

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memorandum of Conversations/Telephone Conversations Files

OA/ID Number: 91156
Folder ID Number: 91156-003

Folder Title:
Memcons/Telcons (January-December) 1990 [3]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	7	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Draft Memcon	Re: Kohl Memcons - One on One (5 pp.)	5/17/90	(b)(1)	~~S~~
01b. Draft Memcon	Re: Kohl Memcons - Expanded Meeting (8 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	~~S~~
01c. Draft Memcon	Re: Kohl Memcons - Working Lunch (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	~~S~~
02. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Alfredo F. Cristiani, President of the Republic of El Salvador (1 pp.)	6/12/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Cristiani (2 pp.)	6/12/91	(b)(1)	
04. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Perez de Cuellar (2 pp.)	5/10/91	(b)(1)	
05. Memcon	Re: Morning Meeting with President Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (4 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	C
06. Memcon	Re: Morning Meeting with President Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (2 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	C
07. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation of Bilateral Meeting with President Luis Alberto Lacalle of Uruguay (6 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1293
OA/ID Number: 91156-003
Date Closed: 8/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Carlos Saul Menem of Argentina (7 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	C
09. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Patricio Aylwin of Chile (5 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	C
10. Memcon	Re: Pre-Dinner Conversation with President Patricio Aylwin of Chile (4 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	C
11. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation of One-on-One Meeting with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (6 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	C
12. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation of One-on-One Meeting with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (10 pp.)	12/19/90	(b)(1)	C
13. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Max Fisher (3 pp.)	11/7/90	(b)(1)	
14. Memo	Brent Scowcroft Memorandum for Record Re: PRC and Taiwan (1 pp.)	8/13/90	~~(b)(1)~~	
15a. Memcon	Re: Meeting/Luncheon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (3 pp.)	8/27/90	(b)(1)	S
15b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Mulroney (5 pp.)	8/27/90	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1293
OA/ID Number: 91156-003
Date Closed: 8/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~

KOHL MEMCONS, 5/17/90

DRAFT

5/21/10

BoS -- For Me

Secretary. RB BlackM

ONE ON ONE, 10:30 - 11:35

Chancellor Kohl: I will be here 6-7 June for the Harvard graduation. I would like to meet briefly with you and talk about Gorbachev.

The President: What day?

Chancellor Kohl: The 8th is the best for me.

The President: I will be in Nebraska and some other stops. I could be back for an evening meeting. How about early supper?

Chancellor Kohl: That would be find. I would like four private hours to walk around Arlington.

The President: You might go to the Vietnam Memorial.

Chancellor Kohl: Good. Maybe Scowcroft could go with me. I am launching an initiative against the drug mafia. I am not satisfied. It is a big danger, including corruption. I read the Claire Sterling book and called her. I asked here to talk with my Minister of Interior and Justice. She told me this man Sapphos was one of the most knowledgeable men in the U.S. on drugs. She suggested this man get in touch with me. I would like to establish a link.

The President: I will talk to Thornburgh and set it up.

Chancellor Kohl: (Gives present a gift -- dry flies.)

The President: Many thanks. I want to raise one sensitive issue -- SNF. We want to conduct ourselves in a way helpful to you and your elections. I noticed Genscher's comment on TASM. I would like you views. We are flexible and want to be helpful. I want to protect TASM -- not to talk about it but to understand.

Chancellor Kohl: Not before the elections?

The President: No.

Chancellor Kohl: First, all Germans want to remain in NATO with U.S. forces. I am not talking about numbers. Second, there is no substitute for NATO. Third, NATO must adjust to developments. Just one year ago we argued about FOTL; now it is gone. I would like to take a low profile publicly. I will defend myself and not cause unnecessary trouble. We should stay in close touch. I can't say what kind of elections there will be. Over the next few weeks I would like to call frequently about the Two Plus

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
8/21/2009 MM

~~SECRET~~

Four. I am going to sign a treaty between the two Germanies next week. There will be a big noise when the treaty goes into parliament. Then there will be the D-Mark conversion and the conversion of existing companies in East Germany. That will take about 14 months. Many are saying that all-German elections should be held as soon as possible. I will have to hold elections before January 14 -- that is how we set a date. The CDU in the GDR has two tendencies. The first is for merger with the CDU in the FRG in October. That will be a big signal, and other parties will follow. The second is to institute the old Laender. The tendency is strong to have municipal elections and Laender elections together. So we probably will have all-German elections before the middle of January.

You must know -- as I know -- who has helped us. Bush is a very lucky thing for us.

The question of Lithuania is important. I met Prunskiene and we had a congenial conversation. She speaks German. We were able to speak frankly. I told her they had done almost everything wrong. I told her that we all sympathize with you, but if you push Gorbachev into a corner you hurt your cause -- as in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956. She asked my advice. I said you can't take back your decision, but you can freeze it. Don't ask him to take off the boycott. You can't talk with the boycott on, but if you will talk, international opinion will get the boycott lifted. Then you can play for time. She said she would do it this way.

The President: Your statement was helpful. We are in a tough position.

Chancellor Kohl: I told her that.

The President: Did she think we were sympathetic?

Chancellor Kohl: Oh, yes. But I told her sympathy won't do it. But on Gorbachev, we are having surprising talks. He told us -- and I have told no one this -- he told Horst Teltschik on Monday that next week he will announce a reform program. He says openly that he has enormous problems with his credit line, short- and medium-term. He really was asking for help from commercial banks and larger financial help. He asked whether German banks could give him 5 billion D-Marks with a Government guarantee. He is also thinking of 10-15 billion from other banks, including U.S. banks. This is for purchases of wheat from the U.S., which Ryzhkov wants. My reaction was that he must also make some concessions. Is that feasible? It is not a financial problem for us. As a debtor they have been good.

The President: We would ^{have} problems. It is impossible now, given Lithuania. Second, what we hear about the Soviet economy is very discouraging. I understand why he would want dollars. The banks, without a Government guarantee, would not think the Soviet

~~SECRET~~

Union a good risk. I want Gorbachev not to fail. But first, the situation in the Baltics must be solved. Then we can energetically move forward. But on loans, I don't see it without reform. He sounds desperate.

Chancellor Kohl: My question is do we want to help him or see someone else? I think it is him.

The President: Probably, but I can't say who would replace him or how the economy would go.

Chancellor Kohl: I think we could calm the Lithuanians. I think he would like to find a solution.

The President: Yes, but Lithuania is not alone. There are all the others.

Chancellor Kohl: But I think Lithuania is different. I told Prunskiene that if soldiers in the Soviet Union serve only in their areas they would be national armies. They can't have that. They can't do this all at once. They should move gradually.

The President: There is also the question of Russians in the Baltics and minority rights.

Chancellor Kohl: I am very aware of the problem, but we can't afford to prejudice our policies on account of Lithuania.

The President: True, but we can't grant MFN now. I am trying to keep the relationship on track and am continuing with arms control. I am troubled by what you say about financial issues. They haven't approached us.

Chancellor Kohl: They will -- at the Summit.

The President: I don't think they can repair~~y~~ right now. They need resources first.

Chancellor Kohl: I don't share your concern about risk. My message to them is you must reform or it won't work out. Where is the greater danger -- supporting him or waiting for someone else? A successor won't be better.

The President: Your people think the military would take over?

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, but not with force. It would be a civil group, but backed by the military. It is not a problem for us, but Poland and others will be upset.

The President: How about Soviet troops remaining in the GDR?

Chancellor Kohl: It is a public relations problem for Gorbachev. He does not want it on substance, but he does have a domestic problem. It is not like the Stalin days. At home he must face

~~SECRET~~

some public opinion. I think his meeting with you will be very important, not on substance but appearance. That is because he stands beside you as an equal. He has big problems. His East European allies say they want to be in NATO.

The President: We will treat him as an equal. If only we could solve the Lithuanian problem.... There is one big issue. We probably can't give him money. But we will address regional issues, arms control, and so forth. We don't want the Summit to be a failure.

Chancellor Kohl: If you agree, I can tell him what I think about this issue, that it will be incredibly important if he could deal with this issue ahead of time.

The President: I have a lot of pressure on this issue.

Chancellor Kohl: Okay. I will use my influence on Gorbachev and also press on economic reform. But this should be just between the two of us. My cabinet doesn't know .

Let me give you a short report on the GDR and Two Plus Four. Our position on NATO is unchanged. In the Two Plus Four I propose to accept for troops to remain for a limited period if that is necessary. In the long run Soviet troops there would become demoralized. It would be the same as in Hungary. The situation there got terrible for Soviet troops.

The President: I am on a different wavelength. I know your position but think they should get out. I want you to tell me in June your honest view about U.S. troops remaining in Germany. I think I can convince Gorbachev that U.S. troops should stay in Germany, but I must know that Germany would want U.S. troops.

Chancellor Kohl: On that point, the U.S. troops presence is related to NATO. What sort of NATO would it be, leaving U.S. troops aside? If the U.S. left, NATO would vanish and there might be only CSCE. Where would be the security for Norway or the Benelux? That is a big argument. A second argument is that if the Soviet Union withdraws, it is still in Europe. If the U.S. withdraws, it is 6,000 kilometers away. That is a big difference. The presence of U.S. troops and NATO give us options. As I look at the future of Europe, I see the U.S. there. In the year 2000 it must be a matter of course to have the U.S. there.

The President: But we can't predict the political climate here or in Germany by then. There are slight isolationist tendencies here. How about in Germany? It would be understandable if they didn't want U.S. troops.

Chancellor Kohl: True, but we can create facts. I will talk at Harvard about my U.S.-German educational project. These things will work against isolationism. What we are setting up now is a

~~SECRET~~

Franco-German brigade to do the same thing with the Europeans. In the future we should have German troops exercising on French soil, and so forth. We cannot leave history behind. We must achieve~~x~~ normalization. If the Europeans allowed the Americans to leave, it would be the greatest defeat for us all. Remember Wilson in 1918.

The President: In the large group, we shouldn't talk about SNF.

Chancellor Kohl: No. We should stay in close touch on these issues. And for Gorbachev, it is important that we make a point that Germany in NATO is indispensable.

The President: Good. And we will meet on June 8 at about 6:30.

Chancellor Kohl: Okay. And I will teach Scowcroft about Arlington Cemetery that afternoon.

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

EXPANDED MEETING, 11:40 a.m. - 12:55 p.m. (10 on 10 plus interpreters)

DRAFT

The President: Mr. Chancellor, welcome. I am delighted to see this high-level German team back. I had a little chat with the Chancellor -- mostly serious, but there was some reminiscing. I told the Chancellor that on the Gorbachev meeting it is important to get your views and for me to share ours with you. It is not an easy time with Soviet Union. I have great respect for German efforts to be a catalyst in solving the Lithuanian problem. The letter was a great help. I hope this will help get that matter in better shape than is it now. It does cloud our relationship. My view is that the Lithuanians themselves have not been as flexible as they should have been. Gorbachev is under pressure. We've had pressure, too -- not unmanageable, but some pressure -- to cancel the summit or impose sanctions. We have tried to handle this carefully, because it affects not just us but also Germany and the rest of Europe. After all, we managed arms control negotiations at a time when things were much more difficult. But I want to say that it is not easy. My position is not as flexible as it might be.

Chancellor Kohl: Mr. President, dear George, first let me thank you for your warm welcome. I would like to repeat in this larger meeting -- and I will say it again in my press briefing (Problems with the President's earphone leads to jokes about its having been made in Japan rather than Germany.) So let me say, without meaning to embarrass you, that for us Germans and Europeans, President George Bush is a lucky thing indeed. I say this not just because I am a guest. But in the Oval Office in the past there were some who have knew considerably less about Germany.

In this dramatic period of transition, we have an interest in pursuing this path in very close cooperation with the U.S. In two weeks time, I will be meeting with a group of U.S. Senators and Congressmen. The next day, I will meet U.S. intellectuals in the field of literature. And, later, Feldstein will point out that my economic ideas are half-baked Communism. All these are connected with our working together. I am also preparing to set up a German-American Academy. All this will have an effect. For European development, think ahead to the year 2000.

It is essential that Americans remain in Europe. Some on the Hill don't grasp the important of this for the U.S., too. I think the military dimension will lose in importance. It will remain, but we need to develop our relations in all fields. I am firmly convinced that NATO is indispensable. Therefore it is essential that a united Germany remain in NATO. We couldn't maintain NATO otherwise, given all the domestic effects in the U.S. Who would send American troops under those circumstances?

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
8/21/2009 MM

~~SECRET~~

And what about the Norwegians and the Benelux without the security guarantee of NATO?

As to our relationship, I'm very grateful that we personally have established such close ties, and that our colleagues, Jim Baker and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Stoltenberg and Cheney, also cooperate in an excellent way. I met a very excellent member of the Department of Justice and asked him facts about organized crime for the EC Summit.

As to present realities and your preparations for Gorbachev, rest assured that we gave great sympathy for Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Before the war, we had lots of contacts with the former states. But they can't live on sympathy alone. I met Prunskiene and had a very frank talk. I told her she cannot expect support from us unless she enters into a dialogue. She cannot expect that I would find it wise if Lithuania prejudiced all other issues. It was a good discussion.

The President: May I interrupt to ask a question? We were impressed with her. I wonder if she's not more flexible than Landsbergis.

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. I said why don't you leave that gentleman at home and you travel around the world. I told her frankly: put your decisions in the freezer for now. Say you want a dialogue, not conditioned on the boycott. But tell the world that you can't talk with the boycott in effect. The world will understand. I need not go into details, but we would like to use our contacts with Moscow in such a way as to convince Gorbachev that if he wants the Summit to succeed he must improve the climate, so that there will be no demonstrations. This is also the opinion of Mrs. Thatcher. Normally she is tough, but on Lithuania she is restrained because she sees the importance of the matter.

Second, in Germany things are more dramatic than we expected. Tomorrow we will have a treaty between the two German states that I would not have hoped for even four weeks ago. We will introduce the D-Mark into the GDR on July 1. I have no doubt that in four years it will be a thriving economy. There are many problems. There are far too many in the GDR administration. Yesterday we achieved a financial miracle, which you will understand as a federal state: we concluded a treaty with our federal states on financing these acts without raising taxes.

It is important for us, it is our wish and plea, that your raise with Gorbachev those issues that hinder Two Plus Four -- so that he will see that the U.S. has an essential interest in not prolonging that process, that you have an interest in seeing these issues settled. The mood in the GDR and the FRG is that people do not want unification prolonged; they want all-German elections.

~~SECRET~~

The real problem of the GDR is not economic, but the wounds to the soul. The GDR has 17 million people, and 105,000 were members of the State Security. To understand this reign of terror, compare it to the Third Reich, which had 80 million people and 50,000 Gestapo. You see how the population was terrorized. We have to find out where these people stashed their money. Information is available that money was used by the GDR Security and Romanian Security for drug trafficking. Now with an opening border, there is an enormous opportunity for this to expand. That is just one reason that compels me to take quick action. I can't give you a date; but I can't delay beyond January, and it would not be good to have elections then and to elect again in six months on an all-German basis.

If the Two Plus Four works out, it will settle satisfactorily the German issue. But look at the overall situation -- in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the USSR. We're in the position of a farmer cutting hay. He asks in the evening, should I bring it in? If it looks cloudy, he brings it in just in case. We should be the farmer that brings in the hay on time.

The President: I think on these matters we're pretty much on the same wavelength. The American people basically support a continuing U.S. troop presence, though we have trouble knowing how long this will last. One thing is certain: it is essential that we have this common view of NATO. The Soviets should not be allowed to expand the Two Plus Four to solve their security problems. We favor an expanded CSCE, as an umbrella under which all participants can be sheltered, but we are convinced that an expanded role for NATO is essential. We want to stay in Europe, but this is only possible if we have an institution that provides a proper forum for us. We have thought hard about this and believe an expanded role for NATO is the only way to accommodate this requirement. I'm convinced that we can convince Gorbachev that U.S. troops do not threaten the USSR. It will take time. We do have all those missiles pointed at each other, after all. But we can convince him that U.S. troops are a stabilizing force. The Chancellor put it very well, when he referred to the distance for the Soviets and the distance for the U.S. We will do our best to convince him that an expanded NATO is not detrimental to his interests. I will tell him that I talked to you, Mitterrand, Thatcher, and Woerner. I don't think we have any differences on this. I hope we agree on the essentials of Two Plus Four.

Chancellor Kohl: We do. There are no problems. The talks between Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Jim Baker are on an excellent track. Regarding Gorbachev's visit with you, it will gain even more importance because of the events ahead of us in the next two weeks. What he will announce in the Supreme Soviet regarding economic reforms will have an enormous effect. It comes too late, but if we consider them reasonable steps we should make favorable comments. He faces real public opinion, so he has an interest in the U.S. response. The Soviet Union has enormous problems in the eyes of the world and his own people, so

~~SECRET~~

he has to avoid looking like a smaller partner with the U.S. They have had a loss of prestige. For a Soviet foreign minister it is a new situation: when he gets together with the Warsaw Pact countries, he has to face the man from Prague, the man from Warsaw, and the man from Budapest, and they say Germany has to stay in NATO. Shevardnadze has talked about that publicly. They call him a weakling in the Soviet parliament.

The President: They're learning fast. They had one big demonstration criticizing Gorbachev and then passed a law saying people can't criticize the President. We want the same thing here. More seriously, you have given good advice, which I accept 100 percent. I want to say in front of your colleagues that everyone has a level of pride. Gorbachev has done amazing things. In terms of Gorbachev's standing, I am sensitive to what you have said. I will do my best not to treat them as a nation in decline or undermine his standing. I understand exactly what you are saying. We have problems, which we will discuss, but we know how much this relationship means -- even for big, powerful countries like the FRG. We will discuss the concerns we have but will treat him with the respect he deserves. It is in our interest that he should succeed. The press says I am a Gorbachev lover. That may be true. I have met the other kind. You've met Yazov. If you sent to central casting for the stereotype of a Soviet general, they would send you Yazov.

Chancellor Kohl: George, I should perhaps come back to one thing we discussed before. Last year we prepared with great success the NATO Summit. I looked at how you had to deal with a lady. In the end we achieved our result. She also said she achieved her result, and I have nothing against that. Now, looking back, what was important then is secondary now. In negotiations with our foreign ministers and defense ministers, it is important that we achieve close coordination. Three dates are important in this context: the Gorbachev meeting, the NATO Summit, and the Economic Summit. Don't underestimate the last. These three will determine who is the leader of the West -- the President of the United States of America. In this transitional period, we have to set the right direction.

We feel this in Germany. A large number want unity but also fear it. People in the GDR know they are bankrupt. They need changes, but they fear changes. It is all the more important in such a situation that you give a sense of leadership. That is why I think these three dates are so important. You can count on us. We are campaigners. We have another date that is important to us. Eagleburger doesn't have enough work. Perhaps a few days before he can come over.

The President: You talked about a lady. When Larry goes to see her, he usually goes with Gates. She refers to them as Tweedledee and Tweedledum. It is important that each of these consultations go forward.

Let me say one word on the Soviet economy. It is absolutely essential that there be fundamental reform. Greenspan was there. So was Thornburgh. He said the legal thinking was like the dark ages. In visit after visit by business people, I hear the same thing. Their major mission is trying to facilitate economic reform. It is in our interest, too. We'll consult and try to be forthcoming.

Chancellor Kohl: Perhaps Hans-Dietrich Genscher could make a few remarks about the Two Plus Four.

Foreign Minister Genscher: I think the beginning in Bonn was encouraging, particularly with fixing the agenda so we could delineate the desired subjects. There is no reference to a Peace Treaty, nor any subject that we think should be dealt with in arms control negotiations. We want to avoid the singularization of united Germany. Also, we have achieve a good speed: in June we will meet in Berlin; in July, we will be in Paris, with the Poles participating.

This is good because the Bundestag and the Volkskammer will pass the resolutions defining the border, saying united Germany has to affirm the existing frontier. This will be signed and ratified afterwards by an all-German government and parliament. The Poles are uneasy about our sincerity. Mazowiecki is responsible, but he is under Communist pressure. Also, Walesa has his own ambitions, creating a kind of tripolar situation. To create this security we will have these two declarations, which will then be accepted by the two Governments, who will formally notify the Polish Government to show that we must enter into binding obligations. We will be grateful if the U.S. could support this approach. Also, the Polish Prime Minister has the idea of initialing a treaty now and have it signed at the time of unification. We think nothing could be more binding than a resolution by the two parliaments and governments.

We also talked about a fourth venue, in the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze was actually ready to do this. He didn't want it in July, because of the Party Congress, so the meeting in the Soviet Union will be in early September. This also has the advantage that already by then talks will have begun toward the CSCE Summit.

So we are off to a good start. It is interesting that Shevardnadze said the high-level official meetings between Ministerials should move very fast. I think that shows the Soviets recognize they cannot be the country that is odd man out, the one that delays. After all, the Soviet Union depends on their being no anti-Soviet feeling in Germany. We have to push unification -- bring in the harvest. This will also have an impact on Two Plus Four. The Soviets want their own interests settled. If we leave ourselves a lot of time in unification, it also means that external issues may be delayed. This is not good for us, and not good for the Soviet Union. Therefore, in your

~~SECRET~~

talks with the Soviets, we would appreciate your showing your interest in having Two Plus Four concluded by the CSCE Summit. Jim Baker is presently in Moscow. It would be helpful if you said it, too. It is important for the next meeting that we adhere strictly to the agenda.

A final point: the settlement under international law should terminate the rights of the Four Powers. We will start with that, so it is clear we want to establish at the same time the sovereignty of a united Germany.

Regarding the NATO Summit, the Soviets have mounted a campaign to remove the demonic image of NATO. The Shevardnadze visit to NATO was an example. All this is to show the Soviet people that NATO is not such a bad thing. Concerning Germany in NATO, we refer to the Helsinki reference to the rights of countries to join or leave alliances. When we wrote that in, we had other things in mind. We were focusing on the second point, with the idea leaving the Warsaw Pact. Actually, we are concerned with the first point, the right to remain in an alliance.

One single problem where we have to pay attention is the temporary presence of Soviet forces in the current GDR. Mistakes are being made in public. We can accept this temporary presence, but the dates must be fixed. We cannot accept a parallel with U.S. forces in the FRG. They can't be compared. That is why it is so important to stress the role of the U.S. and the Western alliance for stability. One consequence of European unity is that Western Europe is a strong stabilizing factor. But I have to say in Eastern Europe there is still a lot of national difficulties. It reminds us of 1913. Therefore NATO, besides its military purpose, has an enormous political purpose. That is why we hope during the Gorbachev visit you will underscore the importance of concluding Two Plus Four before the CSCE Summit in the autumn.

Chancellor Kohl: George, don't be worried about those in the FRG who make parallels between U.S. forces in the FRG and Soviet forces in the GDR. We will push this through. We'll put our political existence at stake for NATO and the political commitment of the U.S. in Europe. I hope you see that within a unified Germany for a period of, say, three years, we can accept Soviet troops in GDR territory. Don't worry. There is no parallel. We will need a new treaty. But I don't believe Gorbachev has an interest in having soldiers in Leipzig. In twelve months, if the shops are full, it will present a completely different security problem for him. Demoralization will set in.

Second, again, I would welcome it if you could very clearly get out the American position during your meeting. Finally, on Poland, we did all we could to find a reasonable solution. Let me say frankly that this has an enormous psychological effect in our country. It is not the same as with Havel, who addressed

~~SECRET~~

those expelled and said Germans also suffered, along with Czechs. So far there has been nothing along those lines from the Poles. A statement like that would be very helpful. Jaruzelski has not been very helpful in the last few weeks. Frankly, I don't think he wants to help. But we need peace between Poles and Germans.

Foreign Minister Genscher: Mr. President, it would be helpful for us if the U.S. could tell the Polish Government that this resolution of the two parliaments is a good solution.

The President: Let me comment. We all but did this when Mazowiecki was here. We discussed it. Since then the situation has improved. I am concerned with what you said about Jaruzelski. We might have some influence, having tried not to knock him publicly. I get the feeling they are more willing to accept your solution, but we can try.

On the meeting with Gorbachev, we will press for the timetable you set. We are on the same wavelength. I worry that the Soviets may try to keep Two Plus Four alive after unity. On the disposition of forces, I have been hard over. The longer Soviet forces remain, the greater the danger of de facto parallelism. I worry that the world would be presented with parallelism. My view is the sooner they are out, the better. If we're successful in persuading them that the U.S. and NATO are stabilizing forces, perhaps that will help. I think we are thinking the same way, but I worry about this three-year period. On Jaruzelski, we can take care of that.

Foreign Minister Genscher: I explained our position to him. He didn't approve, but he didn't reject, either.

The President: The only other point: Walesa looks like he is on the sidelines. We think Mazowiecki a reasonable man.

Chancellor Kohl: I had talks yesterday on the party level. We have a completely new situation in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, though I am skeptical about Romania. On the elections in Czechoslovakia, there are new groups with new names, but they represent the old traditions. In Hungary, Antall is one example of that. Antall is not being given justice in the U.S. press; he is not being treated in a fair way. He is a reasonable man, attached to Western values. In Czechoslovakia, there will be a very clear picture after the elections, with Social Democrats, Liberal, and Christian Democrats. Poland is another matter entirely, more difficult. It is always difficult with the Polish public. What will Walesa do? Mazowiecki? The race is not over yet regarding the parties. I agree with you that Mazowiecki is a clever man. Minister Stoltenberg would like to make a few remarks.

Defense Minister Stoltenberg: The main focus of the talks with Gorbachev will be on arms control. In Vienna, too, after a very good start, again we have delays. We had already anticipated the

~~SECRET~~

success of the Vienna talks. The Soviets now say that because of political changes in the GDR, there is a new situation. Therefore to correct that your Administration's approach is important on the difficult issue of ceilings for aircraft. It is very important that the Soviet President see that he must bring the Vienna talks back on track so they can conclude on time. Your Administration has said that CFE must be signed for there to be a CSCE Summit, but a CSCE Summit is important for other reasons. You have said that the NATO Summit should undertake a political, not only a military, strategy review. Next week, my colleague Secretary Cheney and others will present a few ideas. Vienna is important not just for Germany but for the whole Alliance.

Chancellor Kohl: Let me add one more sentence. I said in our private meeting we are very grateful for your proposals in arms control.

The President: Thank you. Dick?

Secretary Cheney: Having just come from Alberta, we go next week to Brussels. My feeling is that the initiatives on SNF and FOTL are very appropriate concerning the planning meeting. Perhaps we can come to an agreement.

The President: Thank you. Shall we go to lunch?

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

WORKING LUNCH, 1:00 - 2:00 p.m. (8 on 8 plus Secretary Brady plus interpreters)

The President: I talked to Ronald Reagan yesterday, because Gorbachev is stopping in California. He had invited him to Los Angeles, but Gorbachev is going to San Francisco rather than Los Angeles. It is all quite confusing, but Reagan may have coffee with Gorbachev in San Francisco.

Foreign Minister Genscher: How can he spend so much time abroad when he has so many problems at home?

The President: Perhaps it gives him standing at home. But I hope he doesn't encounter folks shaking their fists at him because of Lithuania. Emotions are quite high. Helmut, do you or Hans-Dietrich know Ryzhkov or Yakovlev?

Chancellor Kohl: We have met them.

The President: They have just changed ambassadors here. Dubinin did a good job. Then just before the Summit they changed to Bessmertnykh. I wonder what's going on.

Chancellor Kohl: They are trying to develop a new cadre of ambassadors, supportive of Gorbachev.

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: And Vorontsov is coming to the UN.

The President: Mrs. Gorbachev will travel with Barbara to Wellesley to give a speech. She was such a good Marxist then, but I think she has shifted gears.

Chancellor Kohl: In the SPD, 40 percent of the posts have to be held by women. It's a quota. We have rejected that, but it continually comes up.

The President: I can understand the aspirations of professional women, but that is another matter from denegrating the role of courtesy.

Chancellor Kohl: Mrs. Thatcher feels strongly about this issue.

The President: She has tough political problems because of the poll tax. She isn't always easy to deal with, but I am happy she is there now -- and not Kinnock, although he seems to have calmed down his left wing.

Foreign Minister Genscher: Kinnock has come a long way. He is now quite reasonable regarding NATO. It is much different than before. This is an important reason why Labor is doing better now.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
8/21/2009 MM

The Vice President: He told me unilateralism was dead in his party. He also talked about a nuclear deterrent, although he used the words "for the time being."

The President: Do you have any thoughts on China? Have you had any high-level contacts?

Chancellor Kohl: It would be wrong to isolate China diplomatically.

The President: We agree, but it's tough here at home. They react to pressures differently than others. They are the Middle Kingdom; we are the barbarians. We need to keep some contact. Has Mandela visited?

Chancellor Kohl: A bit later -- next week.

The President: Is anyone asking who should ~~give~~ ^{come} first?

Foreign Minister Genscher: It is not a problem.

The President: I would appreciate a short cable after your meeting with him.

Foreign Minister Genscher: I met with both at Windhoek. Each said the other was a serious person trying to make things better.

Chancellor Kohl: I will call you next week to give you my impressions. Mandela is a human giant. After all the years in prison, he is not embittered. Amazing. But the Boers are very difficult people.

The President: I agree with what de Klerk is trying to do, including deflecting pressures from his right. Some hotheads here want Mandela to come first, but I can't withdraw my invitation to de Klerk. I think things will work out, though. Is there anything else we should discuss?

Chancellor Kohl: Perhaps I should say a few words about the EC. At the end of June we will meet in Dublin for the EC Summit. The Irish are doing very well as EC President. It is not an easy job. We will be discussing Lithuania. And drugs. We need something like an FBI within the EC to deal with drugs and crime, especially after the borders come down in 1992. We will also talk about the IGC on economic and political union that Francois Mitterrand and I are pushing. It will be an interesting debate. We are now in an interesting and much more important phase. (Discussion of budget summit exercise.)

Chancellor Kohl: What are your economic prospects?

The President: Most experts think we have passed the low point and that the economy will keep growing, perhaps at about ~~4~~ 2 percent of GNP. But many still worry about a recession.

~~SECRET~~

Unemployment is about 5.2 percent. But even though things are going reasonably well, we want to work urgently on the deficit problem to forestall a recession. How is your economy?

Chancellor Kohl: It is doing well. There is 4 percent real growth and the highest employment rate ever. I am very optimistic, including on the eventual economic prospects for the GDR.

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Alfredo F. Cristiani, President of the Republic of El Salvador (1 pp.)	6/12/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91156-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Cristiani (2 pp.)	6/12/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Perez de Cuellar (2 pp.)	5/10/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91156-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Memcon	Re: Morning Meeting with President Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (4 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91156-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Memcon	Re: Morning Meeting with President Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (2 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91156-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation of Bilateral Meeting with President Luis Alberto Lacalle of Uruguay (6 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Memcon	Re: Meetin with President Carlos Saul Menem of Argentina (7 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Patricio Aylwin of Chile (5 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Memcon	Re: Pre-Dinner Conversation with President Patricio Aylwin of Chile (4 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation of One-on-One Meeting with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (6 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation of One-on-One Meeting with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (10 pp.)	12/19/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Max Fisher (3 pp.)	11/7/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Date Closed:	8/4/2009	OA/ID Number:	91156-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

August 13, 1990


MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

On this day I met again with Prescott Bush and George Ching at the request of Mr. Bush. The purpose was to provide an update on discussions between the PRC and Taiwan.

Most of the discussion dealt with attaining GATT membership for both PRC and Taiwan, with the principal issue being PRC attitude toward such membership for Taiwan. The situation at present seems to be that the PRC attitude is officially negative but with the possibility of behind-the-scenes signals of acquiescence. In the course of the conversation Mr. Ching stated that he was not fully trusted by Taiwan and asked that word be passed to the Taiwanese that he had in fact met with me to discuss this issue.

There was, in addition, a brief conversation about internal PRC developments. Mr. Ching related a story about how the decision on Feng Lizhi was reached and said that he was told that a decision (apparently negative) on the future of Li Peng would be made next March. Ching said that Zhaou Ziyang had now been ^{ching} released from detention. PRC officials supposedly told ~~him~~ that, after some further rehabilitation, they would like to have Zhaou invited to the United States by a private citizen. They felt that this would go a long way to erase the remaining problems resulting from Tiananmen Square.


Brent Scowcroft



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 29, 1990

NOTE FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT

FROM: Adrian A. Basora *AAB*
SUBJ: Distribution of Mulroney
Memcon

Bob Zoellick has asked for a readout on Mulroney at Kennebunkport. Since his special interest is in the U.S.-EC declaration and in the U.S.-Mexico FTA, one option would be for me to give him an oral readout on these two points.

Do you prefer to:

Pass to Basora 9/4

- 1) pass him the whole memcon Eyes
Only for him and Secretary Baker
✓
- 2) brief orally on U.S.-Mexico FTA
and on absence of any mention
of U.S.-EC declaration _____
- 3) Other (please specify) _____

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15a. Memcon	Re: Meeting/Luncheon with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (3 pp.)	8/27/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91156-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Mulroney (5 pp.)	8/27/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1990 [3]

Date Closed: 8/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91156-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information