

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Handwritten Meeting Notes Files

OA/ID Number: 91158
Folder ID Number: 91158-004

Folder Title:
Handwritten Notes (of meetings/calls, etc.) 1991 [3]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	49	1	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Buthelezi of South Africa (1 pp.)	6/20/91	(b)(1)	
02. Handwritten Notes	Re: B-2s (1 pp.)	5/2/91	(b)(1)	
03. Handwritten Notes	Re: Gorb is trying... (2 pp.)	5/2/91	(b)(1)	
04. Handwritten Notes	Re: What's new (1 pp.)	4/25/91	(b)(1)	
05. Handwritten Notes	Re: LSE [Lawrence Eagleburger] (1 pp.)	4/21/91	(b)(1)	
06. Handwritten Notes	Re: How we excuse... (2 pp.)	4/21/91	(b)(1)	
07. Handwritten Notes	Re: President/Prime Minister Santer (3 pp.)	4/11/91	(b)(1)	
08. Handwritten Notes	Re: Ozal (1 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 4

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Series: Meetings Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Handwritten Notes (of meetings/calls, etc.) 1991 [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1307
OA/ID Number: 91158-004
Date Closed: 8/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09. Handwritten Notes	Re: Deadling/No Request (6 pp.)	2/25	(b)(1)	
10. Handwritten Notes	Re: Kemp (1 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	
11. Handwritten Notes	Re: Brazil, France, Italy, Turkey, Saudi, Kuwaiti, Germany, Egypt (3 pp.)	2/23/91	(b)(1)	
12. Handwritten Draft Letter	Re: To Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (2 pp.)	2/17/91	(b)(1)	
13. Handwritten Notes	Re: King Hussein (1 pp.)	2/9/91	(b)(1)	
14. Handwritten Notes	Re: EAA [Export Administration Act] (3 pp.)	2/5/91	(b)(1)	
15. Handwritten Notes	Re: Overnight Developments (1 pp.)	8/20/91	(b)(1)	
16. Memo	Stephen G. Rademaker to Ricahrd C. Barth Re: EAA Revisions (2 pp.)	2/2/91	(b)(1)	✓
17a. Report	Re: Two Examples (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
17b. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for Meeting with Senators on Export Control Legislation (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓

Page 2 of 4

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
18. Handwritten Notes	Re: Making Progress (1 pp.)	1/24-27/91	(b)(1)	
19. Handwritten Notes	Re: Cheney/Baker (1 pp.)	1/16/91	(b)(1)	
20. Handwritten Notes	Re: New Year Discussions (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
21. Handwritten Notes	Re: Breakfast Topics (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
22. Handwritten Notes	Re: Weather looks excellent... (12 pp.)	1/15/91	(b)(1)	
23. Handwritten Notes	Re: Egypt-IMF (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
24. Handwritten Notes	Re: Attali (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
25. Handwritten Notes	Re: START (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
26. Handwritten Notes	Re: Call Attali (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
27. Handwritten Notes	Re: DOD [Department of Defense] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
28. Handwritten Notes	Re: Collara Meeting (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
29. Handwritten Notes	Re: CFE (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
30. Handwritten Notes	Re: Gingrich (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
31. Handwritten Notes	Re: Meeting 12 December (2 pp.)	8/13/91	(b)(1)	

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P/Buthelzi 6/20/91

88 SOUTH AFRICA

P I will left sanctions when c conditions are met. Some in Congress say otherwise - some issues, like pol. prisoners, should ~~could~~ be prot.

B Yes. I spoke to Senators yesterday

P I met w/ Mandela & gave him a warm reception.

B It was very good.

P But we have probs w/ some of c ANC positions. Supported S & A

B I know. ANC is bad in these respects - Aparat, Qadlafi etc.

P How have your meetings gone

B Mandela & I get along very well. It is c ANC that is c prob. Winnie is behind much of it. She is an evil woman. Mandela thinks this whole thing is de Klerk's fault.

(Discussion of Winnie, Trial)
P Where does Winnie's support come from - Crust wing, Qadlafi supporters
B Something of all of those. [Someone whose name I missed]

P How is c evidence

B It is very worrisome. De Klerk cabled a party of all factions but ANC didn't show up. He is going to try again next week.

5-2-91

- B-2 wholesale

- BDA

- Finding Seeds.

(~~Fiber optics~~)

- Sensor systems &
capabilities

- Sensor equip & tactics.

- Getting pres into area

Understand air power

- How do you measure
its effectiveness.

new wars
like Gulf?
- Overload
New defense
era

- More R&D

Industrial
base

5-2-91
CAMP DAVID

Gov is trying to ~~save~~
cure by inspiring
capitalist elements
(a la Roosevelt w/
the New Deal)

Reform is a desperate
attempt to prevent
collapse - not an
attempt at reform.

- Gov did not appreciate
degree of discontent
inside
- May have a real
collapse of society
(a la 1905, 1917) or
a reassertion of
authority

CAMP DAVID

The SNO System
has been so distorted
by security & potential
needs that leaders
really don't know
what is going on.

Peter Huesy 4/25/91

- What's new

- Sov Union

- Modernization continues

- Buffer threat reduced

- Disintegration - unauthorized launch
uncertainty

- Budget Pressures

- Can't drop or - come

- Gulf War

- Stealth

- Mobility

- Tech

- AC - S&C

- Move toward slow fliers

- Reduced #'s

- Higher tech sep

- ABM

- Spread of high tech - WMD

- The Program

- Trident (too many warheads?)

- ICBM

- Rail Garrison - a hedge / leverage

- B-2 - It does work. Only question is cost.

- 30.8 / 36.4 sunk costs.

28 more to complete 75 aft

- Wholesale vs retail delivery; accident

- SDI - Focus on immediate threats - 3rd world

- AC - CFE
- START

4-21-91 Bill Harrop I recall

- Something good for
Djerjeken

- PRC - Stape Roy.

LSE - Shirley Temple
To Belgium.

Bruce Lell

Torrell

Popadivite

4-21-91

- How we excuse a non-provoked attack
- whose side time on & why
- Pressure on R + W borders.
- How plan for response to provocation
 - long term (strategic)
 - what kinds of events would do it
 - Scale of response.
 - Short term (after event)
 - How quickly a response
 - UN?
 - Allies (co troops in Gulf)
- We have to be able to end it or we will end up like Vietnam.
- How respond to chemical attack
- How do we consult both on responding to provocation and to non-provoked attack.

~~*P~~-Schedule - Exp Fr. Travel Sched - Get for Baker + Cheney

SDI - Early briefing by Cooper
Interagency sched before presentation to Pres.

CSCB - Mail to Summit (Graves/Hodley)

Brazil - Computer safeguards
- Represents Cruise meet

Israel - ~~See~~ Patriot ~~Dec~~ II
- MFR on freight handling costs

CW - Ships around Horn

*Kearney AFB me - DOD likes (Holloman)
J. Staff preparing concept paper
ready next week.

- Computer report to Lang
- NSC stopping it. DOD says
it is law.

ASAT -

Second bite at Casapoli -

4-11-91

P/PM Senter

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

mtg (cc)

Differentiation between what
must stay in place
& what must change

- Integrated and

- US forces

Political Union

- Multilateral forces

- Euro only

- Euro + US

- Future of WEU

- We are debating this
now.

- What is your place
of WEU w/respect
to NATO

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

There are 2 more
topics and lunch
is scheduled to
begin at 12:15

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

If it's OK, I'd like
to place a marker
on an energy cooperation
project the EC is trying
with (re USSR).

Matters to US industry

- Econ -
- Ozel -

- Visit w/ Emir (to Kuwait)

- Vietnam road map.

* - Vietnamese talking to Iraq about
how to fight ground war.

- EAA & Baker report.

- Fast Track - get a group pushing
it in public interest.

- Sol Himmelfarb

- Bob Strauss

(Duke Democrat will manage it)

- Bulgaria - coming along. Any
way we can help? Make
link reform work.

- Iceland - Meet w/ Governor
Offered 500 mil if nothing
more was asked this yr.

- I asked for 2 bit loan guarantee
- we said no

FMI's not coming
to meet w/ GB & Fr

Deadlines / no negot.

Week of 2/25

- Where is our priority?
 - Political approach or gradual escalation.
- Saw my role as trying to ~~draw~~ lines.

our military
think it
possible

- Sought a solution tough but implementable

- 1 week not possible

- Maybe we can combine 2 approaches into a combined approach in CUSC.

What matters most is that this would show we are acting together.
- This would be a major meeting.

~~Get into a few lines~~
- France remains totally committed

He wants 72 hour
delay.

But

Kuwait is now
almost invisible
under the smoke

0000 | Payan end of war

Focus on Hussein
~~can~~ condition then condition
S N speech vs remember
do it now vs more later.

Unbroken - Deadline too short.

Major - Pretty content w/ proposal
- Puts ones on Iraqis.
- French/Ger. pretty much
on board

* Speech
* Add: Iraqis must accept
publicly & authoritatively

** Trucking oil wells

Speech yesterday - w/ demand must
leave him w/ a future

** Iraqis launched 5 missiles ~~into~~ leaving
Saw press conf on Aziz visit

Chances - 1:00 am

We have no diff in assessment
of SH

- His fate has been pre-ordained
- We are not trying even to
save him much less raise
his prestige
- Best we must deal w/ him

We should try after all our
efforts to shift events in a
political direction & thus
avoid a tragedy

You asked me to relay your
demands to SH. OK
- Will also describe your
approach & position

- My final suggestion:
We come out w/ joint
initiative for conveying SC
only to consider this joint
package of demands.
We would pressure to get a
most out of that only & formulate
a res. in a document.

- We have a holiday today - Friday day
- An event has happened which has changed a bit.
 - Iraq has agreed to w/drawal w/in 4 days from Kuwait City
 - Aziz had press conf which set forth that acceptance
 After we talked I gave Aziz your thoughts & my own view.
- Let's work together in a UN to produce a joint ~~effort~~ approach & resolution of this issue. (SH has agreed)
- (P) - Called me a liar about setting oil fires
 - I can't let a deadline pass w/o action
 - Hard as you have tried, there are still conditions.
- 6 Let's stay cool. We are human beings. SH fate has been determined. We need to achieve our goals & prevent a tragic phase of conflict
 SH wants to stall but we are not simpletons. We should raise

- this w/ in 24-48 hrs in UNSC & have a tough decision there.
- I would accept your idea. I think Baker - Bro. can work it out & get it done
 - These are words of a friend.
 - I shake your hand & say goodbye in spirit of understanding
 - ~~It~~ I appreciate, but don't want you to misunderstand. There is no way to delay. I will talk to Jim, but not inclined to delay or stall.
 - I don't know how long I can delay. He has only a few minutes left to leave under UNSC resolutions.
 - One or 2 days is not much given all we have been there

{ More determined than ever to fulfill a UN Resolutions

Kemp

+ Latin America Trip - V.P.
Talk about trip planning.

cut a deal w/ Israel

- Stills in for Briefing

Meet
w/
P

{ Dumas - Thurs.
Genscher - Thurs/Fri

Fr
Steel
Turk

Lebanon
Gor
Egypt

2-23-94

US after consultation w/ coalition

For

Public opinion

So measurement represents

Thanks to effort of P Card there
is hope for

maybe we say we restrain
our forces if oil demand begins
well.

Adjust attack time for Fr -

3rd para - Coalition must make
sure " and those who have
suffered be compensated.
(Perhaps just mention # of resolution)
 Iraqi prisoners & dead as
well as ours.

Fr & its coalition partners.
GB & " " "

To handpade
stay close on precise announcement
time

- We no longer have the luxury of time to resolve our differences w/in the UN and then gain Saddam's acceptance
- We must act now, especially in view of his disgusting & scorching earth attack on Kuwait.

Time is precious

- Iraqis agreed to go down
to 10 days.

another hour (1330)

Kohl 0621 68 0019

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Handwritten Draft Letter	Re: To Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (2 pp.)	2/17/91	(b)(1)	

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FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-Feb-1991 12:48 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Dona F. Proctor

(PROCTOR)

FROM:

Richard N. Haass
(HAASS)

SUBJECT:

shamir reaction re shoval

donna: pls pass to Brent

Brent: pretty smart/gracious response by the PM.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-Feb-1991 10:11 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

(WHSR_ROUTER@WHSR)

SUBJECT:

NO SUBJECT FOUND

<DIST>

SIT: HAASS MONTGOMERY WELCH

<ORIG>

FBIS

<TOR>

910216100339

<TEXT>

FBIS 077

UNCLAS 5L

ISRAEL: SHAMIR ON REBUKE TO SHOVAL, 'COOPERATION' WITH U.S.
TA1602144391 JERUSALEM ISRAEL TELEVISION NETWORK IN HEBREW 1400
GMT 16 FEB 91

[REPORT BY 'IMANU'EL HALPERIN]

[EXCERPT] [PASSAGE OMITTED] WE INTERVIEWED PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR LAST NIGHT ON THE WEEKLY NEWSREEL, AND HE TOLD US THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A VERY POSITIVE AND FRIENDLY LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH. HE MADE NO MENTION OF THE REBUKE OF AMBASSADOR SHOVAL AND THERE COULD POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN TWO SEPARATE MESSAGES THAT REACHED JERUSALEM. I ASKED MR. SHAMIR ABOUT THE SUMMONING OF AMBASSADOR SHOVAL TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND ABOUT THE COOLNESS SHOWN BY THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE SUBJECT OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND THIS WAS HIS RESPONSE:

[BEGIN SHAMIR RECORDING] WE MUST ALWAYS BEAR IN MIND, AND NOT JUST THESE DAYS, THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES IS VERY DIVERSE AND MULTIFACETED. IT COMPRISES MANY EXTREMELY IMPORTANT ISSUES. THEREFORE, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT SOMETIMES THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OR MISUNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING A CERTAIN ISSUE OR EVEN ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES. HOWEVER, WHAT CHARACTERIZES THE RELATIONSHIP -- DESPITE THE OCCASIONAL MISHAPS -- IS THE FUNDAMENTALLY FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE PERVADING THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF OUR RELATIONS. NO OBSTACLE CAN CAST A SHADOW ON THE ATMOSPHERE IN GENERAL. OF COURSE, WE HAVE OCCASIONAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND DISAGREEMENTS. THIS DOES NOT CHANGE THE BASIC NATURE OF THE

FRIENDLY RELATIONS, OR WHAT I WOULD GO SO FAR AS TO CALL THE
EXTREMELY CLOSE COOPERATION EXISTING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
ISRAEL. [END RECORDING]

16 FEB 1501Z CLV

NNNN

2-9-91

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

King Hussein

Civil but unrepentant
effort to preserve ^{personal} rel. w. Bush.
"Pres. advised badly"

Speech reflected ^{king's} own convictions
+ those of ^{his} people

Alluded to domestic situation

no mention of Kuwait. "not necessary"

complained ^{we} didn't read speech
clearly ^{enough} - no mention of
SH - ^{refers to} Iraqi people

Suspend dialogue "OK - best
thing under circumstances"
rel. far from desirable - no
thots for moving ahead.

R.H.
nothing penetrating to King -
focusing on guys around King
Ben Shakin, Abu Talib - surprised
by speech. —

EAA

Mtg w/ Sen Dole et al
300 pm 2-5-91
5-230

- I wanted to talk to you about the EAA legis to see if there is some way we can work our way thru it w/o a big controversy
 - I know some of you were not thrilled about a veto
- There are really 3 major elements to the legis: EAA itself, the Mache Amendment, and the CBW section.
- On EAA, ideally we would propose new legis, which we are preparing right now
 - In 1988, I believe, - Cong mandated a NAS study of whole subject of X controls.
 - That study is now complete and we would like to see its results reflected in EAA legis.
- If that is asking too much, we would propose deletive modification of Section 108 to track the Senate language and deletion of Sections 112, 117, 119, in the current bill
- With respect to a Mache Amendment - we agree w/ a objective, but we would propose

a national interest waiver. There could be real probs, for example, w/ countries like Canada which have contrary laws. U.S. foreign subsidiaries could be forced to violate either US or local law.

- A waiver could take care of that

- The real problem is a CBW section.

- Again, we do not differ in objectives

- Indeed, I think a Admin has shown p itself tough & rigorous on chemicals

- we vetoed a bill, not on its toughness but its rigidity.

- If we are really to deal w/ ^{chemical} proliferation it can only be done cooperatively w/ others, not unilaterally in draconian & ~~stiffer~~ terms.

- We want a system which will work & that demands a coop. approach.

- Since a veto, we have promulgated an exec order, which does what a bill was designed to do.

- We ^{incorporated} ~~made~~ proposals to a Australia Group in Dec to get so far over 1/2 a group to put controls on 50 precursor chemicals - that is enormous prog.

- what we would propose is a new bill, which we have drafted, which incorporates a exec order, a relevant elements of a current bill

and some implementing regulations.

- We think ~~our~~ bill should be broadly acceptable to those who supported current bill.
- If new ^a ~~the~~ CBA ~~is~~ bill is out of a question we would at least request presidential waiver authority.

- Overnight reports 8/20/91
- Partitivity = Cabinet Run

① still unfolding THE WHITE HOUSE

- Major uncertainty ^{WASHINGTON} Reverse
- Objectives = Present Extreme

③ - Minimal leverage

② - clearly an adverse development

④ Short term operational strategy

- Don't take any action which may have to be reversed.
- This is not a end of world or process of change in CSO

⑤ DC checklist

- Strauss credentials

one of the latest thing we can do is make mistakes

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-1157 MB
ES 2/19/13

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

02-Feb-1991 18:33 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard C. Barth

(BARTH)

FROM:

Stephen G. Rademaker
(RADEMAKER)

SUBJECT:

RE: EAA Revisions

Richard:

The following is in response to your question about the constitutionality of EAA sections 112, 117 and 119:

Section 112 The requirement in section 112(a) that the Secretary review the control list and adhere to certain procedures in so doing is constitutional. The requirements in 112(a) that the U.S. seek Cocom review of the Cocom list at least every 2 years, and propose Cocom review of specific items that our review suggests should be deleted, are unconstitutional. In section 112(b), the requirements that the U.S. make certain proposals to Cocom in certain circumstances are unconstitutional (proposed sections 5(c)(9)(A)(ii) and 5(c)(9)(D)). However, the remaining provisions of section 112(b), mandating termination of U.S. controls under certain circumstances, are constitutional and probably severable from (i.e., enforceable notwithstanding) the unconstitutional provisions. We can ignore the unconstitutional provisions, but must obey the constitutional ones.

Section 117 Again, Congress can require the Secretary to study things, but not to make a particular proposal to Cocom. Thus, the first sentence of proposed section 5(k)(2) is constitutional, but the second sentence is not. Proposed section 5(k)(3) is unconstitutional because Congress cannot direct the Secretary of State to make proposals to Cocom, or to do so within a particular timeframe. Proposed section 5(k)(4) is unconstitutional because Congress cannot dictate the composition of U.S. delegations to international organizations. (FYI, we presidential prerogative lawyers secretly would like to see 5(k)(4) enacted because it would make a great test case--of course, to get into court we would have to defy it, meaning we would have to exclude Commerce from the Cocom delegation).

Section 119 As a general matter, Congress can require us to publish things, especially control lists that are legally binding on the private sector. The requirement in proposed section 5(r)(2)(A) that U.S. proposals to Cocom be published is constitutionally dubious, as Executive privilege could be invoked to protect information related to sensitive diplomatic discussions bearing on national security. However, the procedure at the end of proposed section 5(r)(2), whereby information need not be published if the Secretary reports to Congress that its publication would harm national security or violate our Cocom

obligations, appears to cure the constitutional problem. This procedure is obnoxious micromanagement, but it is constitutional. Because of the procedure, I don't think we can claim section 119 is unconstitutional.

CC: Daniel B. Poneman	(PONEMAN)
CC: E. Bret Coulson	(COULSON)
CC: Virginia A. Lampley	(LAMPLEY)
CC: Nicholas Rostow	(ROSTOW)

1. Two examples of the rigidity of the vetoed legislation:

- **Foreign person sanctions: 90-day rule.** Imposition of the foreign person sanctions would be required within 90 days of a Presidential determination that a company violates the act, unless the President certifies to the Congress that the foreign government has taken "specific and effective actions, including appropriate penalties, to terminate" the sanctionable activity.

So if Germany, in the midst of strengthening its own export control laws on CBW, were investigating a company we cited but failed to apply penalties by the 90th day, then the President would have to slap on the sanctions on the 91st day, and could not remove them no matter what penalties Germany finally imposed.

- **Country sanctions: 60-day rule.** The President would be required under the country sanction provisions to make a determination whether or not a government has used CBW within 60 days of whenever information becomes "available to the executive branch indicating the substantial possibility" that a foreign government has made substantial preparations to use CBW.

So if someone sent a report to a U.S. official indicating that two Middle Eastern businessmen had discussed the "substantial possibility" that a certain government might use CBW, the 60-day clock would start running for the President, because that information would be "available to the executive branch" even before anyone had read the report.

2. The **Australia Group** meetings last December in Paris produced substantial consensus to strengthen multilateral controls against CBW proliferation. Eight countries announced they had moved or were moving to place worldwide export controls on all 50 chemicals on the Australia Group list, bringing the total to 11 out of the 20 members of the Group. (Japan and Germany had already applied such controls.) This reflects a broad trend among our allies to strengthen controls on assistance to CBW programs and exports of dual-use equipment and technology.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH SENATORS ON
EXPORT CONTROL LEGISLATION

- I have asked for this meeting to seek your assistance in ensuring passage of CBW sanctions and EAA legislation in this term that is acceptable to both the President and the Congress.
- In November, the President pocket-vetoed the EAA, including CBW provisions attached in the Senate. The President's problem was not with the requirement of sanctions, but the rigid way in which they were imposed. In fact, the President immediately thereafter signed an Executive Order directing the imposition of the sanctions contained in the bill.
- On the EAA side, we have been active in addressing our shared concerns. For example, we implemented new dispute resolution procedures for nonproliferation export licenses.
- In addition we have been preparing new EAA legislation, which ideally would take into account the National Academy of Sciences' study that came out last week.
- But we understand that you may not be willing to reopen the debate on the EAA at this time. Therefore, we have some minor modifications to the bill that passed last year that address our most serious ^{problems w/ the bill} objections.
- One other issue is Connie Mack's Cuba provision, which while ^{we} share the objective ^{should include} ~~needs to provide the President~~

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DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/5/24

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for the President

flexibility to avoid extraterritorial complications with the allies, particularly with Canada.

- Rebo*
- (I hope we can agree today on those modifications.)
 - On the CBW side, the President could not sign legislation that did not permit him to take into account the totality of U.S. interests in deciding whether to apply some or all of the sanctions. Moreover, that bill would have provoked friendly countries whose cooperation is essential to the success of our nonproliferation efforts.
 - We do not want a public Executive-Legislative dispute over chemical weapons legislation at this critical time when U.S. troops face a chemical threat. We all seek the same objective. The President's deep concern about the proliferation and potential use of these terrible weapons is well-known and beyond question.
 - I know you are aware of the concrete steps, in addition to the Executive Order, that the Administration has already taken:
 - o The coalition forces have done tremendous damage to Saddam Hussein's ability to produce and store CBW.
 - o We are about to publish proposed regulations to control CBW-related equipment and technology to countries that may be developing or manufacturing these weapons.
 - In short, we have been waging an Administration-wide assault to combat CBW proliferation and to fix long-standing export

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3

control problems.

- As part of that effort, we have been working on new CBW legislation. The draft CBW bill contains virtually all of the sanctions in the vetoed bill. In some cases our draft is even more stringent. It does, however, meet the essential test of flexibility in application. We can share that draft with you today.

- We hope that you will join in this effort to enact meaningful legislation while avoiding a divisive fight that would almost certainly be damaging to the morale of our troops and disconcerting to our nonproliferation and Gulf allies.

If rebuffed on the new CBW legislation proposed:

- You know the President will be forced to veto the same legislation he was unable to sign last fall. I urge you to consider the few essential changes to that legislation that the President would need before we could consider signing any legislation. (Share language on CBW waiver, Cuba waiver, and EAA changes at Tab C.)

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Defense Production Act (DPA)

Background

The DPA expired on October 20, 1990. Last year both Houses of Congress passed DPA Reauthorization Bills. The House then passed the Conference report on H.R. 486 but the Senate failed to act before adjournment. A senior advisers veto threat was proposed based on industrial policy provisions in the bill. Senator Heinz is sympathetic to these provisions which establish domestic content requirements for "essential weapons systems", which would require case by case waiver by the Secretary of Defense. H.R. 486 also included extremely cumbersome reporting requirements, protectionist burdens on the acquisition process and fair trade provisions that we oppose, but standing alone would not necessarily support a veto recommendation.

Current Status

On January 11, 1991 the Administration submitted legislation to extend the DPA for one year, retroactive to October 20, 1990. This is a simple extension that includes two additional Department of Energy provisions (adds "services" to DPA authorities that currently cover only products and materials; and provides conflict of interest protection to firms involved in international transportation of oil during national emergencies) that were included in H.R. 486 last year (FALLBACK position - drop Energy amendments if necessary to get fast action).

This bill has been introduced in both Houses as H.R. 653 and S. 259 (by Sen Garn) respectively.

While the President did issue Executive Order 12742 on January 8 to provide emergency authorities under the Selective Service Act, it is seen internally as stretching the legal interpretation of certain statutes and would not be as legally protective as would legislation enacted to extend the DPA. Therefore, it is important to push for rapid enactment of the one year extension of DPA.

Long term extension of DPA

The Administration has no pending request for a long term extension of the DPA. Current strategy is to push for the short term extension necessary to support Desert Storm Operations. You should sidestep discussion of the long term legislation if possible. If pressed, make the following points:

- The 1 year extension gives us the authority we need in the near term.
- The Departments and Agencies are currently reviewing H.R. 486. Their inputs (due this week) will form the basis of the overall Administration position.
- Implicit in this exercise is the recognition that we will need to address this issue over the long term.

1-24/27-91

CAMP DAVID

making progress.

1. J Stars worked - a lot of secondary explosions
2. Footages of bridges being dropped
Special descrip. reports
3. Knocked out both mainpds
Briefing by Noren in 1 1/2 hrs.
Fire near terminal
4. Over 40 now. 2 F15 shutdown 4 M16 230
5. Steiner coming in Monday.
6. Should have been in

3:30 Monday

Baker Dole

1-18-91

If Baker / Aziz - Mitchell doesn't
want to do anything
Dole agrees!

Fday that resolution would pass
w/ a minority of Dems + majority
of Repubs.

Leadership meeting on 2nd - Good

- Preceded by Big 4

- Prob NOT C.D. - takes too much
time

- Maybe better if there
is one around 15th

1-16-91

H-1 Call former Presidents
Call Brady (Breedon)
Darnass
Thornburgh
Skinner

Tonight I have reported to Cong.

Initial reports from
cases are that
our Opus are
forming according
to plan

1-16-91

Cheney
Bober

Initial brief to all Cong
on Thurs.?
- when notify Cante Churn

P - Notify Gephardt

Maxlin ~~Maxlin~~ Brief Today?

Church service

Fort Meyer

Billy Graham + Chaplain
Families of people over there

9 am

Nixon } H-1
Carter }
Ford }
Reagan }

New Year Discussion

- New initiatives for Talks
 - Aziz here
 - New dates for both
 - Baker / Aziz at Geneva
 - PDQ - War w/o Baker

(1)

- D-Day Discussion
 - { - Troop closure 18-22 Jan
 - { - Troops ready 7-11 Feb
 - Growing probs after 15 Jan

(2)

- Consultations - Three kinds
 - Strategic consultations
 - Need to go soon after Jan 15
 - Tactical consultations - Date
 - Contingency consultations
 - eg partial / slow pull out
 - Keep him on defensive
 - Do things which make his rejection or provocative.
- Special cases

Each country
unique

(3)

(4)

- France
- USSR
- Syria

- How to handle Israel
 - Send an emissary?

(5)

- No presumption
- No participation if not attacked

Cherky

(3)

Dates

- 7 Corps combat elements
- will arrive bet 18-22 Jan
- because of weather
- Support elements will be behind this
- 7-11 Feb will be ready to go

Israel

- Saudi/Bgypt
- Idea 1 - Israel stop out
- 2 - If they come in after ground campaign has started
- 3 - If I comes in during air campaign it will make a ground campaign diff.

Deploy Patriot to I w/ US morning

(4)

Prime Saudi
Syrians will not participate in offensive until ops
- Prime Saudi

Now Egypt says they have been counting on Syrians to go w/ them

- Now E says they need a US division

- Don't by redefining a boundary.

Do we write a Syrian set of any plans.

- (Gradcont) - hit us respond if attacked
- no mil. reason for Israeli response
 - What targets would they go after that we wouldn't hit.
 - An Israeli response could prevent a ground attack from taking place.

- Jordan

- Leadership Mtg

- Discuss resolution & tactics w/ 4 leaders
- Status report at mtg -
 - Convince SH we are serious
- Diplomatic activity -
 - Consult
 - Talks?
 - Pass coop
- Consult again (on 15th?)

- Domestic activities

- Name Dipeller as Code.
- Summer/Rogers background.
- P - Sonny Montgomery
- Baker Take Coats

~~Cheney - Warning order, etc by Dep. Principal~~

Breakfast Topics

- Cong codes - House + Senate + Mustache
- 2nd rule - no preempt
no attack makes attack
~~If~~ No deconfliction til after
They're hit & consult.
- Air Mobile Force
- Air campaign & ground force combined
- BW - How to attack.
- Saudi arms package - Pres hold on
30 man term
- Trigger for ground campaign

1-15-91

Weather
looks
excellent
for at least
3 days

* - L S E -

✓ - Targetting

- Consultations

* - Cable to Hussein

OK - Leadership

cable - Benjaded

✓ - Tom Johnson

{
- Unproductive
- appreciate efforts
- Decisions to talk to UK & SC
- Trip here slip.
- ~~He wants~~ to contact by plane
would be happy to receive a call

- Expedite order Tues AM

- Alramoudy go in to Ogal on CNR
overflight.

- Who is our Baghdad dip. rep.

- Allenby bridge

Joe Clark To PDD

- 1 Committee of members
post w/ channel
- 2 Post w/ channel agreement
for res. of I-N def.
- 3 used UN peacekeeping
forces to monitor w/ channel
- 4 Post w/ channel effort to resolve
Arab-I issue

NO LINKAGE

Talk only about
the UN Resolutions

Don't forget to ask
about telling Webster
training for him alone.

Please don't
share with anyone
else until shortly before
H hour.

- Labor still edgy & wants to
delay - the Parliament majority
of 477 - Biggest for long time.

Diego
Garcia

Date of elections
Institutionalization of
President &
Constitutional Court
Party laws

Avoid creation of power
vacuum

- like Polish model.
- Thinks Courts will be able
to play dominant role in
new systems of opposition
 - Since a lot of parties
don't have a experience
to govern
 - This over opinion
- we thinking of request &
infrastructure backing to
opposition parties to help
them out. —

But politics won't succeed
unless we get away
from a can bleed soul
we have big debt & haven't
spent it well.

Working capital & joint
ventures

- Reform of ownership
- Even reforms must also
be embodied in Constitution
- we also need reform of
thought process.
- We must have
competition
- But we must have
our own model
- whenever we adopt
foreign models, we
don't do well (get sick)
- you took 200 yrs to build
a market economy
we can do it in 5 yrs.

- We assumed Brez doctrine is dead & we can act independently
- Pronounced at Brezhnev
- Once or 2 socialist leaders had diff opinion, but not both.
- * - Our relations w/ IN F are good, but -
 - They prescribe same cure, regardless of situation.
 - They always prescribe 3
 - Cut price relations
 - Convertibly currency
- ① - Reduce B/P deficit quickly
- ② - Since we're not a market economy we don't finance easily
- ③ - Privatization
- * - Want US help in more flexible INF approach

1 2 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ HOURS
FROM
NOW 1

—
+ Msg to Iraq on
CBW & Tefra.

- Cable on Gt int
consultations that
on countries Baker
does not visit.

- Speed outline

- War powers
- Hear views
on what to do.

+ Iraqi arms
defecting
—

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Shawy holiday line

< Federation Council
Meeting on Saturday

- Demarche to
Boomerstein
Do you want to do?

~~Step~~ -

COLONI

- Egypt - IMAF
 - - Training clearance for terrorist claims.
 - Remarks -
 - AC Mtg Saturday -
-

VAL

Release - what
~~release~~ Bill does
which spec order
doesn't.

?

Panel to discuss issues
relating to testing (CTB) for P

Attali

3 subjects

- Panama - Foreign leader in US field
Restoring democracy
by force
(Precedent)
- N-S Conf on Drugs/Environment
- Where are we going on China

Inter preal Op to discuss
cessation of Testing

- Galvin

START

Sticking just to current proposals

Pro

- Don't delay a process
- Doesn't upset strategic prog. ^(ZFCBM)
- Expense of Singles
- Lets us set sights on early START II
- Sovs may not buy it

Con

- Need to show a world has changed
- Put Brezhnev's input & stamp on it
- Take advantage of current leverage
- Get at Sovs prop whi deployment going on (later, they won't care)
- ~~Sovs~~ Won't get there - budget w/ 2 ICBM's.

C F E

Issues are a Samle - Push it thru or add to it.

- How to add to it
 - For Euros - Get ahead of Cong down to sustainable level
 - For Sovs - Keep it simple - no Bundeswehr ceilings

Budget

Need a strategy for a 70's which we can use to hold things together & give over ^{Cong} friends acquiring material

Jack Chain
Doug Sanders }

Thurs Wash Post

hook at
Telecom

Call Attali - Arrange for Costes.

Notify Ambassadors

- Walters / Secchia, etc now
- The rest on Tues.

HAK
Kohl }

- 6:20 - Ride to Alfalfa

Mulrowy
Silva
Gonzalez

- ^{or phone call} letter to Salinas
Gen. Rivillas cooperating.
 - In connection w/ signing debt agreement
- PFIAB ~~announcement~~
 - HAK had resigned earlier

~~Clearance~~ of drug activities
Three NSC not
informed (LSE memo)

(6) - DOD not go thru mil channels
on base closing

- ~~Comm~~ - one week

(3) - SHC/M Verification

(5) - Ending Binary Production

(2) - Panama Troop #

Termination of Op
13 of 14 thous
Rally 14 Feb
Just
Case

(4) - CFE leaving (Coalition Cdrs Babbling
back)

✓ (1) ~~No~~ - LSE / Gates / Graves go on to Moscow

China

- Asia Trip ²³ 7 Feb { Korea / HK / Phil
Japan

- What if Gorb fails.
- Will he be blamed.

- WW II ~~etc~~ celebrations 7 ^{never} group

- Nicaragua - Merlin
P

- WH go to leadership
- Meeting on SHC/M -

Mulford in Collier mty

- Earmarking allocations by Monday
- Earmarking reference in SOO

Panama announcement

- Cowmy —

— McCune better —

CFF

~~Charlie Bartlett~~

- Pauwau Troops

Just Cause Terminate
13 of 14 w/chain
Restart by Feb 14

*

- Earmarks - when leadership

- Foreign Travel

Salih - Visit arrangements poor

- no coffee

- Name plates

- Cars wrong

CSCB-

~~Thurmond - Pneu - Pair~~

Angola - Dos Santos - Cease fire / negot

- Sess - will they see Sabombi

* Cabete Faked on Salih visit

Call Cheney

- Cheney - Securer on 31 Jan -

- Call Crable -

Democratic conditionality

Conquish

Dec 28

- What is happening on a planet
 - Scale of what we are trying to cope with.
 - 15 members at a time.
- What do you want us to do?
 - Oil supply lines
 - Get to Israel
 - i.e. - what do we not need?
 - Our intel functions to which don't we need to do anymore.
- Capabilities for mine, chess, tanks etc in a world
- What if Gorb disappears tomorrow?
- Increase relative emphasis on intel & R+D.

Bob - Memo letter sent to press.

- The 4 civilian inductees
- Agreement w/ Endara.

8-13-91

- Treaty 12 Dec good treaty w/ S. & S. Gov
- Great emphasis to Helsinki platform
 - Links US to E. Eur
 - Sanitizes boundaries
- Issues - Big concern over Kohl statement
 - Timing very bad
 - E. & S. govts w/ Poland/Hungary
 - Cause their borders were changed
 - Just asked for prudence - T. lies is not a prob to be faced today
- Mil probs should be faced by 2 alliances as such rather than individual nations by themselves.
- Very pleased w/ C of S visit to US.
- Chemicals - Hopes we can conclude an agreement.
- Content to fight against drug & terrorism
 - Herhausen killing.
- Expressed concern that EC would become closed on itself.
- Regional issues
 - M.E. - Ready to press I + Pales to meet
 - Would resume relations w/ I if necessary.
 - Ethiopia - Willing to aid in negot. Stopped mil aid some time ago
 - Nicaragua - Ambrosio raised. 2 planes w/ arms. Makes E. spec. more

dog. He said SU not WPact would
'hand arms to the ~~the~~ people. He would
tell you again.
Should this be a 'lost' or a 'win'?

Audicotti met w/ Vidette. We expect
all work for open elections.

- ME. Gars want to be sure that if they
recall I that I would deal w/ PhO
as they promised if PhO met conditions
- Gars knows Shannin well & feels
he doesn't want to return & testify
- This is several years of cut/paste.
That a tragedy