

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):  
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:  
2009-0275-S

# FOIA MARKER

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**Record Group/Collection:** George H.W. Bush Presidential Records  
**Collection/Office of Origin:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Meetings Files  
**Subseries:** Memorandum of Conversations/Telephone Conversations Files

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**OA/ID Number:** 91156  
**Folder ID Number:** 91156-001

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**Folder Title:**  
Memcons/Telcons (January-December) 1990 [1]

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| Stack:   | Row:      | Section:  | Shelf:   | Position: |
|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|-----------|
| <b>G</b> | <b>34</b> | <b>48</b> | <b>7</b> | <b>7</b>  |

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## Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type         | Subject/Title                                                                           | Date    | Restriction | Classification |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 01. Telcon              | Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (7 pp.) | 5/11/91 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 02a. Memcon             | Re: Breakfast Meeting with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of United Kingdom (4 pp.)  | 7/5/90  | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 02b. Handwritten Memcon | Re: Thatcher Meeting (5 pp.)                                                            | 7/6/90  | (b)(1)      |                |
| 03a. Memcon             | Re: Meeting with President Jaime Paz Zamora of Bolivia (3 pp.)                          | 5/8/90  | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 03b. Handwritten Memcon | Re: President Paz (5 pp.)                                                               | 5/8/90  | (b)(1)      |                |
| 04a. Memcon             | Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica (2 pp.)                       | 5/3/90  | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 04b. Handwritten Memcon | Re: Manley 1 on 1 (2 pp.)                                                               | 5/4/90  | (b)(1)      |                |
| 05. Handwritten Notes   | Re: Bilateral [Meeting Notes] (2 pp.)                                                   | 12/5/89 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 06. Handwritten Notes   | Re: Cuellar Meeting (1 pp.)                                                             | n.d.    | (b)(1)      |                |

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### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Meetings Files  
**Subseries:** Memcons/Telcons Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Memcons/Telcons (January-December) 1990 [1]

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1291  
**OA/ID Number:** 91156-001  
**Date Closed:** 8/3/2009  
**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2009-0275-S  
**Re-review Case #:**  
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type         | Subject/Title                                                                                | Date    | Restriction | Classification |
|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 07a. Memcon             | Re: Meeting with Senators Nunn and Warner (2 pp.)                                            | 2/22/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 07b. Memo               | Senator Sam Nunn to POTUS<br>Re: Ban on Mobile MIRVed ICBMs (5 pp.)                          | 2/22/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 07c. Memo               | Senator John Warner to POTUS<br>Re: Comments on Proposals to Ban Mobile MIRVed ICBMs (2 pp.) | 2/23/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 07d. Handwritten Memcon | Re: President/Nunn/Warner (2 pp.)                                                            | 2/22/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 08a. Memcon             | Re: Meeting with Senators Nunn and Warner (3 pp.)                                            | 2/23/90 | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 08b. Handwritten Memcon | Re: Did you... (4 pp.)                                                                       | n.d.    | (b)(1)      |                |
| 09. Handwritten Memcon  | Re: Kohl 1 on 1 (10 pp.)                                                                     | 5/17/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 10. Handwritten Memcon  | Re: President Paz (5 pp.)                                                                    | 5/8/90  | (b)(1)      |                |
| 11. Handwritten Memcon  | Re: Manley 1 on 1 (2 pp.)                                                                    | 5/4/90  | (b)(1)      |                |
| 12. Handwritten Memcon  | Re: President/Andreotti (4 pp.)                                                              | 3/6/90  | (b)(1)      |                |

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AS AMENDED

1999-0304-F/1

9/4/2007 MM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
President Mikhail GORBACHEV  
Interpreter: Dmitri Zarechnak  
Notetaker: Nicholas Burns, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME May 11, 1991, 9:03-9:47 a.m.  
AND PLACE Camp David

The President: Mikhail, this is George Bush. How are you?

President Gorbachev: I am very happy to hear your voice. And I am happy that your mild condition is behind you.

The President: I'm up at Camp David and I feel good. My heart is perfect and once I get this thyroid under control I will be totally normal.

President Gorbachev: Well, George, I hope you will quit jogging several miles every morning and confine yourself to horseshoes.

The President: I wanted to talk with you today--I don't want to see our countries drift apart. I read Matlock's report and it had me concerned. And when Eduard Shevardnadze was here, he said the same thing.

President Gorbachev: My dear George, I thought since we have covered alot of ground to reach the current state of our relations, that when we reached it, it was well received. So I decided to share my immediate concerns quite sincerely so I could prevent a bad turn in the relationship.

The President: Good. First, I remain firmly committed to a strong cooperative relationship with you. I tried to make that clear in my press conference the other day. I know what you stand for. As long as you continue down the reform path with measures like the new agreement with the nine republics, you'll get nothing but praise from me. Lastly, you are correct. Some in the U.S. want us to pull back now. I don't want to do that and will not do that.

President Gorbachev: I am very happy to hear that. I wish to



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repeat the phrase you used--I also am firmly committed to cooperation. Acting together we have accomplished a great deal. I am quite convinced we should continue to develop our relations which is in the national interests of the U.S. and USSR. I intend to stand by that approach in the USSR. It enjoys support among people in the USSR but there are some, of course, who have doubts.

Of course, we are going through a special transition period. There are new forms of doing things and no ready-made solutions. Some advocate one thing and some another. We will have to go through this period and shape a new life drawing from the experience and support of others. One very important point to share with you is that we are faced with so many difficulties. Virtually all of the republics felt we had to stand together. We are now finishing the anti-crisis program. You know about it. People from all the republics are now in a Moscow suburb working to complete it.

So, I want you to understand that it will take an effort to make it succeed. Because there are so many things we simply didn't know before. There is no guarantee, given the size of the country and its problems, that we may not get something we didn't expect. I think the biggest mistake would be for us to stop or succumb to pressure or move in reverse. And in this type of situation, I sometimes have to take very drastic measures. So, George, this is what I wanted you to keep in mind.

In a normal situation, some of these steps would have been seen as unacceptable. But we have to make allowances for this period. And when I'm looking to you, George, for assistance, it is because I am in this kind of situation. I really need it. And I appreciate the political support and friendly feelings I've been getting. My hope is that these feelings will stay unabated. The main thing for you, George, is that you must know I've made the choice--there is no alternative for me. I am going to do everything I can to continue moving along the track of renewal.

Now this is what I wanted you to know. We are at a very important moment. The specific point is that I will take some major decisions in the next few days and weeks. Well, I've been going on for some time now but since we had not spoken in a while, I thought I would be specific about things.

The President: Mikhail, if you have time, I want to touch on arms control and economic issues.

President Gorbachev: That is what I thought we would do after discussing this general overview.

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The President: If it is okay with you, I would like to start with arms control.

The CFE problem, frankly, is putting a strain on our relationship. Our biggest concern is naval infantry. It is causing a problem not so much here in the Administration but is very difficult across our public opinion. We will see Moiseyev and hope his visit will lead to a rapid solution of this corrosive issue.

Having gotten CFE done, I believe we could then get our experts to overcome the difficulties on START. Both of us should make sure that gets done. If we can get a CFE solution, I would be anxious to have a summit this summer and make every effort to get START ready for signature. I think we have narrowed the differences but am anxious to get your views. That is about all I had to say on arms control.

President Gorbachev: Well, George, I want you to know I want to resolve quickly the first issue in the near future. Moiseyev will bring something to help push things in that direction. I also share your desire to have a treaty ready to sign. It is simply a duty for us to go ahead with the treaty on fifty percent reductions, especially since we have already accomplished alot. And, of course, if that goes well, we could have a very large-scale summit this summer.

The President: I would like to do that very much.

President Gorbachev: That is my goal too. Of course, we could have an interim meeting if there are delays, but our goal should be a large-scale meeting.

The President: I agree with that.

President Gorbachev: I also think there is a chance, George, to succeed in our cooperation in the Middle East. Alexander and Jim are moving on the same track. There is a possibility of cooperation there as in the Persian Gulf.

The President: I think it is very good that Jim and Sasha are working together. They will meet in Cairo. It is a wonderful arrangement we are talking about. I hope Israel and the Arabs will be cooperative.

President Gorbachev: I think if we act together, we can push them in the right direction.



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The President: At some point, we may have to do so publicly if the Baker-Bessmertnykh shuttle diplomacy doesn't work.

President Gorbachev: Okay, I agree to give that some thought at a later point.

Now within the next three days, I will see the leader of China in Moscow. At the conclusion of this meeting, I will brief you on the visit. Now let me give you my views. We appreciate the role of China on the Persian Gulf--its cooperation there and in other areas. China's positive decision was well thought out.

The President: Our relations with China are strained more than I want. I have the MFN question. There is big opposition in Congress. But I want to find a way to renew their MFN. I don't want to isolate China. If you can convey that, I would appreciate it. Is Li Peng or Yang Shangkun coming?

President Gorbachev: No, Jiang Zemin. I think we can proceed with what we agreed as we talked in the limosine.

The President: Right. I would like to talk about economic issues now.

President Gorbachev: Yes.

The President: One, I know you are in a difficult economic situation. You have explained that at the beginning. In the spirit of frankness, our experts don't believe Pavlov's anti-crisis program will move you fast enough to market reform. If there are more steps toward a market reform effort, then we could do more and help especially with the international financial organizations.

I think...Excuse me, go ahead.

President Gorbachev: Excuse me for interrupting.

The President: I just wanted to say that it would lead quickly to Special Associate Status in the IMF and World Bank. There is also great interest here in the emigration bill that is to be voted on. If that passes and meets internationally acceptable standards, then it would enable us to take steps to normalize the economic relationship; steps such as the trade agreement, and most favored nations status. Then we could go to Congress to repeal the legislative restrictions that make trade and finance so difficult for us.

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I have several more points but maybe I should stop there for your comments.

President Gorbachev: I would like to comment on that, George. Among our pressing problems is stabilizing the economic relationship between regions and even enterprises. There are many pitfalls here. The central and republic authorities are on to this issue and are moving to solve it. This is one of the most pressing tasks at hand. I would call it an emergency task. We have done a lot on the planting campaign in the rural areas and have been rather successful at that. In April, agricultural production was up 3-4 percent compared to last year. But there are still difficulties. We are at the end of spring and summer is coming. Last year's reserves are depleted and there is still no new harvest so we have some difficulties.

On Pavlov's program, it has been very seriously changed. But, George, you must always bear in mind the realistic context of our society. The overriding focus of the Pavlov program is to fight inflation through drastic fiscal measures and at the same time stimulate entrepreneurship. You know there are many provisions in the Pavlov program for stepped-up privatization and destatization. There is more economic freedom. It is under strong fire from the trade unions and some in the party organizations. Some call it anti-people and even inhuman. And you know, George, you will reach a different conclusion depending on whether or not you look at the Pavlov program from an academic angle or from a realistic context of society. This is no longer just Pavlov's program by the way since it has been accepted by all the republics.

So much for the current situation. On your other points, I wish to propose something else. What if for the purposes of continuing this discussion, I send over Primakov and Yavlinsky to discuss the possibility of cooperation in the G-7 framework and other international organizations? I know that there is emerging cooperation at the G-7 experts level with your people and ours. But even your experts think it is time to elevate these discussions to a governmental level.

The President: We could talk about that. But I'm not sure exactly what you mean.

President Gorbachev: What I have in mind is that the G-7 will discuss cooperation with the USSR and the place and role of the G-7 in these developments. There is the possibility of Soviet participation in the IMF and participation by the head of the Soviet state in the G-7 session. I'll send Primakov. He will have a package of items to discuss in a closed session.

The President: That is a good idea and I have one to add on agriculture.



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President Gorbachev: I just received your letter. I welcome the idea and am prepared to join.

The President: Would May 20 be too soon for the team to arrive?

President Gorbachev: No, it is fine. I will give the appropriate instructions tomorrow. There is much to be done to prepare for this.

The President: I think we can be very helpful. I want you to know that I want it to lead to what you need in agricultural credits.

President Gorbachev: I welcome this very much. I just got the translation of your letter before our conversation. It is a very exciting idea and very encouraging. And I will appoint tomorrow the people who will start work on this.

The President: Good. I will instruct our people to come in a positive frame of mind--to try to help and not find problems but find reasons to help. After that, Mikhail, it seems to me that at the summit we could discuss financial institutions, energy, the environment and housing. We can discuss this at our meeting.

President Gorbachev: George, these are important and encouraging subjects. I discussed some of these with Mitterrand. George, I am really happy that we had this substantive conversation. It had been some time since we had a conversation like that.

The President: Let me ask you a personal question. How is your health?

President Gorbachev: So far, I am hanging tough.

The President: That is good. You are my friend and I want to prove that and work with you. I don't like stories in our press that put you down. I hope you noticed that I took them on in public the other day.

President Gorbachev: Well, thank you for those words. I share your approach on this and other issues. I have made a choice, a serious choice on relations with the U.S., providing it is reciprocated, and will follow that course.

The President: That is wonderful. It is nice talking to you and good luck.

President Gorbachev: Thank you, George, and the same to you. Best regards to all at Camp David, especially Barbara.

The President: She just walked in the room and just walked out. She is on her way to the gym.

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President Gorbachev: I am glad to hear that.

The President: Okay. Good-bye.

President Gorbachev: Good-bye.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Breakfast Meeting with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of United Kingdom (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
  
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister  
Charles Powell, Private Secretary to the Prime  
Minister

DATE, TIME July 5, 1990, 8:00 - 9:00 am  
AND PLACE: 10 Downing Street, London, England

Prime Minister Thatcher: The main remaining question is, does NATO have a future? (S)

The President: I worry that the U.S. will be asked to leave. [The President then discussed the German internal situation after monetary union.] (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Gorbachev has made a request for aid. Perhaps we should let Germany do it, as the price for unification. (S)

The President: It is a non-starter for the U.S. Maybe we can consider technical support. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I agree. Otherwise it will go out there through a hole in the bucket. They don't know how to organize. They don't know how to set up the rule of law, or how to devolve power. (S)

The President: We also have a big problem with Cuba. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: We should just let Kohl do it. The Japanese are against aid to the Soviet Union now as well. (S)

The President: At least until the Northern Territories issue is solved. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: How about the Declaration? There is only a clause still open about maritime arms control? (S)



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General Scowcroft: There is also the issue of the level of liaison with NATO. (S)

The President: Do we care? ((There was a discussion of this point.)) (S)

The President: Why are the French opposed? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I don't know. Mitterrand is very troubled, I think about the whole role of France. There is a social pattern. \_\_\_\_? \_\_\_\_ last July. (S)

I'm not depressed by Gorbachev's chances. Are you? (S)

I want to talk to Kohl about TASM. (S)

The President: I'm confused about the German elections. Are there two? (S)

((Discussion))

Prime Minister Thatcher: The U.S. nuclear presence is vital. (S)

The President: ((Discussed training/exercises in Germany)) (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: It would be a tragedy if Yugoslavia collapsed. (S)

The President: What do you think about the situation in the Middle East? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: We want to get something going. (S)

The President: ((Discussed the Green Line, and Levy.)) I will not let Shamir run me. The Jewish lobby says I must conciliate him. If Sharon came in they would say the same. (S)

Shamir distorts everything. Brent, explain where we are. (S)

((Discussion.))

((Discussion of aid to Israel and Egypt.))

The President: We will make one more try. I hope you can try to hold off the EC for now. Then maybe we will join you. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: ((Discussed Shamir and territory for peace.)) (S)

General Scowcroft: We're trying to hold Shamir to the particular points at issue, so as not to drag it out. (S)

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The President: Arafat was stupid to launch that attack. (S)

((Discussion.))

Prime Minister Thatcher: Have you heard anything more about biological weapons? (S)

((Discussion.))

Gorbachev seemed to think there was something behind it. He said he would get back to me. (S)

((Discussion of Mandela and De Klerk.)) I think Mandela now realizes he must drop the armed struggle. (S)

The President: He didn't in his talks with me. But he didn't get the support for it in the US, even with blacks ((contrast drawn to Martin Luther King)). (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: He is swayed by whom he talks to. I told him De Klerk has to get elected. If he fails, who will negotiate with him? (S)

The President: He ....((?))

On GATT and agriculture, we have to get rid of subsidies. Will it be difficult? (S)

The President: I want to be firm on it. There is \_\_\_\_?\_\_\_\_ in it anyway, but it is highly political as well. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: We have to get something. The Community has come along a bit, as has Mitterrand. It is Kohl. ((Weekend farmers who work in motor factories.)) (S)

The President: We must be firm. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Hills is very good. There is terrific protectionism in Europe. Germany just put a tax on lorries. (S)

Thank you for being firm with Gorbachev on non-circumvention in START. (S)

I think ((Gaviria??)) understands Colombia. We have had him over here. We are training his people in counter-terrorism. (S)

The President: A good ? but ?.

Prime Minister Thatcher: ((Raised cut flowers issue.)) (U)

The President: I thought we solved that. It is that and coffee. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Those international commodity

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agreements don't work. (S)

-- End of meeting --

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Thatcher Meeting 11/6/90

T What is the main receiving question is does NATO have a future

P I worry that US will be asked to leave

(German interest set.

Maritime union

T Gerb request for aid  
(let Germany do it as price for information)

P It is now started for US

Maybe technical support.

T I agree. Otherwise it is will go out there & choke the market. They don't know how to organize they don't know how to set up rule of laws, or how to develop power.

P We also have a big prob w/ Cuba.

T Let Kohl do it.

P Days against now as well  
Until N. Territories solved

T How about de-escalation?

Only a Maritime Climate Deal?

S Also level of tension

P Do we call

(Discussion)



P Why are French opposed

T Don't know. Vietnam is very  
travelled. I think about whole  
side of France. Social pattern  
Parade last July

T I'm not depressed by Ger  
elections, are you?

I want to talk to Karl about  
TASMI

P I refused about Ger elections,  
are there 2?

~~ET~~ (Discussion)

T My main presence is actual

P (Travelling in Ger)

T Would be tragedy if Yez. collapsed

P HE?

T We must get something going.

P Green line / heavy.

I will not let Shaviee near  
me. Jewish lobby says I  
must conciliate him. If Shaviee  
came in they would say a  
same.

Shaviee destroys everything  
Brent, explain where we are  
(Discussion)



Aid to Israel / Egypt.

P We will make our needs try.  
Try to hold off EC for now. Then  
maybe we will join you.

T (Ghana & Territory for peace)

S P We trying to hold Ghana to a  
particular points at issue, so as  
not to drag it out

P Arafat was stupid to launch  
that attack

(Discussion)

T Have you heard anything  
more about his views

(Discussion)

Libo seemed to think there  
was something behind it.

Said he would get back to us.

T Mandela / de Klerk

I think he now realizes he  
must drop armed struggle

P He didn't w/ us.

But he didn't get a report  
for it in US even w/ blacks  
(vs MKK ring)

T He swayed by whom he  
talks to.

I told him de Klerk has to  
get elected. If he fails, who  
will negotiate



P Ne

T GATT + Agric. ~~to~~ We have  
to get rid of subsidies. Will  
it be diff?

P I must be firm on it. There  
is merit in it anyway, but  
highly political as well

T We have to get something.  
The Council has come along  
a bit, as has Multilateral.  
It is Kohl. (We should know  
who works in motor factories).

P We must be firm

T Hills is very good.

There is in E an terrific  
protectionism.

Germany just put a tax on  
bananas.

T Thank you for being firm  
on non-circum.

I think Cobo understands  
Colombia. We have him  
over here. We training his  
people in computer-technology.

P A good woman but over the top

\* T Cut flowers

\* P I think we should talk

It is that + coffee  
T Those with credit don't  
work.



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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Jaime Paz Zamora of  
Bolivia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Lillian Nigaglioni, Interpreter

Jaime Paz Zamora, President of Bolivia  
Jorge Crespo-Velasco, Bolivian Ambassador  
to the United States

DATE, TIME May 8, 1990, 11:05 a.m. - 11:25 a.m. EST  
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Greetings! If there is anything you would prefer not to say in the larger meeting, now is the time. (Ø)

President Paz: At a personal level, I would like to discuss changing our working methods. I have the impression our relations, although they are grounded our friendship and brotherhood, are carried out -- like "give and take." (Ø)

This sometimes deteriorates things. I have the impression of "if you do one thing we do another." This is part of Colombia Rio. For example, take Paris Club on debt -- they gave us assistance to get to Toronto. But if you don't give us \$10 million to substitute for coca leaf, Bolivia will be in violation of Toronto agreement. So we have to cut ten million in salaries, etc. Couldn't we do it a different way? We are in agreement on almost everything, so why can't we cooperate diplomatically? Not so lower members of the Administration doesn't give impression that I won't go through with it and can't be trusted. (Ø)

The President: You have a good point. Better sometimes contents haven't been kept, so bureaucracy gets into habits of demanding. We go sometimes to IFI's asking for special consideration. They come back to us and say you ask us to go by the rules and then ask us for favors? We want to send signals to you and your people we have confidence and trust in you. You have dropped inflation dramatically. (Ø)

President Paz: Only 1.6 percent for the first quarter. (Ø)

The President: Amazing! Better than ours! We salute it and want to be as flexible as the law permits. To be supportive.

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PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0712-MR  
28 5115



Our aid law is a problem and I am fighting with the Congress about it. I am trying to dig up some more for you, but we are facing a terrible budget problem. Fifty billion deficit more than we forecast. I am not making changes. (C)

President Paz: I understand. In your last letter you said we Americans are our home. I was touched. (C)

The President: In my mind, when I wrote that, I was thinkg of accusations of neglect for our Hemisphere. This is not right and want to change that perception. In Congress there is that, because of ethnic attachment to Eastern Europe. We have for example our controversial committment to Lithuiania. (C)

President Paz: I'm sure that won't happen. I find your approach well balanced. I wanted to mention this personally because as a leader, this is noticed by my people. What we signed in Cartagena was for cooperation. My people say fine, but they want to believe what we proposed is serious -- we are not trying to fool them. (C)

Now, because we agreed at Cartagena, they think we will help them directly \_\_\_\_\_ for drugs. Our adversaries comment about militarization of the struggle publically. We are at peace in Bolivia and this is important. We are making big strides on drugs (describes seizures, etc.). People are aware we are getting results without violence. So we have to treat military delicately so it won't look like we are bringing violence to the country. So on extradition, early on I sent a criminal to the United States and was told it was against the law. I said "yes, but this is a political decision." We should find a way they would not interfere in our sovereignty. This extradition treaty we should not relate to us -- sign it in a couple of weeks. We should treat it like modernizing an old treaty. These are three problems:

1. Method of working
2. Military involvement
3. Extradition

The President: No problem. (U)

President Paz: I am sure of military. We have the most peaceful military in Latin America. They help in development, etc. In the equipment they are sent -- don't send old stuff. They are not paid well, so their weapons are old. Need to give them adequate equipment. Should let them feel up-to-date, not passe' like their present equipment. (C)

They were thinking of sending three T-33s, but the United States stopped issuing them in the early '60's. The U.S. has much equipment. If they (the Bolivian military) get a message they are getting something good, this adds to my authority over them. (C)

The President: We should go in to the others. (U)

President Paz: One more thing very personally. We only have one helicopter. It is 15 years old -- a French one -- like a glass bowl. Suicidal to fly in it. I am embarrassed, but in the equipment, if there could be one helicopter which could fly the high mountains. There are few roads and a helicopter is very important. This is very personal. Just one reliable helicopter.

The President: Brent will look into it.

President Paz: Finally, I hope sometime you can visit Bolivia.

The President: I would like to, but it would be tough this year but I will keep it in mind. I've said it from the heart (???).

Mentions the Mormon missionaries. Presents the President with a crucifix.



Pres. Page 5/8/90

3679

A Greetings. If there is anything you  
would prefer not to say in the <sup>meeting</sup> ~~large~~ <sup>notes</sup> ~~meeting~~ <sup>the time</sup>

Z At personal letter level I  
would like to discuss changing  
our working methods. I have  
impression our relations,  
~~are~~ <sup>all the</sup> they are <sup>for</sup> <sup>rounded</sup>  
our friends, brothers, are carried  
out - like 'give & take' - this  
sometimes <sup>deliberates</sup> things  
have <sup>impressed</sup> <sup>by</sup> <sup>me</sup> I <sup>have</sup>  
things we do another - part  
of Blackmanid, i.e. for <sup>Paris</sup>

Paris <sup>appears</sup> <sup>club</sup> <sup>or</sup> <sup>debt</sup> - they  
give us assistance to get  
to Toronto. But <sup>if</sup> you don't  
give us 10 mil to <sup>see</sup> <sup>for</sup>  
Coca Cola, Botwinia will be in  
violation of Toronto agreement.  
So we have to cut teacher  
salaries, etc. Couldn't we  
do it a different way. We are in  
agreement on almost everything,  
so why can't we operate diff.  
Not so <sup>lower</sup> <sup>member</sup> of Admin  
don't give impression that  
I <sup>can't</sup> <sup>go</sup> <sup>three</sup> <sup>w/it</sup> <sup>can't</sup> <sup>be</sup> <sup>trusted</sup>.

A You have good point. But



sometimes contents haven't been  
kept so bureaucracy gets in  
to habits of demanding. We  
go sometimes to IFI's asking  
for special consideration.  
They come back to us & say  
wait, you ask us to go by a  
rule & then ask for favors.  
We want to send signal to you  
& your ~~ex~~ people we have conf.  
& trust in you. You have  
dropped inflation dramatically  
Only 1.4 for 1<sup>st</sup> Qtr

2  
P Amazing. Better than ours. We  
salute it & want to be as  
flexible as law permits to be  
supportive. Our aid law  
is a prob of fighting w/ Cong  
about it. I trying to dig up  
some more money.

We facing a terrible budget  
prob. 50 bil deficit more  
than we forecast. I not making  
changes  
2 I understand. In your last  
letter you said we should keep  
a Mercedes over here. I  
was touched.

P In my mind when I wrote  
that was accusations of



neglect for our Herms. Not  
right + want to change that  
perception. In a Cong there  
is that, because of ethnic  
attachment to F.E. ur.

2 We have for example an  
emotional current to L. with  
Don here that won't happen.  
I find you very well balanced.  
I wanted to mention this  
personally because as a  
leader this is noticed by  
my people. What we signed  
in Cartagena was for every-  
my people say fine, but  
they want to believe what  
we propose is serious + we  
not trying to fool them.

Now, because we agreed at  
Cartagena they think  
we will help them ad hoc  
for drugs. Our adversaries  
communities don't understand  
a struggle properly. We  
need peace in Bolivia +  
this is important. We working  
big strikes on drugs (describes  
seizures, etc.) People are  
more we getting results w/o



violence. So ~~and~~ have to treat  
military delicately so it not  
look like we bringing violence  
to a country. So on extradition,  
early on I sent a command to  
US it was told against law.  
I said yes but this a political  
decision. We should find  
a way they not interfere in  
our work - this extradition treaty  
we should not relate to us -  
sign it in couple of weeks.  
Treat like working in old  
treaty.

There are 3 probs

- Method of working
- Military involvement
- X tradition

P no problem.

2 I ~~don't~~ see of military. We have  
a most powerful military in  
NA. They help in deployment,  
etc. In ~~equipment~~ they are sent,  
don't sent old stuff. They not  
paid well, so their ~~equip~~  
need to give them dignity.  
Equip should let them feel  
up to date, not worse like  
their present equip.



They were thinking of purchasing  
3 TB3 - US stopped receiving  
them in early 60s. US has  
many much equip. If they  
get a way they are getting  
something good this adds  
to my authority over them.

P We should go in to a bus  
Z Once thing very personally.  
We only have one helo!  
It is 15 yr old French one -  
like a glass bomb. Several  
to fly in it. I am embarrassed  
but in a group of there could  
be 1 helo which could fly a  
high mountains. Few roads  
+ helo very important. This  
is very personal. Just  
one replacement helo!

P Brent will look into it

Z Finally. I hope sometime you  
can visit Bolivia

P would like to. Tough this year but  
I will keep it in mind  
send it from a heart.  
(Go to desk)

Mormon missionaries  
(Crucefix gift from Paz)

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
  
Michael Manley, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense  
Anthony Bogue, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister

DATE, TIME May 3, 1990, 11:05 a.m. - 11:20 a.m. EDT  
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: (Discussed arrangements and medical situation).

Prime Minister Manley: I feel fine. I have a general approach to present, but I have a couple of sensitive points. (Ø)

When we met the first time, I spoke about recognition of Cuba. I promised it in the election -- first a nonresident ambassador, then a resident. I must do it, but want to find a way not to offend you. (Ø)

The President: I understand. You may take a bit of flak from our Congress, but it won't affect us. I appreciate a \_\_\_\_\_ action. (Ø)

Prime Minister Manley: I'll do it in about six weeks. Tie it to Panama. (Ø)

I am convinced I have corruption in my police -- not at the top. I can't catch any drug dealers. I need help. Could perhaps DEA look into the problem and see what is going on? (Ø)

The President: We want to help. Will have to see how we can assist you. (Described Mexican flap). (Ø)

Prime Minister Manley: The third thing I just want to run past you. [not a sentence] It would be marvelous if you could consider {attending a caribbean meeting on drugs? need help!} (Ø)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0712 MR  
E8 5/1/15



The President: I will look at it. I have to consider {complete sentence}. We don't want to neglect the hemisphere, with all the Eastern Europe things going on. Where would you want it held?  
(Ø)

Prime Minister Manley: Naturally, I would like Jamaica.

The President: I see a merit. Only problem would be scheduling. Only CARECOM. (Ø)

Prime Minister Manley: I haven't thought that through. Maybe that would be too small for you. (Ø)

The President: Not at all. I was only thinking about Mulhroney.  
(Ø)

Prime Minister Manley: Good idea. Could I talk in the group a lot about economies? (Ø)

The President: Sure. I will turn it over to you. (U)

Prime Minister Manley: We can talk politics too. I have a few thoughts about places like Nicaragua. (Ø)

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

Meeting - Oval Office Unit  
Muted Money

- Portugal - President,  
Money  
Secret

- MB,

one-on-one



Mawley 1001  
5/4/90

P (Discussed arrangements)  
(Discussed medical intervention)

M I feel fine. I have a general approach  
to <sup>PRESENT</sup> present, but I have a couple of  
sensitive points.

When we met, 1<sup>st</sup> time I spoke  
about recog of Cuba. I promised it  
in <sup>the</sup> election - 1<sup>st</sup> non resid curb,  
then resid. I must do it but  
want to find ~~as~~ a way not to  
offend you.

P I understand. You may take a  
bit of flak from a Cong, but it  
won't affect us. I agree - consultation

M I'll do it in about 6 wks. Tie it to  
Puma.

I worried I have corruption  
in my police - not at top.

I can't catch any drug dealers.  
I need help. Could perhaps DEA  
look into a post + see what is going  
on.

P We want to help. Will have to  
see how we can assist you.  
(Discussed Mexican flap)

M 3<sup>rd</sup> thing I just want to run  
past you. It would be enormous  
if you could consider a secret  
CB or drug - it would be



P I will look at it. I have no relative time to consider. We don't want to neglect a basis, w/ all the E.F. things going on. Where would you want it held

M Naturally I would like ~~your~~

P I see a visit. Only prob would be scheduling. Only Caracas?

M I haven't that that then. Maybe that too small for you.

P Not at all. I was only thinking about Mexico

M Good idea.

Could I talk in a group a lot about economics.

P Sure. I will turn it over to you

M We can talk politics too. I have a few things about places like Nicaragua



R. J. 12/5/89  
Bilateral

P B What should we discuss here.

I raised a issue of cut flowers  
& described a process.

I also mentioned a coffee agreement  
& told him I had discussed it  
w/ Collo - a very attractive person.

Baker I mentioned a coffee agreement  
to my 2 main colleagues

P My just being here demonstrates  
my faith in Barca & my  
interest in coop. w/ a Cuban  
country. Anything you can  
me to raise in the press conf.  
I will talk about importance  
of demand reduction a few  
pleased I am at demand reduction  
The Pres. showed us these notes  
They are very regged.

B Very rudimentary.

McC We think a ELM is a primary  
user.

P Are a Cuban activist here

B No indications that he is

P Castro is sticking out more. He  
is more & more isolated, along  
w/ NK & Albania.

(more discussion on tech aspects  
of cut flowers)

P To degree a Cuban has flex, can

20000 demonstrators

2

will experience it, but this is a  
very sensitive subject process.

Londons Courier said he came because  
US got troops out of Panama  
P He can say what he wants. That  
not acceptable to us & I will tell  
him.



2:15  
Hilberg  
P

P- Cuellar Mtg

E embarrassed about a money thing

Arafat (letter)

Iran phone call

Plans to go to Netanyahu in 4-5 <sup>days</sup> ~~weeks~~  
To let Blanchard go to O. T. for  
security report. (I refused a raise  
for him 2 mos ago).

Dec '88 Arafat undertaking

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senators Nunn and Warner  
DATE & TIME: Thursday, February 22, 1990 - 2:09 PM - 2:16 PM  
PLACE: Oval Office

The President: We only have about five minutes because I must leave at 2:15 p.m. Why don't you start and we will reschedule for more time.

Senator Nunn: We approved two missiles last year. The House killed both. This year this could happen in the Senate. I argued for both on the basis of trading MX for SS-24s. I think we should move to an ICBM MIRV ban. A useful first step would be to ban mobiles. If we don't have an arms control concept, we could lose both missiles. I would have trouble supporting the program unless there was an arms control concept. Secretary Cheney objects on the basis that the Soviets would then have two missiles deployed and we wouldn't have small ICBMs until 1997. That's no worse than it has been for a couple of years and it was DOD's choice to delay the small missile. I think with an arms control concept we could keep both systems alive in the Senate and Aspin thinks he could in the House.

The President: How about the B-2?

Senator Warner: Maybe we could bring it along. It is key to arms control.

Senator Nunn: Coattails aren't that long.

Senator Warner: Nor for SDI.

Senator Nunn: All the START modernization systems are attractive targets. I think we can get by with some numbers on B-2s.

Senator Warner: We could reconsider B-2s next year even if we lost. The missile is this year's issue.

The President: Why does Midgetman cost so much?

Senator Warner: Mobility.

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526  
290-0712-142  
EJ 5/11/15

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Senator Nunn: In the short term (4 years), which is not the right way to look at it, Midgetman costs \$2 billion and Rail Garrison \$6 billion. If we got a total ICBM deMIRVing deal, Midgetman could eventually go in the silos. I do not sense we have to spend \$20 billion over the next decade. I would keep the mobility aspects in R&D.

The President: How about SDI?

Senator Nunn: That needs to be a separate meeting.

The President: Could we wait until next year on the missile issue?

Senator Nunn: No. Congress wouldn't spend \$4.5 billion on Rail Garrison and then kill it for arms control. It has to be in START I.

Senator Warner: I agree.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

**EYES ONLY**

February 22, 1990

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Senator Sam Nunn

SUBJ: Ban on Mobile MIRVed ICBMs

I have been urging the Administration to propose a ban in START on mobile MIRVed ICBMs because I think it makes sense in terms of greater strategic stability and because I think it may be your only hope for maintaining congressional support for the Rail Garrison MX and the Midgetman programs this year.

I do not see a ban on mobile MIRVed ICBMs as an end in itself and would not advocate it if it were. Rather, I see it as a halfway step toward an ultimate goal in START II of banning all MIRVed ICBMs, including those in silos. It is too late in the START I negotiations to try to ban all MIRVed ICBMs, but a window of opportunity is still open to ban mobile MIRVed ICBMs.

Some have suggested that we wait until START II to seek a ban on mobile MIRVs, rather than negotiate it now. Setting this as a goal for START II is better than never proposing it in terms of our long-term objectives for greater strategic stability. However, I do not think that will save the "two-missile" program on the Hill this year since Members will not be attracted to the idea of spending another \$4.9 billion to complete the program before it could be traded away in arms control.

The hard reality, Mr. President, is that absent a mobile MIRVed ban in START, the votes are not there this year for the two ICBMs. I believe if one missile is defeated, both will probably fall in a kind of "mutual fratricide" sequence. I supported the "two-missile" package last year because I thought I had implicit assurances the United States was going to propose a mobile MIRVed ban, but I cannot support the package this year absent this change.

I am, of course, not alone in advocating a ban on mobile MIRVed ICBMs. The idea is widely supported on the Hill and has been endorsed by three former JCS Chairmen, Harold Brown, Bud McFarlane, Jim Woolsey, and Brent Scowcroft, among others. I have attached a paper containing representative statements in support of this proposal, as well as quotations by some who do not favor it.

Secretary Cheney has strongly opposed the idea. His main objection seems to be that since Midgetman will not be available until 1997, the Soviets would have a mobile ICBM (the single-warhead SS-25) and we would have none for a number of years if the Rail Garrison MX is traded for the SS-24. There are two

**EYES ONLY**



**EYES ONLY**

problems with that argument. First, we have been living with, and will continue to do so for a few more years, a situation where the Soviets have two mobile ICBMs (the SS-25 and SS-24) and we have none, yet no one is suggesting that our deterrent has been undermined. Second, the reason the Midgetman will not be ready until the late 1990's is because the Administration decided to deploy the Rail Garrison MX first. We could probably move up the Midgetman timetable up by a year or so if we increased the funding for Fiscal Years 1991 and 1992.

Secretary Baker has not supported the idea either, apparently because he is worried that it might delay START. However, the two most influential military arms control advisors in the Soviet Union, Marshal Akhromeyev and General Chervov, have made public statements indicating that the Soviets might be receptive to the proposal. START will not be delayed if the Soviets see the proposal as being in our mutual interest.

Some Air Force leaders have argued that leaving the MX in silos will make them more vulnerable. But unless the United States receives and acts on strategic warning, the missiles will be far more vulnerable sitting in their garrisons in frail boxcars than they are now in their hardened shelters. And as each side begins to acquire near real-time capabilities to detect, track and target mobile ICBMs (a capability General Chain recently touted in a press interview), the advantages of rail-basing will dissipate, even if we did disperse the trains on strategic warning. The main point, though, is that banning the mobile MIRVs is just a stage on the road to a genuinely more stable strategic balance in which all land-based MIRVs are banned.

I think the strategic arguments for this idea are sound. But the issue cannot be debated in a political vacuum. With a U.S. proposal to ban mobile MIRVs, a majority in Congress might be willing, albeit reluctantly so, to go along with RGMX. With the proposal, I can argue that in voting funds for MX, they support a negotiating position that will lead to elimination of the rebasing of MX and destruction of the Soviets' SS-24 rail mobile ICBM systems. In addition, some who are currently opposed to Midgetman may reluctantly support that program if they think there is a serious prospect that START will ban RGMX, thereby making Midgetman our only option for achieving mobility in the ICBM force.

Let me add one other dimension. We have to start looking ahead to the START ratification hearings. The intelligence community has cautioned that Soviet rail-based ICBMs present especially difficult verification problems and that it would be harder to verify Soviet compliance with a numerical ceiling on rail-based ICBMs than a numerical limit on truck-mounted ICBMs.

**EYES ONLY**

**EYES ONLY**

In addition, a ban on mobile MIRVed ICBMs would aid START ratification by eliminating a particularly worrisome breakout scenario. If the Soviets are not permitted a legal SS-24 force under START, along with its whole deployment infrastructure, then there would be no training, logistics, or deployment base for the Soviets to exploit were they to try to hide a large force of illegal SS-24 trains. In this case, the Soviets would not likely take the risk of cheating. To be sure, the Soviets could covertly hide SS-25s, but would they take this chance if every illegal SS-25 got them only one additional warhead (versus 10 RVs for each hidden SS-24)? Those who raised this argument with regard to the secretly hidden SS-20 scenario during the INF ratification debate did not get very far.

For all these reasons, I urge you to consider this proposal.

**EYES ONLY**



**EYES ONLY****Quotes on Mobile MIRVed Ban Proposal**

1. Brent Scowcroft, Nick Brady, Harold Brown, Lloyd Cutler, John Deutch, Al Haig, Richard Helms, Henry Kissinger, Mel Laird, Bill Perry, Don Rumsfeld, Jim Schlesinger, and Jim Woolsey (members of and counselors to the Scowcroft Commission), December 9, 1987:

The rail-garrison basing for the MX missile, while possessing attractive features, is not a substitute for the Small Mobile ICBM, inasmuch as it requires significant warning time to achieve survivability.

2. Harold Brown, Les Aspin, Bill Cohen, Joe Jordan, Bud McFarlane, Sam Nunn, John Warner, and Jim Woolsey (CSIS "Discussion Group on Strategic Policy"), January 1989:

We should ... give consideration to proposing a continued ban on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRVed) mobile systems in view of their more accelerated effects in cheating scenarios. A trade of the MX for the SS-24 deserves serious consideration.

3. Admiral William Crowe (former JCS Chairman), February 2, 1990:

That [banning mobile MIRVed ICBMs] absolutely makes eminently good sense ... I would buy it in a heartbeat.

4. General David Jones (former JCS Chairman), February 2, 1990:

I would try, for example, the rail mobile MX and the SS-24. I think it was a good idea to try to trade that off.

5. General John Vessey (former JCS Chairman), February 2, 1990:

I would sure try to get rid of MIRVed mobiles in the negotiating side of the house, and not have to deploy the rail mobile MX.

6. Harold Brown, February 6, 1990:

I think that would be a very good trade.

7. Senator Wallop, February 6, 1990:

It would be a good trade-off.

**EYES ONLY**

**EYES ONLY**

8. Soviet Marshal Akhromeyev, July 28, 1989:

If there appeared any specific proposals on this particular issue, then the Soviet Union will [consider them] with the greatest care and attention. I consider this to be a serious kind of proposal and I now confirm this here today.

9. Soviet General Chervov, January 21, 1990:

I believe it is possible [to ban mobile MIRVed ICBMs]. [Both sides] would win by eliminating a great number of MIRVed missiles, provided that no additional such missiles are created.

10. Richard Perle, January 24, 1990:

For the foreseeable future, I believe we can safely reduce the investment we make in protecting against a massive surprise Soviet nuclear attack... I would not proceed with either the Midgetman or the rail mobile MX.

11. General Chain, February 17, 1990:

[I am] strongly opposed. I don't think the Soviets would have one hiccup with us having the rail-garrison Peacekeeper.

12. Secretary Cheney, February 1, 1990:

In terms of the notion of a trade-off between the SS-24 and the Peacekeeper, I would have problems with that, primarily because I do not think you want to get into a position where the final result is the Soviets have mobile missiles and we do not and because at this time the Peacekeeper is our only system that is likely to be operational any time in the near future. The Small ICBM comes into the force in the last nineties. We would end up -- if you were to cut that kind of deal -- where the Soviets would give up their SS-24 on rail and presumably they would keep those in silos and we would keep ours in silos, and the Soviets would have several hundred SS-25s.

**EYES ONLY**



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## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

February 23, 1990

### MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Senator John Warner

RE: Comments on Proposals to Ban Mobile MIRVed ICBMs

A major reason for building the MX missile arose out of SALT I counting rules, which limited missile launchers but placed no direct limit on the number of warheads. The United States and the Soviet Union were thus encouraged to build large missiles with as many warheads as possible to maximize their capabilities under a SALT I Treaty. This was later codified in SALT II in the form of limits on nuclear delivery vehicles, although an attempt was made to limit MIRVed warheads on individual missiles. In START, we are moving away from counting only nuclear delivery vehicles by including limitations on the number of overall warheads and indirect limits on missile throwweight. These circumstances, combined with significant increases in missile accuracy over the years, contribute to MIRVed ICBMs becoming less militarily useful.

For these reasons, I am in basic agreement with Senator Nunn on the proposals put forward yesterday and today in our private meetings with you. However, I stress the need that any such proposal be coupled with an accelerated and serious Small ICBM (SICBM) program that provides for research, development, and production of the missile along with an advanced mobile launcher development program.

In assessing the proposals, certain Congressional considerations must be addressed.

First, while I favor long-term support for deployment of the SICBM program, it is not clear that Congressional support for it can be sustained for two or three years (or even one year). Sustained support for the SICBM could be especially difficult in the House of Representatives. If we are successful in banning all MIRVed ICBMs, but are not successful in funding deployment of the SICBM, we will have no modern ICBM for the early 21st century.

Second, banning all MIRVed ICBMs creates complexities from the monitoring/verification perspective. It is not difficult to refit certain classes of single-warhead ICBMs with a MIRVed warhead configuration in a short period of time. For example, the existing Soviet single-warhead SS-25 road mobile missile could be refitted with the three-warhead SS-20 reentry vehicle, since they are of similar design. Consequently, any comprehensive MIRVed ban

will require strict limitations on missile throwweight and intrusive monitoring provisions to preclude circumvention.

Third, while some Soviet officials have voiced support for a possible ban on mobile MIRVs, the Soviets have made an enormous investment in their rail-based ICBM program, the SS-24. The Soviets have rarely, if ever, negotiated away a major strategic system when no counterpart exists in the U.S. inventory. The mere tabling of a mobile MIRVed ICBM ban could reduce support for Rail Garrison MX (RGMX) in Congress. Members may not be interested in funding a \$2.2 billion bargaining chip this year, even if the obligation rate is slowed. Indeed, Congressman Aspin stated during a recent hearing that the House would not fund RGMX as a bargaining chip. Thus, we may find ourselves with a cancelled RGMX program and the Soviet Union unwilling to negotiate a ban on their mobile MIRVed ICBMs.

Fourth, as Senator Nunn noted in his memorandum, technology may soon permit detection of rail-based ICBMs in almost real time. However, such technology also could be used to detect road-mobile ICBMs. Such a development would suggest a move to ban all MIRVed ICBMs--particularly the Soviet heavy ICBM, the SS-18--and deployment of the SICBM in existing Minuteman silos. Soviet willingness to eliminate their SS-18 and all other MIRVed ICBMs is questionable. But, if we were to succeed in such a move and actually begin to reduce the level of our land-based deterrent with deployment of SICBMs in silos, it is my personal opinion that strategic defenses will become even more important to protect our reduced ICBM force and our C<sup>3</sup> assets, as well as population centers.

Having raised these concerns about the mobile MIRVed ICBM proposal Senator Nunn and I have made to you, we nonetheless believe that the uncertainty and conflict that now exists in Congress over ICBM modernization could result in cancellation of both programs. We believe that our proposal offers less risk than does the status quo.

Finally, since our proposal has less risk than the current budget proposal, it may now be appropriate to consider a broader approach that would include elimination of other MIRVed ICBMs. You may wish to consult with Secretary Cheney and other senior advisors about the possibility of a proposal that would eliminate our MX system, both rail- and silo-based, in return for the Soviet elimination of all SS-24's and, most importantly, all SS-18's. The tabling of such a proposal would raise few, if any, additional Congressional concerns beyond those raised by our mobile MIRVed ICBM proposal. At the same time, a successful outcome along these lines would meet the long-term U.S. goal of truly enhanced strategic stability.



P/Munn/Warner 2/22/90

P We really have about 5 minutes, because I must leave at 2:15.  
 Munn We approved 2 missiles last year. How

beheld both. This year this could happen in Senate. I argued for both on basis of Trade MX for SS 24.

I think we should move to MIRV <sup>useful</sup> war. A first step would be to have mobiles. If we can't support an A concept, we could lose both. I would have trouble supporting unless there was an A concept.

Cheney objects on basis that S-30 would have 2 & we wouldn't have S-1000 til 97. That no worse than now & it was odd choice. I think w/ A concept that we could keep both in Senate & Aspin thinks we could in House.

P Has about B-2

W Maybe we could bring it along. It has PAC

N Coattails aren't that long.

W Not for S OI

N All that modernization systems are attractive targets. I think we can get by w/ same #s on B-2.

W We could reconstruct B-2 next year even if we lost. The missile is this year's issue.

PA Why does Rudy. Cost so much

why don't you start  
 and we will  
 reschedule for  
 more time.

W Mobility

N In short Term (4 yrs) Midy costs  
2 bil & RG 6 bil. -

If we got a learning deal,  
Midy could come in & save  
I not sure we have to spend 2  
bil in next - yrs. I would keep  
a mobility aspect in R+D.

Sm. How about 50/

N That needs to be separate entry

VP Could we wait til next year

N No. Com wouldn't spend 4.5 bil  
on RG & then bill it for AC. It  
has to be in Start I.



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                         | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 08a. Memcon              | Re: Meeting with Senators Nunn and Warner (3 pp.) | 2/23/90 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Meetings Files  
**Subseries:** Memcons/Telcons Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Memcons/Telcons (January-December) 1990 [1]

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 8/3/2009        | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91156-001 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type   | Subject/Title of Document | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 08b. Handwritten<br>Memcon | Re: Did you... (4 pp.)    | n.d. | (b)(1)      |        |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Meetings Files  
**Subseries:** Memcons/Telcons Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Memcons/Telcons (January-December) 1990 [1]

|                                     |                                |
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| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
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| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
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| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



HUTCHINGS  
HAS ORIGINAL

Koke 1-1  
5/17/90

for Howard

K I will be here 6-7 June. would  
like to meet briefly w/you + talk  
about carb.

P What day?

K 8<sup>th</sup> best for me.

P I will be in Nebraska etc. Could  
be back for evening mty. Have  
about early scupper

K That would be fine. I would  
like 4 private rooms to work  
around Arlington.

P You might go to VN Memorial

K Cond. Maybe S. ~~can~~ could  
go w/me.

I launching initiative against  
drug mafia. I not satisfied.

Big danger - rich corruption.

Claire Stirling took - I read it

+ called me. Asked to talk w/ her

w/ my view of interior <sup>+ function</sup> She told

me this (Sapho) was one of

most promoted people now in

US on drugs. Suggested this was

getting in touch w/me. Would

like to estab a link

P I will talk to Thompson & get  
it up

K Give P a gift (dry flies)

P Many thanks.

I want to raise one sensitive issue  
SNT. We want to conduct our-  
selves in way helpful to you  
& your elections. I tried to make  
comment on TASM, would like  
your views - ~~and~~ we are  
flexible & want to be helpful  
want to protect Tasm - not to  
talk about it but to understand  
not before election.

K

P

K

1<sup>st</sup> all Ger must remain  
in NATO & US force (not  
talk about #1's) No substitute  
for NATO. 3<sup>rd</sup> NATO must  
adjust to changes. Just one  
year ago we agreed  
to it - but it gone.

I would like to take low  
profile publicly. Don't want  
depend myself & not cause  
unnecessary trouble, we  
should stay in close touch.  
I can't say what kind of  
elections there will be. Over  
next few weeks we will  
like to call frequently. 2+4  
There will be big noise when  
treaty goes into parliament.

I going to  
sign treaty  
between  
2 countries  
next week



Then there will be D-~~work~~  
<sup>conversion</sup> & then conversion of existing  
companies in Feb. That  
take about 14 mo. Many  
joining all-Ger. electors  
ASAP. Will have to hold  
elections before Jan 14 - that  
very hard but set a date.  
CDU in GDR has 2 tendencies  
(1) merger w/ CDU in <sup>(FRG)</sup> GDR  
That will be big - several other  
parties will follow  
(2) Institute old Land.  
Tendency strong to have <sup>Land</sup> ~~Land~~  
municipal elections & ~~and~~  
elections together. So we prob  
have all Ger. elections before  
middle Jan.  
You must know - as I know -  
who has helped us. Bush is  
a very lucky thing for us. The  
question of hith is important  
& not if we had someone  
else. She speaks Ger.  
We were able to speak freely  
I told her they had done almost  
every thing wrong. We all  
sympathize w/ you but if  
you prob. Ger. into career

you hurt your cause - Even  
in 53, it was in 56.

She asked my advice. I said  
~~tell your people you can't~~  
~~take back decision but~~  
freeze it. Don't ask him to take  
off boycott - you can't talk.  
w/ boycott on, but if you will  
talk, ~~but~~ opinion will get  
boycott lifted. Then play for  
time. She said ~~and~~ she would  
do it this way.

P Your statement was helpful, was  
drawing tough position

K I told her that.

P Did she think we were separate

K Oh yes. But I told her separate  
won't do it.

But on Gov. we have  
surprising talks. We told  
him (I have told no one) he  
told Harst Monday that we  
next week he ~~will announce~~  
~~economic reform prog.~~ (2) He says  
openly he has enormous problems  
w/ his credit line - short & medium  
terms. He really asking for help.  
From central banks & through  
financial help. He said could



Can bank give him 5 mil DM,  
w/ govt guarantee. He also  
thinking of 10-15 mil from other  
banks, incl US. This for  
purchases - wheat from US.  
Ray has wants this.

My reaction was that he can  
also make some concessions. Is  
that possible - not a financial  
problem for us. Also debtors they  
have been good.

P We would know prob - impossible  
now given hit. 2nd what  
we had about for - economy in  
decreasing. Understand why he  
would want it. The banks - w/o  
govt guarantee - would not think  
of a good risk.

I want Gorb not to fail. Best  
1<sup>st</sup>, Baltics must be solved. The  
we can eventually move forward  
Best on loans, I don't see it as  
repro. He sounds desperate.

K My question is do we want to  
help him or see someone else  
I think it is him.

P Prob. but I can't say who would  
replace him or how a reform  
would go.

K I think we could <sup>calm</sup> ~~offer~~ <sup>with</sup> -  
I think he would like to  
+ Yes but with not alone - all  
others.

K But I think with diff. I told P that  
if soldiers in SO similar in  
their areas they would be with  
armies. Can't have that.

They can't do this all at once.  
Should move gradually.

P (Russians in Baltics & minority  
rights)

K Every move of a prob. We can't  
afford to prejudice our policies  
on account of with.

P True, but we can't grant M.F.V.  
now. Trying to help it on the  
continuing w/ A.C.

I am worried by what you  
say about financial issues.  
They haven't approached us.

K They will - at Summit

P I don't think they can repay  
now. They need to press first

K I don't share your concern  
risk. My view is you must  
reprimand it won't be lost.  
There is greater danger - dropping  
him or waiting for someone else



Successor won't be better  
P Young people think civil would  
take over

K Yes, but not a face. A civil  
group but backed by civil.  
Not prob for us, but Pol, etc  
will be upset

P Saw about Sov troops remain

K It a PR prob for <sup>he</sup> Gov - not want  
it on substance, but he does  
want have a domestic prob - no  
like Stalin days. Let have he  
must face some public opinion  
I think his interview <sup>you</sup> will  
be very important, not on sub  
stance but appearance. Then  
he can stand beside you as  
equal. He sees big prob. He  
E allies say they won't be in  
NATO

P we will treat him as equal.  
If only we could solve both prob  
Or big issue prob can't give him  
\$. But with bed these reg. issues.  
Ac, etc, we don't want to seem  
to be pushing

K I agree & can tell him  
what I think about this ~~issue~~  
That it is very important

if we could deal w/ this  
issue ahead of time

P I have a lot of pressure on this  
issue

K K. I will use my influence  
in Gov. - and also press everyone  
But this should be just bet c  
2 of us. My cabinet doesn't know  
what we agree you short-report  
also DR + 2+4

Our position on NATO membership  
In 2+4 I propose to accept countries  
for limited period if that  
necessary. One long time a  
troops there would be demoralized  
It would be same as Hungary. But  
there got trouble for Gov troops.

P I don't say anything. Know your  
position and I think they should  
get out. I want you to tell  
me in your speech how  
many about US troops remain  
in Ger. I think I can convince  
Gov that US troops should stay  
in Ger. But I must know that  
Ger would want US troops

K On that point, US troop presence is  
related to NATO. What sort of NATO  
keeping US troops would. If US left



NATO would vanish & there might  
be ESCF, where security for  
Norway ~~by the~~ <sup>Bogusly</sup>? That is big  
argument. 2<sup>nd</sup> argument is  
if SC w/draws, it is still in  
Eur. If CS w/draws, it is 6000  
that way only. Presence of US  
troops & NATO give us options. As  
I look at future of Eur, I see  
two there. In 2000 it must  
be a matter of course to have  
US there.

P But can't predict pol climate  
here or in Ger by then. Slight  
isolation tendencies here & about  
w. Ger - understandable if they  
didn't want US troops

K From point we can create fact  
I will talk at Harvard about  
my US-Ger educational project  
That thing will work against  
isolationism.

What we setting up now is  
Franco-Ger brigade - to do  
same thing w/ Franco. In future  
we should have Ger troops here  
in Fr soil etc. We must  
learn hist behind. We  
must achieve normalization.

NATO

J. C. E. even allowed Arms & Co.  
it would be a greatest effort  
for us all (Wilson in 1918)

P In a large group, we should not  
take SNF

K No. We should stay in close  
touch on these issues. And  
for Gerb, it is important that  
we make a point that Cee in  
NATO is indispensable

P Good. And we will meet on  
June 5 about 6:30

K OK. And I will teach 5 groups  
about Arlington Cemetery that  
afternoon.



Pres. Paz 5/8/90

Passed to Payge for  
finalizing 9/90

- A Greetings. If there is anything you  
would prefer not to say in the <sup>largest meeting</sup> ~~largest meeting~~ <sup>meeting</sup> ~~meeting~~
- 2 At personal better level I  
would like to discuss changing  
our working methods. I have  
impression our relations,  
~~at~~ <sup>at</sup> ~~all~~ <sup>all</sup> the they are <sup>framed</sup> ~~framed~~  
are friends, brothers, are carried  
out - like 'give & take' - this  
sometimes ~~deliberate~~ <sup>deliberate</sup> things  
have impression by ~~me~~ <sup>me</sup> I have  
things we do another - part  
of ~~blackmail~~ <sup>blackmail</sup>. ie for ~~Paz~~  
Paris ~~appears~~ <sup>appears</sup> ~~club~~ <sup>club</sup> on ~~debt~~ <sup>debt</sup> - they  
give us assistance to get  
to Toronto. But <sup>if</sup> you don't  
give us 10 mil to ~~sub~~ <sup>sub</sup> for  
Coca Cola, Botwinia will be a  
violation of Toronto agreement.  
So we have to cut teacher  
salaries, etc. Couldn't we  
do it a different way. We are in  
agreement on almost everything,  
so why can't we operate diff.  
Not so ~~lower~~ <sup>lower</sup> members of Adm  
don't give impression that  
I won't go there w/ it &  
can't be trusted.

A You have good points. But

sometimes contents haven't been  
kept so bureaucracy gets in  
to habits of demanding. We  
go sometimes to IFI's asking  
for special consideration. They  
come back to us & say  
want you ask us to go by  
rules & then ask for favors.  
We want to send signal to you  
& your people we have conf.  
& trust in you. You have  
dropped inflation dramatically  
Only 1.4 for 1<sup>st</sup> Qtr

P Amazing. Better than ours. We  
salute it & want to be as  
flexible as law permits to be  
supportive. Our aid law  
is a pain & I fighting w/ Cong  
about it. I trying to dig up  
some more money.

We facing a terrible budget  
prob. 50 bil deficit more  
than we forecast. I not making  
I understand. In your last  
letter you said we should work  
a Mercedes over home. I  
was touched.

P In my mind when I wrote  
that was accusations of



neglect for our Heros. Not  
right + want to change that  
perception. In a Cong there  
is that, because of ethnic  
attachment to F.E.M.

2 We have for example an  
emotional current to L. with  
don't know that won't happen.  
I find you very well balanced.  
I wanted to mention this  
personally because as a  
leader this is noticed by  
my people. What was said  
in Cartagena was for every-  
one people say fine, but  
they want to believe what  
we say seems serious - we  
not trying to fool them.

Now, because we agreed at  
Cartagena they think  
we will help them allegedly  
for drugs. Our adversaries  
communities don't understand  
a struggle problem. We  
need peace in Bolivia  
this is important. We working  
big strikes on drugs (describes  
seizures, etc.) People are  
more we getting reports w/:

violence. So we have to treat  
military delicately so it won't  
look like we're bringing violence  
to a country. So on Sept 1st, 1961,  
early on I sent a command to  
US it was told against a law.  
I said yes but this is a political  
decision. We should find  
a way they not interfere in  
our hut - this Sept 1st treaty  
we should not relate to us -  
sign it in couple of weeks.  
Treat like modernizing old  
treaty.

There are 3 probs  
- Method of working  
- Military involvement  
- Tradition

P no problem.

2 I ~~don't~~ see a military. We have  
a most peaceful military in  
N.A. They help in development,  
etc. In equips they are sent,  
but sent old stuff. They not  
paid well, so their equip  
need to give them dignity.  
Equip should let them feel  
up to date, not worse like  
their present equip.



They were thinking of purchasing  
3 TB3 - US stopped receiving  
them in early 60s. US has  
many much equip. If they  
get a way they are getting  
something good this adds  
to my authority over them.

P We should go in to airbus  
Z One thing very personally.  
We only have one helo!  
It is 15 yr old French one -  
like a glass house. Several  
to fly in it. I am embarrassed  
but in a equip of there could  
be 1 helo which could fly a  
high mountains. Few roads  
+ helo very important. This  
is very personal. Just  
one replacement helo!

P Brent will look into it

Z Finally. I hope sometime you  
can visit Bolivia

P would like to. Tough this year but  
I will keep it in mind  
since it is a heart.  
(Goes to desk)

Mormon missionaries  
(Cruzifix gift par Paz)

Manley 1001  
5/4/90

Passed to Payce for  
typing + into the  
system - 4 May

P (Discussed arrangements)  
(Discussed medical intervention)

M I feel fine. I have a general approach  
to present, but I have a couple of  
sensitive points.

When we meet, 1<sup>st</sup> time I spoke  
about recog of Cuba. I promised it  
in election - 1<sup>st</sup> non resid amb,  
then resid. I must do it but I  
want to find ~~out~~ a way not to  
offend you.

P I understand. You may take a  
bit of flak from a long, but it  
won't affect us. I agree a consultation

M I'll do it in about 6 wks. Tie it to  
Puma.

I worried I have corruption  
in my police - not at top.  
I can't catch any drug dealers.  
I need help. Could perhaps DEA  
look into a prob + see what is going  
on.

P We want to help. Will have to  
see how we can assist you.  
(Discussed Mexican flap)

M 3<sup>rd</sup> thing I just want to warn  
prob you. It would be enormous  
if you could consider a secret  
leakage  
CB or drug - it would be



P I will look at it. I have no reserve time to consider. We don't want to neglect a basis, w/ all the E & F things going on. Where would you want it held

M Naturally I would like ~~journalism~~  
P I see a visit. Only prob would be scheduling. Only Curran?

M I haven't that that there. Maybe that too small for you.

P Not at all. I was only thinking about Mukherjee

M Good idea.

Could I talk in a group a lot about economics.

P Sure. I will turn it over to you

M We can talk politics too. I have a few things about places like Nicaragua





prob - maybe Berlin - but  
a B circle approach is right  
EC - NATO - CSCE

\* No solution should come about  
w/o full agreement.

I worry about today even  
But encouraging work from  
2 parties in Berlin that even  
Sov troops remaining in  
Poland are part of this. If Kohl  
could consent & all else of  
us as well, we could deal  
w/ these concerns

Press asks me who is  
evening. I say it is inevitable  
unpredictability. ~~But~~ Events  
have moved in right direction  
but will that continue. Wanted  
you to know my feelings because  
you are such a good & close friend.

A We cannot thoroughly discuss  
alliance because evening  
has changed. Everything  
must be done gradually.  
In early stage there may be  
troops on both sides, but this  
must be temporary. Meantime  
we must build - new  
alliance & H. Jensenki would



There must be strong  
basis for US in Eur.  
Should some Euro theories  
get stronger we would have  
a real crisis. We have  
the powers & resources  
not. We could absorb  
this w/in NATO but w/o  
it all will come under  
a Euro rule. This would  
be a step back

P If this became seen here as  
a predominant aim, a US  
would can hardly be isolationist  
Swill fight for defense & alliance  
but if this happened it would  
overwhelm all other aims

A It would create a crisis of a  
alliance. We must move  
fast to upgrade a photo of NATO

P Degree. We had good talks w/  
Weimer & we should consult  
closely. This is our only way  
forward. Pleased when Kohl came  
out strongly in favor.

A This, plus CSCE, doesn't create  
problems

P On his heart, I think Gorbachev  
this idea - may be not in



generals. unified  
A B. strong for inside E are cope  
US would be a danger. There.  
That's very strong on this point  
& he is right.

You called me on troop reduction  
It is not a # but a US content  
to remain in Far.

P O. possible but there are pressures  
in core & right & left to  
bring troops home. Decker  
peace dividend & put it into  
China etc. But this is not  
world coll & US must play.