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FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memorandum of Conversations/Telephone Conversations Files

OA/ID Number: 91156
Folder ID Number: 91156-005

Folder Title:
Memcons/Telcons (January-December) 1990 [5]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	7	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from President Bush to Prime Minister Thatcher (2 pp.)	11/4/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Handwritten Telcon	Re: President/Thatcher Phone Call (4 pp.)	11/4/90	(b)(1)	
02a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain (3 pp.)	11/19/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Thatcher (4 pp.)	11/19/90	(b)(1)	
03. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Primakov (14 pp.)	10/19/90	(b)(1)	
04. Draft Telcon	Re: Presidential Phone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher (2 pp.)	11/24/90	(b)(1)	
05. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Shamir (10 pp.)	12/11/90	(b)(1)	
06a. Draft Memcon	Re: Conversation with Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain (3 pp.)	12/21/90	(b)(1)	S
06b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Major (5 pp.)	12/21/90	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [5]

Pinksheet Number: cap1295
OA/ID Number: 91156-005
Date Closed: 8/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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01a. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from President Bush to Prime Minister Thatcher (2 pp.)	11/4/90	(b)(1)	TS

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Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 9/4/2013

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	1998-0099-F/3(206)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	4/14/2010	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET
6/27/2008 MM

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Bush to Prime
Minister Thatcher

DATE & TIME: Sunday, November 4, 1990 - 9:00 a.m. - 9:16 a.m.

PLACE: Houston, Texas

Prime Minister Thatcher: We have a problem because Howe
resigned, but we will live through it.

The President: Well, I read about it. You are handling it well.
Brent told me what you wanted to discuss, so go ahead.

Prime Minister Thatcher:

(b)(1)

The President: Baker is taking soundings now. You and I are
thinking of the same time frame. This can't go on forever and
the situation will deteriorate. The Vietnam-type worriers are
getting at me now. I am escalating attention to the hostages to
rally the American people. I believe the treatment of the
hostages will resonate with the American people. We will have
one helluva big force in just a handful of months. We must have
enough force to do the job. Jim may speak to you about that. I
worry about it coming unglued, but I hope all the Allies will
stay with us.

Prime Minister Thatcher: We will see what reserves we can have
standing by in Germany. We will keep the coalition if we don't
appear to be weakening.

(b)(1)

dates with Jim.

I will discuss

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
1998-0099-F/3 / 2005-1149-MR
4/14/2010 MM

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EYES ONLY

2

The President: Jim will discuss all this with you. People say I am using hostages to whip up emotion, but I feel deeply. We could use them as provocation.

Prime Minister Thatcher: Okay.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

The President: I agree completely. I see all these people running to Saddam Hussein to get hostages released.

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

It plays the Saddam Hussein game.

The President: That's right. Let's push the UN propaganda idea. People say I am too bellicose, but I am trying to get the people ready.

Prime Minister Thatcher: The Soviets seem to be playing a double game or trying to be all things to all men.

The President: It is good that Baker will see you after he has been to Moscow. There is a split between Primakov and Shevardnadze. You can have a good talk with Jim.

Prime Minister Thatcher: Good luck on the elections.

The President: We won't be wiped out. I worry about the GATT. We will have a big problem if it doesn't work.

Prime Minister Thatcher: I gave my colleagues a good tongue lashing. Let's see at the Ministerial tomorrow if it did any good.

The President: Thanks a lot. It is really important to us. You are a great friend.

Prime Minister Thatcher: I feel as strongly as you.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

D/Thatcher 11/4/90

Phone call

T We have a prob because Moore
resigned, but we will live
thru it

P Well, I read about it, you
handling it well. Brent told me what
you wanted to discuss, so go ahead,

T How long will we have to
wait? I worry we may
wait too long & get into
Ramadan. The longer we
wait & more dif things
become & more SA thinks
we are weakening.

Date seems to be receding
& we need much part
1st or middle of Jan I
really worry

P Becker is taking soundings
now. You & I are thinking
of same time frame. I ad
cant go on forever & feel
will weaken. VN warriers
are getting at me now.
I am escalating attention
to hostages to rally Am
people. We will have
one helluva big free
in just a handful of
months. We must. over
end price to 100-120

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0473-AR
MAR 11/1/2016

~~SECRET~~

T I worry about it earning
anything, but I hope all
calls will stay w/ us.
We will see what reserves
we can have standing by
in Germany. We will keep
a caption if we don't appear
weakening.

Our people hiding in Korea
are in tough shape &
more so per. That
another reason for an
early det. I will discuss
later w/ Jim.

P I will discuss all this
w/ you. People say I am
using hostages to big
up egotism, but I feel
deeply. We could use them
as provocation.

T or I also think we have
to keep a propaganda going.
We could make full
presentation to UNSC. The
more info we can get
out a better. We have
all authority for all
we need, so let's conclude
an acceptable.

~~SECRET~~

P I agree completely. I see all these people running to SH to get hostages to release
T Yes. I suspect that is what Gennovans, etc. are doing after EC acted. It plays SH game.

P That's right, let's push a UN suppose kinda idea. People say I'm a hellion but I'm trying to get people ready.

T So's been to the plugging double game or trying to do all things to all men.

P Baker will see you after Moscow. There is a split bet Prinebas & Shevard. You have a good talk by him.

T Good luck on election.

P We won't be wiped out. I worried about it. But we will have a big prob if it doesn't work.

T I gave them a good tongue lashing. Let's see what it ministers tomorrow if it did any good.

P Thanks a lot. It is used.

~~SECRET~~

important to us. You are
a great friend.
T I feel as strongly as ever.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Non-log item

January 2, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT *[Signature]*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Memcon with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of
Great Britain on November 19, 1990

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation between the
President and Prime Minister Thatcher which took place at
Ambassador Curley's residence in Paris on November 19, 1990.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memcon

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAE NARA, Date 8/4/09

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

TAB I

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Non-log item

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
of Great Britain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Charles Powell, Private Secretary to the PM

DATE, TIME November 19, 1990, 8:00 - 9:00am
AND PLACE: Ambassador Curley's Residence, Paris

Prime Minister Thatcher: This is a historic day which has been completely overshadowed. (U)

The President: You are so right, but I am dying to know about your situation. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: The basic problem is inflation. We didn't deal with it as effectively as you, so we have interest rates of 15%. (S)

(There was then a discussion of the British internal situation, followed by a discussion of King Hussein.)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Jordan is now not observing sanctions too well. (S)

You asked for more forces in the Gulf. We will send another brigade and some minesweepers. (S)

The President: That will be very helpful. The Congress is on my case and this would help a lot. I noticed what Bentsen and Danforth said to you. Congress is not being helpful. The polls are not as bad as they look, but I think the people will support our policy, especially if I am rescuing the people in the Embassy, though I am not getting out the word properly on that. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: We have the only two embassies left in Kuwait. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0438-ML
Eg 10/17/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
2

The President: I want the military to have the forces they say they need. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: But I worry the time is being pushed off. I worry about that. I think we will have to have about eight weeks to wrap things up, and we risk going into the hot season. (S)

The President: We should get some of these released hostages on TV. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: We have about the same numbers of people still in Kuwait. The Kuwaitis must register by November 25 with the Iraqis, so it will get hard after that to shelter our people. (S)

The President: I have to worry about our political environment. The UN resolution would help a lot, as would a provocation. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I'm not worried about a provocation. We have enough cause, and the hostages are very emotional. (S)

The President: I'm thinking about a replenishment mission. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I worry about anything which would prolong the start of a campaign. He could say, "See, I am reasonable." (S)

The President: I don't think it would do that. (S)

(Discussion of Embassy hostages.)

Prime Minister Thatcher: The danger is he would take the people you sent in as hostages as well and you would be worse off. (S)

The President: I worry about a provocation. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I don't think we need one. He has done terrible things. The UN resolution will give you all you need. That would also be giving warning to everyone to get prepared and out of the way. We do worry about giving a warning to people in the area, like families at Dhahran. (S)

The President: We would hope to get his missiles right away. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Some may get through. We are giving gas masks to our people -- but not yet the children. (S)

The President: We are hopeful about the Soviets. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: We think they are trying to get their people out, but in the end I think they will be with the resolution. We do have to worry about our commercial people there. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 3

(Discussion of states on the UNSC.)

We also must worry about CNN and our country if there is broadcasting of the horrors of a bombardment. (S)

(Discussion of Christmas)

Prime Minister Thatcher: We have strategic objectives. We will be working together. We need to be sure and destroy his capability to attack. We need to do it now so we don't have to do it again in five years. (S)

We're doing our best on GATT. I caused a fearful row when I raised it. (S)

The President: I am very pessimistic. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

P/T meeting 11/18/90

T This is a historic day coming
is completely overshadowed.

P You are so right, but I am
dying to know about your
sit.

T Basic prob is inflation
We didn't deal w/ it as
effectively as you so we
have interest rates of 15%
(Discussion of GB
internal sit)

(Discussion of King Hussein
T Jordan is now not
observing sanctions two
weeks.

You asked for more forces.
We will send another
brigade and some mine
sweepers.

P Very helpful. Corey is
on my case and this would
help a lot. I noticed what
Bentson & Danforth said to
you. Cong is not being
helpful. The polls are not
as bad as they look but
I think a people with
support are - esp if

I am rescuing a people in
a Emergency - tho I not getting
out word ~~right~~ properly in
that

T We have only 2 Embassies
left

P I want military to have a
force they say they need.

T But I worry time is being
pushed off. I worry about that.
I think we will have to leave
about 8 weeks to wrap things
up and we risk going into
a hot season.

P We should get some of these
released hostages on TV

T We have about a sum #
in Kuwait. Kuwaitis must
register by Nov 25, so it
will get hard after that
to shelter our people.

P I have to worry about my
political environment. The
UN resolution would help a lot,
as would a proclamation.

T I not worried about provocation
We have enuf, and a Hostage
are very sensitive.

P I thinking about a resolution

mission.

T I worry about anything which would provoke a start of a campaign. He could say "see, I am reasonable."

P I don't think it would do that.

(Discussion of ~~Embassy~~ hostages)

T The danger is ~~you~~^{he} could take a people you sent in as hostages as well and you would be worse off.

P I worry about a provocation

T I don't think we need one. He has done terrible things. The UN resolution will give you all you need. That would also be giving warning to every one to get prepared out of the way. We do worry about warning to people in a area - like families at Dharam.

P We would hope to get his missiles right away.

T to some may get them. We giving gas remarks to our people - but not yet a

children.

P We are hopeful about the Soviets.
T We think they are trying to get their people out, but in the end I think they will be w/ us. We do have to worry about our communist people there.

(Discussion of states on UNHSC) [press coverage]

We also must worry about C/N & our country's broadcasting a horror of a bombardment.

(Discussion of X-ray)

T Strategic objectives. We will be working together. We need to be sure we don't destroy our capability to attack. We need to do it now so we don't have to do it again in 5 yrs.

We doing our best on both, I caused a fearful row when I raised it.

P I am very persistent.

10/19/90

Primakov / President 10:45 AM

(B) Want to say I'm pleased w/ spirit of cooperation -
Hope Gorbachev & Shevardnadze know this is
a two way street - We listen to your ideas.
The signal of US + Soviet Union together in the
UN is a powerful signal that bodes well for
a much more cooperative future.

I wanted to ask your views - You know a lot
I would like to solicit your view + I will tell
you mine

(P) Thank you. - President Gorbachev asked me to
convey his regards - He looks forward to
seeing you -

It was his idea that I come here and
inform you

Indeed I was in Iraq and have some
impressions to share

Let me dwell on a few points.

- We are absolutely committed to the position
agreed with you -
- We absolutely understand the need to return
to the status quo ante
- This will determine peace in the future
We have no pretensions
- My observations are:
 - (1) ~~The~~ ^{He} ~~seriously~~ ^{is} - Confronted w/ the threat
of attack - Saddam will not be
made to leave -

This factor alone is not enough

- (2) ~~He has demonstrated~~ - We should not discard
the possibility of the demonstration of force -
Economic sanctions will not produce ^{desired} effect
- (3) ^{quickly} Nor do I think the sanctions alone will produce
and organized opposition or make him up down

(Baker) Tell him what you mean by not in a short time

(P) It is a matter of 5-6 mos ^{he would feel it} - ^{between} after that ^{he would not withdraw}

More than that if he feels that the only possibility ~~for him is~~ that sanctions are having effect he may decide on actions of his own -

I don't rule out the possibility of his striking Israel - he is capable of it - but he is not a mad man

(B) Have you known him

(P) Yes - 20 years we made the peace pact between Baghdad & Kurds -

(B) I told him he is wise to understand he should withdraw

(B) ~~In the future~~ In the future - time works against the anti-Saddam front

It seems to me the many among the Arab country's people support him -

people underestimate that

Palestinian factor is the main part
He is ^{bringing} putting out a lot of propaganda ^{points} to the Arab masses -

linking Iraqi withdrawal to Palestinian problem

~~I do not see~~

I believe there are different tendencies in Europe -

possibility of changes in views of Mitterrand, Andreotti -

There are different views there

- There is solidarity w/ the ~~USA~~ USA -
but there are differences of opinion that will
grow over time -

Demographic situation in Kuwait is changing
~~the trends~~ ^{they} believe you opened the possibility of elections in
Kuwait - in the future

① I never made a statement about elections -
At the U.N. I said time to get on w/ Arab-
Israeli conflict resolution

② now about my conversations -
I spoke first w/ ^{King} Hussein & Arafat
I told them that this is the time to
apply pressure - suggested King Hussein go
to Baghdad -

He decided to act independently
w/ my asking Arafat flew to Baghdad after
I met him to prepare the way w/
Sadat -

~~I~~ The field was narrowing -
I was left to believe he is not sufficiently informed
by his immediate circle -
He is told about the great support in
the Arab world and little about his
~~total~~ isolation -

I said should war break out the condition
will be different than Iran where you
were technologically superior

③ Does he understand

④ Yes he does understands that - He said if
my only choice is either leave or
be attacked - I will die but not
leave

~~I~~ I told him that it would be better
to die if you are a revolutionary
and others will enjoy the benefits

The more that happens the more

I feel -

- no compromise ^{can be} ~~is able~~

- I have no long answers

I appreciate the spirit of this ~~1988~~

There is a lot that is positive in

He said, I am prepared to die but the destruction
will be in many countries

went on and said you remind me of Israelis &
their Mossada complex -

He said before he invaded he knew you & Israel
would destroy him -

He said he concluded this after the war of
Iran -

They will not let me stand after I defeated
Iran

I said if you withdraw the situation will change
If you return to civilized society - you
will be accepted in -

I reminded him of our conversation about the
Kurds - I told him that he had said
the Kurds would begin war but in fact,
I said ^{I could not guarantee that} Kurds would not attack but we
would not be up there -

Later on he said I am a realist and I understood
I must leave Kuwait - but cannot do it
This way - That is his credo -

I want to put forward ideas of my own if
we accept a certain philosophy which
could include:

- 1) continue military pressure
- 2) could even strengthen the UN
actions
- 3) at the same time - initiate some
sinking out -

This may not necessarily involve
us - (The Soviet Union) -

If it is somebody else connected
up with you - He will talk to
them - like for instance
Morocco

There is something irrational here

① This is not to show feasibility

This will be a demand -
and at the same time it ^{would} tell
what after

② Danger is he parades that into a
jig and legitimizes his brutality
that is illogical -

When Hitler was at his worst - don't
give him something -

③ You referred to The 1930s -

if we had said - get out of Poland,
get out of occupied lands and then
we can do this or that...

④ You have a different situation - Hitler thought
he was holding the cards -

~~but~~ The world was divided -

We can do something Mr. Muir -
Saddam doesn't hold the cards

⑤ Baker Our partnership cannot fail

⑥ What Hitler did w/ The Death's Head
regiments is identical to Saddam's
actions -

He is throwing babies out of incubators -

This is where to get emotional about it -

He is Hitler revisited - rational approach will not work -

He should try some sort of track up making a package package -

Tell him if he withdraws unconditionally then after he has withdrawn some steps could be taken - This would make him withdraw and if he refuses we will know we've done everything possible - we could even tell the international community -

There is a tactical advantage - main factor is to draw off his support among the Palestinians -

If we had a formula to do that - it would preclude Arab support of any kind -

We need to take a philosophical line - Details are less important -

I know that some Americans do not see the difference between rewarding him and giving him something to 'move forward' - we must indicate difference between these two -

We are talking about alternatives

1) A strike of terrible consequences

2) Continuation of sanctions

This is hypothetical

3) Do something of 1 and 2 but add a political action -

③ I need to know - what do you mean by a political action

④ As an example - concretely -

The statement about his withdrawal & establish status quo as a timetable

That would allow the meter on the
sanctions ~~with~~ ~~at~~ are working -

I don't know if its even 5-6 mos

I think you're right -

If The signal goes out that we're showing
flexibility it will undermine the
Coalition

I don't want to miss something -

You know the man -

I don't want to be responsible for war -
but any apparent flexibility will
encourage him

① I want you to know - You have our absolute
support - If I go to see him my
impression is Americans are very
tough and time is running out for
the resolution -

It is up to you -

② We have an embassy in Kuwait - he is starving
our diplomats -
~~There~~ Vorontsov ~~was~~ ^{is} here - he is transporting
food to Iraq - but there is opposition
from the US. side -
~~we~~ ^{you} are opposing it

③ Its not a topic I wanted to raise

④ Sanctions Committee can authorize that

⑤ I appreciate the spirit of this visit -
We will get back to you - It would be useful to tell him
it is understandable and what

① He knows that if he does it unconditionally, sometime after he withdraws - a fixed period of time - a joint US-Soviet statement about the beginning of active effort to solve Arab-Israeli conflict

Dennis Ross ^{said} regional conference others believe an international conference
This is not a tough challenge

② U.S. would restart the PLO dialogue conceptually -

He knows in advance and so does Arafat that if he remains pro-Saddam he cannot get what he wants - This will weaken Arafat's ~~weak~~ support for him -

③ Establish a security system

④ upon completion of withdrawal
exchg of statement - on Iraqi side on lifting restrictions on departure -

⑤ on the part of those states that have troops
Those states say they will remove the military threat -

⑥ Sometime after that - The League of Arab Nations arranges for his negotiations w/ The Kuwaitis

The important thing is philosophical agreement
He will know that after his unconditional w/drawal these things will happen

US position would be that this clarification would provide a basis for interaction

This would let him go ahead on withdraw

If you agreed to this - you don't need to play an official part -

Maybe I go only to talk about our people - ~~but I~~

I told Tariq Aziz he has been very stupid
Aziz told me he was unhappy w/ the policy (about hostages)

③ This is an important meeting -
You have our trust & standing w/
Saddam

The best signal would be:

The President think highly of Tariq Aziz (if you can get him alone)

I had meetings w/ The President, Baker, Scowcroft -

I ran into a stone wall in terms of flexibility -

It is important that Saddam know that -

You cannot ~~not~~ overestimate what the hostage policy has done to the US

The President was harder

- you must withdraw

- permit return of regime -

Maybe he doesn't know how strongly we feel we tried to help Iraq - he doesn't know us - I sent Senators to reach out -

Maybe he thinks we don't feel very strongly -

At this juncture - the best thing is -

To tell him you ran into a stone wall in facilitating withdrawal -

maybe that would cause him to do a 180

This would be to give him — we cannot set
up a Green light from you

(B) Let me comment:

I think efforts to find a peaceful solution
are to be applauded but if these efforts
signal a compromise on fundamentals
they could soon be counterproductive

Fine is not working in our favor but I am
convinced that if we show flexibility that can
be interpreted as pulling away — uncondit
of dwarf; restoration of the leaders there —
that would weaken the coalition —

I am increasingly concerned in what he is
doing to Kuwait —

He is dismantling the country and brutally treati
citizens — This is uncivilized — we cannot
reward that in any way —
You have heard the allegations they are not
beloved in a democracy

That has nothing to do with the fundamental
question — Can a neighbor take over —
There can be no compromise

Most in all this is what he is doing to the
hostages —

This is brutal and uncivilized — it
simply hardens our resolve —

You don't starve out Embarass

I think he miscalculated — he didn't think
we would move forward and that we would
be united

(P) I agree — he miscalculated — Now he is trying to
do something

① When I talked to him —
I said keep me as a hostage —

② What does he say

③ He says its not political —
They must be replaced first by
Iraqis

Tamir Aziz wanted to do something —

④ Baker We have a President who doesn't like
yes men —

The real issue is the difference between
reward and saving face —

I don't see it —

especially at this crucial time
when you + me are constructing a new
~~international order~~ international order —

If the first act is to give a free
saving commitment to an aggressor like
him — I don't see the difference
in what the West mistakenly did
in the 1930s

Instead of the international community offering
green lights — he should come forward
w/ some ideas —

Anything President would certainly be misinterpreted
in Baghdad

⑤ It would be a sign of weakness

⑥ ~~Do~~ What is your view — Do you think
~~I understand~~

That something not yet taken advantage
of — w/o any linkage — That further
contact w/ him

⑧ But he's not trying to satisfy us. The Sec General
havent; you are a little more optimistic -
Sec Gen; King Hussein is caught in a trap
he is getting nowhere -

I think Saddam believes his ~~main~~ card is linking
Israel w/ this question. If that happens it weakens
the solidarity through economic pressure or military
action -

I would be interested - what do you think about
a raid of some sort - a provocation -

It is my visceral feeling, we would have to respond
w/ force - make sure he is disabled - some think
that would cause him to pull out or be overthrown

we should show no movement away from the U.N.
approved objectives - If he thinks there is
flexibility - I think he would relay it into
victory and rise to fight again -

I wouldn't trust him ~~to~~ We've killed ourselves
trying to move the Arab-Israeli conflict

But I don't want him to be able to rationalize
his actions w/ a Palestinian deal -

his brutalization of Kuwait - hostages
we cannot let him out of this box -

I am just unable to see flexibility -

Mubarak says he made a deal w/ Iran and
undermines Saddam at home - now its
impossible for him to withdraw - If he can
weasel this Palestinian issue in - it gives
him an out

⑨ Mubarak - you must realize - the
Egyptians want to maintain their leadership
in the Arab world. Mubarak's assertion that
Saddam will not withdraw - I disagree -

Unfortunately, naked pressure alone will
not achieve that -

At this point there are many who want to
use the US hand to achieve their own objectives

③ But Mr. Premolar - the GCC objectives and the
US objectives are identical. - If you're
suggesting they want us to kick him militarily
you're right - I don't want US kids
to lose their lives or innocent civilians
Cannot rule out that better ways have been
thought over less than this -

I am very grateful we see eye to eye -
I am saying I don't see a way out ~~right~~ right
now that prove the principles we have -
You see him as more rational than I do

④ ~~He is completely rational~~ -

He is not a crazy man -

But he has some "memories" beat - he went
through a hard time of Iran but believes
he won the war -

Now as regards Kuwait - He understands
our position -

I said to him that Kuwait is an independent country
and ~~that~~ he denied that - depended he returned
claims

When I was leaving - going to the airport ^{Taqi Aziz} he said -
that the ~~present~~ President asks - give me
some suggestion

200
Presidential Phone call to Prime Minister Thatcher

24 November, 1990

10:15 - 10:29

File
President told Thatcher that he wanted to conduct business as usual and fill her in on his trip. Said it was pretty much the same as seen publicly. It was a joy to see our units side by side and that the Desert Rats had joined him for dinner.

After talking to Schwarzkopf, he had no hesitancy that we can do the job and do it promptly. It will not be another Viet Nam. The plan is good and is firm. Hopes Saddam gets the message.

His talks with Fahd and his advisors went well. The Western troops were getting along fine and the Saudis were amenable to suggestions.

Told Thatcher there were two problem areas:

1. Saudis are upset with Baker's visit to Yemen. The President said we told them that we must go the extra mile to get the Yemenis to go along with us, added that we were also going to speak with the Cuban Foreign Minister and we did not like that ourselves. Said Salih doesn't appreciate the force that we have in the area. Salih said we have put a rain cloud in the region. The President said Baker told Salih that it would be the damndest rainstorm that he had ever seen. President said based on discussion with Salih he was concerned Saddam was not getting the message.

Thatcher agreed that we have not convinced Saddam of our seriousness, said even if we do, he won't withdraw.

The President said we must keep pressing, told Thatcher that Baker will meet with Color and the Malaysians.

Thatcher said she talked with Mitterrand, he said it would be helpful to have a general UN resolution to allow whatever steps are necessary.

President said he was determined to do whatever is necessary, if congress is determined to sit on the sidelines and tell him what to do, he knows the power of the office and will do whatever it takes. Congress will fall in line after the action is taken.

Thatcher said you are not alone.

2. The President said the second problem was his meeting with Assad and the heat he was taking for the meeting. The President said that both Mubarak and Fahd thought that it was important to see Assad. The President also felt it was important since Assad had sent troops and got the feeling that Assad would

use the force if necessary.

Thatcher said the visit was very worthwhile. It had given Assad the authority and standing that will allow him to stand by us. She reiterated that the visit was very worthwhile. Thatcher then told the President that the UK agreed on the 22nd to send an additional army division and some mine Sweepers to Saudi Arabia. Said she had no problem in Cabinet or Commons. She said there is no weakening of resolve in the UK, was sure that the President's trip will help with congress.

Both agreed that they could not give Saddam time. Thatcher added that Husayn could not be allowed to gain from the invasion.

The President referred to her resignation and said she had courage and guts, we feel you have served magnificently

Thatcher said to remember that one still has influence and she is watching everything. I shan't stop.

They exchanged pleasantries, agreed to release to fact that they talked to the press, promised to continue business as usual and said good bye.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Shamir (10 pp.)	12/11/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [5]

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06a. Draft Memcon	Re: Conversation with Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain (3 pp.)	12/21/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection

Series: Meetings Files

Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [5]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 11/15/2013

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	1998-0099-F/3(236.01)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	9/13/2011	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister John Major
Charles Powell, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
Brent Scowcroft, NSC, (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME: December 21, 1990;
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The Prime Minister: I want to make clear there will be no change in British policy in the Gulf. Margaret Thatcher's views were those of the Cabinet. Saddam Hussein has to go. If he doesn't there will be no realignment of power in the Middle East, and the price that we will pay in the future will be terrible. (S)

The President: How does your public review this? (S)

The Prime Minister: The public support is good now. But they are worried about a long campaign. It will soften then. The Parliament's position is strong and will remain so. (S)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

I wish we knew what the prospects were for a good campaign. Will Baker go see Saddam Hussein? (S)

The President: Right now I would say no. (U)

(b)(1)

The Prime Minister:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

If Saddam Hussein withdraws, that is not the end of it; that might be the worst-case scenario. There are a few of what we consider the major points for discussion. (S)

The President: Let me respond. I totally agree with your last point. I am convinced that the best option is a prompt, quick campaign. All of our Arab friends say that Saddam Hussein is a pushover. But we must not assume that that is the case. If we must join in pulling the trigger, it should be quick and might end without a single soldier crossing the line. The air strike would be devastating. He has never fought without control of the air. On your question about environmental damage from attacks on his chemical and biological capabilities, we will target our attack so as to incinerate them and we will avoid civilian targets. (S)

I am not worried about General Waller's comment. We should send Saddam Hussein a confused message. (S)

My own sense is that we should go sooner rather than later. Maybe we should discuss that. U.S. public opinion is divided. We are not in too good a shape; the action that I take will not be predicated on consent of Congress. I know my neck is on the block. I will not wait to see which way the political breeze is blowing. I want you to know that I am solid and will do whatever we have to in January and February. If he hits Israel, I told Shamir to let us respond. If we see Saddam fueling his rockets in the Western desert, we will treat this as a provocation. Our Arabs have said they will stay with us if this happens. If Israel attacks, I still think we will be okay. (S)

The Prime Minister: What would you do if he said he was withdrawing. We fear this is likely. Then after saying he would withdraw he would drag it out, maybe even reverse it; but he would get a lot of public sympathy. (S)

The President: This is why I am worried about a Baker trip. Saddam Hussein has not gotten the signal. (S)

The Prime Minister: If we get our people out, maybe that will give him a signal. (S)

The President: Another problem is all the Soviets still in Iraq. Another, how do we trigger an attack? We need 72 hours notice. We need a way to communicate between us. This involves Mitterrand also. I haven't completely thought this through. I was thinking as far as Mitterrand is concerned, I could call him or send someone to talk to him. I think he will be with us if we approach him correctly. (S)

The Prime Minister:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

The President: I have not sensed an unwillingness to use force on Mitterrand's part. (S)

The Prime Minister:

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(At this point the President and the

Prime Minister discussed various possibilities for a consultation and talks either involving Baker or the EC or both.) (S)

The President: What if we moved on 0300 hours on 16 January? That would avoid all of his efforts to obfuscate. (S)

The Prime Minister: (To Charles Powell) Do we have to declare war? (S)

Charles Powell: No. (S)

The President: Let me tell you where we are on that question in the United States. I would like to get a Congressional resolution supporting the UN resolution -- if I was sure I could get it but I am not sure. (S)

The Prime Minister: We need to anticipate what needs to be done and when. Do I need Cabinet approval? (S)

Charles Powell: No, not in advance. (S)

The Prime Minister: We will probably clear out the Embassy during the 6-10 of January. (S)

-- End of Conversation)

P/Major 12/21/90

Leah

M Nicole clear no change in
policy. Her views were those
of cabinet. SH has D90.
He doesn't - no requirement of
power in ME; others don't feel safe,
& present to future would be
terrible.

P How is your machine
M Good now but they won't
that about no and a campaign
It will be ten then. Partial-
mentary period is short &
will remain.
Some of things which were as-
how can we take out best
Chen w/o election. disaster.
TV coverage of fighting. Inoculation
against lies.
What we have a prospect for
a 2nd campaign.

P Will Baker go see SH
M Right for now I say so
Thinking of taking periphrast of
to worry.
Worried about France. Thatcher
is on his high horse. He is
is ~~worried~~ firm that ~~serious~~
should meet SH to make sure

he has a msg.
What will happen around
15th. Defies logic that he won't
do anything.
Israelis ~~are~~ ^{are} very
SH might try to make it a
holocaust - or I may attack.
If SH withdraw that note and
if it - that may be a worst.
(Describes)

P These are a few of the major points
that we respond. I totally agree
w/ your last point. I am convinced
the best option is a preemptive
campaign. As I think say SH
is a just cause. We not agreeing
that. If we must go in by
2 things it could begin &
might end w/o a single
soldier crossing a line. The
air strike will be devastating.
He has never fought w/o control
in.

On previous & Chern, we target
attacks in a way as to incinerate
them. We are avoiding civilian
targets.

I not worried about G.W. or the
movement. We should send him

a confused signal. My own
sense is we should go forward
rather than later. Maybe we
should discuss that.

US public opinion is divided. We
not in too good a position that. The
action I take will not be predicated
on consent of Congress. I know very
well it is not a sure thing. I will not want
to see which way a breeze is blowing.
I want you to know I am ~~not~~ ^{not}
willing to do whatever has to be done.
I think early is best. We have a
window of 10 days in Jan in Feb.
The Israelis - If he lets I ~~am~~ I
told Shaviv to let us respond. If
we see him firing rockets in
W. Desert we have a job. Our Arabs
have said they will stay w/ us
if this happens. If I attack Shaviv
is crazy - I still think we would
be OK.

M what would you do if he said
he was drinking.
(discussion)

We fear this is likely. Then we
~~will~~ pray it out - we reverse it -
 lent get a lot of public sympathy.
 (RR joke). This is why I sent ~~the~~

P (RR fiber). Fibers only 2 not 10

warned about Baker trip. He
hasn't gotten a signal.

M If we get our people out, maybe
that will give him a signal.

P Another ~~prob~~ prob is a Soviets in
Iraq. Another - how does
trigger an attack? We need 72 hrs
notice. We need a way to com-
municate - this includes Mithrand
I haven't thought this ~~etc~~ thru.

(Discussion of options)

I was thinking, I would call him
then send someone over to talk to
him. I think he will let us
if we approach him right.

M He will want to be cancelled, not
told. I am not sure he won't
drag his feet. He really wants
someone to go to Baghdad first.

P I have not sensed much urgency to
use force. He

M He is very persuasive about changes
of peaceful resolution.

(Various possibilities for coordinating
and talks - either Baker or ~~etc~~
both.)

P What if we moved on 0300 16 Jan.
That would avoid all efforts on
his part to obstruct.

(Discussion of the UN emergency)

- (Suggesting in Feb or going in Jan)
- M Do we have to declare war?
- CP No
- P Let me tell you when we can.
I would like a resolution supporting
a CN resolution - if I was there we
could get it - and I'm not sure.
WPA - discusses.
- M We need to contemplate what
needs to be done when.
Do I need cabinet approval?
- CP Not in advance?

M Prob done by early Oct 6-10 Jan.

Write Plentice about
med of Freedom