

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memorandum of Conversations/Telephone Conversations Files

OA/ID Number: 91156
Folder ID Number: 91156-002

Folder Title:
Memcons/Telcons (January-December) 1990 [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	7	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Kohl 1-on-1 (3 pp.)	7/9/90	(b)(1)	C
02a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Chancellor Kohl, Federal Republic of Germany (5 pp.)	5/17/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (8 pp.)	5/17/90	(b)(1)	S
02c. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (3 pp.)	5/17/90	(b)(1)	S
02d. Handwritten Memcon	Re: Kohl 1-on1 (10 pp.)	5/17/90	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January-December) 1990 [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1292
OA/ID Number: 91156-002
Date Closed: 8/3/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

February 22, 1990

General --

Re renaming Michie Stadium at West Point -- I talked with Jack Marsh. He said you called him about it on the telephone, and told him it should be a Department of the Army decision. You did not write a memo.

We have searched our files and found in your handwritten notes for an NSB on July 7, 1989 the following notation:

"West Point - Michei Stadium (P stay out of it)."

In our telephone logs it shows that you called and talked with Jack Marsh on July 7, 1989. The log also shows that you left word for Jack Marsh on August 7, 1989 and that he called you back and the call was completed on that same day. Unfortunately we did not note any subjects.

Jack Marsh said following up on his conversation with you he, as Secretary of the Army, recommended that the stadium name not be changed and passed your comments on to Mike Stone, the new Secretary, that it should be handled by the Department of the Army and the President did not want to be involved in the decision.

Jack said Harry Walters came in to see Mike Stone and brought with him Blaik's son -- they said they wanted to meet with the President to talk about renaming the stadium. This request may have come in before there was talk to name a new building after Blaik and maybe never answered. Jack thinks you might want to talk with [REDACTED] Cheney's office to diffuse this.

Jack tells me the Blaik family is aware there is talk about naming a new intercollegiate administration building to be built after Red Blaik.

Sec. Cheney withdrew his memo to the President. Sec. Stone will handle as a Dept. of the Army issue/decision. President is not involved. Florence F. Gantt 3/9/90

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-Feb-1990 08:36pm EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

FROM:

Dona F. Proctor
(PROCTOR)

SUBJECT:

Blaik / West Point

I found an item in General's notes for NSB's on July 7, 1989:
"West Point - Michei Stadium (P stay out of it)"

(Check w/ Donna Larson on Tuesday 2/20)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-Feb-1990 07:43pm EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

FROM:

Dona F. Proctor
(PROCTOR)

SUBJECT:

Blaik

Secretariat checked every which way on Blaik, West Point, Secretary of the Army & John Marsh. Only the four hits you have came up. There is nothing personally addressed to Marsh or SecArmy in the System. I will look in the file boxes for something. I also checked March, April, May, Sept, Oct, Nov for calls to Marsh and there were none -- only those two in July & Aug. I'll let you know if I find anything.

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # 06

ADMIN FAX #

PAGES

23

DTG 16 2230Z Feb 90

RELEASER

RLG

FROM - LOCATION:

1. WHITE HOSUE SITUATION ROOM/DONA PROCTOR

TO - LOCATION - TIME OF RECEIPT:

1. FLORENCE GANTT/K'PORT

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

INFORMATION ADDEES - LOCATION - TIME OF RECEIPT:

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS - REMARKS:

Aug 11:05
July 7 - Lw for Jack Moush 11:17 cpl
Aug 7
July 7 - called Jack Moush

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: CHENEY, R

DOC DATE: 22 JAN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CM

PERSONS: BLAIK, EARL

SUBJECT: APPROPRIATE MEMORIALIZATION OF COLONEL BLAIK AT WEST POINT

ACTION: APPROPRIATE HANDLING

DUE DATE: 27 JAN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAYDEN

LOGREF: 8905818 9000908

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
BATEMAN, P

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAYDEN

Flavenc -

*Blak " Issue was in the
system. #5518 - individual copy of
outgoing letter in General's personal
file.*

Done

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD

CLOSED BY: NSJWF

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9000604

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HAYDEN
001
001 WH MILITARY OFFICE

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90012420 APPROPRIATE ACTION
X 90012510 TRANSFER ACTION / WHMO PER GPH
X 90012511 APPROPRIATE HANDLING

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1989

Called by
Doc Blanchard
512-494-0191

664

[Handwritten signature]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANDY CARD *[Handwritten signature]*
SUBJECT: West Point Stadium

As you know, there has been a lot of interest in naming an athletic facility at West Point in honor of Colonel Earl "Red" Blaik, former football coach. I have been in touch with the Department of Defense several times concerning plans to honor Red Blaik and report the following:

- o No athletic facility at West Point has been named for anyone other than a cadet who played the sport while at West Point, and who died in service to his nation.
- o Michie Stadium was named for an athletic superstar who graduated from West Point in 1892 and was killed in action in Cuba in 1898. The Stadium was dedicated in his honor in 1924.
- o Officials at the Department of Defense feel that naming an athletic field after someone other than a former cadet who fell in battle would violate the customs and traditions of West Point.
- o There are several other memorializations of Red Blaik, including Blaik Gallery where memorabilia are displayed at Michie Stadium, a monument to Army athletes in front of the center where Blaik's name is prominently listed, and a cemetery plot where Blaik and his wife are buried.

The Blaik Family has been working with officials from West Point to have a new intercollegiate administration building constructed which would be named after Red Blaik. The Blaiks are enthusiastic and the Army strongly endorses this project.

You clearly have the option to do whatever you feel is appropriate.

- ☐ Rename Michie to "Red Blaik Stadium"
- ☐ Name the football field inside the Stadium
"Red Blaik Field"
- ☐ Name the Stadium "Michie-Blaik Stadium"
- ☐ Name the new intercollegiate administration building
"The Red Blaik Administrative Building"
- ☐ None of the above

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: CARD, A

SUSPENSE

DOC DATE: 19 JAN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE RENAMING OF FOOTBALL STADIUM AT WEST POINT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 08 FEB 90

STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HAYDEN

LOGREF: 8905818 9000604

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HAYDEN

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRCB

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

1-19-90

Dear Harry -

Thank you for your note regarding
Red Blaik. I will make sure that
the President sees your letter and
the copy of earlier correspondence.
Please keep in touch.

Sincerely,

Andy Card

Andy Card
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Harry N. Watters
President
Great Lakes Carbon Corporation
320 Old Briarcliff Road
Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510



Great Lakes Carbon
Corporation

Office of the President

January 17, 1990

Dear Andy:

I would appreciate your personal attention to this letter so that the President will see it.

Col. Earl "Red" Blaik seems to be victimized by a small group of graduates who are not conducting themselves in an admirable way.

Thanks for your help and your patience.

Sincerely

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Harry".

Harry N. Walters

Mr. Andy Card
Assistant to the President
Deputy to Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500



Great Lakes Carbon
Corporation

20000 Lakeshore Drive, Detroit, MI 48202
Telex 43807 GLC US
313 447-9500

January 16, 1990

The President
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

An important matter has come to my attention that prompts this letter to you. On July 3, 1989 the President of the Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy, Mr. Denis Mullane, wrote to you about the renaming of the football stadium at West Point. A copy of that letter is attached.

In an effort to set the record straight and to ensure that you, your staff, the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army have accurate information in regard to the proper memorialization for Col. Earl H. "Red" Blaik at West Point, I am compelled to correct the July 3 letter.

The first paragraph of the letter leads you to believe that only a group of West Point graduates who played football for Col. Blaik approached you in the hope of renaming the football stadium at West Point. In fact, Mr. President, graduates and non-graduates alike, including President Nixon and President Ford, have written in favor of renaming the stadium.

The second paragraph states that Mr. Mullane is speaking for 34,000 living graduates. This is clearly not the case.

The third paragraph erroneously states that the "purpose of this letter is to inform you that the Association of Graduates is strongly and unalterably opposed to renaming Michie Stadium".

The AOG had taken no such position on this matter nor had this issue even been discussed as an agenda item for resolution by the Board of Trustees. Col. (Ret) Bob Lamb, Executive Vice President of the AOG, has searched the records of the AOG and has informed me that no such position had been taken.

It should be noted that the West Point Society of Philadelphia has polled its membership and the results favor the renaming of the stadium to Michie-Blaik Stadium. The Board of Governors of the West Point Society of New York has also resolved to poll its membership on this issue and the results should be available in February.

Thank you for your continuing interest in the memory of the legendary Earl "Red" Blaik.

Respectfully,


Harry N. Walters

HNW:bv

cc: The Honorable Richard Cheney
Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Michael P. W. Stone
Secretary of the Army

General Carl E. Vuono
Chief of Staff
United States Army

Mr. Denis F. Mullane



ASSOCIATION OF GRADUATES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT NEW YORK 10996

3 July 1989

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I understand that a group of West Point graduates who played football under Coach Earl H. Blaik have approached you in the hope of obtaining your approval of renaming the football stadium at West Point in honor of Colonel Blaik.

As President of the Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy, West Point's alumni association, I speak for more than 34,000 living graduates, ranging from our most senior military and civilian leaders to the young Americans of the Class of 1989 who have just joined our active Army.

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the Association of Graduates is strongly and unalterably opposed to renaming Michie Stadium.

Michie Stadium was built and dedicated in 1924. For all of those 65 years it has borne the name of the man who introduced football to West Point and who was killed in action at San Juan Hill in the Spanish-American War -- Dennis Mahan Michie, thus symbolizing that essential relationship between service to the nation and the football program.

Dennis Michie was born in 1870 and entered the Military Academy in 1888. As a junior in 1890, he persuaded the authorities at West Point to permit him to organize a football team and accept Navy's long-standing challenge. At that time, there were no intercollegiate sports at West Point, but Navy had been playing football since 1879. Navy won the first game over the Army team organized, coached, trained, and captained by Cadet Michie. The following year, as a senior, Michie led his Army team to a 32-16 upset of Navy at Annapolis, and scored a touchdown himself.

Six years after his graduation in 1892, First Lieutenant Michie died a hero's death in the charge up San Juan Hill. He is buried at West Point, and his legacy is the stadium that bears his name. His courage, leadership, and boundless enthusiasm live on in every Army team that takes the field in Michie Stadium.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

February 15, 1990

SUSPENSEACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*FROM: MICHAEL HAYDEN *MH*

SUBJECT: Renaming Michie Stadium at West Point

*Brent: I think this is one
you will want to steer clear of.
The proposed response to Andy
Card does that. Amie*

You received a note from Mr. Andrew Card (Tab II) asking your guidance on a simmering dispute among West Point graduates on renaming Michie Stadium in honor of Coach "Red" Blaik. The note forwarded two letters, one from Harry Walters supporting "Michie-Blaik" stadium and the other from Denis Mulhane (Association of West Point Graduates) opposing any name change. Neither letter exhibits any spirit of compromise and each of them attempts to draw the President into the controversy.

This question has already been reviewed by the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense. Their recommendation (Tab III) has been forwarded to the President and appears to represent a reasonable compromise. Michie Stadium will keep its name and a new athletic administrative facility -- scheduled to be under construction by 1992 -- will be named for Coach Blaik.

The proposed memo to Mr. Card at Tab I supports this solution.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed memo at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Proposed Memo to Andrew Card
Tab II Note from Andrew Card
Tab III Copy of Memo to the President on Memorializing "Red" Blaik

*See Cheney
with drew
his memo
3/7/90*

12/15/89 11:58

9144466988

12-15-89 11:52AM ;

F

9144466988


2125734599;H 4

004

To rename Michie stadium for anyone else would be contrary to West Point's tradition of service and a dishonor to the individual who was not only founder of Army football, but also, and importantly, a West Point graduate whose example as a soldier and officer provides every cadet in the Corps with a superb role model for future service to the nation.

On behalf of every West Point graduate with a sense of history and tradition, I urge you to disapprove changing the name of our historic stadium.

Sincerely,



DENIS P. MULLANE

President

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW H. CARD, JR.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Memorializing "Red" Blaik

I've reviewed the letters you forwarded on whether or not Michie Stadium at West Point should be renamed in honor of Coach "Red" Blaik. From the tone of both letters, views on both sides of the issue are deeply felt.

The Secretary of the Army has reviewed this question and, through Secretary Cheney, has forwarded a proposal to the President that would retain the name of Michie Stadium but name another soon-to-be-built athletic administrative facility at West Point after Coach Blaik. Although it may not satisfy all interested parties, this seems a reasonable solution.

*Pres. does
not want
to be
involved
- Dept. of
Army
Decision*

*Per Scowcroft
& Andy
Card*

THE WHITE HOUSE

1-19-90

Dear Harry-

Thank you for your note regarding
Red Blaik. I will make sure that
the President sees your letter and
the copy of earlier correspondence.

Please keep in touch.

Sincerely,

Andy Card

Andy Card
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Harry N. Watten
President
Great Lakes Carbon Corporation
320 Old Briarcliff Road
Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510



EX-100 9607
EX-100

The President
The White House
Washington, DC

An important matter has come to my attention that prompts this letter to you. On July 3, 1989 the President of the Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy, Mr. Denis Mullane, wrote to you about the renaming of the football stadium at West Point. A copy of that letter is attached.

The first paragraph of the letter leads you to believe that only a group of West Point graduates who played football for Col. Blaik approached you in the hope of renaming the football stadium at West Point. In fact, Mr. President, graduates and non-graduates alike, including President Nixon and President Ford, have written in favor of renaming the stadium.

The third paragraph erroneously states that the "purpose of this letter is to inform you that the Association of Graduates is strongly and unalterably opposed to renaming Michie Stadium".

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Thank you for your continuing interest in the memory of the legendary Earl "Red" Blaik.

Respectfully,



Harry N. Walters

HNW:bv

cc: The Honorable Richard Cheney
Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Michael P. W. Stone
Secretary of the Army

General Carl E. Vuono
Chief of Staff
United States Army

Mr. Denis F. Mullane



ASSOCIATION OF GRADUATES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT NEW YORK 10996

3 July 1989

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

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Six years after his graduation in 1892, First Lieutenant Michie died a hero's death in the charge up San Juan Hill. He is buried at West Point, and his legacy is the stadium that bears his name. His courage, leadership, and boundless enthusiasm live on in every Army team that takes the field in Michie Stadium.

12/15/89 11:58

9144466988


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004

To rename Michie stadium for anyone else would be contrary to West Point's tradition of service and a dishonor to the individual who was not only founder of Army football, but also, and importantly, a West Point graduate whose example as a soldier and officer provides every cadet in the Corps with a superb role model for future service to the nation.

On behalf of every West Point graduate with a sense of history and tradition, I urge you to disapprove changing the name of our historic stadium.

Sincerely,



DENIS P. MULLANE
President

AC HAS SEEN 4/19



Great Lakes Carbon
Corporation

Office of the President

January 17, 1990

Dear Andy:

I would appreciate your personal attention to this letter so that the President will see it.

Col. Earl "Red" Blaik seems to be victimized by a small group of graduates who are not conducting themselves in an admirable way.

Thanks for your help and your patience.

Sincerely

Harry N. Walters

Mr. Andy Card
Assistant to the President
Deputy to Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

BLAIR
Issue

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1989

Dear Dave:

Thank you for your letter with respect to the Blair issue. There is no question about the emotion it has aroused -- on both sides.

I wanted you to know that the decision in this matter will be made by the Secretary of the Army or his designee. The President will not be involved.

It is always good to hear from you.

Warm personal regards,



Brent Scowcroft

Dr. David M. Abshire
President
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
1800 K Street, N.W. - Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006

Same letter to:
LT Gen Sidney Berry:
Gen Michael Davidson
LT Gen Gar Davidson
Gen Andrew G. G. G.
Lt. Amos Jordan
Gen Jack N. Merrett
Gen William R. Richardson

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8905818
RECEIVED: 25 JUL 89 11

TO: DAVIDSON, GAR

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 21 JUL 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO LTRS RE MICHIE / BLAIK STADIUM ISSUE

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 28 JUL 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCOWCROFT

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

C O P Y
from ORM

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRCB

CLOSED BY: NSRCB

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8905818

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001
002

X 89072511 SCOWCROFT SGD LTRS
X 89072511 SCOWCROFT SGD LTR

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1989

Dear Jack:

Thank you for your letter with respect to the Blaik issue. There is no question about the emotion it has aroused -- on both sides.

I wanted you to know that the decision in this matter will be made by the Secretary of the Army or his designee. The President will not be involved.

It is always good to hear from you.

Warm personal regards,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Brent", with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Brent Scowcroft

General Jack N. Merritt, USA (Ret.)
Executive Vice President
Association of the U.S. Army
2425 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22201-3385

General Jack N. Merritt
United States Army, Retired



JUL 14 1989

Executive Vice President

7/10

Brent - I'm not sure who I should write to - so you get the honor. It has come to my attention that Harry Waters is pushing to rename Michie Stadium for "Red Blake" Moreau. I am told that this proposal is "already in the White House" whatever that means. Now I am not a graduate but have spent a fair amount of time on two major studies of USMA as the "town, not just" and I knew enough of USMA tradition to know that White Blake is properly (only)

reversed it would be inconsistent and inappropriate to change the name of Moline Stadium. The policy of naming things after young graduates who have sacrificed for the nation seems agreed on and ought not be changed.

Sorry to insist this on you. Please don't bother to acknowledge - Appreciate your listening -

L.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1989

Dear Dave:

Thank you for your letter with respect to the Blaik issue. There is no question about the emotion it has aroused -- on both sides.

I wanted you to know that the decision in this matter will be made by the Secretary of the Army or his designee. The President will not be involved.

It is always good to hear from you.

Warm personal regards,



Brent Scowcroft

Dr. David M. Abshire
President
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
1800 K Street, N.W. - Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

David M. Abshire
President

July 10, 1989 JUL 11 1989

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

As a 1951 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, I have been approached by my class leadership to express our concern over the possibility of Michie Stadium being renamed for Colonel Blaik. It is my understanding that such edifices at West Point can only be renamed by undergoing a strict procedure. The name of this stadium already has become a tradition at West Point and I agree with my classmates that it would be sad indeed to make such a change.

I understand that the White House has been approached on supporting such a change and I hope it will not act favorably on such a recommendation.

I have the greatest respect for Colonel Blaik and his achievements in developing champion football teams. This respect notwithstanding, it is unfortunate that the West Point cheating scandal involving so many players and other Cadets took place during his tenure. Therefore I feel it would be a double mistake to change the name of Michie Stadium.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "D. Abshire", written in a cursive style.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1989

Dear Mike:

Thank you for your letter with respect to the Blaik issue. There is no question about the emotion it has aroused -- on both sides.

I wanted you to know that the decision in this matter will be made by the Secretary of the Army or his designee. The President will not be involved.

It is always good to hear from you.

Warm personal regards,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Brent", with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Brent Scowcroft

General Michael S. Davison
USA (Ret.)
2331 S. Queen Street
Arlington, Virginia 22202

1 July

Dear Brent:

It has been brought to my attention that there is a proposal before Pres. Bush to re-name Michie stadium in honor of Earl Blaik. Before taking such action the President should consider the following:

1) The established policy on naming athletic facilities is to name them for graduates athletes who lost their lives in combat at a relatively young age. Blaik never heard a shot fired in anger.

2) To remove Michie's name voids an earned honor of long standing.

3) Questions concerning Blaik's role in the 1951 honor scandal should be resolved.

4) Re-naming of the stadium should have alumni support to assure positive public relations insofar as media coverage is concerned.

If you agree with the foregoing you may wish to suggest to the President that the issue be referred to the Association of Graduates for a recommendation.

I have tried to reach you at your office and your home to discuss this issue but have been unsuccessful. Hence, this letter.

With every best wish,

Philse Davis

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 23, 1989

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter with respect to the Blaik issue. There is no question about the emotion it has aroused -- on both sides.

I wanted you to know that the decision in this matter will be made by the Secretary of the Army or his designee. The President will not be involved.

It is always good to hear from you.

Warm personal regards,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Brent", with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Brent Scowcroft

General William R. Richardson
USA (Ret.)
8612 Dixie Place
McLean, Virginia 22102



July 6, 1989

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.)
6114 Wynnwood Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20816

Dear Brent,

I learned just recently of a move by Harry Walters to change the name of West Point's Michie Stadium to Blaik Stadium in honor of Earl (Red) Blaik. This letter is written in hopes of acquiring your support and voice in opposing such a move.

I dare say that most of us in "The Long Grey Line" find such a proposal in contravention with the established policies of the United States Military Academy and its fundamental traditions. As you well know, Dennis Mahan Michie was the father of Army football and later gave his life for his country on San Juan Hill. These are two facts that argue strongly against removing his name from the stadium.

I hope that the Administration is not insensitive to the proposal's impact on the graduates of the Military Academy. Furthermore, the voice of the Military Academy should be heard on this score.

I have always had great respect for Colonel Blaik as a coach, but he has one mark against him. That mark occurred with the cribbing scandal the year I graduated (1951). The circumstances surrounding his recruitment of football players and the preferential treatment of the football team reflected adversely on Colonel Blaik. To change Michie to Blaik Stadium could be a potential embarrassment to the Administration.

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.)
July 6, 1989
Page Two

I think you know what this projected move could do and hope you recognize that it is not in the National interests. I respect your judgement and your ability to persuade the White House not to accede to Harry Walters' request.

All best wishes for continued success.

Sincerely,

Bill

William R. Richardson
General, USA (Ret.)

WRR:jf

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 23, 1989

Dear Sid:

Thank you for your letter with respect to the Blaik issue. There is no question about the emotion it has aroused -- on both sides.

I wanted you to know that the decision in this matter will be made by the Secretary of the Army or his designee. The President will not be involved.

It is always good to hear from you.

Warm personal regards,

*How is
every thing?*



Brent Scowcroft

Lieutenant General Sidney B. Berry
USA (Ret.)
2407 North Kenmore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22207

2407 North Kenmore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22207
July 5, 1989

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft
6114 Wynnwood Road
Washington, D.C. 20016

Dear Brent:

I understand that some admirers of Coach Earl Blaik hope to enlist President Bush's support in causing the United States Military Academy to change the name of Michie Stadium to Blaik Stadium.

As you know, Michie Stadium, which opened in 1924, is named for Dennis Mahan Michie, USMA '92, captain and coach of Army's first football team. More relevant, however, Michie Stadium is named to memorialize Dennis Mahan Michie, First Lieutenant, Infantry, who was killed in action at San Juan, Puerto Rico, on 1 July 1898. This follows the Military Academy's established policy of naming its sports stadiums and installations for West Pointers killed in action as junior officers leading American soldiers in combat.


No matter how well-intended by its sponsors, any move to rename Michie Stadium for Coach Blaik is bound to arouse bitter public controversy, harm Coach Blaik's reputation, and tarnish his memory.

For President Bush to involve himself in this issue would needlessly plunge him into public controversy and distract his attention from matters of far greater importance to the nation than renaming West Point's football stadium.

Most importantly, changing the name of Michie Stadium to Blaik stadium would signal to cadets and midshipmen, members of the Armed Forces, and citizens everywhere that being a successful football coach is more honored than being a military officer who gives his life while leading other Americans in combat for our country. I am confident that this is the last message that World War II Naval Aviator and current Commander-in-Chief George Bush would ever want to send to anyone, particularly to the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen under his command.

Brent, I hope that you and others of President Bush's senior staff will urge the sponsors to drop any notion of renaming Michie Stadium for Coach Blaik. The notion is ill-advised and will do serious disservice to our Armed Forces, as well as to Coach Blaik himself. Should the sponsors persist, I trust that you and your colleagues will advise President Bush to remain aloof from what, if pursued, is certain to become a highly controversial issue from which no one will benefit.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Sidney B. Berry". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Sidney" being particularly prominent.

Sidney B. Berry
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Retired
Superintendent, USMA, 1974-1977

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1989

Dear Joe:

Thank you for your letter with respect to the Blaik issue. There is no question about the emotion it has aroused -- on both sides.

I wanted you to know that the decision in this matter will be made by the Secretary of the Army or his designee. The President will not be involved.

It is always good to hear from you.

Warm personal regards,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Brent", with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Brent Scowcroft

Dr. Amos A. Jordan
Suite 400
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.D. 20006

AMOS A. JORDAN

JUL 11 1989

July 11, 1989

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft,
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs,
The White House,
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:


As a graduate and former USMA Professor of Social Sciences who continues to be very much interested in the Military Academy and alumni matters, I want to register my deep concern about an Academy matter which I gather has bounced into the White House. I refer to the proposal to change the name of Michie Stadium to Blaik Stadium, a proposal that has been passed to John Sununu. As you may be aware, there is a clear procedure for handling such matters at West Point and criteria that have long since been established. The initiators of this name change probably felt that the proposal could not meet those standards and so are trying an end run.

While Earl Blaik did a good deal for football at West Point, there are enough graduates who are ambivalent about his role that, taken together with the procedural end run, there would be a storm of protest among West Pointers if the change were effectuated. I see no reason why the White House would want to stir things up by such an unprecedented intervention as the proposal recommends.

I hope that you will forward this expression of concern to whatever office is dealing with it in the White House -- together with your own note of disapprobation concerning end runs.

With every good wish.

Yours sincerely,


Amos A. Jordan

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 8, 1989

Dear Andy:

Thank you for your letter forwarding to me a letter to the President with respect to the Red Blaik issue. There is no question about the emotion it has aroused -- on both sides.

I wanted you to know that the decision in this matter will be made by the Secretary of the Army or his designee. The President will not be involved. It is always good to hear from you.

Warm personal regards,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Brent", with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Brent Scowcroft

General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret.)
409 North Fairfax Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314



409 North Fairfax Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

June 30, 1989

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500


Dear Brent:

Attached is a letter I have written and signed to the President. I am sending it to you with a request that it be sent on to him only if serious consideration is given to this proposal. I have tried to express it in calm terms, but the unanimous reaction of about a dozen graduates of my general vintage has been violent when I mentioned it to them. Dennis Michie, for whom the stadium is named, epitomizes the policy now adopted for such naming by Dave Palmer (which has been widely applauded) of choosing young graduates who gave their lives in combat for their country.

I hope that if you have appropriate opportunity to do so, and if there is a necessity, that you will weigh in against this.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,


Andrew J. Goodraster
General, U.S. Army (Ret.)



409 North Fairfax Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

June 30, 1989

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

Word has come to me that a group of Army football players have approached you, or may approach you, proposing, as I understand it, that you direct a change of the name of Michie Stadium at West Point to Blaik Stadium. I feel I should tell you that I would be categorically opposed to such a change and that I believe it would cause a violent reaction among the vast majority of West Point graduates.

I have a high regard for many of the people who may be behind this proposal, but consider it misguided and likely to have the opposite of the effect they intend. Coach Blaik, successful as he was on the gridiron, is a deeply contentious figure among West Pointers, particularly in connection with the cheating scandal of the early 1950s centered on the football team. There cannot fail to be real outrage if serious consideration is given to such a proposal.

I feel that it is my duty to convey these views to you.

With great respect, and personal best wishes,

Sincerely,

Andrew J. Goodpaster
General, U.S. Army (Ret.)



409 North Fairfax Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

June 30, 1989

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

Word has come to me that a group of Army football players have approached you, or may approach you, proposing, as I understand it, that you direct a change of the name of Michie Stadium at West Point to Blaik Stadium. I feel I should tell you that I would be categorically opposed to such a change and that I believe it would cause a violent reaction among the vast majority of West Point graduates.

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I feel that it is my duty to convey these views to you.

With great respect, and personal best wishes,

Sincerely,


Andrew J. Goodpaster
General, U.S. Army (Ret.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1989

Dear Gar:

Thank you for your letter with respect to the Blaik issue. There is no question about the emotion it has aroused -- on both sides.

I wanted you to know that the decision in this matter will be made by the Secretary of the Army or his designee. The President will not be involved.

It is always good to hear from you.

Warm personal regards,



Brent Scowcroft

Lieutenant General Gar Davidson
USA (Ret.)
5730 Margarido Drive
Oakland, California 94618

GAR DAVIDSON
5730 MARGARIDO DRIVE
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94618

Re: Gon. R. W.

1 July '89.

Dear Brent:

Dick Stilwell has kindly agreed to ask this favor of you for me. I have been given to understand that an influential Texas group headed by Larry Walters has visited President Bush in his office and during the visit asked his assistance in support of a move to change the name of Michie Stadium at West Point to Blair Stadium.

Such a move would inevitably revive public discussion of an unhappy period in West Point's history and do the Academy harm.

My favor is to ask that you be alert for a break in a casual conversation with the President when it would be appropriate to advise him of the following facts:
Red Black:

1. Never heard a shot fired in anger,
2. As a prominent college athlete in Ohio, accepted an appointment to West Point and availed active service in World War I,

3. Played a major role in the activities at West Point that resulted in its most major cheating scandal.

4. Was commissioned a colonel in World War II and merely changed his coaching clothes for a uniform.

5. Had a service of only two years as a cadet and two as an officer before he resigned.

It will be grateful for any help you can give us.

Respectfully but

Sincerely,

Star Davidson

P. S. On a November day in 1924 I scored the first Army Touchdown the day Michie Stadium was dedicated.

Maria Clark WSC

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CHRON FILEDate: 6/15TO: *General Scowcroft*

FROM: **JAMES W. CICONI**
Assistant to the President and
Deputy to the Chief of Staff

The attached has been forwarded
to the President.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Kohl 1-on-1 (3 pp.)	7/9/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January-December) 1990 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 10/31/12

Date Closed: 8/3/2009	OA/ID Number: 91156-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0714-MR (500)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/23/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

P/Kohl 1001
1/9/90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

maybe you have seen
mention

P I have just 2 items to ~~revert~~
But 1st Worcester & Connecticut
Private



(b)(1)

P Went and picked up Worcester
reaction

(b)(1)

P Thanks. I have put 2 separate
points. Call to Worcester not
one of them. I leave on what
you do there.
1st is Apple on Chuzzleway Road.
If we can't find, large enough,
the Road will collapse
& a revolt will be sure to
The 2nd report has
some good things on
it. I talked to Johnson

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PER E.O. 13526

2016-0714-MR
SCS 2/23/11

CONFIDENTIAL

about it. If we could just
say we will use it as
basis for ~~discussion~~ negot.
Would you think about
that? I don't want to
complicate your
efforts. That's not
important. But I don't
want to believe ~~you~~
(b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1)

One error. I want to
point out which does not
reduce growth. Only 4%
CO₂ comes from man. My
notion is to focus on another
subject just like - pretty-
much no compromise are
an example
(b)(1) (b)(1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

P So lets do something
faster

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

P I want to see what all
specific limits are for
that and more power
are really affected -

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4000

AKG

May 23, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM:

ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*

SUBJECT:

Memoranda of Conversations for the President's
Meetings with Chancellor Kohl of the Federal
Republic of Germany

Attached at Tabs I-III are the memoranda of conversations for the
President's meetings with Chancellor Kohl on May 17, 1990.

RECOMMENDATION

That the memoranda of conversations at Tabs I-III be filed for
the record.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memcon for Oval Office Meeting
Tab II Memcon for Expanded Meeting in the Cabinet Room
Tab III Memcon for Working Lunch

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/3/09

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2000-0429-F
SS 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chancellor Kohl, Federal
Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Horst Teltschik, Security Advisor to the
Chancellor
Dorothee Kaltenbach, Interpreter

DATE, TIME May 17, 1990, 10:30 - 11:35 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl: I will be here 6-7 June for the Harvard graduation. I would like to meet briefly with you and talk about Gorbachev. (Ø)

The President: What day? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: The 8th is the best for me. (Ø)

The President: I will be in Nebraska and also have some other stops. I could be back for an evening meeting. How about early supper? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: That would be fine. I would like four private hours to walk around Arlington. (Ø)

The President: You might go to the Vietnam Memorial. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Good. Maybe Scowcroft could go with me. I am launching an initiative against the drug mafia. I am not satisfied. It is a big danger, including corruption. I read the Claire Sterling book and called her. I asked her to talk with my Minister of Interior and Justice. She told me this man Sapphos was one of the most knowledgeable men in the U.S. on drugs. She suggested this man get in touch with me. I would like to establish a link. (Ø)

The President: I will talk to Thornburgh and set it up. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: (Gives President a gift -- dry flies.) (U)

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Declassify on: OADR

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The President: Many thanks. I want to raise one sensitive issue -- SNF. We want to conduct ourselves in a way helpful to you and your elections. I noticed Genscher's comment on TASM. I would like your views. We are flexible and want to be helpful. I want to protect TASM -- not to talk about it but to reach an understanding. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Not before the elections? (S)

The President: No. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: First, all Germans want to remain in NATO with U.S. forces remaining. I am not talking about numbers. Second, there is no substitute for NATO. Third, NATO must adjust to developments. Just one year ago we argued about FOTL; now the issue is gone. I would like to take a low profile publicly. I will defend myself and not cause myself unnecessary trouble. We should stay in close touch. I can't say what kind of elections there will be. Over the next few weeks I would like to call frequently about the Two Plus Four. I am going to sign a treaty between the two Germanies next week. There will be a big noise when the treaty goes into parliament. Then there will be the D-Mark conversion and the conversion of existing companies in East Germany. That will take about 14 months. Many are saying that all-German elections should be held as soon as possible. I will have to hold elections before January 14 -- that is how we set a date. The CDU in the GDR has two tendencies. The first is for merger with the CDU in the FRG in October. That will be a big signal, and other parties will follow. The second is to institute the old Laender. The tendency is strong to have municipal elections and Laender elections together. So we probably will have all-German elections before the middle of January. (S)

You must know -- as I know -- who has helped us. Bush is a very lucky thing for us. (S)

The question of Lithuania is important. I met Prunskiene and we had a congenial conversation. She speaks German. We were able to speak frankly. I told her they had done almost everything wrong. I told her that we all sympathize with you, but if you push Gorbachev into a corner you hurt your cause -- as in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956. She asked my advice. I said you can't take back your decision, but you can freeze it. Don't ask him to take off the boycott. You can't talk with the boycott on, but if you will talk, international opinion will get the boycott lifted. Then you can play for time. She said she would do it this way. (S)

The President: Your statement was helpful. We are in a tough position. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I told her that. (U)

The President: Did she think we were sympathetic? (S)

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Chancellor Kohl: Oh, yes. But I told her sympathy won't do it. But on Gorbachev, we are having surprising talks. He told us -- and I have told no one this -- he told Horst Teltschik on Monday that next week he will announce a reform program. He says openly that he has enormous problems with his credit line, short- and medium-term. He really was asking for help from commercial banks and larger financial help. He asked whether German banks could give him 5 billion D-Marks with a Government guarantee. He is also thinking of 10-15 billion from other banks, including U.S. banks. This is for purchases of wheat from the U.S., which Ryzhkov wants. My reaction was that he must also make some concessions. Is that feasible? It is not a financial problem for us. As a debtor they have been good. (S)

The President: We would have problems. It is impossible now, given Lithuania. Second, what we hear about the Soviet economy is very discouraging. I understand why he would want dollars. The banks, without a Government guarantee, would not think the Soviet Union a good risk. I want Gorbachev not to fail. But first, the situation in the Baltics must be solved. Then we can energetically move forward. But on loans, I don't see it without reform. He sounds desperate. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: My question is do we want to help him or see someone else? I think it is him. (S)

The President: Probably, but I can't say who would replace him or how the economy would go. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I think we could calm the Lithuanians. I think he would like to find a solution. (S)

The President: Yes, but Lithuania is not alone. There are all the others. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: But I think Lithuania is different. I told Prunskiene that if soldiers in the Soviet Union serve only in their areas they would be national armies. They can't have that. They can't do this all at once. They should move gradually. (S)

The President: There is also the question of Russians in the Baltics and minority rights. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I am very aware of the problem, but we can't afford to prejudice our policies on account of Lithuania. (S)

The President: True, but we can't grant MFN now. I am trying to keep the relationship on track and am continuing with arms control. I am troubled by what you say about financial issues, though. They haven't approached us. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: They will -- at the Summit. (S)

The President: I don't think they can repay right now. They need resources first. (S)

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Chancellor Kohl: I don't share your concern about risk. My message to them is you must reform or it won't work out. Where is the greater danger -- supporting him or waiting for someone else? A successor won't be better. (S)

The President: Your people think the military would take over? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, but not with force. It would be a civil group, but backed by the military. It is not a problem for us, but Poland and others will be upset. (S)

The President: How about Soviet troops remaining in the GDR? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: It is a public relations problem for Gorbachev. He does not want it on substance, but he does have a domestic problem. It is not like the Stalin days. At home he must face some public opinion. I think his meeting with you will be very important, not on substance but appearance. That is because he stands beside you as an equal. He has big problems. His East European allies say they want to be in NATO. (S)

The President: We will treat him as an equal. If only we could solve the Lithuanian problem.... There is one big issue. We probably can't give him money. But we will address regional issues, arms control, and so forth. We don't want the Summit to be a failure. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: If you agree, I can tell him what I think about this issue, that it will be incredibly important if he could deal with this issue ahead of time. (S)

The President: I have a lot of pressure on this issue. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Okay. I will use my influence on Gorbachev and also press on economic reform. But this should be just between the two of us. My cabinet doesn't know. (S)

Let me give you a short report on the GDR and Two Plus Four. Our position on NATO is unchanged. In the Two Plus Four I propose to accept for troops to remain for a limited period if that is necessary. In the long run Soviet troops there would become demoralized. It would be the same as in Hungary. The situation there got terrible for Soviet troops. (S)

The President: I am on a different wavelength. I know your position but think they should get out. I want you to tell me in June your honest view about U.S. troops remaining in Germany. I think I can convince Gorbachev that U.S. troops should stay in Germany, but I must know that Germany would want U.S. troops. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: On that point, the U.S. troop presence is related to NATO. What sort of NATO would it be, leaving U.S. troops aside? If the U.S. left, NATO would vanish and there might be only CSCE. Where would be the security for Norway or

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the Benelux? That is a big argument. A second argument is that if the Soviet Union withdraws, it is still in Europe. If the U.S. withdraws, it is 6,000 kilometers away. That is a big difference. The presence of U.S. troops and NATO give us options. As I look at the future of Europe, I see the U.S. there. In the year 2000 it must be a matter of course to have the U.S. there. (S)

The President: But we can't predict the political climate here or in Germany by then. There are slight isolationist tendencies here. How about in Germany? It would be understandable if they didn't want U.S. troops. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: True, but we can create facts. I will talk at Harvard about my U.S.-German educational project. These things will work against isolationism. What we are setting up now is a Franco-German brigade to do the same thing with the Europeans. In the future we should have German troops exercising on French soil, and so forth. We cannot leave history behind. We must achieve normalization. If the Europeans allowed the Americans to leave, it would be the greatest defeat for us all. Remember Wilson in 1918. (S)

The President: In the large group, we shouldn't talk about SNF. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: No. We should stay in close touch on these issues. And for Gorbachev, it is important that we make a point that Germany in NATO is indispensable. (S)

The President: Good. And we will meet on June 8 at about 6:30. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Okay. And I will teach Scowcroft about Arlington Cemetery that afternoon. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Vernon Walters, Ambassador to the FRG
Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs
Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

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2000-0429-F
SS 8/21/09

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
Gerhard Stoltenberg, Defense Minister
Hans Klein, Spokesman of the Federal Government
Horst Teltschik, Security Advisor to the Chancellor
Dieter Kastrup, Political Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Klaus Naumann, Major General, Ministry of Defense
Walter Neuer, Director of the Chancellor's Office
Uwe Kaestner, Director for East-West Relations, Federal Chancellery
Dorothee Kaltenbach, Interpreter

DATE, TIME May 17, 1990, 11:40 - 12:55 p.m.
AND PLACE The Cabinet Room

The President: Mr. Chancellor, welcome. I am delighted to see this high-level German team back. I had a little chat with the Chancellor -- mostly serious, but there was some reminiscing. I told the Chancellor that on the Gorbachev meeting it is important to get your views and for me to share ours with you. It is not an easy time with Soviet Union. I have great respect for German

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efforts to be a catalyst in solving the Lithuanian problem. The letter was a great help. I hope this will help get that matter in better shape than is it now. It does cloud our relationship. My view is that the Lithuanians themselves have not been as flexible as they should have been. Gorbachev is under pressure. We've had pressure, too -- not unmanageable, but some pressure -- to cancel the summit or impose sanctions. We have tried to handle this carefully, because it affects not just us but also Germany and the rest of Europe. After all, we managed arms control negotiations at a time when things were much more difficult. But I want to say that it is not easy. My position is not as flexible as it might be. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Mr. President, dear George, first let me thank you for your warm welcome. I would like to repeat in this larger meeting -- and I will say it again in my press briefing (A problem with the President's earphone leads to jokes about its having been made in Japan rather than Germany.) So let me say, without meaning to embarrass you, that for us Germans and Europeans, President George Bush is a lucky thing indeed. I say this not just because I am a guest. But in the Oval Office in the past there were some who have knew considerably less about Germany. (S)

In this dramatic period of transition, we have an interest in pursuing this path in very close cooperation with the U.S. In two weeks' time, I will be meeting with a group of U.S. Senators and Congressmen. The next day, I will meet U.S. intellectuals in the field of literature. And, later, Feldstein will point out that my economic ideas are half-baked Communism. All these are connected with our working together. I am also preparing to set up a German-American Academy. All this will have an effect. For European development, think ahead to the year 2000. It is essential that Americans remain in Europe. Some on the Hill don't grasp the important of this for the U.S., too. I think the military dimension will lose in importance. It will remain, but we need to develop our relations in all fields. I am firmly convinced that NATO is indispensable. Therefore it is essential that a united Germany remain in NATO. We couldn't maintain NATO otherwise, given all the domestic effects in the U.S. Who would send American troops under those circumstances? And what about the Norwegians and the Benelux without the security guarantee of NATO? (S)

As to our relationship, I'm very grateful that we personally have established such close ties, and that our colleagues, Jim Baker and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Stoltenberg and Cheney, also cooperate in an excellent way. I met a very excellent member of the Department of Justice and asked him facts about organized crime for the EC Summit. As to present realities and your preparations for Gorbachev, rest assured that we gave great sympathy for Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Before the war, we had lots of contacts with the former states. But they can't live on sympathy alone. I met Prunskiene and had a very frank talk. I told her she cannot expect support from us unless she enters

into a dialogue. She cannot expect that I would find it wise if Lithuania prejudiced all other issues. It was a good discussion. (S)

The President: May I interrupt to ask a question? We were impressed with her. I wonder if she's not more flexible than Landsbergis. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. I said why don't you leave that gentleman at home and you travel around the world. I told her frankly: put your decisions in the freezer for now. Say you want a dialogue, not conditioned on the boycott. But tell the world that you can't talk with the boycott in effect. The world will understand. I need not go into details, but we would like to use our contacts with Moscow in such a way as to convince Gorbachev that if he wants the Summit to succeed he must improve the climate, so that there will be no demonstrations. This is also the opinion of Mrs. Thatcher. Normally she is tough, but on Lithuania she is restrained because she sees the importance of the matter. (S)

Second, in Germany things are more dramatic than we expected. Tomorrow we will have a treaty between the two German states that I would not have hoped for even four weeks ago. We will introduce the D-Mark into the GDR on July 1. I have no doubt that in four years it will be a thriving economy. There are many problems. There are far too many in the GDR administration. Yesterday we achieved a financial miracle, which you will understand as a federal state: we concluded a treaty with our federal states on financing these acts without raising taxes. (S)

It is important for us, it is our wish and plea, that you raise with Gorbachev those issues that hinder Two Plus Four -- so that he will see that the U.S. has an essential interest in not prolonging that process, that you have an interest in seeing these issues settled. The mood in the GDR and the FRG is that people do not want unification prolonged; they want all-German elections. (S)

The real problem of the GDR is not economic, but the wounds to the soul. The GDR has 17 million people, and 105,000 were members of the State Security. To understand this reign of terror, compare it to the Third Reich, which had 80 million people and 50,000 Gestapo. You see how the GDR population was terrorized. We have to find out where these people stashed their money. Information is available that money was used by the GDR Security and Romanian Security for drug trafficking. Now, with an opening border, there is an enormous opportunity for this to expand. That is just one reason that compels me to take quick action. I can't give you a date; but I can't delay beyond January, and it would not be good to have elections then and to elect again in six months on an all-German basis. (S)

If the Two Plus Four works out, it will settle satisfactorily the German issue. But look at the overall situation -- in Poland,

Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the USSR. We're in the position of a farmer cutting hay. He asks in the evening, should I bring it in? If it looks cloudy, he brings it in just in case. We should be the farmer that brings in the hay on time. (S)

The President: I think on these matters we're pretty much on the same wavelength. The American people basically support a continuing U.S. troop presence, though we have trouble knowing how long this will last. One thing is certain: it is essential that we have this common view of NATO. The Soviets should not be allowed to expand the Two Plus Four to solve their security problems. We favor an expanded CSCE, as an umbrella under which all participants can be sheltered, but we are convinced that an expanded role for NATO is essential. We want to stay in Europe, but this is only possible if we have an institution that provides a proper forum for us. We have thought hard about this and believe an expanded role for NATO is the only way to accommodate this requirement. I'm convinced that we can convince Gorbachev that U.S. troops do not threaten the USSR. It will take time. We do have all those missiles pointed at each other, after all. But we can convince him that U.S. troops are a stabilizing force. The Chancellor put it very well, when he referred to the distance for the Soviets and the distance for the U.S. We will do our best to convince him that an expanded NATO is not detrimental to his interests. I will tell him that I talked to you, Mitterrand, Thatcher, and Woerner. I don't think we have any differences on this. I hope we agree on the essentials of Two Plus Four. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We do. There are no problems. The talks between Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Jim Baker are on an excellent track. Regarding Gorbachev's visit with you, it will gain even more importance because of the events ahead of us in the next two weeks. What he will announce in the Supreme Soviet regarding economic reforms will have an enormous effect. It comes two to three years too late, but if we consider them reasonable steps we should make favorable comments. He faces real public opinion, so he has an interest in the U.S. response. The Soviet Union has enormous problems in the eyes of the world and his own people, so he has to avoid looking like a smaller partner with the U.S. They have had a loss of prestige. For a Soviet Foreign Minister it is a new situation: when he gets together with the Warsaw Pact countries, he has to face the man from Prague, the man from Warsaw, and the man from Budapest, and they say Germany has to stay in NATO. Shevardnadze has talked about that publicly. They call him a weakling in the Soviet parliament. (S)

The President: They're learning fast. They had one big demonstration criticizing Gorbachev and then passed a law saying people can't criticize the President. We want the same thing here. More seriously, you have given good advice, which I accept 100 percent. I want to say in front of your colleagues that everyone has a level of pride. Gorbachev has done amazing things. In terms of Gorbachev's standing, I am sensitive to what you have said. I will do my best not to treat them as a nation in decline or undermine his standing. I understand exactly what you are saying. We have problems, which we will discuss, but we

know how much this relationship means -- even for big, powerful countries like the FRG. We will discuss the concerns we have but will treat him with the respect he deserves. It is in our interest that he should succeed. The press says I am a Gorbachev lover. That may be true. I have met the other kind. You've met Yazov. If you sent to central casting for the stereotype of a Soviet general, they would send you Yazov. (Z)

Chancellor Kohl: George, I should perhaps come back to one thing we discussed before. Last year we prepared with great success the NATO Summit. I looked at how you had to deal with a lady. In the end we achieved our result. She also said she achieved her result, and I have nothing against that. Now, looking back, what was important then is secondary now. In negotiations with our foreign ministers and defense ministers, it is important that we achieve close coordination. Three dates are important in this context: the Gorbachev meeting, the NATO Summit, and the Economic Summit. Don't underestimate the last. These three will determine who is the leader of the West -- the President of the United States of America. In this transitional period, we have to set the right direction. (Z)

We feel this in Germany. A large number want unity but also fear it. People in the GDR know they are bankrupt. They need changes, but they fear changes. It is all the more important in such a situation that you give a sense of leadership. That is why I think these three dates are so important. You can count on us. We are campaigners, and of course we have another date that is important to us. Eagleburger doesn't have enough work. Perhaps a few days before he can come over. (Z)

The President: You talked about a lady. When Larry goes to see her, he usually goes with Gates. She refers to them as Tweedledee and Tweedledum. It is important that each of these consultations go forward. Let me say one word on the Soviet economy. It is absolutely essential that there be fundamental reform. Greenspan was there. So was Thornburgh. He said the legal thinking was like the dark ages. In visit after visit by business people, I hear the same thing. Their major mission is trying to facilitate economic reform. It is in our interest, too. We'll consult and try to be forthcoming. (Z)

Chancellor Kohl: Perhaps Hans-Dietrich Genscher could make a few remarks about the Two Plus Four. (Z)

Foreign Minister Genscher: I think the beginning in Bonn was encouraging, particularly with fixing the agenda so we could delineate the desired subjects. There is no reference to a Peace Treaty, nor to any subject that we think should be dealt with in arms control negotiations. We want to avoid the singularization of united Germany. Also, we have achieve a good speed: in June we will meet in Berlin; in July, we will be in Paris, with the Poles participating. This is good because the Bundestag and the Volkskammer will pass the resolutions defining the border, saying united Germany has to affirm the existing frontier. This will be signed and ratified afterwards by an all-German government and

parliament. The Poles are uneasy about our sincerity. Mazowiecki is responsible, but he is under Communist pressure. Also, Walesa has his own ambitions, creating a kind of tripolar situation. To create this security we will have these two declarations, which will then be accepted by the two Governments, who will formally notify the Polish Government to show that we must enter into binding obligations. We will be grateful if the U.S. could support this approach. Also, the Polish Prime Minister has the idea of initialing a treaty now and have it signed at the time of unification. We think nothing could be more binding than a resolution by the two parliaments and governments. (S)

We also talked about a fourth venue, in the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze was actually ready to do this. He didn't want it in July, because of the Party Congress, so the meeting in the Soviet Union will be in early September. This also has the advantage that already by then talks will have begun toward the CSCE Summit. (S)

So we are off to a good start. It is interesting that Shevardnadze said that high-level official meetings between Ministerials should move very fast. I think that shows the Soviets recognize they cannot be the country that is odd man out, the one that delays. After all, the Soviet Union depends on there being no anti-Soviet feeling in Germany. We have to push unification -- bring in the harvest. This will also have an impact on Two Plus Four. The Soviets want their own interests settled. If we leave ourselves a lot of time in unification, it also means that external issues may be delayed. This is not good for us, and not good for the Soviet Union. Therefore, in your talks with the Soviets, we would appreciate your showing your interest in having Two Plus Four concluded by the CSCE Summit. Jim Baker is presently in Moscow. It would be helpful if you said it, too. It is important for the next meeting that we adhere strictly to the agenda. A final point: the settlement under international law should terminate the rights of the Four Powers. We will start with that, so it is clear we want to establish at the same time the sovereignty of a united Germany. (S)

Regarding the NATO Summit, the Soviets have mounted a campaign to remove the demonic image of NATO. The Shevardnadze visit to NATO was an example. All this is to show the Soviet people that NATO is not such a bad thing. Concerning Germany in NATO, we refer to the Helsinki reference to the rights of countries to join or leave alliances. When we wrote that in, we had other things in mind. We were focusing on the second point, with the idea of East Europeans leaving the Warsaw Pact. Actually, we are concerned with the first point, the right to remain in an alliance. (S)

One single problem where we have to pay attention is the temporary presence of Soviet forces in the current GDR. Mistakes are being made about this in public. We can accept this temporary presence, but the dates must be fixed. We cannot

accept a parallel with U.S. forces in the FRG. They can't be compared. That is why it is so important to stress the role of the U.S. and the Western alliance for stability. One consequence of European unity is that Western Europe is a strong stabilizing factor. But I have to say in Eastern Europe there are still a lot of national difficulties. It reminds us of 1913. Therefore NATO, besides its military purpose, has an enormous political purpose. That is why we hope during the Gorbachev visit you will underscore the importance of concluding Two Plus Four before the CSCE Summit in the autumn. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: George, don't be worried about those in the FRG who make parallels between U.S. forces in the FRG and Soviet forces in the GDR. We will push this through. We'll put our political existence at stake for NATO and the political commitment of the U.S. in Europe. I hope you see that within a unified Germany for a period of, say, three years, we can accept Soviet troops in GDR territory. Don't worry. There is no parallel. We will need a new treaty. But I don't believe Gorbachev has an interest in having soldiers in Leipzig. In twelve months, if the shops are full, it will present a completely different security problem for him. Demoralization will set in. (S)

Second, again, I would welcome it if you could very clearly get out the American position during your meeting. Finally, on Poland, we did all we could to find a reasonable solution. Let me say frankly that this has an enormous psychological effect in our country. It is not the same as with Havel, who addressed those expelled and said Germans also suffered, along with Czechs. So far there has been nothing along those lines from the Poles. A statement like that would be very helpful. Jaruzelski has not been very helpful in the last few weeks. Frankly, I don't think he wants to help. But we need peace between Poles and Germans. (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: Mr. President, it would be helpful for us if the U.S. could tell the Polish Government that this resolution of the two parliaments is a good solution. (S)

The President: Let me comment. We all but did this when Mazowiecki was here. We discussed it. Since then the situation has improved. I am concerned with what you said about Jaruzelski. We might have some influence, because we have tried not to knock him publicly. I get the feeling they are more willing to accept your solution, but we can try. (S)

On the meeting with Gorbachev, we will press for the timetable you set. We are on the same wavelength. I worry that the Soviets may try to keep Two Plus Four alive after unity. On the disposition of forces, I have been hard over. The longer Soviet forces remain, the greater the danger of de facto parallelism. I worry that the world would be presented with parallelism. My view is the sooner they are out, the better. If we're successful in persuading them that the U.S. and NATO are stabilizing forces, perhaps that will help. I think we are thinking the same way,

but I worry about this three-year period. On Jaruzelski, we can take care of that. (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: I explained our position to him. He didn't approve, but he didn't reject, either. (S)

The President: The only other point: Walesa looks like he is on the sidelines. We think Mazowiecki a reasonable man. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I had talks yesterday on the party level. We have a completely new situation in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, though I am skeptical about Romania. On the elections in Czechoslovakia, there are new groups with new names, but they represent the old traditions. In Hungary, Antall is one example of that. Antall is not being given justice in the U.S. press; he is not being treated in a fair way. He is a reasonable man, attached to Western values. In Czechoslovakia, there will be a very clear picture after the elections, with Social Democrats, Liberals, and Christian Democrats. Poland is another matter entirely, more difficult. It is always difficult with the Polish public. What will Walesa do? Mazowiecki? The race is not over yet regarding the parties. I agree with you that Mazowiecki is a clever man. Minister Stoltenberg would like to make a few remarks. (S)

Defense Minister Stoltenberg: The main focus of the talks with Gorbachev will be on arms control. In Vienna, too, after a very good start, again we have delays. We had already anticipated the success of the Vienna talks. The Soviets now say that because of political changes in the GDR, there is a new situation. Therefore to correct that your Administration's approach is important on the difficult issue of ceilings for aircraft. It is very important that the Soviet President see that he must bring the Vienna talks back on track so they can conclude on time. Your Administration has said that CFE must be signed for there to be a CSCE Summit, but a CSCE Summit is also important for other reasons. You have said that the NATO Summit should undertake a political, not only a military, strategy review. Next week, my colleague Secretary Cheney and others will present a few ideas. Vienna is important not just for Germany but for the whole Alliance. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me add one more sentence. I said in our private meeting we are very grateful for your proposals in arms control. (S)

The President: Thank you. Dick? (U)

Secretary Cheney: Having just come from Alberta, we go next week to Brussels. My feeling is that the initiatives on SNF and FOTL are very appropriate concerning the planning meeting. Perhaps we can come to an agreement. (S)

The President: Thank you. Shall we go to lunch? (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2000-0429-F
SS 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary
of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Vernon Walters, Ambassador to the FRG
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for European and Soviet Affairs
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
Gerhard Stoltenberg, Defense Minister
Hans Klein, Spokesman of the Federal
Government
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.
Horst Teltschik, Security Advisor to the
Chancellor
Dieter Kastrup, Political Director, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
Walter Neuer, Director of the Chancellor's
Office
Dorothee Kaltenbach, Interpreter

DATE, TIME May 17, 1990, 1:00 - 2:00 p.m.
AND PLACE Old Family Dining Room

The President: I talked to Ronald Reagan yesterday, because Gorbachev is stopping in California. He had invited him to Los Angeles, but Gorbachev is going to San Francisco rather than Los Angeles. It is all quite confusing, but Reagan may have coffee with Gorbachev in San Francisco. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Genscher: How can he spend so much time abroad when he has so many problems at home? (Ø)

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The President: Perhaps it gives him standing at home. But I hope he doesn't encounter folks shaking their fists at him because of Lithuania. Emotions are quite high. Helmut, do you or Hans-Dietrich know Ryzhkov or Yakovlev? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: We have met them. (U)

The President: They have just changed ambassadors here. Dubinin did a good job. Then just before the Summit they changed to Bessmertnykh. I wonder what's going on. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: They are trying to develop a new cadre of ambassadors, supportive of Gorbachev. (Ø)

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: And Vorontsov is coming to the UN. (Ø)

The President: Mrs. Gorbachev will travel with Barbara to Wellesley to give a speech. She was such a good Marxist then, but I think she has shifted gears. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: In the SPD, 40 percent of the posts have to be held by women. It's a quota. We have rejected that, but it continually comes up. (Ø)

The President: I can understand the aspirations of professional women, but that is another matter from denigrating the role of courtesy. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Mrs. Thatcher feels strongly about this issue. (Ø)

The President: She has tough political problems because of the poll tax. She isn't always easy to deal with, but I am happy she is there now -- and not Kinnock, although he seems to have calmed down his left wing. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Genscher: Kinnock has come a long way. He is now quite reasonable regarding NATO. It is much different than before. This is an important reason why Labor is doing better now. (Ø)

The Vice President: He told me unilateralism was dead in his party. He also talked about a nuclear deterrent, although he used the words "for the time being." (Ø)

The President: Do you have any thoughts on China? Have you had any high-level contacts? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: It would be wrong to isolate China diplomatically. (Ø)

The President: We agree, but it's tough here at home. They react to pressures differently than others. They are the Middle Kingdom; we are the barbarians. We need to keep some contact. Has Mandela visited? (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

Chancellor Kohl: A bit later -- next week. (Ø)

The President: Is anyone asking who should come first? (Ø)

Foreign Minister Genscher: It is not a problem. (U)

The President: I would appreciate a short cable after your meeting with him. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Genscher: I met with both at Windhoek. Each said the other was a serious person trying to make things better. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I will call you next week to give you my impressions. Mandela is a human giant. After all the years in prison, he is not embittered. Amazing. But the Boers are very difficult people. (Ø)

The President: I agree with what de Klerk is trying to do, including deflecting pressures from his right. Some hotheads here want Mandela to come first, but I can't withdraw my invitation to de Klerk. I think things will work out, though. Is there anything else we should discuss? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Perhaps I should say a few words about the EC. At the end of June we will be in Dublin for the EC Summit. The Irish are doing very well in the EC presidency. It is not an easy job. We will be discussing Lithuania. And drugs. We need something like an FBI within the EC to deal with drugs and crime, especially after the borders come down in 1992. We will also talk about the IGC on economic and political union that Francois Mitterrand and I are pushing. It will be an interesting debate. We are now in an interesting and much more important phase. (Discussion of budget summit exercise.) (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: What are your economic prospects? (Ø)

The President: Most experts think we have passed the low point and that the economy will keep growing, perhaps at about 2 percent of GNP. But many still worry about a recession. Unemployment is about 5.2 percent. But even though things are going reasonably well, we want to work urgently on the deficit problem to forestall a recession. How is your economy? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: It is doing well. There is 4 percent real growth and the highest employment rate ever. I am very optimistic, including on the eventual economic prospects for the GDR. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

Koke 1-1
5/17/90

for Howard

K I will be here 6-7 June. would like to meet briefly w/ you + talk about Corb.

P What day?

K 8th best for me

P I will be in Nebraska, etc. Could be back for evening mty. Have about early supper

K That would be fine. I would like 4 private hours to walk around Arlington.

P You might go to VN Memorial

K Cond. Maybe S. ~~some~~ could go w/ me

I launching initiative against drug mafia. I not satisfied. Big danger - real corruption. Claire Stirling took - I read it + called her. Asked to talk w/ her w/ my view of exterior ^{+ function} She told me this (Sappho) was one of most knowledgeable women in US on drugs. Suggested this even get in touch w/ me. Would like to estab a link

SAPPHO

P I will talk to Frankenberg + get it up

K Give P a gift (dry flies)

P Many thanks.

I want to raise one sensitive issue
SXF. We want to conduct our-
selves in way helpful to you
& your elections. Notried Cressler
comment on TASN, would like
your views - ~~and~~ we are
flexible & want to be helpful.
Want to protect Tano - not to
talk about it but to understand
not before elections.

K
P
K

1st all Gen must remain
in NATO & US forces (not
talk about it's) No substitute
for NATO. 3rd NATO must
adjust to all parts. Just one
year ago we agreed
to it - but it's gone.

I would like to take low
profile publicly. Don't want
depend myself & not cause
unnecessary trouble, we
should stay in close touch.
I can't say what kind of
elections there will be. Over
next few weeks we'd
like to call frequently. 2+4
There will be big noise when
treaty goes into parliament.

going to
sign treaty
between
2 countries
next week

Then there will be D-Wank
^{conversion} & then consideration of existing
 agreements in E-Ger. That
 take about 14 mo. Many
 saying all-Ger elections
 ASAP. Will have to hold
 elections before Jan 14 - that
 way know just set a date.
 CDU in GDR has 2 tendencies
 (1) merger w/ CDU in FRG
 That will be big - several other
 parties will follow

(2) Institute old Land.
 Tendency strong to have
 municipal elections & ^{Land} ~~and~~
 elections together. So we prob
 have all Ger elections before
 middle Jan.

You must know - as I know -
 who has helped us. Bush is
 a very lucky thing for us. The
 question of health is important
 & not if we had commercial
 cow. She speaks Ger.

We were able to speak freely.
 I told her they had done almost
 every thing wrong. We all
 sympathize w/ you but if
 you push Gorb into corner

you hurt your cause - Eber
in 53, 14 my in 56.

She asked my advice. I said
~~tell your people. you can't~~
~~take~~ ~~with~~ decision but
freeze it. Don't ask him to take
off boycott - you can't talk.
w/ boycott on, but if you will
talk, ~~but~~ opinion will get
boycott lifted. Then play for
time. She said ~~and~~ she would
do it this way.

P Your statement was helpful, we
are in tough position

K I told her that.

P Did she think we were sympathetic

K Oh yes. But I told her sympathy
won't do it.

But on Gov. We are having
surprising talks. We told
him (I have told no one) he
told Harst Monday that ~~next~~
next week he ^{will announce} ~~will announce~~
~~economic reform prog.~~ (2) He says
openly he has enormous probs
w/ his credit line - that I need
know. He really asking for help.
From emul banks + through
parliamental help. ~~Could~~ could

5
Can bank give him 5 mil DM,
w/ govt guarantee. He also
thinking of 10-15 mil from other
banks, incl US. This for
purchases - wheat from US.
Ratz has wants this.

My reaction was that he must
also make some concessions. Is
that possible - not a financial
problem for us. Also debtors they
have been good.

P We would have probs - impossible
now given hit. 2nd what
we had about Gov - economy - my
discovering. Understand why he
would want \$, The banks - w/o
govt guarantee - would not think
G U a good risk.

I want Gorb not to fail. Best
1st, Baltics must be solved. Then
we can evergetically move forward.
Best on loans, I don't see it as so
reproach. He sounds desperate.

R My question is do we want to
help him or see someone else.
I think it is him.

P Prob. but I can't say who would
replace him or how a recovery
would go.

K I think we could ^{calm} ~~offer~~ ^{with} -
 I think he would like to
 + Yes but with not alone - all
 others.

K Best I think with diff. I told P that
 if soldiers in SO similar in
 their areas they would be with
 armies. Can't have that.

They can't do this all at once.
 Should move gradually..

P (Russians in Baltics & minority
 rights)

K Every move of a prob. we can't
 afford to prejudice our policies
 on account of with.

P True, but we can't grant M.F.V.
 now. Trying to help it on track
 continuing w/ A.C.

Don't would be by what you
 say about financial issues.
 They haven't approached us.

K They will - at Summit

P I don't think they can repay right
 now. They need resources first

K I don't share your concern on
 risk. My view is you must
 reform & it won't be lost.

There is greater danger - supporting
 him or waiting for someone else

Successor won't be better
 P Your people think civil would
 take over

K Yes, but not a face. A civil
 group but backed by civil.
 Not prob for us, but Pol, etc
 will be upset

P Saw about 500 troops remaining
 K It a PR prob for Gov - ^{He} not want
 it on substance, but he does
 want have a domestic prob - not
 like Stalin days. At home he
 must face some public opinion.
 I think his interview ^{you} will
 be very important, not on sub-
 stance but appearance. That
 he can stand beside you as
 equal. He less big prob. His
 E allies say they want be in
 NATO

P we will treat him as equal.
 If only we could solve both prob
 One big issue prob can't give him
 \$. But will bedlines reg. issues.
 Ac, etc, we don't count & seem
 to be pushing

K I agree I can tell him
 what I think about this ^{issue}
 That it is very important

if we can't deal w/ this
issue ahead of time

P I have a lot of pressure on this
issue

K K. I will use my influence
in Gorb. and also press even more.
But this should be just bet a
2 of us. My cabinet doesn't know
what we give you short report
on GDR + 2+4!

Our position on NATO exchanges
in 2+4. I propose to accept 100 troops
for limited period at that
momentary. In a long run a 500
troops there would be demoralized
I think would be same as Hungary. But
there got trouble for 500 troops.

P I don't say anything. Know your
position and I think they should
get out. I want you to tell
me in your speech how
many about US troops remaining
in Ger. I think I can convince
Gorb that US troops should stay
in Ger. But I must know that
Ger would want US troops

K On that point, US troop presence is
related to NATO. What sort of NATO
keeping US troops would. If US left,

NATO would vanish & there might
be CSCE, where security for
Norway ~~by the~~? That is the
argument. 2nd argument is
if SC withdraws, it is still in
E. Eur. If CS withdraws, it is 6000
that way only. Presence of US
troops & NATO give us options. as
I look at future of E. Eur. I see
two there. In 2000 it must
be a matter of course to have
US there.

P But can't predict pol climate
here or in Ger by then. Slight
isolation tendencies here & about
w. Ger - understandable if they
didn't want US troops

K Fine point we can create facts
I will talk at Harvard about
my US-Ger educational project
I see nothing will work against
isolationism.

What we setting up now is
Franco-Ger brigade - to do
same thing w/ E. Eur. In future
we should have Ger troops & divisions
in Fr soil etc. We must
learn hist behind. we
must achieve normalization.

Jc E never allowed arms & knew
it would be greatest benefit
for us all (Wilson in 1918)

P In a large group, we should not
take SNF

K No. We should stay in close
touch on these issues. And
for Gorb, it is important that
we make a point that Cee in
NATO is indispensable

P Good. And we will meet on
June 8 about 10:30

K OK. And I will teach 5 manuscript
about Arlington Cemetery that
afternoon.