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FOIA MARKER

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Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
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OA/ID Number: 91150
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Folder Title:
Other (January - April 1991) [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Arnold Kanter/Richard Haass to Robert Gates Re: Your March 25 Meeting on Mideast Arms Control (4 pp.)	3/25/91	(b)(1)	S
01b. Report	Re: Additional Restraints on Conventional Arms Transfers (ARCA) (15 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Arnold Kanter/Richard Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your March 27 Meeting on Mideast Arms Control (3 pp.)	3/26/91	(b)(1)	S
02b. Report	Re: Additional Restraints on Conventional Arms Transfers: (ARCA) (14 pp.)	3/26/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Minutes	Re: Minutes of Principals' Meeting on European Pillar, March 27 (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04a. Memo	David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Speeches (2 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	C
04b. Talking Points	Re: America, Europe, and the Soviet Union: Foundation of a More Secure World (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (2 pp.)	4/9/91	(b)(1)	C
05b. Letter	President Fernando Collor to President Bush Re: English (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1255
OA/ID Number: 91150-002
Date Closed: 7/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05c. Letter	President Fernando Collor to President Bush Re: Portuguese (2 pp.)	3/27/91	(b)(1)	
05d. Letter	President Aristides Pereira to President Bush Re: Non-Official Translation (1 pp.)	3/21/91	(b)(1)	
05e. Letter	President Aristides Pereira to President Bush Re: Spanish (1 pp.)	3/21/91	(b)(1)	
05f. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush Re: English (1 pp.)	3/20/91	(b)(1)	C
05g. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush Re: Russian (1 pp.)	3/20/91	(b)(1)	C
05h. Cable	Re: Message to President Bush from Prime Minister Sandiford (1 pp.)	3/27/91	(b)(1)	C
05i. Letter	President Herzog to President Bush Re: Secretary Baker's visit (2 pp.)	3/14/91	(b)(1)	C
05j. Letter	UN Secretary General Cuellar to President Bush Re: International Development Strategy (1 pp.)	1/30/91	(b)(1)	
05k. Note	From King Hassan II of Morocco (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
06a. Letter	Brent Scowcroft to Senator Al Gore Re: ICBMs (2 pp.)	4/27/91	(b)(1)	

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06b. Memo	John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter from Senator Gore on ICBM Modernization (2 pp.)	4/15/91	(b)(1)	
06c. Letter	Senator Al Gore to Brent Scowcroft Re: ICBMs (1 pp.)	3/21/91	(b)(1)	
07a. Memo	Adrian Basora/Heather A. Wilson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Shaping the European Pillar [redacted] (3 pp.)	4/30/91	(b)(1)	S
07b. Report	Re: NATO's Core Security Functions in the New Europe (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
08a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Kohl Visit Strategy (3 pp.)	5/2/91	(b)(1)	S
08b. Draft	Re: Draft Public Statement on the European Pillar (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102164
RECEIVED: 25 MAR 91 08

TO: GATES

CHRON FILE

FROM: KANTER

DOC DATE: 25 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MIDDLE EAST
ADNSA

ARMS CONTROL

other

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MTG RE MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 28 MAR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KANTER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/16/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	GATES	Z	91032510	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	91061317	OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/16/09

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2164

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk		7.6/13	
NSC Secretariat	I		OBE/OVR

JUL 12 P3:25

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Memo	Arnold Kanter/Richard Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your March 25 Meeting on Mideast Arms Control (4 pp.)	3/25/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [2]

Date Closed:	7/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91150-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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Additional Restraints on Conventional Arms Transfers (ARCA)

This paper examines whether and how the United States should augment its existing restraints on arms transfers (incorporated in the Arms Export Control Act -- precis at Tab A) with additional measures and possible multilateral activity. It does so by examining why the issue arises; it then looks at the general case for some ARCA and the risks and difficulties that some ARCA could pose; to provide more specifics, it examines a series of options and evaluates three options packages.

I. The Context

o Defining the Issue: The idea of placing additional restraints on conventional arms transfers to the Middle East has gained currency publicly, in the Congress, and in some other countries in the wake of the war. The chief concern is not that the US has or will "overarm" its friends in a damaging way, but that others did and may again. Depending upon perspectives, the issue may be defined in ways with slight but important differences.

Focusing on the conduct of others, the issue may be posed as:

> "Are there ways in which we can induce more responsible arms transfers to the region by others, by doing something that affects our arms transfers?"

A different focus, however, would be whether such a change in the conduct of the US and others would in its net effect hurt or help the United States or its friends in the region:

> "Are there ARCA that would enhance the security and other interests of the US and its Middle East friends?"

A concern that seeks to remove the problems created by the current interest in conventional arms transfers (perhaps by making clear that we do already have restraints that do work and that, combined with our planned enhancement of security structures in the region, will prevent instability) would phrase the issue:

> "Are there ways of addressing the current interest in conventional arms transfers without risking adverse outcomes?"

o The Policy Setting: The consideration of ARCA comes at a time when the US is pursuing several other, related policies:

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--the Iraq-Specific arms control regime in the next UNSC resolution;

--the development of proposals for an initiative on WMD (WMD is a much more serious problem for the region than conventional arms transfer, and resolving the WMD problem, either in conjunction with ARCA or separately, would do much to reduce the pressures for restraints on conventional arms);

--the reactivation of the Arab/Israeli Peace Process;

--the enhancement of the defense capabilities of the GCC and its support by Egyptian and Syrian forces, along with increased US military access.

o The Regional Setting: Iraq had forces that far exceeded its requirements for legitimate self-defense. Most states in the region have acquired particular types of weapons that increase tensions and are destabilizing, particularly ballistic missiles and CBW. The forecast for the future shows some potential for regimes in the area to build up arms in ways that would diminish our security and that of our friends:

--Iraq: Most of Iraq's conventional forces and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been destroyed. The UN resolution we are seeking would destroy the rest of its WMD and prevent its rebuilding. The resolution would also ban arms spare parts imports until the UNSC (including each of the permanent members) decided to resume some trade in arms. Iraq's finances are such that it is unlikely to be able to recreate its former threat for the rest of the century.

--Iran: The Iranian Armed Forces were heavily reliant upon US parts and technicians. After our arms embargo, their capability declined markedly. Operation Staunch denied Iran access to most arms markets during the Iran-Iraq War. Now, Iran is beginning to rebuild by procuring sophisticated systems (Mig-29, SA-5) from the Soviets. While its procurement has been measured, it will have the revenues to permit substantial rearmament in the future. We have already raised concerns about this with the Soviets.

--Syria: Syria has a large and well equipped military and substantial WMD. The Soviet refusal in recent years to extend credits or concessionary financing had halted its modernization. Recent aid from Gulf Arabs has permitted Syria to acquire additional weapons. It is procuring a turnkey missile plant from North Korea.

Our friends in the region also have plans to modernize their defenses:

--Israel: has maintained its defense against quantitatively superior potential enemies through a qualitative edge based upon near state of the art US technology and a formidable indigenous production capability. Although the demise of the Iraqi military has greatly reduced the threat to Israel, the GOI will continue to seek improvements including [redacted] later in the decade.

--Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states: The US has urged the GCC to become a more effective and integrated military alliance so member states can take on more of the burden of deterrence and defense. The Saudis were shocked by the limited capabilities of their ground forces when confronting Iraq, and plan substantial increases in the size and capabilities of both their army and national guard. The UAE also plans a significant ground force growth. Limited improvements in the smaller states are also likely.

o Geographic Scope: to what region would ARCA apply?

Congressional interest is almost exclusively aimed at "the Middle East." Limiting that to the Gulf would avoid the complications of the Arab-Israeli problem, but would also miss an opportunity for ARCA to assist in the Peace Process. Moreover, limiting arms to some Arab states without limiting Israel would provoke a severe Arab reaction and be unlikely to gain the support of other supplier states. Israel says that it supports new restraints across the board.

II. The Cases For and Against ARCA

The merits of any ARCA measures are obviously dependent upon the specifics of the option and how it would be applied. Nonetheless, there are some general observations about the concept of ARCA that provide a framework for looking at options. This section summarizes the general debate.

o The Case For, and Rebuttal

--Over-Arming: The potential exists for another regional state to become as overarmed as Iraq was and threaten our friends and our own security. Only by having a multilateral regime could we achieve either limits on what other suppliers provide or on the inventories of the regional states. The rebuttal: There is a limited risk, largely from Iran, and it could be met by applying multilateral pressure on excessive suppliers without running the risks to our ability to transfer arms that an ARCA regime would entail.

--Reduce Tensions/Prevent War: An ARCA regime could begin to reduce tensions by denying states the means of a major war and by providing greater transparency. ARCA could also be a first step toward arms control in the region. The rebuttal is that wars are not caused by arms build-ups and can occur at lower inventory or technology levels. Arms control only works when the political climate is ripe and it is not yet so in the Middle East.

--Economic Benefits: Most states in the region could improve their stability by rechanneling funds from arms into domestic programs. The wealthier states might also be able to transform some of their defense expenditures into economic aid

to poorer regional states. The rebuttal is that most governments will not significantly rechannel defense funds into domestic or aid programs. They may spend defense funds on second tier suppliers (North Korea, Brazil) or by creating an indigenous arms industry, as South Africa did when embargoed.

--Arab/Israeli Peace Process: Beginning to limit and then reduce the military threats in the Arab/Israeli balance might make it possible for the states involved to be more willing to take risks for peace. In a climate of ever spiralling arms acquisition, the states may cling to any element of defense, including territory. The rebuttal is that to persuade Israel to accept a deal, it may be necessary to repeat the Camp David approach of increasing its feeling of security through additional arms transfers.

o The Case Against, and Rebuttal

--CAT Failed: The 1977-78 Carter Administration effort at Conventional Arms Transfer Talks (CAT) failed because of the desires of other suppliers to export and the inherent difficult of coming up with workable concepts for limits. We should not repeat the mistakes of history. The rebuttal is that we are in entirely different political circumstances and may stand a better chance at gaining support from other suppliers. Some ARCA less ambitious than the Carter policies may be workable.

--Removes a Key Tool: Arms transfers are a key foreign policy tool toward our goals in the Gulf (increasing the ability of the GCC to assume more of the burden of its own defense) and in the Arab/Israeli context (making Israel feel secure enough to deal). Restricting our transfer options reduces the tools available to us. The rebuttal is that we would still have these tools,

--Will End up Hurting us Most: Given the far larger role of our legislature in arms transfers compared to that in other suppliers, anything we do in the way of ARCA will stimulate greater self-restraint in the US than elsewhere. That restraint will result in damage to our defense industrial base because our production of tanks, AWACS, F-15s and other weapons is entirely dependent upon Middle East sales. The rebuttal is that absent some Executive Branch action which could have the benefit of being multilateral, there may be Legislative Branch action which could be unilateral. Our production lines are shutting down because DOD does not need them for US requirements.

--Regional States Reaction to Cartel: Any ARCA is likely to be seen in the end by Arab states as a US-instigated cartel that will deny them the weapons they think they need and have been discussing with us. They will point to Israel's indigenous arms industry as a reason why ARCA does not hurt

Israel as much as it does Arab states. The rebuttal is that we would probably be able to proceed with most sales we have discussed. Some Arab states have expressed some interest in ARCA and some (Egypt) have indigenous capabilities.

III. ARCA Options

The options proposed below could be combined into larger packages to create additional restraints on conventional arms transfers (chart at Tab D). The guidelines option could be adopted on either a unilateral or multilateral basis.

Options two through four are premised on the creation of a suppliers club, composed of the major arms suppliers: the U.S., U.K., Soviet Union, France and China. The concurrence of these major arms suppliers is essential to reducing the risk of destabilizing arms transfers. Participation by recipient states and other suppliers could enhance this core group. The options all involve notification and consultation and agreed guidelines of varying specificity.

1. Guidelines for Arms Transfers

General guidelines for arms transfers would, at a minimum, commit adherents to avoid destablizing transfers (draft guidelines derived from the Arms Export Control Act are at Tab B). Guidelines call upon states not to transfer weapon in excess of the legitimate self defense needs of a recipient, not to create a destabilizing build-up in offensive weaponry, not to create an economic burden on the society, and to have an effective export control and end user verification system.

2. Notification/Communication

Several approaches to consultation are possible: (a) annual ex post facto notification of weapons shipped, or (b) prior notification of planned transfers. Either of these options could apply only to deliveries involving certain types of weapons, or of a certain amount of weapons or dollar value. The degree of transparency of any notification measure would have to be considered, as would form and fora. Notification and consultation could occur either within a group (formal or informal), on a bilateral basis, or in a system of concurrent notification. Whatever the notification requirement, the consultative process could involve an obligation to answer promptly and fully questions raised by other partners.

3. Weapons of Special Concern

We could seek to establish conventional arms transfer limitations focussed on certain weapons or weapons systems (such as fuel-air explosives and Stinger-type man-portable air defense missiles) that are especially troublesome.

4. New "Categories" of Weapons

Suppliers could agree not to transfer any new category of "offensive" weapon not already in regional inventories. These weapons would be defined as contributing to a destabilizing imbalance of offensive capability, or as exceeding requirements of legitimate self defense. New catagories could include stealth aircraft, strategic cruise missiles, or energy weapons. The determination of new categories of offensive weapons could be done unilaterally on a case-by-case basis, or through multilateral consultation.

5. Quantitative Limits

Two types of quantitative approaches have been suggested. One would limit how much a country could buy, by quantity of weapons by type or by dollar value. The second concept would be to agree on ceilings for inventories of each major type of weapon held by each country in the region. This would have to take into account the quality of the weapons, the threat(s) faced by recipients, and the need for a system for verifying inventories. Numerical limits could be linked to a regional confidence-building regime. Although ARCA could be adopted without such limits, it could be structured to permit linkage to CBMs in the future.

6. Qualitative Limits

The suppliers could establish for each major type of weapon some parameters of performance and agree not to provide weapons which exceeded those parameters. For example, aircraft could be limited by range, payload, capability of electronics suites, or stealth capability. Verification would have to be intrusive to be effective.

IV . PACKAGES

Three basic packages are examined below. All packages except the first require the involvement of the major arms suppliers, the Perm Five. Other arms producers and recipient states could join after this core group had reached consensus. The first multilateral option below would not require an agreed document. The others envision a joint declaration by signatory states. A joint declaration like CSCE and the Missile Technology Control Regime would embody political commitments to observe the restraints, minimizing the difficulties for the U.S. and others a formal agreement could create.

The packages could be expanded to incorporate agreements on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) based on the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group.

Evaluative Criteria

The three packages below use the preceding options as building blocks, each adding more of the options and proposing a system progressively more ambitious. All, with the exception of package one, have the same aim: to provide a mean of preventing other states from engaging in destabilizing arms transfers, as the Soviet Union did with Iraq. All, except package one, seek to achieve that effect by agreeing to limits which would also apply to our own activities. They need to be judged on their effectiveness in reaching that aim, the degree to which they can be made operational, and the extent to which they would have an even-handed effect on both suppliers and regional states.

PACKAGE ONE: UNILATERAL

The purpose of this package is to deflect attempt to impose new constraints on US arms transfers, beyond those we already have. The U.S. already has explicit guidelines which require it to avoid destabilizing arms transfers. The U.S. could publicly rearticulate those guidelines and expend upon them, and then urge both suppliers and recipients to adopt a similar policy.

o Evaluation

Issuing a non-binding declaration of policy on arms transfers and urging other suppliers (and recipients) to adopt similar policies might address some concerns on arms transfers, but would likely be criticized as too little. If linked to steps on WMD (Guidelines at Tab C), however, it might be seen as part of an acceptable package.

The other suppliers and the recipients would, however, probably not be a major source of compliant. Urging other states to adopt similar guidelines is unlikely to have a serious effect on others' behaviour.

PACKAGE TWO: MULTILATERAL NON-BINDING

The packages below involve the major suppliers meeting. They might meet once and issue a non-binding declaration or code of responsible arms transfers (II A), or they might agree to set up some permanent, informal channel and perhaps use that channel to notify each other of some things (II B), or they might agree to restrict their trade in non-quantitative ways by not transfering new categories of weapons or especially troubling weapons (II C). Other suppliers and some recipients might be invited to join (Chart at Tab E).

A. One Time Meeting and Guidelines The five major suppliers would meet and jointly declare adherence to general guidelines or code of responsible arms transfers. Implicit would be the fact that they could contact each other if they believed that the guidelines were being violated.

B. Guidelines Plus Follow-On Building on option II A, the suppliers would agree to meet perhaps annually. They would also agree to notifications of some type: before or after transfers had been agreed, on all or only some types of weapons.

C. Selected No Transfer Element

This approach would incorporate the formalized suppliers group of option 2b, with its continuing consultations. It would add constraints on the sale of "new" categories and weapons of special concern. Definitions of "new" categories and weapons of special concern could either be left vague or be developed by technical working groups and could be pegged to the technological generation of equipment.

o Evaluation

These packages provide a club with which we could hit other suppliers and with which we could ourselves be hit. The more ambitious the package, the more of a club it becomes. Countries wishing to block US sales could use the process to interfere in our own deliberations, including the Congressional review process. This would be particularly true if the notification process were in advance of agreement, even though the US already has a public and transparent internal notification process.

Other suppliers have a far less transparent system now and would be unlikely to agree to a proposal for much transparency. They would, however, be less subject to manipulation by domestic pressures building on this agreement. At the same time, however, the agreement could provide us with a window on their activities and a stonger diplomatic weapon to use to block their sales. If WMD were included, it would in effect extend the Australia Group and MTCR guidelines to China and the USSR.

The most ambitious of the three could be difficult to make operational because of the difficulties in defining new categories or weapons of special concern. Left vague, however, these terms could be used by other suppliers to object to things that we did not think we had agreed to ban suppliers -- although this would not provide them with access to high-tech equipment.

PACKAGE THREE

The most ambitious approach to arms transfer restraints would incorporate quantitative and qualitative limits. This package could be an explicit first step toward arrangements for a CSCE or CFE-like arrangement in the region, or link conventional arms transfer restraints and regional confidence-building and security arrangements. It would almost certainly require the participation in some manner of the regional states.

o Evaluation

This package would be difficult to make operational. Unlike in CFE, where we avoided national ceilings in favor of equal, bloc-to-bloc limits, there is no easy bipolar balance in the Middle East. Nations, either suppliers or recipients, would be unlikely to come quickly to an agreement on what would be equitable limits for each country's inventory.

Limits on quality of weapons would be equally difficult. Measures of the quality of a fighter-bomber, for example, are enormously complex and depend on both aerodynamic trade-offs, electronics, and software. The interaction between air defense networks and offensive air forces is also problematic.

Both quantitative and qualitative limits would require intrusive verification of a sort that the countries of the region do not appear to be ready to accept.

Nonethless this sort of system could be a goal. As in Europe, it might be easier to start with CSBMs that limit the types of activities forces can do and then limit their inventories in a subsequent phase.

Attachments: Tab A: Arms Export Control Act Guidelines
Tab B: General Guidelines
Tab C: Conventional/WMD Guidelines
Tab D: ARCA Options Chart
Tab E: Arca Package Spectrum

Tab A.

The Arms Export Control Act of 1976

The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) grew out of Congressional concern with the increasing scope of arms transfers in the 1970s (especially to Iran), which it believed were not sufficiently regulated and potentially destablizing. The AECA established:

-- guidelines for US arms transfer policy;

-- a notification process (by value and category) for arms transfers;

-- greater authority to regulate arms transfers.

AECA guidelines call for arms transfers which are:

-- Solely for internal security and legitimate self defense;

-- permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or other measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security;

-- and enable foreign military forces in less developed friendly countries to construct public works and engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries.

For arms policy, the AECA urges:

-- US leadership in world community to bring about arrangements for reducing the international trade in implements of war.

-- The President to:

  o seek to initiate multialteral discussions for the purpose of reaching agreement among the principle arms suppliers and arms purchasers and other countries to control the international trade in armaments;

  o work actively with all nations to check and control the transfer of conventional weapons and to encourage regional arms control arrangements;

  o undertake a concerted effort to convene an international conference of major arms-supplying and arms-purchasing nations to limit conventional arms transfers;

Tab B.

Guidelines on Additional Restraints on the Transfer of Conventional Arms

To prevent destabilizing military imbalances from reccuring in the region of the Persian Gulf, the Peoples Republic of China, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereafter referred to as the Declaring States, declare that they will:

(1) Establish a special channel for consulting and exchanging information among them on exports covered by this agreement;

(2) Create an effective system to prevent unauthorized retransfers and enduring validation of peaceful uses.

(3) When deciding whether to approve the transfer of weapons, weapons systems or weapons system technology as detailed above the signatories shall be consider whether such transfer will:

   (a) Act to promote the capabilities of the recipient country to meet the requirements of its legitimate self-defense and internal security needs;

   (b) Enhance the ability of the recipient to participate in regional or collective arrangements or other measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security;

   (c) Contribute to the deterrence of aggression, promote regional stability and encourage negotiation for the peaceful resolution of conflicts;

   (d) Serve as an appropriate response to the security and military threats confronting the recipient country.

(4) Insure that conventional arms transfers to the region do not overburden the economy of the recipient nor contribute to the economic or political instability of the recipient state.

Tab C.

Expanded Guidelines for Additional Restraints on the Transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Conventional Arms

To prevent destabilizing military imbalances from reccuring in the region of the Persian Gulf and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the area, the Peoples Republic of China, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereafter referred to as the Declaring States, declare that they will:

(1) Establish a special channel for consulting and exchanging information among them on exports covered by this agreement;

(2) Not provide chemical or biological weapons to countries in the region, and to specially control the export to the region of an agreed list of precursor chemicals and biological agents, for chemical or biological weapons, and to insure that the end-use of any permitted export is solely for non-military purposes;

(3) Specially control the export to the region of an agreed list of dual-use equipment which could be used in the manufacture of chemical or biological weapons and to insure that the end-use of any permitted export is solely for peaceful purposes;

(4) Not provide or permit the export of surface-to-surface missiles to the region and to specially control the export of an agreed list of equipment that could be used in the manufacture of surface-to-surface missiles and to insure that the end-use of any permitted export is soley for non-military purposes.

(5) Not engage in any form of nuclear cooperation with states in the region not party to the NPT; nor to provide sensitive nuclear-technology to any regional state; to engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation with NPT parties in the region only when they have confidence in the state's intention to honor their NPT obligations; and to export nuclear dual-use equipment and technology to the region only when they have insured that the end-use is solely for non-military purposes.

(6) For export permitted under paragraphs 2-5 above, create an effective system to prevent unauthorized retransfers and enduring validation of peaceful uses.

(7) For exports permitted under paragraphs 2-5 above, inform the other Declaring States of such transfers and consult in advance of the transfers on matters of special sensitivity.

(8) When deciding whether to approve the transfer of weapons, weapons systems or weapons system technology as detailed above the signatories shall be consider whether such transfer will:

(a) Act to promote the capabilities of the recipient country to meet the requirements of its legitimate self-defense and internal security needs;

(b) Enhance the ability of the recipient to participate in regional or collective arrangements or other measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security;

(c) Contribute to the deterrence of aggression, promote regional stability and encourage negotiation for the peaceful resolution of conflicts;


(d) Serve as an appropriate response to the security and military threats confronting the recipient country.

(9) Exercise a presumption of denial of the export to the region of any new class or type of offensive weapon not now present in any country in the region, and to permit such a transfer on an exceptional basis only when it would not contribute to a destabilizing imbalance.

(10) Insure that conventional arms transfers to the region do not overburden the economy of the recipient nor contribute to the economic or political instability of the recipient state.

(11) Address fully and consult promptly when questions are raised by any of the Declaring States concerning the potential of an export to be inconsistent with paragraphs 8-10 above, to provide annually a confidential report to the other Declaring States listing the weapons transferred to the region and to insure the operation of an effective system to prevent the unauthorized retransfer or conversion to weapon of mass destruction of such weapons.

ARCA OPTIONS:



SPECTRA WITHIN PACKAGE II

NOTIFICATION

- Ex Post Facto (Some)
- Ex Post Facto (All)
- Advance (Some)
- Advance (All)

TRANSPARENCY

- Some Sales
- Some Types
- Some Values
- All Types

GUIDELINES

- Not Destabilizing
- No New Categories
- No Weapons of Special Concern

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102215
RECEIVED: 26 MAR 91 12

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: KANTER
HAASS

DOC DATE: 26 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
ARMS TRANSFERS
ANSA
MIDDLE EAST
ARMS CONTROL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SCOWCROFT MIDEAST ARMS CONTROL MTG ON 27 MAR

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES DUE DATE: 29 MAR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KANTER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		GANTT
		HAASS
		KANTER
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSPMP CLOSED BY: NSLMS DOC 1 OF 1

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: JEB LOG # 2215

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Bill Sittmann	2	Copy	
Bob Gates	3		
Brent Scowcroft		Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		2
NSC Secretariat	5		2

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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COMMENTS

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CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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March 26, 1991

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ARNOLD KANTER/RICHARD HAASS

SUBJECT: Your March 27 Meeting on Mideast Arms Control

The purpose of this meeting is to define a U.S. approach to Middle East/Gulf conventional arms transfers. The paper at Tab A is a slightly revised version of the State Department draft that was discussed in a Deputies meeting. It has been distributed to your counterparts.

We had hoped to defer consideration of a regional arms transfer policy to a later date. "Weapons of mass destruction" pose a more real and urgent security problem. (Iraq-specific measures are being addressed in the context of the U.N. resolution and are not explicitly addressed.) Conditions are not now ripe to engage other suppliers, much less recipients, in a serious effort to curb the sale of potentially destabilizing conventional arms. Moreover, any new U.S. arms restraint policy could backfire, resulting in unilateral constraints that hamstring our ability to serve our regional security objectives without affecting the behavior of other suppliers.

But much as we would like to wait, we have no choice but to address the issue head-on and now. Growing domestic political pressures, especially on the Hill, for regional arms transfer restraints leave us no alternative. If we do not take the initiative, Congress will fill the void with legislation that imposes tight unilateral constraints on U.S. arms sales.

Under the circumstances, we want a policy that:

(a) demonstrates U.S. leadership on regional arms transfer restraint and launches a process that could lead to a sensible multilateral restraint regime.

(b) allows us the necessary flexibility to use arms transfers to serve our regional security interests.

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(c) gets other suppliers and recipients to share responsibility for restraint, and makes clear that the U.S. is not the obstacle to success.

The approach should encompass the Middle East broadly defined, to include the Gulf. A restraint regime that exempts Israel by focusing exclusively on the Gulf would be a target for easy criticism. A global policy is neither necessary nor desirable.

Any multilateral approach should begin with the major suppliers--France, the UK, the Soviet Union, and China--who also happen to be the Perm 5. Depending on what postwar role we envisage for the UN, and on how much pressure there is to identify some role for the UN to play, we can package the approach either as a Perm 5 effort or an undertaking of the major arms suppliers.

An approach along the lines of Package IIB in the attached discussion paper strikes a good balance among these objectives. The heart of the approach would be the launching of a "process" in the form of periodic meetings among the major suppliers, the creation, in effect, of a conventional arms supplier group. The first item of business would be agreement on a set of non-binding guidelines (which we would develop) to which they would subscribe, and to which other suppliers and regional recipients would be encouraged to adhere. We could add detailed guidelines, particularly bans on the transfer of specific capabilities (e.g., fuel air explosives, man-portable SAMs), although this may be more than the multilateral traffic can now bear, and would risk being translated by the Hill into legislated unilateral constraints on U.S. arms transfers.

Such an approach would represent a U.S. initiative to begin to build a "framework of restraint" that--with multilateral cooperation--could be elaborated over time. Its non-binding guidelines would reduce the chances that we would be saddled with unilateral restraints that would undermine our ability to serve our regional security objectives while leaving the field free to other suppliers. Although the approach might be targeted by domestic critics as "too little, too late," the other major suppliers may well have difficulty in supporting it. If they do prove to be reluctant, it will shift responsibility away from the U.S., and demonstrate how limited the effectiveness of unilateral U.S. measures would be. If we do succeed in engaging them, we will have to be prepared for more concrete measures of restraint, but we should be able to fashion them in a way that serves our security interests.

There was a general consensus in support of such an approach in the Deputies meeting. There was little enthusiasm for either purely unilateral measures or for an ambitious policy that would try to set quantitative or qualitative limits on the inventories of would-be recipients.

If you and your counterparts agree, the next step would be to flesh out the approach, including specific guidelines, that we could take to our allies and other major suppliers, as well as use on the Hill.

Attachment
Tab A State-drafted paper on conventional arms transfer restraint

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Additional Restraints on Conventional Arms Transfers: (ARCA)

This paper examines how the U.S. could augment its existing restraints on arms transfers with additional measures and multilateral activity. It examines the risks and opportunities of ARCA and evaluates three options packages.

I. The Context

Defining the Issue: Since the war, the idea of placing additional restraints on conventional arms transfers to the Middle East has gained currency with the Congress, the public, and in other countries. The challenge is how to engender restraint among other suppliers without hurting U.S. interests or putting our friends at risk. Whether or not these objectives can be achieved, the U.S. must address the current interest in conventional arms transfers.

The Policy Setting: An ARCA approach was to have been developed as part of a broader initiative after a regional WMD initiative was in place. This intended sequence was derailed by the recent surge of interest in ARCA. The need to shape Congressional action and demonstrate U.S. leadership militate in favor of moving now. Apart from the ongoing development of proposals for an initiative on WMD, the present consideration of ARCA comes at a time when the U.S. is pursuing several related policies:

-- the Iraq-Specific arms control regime in the next UNSC resolution;

-- reactivation of the Arab/Israeli peace process;

-- enhancement of the defense capabilities of the GCC and its support by Egyptian and Syrian forces, along with increased U.S. military access.

Regional setting: Iraq had (and to some extent continues to have) forces that far exceeded its requirements for legitimate self-defense. Many states in the region have acquired weapons that increase tensions and are destabilizing, particularly ballistic missiles and CBW. The forecast for the future, (at Tab A), shows the potential for a build-up of arms that would diminish our security and that of our friends. It also shows that the demand for arms by our friends, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the other GCC states, will continue as they modernize their own defenses.

Geographic Scope: to what region would ARCA apply? ARCA could be applied globally, to the entire "Middle East" (Libya, Israel, its neighbours and the Persian Gulf states), or to the

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Persian Gulf alone. The Middle East option best fits our needs. A global ARCA is not in our interest; an ARCA limited to the Persian Gulf (and thus not to Israel) would provoke a severe Arab reaction and be unlikely to gain the support of other suppliers.

II. The Cases For and Against ARCA

The merits of ARCA measures are dependent upon their nature and application. Nonetheless, there are some general observations about an ARCA that provide a framework for considering options. The terms of the debate (examined at Tab B), are these: Proponents of ARCA argue that action are needed to prevent further "overarming," reduce tensions, allow regional states to use resources more productively, and facilitate the peace process. Opponents point to the failure of the Carter Administration effort to limit conventional transfers, the utility of transfers as a diplomatic instrument, the window ARCA provides other countries to interfere in U.S. transfers, the negative regional reaction to a perceived western arms cartel, the conflict with our goal of building the GCC to carry a larger share of the defense burden, the possibility that it could increase demand for non-conventional weapons, and the disproportionate damage ARCA would inflict on our defense industrial base.

III. PACKAGES

The three packages below are designed on a building block approach. The first is unilateral and focusses on guidelines the U.S. would adopt and urge other suppliers to follow. The second would seek multilateral adoption of general guidelines. The third would impose multilateral quantitative and qualitative limits on transfers. All packages except the first require the participation of the major arms suppliers (the U.S., UK, USSR, China and France). Other producers and recipients could join after this core group had reached consensus.

The packages could be expanded to incorporate agreements on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) based on the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group.

Evaluative Criteria

All the packages have the same aim: to provide a means of preventing other states from engaging in destabilizing arms transfers. All seek to achieve that effect by developing restraints which would also apply to our own activities. The packages need to be judged on their effectiveness in reducing destabilizing transfers, their feasibility, and how they would affect both suppliers and recipients.

PACKAGE ONE: UNILATERAL

This package attempts to deflect efforts to impose new constraints on US arms transfers. The U.S. already has explicit guidelines on avoiding destabilizing arms transfers (in the Arms Export Control Act -- precis at Tab C), could publicly rearticulate guidelines (Tab D), and urge suppliers and recipients to adopt a similar policy.

Evaluation

Issuing a non-binding unilateral declaration of policy on arms transfers and urging other suppliers (and recipients) to adopt similar policies might address some concerns on arms transfers, but would be criticized as insufficient. If linked to steps on WMD (Guidelines at Tab E), it might form part of an acceptable package. However, U.S. attempts to urge these states to modify their behavior would have little effect.

PACKAGE TWO: MULTILATERAL

Package Two would require major suppliers to meet and declare their adherence to a code of responsible arms transfers. Other suppliers and recipients could also be invited to join. Expansion of this basic structure would require answers to the following questions:

-- How often would suppliers meet? Suppliers could agree to meet once; regularly (perhaps annually); or on a continuing basis as a formalized suppliers group.

-- How should the guidelines be formulated? Options include a general code of responsible arms transfers, or constraints on the sale of "new" categories and weapons of special concern (such as fuel-air explosives or man-portable air defense systems).

-- How should notification work? At a minimum, the package could include consultation on an ad hoc basis if a supplier believed guidelines were being violated. A more ambitious approach would call for formal notification, either before or after transfers had been arranged; and for either all or only certain types of weapons.

Evaluation

Package two gives us a club to hit other suppliers -- and with which they could hit us. For example, countries wishing to block US sales could use the process to interfere in our own deliberations, including Congressional review, particularly if the notification process were in advance of agreement.

Other suppliers are customarily far less open about their transfers and would find greater transparency difficult to accept. However, they are less vulnerable to the domestic pressures such transparency could spur. Notification could

provide us with a window on their activities and a diplomatic weapon to block their sales. Inclusion of WMD, would in effect extend the Australia Group and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines to China and the USSR.

Package Two might best take the form of a joint declaration by signatories. A joint declaration like CSCE and the MTCR would embody political commitments to observe restraints, minimizing the difficulties for the U.S. and others a formal agreement could create.

Ambiguities in the definition of new categories of weapons or weapons of special concern could complicate implementation. Definitions could be left vague, or be developed by technical working groups and pegged to the technological generation of equipment. Reliance on vague terms could be used by other suppliers to object to things we had not agreed to ban.

PACKAGE THREE: RECIPIENT LIMITS

The most ambitious approach to arms transfer restraints would incorporate national limits based on quantitative and qualitative restrictions. This package could be an explicit first step toward arrangements for a CSCE or CFE-like arrangement in the region, or link conventional arms transfer restraints and regional confidence-building and security arrangements. It would almost certainly require participation by regional states.

Evaluation

This package would be difficult to operationalize. There is no single bipolar balance in the Middle East. Nations would be unlikely to agree on what would be an equitable limit on each country's inventory. Limits on quality of weapons would be equally difficult. Finally, quantitative and qualitative limits could require intrusive verification of a sort that the countries of the region do not appear to be ready to accept.

IV. NEXT STEPS

After reviewing these packages, there was consensus in the DC that the best combination of substance, feasibility, and flexibility was a version of Package II which entailed a joint declaration of adherence to general guidelines on arms transfers, agreement to meet regularly (perhaps annually) and on some form of notification, as a foundation on which we might later build.

As a first step, we would finalize a proposal. The U.S. should then discuss it bilaterally with the UK and France, prior to calling a meeting of the five major suppliers to consult on a cooperative approach.

Attachments:

Tab A: The Regional Setting
Tab B: The Cases for and Against ARCA
Tab C: Arms Export Control Act Overview
Tab D: General Guidelines
Tab E: Conventional/WMD Guidelines
Tab F: ARCA Options Chart
Tab G: ARCA Package Spectrum

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Tab A

The Regional Setting

--Iraq: We have destroyed most of Iraq's conventional forces and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The UN resolution we seek would destroy the rest of its WMD, prevent rebuilding and ban arms spare parts imports until the UNSC (including each of the permanent members) decided to resume some trade in arms. Iraq is unlikely to be able to recreate its former threat for the rest of the century.

--Iran: The Iranian Armed Forces were heavily reliant upon US parts and technicians. After our arms embargo, their capability declined markedly. Operation Staunch denied Iran access to most arms markets during the Iran-Iraq War. Now, Iran is beginning to rebuild by procuring sophisticated systems (Mig-29, SA-5) from the Soviets. While its procurement has been measured, it has the revenues to permit substantial rearmament in the future. We have already raised concerns about this with the Soviets.

--Syria: Syria has a large and well equipped military and substantial WMD. The Soviet refusal in recent years to extend credits or concessionary financing had halted its modernization. Recent aid from Gulf Arabs has permitted Syria to acquire additional weapons. It is procuring a turnkey missile plant from North Korea.

Our friends in the region also have plans to modernize their defenses:

--Israel: has maintained its defense against quantitatively superior potential enemies through a qualitative edge based upon near state of the art US technology and a formidable indigenous production capability. Although the demise of the Iraqi military has greatly reduced the threat to Israel, the GOI will continue to seek improvements including the F-22/23 later in the decade.

--Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states: The US has urged the GCC to become a more effective and integrated military alliance so member states can take on more of the burden of deterrence and defense. The Saudis were shocked by the limited capabilities of their ground forces when confronting Iraq, and plan substantial increases in the size and capabilities of both their army and national guard. The UAE also plans a significant ground force growth. Limited improvements in the smaller states are also likely.

Tab B

The Cases for and Against ARCA

The merits of any ARCA measures are obviously dependent upon an option's nature and application. Nonetheless, there are some general observations about the concept of ARCA that provide a framework for looking at options. This section summarizes the general debate.

The Case For, and Rebuttal

--Over-Arming: The potential exists for another regional state to become as overarmed as Iraq was and threaten our friends and our own security. Only a multilateral regime could limit what other suppliers provide or recipeint inventories. The rebuttal: There is a limited risk, largely from Iran, and it could be met by applying multilateral pressure on excessive suppliers without running the risks to our ability to transfer arms that an ARCA regime would entail.

--Reduce Tensions/Prevent War: An ARCA regime could begin to reduce tensions by denying states the means of a major war and by providing greater transparency. ARCA could also be a first step toward arms control in the region. The rebuttal is that arms build-ups do not lead to wars, which can occur at lower inventory or technology levels. Arms control only works when the political climate is ripe and it is not yet so in the Middle East.

--Economic Benefits: Most states in the region could increase stability by rechanneling funds from arms into domestic programs. Wealthier states might also transform some of their defense expenditures into economic aid to poorer neighbors. The rebuttal is that most governments will not significantly rechannel defense funds into domestic or aid programs. They may instead purchase from second tier suppliers (North Korea, Brazil) or create an indigenous arms industry, as South Africa did when embargoed.

--Arab/Israeli Peace Process: Beginning to limit and then reduce the military threats in the Arab/Israeli balance might make it possible for the states involved to be more willing to take risks for peace. In a climate of ever spiralling arms acquisition, the states may cling to any element of defense, including territory. The rebuttal is that to persuade Israel to accept a deal, it may be necessary to repeat the Camp David approach of increasing its feeling of security through additional arms transfers.

The Case Against, and Rebuttal

--CAT Failed: The 1977-78 Carter Administration effort at Conventional Arms Transfer Talks (CAT) failed because of the desires of other suppliers to export and the inherent difficult of coming up with workable concepts for limits. We should not repeat the mistakes of history. The rebuttal is that we are in entirely different political circumstances and may stand a better chance at gaining support from other suppliers. Some ARCA less ambitious than the Carter policies may be workable.

--Removes a Key Tool: Arms transfers are a key foreign policy tool toward our goals in the Gulf (increasing the ability of the GCC to assume more of the burden of its own defense) and in the Arab/Israeli context (making Israel feel secure enough to deal). Restricting our transfer options reduces the tools available to us. The rebuttal is that we would still have these tools, but would have gained an additional way toward our larger goals by reducing the threats to our friends.

--Will End up Hurting us Most: Given the far larger role of our legislature in arms transfers compared to that in other suppliers, anything we do in the way of ARCA will stimulate greater self-restraint in the US than elsewhere. That restraint will result in damage to our defense industrial base because our production of tanks, AWACS, F-15s and other weapons is entirely dependent upon Middle East sales. The rebuttal is that absent some Executive Branch action which could have the benefit of being multilateral, there may be Legislative Branch action which could be unilateral. Our production lines are shutting down because DOD does not need them for US requirements.

--Regional States Reaction to Cartel: Any ARCA is likely to be seen in the end by Arab states as a US-instigated cartel that will deny them the weapons they think they need and have been discussing with us. They will point to Israel's indigenous arms industry as a reason why ARCA does not hurt Israel as much as it does Arab states. The rebuttal is that we would probably be able to proceed with most sales we have discussed. Some Arab states have expressed some interest in ARCA and some (Egypt) have indigenous capabilities.

Tab C.

The Arms Export Control Act of 1976

The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) grew out of Congressional concern with the increasing scope of arms transfers in the 1970s (especially to Iran), which it believed were not sufficiently regulated and potentially destablizing. The AECA established:

-- guidelines for US arms transfer policy;

-- a notification process (by value and category) for arms transfers;

-- greater authority to regulate arms transfers.

AECA guidelines call for arms transfers which are:

-- Solely for internal security and legitimate self defense;

-- permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or other measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security;

-- and enable foreign military forces in less developed friendly countries to construct public works and engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries.

For arms policy, the AECA urges:

-- US leadership in world community to bring about arrangements for reducing the international trade in implements of war.

-- The President to:

  - o seek to initiate multialteral discussions for the purpose of reaching agreement among the principle arms suppliers and arms purchasers and other countries to control the international trade in armaments;

  - o work actively with all nations to check and control the transfer of conventional weapons and to encourage regional arms control arrangements;

  - o convene an international conference of major arms-supplying and arms-purchasing nations to limit conventional arms transfers;

Tab D.

Guidelines on Additional Restraints on the Transfer of Conventional Arms

To prevent destabilizing military imbalances from reccuring in the region of the Persian Gulf, the Peoples Republic of China, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereafter referred to as the Declaring States, declare that they will:

(1) Create an effective system to prevent unauthorized retransfers and enduring validation of peaceful uses.

(2) When deciding whether to approve the transfer of weapons, weapons systems or weapons system technology as detailed above the signatories shall be consider whether such transfer will:

(a) Act to promote the capabilities of the recipient country to meet the requirements of its legitimate self-defense and internal security needs;

(b) Enhance the ability of the recipient to participate in regional or collective arrangements or other measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security;

(c) Contribute to the deterrence of aggression, promote regional stability and encourage negotiation for the peaceful resolution of conflicts;

(d) Serve as an appropriate response to the security and military threats confronting the recipient country.

(3) Insure that conventional arms transfers to the region do not overburden the economy of the recipient nor contribute to the economic or political instability of the recipient state.

(4) Address fully and consult promptly when questions are raised by any of the Declaring States concerning the potential of an export to be inconsistent with paragraphs 2-3 above, to provide annually a confidential report to the other Declaring States listing the weapons transferred to the region and to insure the operation of an effective system to prevent the unauthorized retransfer or conversion to weapon of mass destruction of such weapons.

Tab E.

Expanded Guidelines for Additional Restraints on the Transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Conventional Arms

To prevent destabilizing military imbalances from reccuring in the region of the Persian Gulf and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the area, the Peoples Republic of China, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereafter referred to as the Declaring States, declare that they will:

(1) Establish a special channel for consulting and exchanging information among them on exports covered by this agreement;

(2) Not provide chemical or biological weapons to countries in the region, and to specially control the export to the region of an agreed list of precursor chemicals and biological agents, for chemical or biological weapons, and to insure that the end-use of any permitted export is solely for non-military purposes;

(3) Specially control the export to the region of an agreed list of dual-use equipment which could be used in the manufacture of chemical or biological weapons and to insure that the end-use of any permitted export is solely for peaceful purposes;

(4) Not provide or permit the export of surface-to-surface missiles to the region and to specially control the export of an agreed list of equipment that could be used in the manufacture of surface-to-surface missiles and to insure that the end-use of any permitted export is soley for non-military purposes.

(5) Not engage in any form of nuclear cooperation with states in the region not party to the NPT; nor to provide sensitive nuclear-technology to any regional state; to engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation with NPT parties in the region only when they have confidence in the state's intention to honor their NPT obligations; and to export nuclear dual-use equipment and technology to the region only when they have insured that the end-use is solely for non-military purposes.

(6) For export permitted under paragraphs 2-5 above, create an effective system to prevent unauthorized retransfers and enduring validation of peaceful uses.

(7) For exports permitted under paragraphs 2-5 above, inform the other Declaring States of such transfers and consult in advance of the transfers on matters of special sensitivity.

(8) When deciding whether to approve the transfer of weapons, weapons systems or weapons system technology as detailed above the signatories shall be consider whether such transfer will:

(a) Act to promote the capabilities of the recipient country to meet the requirements of its legitimate self-defense and internal security needs;

(b) Enhance the ability of the recipient to participate in regional or collective arrangements or other measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security;

(c) Contribute to the deterrence of aggression, promote regional stability and encourage negotiation for the peaceful resolution of conflicts;

(d) Serve as an appropriate response to the security and military threats confronting the recipient country.

(9) Exercise a presumption of denial of the export to the region of any new class or type of destabilizing weapon not now present in any country in the region, and to permit such a transfer on an exceptional basis only when it would not contribute to a destabilizing imbalance.

(10) Insure that conventional arms transfers to the region do not overburden the economy of the recipient nor contribute to the economic or political instability of the recipient state.

(11) Address fully and consult promptly when questions are raised by any of the Declaring States concerning the potential of an export to be inconsistent with paragraphs 8-10 above, to provide annually a confidential report to the other Declaring States listing the weapons transferred to the region and to insure the operation of an effective system to prevent the unauthorized retransfer or conversion to weapon of mass destruction of such weapons.

ARCA OPTIONS:

OPTIONS	PACKAGES
1. Guidelines	I, IIA
2. Notification & Consultation	IIB
3. Weapons of Special Concern	
4. New Category of Weapons	IIC
5. Qualitative Limits	
6. Quantitative Limts	III

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SPECTRUMS WITHIN PACKAGE II

NOTIFICATION

- Ex Post Facto (Some)
- Ex Post Facto (All)
- Advance (Some)
- Advance (All)

TRANSPARENCY

- Some Sales
- Some Types
- Some Values
- All Types

GUIDELINES

- Not Destabilizing
- No New Categories
- No Weapons of Special Concern

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102271
RECEIVED: 27 MAR 91 18

CHRON FILE

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: GATES

DOC DATE: 27 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EUROPE NATO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: EUROPEAN PILLAR

ACTION: GATES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES DUE DATE: 30 MAR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GATES LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/16/09

COMMENTS:

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European Pillar

National Security Council
The White House

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Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	24.3/28	D N
NSC Secretariat	4	[illegible]	D

91 MAR 27 P7:19 RECEIVED

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS NSC/S: I've ADX TO Agencies Please dispatch ~~hard~~ copy.

Konnie

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

[redacted]

UWD ~~Dnd~~ 24 3/28
Please try to get dispatched early this am.
Robin

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

March 28, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: European Pillar

Attached is a summary of the outcome of our meeting on the European Pillar. We will be following up with your representatives in the European Steering Group to coordinate next steps. Please call me if you have any questions or concerns about my understanding of our agreement.

Robert M. Gates
Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs

Attachment
Tab A Meeting Summary

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/16/09

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Tab
A

Minutes of Principals' Meeting on
European Pillar, March 27

The following four principles will be the standard for evaluating and responding to specific European proposals:

A. The United States is ready to support arrangements our European Allies decide are needed for the expression of a common European foreign, security, and defense policy.

B. To ensure this development will strengthen the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance, NATO shall be the principal venue for consultation and the forum for agreement on all policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the North Atlantic Treaty, wherever such policies originate.

C. NATO should maintain an effective integrated military structure to provide for collective defense.

D. We also support the willingness of European Allies to improve Europe's ability to protect vital interests and uphold the rule of law beyond Europe itself.

The U.S. should favor proposals which best reconcile a European defense identity with these principles. Thus, we should continue to express a preference that a European defense identity be organized in the WEU, linked to NATO, rather than organized outside of NATO. In particular, we should continue to associate ourselves broadly with the British approach, while working -- at first privately and bilaterally with the British -- to prevent even that approach from weakening NATO's military effectiveness.

In this regard, there is a specific British proposal for NATO-WEU ties which has been tabled in both NATO and the WEU for Allied, and U.S., comment. We should respond to the British proposal on two parallel tracks:

-- First, we favor the British proposal, in principle, because it appears to be in line with the basic principles which guide U.S. policy on the European pillar.

-- At the same time, we would raise with the British our concerns about the military implications of their proposals, as well as about the membership issue. We would then work within NATO, including the Military Committee, on the implications of the proposal. Final U.S. commitment to the British proposal would not be made until we are satisfied that it will conform with our principles in practice.

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0233-F/3
4/27/2010 MM

We should also actively explain our four basic principles to all Allies, as a way of (a) clarifying that we do not oppose a European pillar; (b) discouraging approaches that measure poorly against these standards; and (c) helping our most sympathetic Allies in their efforts in EC and WEU deliberations. In order to avoid undermining the UK's overall effort while resisting any ideas with potentially adverse military effects, we would also say that other proposals appear less consistent with the principles on which our policy rests.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102367
RECEIVED: 01 APR 91 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 09 APR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SPEECHES
USSR
INTL TRADE

EUROPE
MIDDLE EAST

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES SPEECHES

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 04 APR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOMPERT LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/16/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB CLOSED BY: NSMJT DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE 2367 A/01

April 9, 1991

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID C. COMPERT

SUBJECT: Presidential Speeches

Attached at Tab A is a revised version of the substance of the 4/13 speech on Europe and the Soviet Union; it reflects your comments on the previous draft. I have shared this with Tony Snow, along with our thinking on the series of speeches (Tab B). He was receptive and enthusiastic. He outlined the following plan, which intersperses the several speeches on foreign policy with one or two on domestic policy, to deal with criticism that the Administration is as weak on the latter as it is strong on the former. He also wants to develop consistency between the foreign and domestic policy speeches; this is especially important in the world economy speech.

4/13	Air Force War College	-- Europe and the USSR
5/10	Princeton	-- Middle East
5/12	Hampton University	-- Domestic
5/29	Air Force Academy	-- Defense Policy
6/1	West Point	-- ?
6/14	Cal Tech	-- World Economy

I think this sequence makes sense: start by turning attention away from the situation in Iraq and back toward the success and challenges of Europe/USSR; end with a world economy speech just after fast-track renewal and just prior to the G-7 summit.

There is a danger that the upcoming European/Soviet speech, while important, will get lost because it contains no headline-grabbing initiatives and could be eclipsed by the Kurdish drama. (Remember that the end of the Cold War was reported on page 37

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PER NSC WAIVER #2021-02
By mm NARA, Date 7/16/2021

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

back in November!) We could reverse the order of the European and Middle East speeches, or else try to position the Europe speech through back-grounding.

I would like your permission to discuss our plans, especially for the first speech, with State (Zoellick) as soon as possible.

Attachments
Tab A Revised Speech
Tab B Game-plan

cc: Arnold Kanter
Tim Deal
Richard Haass

America, Europe, and the Soviet Union:
Foundation of a More Secure World

-- After World War II, hopes for a new order were crushed by Stalin's occupation of Eastern Europe and the East-West confrontation that ensued. This stand-off divided Europe and brought about a global East-West rivalry that fueled -- or prevented the resolution of -- conflicts world-wide.

-- Our success in Europe over the last two years alters this situation fundamentally by promising East-West cooperation instead of stalemate. This success was a triumph of Western values, strength, and perseverance, which encouraged a new and enlightened policy of the Soviet Union.

-- This achievement has created an opportunity to realize the hope for a more just and secure world order that was born of the World War but frozen by the Cold War.

-- On August 2, 1990, this hope was threatened by a new aggressor. Yet our very success in ending the Cold War laid the groundwork for our success in winning the Gulf War.

  -- Values that we stood for in Europe for 40 years were those that we and others were prepared to fight for in the Gulf.

  -- NATO allies who stood side-by-side with us for 40 years were ready to fight side-by-side with us -- or otherwise support our common cause -- in the Gulf. We led, politically and militarily, but our allies shared in the burden.

  -- And Soviet leaders, instead of treating the crisis as an East-West face-off, correctly saw it as a question of international law and order. They took the right path, and as a result aggression failed and was punished.

-- Now, just as the opportunity for a new order was created by the end of confrontation in Europe, we need to consider how to seize this chance to create enduring security and prosperity <u>in Europe</u>. A century of conflict in Europe can now give way to a century of peace.

-- To achieve this, the United States must remain in Europe. This century's history shows that the destiny and interests of the United States cannot be separated from Europe's.

-- The need for an American role in Europe transcends the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. And Europe's quest for unity makes it no less compelling.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER #2021-02
By mm NARA, Date 7/16/2021

-- American and European security is as indivisible as ever; our vital interests are largely the same. Our economies are more interdependent than ever; transatlantic trade and investment have grown steeply.

-- Prospects for preserving world peace have been dramatically improved by the events of the past two years. But it would be folly to assume that the future holds no new dangers. The events of this year alone -- in the Gulf, in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe -- have underscored the need to preserve our vital transatlantic bond as the primary force for stability in a turbulent world.

-- America's commitment is the best guarantee of a secure Europe, and a secure Europe is vital to American interests and world peace. This is the essential logic of the Atlantic Alliance, which anchors America in Europe. The United States will maintain a substantial and effective military capability in Europe -- not temporarily but as long as Europe wants us.

-- With the fading of East-West confrontation, our most formidable task in Europe is to help the new democracies succeed, lest a new fault line appear between a prosperous Western Europe and a depressed, unstable Eastern Europe.

-- Forty years ago, with America's help, Western Europe embarked on a path to prosperity, stability, and security -- precisely the hopes of Eastern Europe today.

-- Our West European partners now have both the opportunity and the means to share their success with fellow Europeans. We and they are doing a great deal to help the new democracies. But far more is needed.

-- The United States will do its part, to be sure as we have in reducing Poland's debt by 70% and increasing assistance to Eastern Europe by 50%. I call upon the Western democracies -- including the American people -- to make a commitment that the new democracies will succeed.

-- What the nations of Eastern Europe need is not only more assistance but markets for the products of their workers and entrepreneurs. Within the rules of the world trading system, we appeal to our EC partners to open their markets, as we are opening ours, to Europe's new democracies.

-- The success of Eastern Europe holds promise for the Soviet Union too -- for that success will demonstrate that the future belongs to political and economic freedom. And the Soviet Union can only benefit from a healthy Eastern Europe.

-- We take no comfort in the problems within the Soviet Union today, because its leaders have chosen to help strengthen rather than challenge international order.

-- Having made this choice, we hope that the Soviet Union will reaffirm an equally clear choice in favor of reform, for that is the only road to the prosperity they seek. Such a choice will make the Soviet Union not only a key participant in the world order but a stakeholder in the values that underpin that order.

-- Should the move to democracy and markets prove to be as clear in the USSR as it now is in Eastern Europe, we should stand ready to help as we are now helping in Eastern Europe.

-- Despite its current difficulties, we will stay engaged with the Soviet Union, building on the potential for cooperation so vividly demonstrated in the Security Council during the Gulf War.

-- The new order among nations will be based on principles long favored but elusive while the world was divided between East and West: peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples.

-- To this end, we now have the chance to use multinational institutions to their full potential, especially the UN Security Council and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

-- The agenda, in Europe and beyond, is a demanding one -- and one which affects American interests more than ever: bringing security to the Gulf and peace to the Middle East; expanding the world economy based on free movement of goods, services, know-how, and capital; helping the poor countries share in economic expansion; fostering freedom; permitting the weak to be as secure as the strong.

-- The United States alone cannot and will not determine the new order. But we will not hesitate to lead where our leadership is needed. As we have just witnessed in the Gulf War, the American people will not shrink from the responsibilities thrust upon us by our strength and our values.

-- But others must lead too. Our post-War allies are becoming our new partners. Our old adversary, too, can become a partner in creating a more secure world.

REVISED 4/4/91

Strategy for Spring Presidential Speech Series

Objectives:

- Develop new world order concept.

- In that context, outline U.S. foreign and national security policy priorities and direction.

Strategy:

- Use four speeches (4/13 - June) to explain conceptually and concretely what we mean by a new world order. Capitalize on President's strong political and international position to articulate our vision and consolidate our leadership.

Concept:

- Our triumph in both the Cold War and the Gulf War heralds an opportunity to end this century of violence with a new world order -- not a Pax Americana, based only on American might, but rather based on:

  1. The principles which we stood for in both the Cold War and the Gulf War: peaceful change and settlement of disputes; security from aggression and intimidation; reducing and controlling the means of destruction.

  2. American leadership in advancing and defining these principles and in rallying others to them.

  3. Responsibility-sharing, by those who share the principles and have the wherewithal to shoulder the burden along with the U.S. (Europe, Japan, Gulf Arabs).

  4. Multilateral security institutions and coalitions -- NATO's success in Europe, the Gulf coalition, UNSC -- more feasible than ever because of the end of global East-West confrontation.

Themes:

- A unique historic opportunity

  1918 -- norms but no leader (due to U.S. isolationism)

  1945 -- norms but stalemate (due to East-West confrontation)

  1991 -- norms, a leader, no stalemate, others willing to share both the norms and the burdens.

- America as leader not policeman

- American leadership requires continued military strength (i.e., no post Cold War let-down) economic leadership (i.e.,

no protectionism) and political engagement (i.e., no isolationism)

The Speeches:

Maxwell: Europe and the Soviet Union (Gompert)

Triumph in Europe (1989-90) signalled the opportunity for a new world order. By ending East-West confrontation and engaging the Soviets constructively we have opened new opportunities to solve problems and advance our principles of international order -- not only in Europe but world-wide. Now we must secure the gains (Eastern Europe), call on our traditional partners to share responsibility (Western Europe), and keep the door open for the Soviet Union to become a full-fledged member (based on Gulf example).

USAFA: Middle East (Haass)

Fighting and winning the Gulf War was essential to save the opportunity for a new world order. Our success in Europe made it possible to accomplish this in that it permitted UNSC decisions and enabled us to shift forces from the East-West stand-off in Central Europe. Now we (U.S.-led coalition) have both an opportunity to build regional security arrangements and a need to confront the region's dangerous disputes, especially via the Middle East peace process. (Possible CW/WMD initiatives.)

USMA: U.S. National Defense Policy (Kanter)

While we are not the cop of the new world order, we are the leader and therefore must maintain the means to protect our interests and values, along with others. The end of the Cold War gives us a new opportunity to address problems frozen by East-West stand-off; but it does not leave our interests and values unthreatened. We will emphasize that which brought us success in the Gulf: quality, skill, technology, flexibility, agility, integrated strategy, cooperation with others.

June: U.S. International Economic Policy (Deal)

The end of the Cold War may reduce the salience of traditional security problems, but this only accentuates the need (and opportunity) for steady growth in the world economy. The new order depends on a free and open economic system: economic freedoms and open markets for goods, services and capital. With our fast-track authority in hand by then, the U.S. calls for a determined effort to reach a GATT agreement, sustain steady economic growth, enhance liquidity, promote development, and develop norms for a truly integrated world economy. (Opportunity to discuss East Asia, Latin America, and Africa at greater length).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102306
RECEIVED: 28 MAR 91 14

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 09 APR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS
CAPE VERDE ISLANDS
BARBADOS
BRAZIL
USSR
ISRAEL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HS CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY AS OF 29 MAR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 01 APR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON LOGREF: 9102273 9102274

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By caf NARA, Date 7/16/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADS of State Correspondence Summary

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: [illegible] LOG # 2306

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [illegible] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1		A
Bill Sittmann	2	N	
Bob Gates	3	To Pres	4/9
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk		4/9	
NSC Secretariat	4	4/9	N/R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS Brady ofc gave a copy of the Pres note to Scowcroft. I have provided copy to Fraser,

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: [redacted] for Appropriate Action. Connie

EX Sec's Office has desk file

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

President Collor of Brazil - March 27, 1991
(Received March 28)

President Collor appreciates your message concerning his first year in office. Although unfavorable international circumstances have made his task more difficult, he is still committed to economic reform and social modernization. In closing, he looks forward to visiting Washington in June and strengthening bilateral relations.

President Pereira of Cape Verde - March 21, 1991
(Received March 27)

President Pereira appreciates your support and assistance to Cape Verde during his term as president. He thanks you for your friendship and holds you in the highest esteem.

President Gorbachev of Soviet Union - March 20, 1991
(Received March 29)

President Gorbachev is pleased with the grain agreement made last June. However, he seeks an increase, up to $1.5 billion, in the amount of credit for additional grain purchases since the current food supply in the Soviet Union is low.

Prime Minister Sandiford of Barbados - March 20, 1991
(Received March 28)

PM Sandiford appreciates your congratulatory message upon his re-election. He also hopes that you "build the defenses of peace" in the Middles East within the UN.

President Herzog of Israel - March 14, 1991
(Received March 29)

President Herzog enjoyed Secretary Baker's visit and took the opportunity to admire your leadership role throughout the War. He feels that a "new atmosphere" can be created in the region, given the goodwill that some Arab countries have demonstrated towards Israel. Although the Palestinian issue is more complex, he believes that it could be solved in the same way. However, the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism threatens this possibility.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0722-MR
12/11/2015

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar of UN - January 30, 1991
(Received March 28)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar announces the adoption of the International Development Strategy. Although recent momentous political changes have taken place; poverty still affects a large majority of the world. He feels that only by improving their lives through development and resolution of external debt, trade and technology problems can there be a peaceful world.

King Hassan II of Morocco - March 8, 1991
(Received March 28)

King Hassan II is concerned by the rebellion in Iraq. He believes that if the Shiite Muslims succeed in forming an independent entity, it will shift its obedience towards Iran, thereby disrupting regional balance and stability.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2306

March 29, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: GEORGE VAN ERON for

SUBJECT: Heads of State Correspondence Summary as of March 29

Attached at Tab I is a summary of the Heads of State correspondence received by the Secretariat since Wednesday, March 27.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached summary to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/16/09

Attachments
Tab I Summary for the President

Tab A	President Collor	- Brazil
Tab B	President Pereira	- Cape Verde
Tab C	President Gorbachev	- Soviet Union
Tab D	PM Sandiford	- Barbados
Tab E	President Herzog	- Israel
Tab F	Secretary General Perez de Cuellar	- UN
Tab G	King Hussan II	- Morocco

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Letter	President Fernando Collor to President Bush Re: English (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [2]

Date Closed:	7/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91150-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05c. Letter	President Fernando Collor to President Bush Re: Portuguese (2 pp.)	3/27/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [2]

Date Closed:	7/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91150-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

República de Cabo Verde

Presidência da República

O Presidente

NON-OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Praia, March 21, 1991
Nr. 039/PR/91

Excellency,

It is with great recognition that finishing my mandate of President of the Republic of Cape Verde as the result of the Presidential election held in February 17, 1991, I thank You for all support and solidarity, I could count upon You, in every moment, as well as Your Excellency's very important contribution to strengthen the ties between our two countries.

I keep with me grateful remembrances from the state contacts I had the honour to have with Your Excellency that created a sincere friendship and esteem, which I wish I could continue to usufruct, though in a sphere purely personal.

Please accept, Mr. President the expression of my highest consideration.

Aristides Pereira
President of the Republic of Cape Verde

His Excellency
Mr. George Bush
President of the United states of America
Washington D. C.

República de Cabo Verde

Presidência da República

O Presidente

Praia, 21 de Março de 1991
Nr. 039/PR/91

Excelência,

Ao terminar o meu mandato no alto cargo de Presidente da República de Cabo Verde, na sequência das eleições presidenciais de 17 de Fevereiro de 1991, é com muito reconhecimento que agradeço todo o apoio e solidariedade que, em todos os momentos, pude contar da sua parte, assim como a contribuição muito importante de Vossa Excia. para o reforço das relações de amizade entre os nossos dois países.

Guardo gratas recordações dos contactos de Estado que tive a honra de manter com Vossa Excelência, que forjaram uma sincera amizade e estima, que espero poder continuar a disfrutar, embora já num plano puramente pessoal.

Queira aceitar, Senhor Presidente, a expressão da minha elevada consideração.

Aristides Pereira
Presidente da República de Cabo Verde

Sua Excelência
Sr. George Bush
Presidente dos Estados Unidos da América
Washington D. C.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS 9105518

NSC

2317

March 20, 1991

Moscow

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

Dear Mr. President,

I would like to note with profound satisfaction the positive development in implementing the practical arrangements between the Soviet and the US sides concerning the grain agreement of June 1, 1990, and to thank you for your personal contribution to this matter.

The current food supply situation in our country makes it possible to confirm our intentions to purchase grains in the United States in the full amount provided for by the agreement.

Taking into account the conditions required for realizing these intentions, I would be grateful to you, Mr. President, if the US side decided to increase the amount of credit extended to the USSR last January by up to 1.5 billion dollars for the purchases of wheat, corn and soy-bean meal made in addition to the contracted ones during the first six months of this year.

I am counting on your understanding in this important matter, the favorable resolution of which would contribute tangibly to strengthening the relationship of cooperation and partnership between our countries and peoples.

Respectfully,

M.GORBACHEV

President of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics

THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0304-F/1
11/29/2007 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Уважаемый господин Президент,

С глубоким удовлетворением хотел бы отметить позитивное развитие в реализации практических договоренностей между советской и американской сторонами по зерновому соглашению от I июня I990 г. и поблагодарить за Ваш личный вклад в это дело.

Складывающаяся в нашей стране ситуация с продовольственным обеспечением позволяет подтвердить наши намерения о закупке в этом году в Соединенных Штатах зерновых в полном объеме, предусмотренном соглашением.

С учетом условий, необходимых для реализации этих намерений, был бы признателен Вам, господин Президент, если бы американская сторона приняла решение об увеличении размера кредита, предоставленного СССР в январе с.г., на сумму до I,5 млрд.долларов для оплаты закупок в первом полугодии текущего года дополнительно к законтрактованным объемам - пшеницы, кукурузы и соевого шрота.

Рассчитываю на Ваше понимание в этом важном вопросе, положительное решение которого явилось бы конкретным вкладом в упрочение отношений сотрудничества и партнерства между нашими странами и народами.

С уважением,

М.ГОРБАЧЕВ
Президент Союза Советских Социалистических Республик

Господину Дж.БУШУ
Президенту
Соединенных Штатов Америки

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0723-MR
MM 8/18/2015

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

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FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3570

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BRIDGETOWN 01678
FOR ARA/CAR
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPDC, BB
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM PRIME
- MINISTER SANDIFORD
1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE TEXT OF THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE RIGHT HONORABLE L. ERSKINE SANDIFORD, PRIME MINISTER OF BARBADOS, TO PRESIDENT BUSH. THE SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE FORWARDED TO ARA/CAR BY REGISTERED AIR POUCH.
2. BEGIN TEXT:
MARCH 20, 1991
THE HONORABLE GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEAR PRESIDENT BUSH
I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR VERY KIND MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATION ON THE OCCASION OF MY RE-ELECTION TO THE OFFICE OF PRIME MINISTER. LIKE YOU I AM EAGERLY LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR CONTINUING COLLABORATION IN THE MANY AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST TO OUR TWO COUNTRIES.
WITH RESPECT TO THE TROUBLED SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NOW THAT THE WAR HAS BEEN WON, IT IS MY HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TO BUILD THE DEFENCES

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-2133-MR
5/2/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2320

מדינת ישראל
دولـة اسـرائيل
STATE OF ISRAEL

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

رئيس الدولة
THE PRESIDENT

הנשיא

Jerusalem, 14th March, 1991
160/LL

The Honorable
George Bush
President
of the United States of America
The White House
Washington D.C.
U. S. A.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0108-MR
7/5/2013 MM

Dear Mr. President,

I took the occasion of Secretary Baker's visit to publicly acknowledge your historic role as leader of the free world, in the struggle to overcome the forces of evil in the Middle East, which constituted a grave danger to the countries of this area and, indeed, to the world in general.

You will go down in history for your firmness and steadfastness, for the historic decisions which you made, for the organization of the coalition and the outstanding execution of the mission to free Kuwait. I trust that the new winds now blowing will combine to overcome the atmosphere of fear and prejudice which has characterized much of the Middle East.

Secretary Baker's visit to the area and to Israel was of particular importance.

There are many issues to be faced because the complexity of the problems in the area is far greater than is generally appreciated. Given goodwill on the part of the Arab states, or part of them, I believe that a new atmosphere can be created, which will serve to inspire a feeling of confidence in the population of Israel. After all, people tend to forget that we alone in the area are a democracy, where public opinion, polls, and the views of an independent media count.

I believe that the parallel approach to the Arab states, on the one hand, and to the Palestinians, on the other hand, has the best chance of success because if they show goodwill, it should be possible to develop a far better atmosphere with some of the Arab states.

The Palestinian issue must be tackled too, although it is far more complicated. A high percentage of the Palestinians in the territories administered by Israel now support Hamas, an extreme Islamic Fundamentalist organization which is not prepared to compromise. There is, in fact, a civil war going on among the Palestinians, with the number of Palestinians killed per month by other Palestinians averaging between 60%-80% per month, of all Palestinian casualties. But with the Palestinians too we must look for a period of confidence-building measures and a way to allow a moderate leadership, which does not live under the shadow of the gunman, to emerge.

However, Mr. President, the main problem facing the Middle East today is not our issue, however important it is. The main issue is the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism which is threatening every single regime in the Middle East today and which constitutes a major danger not only in our area, but in the Moslem Republics in the Soviet Union and elswhere. After all, the Israeli-Arab conflict had nothing to do with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with the Iran-Iraq war, with the fall of the Shah and the rise of Khomeini and with the tragic developments in Lebanon since 1975.

Again, please accept on my behalf and on behalf of the people of Israel, our deep and sincere admiration and gratitude for your leadership and for all that you have done to eliminate a great danger and to defend the free world.

We were delighted to hear that you might be visiting us and I look forward, together with the people of Israel, to welcoming you in our midst.

Yours sincerely,

Chaim Herzog

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

30 January 1991

Excellency,

I wish to inform you that the General Assembly of the United Nations last month unanimously adopted a new International Development Strategy for the 1990s. This important document deserves the serious attention of all Governments.

In recent years, we have witnessed momentous political changes which - for all the present difficulties - hold the promise of a new era of global peace. Paradoxically, however, a large majority of the peoples of the world still live in degrading conditions of poverty. We can only succeed in building a more stable and peaceful world if they are given the opportunity to improve their lives through development. In this connexion, the Strategy adopted by the General Assembly provides a viable framework for international action. It places the human condition at the centre of global concerns and recognizes that revival of growth in developing countries is vital for the future of the world economy. To that end, it calls for the resolution of problems relating to external debt, trade and technology. It also emphasizes the critical issues of poverty and hunger, environment and social progress.

It is evident that the Strategy, if acted upon by the international community as a whole, can help alleviate global poverty and under-development. I trust that your Government will extend its full support to the policies and actions called for in it.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

His Excellency
Mr. George Bush
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05k. Note	From King Hassan II of Morocco (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [2]

Date Closed: 7/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:** 91150-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**
Re-review Case #:	**Appeal Disposition:**
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	**Disposition Date:**
AR Case #:	**MR Case #:**
AR Disposition:	**MR Disposition:**
AR Disposition Date:	**MR Disposition Date:**

RESTRICTION CODES

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P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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+177

CHRON FILE

OTR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 27, 1991

Dear Senator Gore:

Thank you for your March 21 letter concerning strategic modernization. I share your belief that we must maintain a highly capable and modern strategic deterrent.

The President's budget is a solid approach to continued strategic modernization in the face of the many uncertainties we see in the international security environment and the stark realities of a decreasing defense budget. It recognizes that we must scale back and restructure defense programs while remembering that our political and military relationship with the Soviet Union is in considerable transition and that the endpoint of this transition is uncertain.

I believe the course we have charted for ICBM modernization is about right. It makes some tough fiscal choices, looks ahead to the potential of START, and yet preserves the options to adjust both the pace and direction of strategic modernization as future conditions warrant.

The decision to terminate Peacekeeper missile production was driven by fiscal constraints but with high confidence in the missile resulting from a very successful flight test program. It reflects the best advice of the military operator, the Air Force and the Department of Defense. While this decision will limit long-term testing options, we do not see it as an important factor either to the achievement of a START agreement or to our own deterrent capability if START is not concluded promptly.

I concur fully that we must be certain that mobile basing for the small ICBM "does not fall out of the picture." In fact, our current program emphasizes development of a mobile ICBM with the option of silo-basing. We need to see that development program through. We do not, however, need to commit ourselves to a single basing concept -- either for initial or long-term deployment -- at this time. Rather, we can wait to make that decision when the system is further along in development and the specific deployment requirements are clearer.

Finally, because of recommendations by the Congressionally-sponsored Drell Commission, the propellant in the missile is being reviewed. I recommend we let the technical experts complete their evaluation of the propellant-related safety issues before reaching any firm conclusions.

Thank you for your continuing interest in strategic modernization. While there have been many changes in the US-Soviet relationship and we are hopeful that the relationship can continue to improve, the Soviet Union remains the only real strategic threat to the United States. An appropriately sized, capable, and stable nuclear deterrent must remain one of out top defense priorities.

Sincerely,

Brent

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-4202

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 15, 1991

Chief Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

SIGNED

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: JOHN GORDON

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Gore on ICBM Modernization

At Tab II is a letter from Senator Gore urging you to "check into what is going on" in ICBM modernization. He is concerned that:

-- ICBM modernization is being driven into the ground by the Air Force to fund the B-2;

-- the MX production line will be gapped while the prospects for START are receding;

-- mobility for the small ICBM is likely to be sacrificed and the missiles deployed only in silos;

-- the propellant in the small ICBM will be changed to a material with lower energy for safety reasons, eliminating southwestern basing as an option.

As we have discussed, the decision to stop Peacekeeper missile production will limit the number of flight tests to two or three a year until about the year 2000 (historically we test six to eight missiles per year) after which all non-emergency testing will have to stop for lack of test missiles. This decision will save about $600 million per year, but may it also send a signal that we are not serious about Peacekeeper much beyond the turn of the century.

While the Air Force had been pressing for initial deployment of the small ICBM in silos and going as slowly as possible on mobile basing for the MX, this has recently changed and the mobile aspects of the program are funded this year and in the President's 1992 budget request. That said, the Air Force commitment to mobility remains very weak, and General Butler at SAC is not enamored of ICBM mobility.

The military requirement for mobility, especially in the near term, is debatable. However, pursuing a silo-only program would put us in the position of asking Congress to fund a small, single-warhead replacement for a perfectly good, (and depending

on START, single-warhead) Minuteman III which could be maintained and upgraded for a fraction of the small ICBM cost. The right approach for now, both politically and militarily, is to defer the basing decision for this new missile until closer to the time when we have to make it.

Finally, Gore expresses concern that the Air Force will opt to replace the propellant in the small ICBM program in response to the safety report of the Drell Commission. The Air Force initially took the position that they should change the propellant simply to avoid any criticism that they had not incorporated every safety feature imaginable. Upon further reflection they seem to be coming to the conclusion that this would be an expensive change with significant loss of range for no improvement in safety. We should let this play out.

The proposed response at Tab I attempts to put the best face on this set of decisions. On the question of Peacekeeper production, we recognize that this was a difficult decision, driven largely by fiscal concerns, but made possible because of the success of the program to date. On the small ICBM, we agree that mobility must be a key element of the development program but that we need not make a final basing decision now -- rather we can wait to get a better picture of our evolving strategic relationship with the Soviet Union. On the propellant, we suggest that we let the technical evaluations be completed.

This is a preview of the position we would take on the Hill to defend these programs in the President's budget -- that we made some really tough decisions that were demanded by the budget but permitted by the changing environment. We are keeping our options open with the timing of the small ICBM deployment, its basing mode and its numbers, so that we have the ability to respond to unexpected developments in our relationship with the Soviet Union.

A draft of the proposed letter has been reviewed in OSD and the Air Staff.

Concurrence by: Virginia Lampley

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed letter to Senator Gore at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Proposed Letter to Senator Gore
Tab II Incoming Letter from Senator Gore

ALBERT GORE, JR.
TENNESSEE

2149

393 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
PHONE: 202-224-4944

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4202

March 21, 1991

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

I'm concerned that without closer attention, ICBM modernization is going to be driven into the ground by the Air Force as a sacrifice to the B-2. Production of MX spares is to be cut back to a level lower than any I ever heard was acceptable in terms of inventory for testing over the years. The production line will be gapped, and yet the START agreement upon which so many calculations are based is receding.

As for Midgetman, the funding level is reasonable considering the times, but I am very concerned that the program is going to be "evolved" out of all recognition, if not out of existence. We need to be sure that mobile basing does not fall out of the picture, but in fact, the missile may be heading for permanent silo-basing. I'm told that the Air Force chooses to believe that this is what the Senate Armed Services wants. That's not so. The Committee reluctantly accepted silo-basing first as a financial necessity: it wants mobile basing in the picture, however. Frankly, I feel we are wasting time and money by this two-step approach, but last year I bowed to what seemed inevitable. Given my preference, we would go mobile from the outset as originally planned.

Meanwhile, I hear that the Air Force keeps on trying by one means or another to emerge from this process with a missile in the Minuteman class. It doesn't help for them to be talking about changing the fuel type in Midgetman--ostensibly for safety--in ways that reduce the missile's range and ruin southwestern basing as an option.

I know you have much else on your mind. But it seems to me that it is better if you check into what is going on sooner rather than later, when today's rumors and trends have become tomorrow's embedded facts.

Sincerely,

Albert Gore, Jr.
United States Senator

I will look forward to hearing from you on this. It is more crucial than ever now. Al

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9103201
RECEIVED: 30 APR 91 11

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: BASORA
WILSON
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 30 APR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EC
GREAT BRITAIN
NATO
GERMANY

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: SHAPING EUROPEAN PILLAR

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 03 MAY 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

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FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BASORA
		GOMPERT
		KANTER
		NSC CHRON
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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/16/09

COMMENTS:

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Shaping the European Pillar

National Security Council
The White House

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Bill Sittmann	1		I
Bob Gates	2		
Brent Scowcroft	3	PNSA Has Seen	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		A
NSC Secretariat	5	5/20	N
~~Brent Wilson~~			

APR 30 P1:17

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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COMMENTS

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07a. Memo	Adrian Basora/Heather A. Wilson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Shaping the European Pillar [redacted] (3 pp.)	4/30/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS on 9/11/14

Date Closed:	7/16/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91150-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0724-MR (501)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	10/17/2013

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~ 3201

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C 20506

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April 30, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT/ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA/HEATHER A. WILSON

SUBJECT: Shaping the European Pillar

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

On April 25, we explored with the British their WEU-centered proposal for shaping the European Pillar, on the basis of policy endorsed by Principals on March 27. This senior-level bilateral involving JCS, OSD, State and NSC along with UK counterparts, confirmed that London's proposal is the best we are likely to get and that the British are sensitive to our concerns.

(b)(1)

Currently, Bonn is tending to line up with the French, Italians and others whose blueprints for European defense less clearly protect NATO's decision-making primacy and integrated structure. While they all say the right words about not undercutting NATO -- as Mitterrand did at Martinique -- their proposals put the building of European Political Union first, with the preservation of NATO and the U.S. role relegated to a subordinate goal.

Since the British approach is currently supported within the EC only by London, The Hague and Lisbon, it is important to begin to bring the Germans toward this view. At this weekend's Gymnich meeting, (b)(1)

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2000-0233-F/4
SCS 10/17/13

(b)(1) The French and others are trying to move the EC's Intergovernmental Conference on European Political Union along as fast as possible. The EC Summit in Luxembourg on June 27-28 could begin to lock in some of the basic principles on which the final blueprint for European political union (due by the end of the year) will be based.

There are three meetings coming up with the Germans which will give us an opportunity to gain German support. On May 6, Peter Hartmann will be here to prepare the Kohl visit, and on May 20, Kohl himself will be here. In between, on May 10, Genscher will be here for a meeting with Secretary Baker. We will use the Hartmann visit to flesh out what we would hope the President and Chancellor can agree on concerning European defense, and then Secretary Baker will try to get Genscher on board in preparation for Kohl's visit. Our tentative goal with Kohl should be to get his endorsement for a WEU-based European defense entity with close ties to NATO, a primary focus on out-of-area contingencies and no intrusion upon the existing NATO integrated command structure.

Our discussions with the British also highlighted two potential problems with the new NATO force structure being developed by SHAPE which we need to address internally in the short term. The SHAPE force structure proposal is based on multinational corps and includes a NATO "Rapid Reaction Corps" in addition to smaller, immediate reaction forces like the ACE mobile force. The British strongly support this structure.

The first problem is that SACEUR and the Pentagon are not committed to providing any U.S. units to the NATO RRC. It is principally a British corps with odd brigades from other European countries attached to it. It is inconceivable that NATO would activate a corps for the defense of a NATO country without U.S. support. Moreover, the lack of U.S. participation in a NATO Rapid Reaction Corps could send the wrong signal in a crisis.

The second problem highlighted during the UK visit is that the JCS wants both American divisions that will remain in Europe to be in the same corps under a U.S. corps commander. Likewise, the British and Germans want their own corps to be supplemented by smaller allies, rather than mixed together in truly multinational formations. While this would be arguably more efficient from a narrow military perspective, we do not think that military efficiency outweighs the broader security advantages of integrating western defenses, and the political advantages of demonstrating that the U.S. is willing to place some of its troops under non-American commanders in NATO. OSD and JCS reluctantly acknowledge that this is not purely a DOD decision. This is a point which you will probably need to discuss with Cheney and Powell. Meanwhile, we will be working to get appropriate policy guidance on these force structure issues generated from the Assistant Secretary level upward.

Our goal should be to tie down all the key issues to our satisfaction by the time of the NATO Summit this fall. To do this requires German cooperation in time for NATO's DPC (May 28) and the NAC Ministerial (June 6) which will address issues such as NATO's core functions, its new military strategy, its future force structure and the RRC, and the NATO-WEU link. Successful resolution of all of these issues is essential groundwork in preparing for a successful NATO Summit in the autumn. In the meantime, Will Taft has had some success in getting his NATO counterparts to agree to a statement on NATO's role which is based on our policy principles (Tab A).

Concurrence by: Robert RJH Hutchings

Attachment
Tab A Statement of NATO Core Functions

- NATO'S CORE SECURITY FUNCTIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE
- ---

THE PURPOSE OF THE ALLIANCE

NATO'S ESSENTIAL PURPOSE, SET OUT IN THE WASHINGTON TREATY AND REITERATED IN THE LONDON DECLARATION, IS TO SAFEGUARD THE FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF ALL ITS MEMBERS BY POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. BASED ON COMMON VALUES OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW, THE ALLIANCE HAS WORKED SINCE ITS INCEPTION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACEFUL ORDER IN EUROPE. THIS ALLIANCE OBJECTIVE REMAINS UNCHANGED.

THE NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE

NATO EMBODIES THE TRANS-ATLANTIC LINK BY WHICH THE SECURITY OF NORTH AMERICA IS PERMANENTLY TIED TO THE SECURITY OF EUROPE. IT IS THE PRACTICAL EXPRESSION OF EFFECTIVE COLLECTIVE EFFORT AMONG ITS MEMBERS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR COMMON INTERESTS.

THE FUNDAMENTAL OPERATING PRINCIPLE OF THE ALLIANCE IS THAT OF COMMON COMMITMENT AND MUTUAL COOPERATION AMONG SOVEREIGN STATES IN SUPPOR OF THE INDIVISIBILITY OF SECURITY FOR ALL OF ITS MEMBERS. SOLIDARTY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, GIVEN SUBSTANCE AND EFFECT BY NATO'S DAIL WORK IN BOTH THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SPHERES, ENSURES THAT N SINGLE ALLY IS FORCED TO RELY UPON ITS OWN NATIONAL EFFORTS ALONE IN DEALING WITH BASIC SECURITY CHALLENGES. WITHOUT DEPRIVING MEMBERS STATES OF THEIR RIGHT AND DUTY TO ASSUME THEIR SOVEREIGN RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE FIELD OF DEFENSE, THE ALLIANCE ENABLES THEM THROUGH COLLECTIVE EFFORT TO ENHANCE THEIR ABILITY TO REALIZE THEIR ESSENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES.

THE RESULTING SENSE OF EQUAL SECURITY AMONGST THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, REGARDLESS OF DIFFERENCES IN THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES OR IN THEIR NATIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES RELATIVE TO EACH OTHER, CONTRIBUTES TO OVERALL STABILITY WITHIN EUROPE AND THUS TO THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO INCREASED COOPERATION BOTH AMONG ALLIANCE MEMBERS AND WITH OTHERS. IT IS ON THIS BASIS THAT MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, TOGETHER WITH OTHER NATIONS, ARE ABLE TO PURSUE THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATIVE STRUCTURES OF SECURITY FOR A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE.

THE FUNDAMENTAL TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

THE MEANS BY WHICH THE ALLIANCE PURSUES ITS SECURITY POLICY TO PRESERVE THE PEACE WILL CONTINUE TO INCLUDE NOT ONLY THE MAINTENANCE OF A MILITARY CAPABILITY SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT WAR AND TO PROVIDE FOR EFFECTIVE DEFENSE, BUT ALSO THE PURSUIT OF POLITICAL EFFORTS FAVORING DIALOGUE WITH OTHER NATIONS AND THE ACTIVE SEARCH FOR A COOPERATIVE

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A0PROACH TO EUROPEAN SECURITY, INCLUDING IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT.

TO ACHIEVE ITS ESSENTIAL PURPOSE, THE ALLIANCE PERFORMS THE FOLLOWING FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY TASKS:

I. TO DETER AND DEFEND AGAINST ANY THREAT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE TERRITORY OF ANY NATO MEMBER STATE.
II. TO PRESERVE THE STRATEGIC BALANCE WITHIN EUROPE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE MILITARY POWER OF THE SOVIET UNION.
III. TO SERVE, AS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE IV OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, AS A TRANS-ATLANTIC FORUM FOR ALLIED CONSULTATIONS ON ANY ISSUES THAT AFFECT THEIR VITAL INTERESTS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS POSING RISKS FOR MEMBERS' SECURITY, AND FOR APPROPRIATE COORDINATION OF THEIR EFFORTS IN FIELDS OF COMMON CONCERN.
IV. TO ASSIST IN CREATING AND SUSTAINING A STABLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN EUROPE, BASED ON THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND COMMITMENT TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES, IN WHICH NO COUNTRY WOULD BE ABLE TO INTIMIDATE OR COERCE ANY EUROPEAN NATION OR TO IMPOSE HEGEMONY THROUGH THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

OTHER EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE EC, WEU AND CSCE HAVE ROLES TO PLAY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES, IN THESE FIELDS. THE CREATION OF A EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN SECURITY AND DEFENSE WILL UNDERLINE THE PREPAREDNESS OF THE EUROPEAN ALLIES TO TAKE A GREATER SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR SECURITY AND WILL HELP TO REINFORCE TRANS-ATLANTIC SOLIDARITY. BUT THE EXTENT OF ITS MEMBERSHIP AND OF ITS CAPABILITIES GIVES NATO A PARTICULAR POSITION IN THAT IT CAN PERFORM ALL FOUR CORE SECURITY FUNCTIONS. NATO IS THE ESSENTIAL FORUM FOR TRANS-ATLANTIC CONSULTATION AND THE FORUM FOR AGREEMENT ON POLICIES BEARING ON THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE COMMITMENTS OF ITS MEMBERS UNDER THE WASHINGTON TREATY.

IN DEFINING THE CORE FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIANCE IN THE TERMS SET OUT ABOVE, MEMBER STATES CONFIRM THAT THE SCOPE OF THE ALLIANCE AS WELL AS THEIR RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE WASHINGTON TREATY REMAIN UNCHANGED.

GERMANY PROPOSES AN OPPOSITE REORDERING OF THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL TASKS, BEGINNING WITH IV TO UNDERSCORE THE INCREASING POLITICAL ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE, BUT RECOGNIZES THAT SUCH REORDERING MIGHT ALSO REQUIRE REDRAFTING THE LANGUAGE OF TASK IV AND III - AS THEY STAND NOW - IN A MORE OPERATIONAL WAY.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9103296
RECEIVED: 02 MAY 91 14

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HUTCHINGS
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 02 MAY 91
SOURCE REF:

OPEN

KEYWORDS: GERMANY
NATO
USSR
GERMAN UNIFICATION
GATT
EUROPE WEST

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: KOHL VISIT STRATEGY

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 06 MAY 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF: 9103306 9103350

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/16/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSDAI DOC 1 OF 1

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Kohl Visit Strategy

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MM
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 3296
SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT
DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann	1	W	I
Bob Gates	2		
Brent Scowcroft	3.		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		N
NSC Secretariat	5		N

A = Action I = Information D = Disp... R = Retain ... = No further Action

APNSA Has Seen

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3296

May 2, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

SUBJECT: Kohl Visit Strategy

This will be the most important U.S.-German meeting since the President's round of talks with Kohl last spring and summer, nailing down agreement on the fundamentals of German unification.

Given the range of issues on our agenda and the limited time, we need to focus sharply on our highest priorities: the European pillar, GATT, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. Kohl needs the boost this visit can give him, and we can secure his support on issues where Germany has been less than helpful -- notably the European pillar -- by demonstrating our relevance to his urgent concerns in the east, including the new German Laender.

European Security Identity/European Pillar. Our highest priority is to secure Kohl's agreement on the fundamentals of developing a European security identity within the Alliance and his commitment to showing more leadership to assure that result is achieved. Germany's position will be key, and we need to nail down Kohl's support before the NATO Ministerial and EC Summit, both in June. Success demands that Kohl understand that he does not have to choose between Paris and Washington, or between Europe and the Alliance. At the same time, it will be imperative to focus his attention on this core issue and not accept vague assurances. Specifically, we want to secure Kohl's agreement that:

-- NATO is the forum for decision on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members.

-- NATO must maintain an effective integrated military command.

-- The European defense identity should be realized through the WEU with strong ties to NATO.

-- NATO forces should be multinational, with German participation.

-- Germany will not self-singularize on the out-of-area issue, but will retain the option of acting via the WEU.

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-- Bonn will work actively to achieve these goals and will not agree to anything in the IGC that contradicts them.

Our aim is to get the Chancellor on record in support of a formula for the future of the Alliance along the lines at Tab I. We suggest this be done during a (brief) joint press availability in the Rose Garden immediately following the expanded meeting. Such a statement would signal a common U.S.-German approach and help fence off decisions in the EC that could imply a European common defense separate and independent from the Alliance.

GATT. We need to build on Germany's recent support within the EC to gain Kohl's assurance that Germany will take the lead in producing a forthcoming European position on agriculture. We can use this commitment in securing an extension of fast-track authority and then in moving to a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round this year.

Eastern Europe. German leadership will be decisive in pushing the EC to be open its markets to the new democracies of central and eastern Europe. Given the broad convergence of our views, this is an area where we can demonstrate what "partners in leadership" means in the new Europe through renewed commitment to supporting the East European economies by continued financial support and enhanced market access.

Soviet Union. Although our approaches are reasonably close, we need to continue working to avoid the appearance that Germany is out front of the rest of the Alliance in courting Moscow. We can strengthen the commonality of our approaches toward the USSR and show support to Kohl by launching a modest joint initiative.

What Kohl gets in return. The visit can offer Kohl specific successes that help him at home:

-- an answer to conservative critics at home who accuse him of mismanaging the U.S. relationship.

-- U.S. recognition that Germany is beginning to assume more global responsibilities -- e.g., in aiding the Kurds.

-- public and private assurances of U.S. support for European unity.

-- active U.S. interest and engagement in the new German Laender.

Three new initiatives should be ready for announcement on May 20:

-- **German air base in the U.S.** This is pretty much on track. Indeed, the Germans now propose a much larger presence, which we and the Air Force welcome, but which may complicate a May 20 announcement. We will keep you apprised.

-- **RIAS Foundation.** This idea, well underway within USIA, would use $8-10 million in proceeds from the sale of RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) equipment to create a joint foundation to support contacts with the new German Laender (a theme Kohl has raised with the President several times).

-- **Joint Nuclear Safety Initiative for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.** This is just being developed, but it tracks with existing technical assistance efforts and will need only a stronger boost.

These three, if we can pull them off, will demonstrate U.S.-German joint action in transatlantic security, the new German Laender, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union.

Hartmann and Genscher Visits. We plan to introduce this agenda during Peter Hartmann's May 6-7 visit, mindful that Kohl's declining domestic fortunes will make it hard for him to exert strong leadership unless we prepare the way. We also hope to advance the strategy during Foreign Minister Genscher's May 10 meeting with Secretary Baker (pending the Secretary's travel plans). The aim there is to issue a joint statement with concrete U.S.-German joint initiatives on the European pillar, the NATO liaison missions, and CSCE. We are leaving it to the Secretary to advance our CSCE policy, by signalling our agreement on creation of an emergency mechanism (for convening meetings at subministerial level) and joining the Germans in proposing that the dispute settlement measures agreed to at Valletta would be placed in the new Conflict Prevention Center. More importantly, the statement would have Genscher sign on to our approach for a European pillar within the Alliance and join us in supporting a stronger role for NATO in Eastern Europe via several new measures to be undertaken through the liaison missions.

Concurrences by: Adrian Basora, Arnie Kanter, and Eric Melby

Attachment
Tab I Draft Public Statement on the European Pillar

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Draft Public Statement on the European Pillar
(for inclusion in President's opening statement)

-- Chancellor Kohl and I discussed the evolution of European security in light of the dramatic changes brought on by the end of the Cold War and progress toward European Political Union.

-- We agreed that even with these changes, it is essential that the United States continue playing a major role in Europe and that the Atlantic Alliance remain the foundation of European security. In that regard, I assured the Chancellor that the U.S. will maintain a significant military presence in Europe.

-- The Chancellor and I agreed that as Europe moves toward political union and a European security identity -- developments that the United States firmly supports -- it is essential that NATO remain the forum for decisions bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members and that NATO's integrated military command be preserved.

-- Noting that Europeans have decided to use the Western European Union for the expression of a European security identity, we agreed that the WEU should develop strong ties to NATO. Chancellor Kohl and I share the conviction that a strong European pillar within the Alliance strengthens transatlantic security.

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