

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memorandum of Conversations/Telephone Conversations Files

OA/ID Number: 91156
Folder ID Number: 91156-006

Folder Title:
Memcons/Telcons (January-December) 1991 [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	7	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with King Hassan of Morocco (4 pp.)	9/26/91	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memcon	Re: Meeting with King Hassan of Morocco (4 pp.)	9/26/91	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation with President Abdou Diouf of Senegal (2 pp.)	9/10/91	(b)(1)	S
02b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Diouf 1-on-1 (3 pp.)	9/10/91	(b)(1)	
03a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia (2 pp.)	10/22/91	(b)(1)	S
03b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Havel 1-on-1 (2 pp.)	10/22/91	(b)(1)	
04a. Draft Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (4 pp.)	10/29/91	(b)(1)	S
04b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Gonzalez in Madrid (6 pp.)	10/28/91	(b)(1)	
05. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President - L - Delors (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1296
OA/ID Number: 91156-006
Date Closed: 8/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06. Handwritten Memcon	Re: Key Largo 1-on-1 (8 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
07a. Draft Telcon	Re: Telcon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	12/16/91	(b)(1)	
07b. Memo	President Bush to Brent Scowcroft Re: EC (ag) (cereals) (rebalancing) (etc.) (1 pp.)	12/16/91	(b)(1)	
08. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Telephone Call to Yeltsin (3 pp.)	12/13/91	(b)(1)	
09. Handwritten Message	Re: Message from Lubbers (2 pp.)	12/11/91	(b)(1)	
10. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Gorbachev (3 pp.)	11/30/91	(b)(1)	
11. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Menem (3 pp.)	11/14/91	(b)(1)	
12. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Mitterrand (1 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	
13. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Kohl (1 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Meetings Files
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WHORM Cat.:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
14. Handwritten Telcon	President/Major (1 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	
15. Handwritten Telcon	Re: Brady (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1296
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Date Closed: 8/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Florence -

Richard is
leaving up
to you who
gets copy of
this one-on
one - memo.

Anne

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

NON-LOG

September 27, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS 

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting between the President and King Hassan of Morocco, September 26, 1991, Oval Office

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and King Hassan of Morocco on September 26, 1991.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record. Distribution should be limited to General Scowcroft, Mr. Gates and myself.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I

Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 8/4/09

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with King Hassan of Morocco (4 pp.)	9/26/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files

Document Partially Declassified

(Copy of Document Follows)

By EL On 5/19/22

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [1]

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91156-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0474-MR(500)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 6/22/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NON-LOG



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with King Hassan of Morocco (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft

King Hassan of Morocco
Ambassador Mohamed Belkhatat

DATE, TIME September 26, 1991, 11:10 - 11:55 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President and King Hassan met in the Oval Office at 11:10 a.m.

President: Welcome. Let me raise first a couple of points before we go into the other room. (U)

King Hassan: May I smoke? (U)

President: I'll begin with just a couple of points where there may be a slight difference between us. We were disappointed when the Maghreb Union did not agree to attend the peace conference. We would welcome your assistance here. The other area is Iraq. We continue to be concerned about Saddam Hussein. For us, we cannot tolerate his violations of UN Security Council resolutions. We do not want sanctions lifted. We will support humanitarian relief. But we will undertake serious actions if he persists. He is testing us. I don't want to be in a position of threatening him but I want to be frank with you. I know about the pressures on you and others but it would be a serious mistake to lift sanctions. One other point. We have grave differences with Qadhafi. We can brief you about why we worry. Mubarak differs with us. Pan Am 103 may end up at Libya's door. The evidence is pointing in that direction--almost certainly. These are my concerns which I wanted to discuss frankly and in private. These are the only areas with any nuance of difference--and maybe not with you. We have good relations with Chadli, but not with Qadhafi. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0474-MR
E8 6/22/15

SECRETKing Hassan: Thanks for your candor.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

President: Thanks for the explanation. The more visible the support for the Arab countries, the more chance that the conference will take place.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

King Hassan: For Morocco, I am 100 percent behind you. The Maghreb Union says that if Egypt and Syria accept, we will be there as observers. (S)

(Discussion of who supported Soviet Coup). (C)

President: Why did Arafat do it? (C)King Hassan:

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(C)

President: I will get to work on it. (U)King Hassan:

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(C)

President:

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(C)

King Hassan:

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(C)

President: What's wrong? (U)King Hassan:

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(C)

President: Who would replace him? (U)SECRET

SECRET

King Hassan: No one. (Goes on to discuss various personalities,
1.4(b); 1.4(d)

Back to Iraq, the humanitarian assistance is important. As president of the Maghreb Union, I am not a free agent, but my group contains those who supported Iraq, more the people than Saddam. (C)

President: What should we do? We are not against the people but he terrorizes his people. 1.4(b); 1.4(d) (S)

King Hassan: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

President: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

King Hassan: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

President: I hope it can happen, but in the meantime we must enforce UN resolutions. I don't want to risk the lives of the Iraqi people. (S)

King Hassan: You have much to consider. 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

President: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

King Hassan: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

President: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(C)

King Hassan: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(C)

SECRET

SECRET

President: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

King Hassan: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

[What followed was a discussion of French speaking parts of Africa]. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

President: Shall we go in? This has been a good, good discussion. (U)

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

NON-LOG

September 27, 1991

ACTION

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Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/4/09

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Memcon	Re: Meeting with King Hassan of Morocco (4 pp.)	9/26/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection

Series: Meetings Files

Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [1]

Document Partially Declassified

(Copy of Document Follows)

By EG On 5/19/22

Date Closed: 8/4/2009

OA/ID Number: 91156-006

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #: 2010-0474-MR(500.01)

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition: Released in Part

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date: 6/22/2015

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SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NON-LOG



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SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0474-MR
Ef 6122115

SECRET

King Hassan: Thanks for your candor. 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

President: Thanks for the explanation. The more visible the support for the Arab countries, the more chance that the conference will take place. 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

King Hassan: For Morocco, I am 100 percent behind you. The Maghreb Union says that if Egypt and Syria accept, we will be there as observers. (S)

(Discussion of who supported Soviet Coup). (C)

President: Why did Arafat do it? (C)

King Hassan: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

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President: I will get to work on it. (U)

King Hassan: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(C)

President: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(C)

King Hassan: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

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President: What's wrong? (U)

King Hassan: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

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President: Who would replace him? (U)

SECRET

SECRET

King Hassan: No one. (Goes on to discuss various personalities,
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President: What should we do? We are not against the people but he terrorizes his people. 1.4(b); 1.4(d) (S)

King Hassan: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

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President: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

King Hassan: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

President: I hope it can happen, but in the meantime we must enforce UN resolutions. I don't want to risk the lives of the Iraqi people. (S)

King Hassan: You have much to consider. 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

President: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

King Hassan: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

President: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

King Hassan: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(S)

SECRET

SECRET

President: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(C)

King Hassan: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

(C)

[What followed was a discussion of French speaking parts of Africa]. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

President: Shall we go in? This has been a good, good discussion. (U)

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6678

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

September 20, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: TED MCNAMARA

FROM: WALTER H. KANSTEINER *WHL*

SUBJECT: Memcon with President Abdou Diouf of Senegal

Attached at Tab I is the One-on-One Memorandum of Conversation in the Oval Office between the President and President Diouf, September 10.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I for the record.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memcon

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 8/4/09

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6678

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with President Abdou Diouf of Senegal

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

President Abdou Diouf

DATE, TIME September 10, 1991, 10:30 a.m. - 10:45 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: I just have a few points. I want to thank you for Desert Storm. I have a few observations on the Soviet developments. Also I have good news on debt relief -- PL-480. I am still concerned about Qadhafi. (C)

President Diouf: I appreciate the honor of this visit. I admire the way you take on and fulfill respect as leader of the world. I am proud of what we did in Desert Storm. (C)

The President: That was historic. I regret we still have Saddam Hussein, but I believe we did the right thing. (C)

President Diouf: We had great success. I didn't think it would wind up so quickly. It was remarkable. I am in the process of organized the Islamic Conference, December 11-14. I will try to forge some unity. This is a plenary meeting. Kuwait said Arafat wanted to go there to improve relations with Kuwait. Kuwait asked me to do nothing. We should not be duped, and we should not reach out for reconciliation, especially with the PLO. (C)

The President: Saddam Hussein is trying to work his way back in under the guise of Arab unity. He hasn't learned a thing. (C)

President Diouf: He is arrogant. We should keep the pressure on. A new leadership would try to establish some ties. (C)

The President: If you could send word that if Saddam Hussein left, the U.S. would give Iraq every fair chance to restore its credibility. (C)

President Diouf: No one could be worse then Saddam Hussein. (C)

The President: Take Paraguay. He turned out not to be so bad. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
2/21/2008 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Diouf: What are your feelings on Iran? Given its position on the Gulf War, do you think they are reliable over the long run? (C)

The President: You may be a better judge. Our big problems are hostages. It looks like Rafsanjani is trying. I am pleased you have better relations. They are a bit reluctant to have open contacts with us. It is an internal problem for them. (C)

President Diouf: Congratulations on your energetic response to the Soviet coup. You gave us all room to do what is right. We are fearful about disintegration of the Soviet Union and control of nuclear weapons especially. What you think? (C)

The President: I think the nuclear issue will be okay but, I can't be sure the republics issue will remain peaceful. We don't know enough to make confident predications. I don't even know where all these republics are. I like Gorbachev and Yeltsin cooperating. I will get pressures to eliminate my armed forces. Gorbachev is a good man, and he has had a hell of a time. I give him great credit. (C)

Shall we go inside? (U)

President Diouf: The PL-480 relief is very good news. It is very welcome. Just a word about Senegal politics. I have brought the opposition leader into the government, Mr. Wade. He and his party agreed to our sending troops to Desert Storm. His cooperation helps stability. It is not a move to a one-party state. (C)

We have vigorous party system. And I want to make it clear that I am not moving backward. (U)

The President: No. No one has made such an accusation. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

P/Dionuf 9/10/91
1 on 1

- P I just have a few points. Want to thank you for D.S. I have a few observations on S & D reports. I have good news on debt relief - PL 480. Still concerned about Kaddafi.
- D Apprec. & honor of this visit. Admire & way you take on & fulfill responsibilities of a world. Proud of what we did in D.S.
- P That was historic. I regret we still have SH, but I believe we did right thing.
- D We had great success. Didn't think it would wind up so quickly. It was remarkable. I in process of organizing Islamic Conf: Dec 11-14. Try to forge some unity. This is a plenary mtg. Kuwait said Kuwait wanted to go there one to improve relations w/ Kuwait. Kuwait asked I do nothing. We should not be duped & we should not reach out for reconciliation - esp w/ PLO.
- P S.H. is trying to work his way back in under guise of Arab Unity. He hasn't learned a thing.
- D He is arrogant. We should keep pressure on. A new leadership will would let us establish same ties.

P If you could spread word that if
S.H. left the US would give Iraq every
fair chance to restore its credibility.

D No one could be worse than S.H.

P Take Paraguay. The times could be not
so bad.

D What are your feelings on Iran?
Give its position on Gulf War,
do you think they reliable now
longer now

P You may be better judge. ~~Set~~ Our
big probs are hostages. Looks like
Rufsum is trying. I pleased you
have better ~~relate~~ relatives. They are
a bit reluctant to have open
contacts w/ us. Internal problem for
them.

D Congrats on your energetic response
to Sav ^{coup} coup. You gave us all room
to do what is right. We feared about
dissemination of S.C. Continuity of rules
exp. what you think.

P I think I make some with me, but
can't be sure a republic issue will
remain ~~open~~ peaceful. We don't
~~know~~ enough to make confident
predictions. I don't even know
where all these Republics are. I
like Cno & Yelstein are cooperating.

I will yet press on to eliminate
my crowd factor. Gorb is a good
man & he has had helluva time
I give him great credit. Shall
not go inside?

D The PH 480 relief is really very
good news. It is very welcome.
Just a word about Senegal photo. I
brought opposition into part - Wada.
He & his party agreed w/ us
sending troops to D.S. His cooperation
helps stability - not a move to one party
state. We have a vigorous party
system - want to make clear & am
not moving backward

P No. No one has ~~up~~ made an
accusation.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Vaclav Havel of
Czechoslovakia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lisa Valyiova, Interpreter

Vaclav Havel, President
Alexandr Vondra, Security Adviser to the
President
Alexandra Brabcova, Interpreter

DATE, TIME October 22, 1991, 10:35 - 10:53 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Feel free to raise anything you may not wish to discuss in the main meeting. Welcome to the White House. (Ø)

President Havel: I am delighted to be here. I know you are busy and hope this visit doesn't take too much of your time. Let's agree on what topics we should discuss. (Ø)

The President: Fine. Here is my list. I would like your views on the Czech-Slovak problem. We don't want to interfere, but I would be interested in your views. Another is European security. We have a NATO meeting coming up, and we could present our views. Then there are bilateral issues. I know defense conversion is important to you. If we can help, we will do so. I will be glad to discuss any economic issues you may want to raise. Next, Yugoslavia: we haven't had the lead role, and it is not clear to me what useful role the U.S. could play at this point. I would welcome your views; it is in your region. Finally, change in the Soviet Union and the Middle East: change in the Soviet Union has been so dramatic since we last met. Maybe I have left some topics out. (Ø)

President Havel: I wanted to raise these same subjects. I also want to convey the best wishes of President Herzog, who visited our country just before I left and gave me his views on the peace process. (Ø)

The President: A conference, if it convenes, will be a long process with much shouting. (Ø)

President Havel: You have our admiration for bringing things this far. I understand you will attend the opening in Madrid.

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
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EJ 6/22/15

~~SECRET~~

2

It will be a long conference, and if Prague would be a useful site, I would offer it for the meetings. (S)

The President: Thank you. We will keep it in mind. (S)

President Havel: Prague may be We have good relations with Israel and the PLO office. (S)

The President: We leave Monday night, see Gorbachev on Tuesday, open the conference on Wednesday, and come home. (S)

President Havel: My delegation includes the Minister of the Interior and others at the conference. Talks, I think, are going well. (S)

The President: I certainly hope so. If any problems develop, we can talk about them at the end of the day. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

P/Havel 10/22/91
1 on 1

P Feel free to raise anything you
may wish to discuss in a
main meeting. Welcome to a lot

H Delighted to be here. Know you very
much & hope this doesn't take too much time
lets agree here on what Topics
we should discuss

P Fine. Here is my list. I would like
your opinion on a C-S prob. Don't
want to interfere but would be
interested.

Another is E-mo security. We
have a NATO meeting coming up &
we could present our views.
Then there are bilateral issues. Sog.
conversion is important if we can
help. Any other issues.

Yugo. We haven't had lead role.
Welcome your views. Not clear
what useful role US could play.
It is your region.

Change in SV & ME. Change in S-
has been so dramatic since we
last met. Maybe I have left someone

H I wanted to raise these more subject
I want to convey best wishes of
P. Havel who visited our country just
before I left & of me & my two friends

P It is a conference - will be a long

- process w/ much shouting.
- H You have our admiration for
bringing things this far. I understand
you will attend - seeing in Munich
Will be long conf + if Prague would
be useful I would offer it for entry
- P Thank you. Will keep it in mind.
- H Prague may be merged - graduation
w/ Israel & PhD office.
- P We leave Wednesday night, see Carl
on Tues, open conf Wed + come home.
- H My delegation includes Min. Justice
& others + a conf. Czechs I think are going
well
- P I certainly hope so. If any probs
drop we can talk at end of day.
-

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez
of Spain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs (Notetaker)
Joseph Zappala, Ambassador to Spain
Interpreter

Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister
Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez, Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Eleuterio Roberto Dorado, Director of
the Office of the Presidency
Jose Maria Pons, International Affairs
Advisor
Jaime de Ojeda, Ambassador to the U.S.
Interpreter

DATE, TIME October 29, 1991, 6:00 - 6:56 p.m.
AND PLACE: Madrid, Spain

The President: Thank you very much for your hospitality, not only for us but for all the participants in this historic peace conference. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: It's a great pleasure and honor for us to host this historic event. If all of Jim Baker's predictions come true, we will be justly rewarded. I note that the U.S. brought over 80,000 kilos of gear. There are over 100 American reporters here, and that's only the beginning. (U)

The President: President Salinas gave me a read out on his meeting with Castro. He reports that Castro indicated he would hold elections and would leave if he loses. Salinas is doing a good job, and he has very great respect for you. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, he is providing fantastic services for the whole region. But I must say that my information about the Castro meeting is not so positive. I am, however, pleased with the good results of the elections in Colombia on Sunday. I also met with Peruvian President Fujimora last Sunday. He briefed me on his counternarcotics campaign. I will send you more detailed information on this because for the first time I think we could have a success on the anti-production side. Peru

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now produces 60% of the region's cocaine on over 200,000 hectares. (Ø)

The President: Fujimora tells me the total cost of the crop is \$100 million. He says the labor unions and everybody else agree that you could buy out a crop. But wouldn't it just show up somewhere else? (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: We could probably cut production by half. In the EC, we could do it. We call it set-aside production. We pay people not to grow. They could then raise alternative crops. Maybe we could even use those crops for food aid. The first year, we could just buy the coca leaf. The second year, we could begin the production of alternative products. (Ø)

Back to the peace process for a moment. This morning I met with the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation. They want something on the suspension of new settlements. Nothing more than that. This would let them participate in the bilateral process. They would like to have those bilaterals here in Spain. Then I met with Prime Minister Shamir. He was in a good frame of mind. He said the longer we go, the better. But he wants to continue the meetings in the region. These are my two impressions. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Did the Palestinians make clear exactly what kind of a gesture they wanted on settlements? For example, not starting new settlements after the bilaterals begin? (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: No. (U)

The President: May I shift to El Salvador for a moment? We think it would be very good if you and the UN Secretary General's Representative Goulding could re-engage in order to get the process going again. (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes. Just today a new problem was called to my attention with De Soto. He was called as an intermediary between the two parties in the conflict, but he doesn't seem to realize that one party is a state and the other is a guerrilla apparatus. Now the FMLN is demanding that the guerrilla high command be integrated into the army. That was rejected earlier in New York. (Ø)

(Ordonez read a paper describing the state of play.)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: The moderator is trapped. The situation was loosened up by Perez de Cuellar and the group of friends. We need to drive it and channel it again to Perez de Cuellar. (Ø)

The President: De Soto has a brother in Peru who has a good vision of what can be done there. (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: If we could give growers in Peru \$400 each, we could deal with the problem. I think it is worth

trying. Peru needs \$800 million worth of rice. They could grow it there. The poor peasants are shot at by the army and the drug dealers. (Ø)

The President: Do you think that Colombian President Gaviria is making progress? He is trying, but I'm not so sure of the results. (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I think he will survive. But, if he can break the present Mafia, it will be easier for the judges to regain authority. His program toward the traffickers seems to be working, and I think he will get them to surrender. That will operate like a vaccination. The biggest problem is Cali. There is also a change in tune with Bolivia. With help, they can do it, I think. But the level of violence in Cali is going up. How did you find Gorbachev? (Ø)

The President: He was glad to see us and to have these talks. Our analysts think his power is eroding. He told us he is in close touch with Yeltsin. Some (of my analysts) wonder if he will even survive. They haven't yet sorted out their problems with the republics, so it is hard to help him out. Clearly, he is no longer a super power. His problems are so enormous. He thought the G-7 meeting had gone well. Our news is that it was a disaster. The G-7 doesn't seem to be in line with what he thinks. What else? (Ø)

Secretary Baker: (Describes Gorbachev's explanation of the current situation in the Soviet Union.) (U)

The President: A key area of interest to us is the control of Soviet nuclear weapons. Gorbachev gave us assurances, but the Ukraine has made contradictory comments. (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: The greatest danger is not only the weapons themselves, but all the know-how to build them. Gorbachev's maneuver room is very narrow. There is no real juridical or political link between the republics and the center. The biggest mistake was to legitimize the republic leaders. Yeltsin is legitimate via the ballot box. Gorbachev has no such legitimacy. The greatest danger is the centrifical forces in the republics. That can spin out of control in an uncertain state of affairs that could also paralyze arms control. (Ø)

The President: It could be that Gorbachev thinks much of this is posturing and that there will be a better situation after the Ukrainian elections. (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Rebuilding the center has to happen quickly, but there are no ministers and no financing for it. (Ø)

The President: Gorbachev feels Yeltsin is unpredictable. (He then described his phone conversation with Yeltsin.) (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: When I last visited the USSR, I could see the economic situation was extremely serious, but less so

than the center-republic problem. There are fewer clear climbers there than economists. They don't know what the rule of law is. They don't know the difference between executive and legislative. The judiciary is an alien concept to them. There is an argument for talking directly to the republics. They have held elections, but their thinking is no better than the center. (Ø)

The President: Our agricultural people who went there felt there was not an acute shortage but a distribution problem. No starvation. Gorbachev did say the republics promised responsibility for debt-sharing with the center. The worst scenario would be a knight on a white horse coming along and promising order as a result of our not helping. (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, just a strong man. That is Gorbachev's only advantage. No one wants the union, but they can't do without it right now. (Ø)

The President: We haven't even discussed the Baltics. (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: They are not behaving well with their minorities. This is a problem for the Europeans. There are many similar problems in Europe. Your problems in America are easier. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

P/Gonzales 10/28/91
in Madrid

21
G. Gonyea

P (Thanks for hospitality)

6 Count pleasure & honor. If all Baker
predictions come true - on reporters -
we will be fine. US brought 80 000 bel.
of gear. 700^{US} reporters etc.

P Salinas told me Castro said he expects
have elections & would I leave if he leaves ^{loose}
Salinas doing good job - he's ^{has} great
respect for you.

C- He knowing fantastic success. But my info about Castro entry not so positive. Good results on Colombia elections Sunday. I met w/ ^{Peru} Enrique last Sunday. He told me of a cert^{Counter} narco campaign. I will send you a info because for 1st time we could have success on anti-production side. Peru produces 60% & that on 200000 hectares.

P He tells me total cost of crop 100 with
5000 labor unions & everybody else agrees
you could buy out a crop - but wouldn't
it crop up somewhere else?

G We could prob cut production by $\frac{1}{2}$.
In EC we could do it - set aside
prod. Pay people not to grow. They
could raise ^{alternative} cult. crops. We could use
these crops for food and ^{and} 1st year
just buy coca leaf, 2nd year =

Back to peace ^{conference} ~~conf.~~ This evening I
met w/ Jordan/Pales delegation. It
wants something on ^{SUSPENSION} suspension of
new settlements - ^{nothing} nothing more. This
would let them partic^{ipate} in bilateral
process - they want it here.

Then I met w/ Sharir. In good frame
of mind. He said a longer way of
going ^{the} better. He wants to continue
a ^{the} intp in region.

There are ^{two} 2 inputs. ^{present} ~~present~~
Baker (Clarification of Pales commitment on
settlements.). Not to start new settle-
ments after bilateral begin?

P May I shift to Galvador. Whether ^{Goulden} Goulden
re^{engagement} engagement could get a process
going again

C Today a new prot. Prot w/ de Soto.
He was called as intermediary bet 2 parties
in conflict. He doesn't realize 1 party
is a state & 1 is a guerrilla group.
Now FMKN is dismissing that guerrilla
high ^{level} ~~level~~ ^{command} be ^{incorporated} ~~incorporated~~ into army.
That ^{was} rejected in NY earlier.

Ord. (Reads paper)

G The mandate is trapped. It loosened
up by P D Q & group of friends. We
need a direct channel ^{channel} again to P D Q

P De Soto has a notice in favor who

He that the G-7 meeting had gone well.
Our news is it was a disaster.

G-7 doesn't seem eager to adhere to what he thinks.

What else?

13 (Describes verb explanation of sit.)

P Key area of interest is rules. He gave reassurances, but Ukraine has made ^{contradictory} contradictory comments.

G Greatest risk is not only a coup
but also know how to build them.
Gov's maneuver room is very narrow.
There is no real fence between
political link bet a repub + a
center. Biggest mistake was to legit
a repub's ^{readers} filtration was legit
a ballot box. Gov has no such
legit.

greatest danger is a centrifugal force
in a republic. That can leave us
control in an ^{uncertain} state.

Could parallel if even $\text{conv } A^c$.

P could be. Gov thinks much of this
is ~~poor~~ ^{poor} & will be better after
Unionist election.

G R. Rebuilding center has ^{been} to ^{happen} quicker. But there are no criminals & no fire ^{insurance} part.

P Govt feels yettside 'unpredictable'

(Describes Yeltsin phrase call)

G When I last visited USSR I concluded
a econ prob was extremely serious
but less so than a ^{current} center - republic
prob. There are fewer clear thinkers
there than economists. They don't
know what a rule of law is. They
don't know a diff bet exec + legis,
judiciary is an alien concept.
There is argument for talking
directly to republics. They have had
elections, but their thinking is no
better than at a center.

P Our agri people who went there
felt there was not an acute
shortage, but a distribution prob. No
starvation. Gorb did say a republics
promised resp. for a debt along
w/ a center.

Worst scenario would be a kind of
on white horse come along & peruse
order - as result of our not helping

G Not a Eurot - just a strong man. That
Gorb only advantage. No one
likes a Union but they can't do w/o
it right now.

P We haven't even discussed Baltics

G They are not behaving with respect
their minorities. Prob for Europe.

Many similar. Your probs in
America are easier. Many
new leaders w/ hope & optimism

P-L-dL

P: START good
Assad letter

GATT

Baker: The throw-weight issue must be solved by the 2 Presidents
OK on data denial ban. OK on ~~down~~ downloading
Nothing's done until everything's done

P We've kept START separate from Gorb at G-7
Summit. Don't want to look like aid in return
for START

Baker: Syrian response is positive. Acceptance of proposal
for a Conf. along lines we suggested. Now the
ball is in Israel's court. Leb. & Jordan will
be there. Better chance of it. Jordanian-Palestinian
delegation. Opens up signif. possibilities. Makes clear
where the problem lies.

Egypt & S.A. will propose suspension of
Arab boycott for Isr suspension of settlements.

L When will Isr answer

Baker They've answered negatively

① UN observer not desired

② no recourse w/o consent of all parties

③ PLO can't be there

P Andreotti raised the hope that UN would repeal
Zionism: racism resolution. But let's not
make that a precondition.

Baker If that could be done, it would make it
harder for ~~the~~ Isr to ~~complain~~ ^{complain} ~~at~~ ^{the}
UN ^{disorder}

L Let the EC know if there's anything we can do.

~~P U.R. Always talk to Jacques about it.~~

Baker You can help with Maschek & others on the
S.A. & Egypt idea

Selors We've offered ^{EC} FTA deal with Isr after
the peace.

P Israelis have shifted to the right ~~on~~ on
conf. & settlements. Shamir has a problem
with Shamir.

Baker Would also be useful if ~~Arabs~~ Palestinians
would suspend the intifada. Then ^{we} pressure
to ^{suspend} ~~stop~~ settlements.

P U.R. ? We're committed. ~~Everything~~ Everything
has to be in there. We've talked to Jap, Ger,
Fr., UK. We want a deal. We'll do what
we have to do. We fought for F/T authority

Market access, IP, etc.

Delors This is very important

~~#~~

L Won't be easy. Commission made a new proposal. Criticized by agric. ministers. Will be under discussion by the community. We need transformation for ourselves. Help Mr. Dunkel will now be more aggressive.

Andersson ~~Happy~~ Happy you say, Mr. Pres., that Agric is not only issue. Globally, other sectors.

External effects of our internal reform will create better environment for negotiations. ∴ CAP reform will help.

Need a better paper by 8/1 from Dunkel
Must finish round this year

Cairns position on agric. are too high. We can't achieve it. ~~We'll pass~~ ① CAP reform ② export subs & mkt access ③ CEE market access ④ Medit. market access.

L Agric is important. But political will is what's critical. Attitude in Europe about GATT

isn't focussed on agric. Protectionism is wider. ~~we have~~ ~~put~~ Japanese cars, e.g.

U.S. and Europe will decide agric.

Japan is a key player in the larger picture. If they're better, it would improve the climate.

P: We'll face protection on textiles. Terrible for Turkey & other poorer countries. We're not perfect on agric.

We'll put everything on the ~~table~~ table & we have the will.

Trade far more important for LDCs than aid.

And: We plan a mtg with Hill & Madiga after Dunkel paper - see if we can narrow differences

P: Good

L: Gorb - G-7

P: His plan ~~stopped~~ short on specifics.

Not clear on republics. Who do our businessmen deal with.

Sellers: Disappointed on Union Treaty, inst aspect

P: Can't move beyond tech. assistance w/o
Center - republic

Baker: Stabilization fund request
EBRD CAP request
Debt restructuring request

Selors: Debt restructuring important. This will
give him maneuvering room.

P: But to what end? What will they do with
the maneuvering room? We have to
have visible reason to think that
they ~~are~~ have a plan to take care of it.

Selors: Lack of clarity on Center vs republic's
defense + railroads

P: Then how can we agree to restructure
debt?

Selors: But he can't leave without something

P: He'll leave with tech assist & IMF ~~status~~
spec. assoc. status.

Selors: On condition that ~~the~~ Union Treaty is sorted
out.

P: Let's not leave town with bad signal to CEE
Walesa + Havel. Maybe US can do more.

We think opening markets is key. But
our underlying point should be that
we won't neglect.

And: If we reschedule Sov debt, it will help
CEE.

P: But there's new indecision on who's in
charge.

L: Hung, Czech, Poland - 1/2 year to 1 year
these countries will be reoriented.

Grady: But restructuring means tacit admission
of bankruptcy. Could shut off credit to
USSR.

L: We need to ~~the~~ say in communique that
there's a relationship between USSR & CEE

Baker: Panic Club needs to decide

P: Iraq: We showed UNSC pictures of his
cheating. Then he sent letter saying
he'd fully disclose. He's ~~the~~ still hiding
things.

He sent the letter because he was afraid
he'd be hit.

I don't want to take unilateral action.
But folly to let him defy us on nuclear.
We don't want to attack Iraq again. But
also have concern about what might happen
to Kurds in the North. We have made
clear that we will be available in Turkey to
punish him if he brutalizes the Kurds
again. Don't want to do it alone.
We want others to be with us. U.S. will
vote against ~~lifting~~ lifting sanctions ~~if~~ as
long as S-H is there. We'll take the heat.
He's absolutely evil. The nuclear
discovery + threatening inspectors was the last straw.
We'll stand alone if need be. We're
~~unbreakable~~ determined on both fronts.

On Kurds
V den B "We're all on the same line, thanks to
good consultations. We should stay in
close contact.

Braker Some signs of disaffection in Iraq

Key. Jango (1-on-1)

P No agenda but want to have a clear view of your ideas

M German prob. My position simplicity is matter for German people. We should not intervene. Consequences concern us all, however, esp 4 1st prob is borders. Recog of borders is a must - esp to East. Kohl says only unified Parliament can decide I say yes, but you can indicate interest

P (Describes what Kohl told him)

M I think that is right, but not clear how it will actually work out. Public statements differ.

Where Mazo came to see me he showed me a leaflet of CDC for 1988 campaign. It had map showing 1st Prior countries in a unified Ger. Some do need clarification #2 Unified Ger w/in alliance This also concerns us all, not just a Ger.

P What of Kohl probably stated what he told me?

M Yes, but he hasn't done it. Mazo pressing for treaties.

M P. It will turn out ok, but best to

clear it up now

P I didn't realize he hadn't said that in public

M That what I wanted to say or be sure

no on NATO - Baker speech & your letter. Whatever your feelings

P It is in ~~our~~ US interest & that of stability for US to stay in Eur. Most, not all, ~~agrees~~ agree. Question is how. No seat at EC. CSCE can't be guarantor of security. We do see an expanded role for NATO. That I like to place w/ you. Appears to me a main way US can remain involved. There are various ways. We respect for ^{historical} positions on NATO. We don't think whatever want cuts across for interests. But you are a historian. I think we should stay in Eur w/ reasonable level of force. We would stay as we've been in Eur. And if we not wanted in Ger, we could be out in a minute. I think most EE countries want US to remain. I am rambling because it not all clear to me. But I think

M Role of NATO is already large. How could it be made larger?

P Its role is changing. It will be speaking against instability, etc. Its role will be dif. The crystal must be flex.

U Risk of war has decreased. EU will hardly be retaining its unity. IF no longer enemies. Threat remains. Freed by necessity Gorb may have to take certain dangerous attitudes. So we must retain our security arrangements. Can't ask them to say & not have a voice - NATO should consider whole range of ^{security} issues facing Eur. EU is not reassuring. A great power which is weak is dangerous. US should have a say in all issues which consider security in Eur. I have written this out (reads say will give to us)

~~1st~~ 3 postures - US & FR principles already have been. ~~with~~ Nothing fundamental divides us

2nd posture - Alliance has its own rules - in areas defined by a Treaty it is comp for these decisions

3rd posture - FR has its unique def posture which we will retain.

The alliance is a organic growth for a discussion of issues regarding Eur

security & equilib. We are nuclear powers
but don't participate in integrated structure
we would use nukes for ~~our~~ allies
but don't want to use nukes for Australia,
or Japan. Nukes are deterrence - for us
and our allies.

Those are current pictures. New conditions
are arising. New gpts arising in E & W.
They should take part in a confederal
orgn which would encompass common
concerns. This is ~~long~~ long term idea &
would be allied to OS.

EC. It has no mid resp - Ireland is
needed. So there must be agreements
between EC + US. There must be ties
to EE + EFTA. We should seek Eur
unity - long term - & then we should
have treaty w/ US. Econ coop bet US
& EC is weak - we argue all the time.

(3) P - We need better coop
M - We should have treaty w/ US. This
area is now disarmed. It must
continue
What should alliance do. Unifications.
Keep US troops. Keep in NATO, but
w/o SO thinking it is anti-SO

P I think that can be done.
M I agree. SO will prefer unif. Ge w/ in
NATO rather than exercising its own

mutual security.

We should not exclude US in roles of security - I mean that in a sense of equitable.

2
We must also be able to create a / i.e. alliance disarmament. Fr does not have a diff position on this. We just must ensure complementarity among NATO, EC & CFE. [On EC] why should it not organize regular contacts at FM level to discuss political issues. I am ready to convene a ^{NATO} conf. to discuss this. Delors says this would compete w/ EC. Not at all what I have in mind. Eur is larger than EC. Also EE they don't know where to go. They would have to come to a big EC like beggars. I'll organize a forum to deal w/ it. There is CSCE, but that not really approp. Gorb talks about Euro zone, but that just a vision. A treaty bet EC & US, w/ perm. organ for discussion. It will take a generation to work all this out completely. Euro union, ^(not happening any time) should have basic treaty w/ US. People say I don't want a ~~union~~ any more. That wholly wrong. I want a ~~union~~ a part of it.

P To sustain US presence at time when role of NATO has changed, NATO has a

changed, won't work. NATO must be more active than drawing target lines.

M Let's have meeting then, where we can talk about all this

P You mean NATO summit?

M Yes

P I like that very much. Exactly what I have in mind. For example, NATO should meet before CSCE entry.

M Sure, if necessary, CSCE would be better if it contains all E.M., but only for something

P Could I call US-SC for a minute. Worried about Lithuania. If I saw cut off oil & gas I can't not act. I must do something. I need his leg set.

M What can he do?

P I have been in touch with Baker. As of now. Shevard said no coercion used & judge us by acts not words. If they cut off oil/gas I must do something. I won't stop A.C. One thing could be N.A.F.N. report. Might come to do something there. Maybe something else. If they do act, I will consult w/ allies - that will buy us a couple of days. Don't have clear answer but I'll have to do something. What is your view?

M We in terrible contradiction. Our interest is keep Carb where he is - and support Litch in place. Carb didn't have time to revise Court. on utilities. He knows he has to work out arrangements in some cases edpce, but wants to do it in accordance w/ law. Otherwise he can't sustain himself. We should try to negot to give him time to introduce changes he needs. Should encourage Litch to be wise

P They aren't

M Carb has inherited an empire. It is now in revolt. If Ukraine starts to move, Carb is gone. Real dictatorship would result. He has inherited several centuries of history. We have never recog incorporation into SO. legations in Paris. German to German in war & try de Gaulle to Russians. But the gold is still there. But we must recog complications. Sending Ambassadors would complement it. Like if you sent an amb to Alsace.

P What worries me today is that Sov civil way be more condensed than previously. Crowe found Akro very def. Brent met him & didn't find him Chateaugay. But if

M I think we must act in interests of Alston

world. We must take special. But if we go far, we will get a real dictatorship. Then where are we?

P Exactly. I don't want to return to cold war environ.

M We are building for future. We are 10 mile stretch of road & have only gone 500 yards.

P If 50 cents off all oil & gas what would you do

M I can measure & nothing more. I wouldn't threaten what wouldn't want to do. ~~at~~ Can't send troops.

~~It~~ SO capable of violent reactions.

Historically these areas were part of Russia

P Didn't have much confidence when I saw hands. on TV

M During their 20 yrs of freedom they were not Democratic.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07a. Draft Telcon	Re: Telcon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	12/16/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection

Series: Meetings Files

Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 11/23/2015

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91156-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-0745-MR(541.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/22/2014

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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



9167

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Tony Wayne

DATE, TIME December 16, 1991, 4:05 - 4:17 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Ruud. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Hello, George. Here I am again. (U)

The President: How's the master negotiator? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: No, I'm not a master. (U)

The President: Yes, you're the only guy who knows what he's doing. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: Well, I think, given the nature of this, that is probably the best thing to do because I think it really needs the technical experts like Madigan to be involved. Now, of course, we always welcome you here. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: What is your thinking? (U)

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0745-MR
12/22/2014 MM

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1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: I think on this one it is best to go with Madigan first. All it will take him is a phone call to me and if he is satisfied and if he says let's go. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: Well, I haven't seen it. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: Let me get a hold of him and see. I'm sure that this is what we want to do. Had Delors actually sent the letter? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes, this afternoon, I think about 10-11:00 in the morning U.S. time. (U)

The President: It must be coming in right this minute. (U)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: What is the substance? (U)


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
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1.4(b); 1.4(d)




The President: Do you think it's worth getting Madigan over there based on Delors' letter? (Ø)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



The President: Well, let me get a hold of Madigan right away. I've talked to Helmut Kohl and John Major, and both want to be helpful. They are very respectful of what you're trying to do. I talked to Mitterrand, but he didn't want to talk about the Uruguay Round. (Ø)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



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4

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: I think this is encouraging. I am grateful to you. What is the best for you on timing? What place and time are best for you? (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I would say Wednesday or Thursday of this week. It's Monday now, isn't it? If we could make that, it is the best. (C)

The President: Is it best in The Hague? (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers: The Hague or Brussels. The distances here are small, so that I could fly as well to Geneva. Also, psychologically what he (Madigan) likes the most. He is most welcome in The Hague, and MacSharry is most welcome as well. (C)

The President: Let me get right back to you, and once again, I'm grateful to you. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



December 16, 1991

4:28 PM

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

EC (ag) (cereals) (rebalancing) (etc.)

When Eliot Roosevelt was named mil aide to his father he went on certain overseas trips, standing next to his dad on yachts, battleships, tens wherever! Once in his little read memoirs for doing some menial task well he writes that "My Dad said he was proud of me;and, yes, I was proud of myself".

Well, I've just hung up from Ruud lubbers and like Eliot I am proud of myself.

Rudd feels there is a 60-70% chance of success.
Madigan is making plane reservations to be in Hague or Geneva or Brussels -arriving Wednesday AM, reserving an "Out"; namely if DeLors letter is horrible, we can stall or not go.

Ruud prepared to roll the French.

For more detail call Signal and ask them to put you through - direct asap.

Faithfully yours,

GB

FROM THE PRESIDENT

General Scowcroft
Eyes Only

and
Carry to his parents

P/Telephone Call 12-13-91
to Gyltsin

Y want to give you a short
rundown. All 3 parliaments
ratified - accord 5 Asian
republic met yesterday. Decided
to sign on 21st in Telma etc.
Moldova wants to join. Also Ter-Pet
called to say he was broken from
Union & wants to sign. So there
will be about 10 states signing.
Also I met w/ met & security forces
& all of them support & desire
so Moscow is calm. Every
day I talk to Gorb so we can
carry this thru w/ calm & w/o
disturbances. By early Jan
we will have a new structure
of center will cease to exist
President Gorb w/ respect, up
to him to decide his fate. Also
take legal steps toward reform &
market economy on 2 Jan. So
we may be in tough sit on 1st
Ek has decided to help w/ food, esp
Russia. Gorb I ask personally
if you can help w/ food
to avoid disturbances. Don't
worry about new arms. We
disaccord to buy w/ \$ hard. &
all 4 new republics have joined

- Q What about military?
- Y military and even good forces left for Ukraine but they will be in accord on #1's

P What ^{do you think} ~~will~~ ^{will} ~~can~~ ~~the~~ ~~Cab~~ do?

- Y He said yesterday he not adverse to letting a 10 repub. bodies what they wish. He bending to reality according to agreement of 1922, the new decision will prefered + a central organs will cease to exist. We will have Council of Pres & Council of heads of Govts to come together to discuss common issues. Will be similar to Brit. Commonwealth.

Cab should come to his own decision about his fate. We will not have a Pres. of the Union as such. All Union organs we will just move over to Russia & they will become Russian bodies. Things like intelligence, etc.

P On point, Baker will be there

- Y Yes, big early on Monday

If he was your guide, we
can get into details, like transport.
we would be using Army transport.
This is a way we did it w/ E.C.

(Coordinating Council)

12-11-91

msg from Huber

- Got letter late in afternoon
- Too late to get to Mac Sweeney
- Now checking Medicaid
- ~~One again things done~~
- Mac Sweeney / Medicaid moved a little on:
 - continuation
 - peace
 - Green box
- Trying in Hague to get more things further than EC would do.
- ~~Want~~ believe we US desire for reform reduction & EC to do it in budget
 - Corruption could be 35% completely

in volume.

- Rebalancing - seems fundamental misunderstanding
- No movement this weekend
- h. ubbers wants to talk to P ASAP after Monday

P/Gorb 11/30/91

G And you called. Is this continuation of your letter?

P Yes. Would like to run a few points

G Good. I will take notes

P (Goes thru T.P.)

Thanks conveyed Shew concerns but

G I hope this brings some of them
Prob is very important for future of
union & for Euro & world. We must
keep in mind a future of a Union.
Reacts from WH on recog on level of
recog are taken negatively here. People
think you trying to interfere. Most
reports have declared independence. But this
doesn't present their position in forming
new union. ∴ positive result of ref.
doesn't mean Ukraine has taken
from Union. Your key question is when
& how to recog. We hope there is no
unnecessary rush. Recall Yugo.
Some wanted early recog of Slovenia
& Croatia & that led to present sit.
Sit in Ukraine even more complex.
If Ukraine broke w/ Union 12 mil Russians
& others would be citizens of foreign
country. Crime has already said
in this case it would hold ref
on its union w/ Ukraine. ∴ we
all must act w/ care & not push

disputes in wrong direction. I ask you
to leave these things in mind. These
things will take time.

There are forces around Yeltsin pushing
him to split & return of all Russ lands
if that were to happen it would be a
catastrophe. Please recall our Madrid
talk - we all have interest in preservation
of Union.

These are my thts. I hope you can
take them into acct.

I spoke Yeltsin today & we will be resp.
Prod a mty bet us & Krawchuk.

So I urge prudent & balanced steps.
No rush & coop w/us.

P We want to coop & support & moderate
not radicals. If ref goes as expected
what will you say about split - not
recog.

G I will say split gives Ukraine strength to
security & ability to coop w/center - esp
in security & defense

P I think split will help to solve these
staring probs. But Clinton line is
we not trying to embarrass you or
meddle in internal affairs - as play
into hands of radicals in Russ or Ukraine

G Yesterday I met w/ Pol Exec Comm. G.
Petrov, Yavlinsky, Y. Yabov, Babin

This a session team of reviewers - we
focused on pol. union. lasted 6 hours.
Common view is pol union is vital.
w/o it all points could be cut as for us, EEC
a world.

P We have great respect for members of
that council.

G Appreciate your call & this piece of
exchange.

P We read follows closely. I available
at any time.

P/Mensen 11/14/91
1 on 1

M If we have time just 2 or 3 subjects
First - Falklands & G.B. Our
relations are improving. If
there would be any way you
could have c 2 - or c 3 flags
flying together it would be
tremendous symbol

P We'd have to be catalyst. Don't
know if G.B. and it's col-
lections coming. Major is
a fine man. Is it still
subject of passion

M No not of passion. We have
very good relationship but
this would be such a
great move. Our trade
is improving.

Another subject. Reentry ticket
of F.N.F./W.B. Having my st.
Only thing, Dark is same
treatment as Mexico. Inflat
is only 0.4/month. When I
arrived it was —

P What does Camacho say

M — We have made some
prog than Mexico + weak body
a same treatment

P Will you see Brady? We
would have to weigh

M Facility credit. If you a Brady talk on it it will be granted. Then Brady plan - end of next yr.

P How do they answer equal terms for Mexico? what is a prior.

M ~~The~~ We want you to weigh in so they beat this in court. They asking for ↑ in tax rate on fuel. The measures we are taking are already very harsh. I want people to know I want raise taxes any more. We reducing them! We running a surplus - Every austral is backed.

P we will weigh in but I don't do what we ask

M of course. 1st Time Argentina loans to US not as big as but as country which has wholly changed. George if you have seen stayed at by river world it is us.

P I want what I said out on a loan.

What is your schedule? I
need a tennis racket.

(Discussion)

Have court Saturday at 3 pm

P/Mitterand 9/27/91

Budget
B-2
Brief Leadership

- M 4 points are fine. It is good to get rid of me certifying & reducing potential of that missile.
- As for usefulness of my proposal, when do you plan discussions.
- Not concerned about F2. unless prog.
- P On your proposal, we think should be prior consultations before talking to French.
- M Fine. let's do it soon
- P Drag. looks good but...
- M We agreed not to give in to provocation but we must do what we require

P / Kohl 9/27/91

- R I read a letter - Congratulations.
Weir step forward. Thanks
for all German people.
- P Coorb is very positive.

P) Major 9/27/91

M Very bold & decisive move. We'll
trot around and trying to
absorb it. Studying move

P No effect on Br. forces.

M Good. There are one or 2 which
have ramifications. Moves on
Br ships & alliance probs.

We will give it strong support

P We will try to accommodate

M harbor conf. How will play to their defense
policy.
Could you send us a text.

Could you say you had been
in consultation w/ us.

*

P Absolutely. Have Stephen call Bunters/any
changes. We don't want to help harbor

M The less reliance on moves & less
danger to public in electing
TASM - delicate in NATO discussions
ABM - we'd like to look at a text.

Beady

- Press I M F on assoc status
- Delot stand still
- Pressing for a strong center (no republic)
(How much)

Marvin Bungee Bhutto

- That August would be a time for quiet introspection & opportunity to prepare some thoughtful remarks
- ~~Don't know whether this is a good or a bad time to be talking w/ you~~
- These are absolutely unprecedented times in which we ^{are} living ~~at the moment~~
- So I thought I would, ^{somewhat philosophical w/ you today and} share with you a few thoughts about where we are ^{and} ~~and~~ fewer about what it means ^{perhaps} and even fewer about what we might do about it.

celebrated
or derided
its
prospects

- I am ^{going to be} ~~being~~ tentative, not only because I am a member of a "preludist" Admin but because events are moving so rapidly thru uncharted territory that:
- Let me begin by saying we are ^{now} living in one of those relatively rare moments in world history.
 - It is a period of transition, from one historical period to another.
 - The period we are leaving has dominated our ^{existence} ~~lives~~ for over 40 yrs.
 - It pervaded every aspect of our intl lives and much of our domestic lives
 - It ^{itself} began in a period of transition, ~~itself~~ in a practical sense to the present one, ^{at a transition} from WWII and the immediate post-war sense of euphoria, to the Cold War ^{when} the Cold War broke upon a crest, the policies which were fashioned to cope w/ it - containment and all its

corollaries - were a masterpiece

- And a masterpiece of bipartisanship.

- ~~More about that in a moment~~

- In one sense, these ~~of~~ bipartisan policies (not that there weren't fierce debates about various sub-policies) were fairly easy to fashion, because the threat was perceived to be fundamental and mortal.

§ - A confrontation of basic philosophies

- ^{about} the organization & functioning of society in a world not felt to be big enough for both.

- That confrontation w/ an aggressive, expanding power spawned and shaped our foreign policy, military policy, the size & doctrine of our armed forces, ~~and~~ led us into unprecedented peacetime alliances -

- in short shaped a way we thought about the world.

- This period has been all we have ever known and the attitudes it has produced are instinctive w/ most of us.

- Suddenly, in a breath-takingly brief period of time historically, it has disappeared.

- These policies of the late 40's and early 50's were spectacularly successful.

- ~~They~~ Implemented w/ courage, patience, & cooperation by Admins

of both parties and ~~the~~ ^{partners,} industrial democracies, they contained this expansionist threat until a sacrifice necessary to maintain it, ^{on some side} could no longer be sustained.

- Sure it took 40 odd years, but I ^{do} ~~now~~ would have predicted that brief a span only a few years ago.
- The collapse of this world, however, ~~has~~ left us w/ policies, attitudes, and forces geared to a ~~non-existent~~ ^{vanishing} environment.
- So we now have a major task before us. Its elements are plain, but ~~their~~ ^{much} accomplishment will not come w/o foresight and hard work. For example,
 - We must try to anticipate at least a major dimensions of a world environment which lies ahead.
 - We must discard or revise old policies and develop new ones to guide us.
 - We must hedge against the unknown or faulty assumptions.
 - We must do all these things while trying to avoid being prisoners of a Cold War mentality in which we have lived for so long.

- What sort of world will it be?
- There has been much talk of late about a "New World Order."
- It has been described, defined, derided, defended, debunked and dissolved even before it has appeared.

dissected

- Let's look at the notion for a moment
- First, there will be a New World Order - of some sort

- The issue is not ^{whether} will there be one but, ^{significantly} will it be shaped or influenced by wise and farsighted US policies - ~~or not~~.

- A glimpse of a small portion of the possibilities of that Order may have been revealed by a Gulf war.

- That crisis did a number of things

- Restored US self confidence
- Restored confidence of others in us.
- Brought UNSC into the real world
- Mobilized a grand coalition against aggression

Doing - meant
what it meant
to succeed
countries
unable to protect
themselves against
predators

- This crisis gave us a glimpse of a world in which not every significant crisis becomes transformed almost automatically into a test of wills between competing blocs.

- Of overriding significance was a SU joining in a condemnation of Iraq

- It was this which made possible
a UN role.

- Freed from cold war paralysis, a
UNSC acted as designed

(And a US - then (mostly) a UN - fashioned
a grand coalition of 29 states who
contributed ~~the~~ forces.

- Was this a one shot affair, or can
we generalize? Many imagine elements, but

- There are some other good signs

- Such as a surge of democracy
in many places

- And a liquidation of some of a
neuralgic issues of a Cold war

- But there are, ^{also} other, more troublesome
signs

- Such as a resurgence of nationalism,
in some places w/a virulence
not seen in decades.

needed, as one
writer suggested
recently, but
has been

- Some examples, ^{in areas} such as a Balkans,
lead us to ^{reflect} ~~conclusion~~ that history
^{is not over} ~~has been~~ in suspended animation

Then since ~~the~~ the end of WWI
- there is a spread of sophisticated
military technology, including so
called weapons of mass destruction, which
gives an ever wider circle of states
a ability to inflict the horrors of
war in extreme form.

- There are other areas, ^{which have been} very directly affected by the ~~changes~~ ending of the Cold War
- One of the most important of these is W. Europe. Here there are many questions, whose answers are still being formulated.
- There are 3 major intl orgns in Eur - each developed in a very different environment than that now prevailing.

- NATO - Designed to preserve a ^{balance} of Eur in face of a Sov threat
- NATO is a US institutional presence in a council of W. Eur
- Can NATO preserve a function perceived to have continued value to its members when its original purpose seems to be evaporating?

- EC - Formed in a "small" Europe by group whose principal states were of roughly equal power.
- How will it be affected by a new ^{Euro} superstate (German unif.) and a larger Eur w/ many states clamoring for association or membership
- CSCE - ^{Sought} Formed by East to preserve a postwar boundaries & a west

On this score I am optimistic. It is instructive that E Eur seem eager for a closest possible relationship to NATO - could indicate a value of stability in a region w/ many potential sources of instability

Only ~~institutions~~ ^{the} including cell & er
& US, Canada, SO, #

To press human rights & peaceful (only) change. Does it have a ^{real} role in a Europe of a future?

- A fundamental question is whether a US is a Euro power and, if so, in what sense.
- Further East are a newly freed states of Eastern Euro, struggling to establish, preserve, and extend fragile democracies in difficult circumstances.
 - They face formidable tasks
 - Restructure their economies
 - Convert huge def. industries - ^{relics of a cold war not needed, but they employ}
 - Reorient trading patterns & practices
 - Find a reassuring role in Europe
 - Success is not preordained.
- And then there is a USSR (whatever its ^{name})
 - What has taken place there may be a most significant development since 1917 (or even before).
- The probs of E Eser are magnified many times in a SU
 - There are 3 simultaneous revolutions
 - Natl
 - Political
 - Econ
- (- Gorb felt compelled to reinvigorate)
 - SU couldn't keep up a leader
 - Productivity
 - Class war
 - Balancing act
 - CFE
 - Gorb/Yelt. Pact

- In a ^{primarily} social revolution we should be ^{only} observers.
 - They must sort out their own interrelationships.
 - Result could strain over trad. concepts of society
- In political revolution, we can express strong preference for democracy and offer assistance (if desired) ^{voluntarily}
 - Can democracy sprout spontaneously from relatively arid soil?
- In econ revolution we can, ^{if we direct help,} providing practical assistance in moving to market economy.
 - But it is ^{difficult and further} complicated by non-economic factors:
 - By center-republic issues
 - By traditions

- ~~Just a word~~
- We should not expect early conclusions to these revolutions, but we should encourage regular processes rather than arbitrary steps ^{arbitrary steps} to resolve issues.
 - That was why our position on Baltics
 - Just a word on China
 - Glasnost vs perestroika
 - Deng couldn't pass on power
 - Hu Yaobang
 - Zhao Ziang
 - Change erupted from below, not top down as in USSR
 - Frozen now
 - Be careful about picking a leader

not responding to our dictators we brought process of good will

Despite ^{this} ~~the~~ plethora of vexing probs, this
we have ~~before us~~ ^{is} a more promising vista than
in 77 (over 70) years

- So much so that some are now
saying "America First."

- Forget a world. Tend to our
domestic probs & let a world fend
for itself.

- History suggests that would be a
foolish course (as I suggested, history
~~may be~~ ^{is} once more becoming relevant)

- This century began w/ a ^{sinister} ~~great~~
sense of optimism - even euphoria
Based, tho, on

- Science & logic would banish a
 scourge of war (holding from man's
ancient past.

- Disarmament conferences

- Andrew Carnegie - ^{Endowment for} ~~Int'l Peace~~

- That optimism was shattered by WWI

- Sarajevo

- Thus beginning a bloodiest century
in history

- After war, US came home
(like now) - no visible threats

- Thus nourishing a seeds of WWII

- Following that war, we began a
same process, only to be brought up
short by a Cold War

- Now not have a new, almost clean slate
on which to write

- WWI is finally over.

We can not & should not be a world's policeman / 10
But only a world community -
as a world demonstrates

- There is only one super power today - and events throughout a world continue to affect us

- Can we not write on that slate in a way which encourages a world compatible w/ a best mix of American values & aspirations.

World may be more malleable now than any time since 1914.

→ We should not - hopefully - need yet again a threat right on our doorstep to remind us a world is a dangerous place & requires constant attention.

- Let ~~me~~ recall a theme of Churchill's last polemical history of WWII: "Hence a great democracies triumphed and so were able to resume a policies which had so nearly cost them their lives."

Thank you.

{ Not only that. The world may be more malleable to values for which US has always stood than at any time at least since 1914.

George R. Runn