong. I should have
put it that way rather than saying
how much his Baltis moves were
hurting him. I ~~should~~ should do
that with him.

P I will do that as well

M Are you going to see him.

P Don't know when. Baker said
no prog on ~~the~~ arms control.

M We have our prob left over from
Thatcher. Carb + Econ Summit.
Having him for lunch just
before Sat.

P May I talk to Baker before I reply.
(Both were cool to idea)

M There is a ~~running~~ debate in EC
is a ~~second~~ defense role. What Dehars
& Mitterand want is a direct EC role
in defense. We are very negative
but it has a big head of steam. Kohl
is supporting it.

We have suggested increasing
the role in NATO but Carb

and keep integrated Cwd.

WEV. Kohl was supportive but in a cautious way. It would be useful if you could raise it w/ Kohl it would help greatly. Mitterand is beyond hope on this.

(Disunion of Mitterand
ruly.

M Mitterand can wrap Kohl around his little finger when he is at his ~~Delfie~~ Delfin best. I like Kohl & get along well w/ him, but he is no match for Mitterand.

P We sent a ~~document~~ ^{man} which Mitterand denounced.

CP We liked it.

P Trade. (Fast track explanatory)

M I hope fast track comes thru. We would like to finish Uruguay Rd this year. The agri reform & even more reform is worse than a mess we have now. A banana for a fish.

Dehro thinks I am a clown. The Censor needs to wing clipped badly. These 2 treaties - on leaves political union are disasters. I am trying to get ~~to~~ to Kohl to get him on my side.

P Dehro wants to be President

M Kohl says he won't make it. He

Too conservative for Fr left.

(Thatcher - Poll tax)

(Thatcher w/dramat poems - CNN inter-
view played badly.)

She doesn't like way I playing w/ a
Germans - she doesn't like Kohl. ^{Presently} ~~Evening~~
mostly is big pub. French want it
~~to~~ to tie Germany into Euro & Kohl wants
it to show Ger is a good Euro. It ^{is} ~~is~~
a bloody mess, but unified currency
& fed can't be done like yours. The
Russians aren't there. Bundesbank can
on it - Germans are brothers to want it.

(Discussion of Thatcher & party
politics)

I ~~can't~~ can't win, but it must be
done, but if it must be done tis better
it should be done quickly.

Thank you for S. Africa letter

P (Discussion of Mandela phone call).

I want to wear on sanctions as fast
as possible. This man deserves our
support.

M I agree completely. The EC is OK because
I know Kohl w/ me. Some countries are
reluctant. I trying to push a common-
wealth but not going too well.

Can you

P what else?

M One unpleasant thing. Hong Kong refugees. #1 are up 200 to + we can't hold a position much longer. It will blow back to Commons shortly & a lobby there is strong.

P we have had this for a repetition
What do you want?

M ^{freedom} ~~discretion~~ ⁱⁿ ~~repetition~~ ^{conditions}

S Is there any way we could leave a consensus but not object?

M I can't look at that

P We are taking such a risk w/ our core - sensitivities. We will look at it again

CP we have some new proposals.

M lets us get our people together.

P How is HK going

M Chinese are deeply suspicious. HK groups were deeply involved in aftermath of Tian. & PRC thinks we had to be involved. Also a new airport going up & they suspicious.

P we still have a China prob. MFX coming up soon & if long bills it a Chinese will become.

M HK may well be deconstituted.

P How about getting Hong Kongers over to talk to Norway Pelosi, etc.

* M We ~~can~~ ^{would} do it like a shot.

M ^{only} My other point is Colom + telecommunications
I worry about our collusion this issue
They ~~don't~~ don't know intel value
of delay & it is very important.

P All we can do?

S Yes; we are very close together on it.

Zolleik comes in to brief on Baker duty
w/ Gorb.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3/27/91

Florence -

Here is the MEMCON
for the President's one-on-one
with Wales, along with
the General's notes.

- Bob Hutchings

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: One-on-One Meeting with President Walesa of Poland (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Interpreter

Lech Walesa, President
Slawomir Siwek, Secretary of State
Michal Rozycki, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: March 20, 1991, 10:30 - 10:40 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Walesa: Poland is proceeding toward the West. It wants to be part of the West politically and economically. We must move carefully, but we will move persistently toward the West. Our reforms are becoming complicated, and I am discouraged. Communism lasted too long. It is too hard to change people. Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia have problems, too. Every factory which leaves the system wants to do something different. For example, car manufacturers no longer can get all the little parts they need. We also need foreign participation and financing. No formerly Communist country will rise without outside help. Our first need is debt relief; the second is participation. This is my introductory comment. (S)

The President: Are you moving on privatization? (S)

President Walesa: I can make things easier, but I can't replace cooperation. Cooperation is the only way we can make it. There is no other option. Our reforms are breaking up, as in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Our concepts are wrong. The West says to move deliberately, carefully. That isn't working. We must move broadly and completely. (S)

The President: We want to cooperate. We can talk more in the larger meeting. Let me ask you about the Soviet Union. I am accused of over-supporting Gorbachev, but I think he is the best guarantee against a military and KGB threat to Eastern Europe. I worry about the possibility of a return in the Soviet Union of a right-wing system. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-0288-MF
9/25/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

President Walesa: You are doing the right thing and doing it wisely. What I said about making cars in Poland is even more true in the Soviet Union. I am not sure all this can be done within a big country like the Soviet Union. I support Gorbachev, but I myself am in a bad economic situation. The most wisdom is in your approach. (C)

The President: Do you worry about the threat to Poland from a right-wing Soviet system? (S)

President Walesa: What I worry about is that reforms will break down, people will lose hope and then move west. The East European states are not producing. We really need cooperation. I want military cooperation, too, but not cooperation against someone. We would like F-16s and for your officers to train ours -- and our police, as well. We have broken off with the Soviets militarily and now we are lost. This is not against the Soviet Union or Germany, but we have to have something. (S)

The President: You will be talking to Baker this afternoon. Brent? (General discussion of military cooperation: the Poles are producing MiGs, which are junk, and tanks they don't know what to do with. Their factories are doing nothing. They can't simply close down the military industry, so they want our help to make this industry useful.) (S)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

P/Walesa 3/20/91

W Poland is proceeding ~~Toward~~
west, ~~W~~ must be part
of 1st pol & econ. ~~But~~
we must move carefully,
but we will move persistently
toward west. Our reforms are
becoming complicated &
are discouraged. Change
too long. It is too hard
to change people. You ^{know} have
problems. Every system which
leaves ^{system} ~~people~~ to do some-
thing diff. ^{for people} ~~Can~~ no longer
can get all the little parts.
We also need foreign participation
& financing. No east country
will rise w/o outside help.
First need is debt, 2nd is
participation. This is my
introductory comment.

P All you mentioning privatization
W I can make thing easier but
(2) I can't replace cooperatives
Cooperation is ~~only way we~~
can make it - no other option
Our reforms are heading up -
as in Yugo, Czech, Hungary. Our
concepts are wrong. West says

RH
all yours.
W

- more deliberately, carefully. That
isn't working. We must move
broadly & completely.
- P We want to coop. We can talk
more in a larger city.
Let me ask about S.V. I accused
of over-supporting Carb. I think
the best guarantee against
Milo & K&B threat to E.E.W.
I worry about possibility of a return
in S.V. of a right wing system.
- W You are doing a right thing
& doing it ~~carefully~~ ^{wisely}. What I
said about ~~trust~~ ^{making} in Poland is
even more true in S.V. I
not sure all this can be done
in a big country like S.V. I
support Carb. But I myself am
in ~~head~~ ^{head} even so. The most
wisdom is your approach.
- P Do you worry about threat
to Poland from right wing
system.
- W What I worry is repression will
break down, people will lose
help & then move west. The
E.E. states are not producing,
we really need coop.
I want not coop too. Not coop

Russian junk

Tanks

Factories
doing
3rd

against someone. We can't
produce mil equip either. Our
MiGs are worthless. We'd like
F-14 & your officers to train
ours - and police as well. We
have broken off w/c some
militarily & now we are lost.
This not against Sov Gov, but
we have to have something.

P You will be talking to Bakin
this afternoon. Brecht

(Discussion of mil equip)

They are producing MiGs which
are junk, tanks they don't know
what to do, factories doing
nothing. They can't simply
close mil. industry, so
they want our help to
make this industry useful.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Handwritten Memcon	Re: Beatrice Rangel (7 pp.)	3/26/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [5]

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91156-010
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Collins (Irish) (1 pp.)	3/13/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [5]

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Havel Phone Call (1 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [5]

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Handwritten Memcon	Re: Perez de Cuellar at Camp David (6 pp.)	1/5/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [5]

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91156-010
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT BUSH
AND BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR ON THE SECURE PHONE
CAMP DAVID

12:27 - 12:44 P.M. - SUNDAY, JANUARY 27, 1991

Prime Minister Major: I am feeling rather chipper. I had a conversation with my general in the Gulf who is very content with the way things are going.

The President: We feel the same. The press is beginning to say we miscalculated. Public opinion is okay. Yours?

Prime Minister Major: Fantastic. There are protests but they are pathetic. One worry is the oil slick. But if we can show it is Saddam Hussein and not us, that should solidify opinions.

The President: Yes, the evidence is conclusive. This man is mad. Saudi comments, "how can one Arab do this to another" are useful.

Prime Minister Major: I think we just make sure that our publics know that Saddam Hussein is responsible for the spill.

The President: Let me make a couple of points. Doing well on the Scuds. We have dropped some bridges and doing well on Royal Guards but it is hard to calculate damage on them. On the spill, we have hit the manifolds and hope that will help. On aircraft going to Iran, there are over 40 now. Iran says they will impound them.

Prime Minister Major: We wondered whether they were defecting or husbanding his forces. Our Charge in Iran was told they would impound, but he only mentioned the first seven. He also said pilots asked to be sent back. That is not consistent with their fleeing.

The President: I still think things are going well.

Prime Minister Major: May I just mention the Israelis. You have worked a miracle so far but I fear if they are hit with a chemical attack they will respond.

The President: They have shown restraint but it hasn't been easy. There are no deals, though they have floated some big bills. We are worried about the supply of patriots so we are stepping up our air attacks on Scuds. They came in with a number of demands, some of which we granted. I fear they are trying to tell us how to run the war. You have heard their plan, which we can't accept. We mentioned Jericho but that didn't seem to be attractive to them. Thank heavens for the Patriots.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-2401-MR
10/14/2015 MM

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~**TOP SECRET**~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

Prime Minister Major: We especially appreciate the kind words about the RAF. It is playing very well for us.

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~**TOP SECRET**~~

P/Major 1/27/91

- M I feel very rather chipper. Had conversation w/ my general in Gulf who is very confident w/ way things are going.
- P We feel the same. The press is beginning to say we muscled it. Public opinion is K. Yours?
- M Fantastic. There are protests but they are pathetic. One worry is oil slick. But if we can show it is S.H. & not us that should solidify opinions.
- P Yes, & evidence is conclusive. This man is used. Saudi Committee how can we do this to another is useful.
- M I think we just make sure that our public knows that S.H. is resp for the spill.
- P Let me make a couple of points. Doing well on Saudis. We have dropped some bridges & doing well on R. gears but it is hard to calculate damage on them. On a spill, we have hit a number of ligaments that will help. Left to know - over 40,000 tons & I don't say other, well represented.

M We wondered whether they were
deportees or husbanding his pros.
Our charge in Iran was told
they would respond, but he only
waited c. 1st '7. Also said
pilts asked to be sent back. That
note resistant w/ fleeing

P I still think they are going
well.

M May I just mention a I need.
You have worked a miracle so
far but I fear if they are hit
w/ a chemical attack they
will respond.

P # They have shown restraint
but it hasn't been easy. There
are no debts, that they have
floating some big bills. We
are worried about supply of
patrists so we are stepping up
our attacks on Secs. They
cannot in w/a # of demands,
some of which we granted. I
fear they ~~think~~ trying to tell us
how to run a war. You
have heard their place, which
we can't accept, we mentioned
Jericho but that didn't seem
attractive to them. I have

heavens for a Patriote
M We especially appreciate a
kind word about CRFF. It
is playing very well for us.

P/ Major 1/10/91

- P (Describes Boher - Aziz mtg)
PDQ going - That should be ok
- M I share your view about PDQ. It
will help keep a good team traveling.
The Arabs are very robust. They are
angry w/ Saddam & ready to go.
Fahd says a mid option is best.
Mubarak was breathing fire. Much
harder than I expected
Qatari was more restrained but robust
They are all angry w/ Jordan & a split
will take some time to heal.
- P I expect a traps are in good shape
- M Morale is very high. Understand their
mission & get warm reception. They
are ready + most want it to get under
way
- P I think your visit helped a long
while. Don't worry about that debate
I will do what I have to do, tho a
Cong temperature seems improving.
- M Cong relationships are excellent
Mubarak says he has spoken toughly
to Cong.
- P It has been very effective
- M One point on a ^{time} window. Our eds think
your gd trees won't be ready
before early to mid Feb.
- P (Describes Powell says it will be ok)

The big job is a revision which begins
on 15th. Our chief says it is manageable.
(Describes at length)

There certainly is a political impetus
for moving quickly. I shall just have
a word w/ Craig. I got Cabinet approval
to go just this morning.

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-2401-MR
10/14/2015 MM

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister John Major

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and
Deputy for National Security Affairs
Henry E. Cato, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Marlin Fitzwater

Prime Minister Major
Robin Butler
Charles Powell
Ambassador Antony Acland

DATE, TIME December 21, 1990, 5:00 p.m. - 6:15 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Let me just touch on PAN AM 103 as this is the second anniversary. We need to make clear that this crime has not been forgotten. We might mention it at the press session tomorrow. At first we thought Syria was responsible, now according to our intelligence, while the Syrians wanted to attack an American aircraft, their operations were rolled up, and the Libyans appear to have been responsible for PAN AM 103. When I met with Assad in Geneva he protested that he was being convicted for a crime he didn't do, and, in fact, the evidence doesn't point to him.

Charles Powell: The evidence, in fact, does point toward Libya. The suitcase and clothing from Malta and so on.

Robin Butler: In reconstructing the explosive device we found the timer, and it is the kind only used by libyans.

Charles Powell: The same thing was used in the plane crash in Chad.

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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Robin Butler: It's been a remarkable investigation.

The President: Let me report to you on a cable we have received from Shevardnadze's assistant Tarasenko. A cable that has been sent to Jim Baker. In the cable Shevardnadze regrets not being able to talk to Baker on the phone, but said that he had been exhausted and simply unable to discuss the events on the phone. He said he would call today or tomorrow. He said he would not have taken this step if the positive course in U.S./Soviet relations had not become irreversible. His successor will be constrained to follow the same course. He goes on that the personal relationship with Baker was important, and that he viewed the improvement in U.S./Soviet relations as the culmination of his career. He said he had a two hour talk with Gorbachev, in which the later refused his resignation. Then Shevardnadze told him it was final. He said he had made many sacrifices for perestroika including the resignation. He said his staying would be moral suicide. Gorbachev disagreed and insisted that he would not accept that resignation. Shevardnadze said he had insisted and would leave in a few days. Tarasenko concluded that he was convinced Shevardnadze's resolve was unshakable and that they would provide more details. The statement clearly was directed at Gorbachev, who had failed to support Shevardnadze fully of late.

Brent Scowcroft: Part of the problem is that the agreements Baker and Shevardnadze had reached are coming unstuck at home in the USSR. Gorbachev is not backing them. Shevardnadze seems to

EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY

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believe that Gorbachev is making himself hostage to the military oriented chauvinists. He feels a clampdown in the Baltics will affect foreign policy. He hopes his resignation will wake up the reformers.

Prime Minister Major: I asked Jim Baker if he had talked to Shevardnadze. Baker said that he thought that the first half of Shevardnadze's remarks to the Congress were encouraging, but that there was a disjunction between the first positive remarks and the second half which were more threatening.

Brent Scowcroft: In CFE we see ...

Prime Minister Major: Will his successor be proactive?

The President: We've set a date for the conclusion of the START Treaty. Gorbachev was interested in getting a date for the Summit locked in. We hope this will keep. I am concerned that it will affect the Gulf policy, but there's no sign of that yet. It's hard to see where we would go now, unless they would push for non-use of force. They might provide rhetorical support for delay. The Primakov line.

Prime Minister Major: Can they do that while looking to the West for economic help?

Governor Sununu: Our impression is that the Primakov trips were not quite free-lancing.

Prime Minister Major: He struck out in Baghdad.

The President: Let me raise this transfer of airline routes. I hope there won't be a legal problem and that you can let the two U.S. airlines take the place of two U.S. airlines. We had hoped

EYES ONLY ~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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to work to get the legal problems worked out. I wanted to call this to your attention because our airlines are in trouble. It is an important commercial matter.

Prime Minister Major: Are they officially talking at the moment?

Brent Scowcroft: PAN AM is having a short-term liquidity problem.

The President: What is your judgment on GATT. We had a long session with Carla Hills, a very able and tough negotiator.

Prime Minister Major: I met her the first day I was foreign Secretary. The bruises have healed.

The President: She knows her subject. I told her I had asked Kohl to be more forthcoming, but I am afraid I made no headway with Mitterrand.

Prime Minister Major: There was a long discussion of this at the EC meeting in Rome. There's a general recognition in the EC that the round was not well handled by either the EC or the Chair or the U.S. There were some personal bruising and the EC negotiators did not use all their negotiating room. The EC negotiators have 20 ministers sitting on their heads. In Rome, there was a recognition of the damage if there's no agreement. The dangers of protectionism and retaliation and damage to trade. There is a lengthy heated discussion about what to do. The heads want a settlement. Negotiators were told to go back and use the flexibility they have. Mitterrand was, with the support of the Irish, clearly digging his toes in, particularly the problem with agriculture. He is very miffed and worried. The rest of the EC

EYES ONLY ~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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was more amenable to compromise. It is important for the U.S. to move on several areas such as services, ceramics, textiles, and so on. If there is movement on these, there should be movement on agriculture from the EC. The fly in the ointment is Mitterrand. If he doesn't like the conclusions, he is prepared to veto. There's a lot of pressure on him not to do so. Kohl will help here. So the question is how to deal with Mitterrand and Kohl. It may be necessary for you to talk to them. If there is movement elsewhere, agreement is possible. Mitterrand thinks part of the problems of the round are driven by the U.S. fast track timing. He is illogical about it. Delors is more reasonable and understands the problem. Andriessen, but not McSherry, can be helpful. McSherry wants to be the Prime Minister of Ireland. It's a long convoluted story. The negotiators will go back. We're serious about an agreement, but it won't be easy.

The President: Well, we all have a domestic problem. Carla says we have shown flexibility on textiles and services. Maybe we should start from the Hellstrom text. I told Carla to go back and give the impression of flexibility. I have a big domestic problem on textiles. I barely sustained my veto. I am not sure we can be forthcoming on these without agriculture. We will try again. Should I talk to Mitterrand?

Prime Minister Major: Not yet. Only if we're near agreement. An early call is not helpful. Privately we might talk to Kohl and get him to talk to Mitterrand.

EYES ONLY ~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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The President: I did just that in Kohl's living room that after the election he might be helpful. We'll see.

Governor Sununu: The starting point in the round should be agriculture. We need to let the discussion go forward or this first hurdle will prevent us from finding a starting point.

Prime Minister Major: A starting point is not agreed. The negotiators instructions were not fully used. The personal relationships broke down, and it was not well chaired.

The President: Is the Hellstrom agreement a starting point.

Prime Minister Major: It was not discussed in Rome. A committee cannot negotiate. We have negotiators, let's let them negotiate. Let's just start. Go back and talk to Andriessen.

The President: What is your view of the EC generally. I try to look to the future and see how the U.S. will interact with the EC. We formalized bilateral meetings last year. We're not a member, and we don't want decisions affecting us presented as a fait accompli, such as the EBRD Bank. We'll keep trying. There may always be bumps in the road. There are differences in my own government.

Prime Minister Major: The last couple of years, there's been wind in the sails of the French and Germans. The whole idea of political union. Centralized government and decision making in the EC are not in the cards. There will be more coordination, but something short of these grand speeches. This coordination will be allied to economic and monetary union, but it does seem enthusiasm is slowing and the time table is looking different

EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY

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than before German unification. There seems to be a clearer eye now. The Germans attacked the monetary proposals at the Commission meeting. We're very optimistic. Reality seems to be breaking through and making an impact on the European countries. Your concern is the greater cohesion before the discussions with you, particularly on issues of defense and security.

The President: How will the EC cooperate with NATO? Where does NATO go? That is the discussion. Events are moving so fast that it's murky. We need to stay in close touch. There's some isolationist pressures here -- in the Gulf we've seen some fringe groups, but as the Germans move forward and there will be no Soviet troops, we may be asked just to pull back. We don't want to make a mistake, there are political issues here.

Prime Minister Major: I don't favor the EC having a defense role. There are neutrals in it, like Austria that make it inappropriate. There is enthusiasm for a bigger European defense involvement, including a bigger portion of cost, but knocking that into the WEU. There is no expressed hostility to NATO. My expectation is essentially that all want the U.S. to have a psychological and practical involvement in the defense of Europe. We do not share the grand ambitions of some for an EC defense role.

Governor Sununu: Are Soviet developments impacting on European defense thinking -- the retreat from euphoria about Gorbachev.

Prime Minister Major: I don't know. I haven't seen such a thing yet. They may be more cautious.

EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY

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Ambassador Acland: We've been sharing ideas on these issues with Gompert, Zoellick, and Reg Bartholomew. The Hurd speech in Berlin should not have caused you concern. The idea is to use the WEU in NATO to strengthen NATO as a bridge to the EC and would continue to do this. We would continue to deal with defense issues in NATO.

The President: That's the place to be. We can't see too far down the road with respect to the Germans. There's gratitude for our troops there now, but how about later. This may not be too far away. Well, we can't settle this here.

General Scowcroft: Our attraction to NATO is based on the fact that it is our institutional presence in Europe. It is the only way in which we can participate in European councils.

Prime Minister Major: I have some sense that in the post-Houston period there has been greater cohesion in the EC, but I wouldn't anticipate that thinking has gone very far on defense. There is no interest in a defense role for the EC. They'll talk a bit, but it won't come to much based on the discussions in Rome -- in terms of NATO.

The President: You saw Shamir.

Prime Minister Major: He was on his best behavior. I have no enthusiasm for seeing him at his worst. The principal element of discussion was the Gulf. We encouraged them to keep out, and it would be very unhelpful for them to become involved. Otherwise, we talked about economic issues such as the supply of oil. This

EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY

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was brushed aside without agreement. He mentioned the familiar line on the Arab/Israeli dispute and bilateral negotiations.

The President: It sounds like an overlay of our conversation; the tone was pleasant, but there are still differences. I told him we appreciate their low profile on the Gulf and that what we're doing is in their interest. I told him that if Israel was hit, we would retaliate. He shook me off and did not sign up to that. It will be difficult for them. The question is whether Saddam Hussein will seek to break the coalition by preempting against Israel. Generally on the Gulf, Shamir was supportive. Our Jewish community is upset with us on the UN Resolution, and they want more on the settlements.

Prime Minister Major: It is staggering how many immigrants are going there from the USSR.

The President: Most are drifting into the occupied territories.

Prime Minister Major: He made less of that.

The President: We long for the return of Labor.

Governor Sununu: In Israel.

Prime Minister Major: On South Africa we lifted the investment sanctions a short time ago, and the EC has lifted its ban. We hope to lift further sanctions in February if DeKlerk performs. The rationale is the self-evident need for investment in South Africa for stabilization. It has been quite a move. There is little opposition in Europe. It went extremely well. We hope to get more in March. It is important to recognize that DeKlerk has

EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY

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moved a great deal. If he is not seen to get something for what he has done, the right-wing problem will become pretty bad.

The President: I salute what you have done. We are pleased with what he has done. Mandela seems to be separating out himself. This is a good thing. He is much more moderate -- this is very important -- with DeKlerk. We are still constrained by our law on the political prisoners issue.

Prime Minister Major: We hope to revisit the sporting links. This is okay with the UK. As the UK, but not with the UK as head of the commonwealth.

The President: Sanctions are on investments, sporting, all kinds.

Prime Minister Major: Yes, on IMF and world bank lending.

Governor Sununu: Access would release informal pressure on domestic companies that are inhibited by pressure but not by law.

. . .

EYES ONLY

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P/T Thatcher 1/20/91

BKFST MTG

T Gorb was totally different than he was w/R! He'd done He had been in a grip of conservatives & couldn't get out.

Now he pleased w/ 9+1 and said "Constitution" would be ready soon.

Gorb has accepted federalism - not security.

P Incl. C. Baetis

T In a moment. Gorb has always said he supported private property but couldn't get it there SS.

Sachak is a real discovery. He is really for private property - wants people to be able to buy & sell

property. He says Corb
is against p.p.

I met w/ householders
Persin. But can't be
sold or traded. ~~It is~~
There is not for money
but Corb & a true
reformer - like Popo
& Sobachuk.

I didn't see Yeltzin
but he had come to
London earlier.

Yeltzin was decisively
He is a reformer &

p.p. man

I met 12 was a great
day for SU

F Election really helps
Corb as well - & / c
conservatives

T I saw Yazov &
Morseycov. Told them
I had heard talk

of a coop. I told them
don't think of it. They
both said no question
of mil coop. I don't
necessarily believe,
though but they can't
beat people power
at this point.

Wojciech ~~as~~ said
start would be
completed there.
would be a summit
I'm sorry about KGB.
Khrushch, say much
in charge.

I saw Baltic leaders.
Gorb talks about probs
of settling them free
(Keg Vilnius)

P (Discussion of hard Reg
vs Proushenko)

T Baltics that 9+1 completion
would help them

got free because Gorb
would be free of
domino fears.

I dismissed Gordinovsky
At dinner Reisa was
interesting. I always
thought she was more
conservative. The sphere
of her grandfather
during collectivization
being short.

There is great un-
certainty about 9+1
objective have really
is + what can & can't
be done. Some are just
pressing ahead but
most said uncertainty
& lack of credit was
a real dampener.

I spoke of a need for
independent judiciary &
rule of law. But

these people were not
servile.

P How should we play
a Gorb / Yeltsin thing.
I think Gorb is strong -
there's a right wing.

T Gorb's only hope of getting
there is to embrace
those elected.

They will need some
modest help - they
deserve it given the
attitudes they are
breaking down. Your
good people (Hein)
could teach them
worders w/ no money
from us at all.

They must learn
more about sanctity
of contracts.

Gorbachev said don't
give us aid except

w/ conditions

P ~~Hence~~ should we
treat Yeltsin. What
should we want &
papers to say w/o
hurting Coob. We
want to identify w/
Yeltsin but I still
have respect for
Coob

T This is a 1st elected
leader in Russian
history. We should
be prepared to help.
If we don't & it goes
bad we may have
missed a opportunity
of a century. But we
still must link help
to framework of reform.
The black economy is
huge. It can only
be dealt w/ by increasing

supply. The wretched
SS & apparatuses could
ruin everything if
they got a chance.

P Have we get them
to get them to stop
arms building.

T We must get them to
stop w/o undercutting
Gov. But we must
stay prepared & person
w/ SDI.

P Yeltsin is for efforts
but they go on building.

T We are entitled to
raise issues. Tell
them democrats don't
forget each other.

P It is big to help them
under such circum-
stances.

Everyone says Yeltsin
is damaged but he

supports & things we
stand for.

T I think Yeltsin will be
on his best behavior
this time.

P If Gorbachev left now, &
if Yeltsin were to have
press engagement w/
Yeltsin.

Clode is running. Basically
I will lift sanctions
as soon as conditions
permit.

Would you support
NFX for PRC?

T I do, in every public
comment I make. I
say you are absolutely
right.

P You could do much
w/our conservatives,
emphasizing Hong Kong

T PRC are doing so well

diplomatically & political
will follow.

T we can't let Carb down
He made it all possible
Now they should coop
on a next phase —
a new reform.

P [short discussion of
N Iraq, Kurds, etc)
(Moved to Oval
Office).

(short discussion of
G start & summit)

I would like to see Carb
before Summit to
save him embarrassment

T Maybe you can
see him before he
meets w/ a group

P That would be good.

P/Mozguitan 1/11/91

You have total support on
your policy up to Art 42
On sanctions - we have a
Time - Transition - Review for 40
yrs.

- Neither of these countries is sig.

- For us to be totally absorbed
seems ~~too~~ disproportionate

- E op when a SU is falling
apart.

- Vorontsov - He is good value. He
says 1/2 a Iraqi plane are not
much.

- I think you will win in a
Senate. If you do, Vorontsov
noted that Art 42 provides
for demeritisation never -

- Scotty Ruston - He not w/c present
policy. Carrots used to put out
white papers when they went
to work - To make their case

- On lines - You sign up to
be a member, you accept
what that means.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12a. Draft Telcon	Re: Presidential Phone Call to Prime Minister Shamir (2 pp.)	1/19/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [5]

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91156-010
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

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C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

P/ Gorbachev 1/11/91

- We have now a budget
 - Following an econ agreement
 - Will budget reduced about 2 bil ~~roubles~~
 - We are analyzing all articles in a budget & we have a breakthrough in our budget process
 - We need extraordinary measures to keep econ links bet a republics. That important & dif. incl food links.
 - Mtg w Fed Council tomorrow
 - Will pick new cabinet
 - Further steps on Union Treaty
 - There are 3 acute probs
 - Lithuania
 - Georgia
 - Karabakh
- Doing every thing possible to avoid radical steps but it is dif.
- I have a brief proposal

We are trying to intervene
only when there is
bloodshed & lives are
threatened.

I & Gen. Sora are under
pressure to intro
P. rule in Leth. So
far I have been able
to avoid that.

- SS of Leth & handbeis seem
incapable of constructive
movement. I asked them
to restore const. order but
no response. Today the
sit. is diff. -

My style is similar to yours.
Try to avoid moves which
make things worse & attempt
to ameliorate a part.

We will act responsibly, but
it doesn't depend solely on
us. Some shooting today.

- I'll do my best to draw
extremes - but if a
grave threat I will
do what is needed.

- Could -

- I think S H is seeking advice from me - that's the tone of his last letter.

- If I do something I want to coop closely w/ you.

- If you don't object I could send an survey

- if you think it would be useful

- I could ask Bess to tell you my ideas.

→

- why don't you look at Bess. ideas. If you don't object then I could send an emissary tonight.

OK. I understand your point on timing.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12c. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Shamir (3 pp.)	1/19/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [5]

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AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12d. Handwritten Post-It Notes	Re: From the Desk of George Bush (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [5]

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91156-010
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12e. Handwritten Notes	Re: Presidential Meeting (2 pp.)	1/10/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [5]

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0539-MR
SCS 6/28/13

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Jan-1990 13:06 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Diane L. Edwards
Florence E. Gantt

(EDWARDS)
(GANTT)

FROM: Douglas H. Paal
(PAAL)

SUBJECT: leniency

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chinese Ambassador Zhu Qizhen,
January 13, 1990

PARTICIPANTS: Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor
Robert M. Gates, Deputy National Security
Advisor
Douglas H. Paal, NSC, Notetaker

Ambassador Zhu Qizhen
Counselor Chen Mingming, Interpreter

DATE, TIME
AND PLACE: Saturday, January 13, 1990, 11:28 a.m.- 11:45
a.m. EST, West Wing

General Scowcroft and Ambassador briefly exchanged greetings.

Ambassador Zhu: I have been instructed to pass to you an oral message, and if I may, I will just read it: "We have stated on numerous occasions that those who merely participated in the turmoil and riots last June will not be punished. Even those who have pled guilty to crimes will be treated leniently."

"Following the June 4 incident, it was mainly the organizers, agitators and those who instigated the riots, as well as those who committed serious crimes such as beating, smashing and looting, who were detained by the Beijing municipal security authorities (prompting by Chen Mingming) in accordance with the law. Except for a very small number who were arrested and punished by law for serious offense, most have been and will be released in a spirit of leniency." The total number may well exceed 500, although we do not have the exact number, the number of those who have been and will be released.

(Continuing to read) "This is the full expression of our policy of leniency toward those who participated in the turmoil and riots. It is also an expression of China's political stability. Furthermore, it is another major step by the Chinese side to improve US-China relations. It will be made public at an appropriate time." I don't know when it will be made public.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

2

(Continuing to read) "We appreciate the reaction of the United States Government and President Bush himself toward the lifting of martial law. We regret and find unacceptable statements by some senior American officials and the US side's position that the US will continue to discourage World Bank industrial loans to China. We hope that your side will take further steps for restoring and developing US-China relations.

"According to various reports, Vice President Quayle advised a Japanese minister against resuming loans and improving relations with China. If true, this would be inconsistent with the repeatedly expressed desire in the statements of President Bush and the USG to improve and restore relations. We hope the US position will not deviate from the stated position." That is all I have to say.

General Scowcroft: This is another positive step, which the President will welcome very much. It is in the spirit of dialogue that we have begun. I am very much encouraged by this move on the part of your leaders. You have seen in the reaction to lifting martial law the emotion in the American public and the Congress.

I can assure you we have not deviated from the goal I spoke to your leaders about. Our sole objective is restoring relations and bringing about the visit by General Secretary Jiang Zemin, but we must move at a pace that pulls the Congress along.

I don't know what comments by Administration officials you

referred to. We view it positively. We will move as rapidly as we feel we can to pull the Congress along and not produce a negative reaction. On the loans, we have moved in a positive direction on basic human need loans. We will move on all loans as fast as we can to sustain support and not produce legislation that will affect the loans. We have to calculate the pace at which to move. We are very much determined to move.

As for the reported remarks by the Vice President, it is not my impression that he made any comment like that, but I will find out. We have been in close touch with the Japanese, well, since the day we left Beijing. We will encourage them to follow our lead.

Ambassador Zhu: If I may make a personal observation. Since you trip, there have been many positive steps by our side, for example, our restrained reaction on the Administration's actions regarding the Chinese students, resumption of the Fulbright program, approval for the Peace Corps, which we refer to as Friendship Volunteers -- this was by no means a small step -- accrediting a Voice of America correspondent, and lifting martial

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

law. Now we are offering leniency. Especially the latter two, they are China's internal affairs, but they are also major steps by our country to put relations with the US on track. The last time we met, I said that lifting martial law was not an easy step. I hope there will be a package solution. May we expect corresponding major steps will be taken by the American side?

General Scowcroft: You can be assured we will work in exactly just the same spirit you described. I am much more optimistic now. Now, if the two sides can come to successful resolution of the Fang issue, it is hard to predict, and the Congress is very difficult, but it will help a great deal.

Ambassador Zhu: On the Fang issue, as agreed in Beijing, this is an issue to be discussed with Ambassador Lilley.

General Scowcroft: I know. The discussions are fundamentally between Fang Lizhi and the Chinese government. We will move just as rapidly as we think is possible. Congress is out, and will be back on the 23rd. We need to calculate to move as fast as we possibly can, but at a rate which will not produce new sanctions. That is the sole restraint we have. I do believe you have responded in the spirit in which we discussed a package deal.

If I can add a small point, when you announce leniency, it would be good to couch it in positive terms. Do it with an eye to how it will be viewed by Congress.

Ambassador Zhu: Can I expect, because it is very unclear about the timetable from the American side on the sanctions, and hope that in the next few days time, you or Secretary Eagleburger can meet with me on a timetable for, for example, the FMS programs, exchanges of military visits, resumption of high level visits? What is generally your timetable on what will be done? I hope we can have some clarification.

General Scowcroft: On the World Bank, we have already moved. It is just a matter of the rate at which we move. We will get back to you. What we need is to calculate with the Congressional leadership how much freedom we will have. On some issues, we may not get back to you with precise answers, but we will get back to you and give estimates. I assure you we will move as rapidly as we can. I will call the President right away with this news. He is up at Camp David.

~~Thatcher~~ Nothing in ~~visit~~ which would
argue against going ahead

- Will support = P
- This not consultation

Take it or leave it

Decides a details in NATO

Point,

- CFE II will be resumed

Doesn't want II

- No further reductions

- Introduced as proposal in NATO

- Kohl must accept as for

- Continued presence of nucs
necessary ^{accepts} into FOTL

- Will assessment of mil int
in NATO

- Trident / S D, proceed US
stay in NATO

- Copy of what P will say in SOTC
- Prof to her that he hopes
to return this level +
will press Kohl to support
this level

T
can't
complain
Too much

When Europeans feel it is dangerous
to have nuclear arms in Europe

Mitterand

Positive if presented in right context

- # is compatible w/ mil sense
- Necessary to avoid *de facto* *vacuum* in Ger
- No decoupling from Europe

Pressing CFE to get it thru.
- Have about dropping helos!

- Kohl Mtg on 24 Feb (Sat)

- State authorization -

- ~~Gates~~ / KSE w/ Kohl 3 p.m. Tues

- LA Trip in Sept

through Australia after World Election

* Hans should not deal w/ Eur
EC/NATO/OSCE, etc.

(US at EC table - too big ~~complex~~)

Starence, this is the last set
of the General's notes we had.
We couldn't decipher them.

Nancy

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Son Prison
in Afghanistan

P / Kravchuk 8/1/91
1001

P Question of what msg this greeting
sent to Bob is measure. It is
simply friendship - a warm
& wonderful welcome. No
other msg to Bob

K Anywhere you go in US a
greeting would be a warm
because a people see a coop
bet US + SC in many fields
& receive it warmly. The
one question I get is when US
business will be integrated
into our economy. They know
a Americans know how to
work.

P That will be when small
business is attracted here. They
are a engine of prog - not
a giant corp.

K In agri production we top
a list in US but we
lose 30% in processing &
distribution

4 P We sent a group to see
business we do here.

K We should also think about
new readers. Moratorium
imposed w/ many 1/2 built.
But people have no faith

in nuc. We need US assist.

P We have considerable expertise. I believe nuc power can be safely used. How are practically exp div not sure but we have a expertise.

K We have Chernobyl. We very grateful for US help. We worry that IAEA said results not so bad as earlier that, but we still need help.

P Let us think of some practical way we can help. Who in charge of nuc energy.

K Nuc power production is administered from Moscow. We have have center for Chernobyl.

P Will he be present? Securus knows much about nuc power. Maybe they could ride together.

K Another prop is recovery of portion of Ukraine. I grateful you came for that reason. We are #2 Republic but don't think we are recog adequately. We will invest much in Union treaty. We need recovery of rights & aspirations after a Union Treaty.

K Yes, by US & all rich world.

No tape recording

P Yeltsin said a same thing - we understand + will be ready

K Otherwise no one will believe in a Union Treaty. While now - SS passes lots of laws but no one accepts them. We must have a reality of change.

P We will accept whatever is worked out. We don't want to dictate or interfere in your internal affairs. Maybe you could glance at my speech.

K Most Ukrainians walk a center line as well, but there are extremes on both sides.

But they may be asking for it separately, as a sign of sovereignty

MRP now
will apply to
all sov.
unions?

Yes