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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memorandum of Conversations/Telephone Conversations Files

OA/ID Number: 91156
Folder ID Number: 91156-008

Folder Title:
Memcons/Telcons (January-December) 1991 [3]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	7	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Sir Anerood Jugnauth, Prime Minister of Mauritius (2 pp.)	6/5/91	(b)(1)	C
01b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Jugnauth (3 pp.)	6/5/91	(b)(1)	
02. Handwritten Notes	Re: Pico (2 pp.)	8/7/91	(b)(1)	
03a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR (3 pp.)	7/17/91	(b)(1)	S
03b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Gorbachev (6 pp.)	7/17/91	(b)(1)	
03c. Draft Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Gorbachev of the USSR (3 pp.)	7/17/91	(b)(1)	S
04a. Memcon	Re: Three-on-Three Meeting with President Mikhail Gorbachev (8 pp.)	7/31/91	(b)(1)	S
04b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Gorbachev 3-on-3 (13 pp.)	7/31/91	(b)(1)	
05a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France on July 14, 1991 (5 pp.)	7/14/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1298
OA/ID Number: 91156-008
Date Closed: 8/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Mitterrand (10 pp.)	7/14/91	(b)(1)	
06a. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Karamaulis [sic] (6 pp.)	7/18/91	(b)(1)	
06b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Mitsotakis (7 pp.)	7/18/91	(b)(1)	
07. Memcon	Re: Three-on-Three Meeting with President Mikhail Gorbachev (8 pp.)	7/31/91	(b)(1)	S
08. Memcon	Re: Final Plenary (4 pp.)	7/17/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Sir Anerood Jugnauth, Prime Minister of Mauritius

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor

Sir Anerood Jugnauth, Prime Minister

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 5, 1991, 11:00 - 11:15 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President and Prime Minister Jugnauth met briefly in the Oval Office and proceeded to the Cabinet for the Plenary Session.

Prime Minister Jugnauth: There are a couple of things I would prefer to discuss here. (U)

First, thank you. It is a great honor for me and my country. (U)

The President: I am pleased to have you here. (U)

Prime Minister Jugnauth: The first item is the Chagos Islands. The Brits acted accordingly on these. However, it is a fact that BIDT was created. We will claim it. The UK has written that a territory will be returned whenever it is not needed for the defense of the west. ~~(C)~~

The President: (Looks at the Atlas.) (U)

Prime Minister Jugnauth: There has been a problem with civil aviation and military aircraft not notifying. That now is solved. We now are expanding our civil aviation. If there is an emergency, we would like permission to land at the base. ~~(C)~~

The President: Brent, will you check on this? (U)

Prime Minister Jugnauth: Next we would like the use of one of the Chagos Islands far from Diego. We want to put a cold storage plant there for the fishing industry. ~~(C)~~

The President: How does Great Britain feel? ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Jugnauth: They don't have a problem with it in principle, exploiting our own natural resources. ~~(C)~~

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2000-0429-F
8/21/2009 MM

The President: Let me check on it. (U)

Prime Minister Jugnauth: As far as use by the U.S., we have no problem. During the Gulf War, there were some groups as in my country. We have a lot of Muslims, who are basically pro-Saddam. (C)

The President: Is there good commercial fishing? (U)

Prime Minister Jugnauth: Yes. The northern islands are very rich in fish. We are just beginning to exploit them in a big way. (U)

Second point, I wanted to mention is my people hope this visit will result in tangible results. (C)

The President: Like what? (U)

Prime Minister Jugnauth: We were in a different position several years ago. Now we have good economic progress but still we have our problems. Our roads are badly congested. We would like to build a light railway. (C)

The President: Isn't that expensive? (U)

Prime Minister Jugnauth: Yes, and we would like more help. (C)

The President: What would that cost? (U)

Prime Minister Jugnauth: $300,000,000 (U)

The President: I don't know right now what we can do, but we will look into it. Does it have to be government owned? (C)

Prime Minister Jugnauth: We plan it that way but not necessarily. (U)

The President: Privatizing might attract workers. Have you asked World Bank? (C)

Prime Minister Jugnauth: Yes. (A bit of a vague answer!) (U)

The President: We will get right on it. (U)

Prime Minister Jugnauth: It would take three years to build. (U)

The President: Shall we continue this conversation next door? (U)

-- End of Conversation --

P/Jugnauth 6/5/91

J A couple of things I would propose to discuss here.
First, thank you - It is a great honor for me & my country.

P I am pleased to learn your views

J The first item is a thing to do. The Brits acted wrongly on three Hundred, it is a fact that BIOT was created. We still claim it. U.K. has written that territory will be returned whenever it not used for Def. & US.

P (looks at atlas)

J There has been a problem of illegal emigration & misdeeds not notifying That now solved.
We now expanding our civil aviation. If there is an emergency we would like permission to land at base.

P Brent, would you check

J Next we would like use of one of the Islands for from Diego. We want to put a cold storage plant there for fishing industry.

P How do G/B's feel?

J They don't like a precedent on principle, exploding our

natural resources.

P Let me check on it.

J ~~Since~~ As far as we by the U.S. we had no prob. During the Gulf, there were some groups + as in my country. We have lots of Muslims who are basically pro Saddam.

P Is there good cultural feeling?

J Yes. The northern Islands are very rich in fish. We are just beginning to exploit in a big way.

2nd point I wanted to mention is my people hope this visit will result in tangible results.

P Like what?

J We were in dif position several yrs ago. Now we have ~~cash~~ trade prog. but still prob. Our roads are badly congested. We would like to build a light rail way.

P Quite right expensive?

J Yes, and we would like some help.

P What would be cost.

J 300 mil U.S.

P I don't know right now what we can do, but we will look into it. Does it have to be govt

owned?

J We plan it that way but not necessary

P Privatizing might attract investors Have you asked World Bank?

J Yes. (a bit vague in answer)

R We will get right on it.

J It would take 3 yrs or so to build.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 30, 1991

Florence,

Finally, here is the version that we were able to assemble from the General's notes for Prime Minister Jugnauth's One-on-One session on June 5.

I completed it as soon as I got it, however, Bob didn't focus on it and left it for Walter and I to do final edits.

I hope that it is all right!

Norma

Pico 8-7-91

- Only ones who could help was Iranian Govt
  - Nobody in Beirut
    CBS Fadlallah / Hezb.
- Totally Iranian run op -
  even logistics
  (Beirut)
- Iranian Govt run op - much more important than people know
  - Direct line to Rafs.

June - Extraand House - They give up hostages up front but they have insurance till Obed comes back. (Pico to have insurance)
Vrazi / Carezzi June in Can only help w/ hostages - 6 US - 3 GB. Can't w/ Gen. Never have seen Italian don't know where he is.
Have 2 Israeli bodies - don't have R's dead.
- Montesinos has nothing to do w/ Adams any more.
- We prepared to deal w/ except to deal w/ C7, C2, + prisoners held by I.
Pico said this 2 year old proposal. Must do something up front.

Cindy à - Mother N.Y. | 212 888-0852
Saturday evening 1900

They said prepared to accept any procedure - including (Dramamine) those Price put forth (insurance)

Not even those see those steps (so Price or someone else can).

Check w/ U.S. Do those accept anything or which one can bring along those details.
- All comes down to Rudrd. It has to be dual dressed scrubbers.
  - We could release those steps & those 2 bolts + get Israeli pioneer back.

Make them statements of fact thy can discuss.

What is our reaction.

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Meeting with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President James A. Baker III, Secretary of State John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Interpreter Mikhail Gorbachev, President of USSR Alexander Bessmertnykh, Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoliy Chernyaev, Assistant to President Gorbachev Interpreter
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	July 17, 1991 Winfield House, London

President Bush: Welcome. We will talk here and then alone for a few minutes or so. We don't have much time. (U)

President Gorbachev: In this day and age that is a lot. (U)

President Bush: Thank you for sending Bessmertnykh and Moiseyev to meet on START. I worried about Yeltsin. He behaved very well but I didn't want you to think I was shifting away from you. ~~(S)~~

President Gorbachev: Very glad to see you all. We have accomplished a lot. We have, I think, convinced all that we are true to our word. I know you are a very substantive man. That means when you make a decision----------. What kind of Soviet Union does the U.S. want to see? I think no final answer to that question has been given. Until it is, we will have to do a lot of marking time, waiting on specific issues. Time is precious for us. Two months ago our Security Council debated whether the U.S. had changed its position. We were going through a serious phase two months ago. The two members of the Security Council sitting with me here can confirm I said we need a healthy, strong, country. Not everyone likes our evolving relationship and my policy, but the big majority do. Even if you get doubts, I will fight at home and in the U.S. to preserve this kind of relationship. So I hope on a question whether the U.S. wants to see a strong, healthy Soviet Union, you will answer as we have.

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We want more -- on each other. This G-7 meeting is a good place to state that. I think a great deal will depend on your attitude. (S)

In the Soviet Union, we have come a long way toward democracy. Just a short time ago we didn't have strong support for our approach, but now we do. We have also converted defense industries, developed leaseholders, and privatization. We now have over 1000 civilian banks, 40,000 individual farms. Privatization is on its way. Even defense related companies are becoming stock companies. We are about to adopt a big package of business related legislation. We have made a final choice and must move fast. So, what is my friend George Bush going to do? What does he want? And when we meet with other colleagues, will they say we like what you're doing? And what about afterwards? Will we just boil in our own soup--it will be ---- soup. It's strange to me to find $100 billion for a regional war but not to make the Soviet Union a new country. We need mutual understanding -- reciprocating steps. We will press on to extract ourselves, but we need a new kind of cooperation and economic understanding as you mentioned in your letter. The world is in transition to a new order and needs the U.S.-USSR cooperation. (S)

Sometimes Europeans worry about U.S.-USSR engagement, but not this time. (S)

Perestroika we need and will do. But in our transition, if we have concurrent effort at critical points...it is not just money. We have still a two-tiered economy...it is a political push. That is my piece. (S)

President Bush: I feel frustrated that your Security Council has to meet and wonder about what kind of Soviet Union we seek. We seek a democratic market-oriented, economy integrated into the world economy, the resolution of problems between the center and republics -- essential for capital flow. And cooperation on major global issues. I know your historical relations with Iraq and appreciate the bold decisions you're making on the Gulf. The rest is philosophical. People ask me who is the enemy? I want the American people to say the Soviet Union is not the enemy. I still think I must sell you on that ( ). To a degree your people feel encircled and we feel missiles aimed at New York will fail. So my final point is to reduce the level of suspicion. One practical problem is we see your modernizing your missiles. That is ---------- by what you have done in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The sixth point is cooperation on regional issues (I don't consider Iraq regional). I mean the peace process, Angola, etc. I want that unprecedented kind of cooperation to continue. We don't seek economic catastrophe in the Soviet Union. What do you mean by political push? I want to look at everything in light of U.S. interests -- and your success is one of them. If I have projected something different, I apologize. (S)

President Gorbachev: Then how should we enter the G-7? (S)

President Bush: You don't yet have a market economy, etcetera. You need our technical advice to help to aid in your integration into the world economy. You need a political push. (S)

President Gorbachev: And a mechanism to implement it. (S)

President Bush: Yes. I will work with G-7 colleagues to make it work. The best thing you could do politically is cut loose the Baltics. Cuba, we don't have time to discuss. But these are minor -- they would just facilitate defense conversion. George Mitchell and base reduction (??) (S)

President Gorbachev: We have our George Mitchells. We know to reduce defense, but avoid hurting. We have reduced the defense budget 29 percent. One defense industry was the best of everything in it -- and we have the army. We must do it all carefully. (S)

President Bush: You are walking a tightrope. (S)

President Gorbachev: The Soviet Jewish community is strongly against. So for now, all we can do is open it up for all. (S)

President Bush: Arafat . . . (S)

President Gorbachev: We will work with Arafat, ----------, ----------. (S)

Mayor Popov raised questions of our American University in Moscow. Let's work it out. (U)

Summit, 31 July to 1 August? (U)

President Bush: How about on 31 July? (S)

-- End of Conversation --

Notes 1

P/Gorbachev 7/17/91

P Welcome... We will talk here & then alone for 5 minutes or so. We don't have much time

G In this day & age that's a lot

P Thank you for sending B + Moiseyev to meet on Start

I worried about Yeltsin. He behaved very well but I detect a current in that I sense shifting away from me.

G Very glad to see you all. We have accomplished a lot. We have I think convinced all that we are true to our word. I know you are a very obstinate man. That means when you make a decision you are very careful. What kind of S U does U S want to see? I think no final answer to that question has been given. Until it is we will have to do a lot of marking time, waiting on specific issues. That is precious for us. 2 months ago on security council debated the U S had changed its position.

relationship.

We were going through serious phase 2 mos. ago. The 2 members of SC sitting with me here can confirm. I said we need a healthy strong DC-US relationship. Not everyone likes our evolving relationship & my policy, but big majority do. Even if you get defeated, I will fight to prove & win US to preserve this kind of relationship. So I hope on question of whether US wants to see a strong healthy SC, you will answer as we have. We must rely on each other. This G-7 mtg is a good place to state that. I think apart deal will depend on your attitude.

In SC, we have a very very Toxic democracy. Just a short time ago we didn't have strong support for our approach but now we do. We have also developed coop w/ key industries, developed coop w/ Leasehold, privatization. We now have over 1,000 civil & banks, 40,000 individual farms! Privatization is on its way. Even defense related companies are becoming

stocks
stock companies. We are about to adopt big package of business related legislation. We have made? crucial choice & must move fast. must
So, what is my friend GB going to do? What does he want? And when we meet w/ other colleagues will they say we like what you're doing? And what about afterwards will we just boil in our own soup — it will be common soup. It is strange to me to find, too bad for regional cooperation but not to make SC a new country. We need mutual understanding & reciprocating steps. We will preserve & strengthen ourselves but we need a new kind of coop & less misunderstanding your continued mentioned in-goers-outers. The world is in transition to a new order & needs US-SC coop.
Sometimes European worry about SC-US engagement but not this time.
Perestroika we need & welcome. But in our transition if we have concurrent effort at critical points

CRITICAL POINTS

2-tier real

... it not just $, we have a tiered economy, it is political push. That is my piece frustrated?

7 2 feel frustrated! that your SC has to meet & consider about S and seek. We seek democratic, market oriented, w/ economy integrated into world economy, resolution of prob lict. center & republics - essential for capital flow. And coop on major global issues. 2 hope (relation?) your historical relations w/ Iraq & appreciate bold decision you made on Gulf. The last is philosophical. People ask me who is enemy? I want them people to say SC is not enemy. 2 still think 2 must tell you on that (map w/ blue flap). To degree some people feel encircled & we feel missiles aimed at NY we fail. So my third point is to reduce level of suspicion. One practical pt is we see you modernizing your missiles. That is strategic key what you have in US & EE ex. 6th point is coop

consider

or regional crises (I don't consider
Iraq ~~Iraq~~ regional). I mean peace
process, Angola etc. I cannot think
unprecedented kind of cuts to
continue. We don't seek Economic
catastrophe in S.U. What do you
mean by political push? I must
look at everything in light of US
interests - and your success
of them. If I have projected some-
thing dif, I apologize

G Then Iran should we end G-7

P ~~We~~ You don't get Iran a
market economy, etc. You need
our technical advice & help to aid
in your integration into world
economy. You need a political

AND push? push?

G push & mechanism to implement
it.

P Yes. I will work w/ G-7 colleagues
to make it work. The last
thing you should do politically
is cut loose a Baltics. Cuba -
don't have time to discuss. But
those are minor - they would
just jeopardize. D of conversion
George Mitchell & base relations

G We have our. George Mitchell

We want to reduce deficit — but avoid a melting. We have reduced deficit 2 % p.a. One day university has all (best) of everything in it — + we have a army. We must do it all carefully.

P You are making a tightrope

G ~~I hope you don't~~

+ intellectually blind . . .

B Our Jewish community is strongly against. So for now all we can do is open it up for all.

P Accept . . .

G We will work up / Accept, Egypt, Poles.

Major Popov raised question of an Arab University in Morocco. Let's work on it.

Summit, 31 July + / Aug?

B How about 31 July.

BW - Tues to meet before 15 August

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Interpreter ——— Sumner

Mikhail Gorbachev, President of USSR
Interpreter ——— Bessmertnykh
Anatoliy Chernyaev, Assistant to Pres. Gorbachev

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 17, 1991
~~Oval Office~~ Winfield House, London

President Bush: Welcome. We will talk here and then alone for a few minutes or so. We don't have much time. (U)

President Gorbachev: In this day and age that is a lot. (U)

President Bush: Thank you for sending Bessmertnykh and Moiseyev to meet on START. I worried about Yeltsin. He behaved very well but I didn't want you to think I was shifting away from you. ~~(S)~~

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9/4/2007 MM

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Sometimes Europeans worry about U.S.-USSR engagement, but not this time. (S)

Perestroika we need and will do. But in our transition, if we have concurrent effort at critical points...it is not just money. We have still a two-tiered economy...it is a political push. That is my piece. (S)

President Bush: I feel ~~-----~~ frustrated that your ~~Security Council~~ Security Council Soviet Union has to meet and wonder about ~~(?)~~ what kind of ~~the~~ Soviet Union we seek. We seek a democratic market-oriented, economy integrated into the world economy, the resolution of problems between the ~~but~~ center and republics -- essential for capital flow. And cooperation on major global issues. I know your historical relations with Iraq and appreciate the bold decisions you're making on the Gulf. The rest is philosophical. People ask me who is the enemy? I want the American people to say the Soviet Union is not the enemy. I still think I must sell you on that ( ). To a degree your people feel encircled and we feel missiles aimed at New York will fail. So my final point is to reduce the level of suspicion. One practical problem is we see your modernizing your missiles. That is ---------- by what you have done in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The sixth point is cooperation on regional issues (I don't consider Iraq regional). I mean the peace process, Angola, etc. I want that unprecedented kind of cooperation to continue. We don't seek economic catastrophe in the Soviet Union. What do you mean by political push? I want to look at everything in light of U.S. interests -- and your success is one of them. If I have projected something different, I apologize. (S)

President Gorbachev: Then how should we enter the G-7? (S)

President Bush: You don't yet have a market economy, etcetera. You need our technical advice to help to aid in your integration into the world economy. You need a political push. (S)

President Gorbachev: And a mechanism to implement it. (S)

President Bush: Yes. I will work with G-7 colleagues to make it work. The best thing you could do politically is cut loose the Baltics. Cuba, we don't have time to discuss. But these are minor -- they would just facilitate defense conversion. George Mitchell and base reduction (??) (S)

President Gorbachev: We have our George Mitchells. We know to reduce defense, but avoid hurting. We have reduced the defense budget 29 percent. One defense industry was the best of everything in it -- and we have the army. We must do it all carefully. (S)

President Bush: You are walking a tightrope. (S)

President Gorbachev: The Soviet Jewish community is strongly against. So for now, all we can do is open it up for all. (S)

President Bush: Arafat . . . (S)

President Gorbachev: We will work with Arafat, ----------, ----------. (S)

Mayor Popov raised questions of our American University in Moscow. Let's work it out. (U)

Summit, 31 July to 1 August? (U)

President Bush: How about on 31 July? (S)

-- End of Conversation --

G:PC303

- Please spell check
- Check with Mary to get series rescheduled for this meeting.
- Participants P/Baker/BS g/Chenaye/Bennett
- ask Florence if she can fill in "????", white out and mark in Blue or this.

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

~~SECRET~~

Limited Access

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Three-on-Three Meeting With President Mikhail Gorbachev

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the USSR
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoliy Chernyaev, Foreign Affairs Advisor

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 31, 1991, 10:55am - 2:55pm
Novo-Ogarevo, USSR

President Gorbachev: I want to welcome you in this very Russian setting. This is a landmark -- where the Russian spirit resides. (Kohl said he felt he was in a Cathedral) (U)

The President: What shall we talk about? (U)

President Gorbachev: Jim and Alexander have had discussions. Perhaps we should hear from them. Let me refer again to my basic theme. While there have been big gains in politics in recent years, there are problems still to which we must give attention. Our relationship now allows us to channel these problems in desirable directions. The things which have worked in our relationship should be developed. (Ø)

Also, we are still developing new approaches and new concepts of strategic stability. In the past strategic stability used to relate only to military aspects of [the relationship]. Now it should be different. This is a new situation. We no longer think in terms of power relationship and confrontation, which gives us a broadened perspective. Looking especially at Europe, there is considerable stability, and we should keep this in mind. Both ethnic and religious elements are newly important. (Ø)

It is very important to stimulate the democratic nature of the changes taking place. Authoritarianism is gradually departing. Our actions are stimulating this movement. (Ø)

The President: Exactly. (U)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0532-MR
EJ 4/16/15

President Gorbachev: The question is how to keep these processes along the right lines, and not let them become dangerous. Some of these have far-reaching implications, and we should discuss [them]. We can't avoid seeing new centers of power developing. Europe is unifying. Nordic, Eastern Europe would like to enter it. If we don't combine this with the CSCE process, we will miss something important. If we don't, we will see a European center which will create problems for overall European integration. We need overall Europe which will let us solve many problems. (S)

We have done good work together in Africa. We should think about what is next -- like South Africa. We shouldn't do separate things at cross purposes, but work together. Also we must bear in mind the factors of China and India. They are preparing initiatives with ????? They are ancient nations, seeking a breakthrough in ?????? life(?). So far we both have had responsible attitudes towards China -- no China card. (S)

The President: I agree. (U)

President Gorbachev: We will not allow any policy which would distort the strategic balance. We would welcome your China relations returning to normal. I was there during student problems. I was in the soup, but played it cool. I was sorry for what happened to Zhao Ziyang. He provided balance. I told ???? ??? PRC had entered a new road which would not be easy. The student response was generally negative. (S)

Jiang Zemin (?) came here recently. He told me of a talk with Carter, who lectured him on human rights. He told Jimmy, "...we are lucky to be able to feed and clothe one billion people." Why raise this? Because China is special. (C)

Another point. Baker recently went to ASEAN. Another symbol of the ????? The impressions of our people at that meeting were that many countries in the region are concerned over the economic expansion of Japan. [One hears terms like] Japanese Empire. They believe at the end the Japanese won't be content with simply economic power, but will want military power as well. It will continue to cooperate with the U.S. military, but take advantage of it for its own purposes. (S)

But that's not all. THe problems of resources, water resources, environment, population explosion. What is the role of our two countries in this changing world and how to build our relationship? (C)

I conclude that our decisions about reform are correct. Tactically, I conclude we should ???? ? ???? to move into a period of stability. There will be no ideological constraints or dogma restricting me in how to move. Problems of our state and building the economy and top priority. U.S. leaders can be our judges. (C)

[Gap- notetaker leaves for a moment]

The President: In this changing world, we feel comfortable with a strong, economically powerful, changed Soviet Union. We are more confident of your intentions and knowing how to get where you want to go than when we came. We are confident of your desire to be a useful participant in this changing world. Your intent to change, but without chaos, is something we are very comfortable with. (C)

Your ??? ??? with Europe. We may have emerging problems with Europe, but will stay involved. We will stay with CSCE process. We tell Europe we want in on T.O., not just ???. (C)

On Africa, any moves you make toward de Klerk would be good. Mandela is in a time warp, and the ANC is behind changes in the world. Mandela salutes Castro, Khadafi. If you can bring him into the real world -- that is all to the good. I am convinced de Klerk is trying to do real things and should be supported. (C)

I, too, worry about S. Asia, also about keeping things on an even keel with the PRC. Feelings on Taiwan are still strong. We won't try to play the China Card. I will keep contact and try to help them move forward. We will barely succeed on MFN. (C)

On India and China, I would hope the Soviet Union could work on India on nukes with respect to Pakistan. Pakistan has lied to us, but they have a point. India won't talk with them about it. (S)

President Gorbachev: India asks us if Pakistan has a bomb? (S)

The President: I think not, but they lied to us about pursuing it. (S)

Secretary Baker: India is holding out on the 5-point initiative. (S)

President Gorbachev: We can discuss specifics a little later. (C)

The President: There is concern in Asia about Japanese imperialism. We haven't worried much about that yet. It would help if you could work out the northern territories. There is a lot of anti-Japanese feeling in the U.S. If you could engage with their economy, it would discourage militarism. (S)

These are just a few points. But we are confident of your intentions. We see your problems in the way Yel'tsin conducted himself at dinner last night. We want to interact on your reforms to be more helpful. (C)

President Gorbachev: Our thinking goes basically in the same direction. How should we build our relationship from this

analysis? Let's turn to specific areas and start with Alex and Jim. (C)

Secretary Baker: ASEAN worries not only about Japan, but China and India. I don't have a sense the Japanese are interested in a military role. ASEAN sees our security relationship with Japan as a way to restrain them. Like U.S. forces in Europe constraining Germany. (S)

President Gorbachev: Let's discuss the interaction in the Gulf, Middle East, and Arms Control and proliferation.. With arms reductions, the pressure to sell arms abroad grows. Also Yugoslavia. (S)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: On the basis of the June 1990 communique we agreed the Defense and Space Talks would resume September 30. These talks would continue on the basis of the mandate of 1985. We agreed tentatively that arms control consultations should start in early October. (S)

President Gorbachev: We believe this is important because it lays down the next steps. (C)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: One small point in phasing down of Soviet heavy missiles. The U.S. wanted a statement offering that in a letter that has a legally binding effect. This is our intent. (S)

President Gorbachev: Did you discuss how to deal with other members of the nuclear club? Should our approach change? (S)

Secretary Baker: No. (U)

President Gorbachev: We should discuss at the foreign minister level or at consultations. (C)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: In other areas of arms control: couldn't we set a date for the resumption of nuclear testing talks? We wanted to wait for results of TTBT. We raised ?????? in E ???, but the U.S. insists it is first discussed within NATO. (S)

We discussed BW in light of the exchange of letters and agreed to meeting of experts. We would like a Soviet visit immediately following the meeting of experts. Also, would like the experts meeting before the US says it is possible. (S)

The President: These meetings are very important. We have a big difference on this and we must get to the bottom of it. This is the way to do it. (S)

President Gorbachev: We want total clarity and to be totally honest on this. When the U.S. experts come, let's have the same group so we don't have to start over again. (S)

General Scowcroft: We will make sure at least some will be the same. (S)

President Gorbachev: We would like the U.S. to ??? the date for our visit to the U.S. (S)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: On arms control, the U.S. proposed two working groups -- deterrence and predictability to identify a possible U.S. and Soviet role. The second looks at aspects of proliferation, WMD and nuclear technology. (S)

President Gorbachev: I support it. (S)

The President: OK. (U)

Secretary Baker: Also importance of trying to conclude CW this year. We made new proposals on challenge inspections. Down only to this issue. One problem is to deal with your problems on CW destruction. (S)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: We are closer to a convention on CW. U.S. has abandoned some of its positions. We will focus on challenge inspections. We wanted universal inspection rights, bur are examining the U.S. proposal. (S)

President Gorbachev: I have approved the proposal on CW destruction and the Cabinet is discussing it. There is a problem on sites and dates by which this must be completed. We have a young democracy. Our "Greens" have forced us to close 1300 factories. One of these made parts for the whole country. So where to put it is a big problem. (S)

The President: We took ours to Johnston Island, and all hell broke loose. (S)

Secretary Baker: There are three other issues: We should conclude the Open Skies Agreement. We agreed to work bilaterally on this. (S)

Two, We need to complete the CFE Treaty by March of 1992 if possible, that being the date of the Helsinki Conference. (S)

Three, you have sent a summary letter leaving out the question of SS 23's in Eastern Europe, which is now a political issue. You have provided it in a very difficult way. (S)

President Gorbachev: OK. (U)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: We have begun moving on Open Skies. Our positions are getting closer. We have received the NATO suggestions. We have prepared a response, which is awaiting Gorbachev's approval. (S)

Things are moving well on CFE 1A. (S)

We have prepared materials on the SS-23 and will provide it before you leave. (S)

President Gorbachev: What about the Middle East? (S)

Secretary Baker: This is an area you can point to as a partnership -- not just cooperation. We both have been working hard and that is the reason for the present possibilities. There are still many hurdles ahead. (S)

I just concluded a talk with Shamir. He seems to have accepted our approach. There will probably be qualifiers: Knesset approval, Palestinian representation, assurances from the U.S., a promise not to move the process into the UNSC. We -- as you probably know -- have been asked for assurances to Palestinians. We won't change our policy positions and we cannot. The President has asked me to go to Israel tomorrow to try to get Shamir to accept our proposal. (S)

President Gorbachev: Arafat sent ma a letter. It has six points. (S)

Secretary Baker: We have been asked the same. Each side wants a guaranteed outcome. We can't do that. We have worked out a statement for the President. (S)

The President: Would you tell us how you see Arafat now? (S)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: I met with him two months ago. There are differences within the PLO Executive. It is true that Arafat's position is weaker, but without him the PLO won't take a position. (S)

Secretary Baker: To get Israel to the table we must agree on transition arrangements, that East Jerusalem won't be represented, and the PLO cannot sit at the table. They can call the shots, but from the background. (S)

We're building a number of links for the Palestinians to make obvious that they are not abandoning their claim to East Jerusalem. If Jerusalem gets up front, the peace process is dead. (S)

President Gorbachev: The press will try to draw us out and separate us. (S)

Secretary Baker: Correct. You can say you are engaged jointly on the peace process and won't be drawn out on Palestinian issues. (S)

President Gorbachev: We can say this paper is our position. The process will lead to a just and comprehensive peace. (S)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: Just a word on the conference itself. We the think the two presidents should issue the invitation. We are working on a text. It contains a framework

for the conference. The conference should be opened by the two presidents. Venue: compromise place in Europe. (S)

Secretary Baker: Maybe Oslo. (U)

President Gorbachev: This day and issues could be a milestone. (U)

The President: I hope so. We worry about Israel's response. (S)

President Gorbachev: Tell them we are preparing a resumption of diplomatic relations by the time the conference starts. (S)

Secretary Baker: Before? (C)

President Gorbachev: Maybe on the same day. They say that when you're walking in Tel Aviv you think you're in Moscow. (C)

The President: I must tell you my problem with the settlements. Shamir is a real problem on this. (S)

President Gorbachev: We are being criticized by the Arabs for not stopping emigration while the settlements continue. Mubarak said he had to disagree with our emigration policy in light of settlements. He did it publicly. (S)

(The President discusses problems with the Jewish Community. Gorbachev thanks him for the comment.)

Secretary Baker: It is important that the Palestinians not give Israel an excuse for not participating. We have to keep East Jerusalem out of the public debate. (S)

President Gorbachev: I understand. (U)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: We're trying for a joint statement on Yugoslavia. We haven't made it yet. We think it would be easy based on the EC Foreign Ministers' meeting -- territorial integrity and unity. (S)

Secretary Baker: Let me summarize. The EC has taken the lead and we are following. Van den Brock says the last 1/2 of the statement is a problem. The specific reference to territorial integrity and unity will split the EC because of differences developing within the EC. (S)

President Gorbachev: Especially between Germany and the rest. (C)

The President: We could issue the first half and in questions each could amplify. (C)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: We have supported territorial integrity. (C)

Secretary Baker: But not alone. Both can say they stand behind Berlin, but avoid buzzwords -- territorial integrity and self-determination. Lets go with things we can agree on. (C)

President Gorbachev: Let me make a general comment. I told ???? that dissolution of that state, even partially, could begin a chain reaction of great danger. There are so many territorial disputes around. Within the Soviet Union people didn't even notice our internal frontiers. As soon as nationalism appears, they claim borders going back to Alexander the Great. Byelorussia wants back the territory given to Lithuania when it jointed the Soviet Union. If Lithuania goes, Klaipieda also. If it is all given back, what would remain? Eastern Estonia is settled mainly by Russians (Ukrainians also). As you can see I felt this topic in my skin. Also Poland, Bulgaria, Transylvania. (S)

The President: Slovakia. (S)

President Gorbachev: So we must keep the issue in ?????. Kohl asked me, what about self-determination? I said there is no contradiction. We have to keep self-determination within a country, in the constitutional framework. That is my attitude to the Baltics. Everything -- the economy, ????, politics, ethnic is mixed. Therefore there must be a process to disentangle. Therefore in paragraph #2, the first phrase remains. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

P/Gorbachev 7/31/91

3 of 3

G Want to welcome you in this very Russian setting. This is a landmark - where a Russian spirit resides (Kohl in — Cathedral)

P What shall we talk about

G Jim/Alex have had discussions. Perhaps we should hear from them.

Let us report against our basic themes. While big gains in both policies in recent yrs, there are probs still to which we must give attention. Our relationship must allow us to channel these probs in desirable directions. The things which have worked in our relationship should be deepd. Also full alloy new approaches & new concept of strat stab. In past S.S. used to relate to mil aspects only. Now it should be dip. Now it - we no longer think in terms of power rltnship & confrontation gives us a broadened perspective. Looking esp at Eur there is considerable stability & we should keep this in mind. Both ethnic & religious elements are newly important. Very important to stimulate a democratic nature of a change taking place. The Gorbachev era is gradually departing. Our actions have stimulated this movement

P Exactly

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[6]

Question is how to keep these powers along civil lines + not let them become dangerous. Some of these have far-reaching implications & we should discuss. Can't avoid seeing new centers of power shaping. Europe emerging. Nordic, E.E. would like to enter it. If we don't combine this w/ CSCE process, we will miss something important. If we don't, we will see a Euro center which will create probs for overall Euro integration. We need overall Euro which will let us solve many probs.

We have done good work together in Africa. Should think what next - like S.A. We should not do separate things at cross purposes but work together. Also must bear in mind factors of China + Japan. They are preparing annexations with plans. They are adjacent nations seeking a treaty tie with Japan. So you see both have civil resp attitudes toward China - no China card.

P Pagan

G We will not allow any policy which would distort strat balance! We would welcome yr your China

relations relating to normal.
I was there during student pro.
I was in a camp, but played it
cool. I saw what happened to
Zhao Ziyang. He pressed balance
& told Sorbonne why PRC had entered
new road which would not be
easy. Student response was generally
negative. Zhao Ziyang came here
recently. Told me of talk w/ Carter.
He declared our human rights. We
told Jimmy we are lucky to enable
to feed + clothe 1 bil people. Why raise
this? Because China is special.
Another point. Bahar recently at
Asean. Another regionally minded
dissent. Impressions of our people act
that only view that many countries still
concerned at our expansion of Japan
terms like Jap Empire. They believe
that Jap won't be content w/
simply econ power but will assert
mil power as well. It will continue
to cooperate w/ US in mil. but take advantage
of it for own purposes.
But that not all. Probs of resources,
water resources, environment,
population explosion. What is a role
of our 2 countries in this changing

world to have to build our relationships.
1st I conclude our (Sov) decisions
about response are correct. Tactically
I conclude we should enter battle to
move into period of stability. There
will be no econ. constraints &
doctrine restraining use in Euro
to have. Protect our state + building
economy are top priority. US leaders
can be cool judges.
(I left for a movement)

P In this changing world, we feel
comfortable w/a Treaty even perverted
changed S.C. We have confident
Lynch restrictions + knowing how
to get where you want to go changes
became. We confident of your
desire to be a useful participant
in this changing world. Your content
to change - but not chaos - is
something we very comfortable w/
you by our CSCE/Euro. We envy
Euro changing pols w/Euro but
will stay in mainland. We will stay
w/CSCE process. Tell Euro we
want in on T.D. not just Italy.
On Africa, any remarks you make
toward dirt bike would be good. Unrelated
is in time warp + Africa behind change

in a world (mumbled salutes Castro) Khadafi. If you can bring him into a real world - good. I convinced de Klerk is trying to do real things & should be supported.

I too worry about S. Asia, also about keeping things on even keel w/ PRC. Feelings on Taiwan are still strong. We must try to play China card. We will maintain contact & try to help them move forward. We will likely succeed on MFN. On India & China, I would hope S could work on Indian nukes w/respect to Pak. Pak was lied to us but they have a point India could talk w/them about it.

G Judith asks us does Pak have bomb

P I think not but they lied to us about pursuing it.

B (5 power initiative - Judith holding out)

G we can discuss specifically a little later

(newly added)

P There is concern in Asia on Jap unprincipled. We haven't worried much about that yet. It would help if you could work out N. T. A lot of anti-Jap feeling in U.S. If you could engage w/them early, it would

help discourage retaliation.
Those just a few points. But we are confident of your intentions. But we see your pros in every Yeltsin contacted himself at dinner last night. We want to interact on every response to be helpful.

G Our thinking goes especially in some direction. How should we build our relationship post this crisis - lets turn to specific areas & start w/ Calcy/ Jim.

Be Asean worries not only about Jap, but China & India. Don't have sense Jap interested in mil role. Asean sees our security relationship w/ Jap as way to restrain them. Like US fears in Euro constraining Ger.

G Lets discuss interaction in Gulf, ME, & AC & proliferation. W/ arms reduction, pressure to sell arms as hard goods. Calcy Yugo

Be On basis of June '90 communique we agreed D+S talks would resume Sept 30. These talks would continue on basis of remedial data of 1985. We agreed tactically that AC consultations should start in early Oct.

G We believe this is important because

it lays down next steps.

Be One would point on phasing down of Soviet heavy missiles. US wanted statement affirming that letter given has legally binding effect. That is our intent.

G Did your discuss how to deal w/ other nuclear powers & nuc club? Should our approach change?

Be No.

G We should discuss at FM level & at consultations.

Be In other areas of AC: Could set a date for resumption of nuc testing talks. US wanted to wait for results of TTBT. We raised CTBT on two occasions in Geneva, but US wasn't ready to discuss w/ UK & FR. Discussed BW in light of X-ray of letters. Agreed to unity of efforts. We would like Soviet assurance following unity of efforts. Would like efforts unity before US says position

P These unity efforts are very important. We know a big dig one this & we must get to bottom of it. This is way to do it.

G We want to talk clearly & to be totally honest on this. When US efforts come out have some

** prep so we don't have to start over again.

S We will endeavor at least some will be done.

* G We would like US to ~~[illegible]~~ to
* our visit to US.

Be On AC, US proposed 2 working grps - Deterrence & predictability - identify possible US & ~~SU~~ SU role. 2nd Cespec & prolif, WMD & new tech.

G Support it

P OK.

Ba Also importance of trying to conclude CW ~~conv~~ this (?) yr. We made new proposal on challenge inspections. Down only to ~~two~~ issues. One prob is to deal w/ your pols on CW destruction grp.

Be We are closer to convention on CW. US has abandoned some old positions. We will focus on challenge inspection. We wanted universal inspection rights but we abandoning US proposal.

G ~~Yes~~ I have approved proposal on CW destruction & Cabinet is discussing. There is prob on scale & dates by which must be completed. We have a young democ. Our "greens" have made us close 1300 factories.

~~SECRET~~ Limited Dist.

One of these trade parts for a whole country. So close to feet it is a big risk.

P We lose access to Johnstone Island all but base lease.

Ba Other issues: We should consider open this agreement - we agreed to work bilaterally on this

2 - Complete CFE 1A by March 92 if possible date of Helsinki conf

3 - You get ~~see~~ summary letter laying out question of SS 23 in EE which is more a political issue. You have provided it in a very different way

G OK.

Be We have been working on open skies. Positions getting closer. Read NATO suggestions. We have prepared response awaiting Cork approval. Things moving well on CFE 1A. Have prepared material on SS 23 & will provide it before you leave.

Cookbacker What about AAE?

Baker Ba This is an area you can point to as partnership - not joint coop. Both have been working hard to test reserve for a report possibilities Still many hurdles ahead.

just concluded talk w/ Shamir. Seems to have accepted our approach. Prob will have qualifiers - Knesset approval, Palestinian, assurances from U.S., promise not to move a person into U.N.S.C. We - as pot'n - have been asked for assurances to Pales. We won't change our policy positions & we won't. Presents me to go to E Jerusalem tomorrow. Try to get Shamir to accept proposal.

C Bessmertnykh sent me a letter. 6 points

Ba We have been asked a question. Each side wants guaranteed outcome. We can't do that. We have worked out a statement for C & P.

P Would you tell us how you see Draft now?

Ba (Bessmertnykh) Met w/ him 2 times ago. There are big issues w/ in PLO executive. Two that Draft position weakens. Until PLO won't take a position.

Ba To get E J to table we must agree, on transition arrangements, that E Jer would be represented - & PLO can't sit at table. Pals can call shots, but pow & background. We building # of links for Pals to make decisions that they not abandoning claim to E Jer. If Jer gets rep't, a peace process to end.

G ~~Go~~ Press will try to characterize out + separate us.

Ba Correct. You can say you engaged jointly on peace process + won't be drawn out on Pales issues.

G We can say this paper is one positive Process will lead to just + comprehensive peace

Be Just a word on conf itself. We think 2 P's should issue invite. We working on text. It contains framework + TOR for conf. Conf should be opened by 2 P's. Venue: Compromise place in Europe.

Be Maybe Oslo.

G This day + issues could be milestone

P ~~Go~~ Hope so. We worry about Europeans

G Tell them we preparing resumption of dip relations by time of conf start

Ba Before?

G Maybe on same day. They say walking in Tel Aviv you think you're in Moscow

P I must tell you my pbm w/ settlements. Sharon is a real pbm for this.

G We being harshly criticized by Arabs for not stopping emigration while settlement continues. Mubarak said he had to disagree w/ our emigration policy in light of settlements. Hailed Prague

(P discussion of Pres w/ Jewish community
Gorbachev's trip for comment)

Ba Important that Pakis not give it an excuse for not participating. Have to keep E Jew aware of public debate

G Understood

Be We trying for joint statement on Yugo. Haven't made it yet. We think it would be easy based on E C & F-11s - Territorial integrity & unity.

Ba Let me summarize. E C has taken lead & we following. Vin der Broek says last ½ of statement is a prob. Spec. ref to T.I. & unity will split c EC because dip w/in E c are divided: esp Brit Ger & c rest.

P We could issue 1st ½ & in questions each could comply

Be We have supported T I

Ba But not alone. Both can say they stand behind Berlin, but avoid c buzz words - T.I. & self deter. Lets try w/c things we can agree on.

G Let me make good comment. I told Bruce that dissolution of that state, even partially could begin a chain reaction of great danger. There are so many territorial disputes around. W/in SU people previously didn't even notice c internal frontiers in SU. Etc soon as nothing appears, they claim

borders going back to after Great
Byelo Russia wants its territory given
to it, it must joined SU, if it will goes.
Klaipeda also. If all given back, what
would remain. E. Estonia is settled
mainly by Russians. (Ukraine also)
As you can see, I felt this topic
is very thin. Also Poland, Bulgaria
Transylvania
P Slovakia
G Soviet must keep eyes on Hungary.
Kohl agreed w/us, what about self determ
I said no contradiction. Have to keep
self determ w/in a country w/in const
framework. That my attitude re
Baltics. Every thing - econ, civil,
political, ethnic is mixed, ∴ there
must be a process to disentangle.
∴ in para 2, 1st phrase remain

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France on July 14, 1991
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Francois Mitterrand, President Hubert Vedrine, Cabinet Director
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	July 14, 1991, 4:45 - 5:45 p.m. Rambouillet, France

The President: It's so good to see you. I'm very sorry to have had to interrupt your Bastille Day activities. (U)

President Mitterrand: No, it's my pleasure. Our celebrations take all day, but I am pleased to take this opportunity to talk with you. (U)

The President: I think Gorbachev will dominate this summit. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, but rightly so. His letter is ambitious and not all of his desires can be accommodated. (S)

The President: Yes, we want the visit to London to be seen as a success for Gorbachev. But he has enormous problems, and we can't solve them for him. How do you think we should come out? (S)

President Mitterrand: It's true that the Soviet Union and the world must be convinced that Gorbachev is the last chance before the Soviet Union falls into unpredictable chaos. If we can convey that, we will have given him some breathing room. He goes from crisis to crisis. He seems to have patched up with Yeltsin and with 9, and perhaps 11, of the republics. We should give him a chance at the economic summit, providing he comes up with an economic plan. (S)

The President: I agree. How do we do that without diminishing our attention to eastern Europe? (S)

President Mitterrand: We need to find the right balance. The eastern European nations have mostly entered into association agreements with Europe. They are engaged in a process. Only the Soviet Union is outside. They shouldn't complain, but they

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probably think all the money should go to eastern Europe. They and we must also recognize that chaos in the Soviet Union is not in eastern Europe's interest. (S)

The President: I agree. Some of our people are worried about the role of the Soviet military and the KGB. But Gorbachev seems to be doing a better job now. (S)

President Mitterrand: I agree. He is now managing things well. (C)

The President: Jim Baker is trying to come to closure on the START treaty. We want to keep it separate from our economic aid, but it is essential for Gorbachev to know that we are serious about arms control. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes. The two should not be tied, though there is an intrinsic relationship between them. But there should be no linking. (C)

The President: We have a major problem with raising the cap on lending to the Soviet Union from the EBRD. We told Congress that we would not do it. We may have a difference here. (S)

President Mitterrand: What is the status of START? (C)

The President: The major issues are down loading and data denial. (President and General Scowcroft described where START stands.) I think it is important to treat Gorbachev with respect but they still have a lot of missiles, which complicates offers of aid. And I still wish he could set the Baltics free. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, they are forging a new empire. When he is sure he has the others on board, he will have more latitude with the Baltics. The other way around would be a disaster for him. It is a matter of timing. (S)

The President: Are we close together on Iraq? Every day there is more evidence of his (Saddam's) cheating (gives examples). These are nuclear matters, and they are very serious. That is what prompted my call to you. (S)

President Mitterrand: I don't personally know him. I refused to help him rebuild after Israel hit his plant, so there is a coolness. I am convinced nothing will stop him but force or its threat. There are three points. First, the Kurds and, second, the Shi'ites. I am more familiar with the Kurds and you have my assent to your request. I have given instructions to Lanxade -- several hundred troops and aircraft will be placed under the coalition umbrella. In the south with the Shi'ites, I don't feel there is much we can do. Iran is active, but we can help mostly in a humanitarian way. If he (Saddam) moves in the south, then there should be a wise response. The third point is the nuclear issue. The principle is the same but the situation is different. If you decide to strike a site, for example, which is suspect, we would not object. But your public would have to be convinced

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against a situation which he might adroitly manage. We don't have the means to strike against nuclear facilities, as opposed to acting in Kurdistan. We would want to be apprised closely in your plans. Our staffs should consult closely on this. In case you should act in defense of UN Security Council resolutions, we certainly would not object. (S)

The President: We don't want to start another war. But, I think the American people would support action where evidence is incontrovertible. Saddam has pulled back when he thought we might hit him. The UN must be involved, but I worry about the chance of new resolutions. We just can't let Saddam Hussein go ahead with his nuclear program. We understand you and will stay in close touch. We are together in the north and on the Shi'ites, where we can't do much. I wish we could be rid of Saddam Hussein. (S)

President Mitterrand: On all of this then we have a common base. I wish we could find an honest way to send him to God (joking honest versus dishonest). (S)

The President: The Saudis are agreeable to strikes from Saudi territory. They want prudence but will cooperate. (S)

President Mitterrand: You know our position. The best case is one in which Saddam Hussein departs. As for protecting the Kurds, we are at your side. On the nuclear issue, we would like precise data and will support you internationally and in the UN. (Discussion of the wisdom of the Gulf operations in retrospect.) We have particular problems in Lebanon. It would be good to force Shamir to cooperate. I know that gives you problems. (S)

The President: Here is where we are. (Describes the state of play on the peace process and settlements.) (C)

President Mitterrand: On the boycott, I approve of Shamir's position. The boycott is unacceptable, but we won't get anywhere unless we know and embrace a vision of where we want to go. Shamir has one. Whither the West Bank? A state? Confederation? Demilitarization? I don't know the grounds of the U.S. lack of clarity. It is made worse by UN resolutions calling for West Bank withdrawal by Israel. I am not saying this has to be fully complemented -- not Jerusalem, for example. But a bold move should be made while protecting the holy sites. On the West Bank, if there could be a demilitarized state so that it posed no threat to Israel, that might work. We should say what we hope for even though it is not ours to say how it should be. But of course, Israel knows what it doesn't want. To leave Israel in possession of all they now occupy is to say that Israel has an imperialistic policy. It reminds one of Hitler. So long as he argued that he was bringing all the Germans into Germany he could not be stopped. So long as Israel wants to get back historic lands, there is sympathy. But the West Bank no longer has Israelis there -- hence the settlements. The Golan Heights, Lebanon, and Gaza are pure imperialism. (S)

The President: Very interesting. We are grateful that our friends have given our peace process a chance. There has been some movement, but the settlements send a wave of horror through the Arab world. We are disappointed that Syria hasn't moved. Jordan won't move without Syria. We will spend a little more time behind the scenes. I owe the international community and the American people an explanation of where we are and what we are prepared to do. I appreciate your patience. I also understand your idea for a gathering of the heads of state in the UN Security Council to address the problem, though I am not enthusiastic. (S)

President Mitterrand: You and the Soviet Union are already there and Great Britain and France are already there as the EC, so the only one that is absent is the PRC. (S)

The President: True. Anyway, I won't delay much longer. (C)

President Mitterrand: I won't do battle on details. I am not enthusiastic about participating in a conference doomed to failure. There were two reasons for the Gulf conflict: one, to stop Iraq, and, two, the coming of a new era in the Middle East. If we stop now, we will not be judged well in history. (S)

The President: It's not just Israel. The Arabs are not being particularly helpful. (S)

President Mitterrand: The Arabs will never accept not having the religious sites, especially Jerusalem. They see no concessions over the West Bank. The Palestinians have emigrated throughout the Arab world where they exercise leverage because they are in key positions. (S)

The President: (Discussion of Arafat.)
(Time problem -- need to leave for London)

President Mitterrand: Let me say why France is standing aside. We are faithful to the Alliance. Nothing can replace the Alliance for a long time -- beyond my time. We are not in integrated structure. One reason is that we are a nuclear power. We can't depend for our survival on a NATO decision. It must be France's decision. The best is that we are content with agreement to cooperate closely in the event of a nuclear threat. Because I want the EC to come closer militarily, it does not mean I want the U.S. out of Europe. But because I think the United States in the next 100 years -- maybe by the new millennium -- will be moving away, gradually reducing its forces. A new president may see things differently from you, and maybe he won't be able to resist the Congress and the people objecting to spending money on an issue thousands of miles away. You may disagree. I'm not opposed to NATO's rapid deployment force, but we won't participate. Because if there is a war, it will be nuclear. The United States, Great Britain and France's nuclear weapons are the best hedge against a war. There will be little conflicts a la Yugoslavia. There are many national groups ready to do what the Yugoslavs are doing. All over Europe there are

similar problems. There could be a veritable explosion in Europe. On Yugoslavia, the EC has played a useful role, but suppose it falls apart and Slovenia and Croatia break away? There will be local war. What would the RDF do? How would it act? (S)

The President: Carefully. (U)

President Mitterrand: I don't want to be dragged into that kind of conflict against France's interests. I have great faith in you, but I would be uneasy about letting the Pentagon make such a decision. (S)

The President: With Yugoslavia as an example, the U.S. would not want to be dragged into a Yugoslav war. But I understand about your logic, we don't need NATO or a European force. (S)

President Mitterrand: We do need NATO for the threat of a big war. (S)

The President: We must continue this discussion. I understand you, and there are no hard feelings. (C)

President Mitterrand: So long as you and I are here, France will be the U.S.' most loyal ally. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

P/ Mitterrand 2/14/91 g: gbf m. 71

P So good to see you. Sorry to interrupt Bastille Day

M Perhaps we can investigate soon ways. Our celebrations take all day but I pleased to take this break to talk

P I think Gulf crisis will dominate this summit

M yes, but rightly so. It is document document is ambitious but not all his desires can be accommodated desire

P We want it to be success soon success for Gorby. But he has enormous enormous probs problems & we can't solve their problems for him.

M How do you think we should proceed


P Care out evaluate

M The SU & world must be convinced be convinced that Gorb is last chance before SU falls into unpredictable unpredictable chaos. If we can convey that we could have some influence found? than soon soon terribly worst. He goes from crisis to crisis. Seems to have patched up w/ Yeltsin & w/ 9 & perhaps w/ the republics. We should give him a chance on the crisis & perhaps help him overcome with a plan

P Agree. How do we do demonstrate attention

↑ to come to pleasure on START

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P/ Mitterrand 2/14/91 g: gbfm.71

P So good to see you. Sorry to interrupt Barbecue Day

M Perhaps we can investigate some issues. Our celebrations take all day but I pleased to take this break to talk

P I think Gorb Cart will dominate this document

M yes, but rightly so. It is document is ambitious & not all his desires can be accommodated

P We want it to be success soar success for Gorb. But he has enormous problems & we can't solve them for him.

M How do you think we should proceed conduct

M The SU world must be convinced that Cart is last chance before SU falls into unpredictable chaos. If we can convey that we will have found? some soar success heartily warm. He goes from crisis to crisis. Seems to have patched up w/ Yeltsin & w/ Q & perhaps w/ the republics. We should give him a chance on the proceeding basis

P Agree. How do we do that w/o diminishing attention to EE.

M We need to find a way to balance
EE have mostly entitled with
assoc agreements w/ EE ees. They
are employed in a process. Only
SU is outside. They shouldn't
complain (complain) but they push think
all money should go to EE but
Chairs in SU not in EE interest (interest)
P Some of our people are worried (Gone) (about)
a mil & KGB, but Cab seems to
be doing better (better) now.
M Agree. He is managing (things) well.
P Baker trying to create to close
or start, but keep it separate
from union aid. But essential
to keep ees seriously about AC.
M Yes. The 2 should not be tied but
there is an intrinsic (intrinsic) relationship
(relationship)
between
but there — but no linking. (Baker)
P We have (have) major (major) push of raising cups
on FBRD. We represented to Dreyfuss
won't do it. We may have a lift
(many) (have a def)
there.
M What is status of START?
P Major issues (down) are down loading
and data denial. (denial) (Jake doesn't see)
(P+ described where Start
stands) —
I think it important to treat (Gorb) Gorb

w/respect. But they still have a lot of missiles. I still wish he could set a Baltics free

✓ W Yes. They are trying & have ways in which (he) sees he has & others can wizard he will have more latitude w/ Baltics. The states were would abroad would be a disaster for him. It's a matter of timing

P Are we close together on Iraq? Every day there is more evidence of his cheating (9 missile warheads) These are new violations & they very serious. I that prompted my call

W I don't personally know him. I refused to help him rebuild after I hit his plant so there is a coolness. I convinced nothing will stop him but force or its threat. There are 3 parts: Kurds & Shiites. I more pressure w/ Kurds & your ~~w~~ agreement ✓ ✓ ✓

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more we can do. Iran is active but we can help mostly in an humanitarian way? By the words in words than sending in a wire response

The 3rd is a course. The principle course but set ~~es~~ stringent. If you decide to strike a site, for example, which is, I suspect we would not object. But your public would have to be convinced, against a situation which be more ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~message~~ to make it ~~work~~. We don't want to strike again together trans opposed to ~~Kurdistan~~. We would want to be apprised closely in your plans. ~~Haig~~ should ~~keep~~ coordinate ~~closely~~ on this. In case CONSULT ~~should~~ act in ~~delay~~ UNSC we certainly would not object.

P We don't want a ~~hurt~~ another war. I think the people would support decisive ~~action~~ ~~indecisive~~ ~~indecisive~~ is ~~indecisive~~ unacceptable. He has pulled back when he ~~thought~~

Make it together

↑ Means

↑ CONSULT

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machine can do. Iran is active but we can help mostly in humanitarian ways; by the more in words than words or a wire response

The 3rd is a new one. The principle course but set ~~set~~ as left. If you decide to strike a situation, for example, which is, I suspect we would not object. But your public would have to be convinced, against a situation which he might address by message to Congress at large. We don't have ~~to~~ to strike against wars - as opposed to Resolution. We would want to be apprised closely in your plans. ~~AF~~ is our staffs should coordinate closely on this. In case you should act in defense of NSC we certainly would not object.

We don't want to hurt another war. I think the people would support action indeed evidence is incontrovertible. He has pulled wires when he thought

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might hit him. UN erupt—is involved but during element about change of new resolutions. We just can't let S.H. go ahead w/ nuc prog. We understand your [illegible] will stay in close touch. We are together in our work & on sanctions, where we could do more. Question was could be used by S.H.

M all their troops have a common base. We work we called for food are an honest way to send him to food. (joker: Soviet US disarmament

P Saudis are agreeable to Iraq's pressure & anti terrorism. They urge prudence but will cooperate.

M You know our position. Best case is S.H. departs. Protecting Kurds we are at your side. On nuc we would like precise data & will support you actively in UN.

(Discussion of [illegible] Gulf oil price increase internationally.

We have [illegible] ? we Lebanon relevance. It [illegible] OR UNILATERALLY [illegible] to price Shamir [illegible] know that gives you [illegible]

internationally

?

OR

UNILATERALLY

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might hit him. UN ought to
involved but worry about
choice of new resolutions. We
just can't let S.H. go ahead w/
nuc prog. We understand
you & will stay in close
touch. We are together in
North & on Shirts, where we
could do much. Discuss we
could be w/ S.H.
W all they have a common base.
Work we can't find are an
honest way to send him
to God. (Joke: Invert us diplomat
P Saudis are agreeable to blacks
pm & anti tanker. They want
prudence but will cop.
W You know our position. Best
case is S.H. departs. Protecting
Kurds w/ we are at your side
On nuc we would like
precise data & will support
you actly in UN.
(Discussion of wisdom of Gulf
op in retrospect.
We have public problem
relevance. It would be good to
give Shamir to cop. I know
that gives you probs.

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P Here is where means ending
state WE REPRESENTED AMERICAN PEOPLE process
TO CONGRESS WE
WOULDN'T DO IT. WE MAY HAVE DIFFER- CONSULT

WE REPRESENTED TO CONGRESS WE WOULDN'T DO IT. WE MAY HAVE A DIFFERENCE THERE.

The EAST Europeans have mostly entered into associate / Association Agreements w/ Europe

↑ AMERICAN PEOPLE

↑ CONSULT

↑ We will have given him some breathing room

↑ We need to find the right balance.

Israel?

(Malia)

↑ be convinced against a situation which

↑ North?

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
P Here is where we are (Describe state of play on peace process + settlements).


M One = boycott & approve of Shamir position. Boycott is unacceptable but we want to get agreement under which we can do other things we want to do. Shamir has not written W.B.? A state? Confederation? Demilitarized? I don't know (goals of) US. Lack of clarity made worse by lack of Reagan/WB co/ discord. I not saying this has to be fully complemented - not foreseeing but left a void we should be made while protecting Arab rights. On WB, if there could be decent state no threat to I, that might work. We should say what we hope for - even tho it not ours to say how it should be. But I should know what it doesn't want. To leave I in possession of all they now occupy is to say I has unqualified policy. Results are what matter. So long as he argued he [illegible]

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not instrumental about participation
in coal dossier to Jubilee. and Jerusalem Customs
There are 2 reasons for Cooley
conflict: stop Iraq + evening
of war date for NIE. ~~of~~ If
we stop now we will not
be judged well in history.
P It but just Fr. Arabs nothing
particularly helpful.
M Arabs will never accept not
having religious rights over
Jerusalem. They see no
concessions over W.B. The
Pales time corrupted Khrenart
Arab world where they
exercise overseas because they
are in they ~~&~~ posters
P (Discussion
(Time) pro faithful
M (but) we say Hindus
Arabs. We ~~have~~ to the
alliance. Northern ~~Europe~~ replace
it for a long time (Europe
may not) We not-in-time. ~~Europe~~
structure. One reason
are a new power. U
depend for our security
a NATO decision - it time
be France. Between us

Beyond
my?





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not instrumental about participation
in coup doomed to failure. Cant determine Castro
There were 2 reasons for coup
conflict: stop drug + running
of arms via ME. If
we stop now we will not
be judged well in history.
P It hurt just Fr. Arabs nothing
particularly helpful.
M Arabs will never accept not
having religious rights reawakened. They see no
concessions over WB. The
Pales have corrupted Khrushchev
Arab world before they
exercise leverage because they
are in they positions
P (Discussion of Cuba)
(Time prob)
M But we say why Fr stopping
arms - we are interfered to the
alliance. Nothing can replace
it for a long time. Imposed
may hurt. We are not in integrated
structure. One reason is we
are a nuc power. We can't
depend for our security on
a NATO decision - it must
be Fr nucs. Both are

all business with Gen he could not be stopped. So long as I wants to get back historic lands there is sympathy. But WB up lawlessness Israelis there (three) settlements. Bank Hebron, Gaza are pure expropriation. unpermitted

P Very interesting. We appreciate our friends hand given our press a chance. There this bro [illegible] movement, but settlements send a wave of terror. Then Arab world. We disappointed Syria hasn't moved — Jordan won't move w/o Syria. We will spend a little more time behind scenes. Do you will consult + discuss people explanation of where ... + what are prepared to do. Do we ISRAEL NEEDS ↑ INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ? your parties your ☐ CHOICE ?

✓ most enthusiastic

M Do we not if + GB + Fr go to EC. So only one absent is PRC

P True. Anyway, I don't want to delay much longer

M I won't do battle on details. D

ISRAEL NEEDS ↑
INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY ?

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all lawyers with Gen he could not see stopped. So long as I wants to get back histories books there is sympathy. But WB ex lawyers do realise there [there] settlements. But [illegible], Lebanon, Gaza and pure [pure] expansion. [unparalleled]

P Very interesting. We question our own minds and give our press a chance. There [there] was [has] been [been] movement, but settlements [moved] send a wave [wave] of horror. There [they] [illegible] world. We [already] disappointed Syria hasn't moved — Jordan won't move w/o Syria.
We will speak a little more time between sessions. Do you [will] [illegible] community & can people explain [illegible] where we are & what we propose? PLs. I appreciate your patience & I understand your [CHOICE ?] of [illegible] State in UNSC, though I [not] [illegible] you & so [illegible] already there, & GB + Fr as EC. So only one absent is PRC

M [Most enthusiastic] ✓

P True. Anyway, I [can't] [delay] much longer [longer]

M I won't do [bottle] or deficits. I [bottle] [on] [detail]

contact w/ coop closely in event
of nuc threat. Because Russia want
to come closer militarily - not
because of want US out. But
because I think US in right
now - maybe by new military
will be moving away, gradually
reducing its pres. If new
President may see things dif pos
now & maybe current
Congress + people objecting to spend
money on our discussions
of risks many. You may disagree
& not. Opposed to RDF but we won't
participate. Because of this + a
war it will be nuclear. US/GB/Fr
must be best but we cannot
This will be little conflicts
of like Yugo. I meant all natl
groups ready & do what Yugo is.
All over & no there is similar
prob. Fleet could be there
explosion in Eur.
On Yugo. EC has played useful
role. But support it fails as pass
& GL. & Croatia back down.
There will be local war. What
would RDF do? How would that
P Carefully

M I don't want to be dragged into that kind of conflict against French interests. I have great faith in you, but I would be nervous about letting Pentagon make such a decision.

P W/ Yugo as example, US would not want to be dragged into Yugo war. But under your logic, we don't need NATO or European force.

M We do need NATO for the entente & big war.

P We must continue this. I understand you & there no hard feelings.

M So long as you & I are here, France will be US most loyal ally.

π BUT I UNDERSTAND YOUR LOGIC — WE DON'T NEED NATO OR EUROPEAN FORCE

WE AS YOU AND I ARE HERE, FRANCE WILL BE US MOST LOYAL ALLY

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↑ BUT I UNDERSTAND YOUR LOGIC = WE DON'T NEED NATO OR EUROPEAN FORCE

SO LONG AS YOU AND I ARE HERE, FRANCE WILL BE US MOST LOYAL ALLY

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M I don't want to be dragged into that kind of conflict against French interests. I have great faith in you, but I would be uneasy about letting Pentagon make such a decision.

P W/ Yugo as example, US would not want to be dragged into Yugo war. But if under your flag, we don't need NATO or European.

M We do need NATO for threat of big war.

P We must continue this. I understand you & there no hard feelings.

M So long as you & I are here, France will be US' most loyal ally.

P/Karamanlis 2/18/91

K Express my joy for your presence here. Both because you are P of great US & because of your. There are many problems we could discuss even, secondly, Cyprus G-T, ME, EE & many others. I would suggest you say what issues you would like to hear our views on.

P Would like your judgment on Yugo.

K Yugo is complex. Time will break up. It is artificial - different nationalities, languages, religion, standards of living, culture. We want preservation of Y, but it won't be possible.

P Blood shed?

K Not safe to predict how it will happen. In their efforts at achieving democ they must go thru a lot of preparations, at a fixed regime. It too artificial & there is too much hatred.

P We hoped for unity or at least peaceful separation but now it looks like a clash.

K Blood shed or not will probably depend on Serbia which has 75% of officer corps. I saw a Pole couple of months ago & he not optimistic.

K In Croatia are 600000 Serbs who don't feel safe. We support unity because we want stability in Balkans but it not up to us.

P Amazing about America

K We live in era of triumph of democ. But a transition is delicate dangerous Tough for all of them, incl SC.

P True. Best thing Court could do for US public opinion would be to free Baltics. He says procedures exist but they say no.

K But he fears if he lets them go others will follow. And he worries about a army.

P Yes. About 45% of army voted for Yeltsin

K I think we should support Gorby, to avoid a army.

P Agree, but there are those in US who seek a breakup of SU

K A Sov minister said a same thing. I said, but not a Govt.
Your dilemma is a protection of liberty while trying to safeguard order & peace.

P (Discussion of internal Sov politics)
We will continue to support Gorb

K There may be surprises in these countries after their evolution.

P SU is trying to be helpful in ME — shows how coop could be.

K That is good news, but these probs are dif to solve. The Arabs don't have firm policies. They hold each other + Communist policies. The govts. regimes there are fragile + may fall

P If they fall to fundamentalists, we have probs.

K This could happen.

P If we could get a deal on Poles & MBFR that would reduce fundamentalist power.

K What needed is for Arabs to agree on a moderate policy + then Israel to accept that policy — in that order.
I fear that ME prob will be w/us for some time. Hard to predict because it is not based on logic.

P Baker on his way to ME. We trying to get direct talks going. Now Syria has said yes. Baker will try to pin that down + then try to get Israel to come forward. Jordan is also important.
I spoke to K. Hussein to form a joint delegation + come to a conf. can get

K Encouraging that Syria + Egypt could

together.

P Mubarak agreed w/me. Thinks he can reform K'hadafi

K He obsessed w/ K'hadafi. I asked why, when he 40 w/o K'hadafi 3. He said he crazy, that's why

P Do you prefer S H

K I met him in 79. He a megalomaniac why did you let him survive

P The coalition would not have stayed together, nor UN resolutions if goal was S H removal. Mubarak still says he won't put a single soldier into Iraq. We didn't want to get bogged down either

K This is true, but it in interest of all to get rid of him.

P Yes. He lies constantly. We may have to punish him again but we need a multilateral umbrella

K I wish he would give you an excuse

P We not cynical, but don't want let him get away, either w/ provoking K'wait or flying UN Rs.

K How can his people continue to tolerate him?

P He has great security

K Killing is nothing to him.
Anything else you wish to discuss?

P Turkey + Cyprus

K It sad + dangerous our relations w/ Turkey

are so vad for 30 yrs. Not only Cyprus but Aegean Is & Thrace. I stay Ellinikon resisting your pids w/ T embry. Geography demands it & I have tried hard. I abandoned a unity of Cyprus & Greece. I still accused of treason for that. I wanted to ridd us of that. I met w/ Denktash, proposed non aggression pact. They agreed then changed their minds. I wanted to take Islas to I.C. Turks changed their minds. I repeated this w/ Ecevit. He had already accused Denktash of treason so said he couldn't go ahead. There is more much frustration on this issue. If there was a Turk Gandhi w/ courage I would try again

P I think Ozal a good man

K I made visit him. It my ambition to solve Turk prob but it takes reasonable Turk

P How about Ugsidion

K a wise & honorable man

P Does SG initiative have a chance?

K Depends on ~~Turkish leaders~~ Cyprus. Cyprus is a 2nd Greece. 18% Turk. Depends on Turks. Turks invaded in 74 on excuse of revolt of Greek Cols. Had nothing to do w/ Cyprus. When legality restored they should have left but they still there.

1 page of issues to be resolved

P What can c US do, if anything?

K Give them more advice than arms. Try to make them more responsible. No doubt they is c irony.

P Ozal seems to me to be a reasonable man.

K I have met every Turk leader for 50 yrs but Ozal. It absolutely necessary to solve this prob. It takes alot of logic & courage.

P How about Isles. How does that compare w/ Cyprus

K If Turkey trying to grab them it worse than Cyprus.

P But c current controversy is over cont. shelf.

K But c shelf would surround c isles and cut them off. Turks want to draw a line down c middle of c Aegean. It is a complex prob. Funny thing is there is nothing there but sea bottom - no oil.

P / Mitsotakis 7/18/91

M Very pleased to have you here – esp at this moment. It is critical for our cause. Objective of this visit is strengthen US-Greek relations. Also we promote democ & stability in Balkans. And peds which we share NATO & recite peds for all of us. We want to find a place in a new world order you are setting up w/ success.
Would like to discuss Cyprus, G-T, economy & bilateral relations.
P Fine OK
M Lets me start w/ Cyprus. I believe it can be solved now. Your presence here could be decisive. We have little time available. Our govt will be resp. I believe Ozal a reasonable & resp. man. I believe a new PM is a stable friend of the West. The UNSYG has only a few months left. Ozal has dif elections for him. I want to Cyprus recently & spoke to all. There is reasonable chance for 1st time. I think time is right. Initiative is w/ the UN. There are deadline issues. For Turks is necessity & security. For Greeks it is territory & refugees. For our part we will give. Even Turks want to proceed on territory a

there is deadlock. Territorial aspect is primary for us. All accept it is bet 25-29. This is more than proposed. Turk bent ok. Much has been said of ~~Cobby~~ Ceyhan line. Defined in 1951. Selsby thinks it is reasonable. If you can convince Ozal to accept it, that is great prog.

P What has Ozal said

M Selsby thinks he will accept but he hasn't said. We will go to corp. Key is preparation, not who attends. If this happens a solution possible in coming months. I ask you to encourage Ozal to accept Ceyhan line - then a corp. All accept idea of corp. Composition is a prob. We accept Ozal's form but think others, like US, should also be there to help. Territory closely linked to refugee prob. If reasonable part of territory returned, refugees will return.

P What are Turks asking before they come forward.

M Security being given. Who will be guarantors. We agree on that. As to equality, I said ~~=~~ 2 communities should be equal in a federation

P You request me to ask Ozal to accept Ceyhan + then come to a corp.

M I believe in Ozal good faith. He is

working more to obtain majority next year. Appld good PM, etc, but he only 16th in polls. Economy is bad. P Would he think a deal with Kurds or help him?

M He has other more serious problems: Iraq not asking for Turkey to give in but something for benefit of all.
Ozal told me his 1st post was pro Americanism & his 2nd his borders. I asked why then he stayed in Cyprus keeping another pro drive.

P We want to help. I glad to take it up w/him.

M I would be grateful. There is issue of G-T. I happy w/c stand your took + support it. I stand for dialogue. I told Ozal we should start w/c big issues - he said 1st improve climate. Now he says talks at Top level. I proposed secret talks. He accepted but nothing has happened. I proposed non-aggression pact. It could start good-will. He invited me to Ankara. I accept but we must prepare.

P Let us help. Ozal is a good man. He has many picks - he doesn't need this one. I sure be happy to try to get him to

Get details of Colby leave.

engage.

M Ozal is key but Yilmaz has a role & I think will help

P If we can be a catalyst I want to.

Sct. PM accepts idea of unity in Wash in Sept. He prep prepares Cyprus 1st & then is sidelined, so it doesn't look like he undercut to sell out Cyprus. Then a non-aggressive part.

(Discussion of a role of PDQ)

The other matter is a Greek economy. We invited a tragic economy. The order of our pubs: 35% of revenue goes to retire debt. Gulf War cost us 2.5 bil, $50 mil lost pub tourism. Dregnts in Yugo & we carry bring news/jobs. We know your pubs & don't ask for aid. One request — we pay our debt in total amt. FMS will be 350 mil next yr. My request would be 5 yr moratorium — not relief.

P I'll look into it. Don't know what it takes

Sec. It takes Congress, I think.

P Is there a budget impact? Will look into it.

M One other matter w/ Turks. Continental shelf. To permit offshore drilling in areas not in dispute. This is reasonable request but in 87 Papandreou

(did something) + move no drilling possible - There may be oil + in our sit we must agree it. I have warned the Turks but I don't want it to be subject of dispute or conflict

P Have they said no?

W They haven't stated it explicitly, but want to have it clear.

I appreciate your sending Wisbaden We need investment, Greece now has both euro & lot credibility

P How about tourist agreement.

(Scotties talks about travel advisory)

W We do what we can on terrorism. We determined to go after it. We are going to have trial for Rashid. We have extradited some Arabs. We ask for your support.

P Are you getting tech support from us

W Yes. It is valuable. Don't know if you can do better.

We have no prob of pol stability. The opposition is divided. My only prob is economy.

(Discussion of parliament)

W Let me say a word on Balkans. My forecast is optimistic. We believe in a unity of Yugo & stability of borders in Balkans. Everything else is Pandora's box.

We are only one in Balkans not a member of Quint bloc. i.e. can play a useful role. We have good ties w/ Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, Romania (Romania not much enhanced there) Great possibility of influence in Balkans. US w/ its great prestige should be playing predominant role.

P Don't know if we have much clout on Cyprus.

FM We like your stand but note some shift in your position. Unilateral action is a big danger. We must stand for agreed procedures as Balkans could be a nightmare.

M We have proposed a/ shared of offensive arms from Turkish area. Turkey response was more negative than positive

P We will take it up w/ Ozal. Could worried about this area also, as an example for SC. You are doing ok for Albania?

M Yes. Baker visit was a big help for a stop plus

One thing we will be talking to Turks about is Patriot sale & Counterweights. It is in danger of slipping because of Turkish policy. They don't allow new blood. Any new people

must be how Tubbs & there can no
more Greek minority there. I will tell
Ozal either he must change or I will
bring pertinacity to Greece. Ozal should-ha
resent that.

P I met him

M Let's go into other room & I will get
a clear minister to report.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Three-on-Three Meeting With President Mikahil Gorbachev
PARTICIPANTS:	The President James A. Baker III, Secretary of State Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the USSR Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoliy Chernyaev, Foreign Affairs Advisor
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	July 31, 1991, 10:55am - 2:55pm Novo-Ogarevo, USSR

President Gorbachev: I want to welcome you in this very Russian setting. This is a landmark -- where the Russian spirit resides. (Kohl said he felt he was in a Cathedral) (U)

The President: What shall we talk about? (U)

President Gorbachev: Jim and Alexander have had discussions. Perhaps we should hear from them. Let me refer again to my basic theme. While there have been big gains in politics in recent years, there are problems still to which we must give attention. Our relationship now allows us to channel these problems in desirable directions. The things which have worked in our relationship should be developed. (Ø)

Also, we are still developing new approaches and new concepts of strategic stability. In the past strategic stability used to relate only to military aspects of [the relationship]. Now it should be different. This is a new situation. We no longer think in terms of power relationship and confrontation, which gives us a broadened perspective. Looking especially at Europe, there is considerable stability, and we should keep this in mind. Both ethnic and religious elements are newly important. (Ø)

It is very important to stimulate the democratic nature of the changes taking place. Authoritarianism is gradually departing. Our actions are stimulating this movement. (Ø)

The President: Exactly. (U)

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President Gorbachev: The question is how to keep these processes along the right lines, and not let them become dangerous. Some of these have far-reaching implications, and we should discuss [them]. We can't avoid seeing new centers of power developing. Europe is unifying. Nordic, Eastern Europe would like to enter it. If we don't combine this with the CSCE process, we will miss something important. If we don't, we will see a European center which will create problems for overall European integration. We need overall Europe which will let us solve many problems. (S)

We have done good work together in Africa. We should think about what is next -- like South Africa. We shouldn't do separate things at cross purposes, but work together. Also we must bear in mind the factors of China and India. They are preparing initiatives with ????? They are ancient nations, seeking a breakthrough in ?????? life(?). So far we both have had responsible attitudes towards China -- no China card. (S)

The President: I agree. (U)

President Gorbachev: We will not allow any policy which would distort the strategic balance. We would welcome your China relations returning to normal. I was there during student problems. I was in the soup, but played it cool. I was sorry for what happened to Zhao Ziyang. He provided balance. I told ???? ??? PRC had entered a new road which would not be easy. The student response was generally negative. (S)

Jiang Zemin (?) came here recently. He told me of a talk with Carter, who lectured him on human rights. He told Jimmy, "...we are lucky to be able to feed and clothe one billion people." Why raise this? Because China is special. (C)

Another point. Baker recently went to ASEAN. Another symbol of the ????? The impressions of our people at that meeting were that many countries in the region are concerned over the economic expansion of Japan. [One hears terms like] Japanese Empire. They believe at the end the Japanese won't be content with simply economic power, but will want military power as well. It will continue to cooperate with the U.S. military, but take advantage of it for its own purposes. (S)

But that's not all. THe problems of resources, water resources, environment, population explosion. What is the role of our two countries in this changing world and how to build our relationship? (C)

I conclude that our decisions about reform are correct. Tactically, I conclude we should ???? ? ???? to move into a period of stability. There will be no ideological constraints or dogma restricting me in how to move. Problems of our state and building the economy and top priority. U.S. leaders can be our judges. (C)

[Gap- notetaker leaves for a moment]

The President: In this changing world, we feel comfortable with a strong, economically powerful, changed Soviet Union. We are more confident of your intentions and knowing how to get where you want to go than when we came. We are confident of your desire to be a useful participant in this changing world. Your intent to change, but without chaos, is something we are very comfortable with. (C)

Your ??? ??? with Europe. We may have emerging problems with Europe, but will stay involved. We will stay with CSCE process. We tell Europe we want in on T.O., not just ???. (C)

On Africa, any moves you make toward de Klerk would be good. Mandela is in a time warp, and the ANC is behind changes in the world. Mandela salutes Castro, Khadafi. If you can bring him into the real world -- that is all to the good. I am convinced de Klerk is trying to do real things and should be supported. (C)

I, too, worry about S. Asia, also about keeping things on an even keel with the PRC. Feelings on Taiwan are still strong. We won't try to play the China Card. I will keep contact and try to help them move forward. We will barely succeed on MFN. (C)

On India and China, I would hope the Soviet Union could work on India on nukes with respect to Pakistan. Pakistan has lied to us, but they have a point. India won't talk with them about it. (S)

President Gorbachev: India asks us if Pakistan has a bomb? (S)

The President: I think not, but they lied to us about pursuing it. (S)

Secretary Baker: India is holding out on the 5-point initiative. (S)

President Gorbachev: We can discuss specifics a little later. (C)

The President: There is concern in Asia about Japanese imperialism. We haven't worried much about that yet. It would help if you could work out the northern territories. There is a lot of anti-Japanese feeling in the U.S. If you could engage with their economy, it would discourage militarism. (S)

These are just a few points. But we are confident of your intentions. We see your problems in the way Yel'tsin conducted himself at dinner last night. We want to interact on your reforms to be more helpful. (C)

President Gorbachev: Our thinking goes basically in the same direction. How should we build our relationship from this

analysis? Let's turn to specific areas and start with Alex and Jim. (C)

Secretary Baker: ASEAN worries not only about Japan, but China and India. I don't have a sense the Japanese are interested in a military role. ASEAN sees our security relationship with Japan as a way to restrain them. Like U.S. forces in Europe constraining Germany. (S)

President Gorbachev: Let's discuss the interaction in the Gulf, Middle East, and Arms Control and proliferation.. With arms reductions, the pressure to sell arms abroad grows. Also Yugoslavia. (S)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: On the basis of the June 1990 communique we agreed the Defense and Space Talks would resume September 30. These talks would continue on the basis of the mandate of 1985. We agreed tentatively that arms control consultations should start in early October. (S)

President Gorbachev: We believe this is important because it lays down the next steps. (C)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: One small point in phasing down of Soviet heavy missiles. The U.S. wanted a statement offering that in a letter that has a legally binding effect. This is our intent. (S)

President Gorbachev: Did you discuss how to deal with other members of the nuclear club? Should our approach change? (S)

Secretary Baker: No. (U)

President Gorbachev: We should discuss at the foreign minister level or at consultations. (C)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: In other areas of arms control: couldn't we set a date for the resumption of nuclear testing talks? We wanted to wait for results of TTBT. We raised ?????? in E ???, but the U.S. insists it is first discussed within NATO. (S)

We discussed BW in light of the exchange of letters and agreed to meeting of experts. We would like a Soviet visit immediately following the meeting of experts. Also, would like the experts meeting before the US says it is possible. (S)

The President: These meetings are very important. We have a big difference on this and we must get to the bottom of it. This is the way to do it. (S)

President Gorbachev: We want total clarity and to be totally honest on this. When the U.S. experts come, let's have the same group so we don't have to start over again. (S)

General Scowcroft: We will make sure at least some will be the same. (S)

President Gorbachev: We would like the U.S. to ??? the date for our visit to the U.S. (S)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: On arms control, the U.S. proposed two working groups -- deterrence and predictability to identify a possible U.S. and Soviet role. The second looks at aspects of proliferation, WMD and nuclear technology. (S)

President Gorbachev: I support it. (S)

The President: OK. (U)

Secretary Baker: Also importance of trying to conclude CW this year. We made new proposals on challenge inspections. Down only to this issue. One problem is to deal with your problems on CW destruction. (S)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: We are closer to a convention on CW. U.S. has abandoned some of its positions. We will focus on challenge inspections. We wanted universal inspection rights, bur are examining the U.S. proposal. (S)

President Gorbachev: I have approved the proposal on CW destruction and the Cabinet is discussing it. There is a problem on sites and dates by which this must be completed. We have a young democracy. Our "Greens" have forced us to close 1300 factories. One of these made parts for the whole country. So where to put it is a big problem. (S)

The President: We took ours to Johnston Island, and all hell broke loose. (S)

Secretary Baker: There are three other issues: We should conclude the Open Skies Agreement. We agreed to work bilaterally on this. (S)

Two, We need to complete the CFE Treaty by March of 1992 if possible, that being the date of the Helsinki Conference. (S)

Three, you have sent a summary letter leaving out the question of SS 23's in Eastern Europe, which is now a political issue. You have provided it in a very difficult way. (S)

President Gorbachev: OK. (U)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: We have begun moving on Open Skies. Our positions are getting closer. We have received the NATO suggestions. We have prepared a response, which is awaiting Gorbachev's approval. (S)

Things are moving well on CFE 1A. (S)

We have prepared materials on the SS-23 and will provide it before you leave. (S)

President Gorbachev: What about the Middle East? (S)

Secretary Baker: This is an area you can point to as a partnership -- not just cooperation. We both have been working hard and that is the reason for the present possibilities. There are still many hurdles ahead. (S)

I just concluded a talk with Shamir. He seems to have accepted our approach. There will probably be qualifiers: Knesset approval, Palestinian representation, assurances from the U.S., a promise not to move the process into the UNSC. We -- as you probably know -- have been asked for assurances to Palestinians. We won't change our policy positions and we cannot. The President has asked me to go to Israel tomorrow to try to get Shamir to accept our proposal. (S)

President Gorbachev: Arafat sent ma a letter. It has six points. (S)

Secretary Baker: We have been asked the same. Each side wants a guaranteed outcome. We can't do that. We have worked out a statement for the President. (S)

The President: Would you tell us how you see Arafat now? (S)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: I met with him two months ago. There are differences within the PLO Executive. It is true that Arafat's position is weaker, but without him the PLO won't take a position. (S)

Secretary Baker: To get Israel to the table we must agree on transition arrangements, that East Jerusalem won't be represented, and the PLO cannot sit at the table. They can call the shots, but from the background. (S)

We're building a number of links for the Palestinians to make obvious that they are not abandoning their claim to East Jerusalem. If Jerusalem gets up front, the peace process is dead. (S)

President Gorbachev: The press will try to draw us out and separate us. (S)

Secretary Baker: Correct. You can say you are engaged jointly on the peace process and won't be drawn out on Palestinian issues. (S)

President Gorbachev: We can say this paper is our position. The process will lead to a just and comprehensive peace. (S)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: Just a word on the conference itself. We the think the two presidents should issue the invitation. We are working on a text. It contains a framework

for the conference. The conference should be opened by the two presidents. Venue: compromise place in Europe. (S)

Secretary Baker: Maybe Oslo. (U)

President Gorbachev: This day and issues could be a milestone. (U)

The President: I hope so. We worry about Israel's response. (S)

President Gorbachev: Tell them we are preparing a resumption of diplomatic relations by the time the conference starts. (S)

Secretary Baker: Before? (C)

President Gorbachev: Maybe on the same day. They say that when you're walking in Tel Aviv you think you're in Moscow. (C)

The President: I must tell you my problem with the settlements. Shamir is a real problem on this. (S)

President Gorbachev: We are being criticized by the Arabs for not stopping emigration while the settlements continue. Mubarak said he had to disagree with our emigration policy in light of settlements. He did it publicly. (S)

(The President discusses problems with the Jewish Community. Gorbachev thanks him for the comment.)

Secretary Baker: It is important that the Palestinians not give Israel an excuse for not participating. We have to keep East Jerusalem out of the public debate. (S)

President Gorbachev: I understand. (U)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: We're trying for a joint statement on Yugoslavia. We haven't made it yet. We think it would be easy based on the EC Foreign Ministers' meeting -- territorial integrity and unity. (S)

Secretary Baker: Let me summarize. The EC has taken the lead and we are following. Van den Brock says the last 1/2 of the statement is a problem. The specific reference to territorial integrity and unity will split the EC because of differences developing within the EC. (S)

President Gorbachev: Especially between Germany and the rest. (C)

The President: We could issue the first half and in questions each could amplify. (C)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: We have supported territorial integrity. (C)

Secretary Baker: But not alone. Both can say they stand behind Berlin, but avoid buzzwords -- territorial integrity and self-determination. Lets go with things we can agree on. (Ø)

President Gorbachev: Let me make a general comment. I told ???? that dissolution of that state, even partially, could begin a chain reaction of great danger. There are so many territorial disputes around. Within the Soviet Union people didn't even notice our internal frontiers. As soon as nationalism appears, they claim borders going back to Alexander the Great. Byelorussia wants back the territory given to Lithuania when it jointed the Soviet Union. If Lithuania goes, Klaipieda also. If it is all given back, what would remain? Eastern Estonia is settled mainly by Russians (Ukrainians also). As you can see I felt this topic in my skin. Also Poland, Bulgaria, Transylvania. (Ø)

The President: Slovakia. (Ø)

President Gorbachev: So we must keep the issue in ?????. Kohl asked me, what about self-determination? I said there is no contradiction. We have to keep self-determination within a country, in the constitutional framework. That is my attitude to the Baltics. Everything -- the economy, ????, politics, ethnic is mixed. Therefore there must be a process to disentangle. Therefore in paragraph #2, the first phrase remains. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Final Plenary

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Secretary of State Baker
Treasury Secretary Brady
President Mitterrand
Foreign Minister Dumas
Finance Minister Beregevoy
Chancellor Kohl
Foreign Minister Genscher
Finance Minister Waigel
Economics Minister Moellemann
Prime Minister Mulroney
Secretary McDougass
Finance Minister Mazankowski
Prime Minister Andreotti
Foreign Minister de Michelis
Treasury Minister Carli
Prime Minister Kaifu
Foreign Minister Nakayama
Finance Minister Hashimoto
MITI Minister Nakao
President Delors
Vice President Andriessen
Prime Minister Major
Foreign Secretary Hurd
Chancellor of the Exchequer Lamont
Prime Minister Lubbers
Foreign Minister van den Broek

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BL 8/21/09

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: Wednesday, July 17, 1991 - 9:15 AM - 10:20 AM
Long Gallery - Lancaster House, London, England

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: (He opened by addressing errata in the Economic Declaration draft text made available the previous night.

-- Paragraph 9, second sentence: insert after "stimulate": "non-inflationary growth by bolstering confidence,..."

-- Paragraph 12, second sentence: "improve" should read "improved".

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-- Paragraph 17, second sentence: insert after "welcome increase in": "supplies by certain oil-exporting countries and by the actions..."

-- Paragraph 32, first sentence: delete "the" before "Soviet foreign policy".)

CHANCELLOR KOHL: Re paragraph 54, this doesn't reflect the content of our discussions. I don't like, "seek financial support for the successful implementation of the preliminary stage..." We should change this to "we will support the first phase".

SECRETARY BAKER: How about, "We will support the implementation of the preliminary stage of the pilot program."

CHANCELLOR KOHL: Financing is needed.

CHANCELLOR KOHL/PRESIDENT BUSH: Agree: "We will financially support the implementation of the preliminary stage of the pilot programme utilizing all potential sources..." (E.g., adds "utilizing" to make it consistent.)

(DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC DECLARATION COMPLETED.)

PRESIDENT MITTERRAND: We're getting through the agenda more quickly. This is good. Now we should move toward the extended part of our agenda. We only come together again with President Gorbachev. I met him, as will others. I'd like to ask the Chairman how you intend to proceed. There won't be a concluding plenary. How do we draw lessons from this visit? How do we disperse without informing world opinion? How will Prime Minister Major proceed? I feel we're leaving the process hanging in the air. We should explain what needs to be done. We might try to move the process forward.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: On the basis of yesterday's discussions, we had a general agreement on some points. When we meet with President Gorbachev, I will open; then Gorbachev and then the Heads will talk, and then we'll throw the discussion open. At the conclusion, I would, as we do in the EC, summarize the views expressed and seek concordence for the summary. There won't be a formal statement, but at the press conference with Gorbachev I would sum up.

On follow-up, we've talked about several elements: (1) Special Association with the IFIs. (2) As President Mitterrand suggested, the G-7 Chairman would visit the USSR before Christmas and report to his colleagues.

(There was silence; e.g., everyone agreed.)

PRESIDENT BUSH: As a wrap-up note, I'd like to express sincere appreciation to Prime Minister Major for his leadership. And thanks to Her Majesty for a splendid evening.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: There is a problem. We have been talking about the Soviet issue BEFORE we meet with President Gorbachev. We can't predict what will happen. We don't know what he'll propose. We should have a moment to reflect after we meet with him. I'm concerned we'll echo different views. I'm all for pluralism, but.... What about a little time to put our heads together after meeting with President Gorbachev? There's nothing planned now. I don't find it good to have different versions (of a meeting) given. This has been a well-prepared Summit. We need a meeting where we can discuss these questions. On the U.S. side, they will also have things to say.

PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI: This is a very good idea. We're called upon to approve a document. Those of us in the EC approved a very precise view on the USSR last December. We were unanimous on encouraging Soviet participiation in the IFIs. I understand that there are limits; the EC doesn't commit all of us. But if we compare this with what we have here.... We shouldn't fail to give a politically valid message.

PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS: I fully see the problem. Re paragraphs 28-33, the text is OK, but less specific that the lists we discussed yesterday. There is a risk the public will see this as vague. We might ask the Sherpas to continue work by looking into the list presented by Chancellor Kohl and President Delors. We will be more specific at the end of the day.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: The language is bland in the Declaration because we cannot preempt the Gorbachev meeting. But we can be much warmer after we meet. Later we will work on some conclusions and circulate them.

PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS: That's what I suggested: a list of specific points.

PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY: If Prime Minister Major makes his presentation to the media afterward as skillfully as he has here, then we'll do fine. But it's hard to do in advance. We have an idea of our package; Helmut laid it out yesterday. The Chairman can lay it out. My concern is that we need to find out what Gorbachev will say before we leave. We need to know what he'll say BEFORE we put forward our line. We need to know he'll respond constructively. If he were critical of what we're saying, the press will be on his side. President Walesa did this to us once after we forgave Poland's debt. We need to nail down Gorbachev's reaction.

PRIME MINISTER KAIFU: There are points we need to be careful on. E.g., the Asia-Pacific, LDCs, etc., that we don't want to have overshadowed. With President Gorbachev, we want to find out if there is progress in key areas and leave it to the Chairman to represent a common understanding.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Prime Minister Mulroney's point is compelling. That's why I proposed that we agree on the basis of

yesterday's discussion (note: he said he'll circulate a text). Then I will summarize what I'll say, and then ask Gorbachev what he'll say. I hope to reach a concordat. I will circulate language with the warmest tone, according precisely with what was agreed yesterday. I will seek to summarize this at 5:30, to give us time to handle it before the 6:00 pm break. There won't be a formal communique. I'm doing it this way because of Prime Minister Mulroney's point. But I also wanted to avoid a sense of sitting in judgment without Gorbachev after we meet. This is a proud man and nation. But I can see why you'll want to know the line we're taking. So I'll circulate later this morning a text of points on what I'd like to say. I'll be open to suggestions.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: Perhaps we might talk during a coffee break. This will allow us to act with tact.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: OK. We'll have a paper to look at (e.g., talking points for PM Major). There won't be formal communique. We may want to move up the 10:45 reading of the Economic Declaration.

BREAK FOR COFFEE