

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memorandum of Conversations/Telephone Conversations Files

OA/ID Number: 91156
Folder ID Number: 91156-007

Folder Title:
Memcons/Telcons (January-December) 1991 [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	7	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Handwritten Telcon	Re: Yeltsin Phone Call (2 pp.)	10/25/91	(b)(1)	
02. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Calderon 1-on-1 (2 pp.)	10/10/91	(b)(1)	
03a. Memcon	Re: Luncheon Meeting Between the President and Yevgeniy Primakov, Member of the USSR Security Council (3 pp.)	5/31/91	(b)(1)	S
03b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: Discussed... (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03c. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Primakov (10 pp.)	5/31/91	(b)(1)	
04. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Ambassador Zhu Qizhen of China (2 pp.)	10/10/91	(b)(1)	S
05. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Gorbachev (2 pp.)	10/4/91	(b)(1)	
06a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Alberto Fujimori, President of Peru (3 pp.)	9/17/91	(b)(1)	S
06b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Fujimori (4 pp.)	9/17/91	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 3

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1297
OA/ID Number: 91156-007
Date Closed: 8/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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07. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Mitterrand (2 pp.)	9/24/91	(b)(1)	
08. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Kohl 1-on-1 (7 pp.)	9/16/91	(b)(1)	
09a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Bielecki of Poland (2 pp.)	9/11/91	(b)(1)	S
09b. Draft Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Bielecki of Poland (3 pp.)	9/11/91	(b)(1)	S
10a. Draft Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with Senators Kasten, Inouye, and Leahy (3 pp.)	9/10/91	(b)(1)	
10b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Inouye, Kasten, and Leahy (6 pp.)	9/10/91	(b)(1)	
11. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Mitchell, Dole, Foley, Michel (5 pp.)	9/12/91	(b)(1)	
12. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Mayor Mitchell (5 pp.)	9/12/91	(b)(1)	
13. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Kaifu (2 pp.)	8/26/91	(b)(1)	
14. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Kohl Phone Call (1 pp.)	8/26/91	(b)(1)	

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15a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Mitterrand of France on July 13, 1989 (4 pp.)	7/13/89	(b)(1)	S
15b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: Mitterrand (6 pp.)	7/13/89	(b)(1)	

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Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
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Wilma, Source
Here is the
memo from the
General's notes re
Prunakow. The
notes are attached.
no copies were
made except for
original & no dist.

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting Between the President and
Yevgeniy Primakov, Member of the USSR
Security Council

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Yevgeniy Primakov, Member of the USSR
Security Council

DATE, TIME May 31, 1991, 12:00 - 1:00pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Mr. Primakov: The situation is truly critical. Gorbachev has reaffirmed his dedication to economic reform. Do not underestimate Pavlov. He is trying very hard, but he is not a politician, and sometimes he makes ill-considered statements. (S)

The Moiseyev visit was well received. He is not sophisticated, but he understood you. (S)

What we need now is large-scale assistance. The issue is taking on strategic importance. Mikhail Gorbachev has named me as the coordinator of the assistance. Yavlinskiy is able, but he wasn't involved at the beginning. He works for me. Don't overestimate him -- he is a bit immature. He works on instructions he got from Gorbachev. (S)

We (Yavlinskiy and Primakov) must get together, and not have competing plans. We will use the result of Yavlinsky's work in Boston as an "overlay" on our basic plan. (S)

We want you to come to a summit. (S)

The President: We want to if we can only hammer out our differences on arms control. (S)

The Economic Summit is a more complicated issue. We have to work it out so that Gorbachev doesn't ask, then go away empty-handed. (S)

Yeltsin says what many want to hear. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0850-MR
9/24/2013 MR

The question is which comes first: reform or aid. We are broke right now, more or less. I have to be able to go to our Treasury and the IMF and present something which is economically feasible. (S)

We will also have a big problem with your defense spending. That will be a big issue with our conservatives. (He mentions a chart used at Malta.) (S)

(The President then describes the views on defense budget by the U.S. and by the Soviet military.)

You get great credit for Eastern Europe, etc., and for the historic and dramatic changes you have undertaken. (S)

Mr. Primakov: Yeltsin is not a serious political figure, but he is a fact. We are trying hard to work with him. (S)

We need to stop aid to Cuba, but it would be a disaster to associate it with western aid. (S)

The President: Who would it be a disaster for? (S)

Mr. Primakov: How much of a disaster will depend on how well the economy is doing. Now people are saying we have gotten nothing from the West, or internally, from our new course. For example we walked away from a huge infrastructure we built in East Germany. (S)

For us the Baltics are a problem. Gorbachev rejects the use of force. (S)

Those who don't accept 9+1 must accept five principles:

- A single monetary unit
- Fixed contributions to the center
- A single court system
- No internal customs
- Single price for fixed-price products

If they won't play by these rules, we would have to try to find something else, for example, trading at world prices. There also may be a reward for signers. (S)

Gorbachev has said that relations with the U.S. are a #1 priority, so your respect has great importance for us. (S)

The Balts must understand they have no economic niche in Europe. They also want to cut their economic ties as if nothing much changed. The borders of Lithuania, for example, are now an issue. (S)

so this is a complicated issue. We feel some in the U.S. are turning their backs on us. (S)

The President: (Discussed the attractiveness of Yeltsin vs. Gorbachev.) (S)

Mr. Primakov: We are now doing things right. We are now following the law. The basic contradiction between us and the U.S. is that right now we cannot fully abandon all administrative methods. We need to move to a market economy, but our transition requires some levers. Our people won't use initiative -- they wait to be told. (S)

The President: There is a perception here that the military establishment is pressuring Gorbachev to yield. (S)

Mr. Primakov: The reality is more complex. At the last (Communist Party) Plenum the conservatives wanted to take over. They were defeated in their efforts. As an institution, the military supports Gorbachev, but not Yeltsin. If the military and conservative establishments combine, then that is a problem. (S)

Gorbachev will not come to London and ask for \$100 billion. (S)

The President: I have a question on CFE. Gorbachev signed a treaty. Then we think the military made Gorbachev pull back from the treaty, and are resisting it. (S)

Mr. Primakov: They couldn't openly be against a treaty, no. The militaries talk much about asymmetries: NATO, but no Warsaw Pack, etc. But nobody wants to stop arms control and reductions. We will reduce our military expenditures. (S)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

attractiveness?
yes.

P (Discussed attractiveness
of Yeltsin ~~vs~~ Gorb)

Rn. We are now doing
things right
- We are following a new
Basic contradiction. Not
us + US is we regret
now cannot fully
abandon all Admin
we need to move
to a market econ.
- Our transition needs
some levers.
- Our people won't use
initiative - they
want to be told.

P There is a perception
here that mil estab
are pressuring for
be must yield ?
must yield
must Yeltsin?

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- eg - we walked
away from huge
infrastructure we built
in Gr.
- For us, Baltics are
a prob.
 - Govt rejects a use
of force
 - Those who don't accept
9+1, must accept 5
principles
 - Single monetary
 - Fixed contributions
to central
 - Single account system
 - No internal borders
 - Single price for
fixed price products
- If they won't play by these
rules, we would have
to try something else

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- eg - pay world prices,
etc.
- Also may be a ^{signers} reward for a sequestr.
- Govt has said relations
w/US are #1 priority
- So guarantee has
great importance.
 - Bolts must understand
they have no room
niche in E. sec.
 - They also want to
into their own ties
as if nothing had
changed.
- (Size of both sides)
- So it is a complicated
issue
 - We feel some in
US are turning their
backs on us

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03c. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Primakov (10 pp.)	5/31/91	(b)(1)	

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07. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Mitterrand (2 pp.)	9/24/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [2]

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

P/K Ark 9/16/91
1001

R RR looks very old (didn't want to say that in front of press). He did OK from a test but over lunch it was rather depressing. He confessed things. The lady still regrets I think he is no longer here.

P she should not push him. He has earned a special retirement.

R Here a small movement to your desk.

P What a thoughtful present.

Yamaguchi was my host in SO. We talked fishing & I sent him some lines. Prob didn't get there before camp.

K We need to make good use of our time. Had good talks w/ Cardenas & I had invited MIT group. US-Ger academy of Sciences is a great idea. Maybe we could inaugurate next year. It good to see a level of interest. I went to Berkeley because there are 3 centers of excellence in US - Howard, Georgetown, Berkeley. We found grad & post-grad students & they making good prog. Ger inspiration has led to increase in Ger language in US univ. I will note all this in letter to you. Now just want to underscore how good it would be for both of us. Good if we did it in '92. About 1/4 of Am people have

do not contribute

86%

beer. limbs. That would let me to do something for you.

P Send material to me.

K Even when there is EC pol community we will be German & there are over 80 mil of us.

I was surprised that so many in Italy were interested in Eur. There a bit of anti-Jap sentiment as well.

P Do there that in beer

K Not so much, but in Eur generally, Japs are more diff for Econs to understand than for Communians.

P We have Pearl Harbor coming up. I must manage that so as not to make pub noise

K Anyway I will come back to you on this. Another issue: Beer + Hartmann can be serious. I been working on Mitterand for months explaining how w/ in EC ^{Pol.} union we can retain NATO. Calendar for that will start in coming year. Agreed common market in 86 - will happen 12/31/86. There is security aspect. It is complicated right now w/ French. German civility a severe blow to Fr. We have been smaller brother in def. - w/o us. Now we are no longer so important & econ are more important. Recently a Franco-Ger meeting. Cresson. Mitterand

replied Germans would have ~~problems~~ 2-3
yrs but then they would be ^{much} ~~much~~ stronger
People to people relations are fine.

P Do Cresser pro-ber?

K She not friendly. Mitterand has a good
attitude ^{toward me} we are friends. Currently French
are trying to get closer to NATO than WEO.
We should try to join them along.
I told Francois we should think hard that
when we have our little partnership, we
should have a trilateral entity

P Could we do it w/o raising probs w/ others.

K We would have to be careful but I hope
to get Mitterand & credit.

P What would be a outcome

K The reps would be simultaneously
WEU + NATO, thus allowing France
to go to the back in. Gen. Huttman
can perhaps discuss it. We can
tell Baker, but it should not go
lower than that til we have it
worked out.

P Let's have Brent & Peter work ^{on it} out.

K There is a good chance here to have
prob. integration w/ NATO. Many in
Wash worry about pd union. That
wrong. If it worked out right it
can benefit US. It will happen
in your term of office. I don't

to be helpful. Nothing in it for me personally. Have been too close with w/you it will be easier for us & also for CB. Thatcher - making it very tough for Major. The union holiday in Austria - told Kunitzky. Said he shouldn't join EC.

(Moved to residence)

Witter and looking for way out of this pit. We spoke for a few hours just like this. After, Witter said to stop, that was best way to end. He has dip in interest. I must work on him on ATT

P If you can make headway on that.... we just must.

H On Germany. Even w/o GATT we have to change CAP. Sat is absurd & I have prob w/our partners. We seem to have money only for a few years. What happening in EC is a horror. Impact of what is going. But a few more conditions have changed. We have made quantitative prog also. Treasury prog in yield - $\frac{1}{3}$ more now.

This not good for nature. Third remain is 3rd world. They can't buy our machines if they can't sell credits.

P Does Witter and Chuck & I will leave ECU?

K Yes

P What do I have to do on 6/17

K I will call in 2-3 weeks. Want to go
then a year or so/4 hours, then I will call
let me raise. I. You must not
give away. I think you have lost
CWS. + all EWS w/you. For
rept war is on a horizon. It will
be a big long ^{one} war. For CWS is in
is on a rise. In Turkey they are
warred too (talked about Indian
CWS)

P No compromise on my part. If
we go in to Sharon CWS is a
a peace process would be at end.
I have a lot at stake - domestic policy
as well

K I totally am anti Soviet. As German
I must restrain my self (especially)
But there no way to repair a pain
from past w/ money. We have
tried, as far as money can do it.
Adenauer paid 100 bil Deutschmarks
In 2nd half 1989, Jewish agents
served CDS not to unify. In Dec
89 rep of Jewish World Org (Brosnan)
in E Berlin told FR that JWC was
against unification. + would engage in
against

P They asked you for 10 bil - 5 grant + 5 loan

K Yes, we will do what to see how far
D.D. & our restraint want prevail
on a Jewish side

I need will emigrate - and they
will vote for Starvins. So we must
be kept to a rapid evolution. In 2-3
yrs things will be tougher. I need
support you any way I can, also
in EC

P Maybe we can get a side talking,
but not if we give in now.
(Israel + war)

K If there is no peace, Mubarak &
Hussein will be in big trouble
who comes after them will be
much more difficult for IT to handle

P Hussein has been behaved badly
but he has big probs now.
Will talk SU in big city?
Is Mitterand well?

K It changes. It more pro right
now. He has strong position. East
Europe world is changing around
him.

(Discussed French Polish policy
Poles want to join EC. For me very
restrained about that. He also wants

wants to pick his successor. Won't happen. Can't prevent Rocard
P How can he want?

R Fabius.
(Discussion of Cresson, ^{dehors} etc)

P Let us ask about SPD politics now - attitude to NATO, US, ~~et~~ security, etc.

K Right now there no SPD view, but a multiplicity. But some day they will have a majority. In '70's a socialists (everywhere) drifted sharply left. Schmidt did nothing to stop it.
(P takes phone call from Baker)

P Baker had 3 hrs with, 1 1/2 out. They proposed compromise - no deal. They argued blind-sided. Baker set them straight. He said they still fell benefits from getting down w/ their adversaries. Didn't threaten to kill conf. over a 10 bid.
(Discussed Jewish lobby)

K History doesn't repeat itself, but Weimer is instructive. Jews didn't understand that they should support moderates because of a move towards a united path.

Ans. Jones
7 Oct 11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

22-Sep-1991 09:58 ED

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

David C. Gompert
Betty A. Marshall

(GOMPERT)
(MARSHALL)

FROM: Dona F. Proctor
(PROCTOR)

SUBJECT: BS/Kohl Notes

The General needs his notes from the Kohl meeting for use during a phone call. Please return them to me. Thanks.

CC: Wilma G. Hall (HALL)

September 23, 1991

8:13am

Per your request.

bam

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0530-MR
MM 4/21/2016

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Bielecki of Poland

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Prime Minister
Ewa Piwowar, General Director, Office of
Council of Ministers

DATE, TIME September 11, 1991, 2:00 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Prime Minister Bielecki: We need a long-term American commitment to Poland. I heard your speech to the Polish Parliament in 1989. I was a back bencher then. (U)

The President: Did you ever dream you would be in this job? (U)

Prime Minister Bielecki: I've always had the slogan "make it happen." I will try to do my best. We must go forward with a belief in fundamental principles. (U)

The President: We will stay with you. We have this constant drain on our treasuries. I will ask you to open the discussion in the broader meeting. We need our experts to hear your priorities. Give my best to Lech Walesa. How is his health? (U)

Prime Minister Bielecki: He plays table tennis. He tries to stay in shape. I remember your last phone call to him. I recommended that he call you. He was very happy with your expression, "my friend." (U)

The President: With all this turmoil, it is important to stay in touch. I just talked to Secretary Baker in Moscow. He met with Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and the sessions are going well. We want them working together. They don't need more disorder. One resulting problem would possibly be many refugees. (U)

Prime Minister Bielecki: We don't want to become a special zone for refugees between the EC and Russia. We hope that the compromise between Gorbachev and Yeltsin will last. Gorbachev does not understand the new challenge after the coup, even when he tries. When we met and the discussion turned to questions of transition and the economic aspects, he couldn't understand me. (U)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

The President: He clearly doesn't understand the fundamentals of the market and of freedom that he is learning. He has done marvelous things. It is important that they work cooperatively and not fight over controls. Baker says they seem to be going down the right path together. (S)

Prime Minister Bielecki: It is necessary for our security, even if it only lasts a few months. (S)

The President: Then what? (U)

Prime Minister Bielecki: I think the 15 republics will turn into totally independent sovereign states. No one can stop this. They want their own currency, and it will be very difficult for them to work out economic cooperation. Eighty percent of production has been planned in Moscow. I had an interesting discussion last Saturday with the Ukrainian Foreign Minister. His visit to Poland was his first visit abroad, and he asked full recognition and diplomatic relations. We decided to go forward and will soon establish diplomatic relations. Also, it is my opinion that the Ukrainian leaders and people feel they must become sovereign with flags and an army and so forth. And only then can they discuss association. The same is true with Russia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and so on. An example of what is possible is Korea, particularly for the Kazakhs. What worries even them is the implication of 15 independent countries. Then in Russia there will be the demand for the autonomous republics to seek rights for themselves, resources and oil and so forth. If they are independent, they will say the oil is ours. An economic disaster is very possible. I spent a year in the USSR. The wintertime is very tough. I can't imagine what it will be like this winter. I am afraid about it. Seven hundred thousand Russians come to Poland every month. Most of them leave. They bring vodka. We confiscated 65,000 bottles in July alone. If they sell two bottles of vodka, they get a month's salary in the USSR. It's cheaper than Polish vodka. (S)

Your personal attitude toward Poland is so important. It's more important than NATO and the other issues. Of first importance, is the presence of the United States to achieve a good example for the rest. When you came in 1989, you were the one country pioneering the process. (S)

The President: We will stay involved, we are interested, we want to promote the market, we want your success, and we have to help. Poland is a good example. (S)

-- END OF CONVERSATION --

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0530-MR

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(other) Ewa Piwowar, General Director,
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The President: We will stay involved, we are interested, we want to promote the market, we want your success, and we have to help. Poland is a good example. ^(e)

new para.

-- End of Conversation --

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SENATORS KASTEN, INOUE AND LEAHY
September 10, 1991 -- 11:30 a.m.
Oval Office

P: This is an important issue. We want to delay without prejudice. Can work on vehicle scoring. Don't want to get into fight on settlements. I firmly believe we should move it down the road to get the peace talks going. I know what the pressures are. We won't change on settlements but counterproductive to debate that now. Thanks to Pat Leahy.

I: Appreciate this meeting. Time is of the essence. Surprised at the news because I thought things were moving along. Have given it much thought. Respectfully, I think you are wrong. But I don't wish to be partly responsible for unnecessary bloodshed. But in our system there are many unknowns. Anyone can make an amendment and this issue could get in to cong campaigns. We want to work with you and I think maybe we can work it out. We should explore possibilities. Wrong for either side to announce "to hell with you" and plunge ahead. Ill will can last for years. Need to try to work it out to avoid bloodshed and recriminations.

P: Where do the leaders stand? They didn't reject it with me.

K: You're talking to the people who put together Desert Storm Supplemental, Egypt debt. We all realize this is a different issue. To vote this through against your opposition perhaps not the thing to do. I disagree with your analysis, but we need to look at this. Pat may be almost the only vote in subcommittee.

L: We will know more after caucuses we are both having today. Metz. said if we can work out something, he'd be the happiest man in the Senate. If caucuses can turn lose-lose into win-win, we are all better off. I am convinced we can come out of this with a workable proposition. Every senator wants successful peace conference. There will be absorption guarantees. Mr. President, you can ask other countries to help. But debate now would be wrong.

I: There are many who are hyped. US helped Jewish emigration. Then we asked Israel to bite its tongue during Desert Storm. I need more casualties than Syria and others. They have given up territory in the past and didn't object to E debt relief. When do I get pat on the back. But I will work to avoid bloodshed.

P: Easiest for me to say give them a check. But that's not best for peace. Issue is not whether we're giving enough to Israel. It is whether we have chance for peace. It is our judgment -- all of us -- that nothing now would be detrimental to peace process. I don't want to debate settlements, who gets what aid, etc. that is not beneficial to Israel or the peace process. I don't want to bring out what Shamir has told me on settlements. Let's get the peace conference going. This is almost as

important as what is happening in Soviet Union. It would be historic.

I: I have heard that authoritative people have said 120 days, then support for the program and the scoring.

P: Not critical to support the exact program but support for absorption aid.

K: Does referring to Ross talks with Shovel -- the six points. Key is what will be your position in Jan. If we are going to have a fight, is it better now or Jan?

P: Not now.

K: Better not at all. Some will say more Jews will want to emigrate now. What is Administration position on package in Jan. Scoring is important. Dave and I want to handle legislation so that Israel, not US, pays for it.

P: Administration begins with a good record. But I won't promise \$10 billion and good scoring.

L: There is a way. Won't come up before end of month anyway. I would hope that all sides willing to hold off a bit to see if there are parameters which will allow it to be put off. If people lock themselves in, we will be in trouble. Let's use this time to try to work something out. Israel's economy is in terrible shape. Maybe they can blame us for having to do what they should. Let's give it a chance. We lose nothing by trying to work it out.

P: Let me read what we prepared to do (reads 6 points).

K: To understand scoring we have to look at legislation. It also changes on 1 October. OMB does have some flexibility. But key is point 2 -- no further delay. Should be language saying we are not in the business of supporting settlements with the money. What about linkage in. . .

P: I don't want this used for settlements beyond green line.

K: Me neither. There are side statements each year. None of us do.

P: Good. But Shamir statements not that way. Tough to contain myself about his comments. Sharon wagging this tail. Shamir put his finger in my eye but I'm more interested in peace process. I can take some hits -- but not too many.

I: Your point is valid. We should try to generate moratorium. Ask Jewish and others to cool it for 10 days while we try to work something out.

L: (Discussion of vehicle) Best hope is that people work out concerns saying this more complicated than we thought.

K: Will say we might push this off til Jan, will look at scoring and other questions, hope no one puts amendment on anything over next couple of weeks.

(Discussion about what to do or not do til Baker gets back.)

P/Drouge/Kastner/Leahy
9/10/91

P This an important issue. We want
to delay w/o prejudice. Can work
on vehicle & ~~scoring~~. Don't want
to get into fight on settlements.
I firmly believe we should move
it down a road to get a peace talks
going. I know what pressures
are. We won't change on settlements
but counterproductive to debate that
road. Thanks to Pat

I Appreciate this entry. Time is of
essence. Surprised at a review because
of the things we were writing along. Have
given it much thought. Resp. I think
you are wrong. But I don't wish
to be party resp for unnecessary
bloodshed. But in our system
there are many embarras. Anyone
can make an amendment & this
issue could get into core
campaigns. We want to work
w/you & I think maybe we
can work it out. We should
explore possibilities. Wrong for
either side to ~~commit~~ "to
tell w/you" & plunge ahead.
It will cost for years. We
try to work it out to avoid blood
shed & recommendations.

P where do leaders stand. They
didn't reject it w/ me.

K You talking to people who put
together DS supplemented, Egypt
debt. We all realize this is a
diff issue. To ~~note~~ ^{note} this ~~then~~
against your opposition perhaps not
a thing to do. I disagree w/ your
analysis, but we need to
look at this. Pat may be ^{almost} right
note in subcommittee

L We will know more after
Caucuses and both hearing today.
Meltz. said if we can work out
something he'd be a happier
man in a Senate. If caucus
can turn lose-lose into win-
win we are all better off.

I convinced me can come out
of this w/ a workable proposition.
Every senator wants successful
peace conf. There will be
absorption guarantees. US P, you
can ask other countries to help. But
debate was ~~was~~ ^{was} be wrong.

I There are many who are ~~happy~~
~~the~~ US helped Jewish emigration. Then
we asked Israel to take its ~~its~~ ^{its} ~~targets~~
during DS. I had more ~~casualties~~.

than Syria & others. They have
quite a reputation in past & didn't
object to E debt relief. When does
I get put over a bank. But I will
work to avoid bloodshed.

P Easier for me to say give them
a check. But that's not best for
peace. Issue is not whether
in giving money to I. It is
whether we have a chance for
peace. It is our duty now - all
of us - that money now would
be detrimental to peace process.
I don't want to create settlements
who gets what aid, etc. That
not beneficial to I or a peace
process. I don't want to bring
out what Shuman has told me
on settlements. Let's get a
peace conf going. This almost as
important as what happening
in S.C. It would be historic.

I I have heard ^{that} a number of people
have said 120 days, then support
for a peace & security.

P Not want to support a short
prog but support for absorption
aid.

K Don't referring to R or talks w/

Shovel - the six points. Key is what
will be your position in Jan. If
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end of month anyway. I would hope
that all sides willing to hold off a
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will be in trouble. Let's use this
time to try to work something out.
I covering in terrible shape. Maybe
they can blame us for having to
do what they need. Let's give it a
chance. We lose nothing by trying
to work it out.

P Let me read what we prepared to do
(Reads 10 points)

K To understand working we have to
look at legs. It also changes on
1 Oct. OMB does have some flex.
But key is point 2 - no further
delay. Should be language saying
we not in business of supporting
settlements w/c money. What
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K Mr. Neithan, There are side
statements each year. None of us
do.

P Good. But Sharon statements not
that way. Tough to contain myself
about his comments. Sharon wagging
this tail. Sharon put his
finger in my eye but I more
interested in peace process. I can
take some hits - but not too many

I Your point is valid. We should
try to generate ~~correction~~ ^{correction}. Ask
Jews ^{to} cool it for 10 days while
we try to work something out.

L (Discussion of subtitle)

^{Best} Hope is that people come out of caucus
saying this was complicated
than we thought.

K Well say we might push this off

...
+ other questions
you, will look at showing, hope
no one gets announcement on
anything over next couple of weeks

↳ Don't know what to do or not
do til Baker gets back).

P / Mitchell, Dole 7/12/91
Foley, Michel

P Very concerned about peace process
I aware of pressures you under.
I speak frankly. AIPAC is driving
this. We at verge of a peace conf.
which everyone wants. All experts
feel going forward now will kill
a peace process. (Described Sharon
speech + statement we promised
aid)

(Reeds a T. P.)

Then direct talks are essential. D.S.
make this process possible.

I wanted to avoid a public debate on
this - where I weigh in. I will
unapologetically defend settlement policy,
land for peace, 242 + 338. Best
debate won't help get ^{peace} core going.
So we asked for 120 day referral.

I represented to that I talked to that we
had a little time to discuss this + it
started that way - let Baker talk to
Shimon. Best lobby is now
working to present is w/ a joint
accompli. After advice from both
sides of aisle I can't just sit back.
Impression being created. I going to
have a list of what we have done
for F. Also that I will trade ~~for~~
support for 10 mil for 120 day delay.

This not a points in issue. I have
(Described Kasten Arsenal + securing)
The six points are being "interpreted."
They are literal + are not a
negotiating position. I won't promise
\$10 bill or \$100 mil in security.
My position not an opening gambit.
I have very sincere peace
process. I am being taken advantage
of. Our phones are strangely quiet.
I think because they think they can
roll us. This time there is too
much at stake. I want to take this
case, maybe in increments, to
our people. Probably press very today.
I will stay away from a full case
so as not to antagonize I. But
I will explain what we want & why
& I think our people will support
it. I won't go full court press now.
This not about enlargement or
support for absorption. It is about a
peace process. When a full case is
made I think I'll have a support
of our people. Not a position but
a policy issue. I tried to do this day,
but there is a snowball building
on Hill.

BM I know what you talking about.

Council of Ps all want to see deal today.

P Two ~~substantive~~ substantive issues. We helped w/ Edley & I didn't respond to Scud attack. (Rebuttal).

Once again I ask if he referred. If not, I go to genl ytes. If I don't, I will lose a ~~major~~ & a peace process. I may take some hits - encourage friends & particular races, etc. But this too important.

FBAH Your instinct to avoid debate is right but unfortunately you can't avoid it

ERR

GM

Can't avoid commitment under Sec 20 rules. I destroyed at Duane's hands out 6 points. asked for 2 wk restoration while - I don't know if he used term negotiations - while this was being worked. I surely was worried about Kister or 4 others offering amendment. We won't get to it until about 1 Oct. But anyone can offer anytime they want. Hasten/Duane introduced Amend & are seeking co sponsors.

I think most Senators would not want to be caught bet you & lobby. But there are some who want a fight to prove their devotion.

D I agree. If you go to court you will get ~~into~~ go to public support.

P I really just wanted to tell you I felt I had to be more public on this. Maybe not full court press right now. (Reads from Sharon statement)

GM I will try to get our guys not to do anything on a floor used.

F Basic thrust of argument is delay is to exert leverage. Dangling housing guarantees to keep I in peace process. I understand 6 points. Now members are saying if Admin would not oppose it in Jan.

P I have to show members I will not be like Creek ship Captain

F Congress/Comm are saying don't worry it will all be worked out. Members are worried about being outflanked by your work crew - or that you will work deal w/I & I supporters who back your present position will then be out on a limb.

GM One suggestion. Do it in a way which doesn't predetermine result. You're going public tho can equalize sides. Your six points are not a negot position but I assume you would talk about them

P I not trying to polarize position.

F If this gets very public you will get people speaking out on a whole pattern of support for I, which up to now has been sacrosanct.

CAR Paper said only Pell & Leach spoke for you at Comm. Pell spoke for Duany & not delay - not your delay.

P / Mayor Mitchell

9/12/91

P We have a big prob & I wanted to look
you in the eye & talk about all the activity
on the Hill today. Let me tell you my
game plan.
(Reads TP)

We are on a very ed historic peace process
D.S. puts us in position of being catalyst
for peace

We could go forward if Congress takes up a
guarantee now. Debate could not be
restricted just to that. It would be sharp
proloyant debate & dangerous for
peace process. Territories could come up
& debate on that now could destroy a
peace process.

We hoped to avoid a fight. We never
went to these guarantees.

I shouldn't have read a known piece
before I spoke to you.

Others see this big & want to see it
debated. Others feel I will come &
leave them ^{upset} ~~upset~~ to day. I had R/I
know to try to work it out. I just spoke
to the leaders. I can't sit back & watch
this erosion take place & keep quiet against
charges I'm trying to provide. I agreed
to 450 in return for delay of decision
to Sept. Now word going around that if
I get delay I will agree in Jan. That

wrong. My 6 points - not an opening game
^{Sorry} it is going this way. I know & know
side - but I am looking at a prospect
for peace and I have to stand up for
proper principles. I certainly this in best
interests of peace & when I take this to
Am people they will support me. My
side is not getting out. It is one way
street on a Hill. ~~It~~ Not an issue of
support for I or absorption. It is peace
process. We have a chance at a prob
which had plagued world for years.
Sorry to do this but I have no choice.

Out of fairness I wanted to tell you
M I appreciate this opportunity to talk.

We apprec. all you all have done
for everything. (Expands w/ details, eg false
description, Boba Yar, etc). Eruption of never again
drives & Jews, as does emigration. Lithuania
just released all war criminals. For 30
it wasn't possible to communicate a prob.
Then I was created - what peace joy. US
is only I find in a world. ~~We~~ I can't absorb
a immigrants right now.

We were surprised at delay request.
There was agreement on 450 not to raise
10 bil til Labor Day. But can't start early
then so we were mobilizing our forces
to get ready. Delay request shocked us.

If I remember a mistake, its existence is it
alone - only I in this sit. I needs conf.
They weren't prepared for delay request.

I trying to understand why it had to come
now. Arabs had agreed to come to conf.

The last thing we need is a confrontation.
We that this issue would be addressed in
Sept & approved. Confrontation is lose-lose
sit. Does delay merely postpone confrontation
I was remark for left progressives & chief.

We feel I can repay a loan. Delay
would be for total of 10 mms. By Jan will
be 50 or 60,000 more immigrants. It could
accelerate if anti-semitism increases in S.
Then there's big issue of settlements. For
Many Jews oppose settlements but that
should be settled at peace conf, not on
a loan issue. By Jan, we don't
know what Sharon will do. All we
are merely delaying a fight.

P What do you want a fight? If a fight
now, we don't think there will be a
peace process. We don't support linkage,
but settlements will be an issue &
a US position on settlements is being
flamantely flanked. I probably think
Sharon misled me. I ~~don't~~ don't
think it can be delayed in a debate.

M We don't want to see a liberal left fall

because it can not reach peace
by handling - reject.

We not anxious for confrontation. Some
think Cripps - Hoping for fight. Not so.
We want to be assured that a deal
will be available w/o confrontation.

But to step back we need to feel we
not just postponing a fight to free
we 3 more points! Want link guarantees
to issues to be solved at peace conf.

If a agreement on # we could see
up a flag. Think is rapid implementation
P Crit how debate w/o settlements being
brought up & I won't change US policy.
So I can't represent ore #1. One can't,
we support something. What do you
mean rapid implementation

M On 400 mil it took - wants
to disperse

P That because you didn't meet
a condition - & still haven't.

M I would hope we could have some fair

P Time is working against us. We tried
& ~~the~~ our world crowd is not getting
out. I won't go full court press, but
I think I must say something today
to give peace a chance. If that not
enough, I would use my office to go
into - issue fully. I don't like to be

X advise w/ friends, but I cannot let
this erode w/ regarding the peace process
M We have pleaded w/ it to tell public
rhetoric down, but muted voices in
that country don't exist. I haven't given
up working something out. I hope you
will keep rhetoric down so as not
to inflame a issue. We will be
doing it that way. If you must
say something, please try to do it that way.
P I must go out & defend my position,
prevent these distortions & get my side
out to a public.
Glad we have someone like you
to discuss this w.

P/Kaifu 8/26/91

K even 2 executives should act together in face of dissolution of SC. The movement is toward reform there which is good. Discontent w/ Govt is mounting. But he has done so much we can't "discharge" him. Conf. How do you see his future?

P yes, we shouldn't "discharge" him. Yelloni a big winner. Let's be cautious & careful. Execs are moving in right direction. Some here think Govt will be figured out, tho that may be premature.

(Described Kohl / Mubarak)
We under pressure to recon Baltics EC mtg tomorrow to discuss what is Jap position.

K In Diet I made clear we support independence of Baltics. It should be done quickly & Japan shouldn't be behind. I said we would be recon after Baltics accomplish their independence.

P One more point in econ. Some say comp wouldn't have happened if we had been more generous. I think that nonsense.

K Now I know from you what Kohl is really up to - not pushing aid. At Sharpa mtg, we agree this mtg should be exchange of views, not decision making. Watanabe will stick close to Zolles.

P Great. Same w/ dep. Fin min mtg.

- K I see doing Suite to Museum Treasurer
to discuss US/Jap issues w/ Carl + Yelton
- P OK. Hope he gets to back to them.
- K I want him to gather info on SV.
- P I think now is time for watchful
caution. We not ready to take formal
positions or sit or personnel.

Prepared
statement

Meeting w/ Muhl. PM on Tuesday. Currently
wildly. Will have something more
to say on Friday

- Call Butler

Rapid moving. Time
for evaluation and
action

~~calling for advice for 40 yrs.~~

~~Involved adherence to a principle
of advice
Secession laws too over.~~

- Send in Ambassador

- De facto control of territory

But -
contingencies

- P to Kahl -

- SV.

Cheney - Major - N. J. 7.

P/Kohl phone call 8/26(?) / 91

K EC mtg beginning. I think they will recog Baltic states & we will do that tomorrow in Cabinet

P Others are doing it also. We will do it soon. I wish we knew a little more than we do about a sit, but we don't, so we'll have to do w/o it

K I told Yeltsin he should coop closely w/ Orb. Dissolution of SU would be catastrophic. Esp Ukraine.

P Ukraine has declared indep

K Depends what they receive.

P I think you have good point about not leaving all at once & keeping in touch w/ center. Orb said he'd resign if Union broke up - he may also help to

K We should keep him if possible

P On Europe mtg, we have no contacts - I don't think that was your position

K Yes. we have to see what is going on before we can make a decision

P Nothing has been done since London to make aid more effective

K I said that in a statement today

P Let's stay in close touch on all this.

8/12

Florence,

This is a memo from when I had not yet learned to decipher the General's handwriting. You then asked Candi to try her hand, but she had not been able to get to it before she left in March. Since I was covering both my job & Zelikow's I couldn't either until now.

AAB

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Mitterrand of France
on July 13, 1989

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Notetaker

Francois Mitterrand, President
Jacques Attali, Notetaker
Christopher Thierry, Interpreter

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262010-0530-MR
MM 4/21/2016

DATE, TIME July 13, 1989,
AND PLACE: Elysee Palace, Paris

President Mitterrand: (Discusses decoration.) ✓

The President: Is this your regular office? (U)

President Mitterrand: This is my ceremonial office. Mine is
next door. (U)

The President: The ceremony was moving and eloquent. I thought
it was beautifully done. (U)

President Mitterrand: Thank you. (U)

The President: Were the children and the others actors? (U)

President Mitterrand: The woman was an actress. (discussion of
the Trocadero performance) (U) ✓

I am receiving you here as President. I have that feeling of
mutual confidence. Without getting into domestic politics, I had
a good feeling for our relations when you were elected. That was
reinforced at Kennebunkport. I see you as more than the head of
a superpower. Please feel at home here. There are squabbles
about security and administration. (U)

The President: There is a saying that no Porcupine is so thin
that it doesn't have two sides. (U) ①

President Mitterrand: We can leave it to Attali and Scowcroft to
settle all problems. (U)

The President: Just a word on Poland and Hungary. There was not
an expectation that they would receive a giant check to fill out

on their own. They know they must do it themselves. The Hungarian leaders are most impressive. The Hungarian people are so warm and friendly. They are convinced that Gorbachev wants real change. What worries me is Poland; it is that labor will make extreme demands which could lead to a crackdown. That is why Walesa doesn't do it. What do you think? (S)

President Mitterrand: I foresee coexistence between political authority and popular power. It is unstable, but it must succeed. If the state cracks down, there will be chaos. If popular power goes too fast, there will be chaos. Either way, this could lead to Soviet intervention. They won't let anyone move away from their alliance, except maybe in 50 years. (S)

I prefer Jaruzelsky. He has lived through an experience. He is battered but experienced, and he won't want to go through it again. It would be ideal if Jaruzelsky and Walesa could both remain. (S)

The President: Would you like to share any thoughts about Gorbachev? (S)

President Mitterrand: He is in the best frame of mind that I have seen him in years. Yet he is more imperiled than ever before. He will continue to try to impose his authority, perhaps more harshly. He is afraid to go that far, however, because that would jeopardize his course of action. He does not like the Chinese course. He feels threatened. He says he never has time to sleep. He is harassed. He made a couple of critical remarks about the U.S. He said they aren't helping in Afghanistan. I pulled my troops out and they still are around. (S) (2)

I said: "Maybe it is because you are aiding Najibullah. Why don't you talk about it?" The other remark was about pulling Soviet troops out of Poland. He said, "I would ~~not~~ last one week if I accepted that." But he likes you. (S) *only*

The President: He is concerned, I guess, about my remarks. (These were discussed.) I think I should get in touch with him, with your consent. (S)

President Mitterrand: The thing which most worried him was the internal situation of the countries of Europe. He wasn't concerned about your diplomatic intentions. As a new President, I think it would be good for you to meet with him. (S)

The President: Even without an arms limitation agreement? (S)

President Mitterrand: You don't have to talk arms control. You are the superpowers. You can talk about anything. My view is that you should exchange views with Gorbachev. (S)

The President: I am not set in concrete on this. (S)

President Mitterrand: You could say that we don't know each other as Presidents. Why don't we meet informally? You could work out the protocol. (S)

The President: Is he worried that we don't want perestroika to succeed? (S)

President Mitterrand: I don't think so. If he did, that would be dangerous. But I don't think so. (S)

The President: In New York, he said that elements in the United States want perestroika to fail. But he said he would never give up. (S)

President Mitterrand: It would be good to clear the matter up. Ronald Reagan established a personal relationship with Gorbachev. I think he would like one with you. I was going to write you about it. (S)

The President: Could we have a moment on the Middle East? On Lebanon, the only thing I see that is promising is the Arab League proposal. What do you think? (S)

President Mitterrand: It is the only way to go, but I am pessimistic. The three factions don't agree on much among themselves. (S)

I fear there will be an offensive on East Beirut. If the Christians move into East Beirut, there could be a massacre. Israel has not been helpful. If Israel joined in, that would give the Syrians an excuse. (S)

If the ^{not} ~~GP's~~ keep stressing the unity of Lebanon, the Syrians wouldn't dare attack. We need to keep the Iraqi troops out of Lebanon. Repeated assertions hoping for the success of the negotiations and calling for security and unity for Lebanon would help. Gorbachev would do that. He told me that Syria does not want to make a fool of itself. We could stress security and unity without cutting across the Arab negotiations. We can perhaps stop the massacre. The Arabs are useful because they are family and co-religionists, but they don't have a precise turn of mind. (S)

3

The President: The politics of Israel don't help. (S)

President Mitterrand: It is a bad situation. (S)

The President: Sharon is pushing things to the right. (S)

President Mitterrand: It encourages extremists on both sides. Are you tired from your trip to Eastern Europe? (S)

The President: No, I am very exhilarated at what I have seen during the past three days. (S)

President Mitterrand: You must be careful not to push them to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. Indirect action, especially in the economic field is okay, but that was the problem with Imre Nagy. When he declared Hungarian neutrality, the Russian troops moved in. Now it is too soon to think about dissolving the Warsaw Pact. It can happen by the end of the century, but not now. I forecast that 10 years ago. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

Wittmann

Paris
7/13/89

M Discussion of deer

P Is this your regular office?

M This is my ceremonial office
main is next door

P The ceremony was moving &
eloquent. & that it was beautifully
done

M Thank you.

P were children & other actors?

M The woman is an actress

(Discussion of the Tronard performance)

M I am receiving you here as P. I have
that feeling of mutual confidence. I got
getting into domestic pt. I have
good feeling for our relations when
you were killed. That happened
at K B. You as more than head

superpower { of responsibility. Please feel at home
[there are squabbles but security &
admission]

① ✓ P There is saying that no process is
there it doesn't have 2 sides

M Attale + Soc. to can settle all.

P [Interested in New York comment
on Libya]

Just a word on P + H. There was
not an expectation they expected
a great check to civilization.

They know they want to do it themselves.

(*) HHS could not decipher & returned to Flo. Flo asked C. D. to help. C. D. returned

(Rec'd
8/28/89 by
HHS, w/o
trans-
mittal
note
(*)

for HHS to. 10/1/89

The H leaders are most aggressive
H people so warm + friendly. They
convinced Gov wants real change.
What worries are in place,
Is that labor will make extreme
demands which could lead to
crackdown

[That why w doesn't
what do you think?]

Mitt?

Coexistence but ~~not~~ not exte authorit
& popular power. Unstable but it
must succeed. If state backs
down - chaos, if popular power
goes to fast - chaos. Either may lead
lead to gov intervention. They won't
let anyone wave away free
alliance under in 50 yrs. I
prefer Jan. He has lived there
an experience - he is better
best experienced. Want want to
go thru it again. I deal if
Jan & Walcott could both remain
would you share any info about
carb. [Still S Carb (Coffin)]

11/1 He is in best frame of mind
for years
He is more impartial than ever
before. He will continue to try

Hansen

to misrep his authority + perhaps
more harshly. He fears to go that
far because that jeopardizes his
course. Doesn't like Chinese course
He feels threatened. Says never has
time to ~~think~~ sleep. He is Hansen.
He had couple of critical remarks
about US. They aren't helping in
appear. I pulled my troops out +
they still are. I said maybe
~~change~~ ^{very} ~~regret~~ ^{very} ~~and~~ ^{very} ~~Marshall~~ ^{very} ~~I don't~~ ^{very} ~~you~~
talk about it. The other was troops
out of Poland. I would last only
one week if I accepted that. But he
leaves you

P He is concerned I guess about ~~your~~
my remark. (Deserved)

* I think I should get in Touches/
him, w/ your (H) consent.

III Thing which most worried him
was internal situation of corridor
of E Europe. He ~~wasn't~~ ^{wasn't} worried
about your dip. intention. As
usual P I think it good to meet
him

P ~~Even~~ w/ AL agreement

II Don't have to talk ~~are~~. You are
a ~~superpower~~. You don't talk
about anything. They want to give

should exchange views

P I just in comments on it.

M You could say we don't know each other as P's, let's not let's meet informally. You could work out a protocol

P Do the worried we don't want press. to service

M I don't think so. If we did, that would be dangerous, but I don't think so

P In ~~the~~ my he said element in US want Peres to fail. Said we would never give up

M It would be good to clear matters up. RR establish a personal relationship. I think he would like one w/ you. I am going to write you about it

P Can we have a minute on M.F.?

On balance, only thing I see as Arab danger. What you think.

M It's only way to go left I personally think I don't see or much there - selves. I think GPs can't contact diplomatically because of Arab redemption work. I fear there will be an offensive on E Beirut if Christians were into E Beirut there could be war between Israel not helped. If F

joined that would just Syria
an expense. If the G.P.S keep stressing
a unity of Syria Lebanon, Syria
wouldn't have attack.

?

We need to keep Iraqi Frang of
Lebanon. Repeated assertions hoping
for success of recent + calling for
security & unity for Lebanon, that
would help. Arab would do that.
He told me Syria must not
make a fool of itself. We could
stop security & unity w/ cutting
across a Arab negotiators

We can perhaps stop a war.
The Arabs are useful because they
are purely & co religious. But they
don't have precise line of round
Politics of I don't buy

P
M

It is bad

✓? P Sharon is picking things to a input

III

It is encourages treaty on both sides.
are you tired?

P

No. I am exhausted at what I have
seen the past 3 days.

We must be careful not to push
them to w/ draw from Lebanon
Part. In fact action, esp. economic
is OK, but that was the prop w/

various
part
Judith
Nancy
to room
room.
End of
meeting

Imre Nagy. When he declared
Hungarian neutrality, the
Russian troops moved in. Now is
too soon to think about disarming
the C. P. It ~~can~~ can happen by the
end of the century, but not now. I
~~think~~ ^{think} that 10 yrs ago.