

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91150
Folder ID Number: 91150-001

Folder Title:
Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	7	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Heather Wilson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Office Call with SACEUR General Jack Galvin, 2:00 p.m., January 8, 1991 (1 pp.)	1/5/91	(b)(1)	S
01b. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusion European Strategy Steering Group (5 pp.)	11/29/90	(b)(1)	S
02a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02b. Cable	Re: The Pope Sends Message to the President on the Gulf: Public Comments Condemn Iraq's Violation of International Law (2 pp.)	1/12/91	(b)(1)	C
02c. Cable	Re: Message to President Bush from the Pope (3 pp.)	1/16/91	(b)(1)	C
02d. Cable	Re: Kaunda Letter to President Bush on His Visit to Iraq (4 pp.)	1/14/91	(b)(1)	C
02e. Cable	Re: Poland: Letter on Debt Reduction from President Walesa to President Bush (5 pp.)	1/14/91	(b)(1)	C
02f. Cable	Re: Poland Supports the President: President Walesa's Letter (2 pp.)	1/8/91	(b)(1)	S
02g. Cable	Re: Letter from Prime Minister Sharif to President Bush on the Gulf Crisis (3 pp.)	1/15/91	(b)(1)	C

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1254
OA/ID Number: 91150-001
Date Closed: 7/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02h. Letter	Chancellor Kohl to President Bush Re: Translation (2 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	
02i. Letter	Chancellor Kohl to President Bush Re: [German] (2 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	
03a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	2/5/91	(b)(1)	C
03b. Letter	Prime Minister Andreotti to President Bush Re: Department of State Translation (3 pp.)	1/2/91	(b)(1)	
03c. Letter	Prime Minister Andreotti to President Bush Re: Page 2 [Italian] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04a. Cover Sheet	NSC Profile Sheet Re: Germany (1 pp.)	02/19/91	(b)(1)	S
04b. Form	NSC Tracking Sheet Re: Germany (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04c. Memo	Mike Fry to Brent Scowcroft Re: Germany (1 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S
05a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	2/28/91	(b)(1)	C
05b. Letter	Prime Minister Hawke to President Bush Re: [Soviet proposals] (1 pp.)	2/20/91	(b)(1)	

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Subseries:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05c. Letter	President Carlos Salinas de Gortari to President Bush Re: Department of State Translation (2 pp.)	1/22/91	(b)(1)	
05d. Letter	President Carlos Salinas de Gortari to President Bush Re: Spanish (2 pp.)	1/22/91	(b)(1)	
06. Memo	David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft Re: Cracks in the European Pillar (3 pp.)	2/25/91	(b)(1)	S
07a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Carlos Menem of Argentina (1 pp.)	3/4/91	(b)(1)	C
07b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Menem of Argentina (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07c. Memo	David A. Pacelli/Nancy Bearg Dyke to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Telephone Schedule Proposal for President Menem of Argentina, Regarding Cuban Human Rights (2 pp.)	3/4/91	(b)(1)	C
08a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Margaret Thatcher (2 pp.)	3/7/91	(b)(1)	C
08b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Margaret Thatcher (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
08c. Report	Re: Margaret Thatcher [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	3/6/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
09b. Cable	Re: King Sends Copies of Speech to President, Secretary, Other World Leaders (2 pp.)	3/5/91	(b)(1)	C
10a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: NATO and European Integration (2 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	S
10b. Memo	David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memo to the President on the European Pillar (1 pp.)	3/5/91	(b)(1)	S
11a. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Robert Gates Re: Your Meeting of the European Strategy Steering Group on Tuesday, March 19, at 5:00 pm (3 pp.)	3/18/90	(b)(1)	S
11b. Cable	Re: Brainstorming Exercise on Strategy Review -- New UK Paper on NATO - WEU Relationship (4 pp.)	3/15/91	(b)(1)	C
12a. Letter	President Bush to President Carlos Andres Perez (3 pp.)	3/21/91	(b)(1)	
12b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Reply to Venezuelan President Perez on Energy Policy (2 pp.)	3/21/91	(b)(1)	C
12c. Draft Letter	Department of State Draft Reply to President Perez (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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OA/ID Number: 91150-001
Date Closed: 7/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12d. Cable	Re: Letter from President Perez to President Bush Reiterating Call for Producer-Consumer Dialogue on Petroleum (3 pp.)	2/16/91	(b)(1)	C
12e. Letter	President Carlos Andres Perez to President Bush Re: [Spanish] (2 pp.)	2/15/91	(b)(1)	

Page 5 of 5

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OA/ID Number: 91150-001
Date Closed: 7/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100104
RECEIVED: 05 JAN 91 09

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILSON
KANTER
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 05 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

6th

KEYWORDS: EUROPE
EC
ANSA

NATO
SECURITY

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: GALVIN, JACK

SUBJECT: OFC CALL W/ GENERAL GALVIN ON 8 JAN 1991

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT	DUE DATE: 09 JAN 91	STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: WILSON	LOGREF:	
FILES: PA	NSCP:	CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
KANTER
NSC CHRON
WILSON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSCLG

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 5, 1991

APNSA Has Seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ^{He}ARNOLD KANTER/DAVID GOMPERT *AK*

FROM: HEATHER WILSON *He*

SUBJECT: Office ~~Call~~ with SACEUR General Jack Galvin,
2:00 p.m., January 8, 1991

General Galvin may raise the following issues with you.

NATO's European Pillar: Galvin is concerned that a separate European security identity could undermine NATO. He believes that the U.S. should allow the Europeans to develop a structure on their own, and not support any particular idea. Galvin may be betting that, without a U.S. lead, the Europeans will not be able to develop support for any meaningful rival to NATO.

You might tell him that, with the EC intergovernmental conference given the task of developing the EC security role, we need to make clear that we have some preferences and some parameters in support of many European countries who want continued U.S. involvement in Europe and want NATO to remain the focus for security matters. We think that the WEU, with certain conditions, is better than other alternatives. Tab I is a summary of the U.S. position. The UK has already taken an active lead in pushing the WEU approach. Douglas Hurd outlined it in his Berlin speech on December 10 and later at the NAC Ministerial. They will need our continued support.

Military Aid to Turkey: Galvin will want to talk to you about the military assistance package being prepared for Baker to take to Ankara. In particular, he will want to talk about sending Patriot to Turkey.

Crotone: General Galvin will be seeing Senator Sasser before he comes to see you, and will share his impressions with you.

The Gulf: General Galvin may summarize where the status of troop movements to the Gulf from the European theater. You might ask him to keep thinking and planning for possible further support from Europe in the event of war.

He for
Concurrence by: Nick Burns, Mike Hayden, Philip Zelikow

Attachment
Tab I Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262000-0233-F/3
3/14/2011 *MM*

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Summary of Conclusions
European Strategy Steering Group
November 29-30, 1990

1. This summary of conclusions is a resource document to be drawn upon by officials, **as appropriate**, as guidance in planning further work within the USG and preparing for consultations with foreign officials. The summary itself is for internal USG use only.
2. Our overall goal is to keep NATO strong and viable for the foreseeable future, as the foundation for Atlantic cooperation in addressing political and security concerns and to maintain the United States position as a European power. To achieve this goal, we need:
 - To emphasize America's continuing commitment to the Alliance, including a substantial U.S. military presence in Europe;
 - To recognize that in the new European environment there are important tasks for NATO that go beyond deterrence of the Soviet Union (see point 4) but that this does not exclude a complementary European role in handling true out-of-area contingencies;
 - To adapt NATO's political structures to encompass European desires for a distinct security identity within the Alliance framework; and
 - To adapt NATO's military command structure as appropriate to reflect the new security environment, which should make the US overseas presence more sustainable, encourage -- within a transatlantic framework -- greater European responsibility for Europe's defense in years to come, and -- if possible -- draw France closer to the Alliance.
3. In discussing the US military commitment to Europe, US officials should be prepared as appropriate to state that, as the President has assured our Allies, the United States will maintain for the foreseeable future substantial nuclear and conventional forces in Europe that will constitute a significant contribution to NATO's residual force levels. This presence will at least include a robust army corps, composed of a corps headquarters, associated corps units, and two ground force divisions, supplemented by appropriate air and naval forces and sufficient infrastructure to support force regeneration.

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0233-F/3
4/27/2010 MJ

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4. The United States has identified five core security functions for the North Atlantic Alliance. They are to:
 - Deter and defend against a threat of aggression from the Soviet Union against the territory of any NATO member state.
 - Deter and defend against a threat of aggression from countries other than the Soviet Union, such as states in the Middle East and North Africa, against the territory of any NATO member state.
 - Dissuade the Soviet Union from seeking to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to reimpose hegemony over Central/Eastern Europe through the threat or use of force.
 - Promote a stable security environment in Europe based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes.
 - Serve, as provided for in Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, and for coordinating their efforts at arms procurement, arms control, and other security matters as appropriate.
5. A preoccupation with new institutions and wiring diagrams can divert attention from our essential goal: a viable NATO that is the foundation for Atlantic cooperation on political and security concerns and maintains the position of the United States as a European power. Any changes in NATO should be consistent with that end, anticipating European trends in order to shape them to NATO's advantage.

Thus, the U.S. is sympathetic to European desires to develop a greater European identity on security issues in keeping with the continued viability of NATO and its principle of unity of security within the Alliance. To keep NATO strong, we would prefer to see the European security identity develop within the framework of the Alliance. We want to keep European leaders from feeling torn between a NATO security structure and a European security structure.

European governments will necessarily take the lead in devising a policy to achieve this distinct security identity. As they seek our views in this process, we should indicate that we are open-minded about a European identity, as long as that identity strengthens the Alliance and does not marginalize it. In our view, a European security identity centered in the Western European Union could meet that goal. If adopted, the WEU option should meet the

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following four criteria:

- (a) The WEU is moved to Brussels. Its member states would be represented on the WEU Council by the same individuals as represent them on the NAC. Its military advice would be provided by the appropriate members of NATO's Military Committee.
- (b) Decisionmaking on issues related to NATO's core security functions should occur within NATO, even if consultation on some of those issues also occurs elsewhere.
- (c) WEU consultative processes should not require prior agreement within the WEU before an issue can be discussed and decided within NATO. This would not preclude prior agreement on a position by WEU members as long as NATO processes are not delayed and NATO's decisionmaking prerogatives are preserved.
- (d) The WEU does not form an independent military structure, outside of NATO, that has any role in the performance of NATO's core security functions.
- (e) As European support grows for a transformation of the WEU, European governments will need to recognize the limitations in the membership of that organization that might increase divisiveness within the Alliance. If the WEU becomes the focal point for creation of a European security identity, the United States will raise as a serious concern some implications of the fact that Denmark, Norway, Greece, and Turkey are currently not in the WEU. We need more information on the views of European states on the issue of future WEU membership and association, and time to consider how strongly to press our preference.

These criteria are designed to leave room for the WEU's potential to organize European military capabilities for out-of-area operations. The close ties and dual-hatting between the WEU and NATO may actually facilitate consultation within the Alliance on these issues, as needed.

- 6. The U.S. is prepared to consider adapting NATO command structures to the new security environment because it will make the US overseas presence more sustainable politically and encourage and reflect greater European responsibility for Europe's defense in years to come. The U.S. also seeks to draw France closer to the military structures of the Alliance in a way that will support a continued U.S. military presence in Europe, including some form of integrated NATO military structure which includes Germany.

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The command structure of NATO should reflect the reassessment of risks to the Alliance, the new NATO strategy and its resultant force structure, and national contributions to NATO's defense. Although it is too soon to see where this process will take us, the U.S. is prepared to look at some emerging concepts and is in fact doing so in the ongoing Military Committee command structure review.

- (a) Alliance forces, including U.S. forces, would be organized into multinational corps. These corps structures would function in peacetime, and not just be contingent structures that could be activated to supplant national corps only in a crisis.
 - (b) The question of SACEUR's nationality need not even be introduced to Allies by the US.
 - (c) The US would be prepared internally to review the peacetime responsibilities of NATO's Military Committee.
7. In reviewing the concepts listed above, and in the context of pursuing our objectives, any NATO command structure should conform to the following principles:
- (a) Peacetime command relationships must be able to transfer smoothly to an effective wartime command structure. There must be unity of command during crisis and transition to war.
 - (b) Elements of the peacetime command structure which are essential for Allied forces to be interoperable in wartime must be maintained.
 - (c) The chain of command should be simple, and reduced where possible to reflect the smaller size of NATO forces. At the same time, the chain of command must be capable of accommodating NATO's increased reliance on the reconstitution of military forces.
 - (d) The command structure must be capable of assimilating forces which have not been committed to NATO in advance of a crisis or hostilities.
 - (e) The command structure must be capable of accommodating the likelihood of more flexible and mobile forces.
 - (f) Allocation of key decisionmaking positions (aside from SACEUR) should be generally commensurate with national military contributions and regional responsibilities.

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Significant additional work will be needed within the USG to translate these concepts and principles into clearcut goals for a revised NATO command structure. This organization may have a simplified chain of command, as described above, and structures capable of assimilating French or other forces not now in the integrated structure.

8. This material supplements the guidance on NATO's future mission and responsibilities already sent, on November 11, in State 382263.

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: 24

LOG # 0104

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 24 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>KH</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>OK</u>	<u>✓</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N/R</u>

91 JAN 5 12.12

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Office Call w/ SACEUR Jack Galvin
on Jan. 8 at 2:00pm

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

CHRON FILE
RECORD ID: 9100217
RECEIVED: 09 JAN 91 19

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: SITTMANN
VAN ERON

DOC DATE: 11 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS
POLAND
GERMANY

ZAMBIA
PAKISTAN
VATICAN

PERSONS: JOHN PAUL II
WALESIA, LECH

KAUNDA, KENNETH D
SHARIF, NAWAZ

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY AS OF 17 JAN

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 12 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON

LOGREF: 9100291 9100318

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
VAN ERON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSJEB

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary

LOG # 0217

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

DOCLOG A/O

DISPOSITION



K

2

W

4

AM 118

5

N = No further Action

Other

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS
Heads of State Correspondence
Summary

Exec Sec office has diskette

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Chronological Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 5/26/2022

Date Closed:	7/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91150-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-0716-MR(501)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/28/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile


Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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CHRON FILE



Heads of State Correspondence Summary

Pope John Paul II of Vatican City - January 12 and 15, 1991
(Received January 15)

Pope John Paul II asked Ambassador Melady to convey to you the message that he is keeping you in his prayers and is confident that you will make the right decision with regards to the Gulf Crisis.

In a follow up letter, Pope John Paul II expresses his concern that war in the Gulf will not provide an adequate solution to international problems. Although "an unjust situation might be momentarily met," he believes "the consequences that would possibly derive from war would be devastating and tragic."

President Kaunda of Zambia - January 13, 1991
(Received January 14)


President Kaunda informs you of his recent visit to Baghdad and his "proposal" for an international conference that would be followed by an Arab summit and solution to the Gulf Crisis.

President Walesa of Poland - January 11 and 8, 1991
(Received January 15)

President Walesa wrote two letters this week. In the first, he seeks your assistance in solving Poland's external debt problem.

In his second letter, President Walesa supports U.S. efforts for a peaceful solution to the Gulf Crisis and, if necessary, the use of force.

3.3(b)(6)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0716-MR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chancellor Kohl of Germany - December 20, 1990
(Received January 14)

07

Chancellor Kohl acknowledges your November 17 letter concerning Poland's foreign debt and shares your concern on Poland's indebtedness with commercial banks and public creditors. After consultations with German commercial banks, he believes that the German banks are willing to help Poland by assuming a share of the burden. With regards to the public creditors, Germany has been working within the framework of the G-7 and the Paris Club on a new debt settlement scheme and is considering debt and debt service reduction measures.

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

0318

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN SUNUNU VANERON
SIT FILE HUTCHINGS MONTGOMERY ROSTOW WELCH WHSR_IRAQ PRES_MSGS SIT SUM
VAX

PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 121713Z JAN 91

FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8191
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHWW/GULF WAR COLLECTIVE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0716-MR
mm 9/28/2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ROME 00797

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

FROM EMBASSY VATICAN/MESSAGE NO. 0040/91

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ZP, VT

SUBJECT: THE POPE SENDS MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT

-- ON THE GULF; PUBLIC COMMENTS CONDEMN IRAQ'S

-- VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. (U) AFTER THE POPE'S ANNUAL ADDRESS TO THE
DIPLOMATIC CORPS TODAY, HE SPOKE BRIEFLY WITH ME ALONE
AND ASKED THAT I PASS A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. THE
POPE SAID THAT HE WAS "THINKING OF PRESIDENT BUSH," AND
UNDERSTOOD THE PRESIDENT HAD A DIFFICULT DECISION TO
MAKE. THE POPE INDICATED HE WAS CONFIDENT THE
PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE THE RIGHT DECISION, WHICH WOULD
AFFECT THE ENTIRE WORLD. THE POPE SAID HE WAS PRAYING
FOR THE PRESIDENT.

2. (U) IN THE POPE'S TOUR D'HORIZON REMARKS TO THE
DIPLOMATIC CORPS, HE REFERRED TO THE GULF REGION AS
BEING IN A STATE OF SEIGE. HE NOTED THAT "ONE COUNTRY
VIOLATES THE MOST ELEMENTARY RULES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW." "ONE CANNOT ACCEPT THAT THE LAW OF THE STRONGER
CAN BE BRUTALLY IMPOSED ON THE WEAKER." HE ONCE AGAIN
PRAISED THE UN'S REACTION TO IRAQ'S AGGRESSION. THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

POPE REFERRED TO A MESSAGE HE HAD SENT UN SYG PEREZ DE
CUELLAR THE PREVIOUS DAY WHICH REAFFIRMED THE
"UNACCEPTABLE FACTS" OF IRAQ'S "BRUTAL VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW." THE POPE THEN CALLED FOR
EXHAUSTING ALL PEACEFUL MEANS TO FIND A JUST SOLUTION.

MELADY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

0362

PAGE 01 OF 03

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0716-MR

MM 9/28/2015

PRT GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SITTMANN SUNUNU VANERON
SIT CHARLES HAASS FILE HUTCHINGS PRES-MSGs SIT VAX

-PREC- IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 161022Z JAN 91

FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8321
INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHWW/GULF WAR COLLECTIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ROME 01021

FROM EMBASSY VATICAN/MESSAGE NO. 0053/91

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, IZ, VT

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM THE

- POPE

REF: EMBASSY VATICAN/EUR/WE FAX

1. (S) VATICAN DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
TAURAN CONVOKED AMBASSADOR 15 JANUARY TO PRESENT
LETTER FROM POPE TO PRESIDENT BUSH ON SITUATION
IN GULF (ORIGINAL POUCHED TO EUR/WE). TAURAN
SAID POPE HAD ALSO ADDRESSED A LETTER TO SADDAM
HUSSEIN AND THAT PRESS WOULD BE INFORMED OF
THESE APPEALS. AMBASSADOR AGREED TO TRANSMIT
MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY.

2. (U) BEGIN TEXT:

- TO THE HONORABLE GEORGE BUSH

- PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I FEEL THE PRESSING DUTY TO TURN TO YOU AS THE
LEADER OF THE NATION WHICH IS MOST INVOLVED,
FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT,
IN THE MILITARY OPERATION NOW TAKING PLACE IN
THE GULF REGION.

IN RECENT DAYS, VOICING THE THOUGHTS AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

CONCERNS OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE. I HAVE STRESSED THE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES WHICH A WAR IN THAT AREA COULD HAVE. I WISH NOW TO RESTATE MY FIRM BELIEF THAT WAR IS NOT LIKELY TO BRING AN ADEQUATE SOLUTION TO INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND THAT. EVEN THOUGH AN UNJUST SITUATION MIGHT BE MOMENTARILY MET. THE CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD POSSIBLY DERIVE FROM WAR WOULD BE DEVASTATING AND TRAGIC. WE CANNOT PRETEND THAT THE USE OF ARMS, AND ESPECIALLY OF TODAY'S HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY. WOULD NOT GIVE RISE. IN ADDITION TO SUFFERING AND DESTRUCTION, TO NEW AND PERHAPS WORSE INJUSTICES.

MR. PRESIDENT, I AM CERTAIN THAT, TOGETHER WITH YOUR ADVISERS, YOU TOO HAVE CLEARLY WEIGHED ALL THESE FACTORS, AND WILL NOT SPARE FURTHER EFFORTS TO AVOID DECISIONS WHICH WOULD BE IRREVERSIBLE AND BRING SUFFERING TO THOUSANDS OF FAMILIES AMONG YOUR FELLOW CITIZENS AND TO SO MANY PEOPLES IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IN THESE LAST HOURS BEFORE THE DEADLINE LAID DOWN BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, I

TRULY HOPE, AND I APPEAL WITH LIVELY FAITH TO THE LORD, THAT PEACE CAN STILL BE SAVED. I HOPE THAT, THROUGH A LAST-MINUTE EFFORT A DIALOGUE, SOVEREIGNTY MAY BE RESTORED TO THE PEOPLE OF KUWAIT AND THAT THAT INTERNATIONAL ORDER WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR A COEXISTENCE BETWEEN PEOPLES TRULY WORTHY OF MANKIND MAY BE RE-ESTABLISHED IN THE GULF AREA AND IN THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST. I INVOKE UPON YOU GOD'S ABUNDANT BLESSINGS AND, AT THIS MOMENT OF GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE YOUR COUNTRY AND BEFORE HISTORY, I ESPECIALLY PRAY THAT YOU BE GRANTED THE WISDOM TO MAKE

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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

DECISIONS WHICH WILL TRULY SERVE THE GOOD OF
YOUR FELLOW-CITIZENS AND OF THE ENTIRE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

FROM THE VATICAN. JANUARY 15, 1991.

- SIGNED: JOANNES PAULUS

END TEXT. MELADY

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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0320

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN SUNUNU VANERON
SIT FRASURE FILE MONTGOMERY ROSTOW WELCH WHSR-IRAQ PRES-MSGs SIT
SHEEHAN SUM VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 141017Z JAN 91

FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7821
INFO RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8595

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LUSAKA 00165
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR

TAGS: ZA, IZ, PREL

SUBJECT: KAUNDA LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH ON HIS VISIT
TO IRAQ

REF: 91 LUSAKA 0164

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. PRESIDENT KAUNDA PASSED TO EMBASSY JANUARY 13 A
COPY OF A LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH DESCRIBING HIS
VISIT TO BAGHDAD AND HIS "PROPOSAL" FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE LEADING TO AN ARAB SUMMIT
AND SOLUTION TO THE GULF CRISIS (TEXT OF LETTER IN
PARA 6 BELOW). ACCOMPANYING THE LETTER WAS THE
MEMCON OF A CONVERSATION THAT TOOK PLACE JANUARY 5
BETWEEN AN UNNAMED "FOREIGN ENVOY" (COUNTRY
UNSPECIFIED AS WELL, BUT JUDGING BY CONTENT OF LETTER
AND TIMING WE SUSPECT IT WAS A FRENCH VISITOR TO
BAGHDAD) AND SADDAM HUSSEIN, IN WHICH ACCORDING TO
KAUNDA, SADDAM HUSSEIN TOOK ESSENTIALLY THE SAME LINE
THAT HE TOOK IN HIS MEETING WITH KAUNDA (TEXT OF
SADDAM HUSSEIN'S JANUARY 5 CONVERSATION WITH THE
FOREIGN ENVOY CONTAINED IN SEPTTEL).

3. TIMES OF ZAMBIA JANUARY 14 SUMMARIZED KAUNDA'S

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2010-0716-MR

mm 9/28/2015

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF HIS TRIP. KK REPORTEDLY SAID ON THE AIRCRAFT RETURNING FROM BAGHDAD THAT HE SUPPORTED THE INITIATIVES BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR: THAT HE WISHED THE UNSYG HAD MOVED IN EARLIER INSTEAD OF LEAVING MATTERS IN THE HANDS OF THE US SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER: THAT THE MATTER SHOULD HAVE BEEN HANDLED FROM THE START BY THE UN RATHER THAN BY THE US: THAT HE HOPED TO APPROACH PRESIDENT BUSH SOON AND THAT NO ONE SHOULD APPORTION BLAME TO ANYONE.

4. KAUNDA CALLED IN UK HIGH COMMISSION AS WELL TO CONVEY A COPY OF THE SAME MEMCON BETWEEN SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE UNNAMED "FOREIGN ENVOY" AND TO PASS A LETTER FROM KK TO PM MAJOR ON HIS TRIP TO BAGHDAD. THE UK HIGH COMMISSION TOLD US THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SEVERAL HOUR DISCOURSE TO KK ON THE GULF SEEMED TO HAVE HAD SOME IMPACT ON KK'S THINKING.

5. KAUNDA HAS NOT YET CALLED THE PRESS CONFERENCE THAT HIS AIDES HINTED HE MIGHT HOLD ON JANUARY 14 TO DISCUSS HIS VISIT. WE CAN ONLY HOPE THAT HE WILL NOT COMPOUND THE STUPIDITY OF THE VISIT AND THE UNHELPFUL PUBLIC COMMENTS HE HAS ALREADY MADE WITH FURTHER THEATRICS. POST PLANS IN NEXT SEVERAL DAYS TO REINFORCE THE MESSAGE CARRIED BY A/S COHEN BEFORE KK

LEFT FOR BAGHDAD (STATE 6775) BY MAKING CLEAR THAT HIS VISIT HAS CAUSED CONCERN IN WASHINGTON AND THAT HIS SUBSEQUENT COMMENTS ARE NOT HELPFUL TO OUR ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE GULF CRISIS.

-

6. TEXT OF KAUNDA LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH FOLLOWS (ORIGINAL POUCHED TO AF/S):

QUOTE.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THE GULF CRISIS

A FEW DAYS AGO YOU WERE KIND ENOUGH AS USUAL TO SEND ASSISTANT SECRETARY COHEN TO COME AND SEE ME. I TOOK

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN TO HIM THE THOUGHTS OF MY COLLEAGUES. THE PRESIDENTS OF ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE ON INTERNAL SITUATIONS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. I HOPE THAT HE FOUND THOSE EXCHANGES FRUITFUL AND THAT THEY WILL BE OF USE AS YOU WORK TO HELP US FIND SOLUTIONS TO OUR REGIONAL PROBLEMS OF CONFLICT. APART FROM THESE EXCHANGES OF VIEWS, I HINTED TO HIM THAT I WOULD BE VISITING BAGHDAD TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS LETTER IS TO GIVE YOU MY OWN IMPRESSION OF THE SITUATION AS I FIND IT. I BELIEVE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT ONLY YOU CAN HELP US AVOID AN EXPLOSION OF IMMENSE PROPORTIONS. BUT I ALSO BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE YOUR COUNTRY - THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - HAS BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED NATIONS THROUGH YOUR GOOD SELF AND YOUR SECRETARY OF STATE, JAMES BAKER, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE INITIATIVE I AM GOING TO DISCUSS COMES FROM OTHER WESTERN LEADERS. I HAVE, THEREFORE, BT

#0165

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 LUSAKA 00165
LONDON FOR MCKINLEY

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR

TAGS: ZA, IZ, PREL

SUBJECT: KAUNDA LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH ON HIS VISIT
DISPATCHED TWO OF MY COLLEAGUES, MY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND MY SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, TO PARIS, BONN AND ROME. THE IDEA I AM TALKING ABOUT IS THAT WE MUST FIND, THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, AN ARAB SOLUTION.

IT IS WITH THIS IN MIND THAT I AM EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, WILL FIND A WAY OF SUPPORTING THE IDEA BEING DISCUSSED IN EUROPEAN CAPITALS OF HOLDING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

THIS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. IF AGREED. SHOULD LEAD TO AN ARAB SUMMIT AND HOPEFULLY AND PRAYERFULLY TO AN ARAB SOLUTION. IF I MAY GO INTO A LITTLE MORE DETAIL. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT FOR THE SLIGHTEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS. WE ENCOURAGE BOTH IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA TO BEGIN SOME QUIET DISCUSSIONS AROUND WHICH BROADER PARTICIPATION CAN BE BUILT.

FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, I ATTACH TO THIS LETTER A COPY OF MINUTES OF A DISCUSSION WHICH TOOK PLACE BETWEEN A FOREIGN ENVOY AND PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN ON JANUARY 5, 1991. WHICH IS A SUPPLEMENT TO OUR TALKS HELD OVER THREE MEETINGS TOTALLING ABOUT SEVEN HOURS. I

THOUGHT YOUR EXCELLENCY MAY WISH TO KNOW ABOUT THIS. MAY GOD, OUR CREATOR, CONTINUE TO GUIDE YOU IN ALL THAT YOU THINK, SAY AND DO AS YOU SERVE THE GREAT AMERICAN PEOPLE AND INDEED MAN BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

YOURS IN OUR COMMON STRUGGLE,

KENNETH D. KAUNDA

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

END QUOTE.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRES NOTED 141556Z JAN 91

PAGE 01 OF 05

PRT GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SITTMANN VANERON
SIT: BASORA RICE DEAL FILE GOMPERT HUTCHINGS PRES MSGS SIT VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~> <DTG> 141556Z JAN 91

FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9970
RUEATRS/DEPTREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 3667
RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8370
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0656
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0828
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 8460
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0560
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 7615

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 00696

DEPT ALSO FOR C/ZOELICK AND D/BARRY/JUSTER
AND E/MJSEIBER
TREASURY FOR MULFORD/DALLARA
WHITE HOUSE ALSO FOR CEA/BOSKIN AND NSC/BASORA
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
BRUSSELS FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR

TAGS: EFIN, EAID, PL

SUBJECT: POLAND: LETTER ON DEBT REDUCTION FROM
- PRESIDENT WALESA TO PRESIDENT BUSH

(C) 1. MFA DEPUTY MINISTER KRZYMSKI CALLED IN
G-7 AMBASSADORS ON THE AFTERNOON ON JANUARY 14 TO
DELIVER A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT WALESA TO EACH
OF HIS G-7 COUNTERPARTS REQUESTING A PERSONAL
COMMITMENT TO HELPING FIND A PERMANENT SOLUTION
TO POLAND'S FOREIGN DEBT PROBLEM. TEXT OF LETTER
TO PRESIDENT BUSH FOLLOWS IN PARA 3. LETTER

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2012-0299-MR

MM 4/6/2015

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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EMPHASIZES DEMOCRATIC REFORMS AND UNPRECEDENTED TRANSITION TO A MODERN MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY. EXPRESSING THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION TO ACCELERATE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, IT CITES FOREIGN DEBT AS A MAJOR THREAT TO POLISH EFFORTS. IT SPEAKS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY UNDERSTANDING AND SACRIFICE OF THE NATION AND POINTS TO THE PROSPECT OF UNENDING DIFFICULTIES IN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, MOBILIZING DOMESTIC CAPITAL, ENCOURAGING FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND PRIVATIZATION. IT REFERS TO THE AGGRAVATION OF THE OTHERWISE DIFFICULT SITUATION BY THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT AND ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UPCOMING CHALLENGES OF A PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION AND DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION. THE LETTER TALKS OF DEBT REDUCTION AS AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY.

(S) 2. FOLLOWING KRZYMSKI'S REMARKS, DEPUTY FINANCE MINISTER AND CHIEF DEBT NEGOTIATOR SAWICKI ANNOUNCED AN INITIATIVE TO VISIT ALL G-7 CAPITALS SHORTLY ON BEHALF OF PRIME MINISTER BIELECKI TO FOLLOW THROUGH. DEPENDING ON LOGISTICS, HE PLANS TO START IN BONN AS EARLY AS WEDNESDAY,

JANUARY 16 AND THEN PROCEED TO PARIS, ROME, LONDON, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA AND TOKYO. HE EXPECTS TO BE IN WASHINGTON LATE IN THE WEEK OF JANUARY 21; HE TOLD US POLISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON IS WORKING ON AN APPOINTMENT REQUEST WITH TREASURY UNDER SECRETARY MULFORD. SAWICKI DISTRIBUTED A WHITE PAPER WHICH WILL BE TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY. UNLIKE THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, THE WHITE PAPER SPECIFICALLY REFERS TO THE GOP'S LONGSTANDING CONTENTION THAT 80 PERCENT DEBT REDUCTION ACHIEVED BY LOWERING INTEREST PAYMENTS TO TWO PERCENT OF CURRENT VALUE OF DEBT STOCK IS NEEDED.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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(LOU) 3. BEGIN FOREIGN MINISTRY TRANSLATION OF TEXT
OF LETTER:

WARSAW. JANUARY 11, 1991

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THE LONG AND ARDUOUS PATH OF POLISH DEMOCRATIC
REFORMS HAS NOW BROUGHT US CLOSE TO OUR GOAL. WE
HAVE ALSO BECOME INVOLVED IN AN UNPRECEDENTED
TRANSITION FROM A COMMUNIST TO MODERN MARKET-ORIENTED
ECONOMY. THESE TWO OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN ADOPTED SO
THAT POLAND MAY RETURN TO EUROPE AS A STABLE AND
RELIABLE PARTNER. SUCCESS IS NOT YET ASSURED,
HOWEVER, AND WILL DEPEND ON MORE THAN JUST OUR OWN
PERSEVERANCE AND PATIENCE. A MAJOR THREAT TO OUR
EFFORTS IS THE OVERWHELMING BURDEN OF EXTERNAL DEBT.
IN THIS PREDICAMENT, SIR, I TAKE THE LIBERTY OF
DIRECTLY REQUESTING YOUR ASSISTANCE IN OUR EFFORTS TO
OVERCOME THAT PROBLEM.

FIRST, LET ME EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION OF YOUR
CONTRIBUTION IN FOSTERING GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE RESURRECTING POLAND.

I THINK WITH PRIDE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY DEGREE OF
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 WARSAW 00696

DEPT ALSO FOR C/ZOELLICK AND D/BARRY/JUSTER

AND E/MJSEIBER

TREASURY FOR MULFORD/DALLARA

WHITE HOUSE ALSO FOR CEA/BOSKIN AND NSC/BASORA

PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR

TAGS: EFIN, EAID, PL

SUBJECT: POLAND: LETTER ON DEBT REDUCTION FROM

UNDERSTANDING AND SACRIFICE ON THE PART OF THE

NATION, WHICH HAS BEEN PAYING AN EXTREMELY HIGH PRICE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FOR THE DEBTS INCURRED BY RULERS IMPOSED ON US BY FORCE IN THE PAST. WE POLES ARE NOT TO BLAME FOR THE FACT THAT OUR ECONOMY HAS BEEN REDUCED TO SHAMBLES BY THE ALIEN SYSTEM OF COMMUNISM. YET THE NATION HAS SO FAR RESPONSIBLY ACCEPTED A RADICALLY REDUCED LIVING STANDARDS IN THE COMMON BELIEF THAT THE SEVERE AUSTERITY MUST BE A SALUTARY REMEDY. THE DEBT BURDEN CONFRONTS US WITH THE PROSPECT OF UNENDING DIFFICULTIES IN BALANCING OUR PAYMENTS, POSING A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO THE CREATION OF AN EFFICIENT MARKET ECONOMY WHICH IS OUR GOAL. WITHOUT A MAJOR REDUCTION OF POLAND'S FOREIGN DEBT, MANY OF THE

ACTIONS INDISPENSABLE TO BUILD AN ADVANCED MARKET ECONOMY, SUCH AS THE MOBILIZATION OF DOMESTIC CAPITAL, THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN POLAND, OR THE PRIVATIZATION OF INDUSTRY, MAY PROVE IMPRACTICABLE.

I AM DETERMINED TO DEVOTE MY TERM AS PRESIDENT TO ACCELERATION OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE. ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT, THE OTHERWISE DIFFICULT SITUATION HAS AGGRAVATED FURTHER IN THE WAKE OF THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT AND THE ECONOMIC COLLAPSE IN THE SOVIET UNION. POLITICALLY, WE ARE FACING THE CHALLENGES OF A PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION AND OF DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION. WE BELIEVE THAT DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS IN POLAND IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE WEST. POLAND CAN AND DESIRES TO JOIN THE FAMILY OF STABLE DEMOCRACIES, BUT THAT WILL REQUIRE THE COOPERATION OF THE FREE WORLD. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EASING NOW THE BURDEN OF OUR FOREIGN DEBT MAY BE HISTORIC.

PERMIT ME TO ONCE AGAIN THANK YOU FOR YOUR INTEREST AND ASSISTANCE TO POLAND IN THIS DIFFICULT TIME AND EXPRESS MY HOPE FOR YOUR PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO HELPING IN THE FINDING OF A PERMANENT SOLUTION TO

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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POLAND'S FOREIGN DEBT PROBLEM.

SINCERELY YOURS. /S/ END TEXT. SIMONS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-0312-MR
MM 1/20/2015

PAGE 01 OF 02

PR: VANERON

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~ DTG 081851Z JAN 91

FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9722

~~SECRET~~ WARSAW 00360

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR

TAGS: ETTT PREL, OFDP, PL, IZ

SUBJECT: TFKU01: POLAND SUPPORTS THE PRESIDENT:

- PRESIDENT WALESA'S LETTER

REF: WARSAW 308

1. ~~SECRET~~ NODIS - ENTIRE TEXT. ACTION REQUEST-PARA 6.

>BEGIN SUMMARY>

2. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: POLISH PRESIDENT LECH WALESA HAS WRITTEN TO PRESIDENT BUSH TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE U. S. EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE GULF CRISIS AND, IF NECESSARY, TO ENFORCE THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS TO FREE KUWAIT. WALESA, SPEAKING AS PRESIDENT OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC AND AS A NOBEL PEACE PRIZE LAUREATE, STATES THAT POLAND STANDS IN SOLIDARITY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IN THE GULF. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

END SUMMARY>

3. POLISH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER JAN MAJEWSKI CALLED DCM IN AT COB ON JANUARY 8 TO DELIVER THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT LECH WALESA TO PRESIDENT BUSH REGARDING THE GULF CRISIS. IN DELIVERING THE LETTER, MAJEWSKI SAID THAT IT WAS THE RESULT OF EXTENSIVE DELIBERATIONS OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS, AND THAT HE THOUGHT THE U. S. WOULD FIND THE RESULT "HIGHLY SATISFACTORY." AT ONE POINT, PRESIDENT WALESA WAS CONSIDERING A SEPARATE INITIATIVE, DRAWING ON HIS MORAL STATURE AS A NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER. BUT AFTER DUE DELIBERATION, WALESA HAD AGREED TO ENDORSE THE APPROACH BEING PURSUED BY PRESIDENT BUSH, SECRETARY BAKER, THE UNSC AND OTHERS. THIS WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICY LINE POLAND HAD FOLLOWED FROM THE FIRST MOMENT OF IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT.

4. AFTER HANDING OVER THE LETTER, MAJEWSKI ALSO GAVE DCM THE TEXT OF A PRESS STATEMENT WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE RELEASED ON THE MORNING OF JANUARY 9 (WARSAW TIME). HE WANTED TO BE CERTAIN THAT WALESA'S MESSAGE REACHED PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY BAKER BEFORE THE PRESS REPORTED THE LETTER.

5. THE TEXTS OF BOTH ITEMS (THE LETTER AND THE PRESS RELEASE) WERE PROVIDED ONLY IN POLISH. THE TRANSLATIONS WHICH FOLLOW ARE UNOFFICIAL EMBASSY TRANSLATIONS.

BEGIN TEXT.

WARSAW, JANUARY 8, 1991

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

MR. GEORGE BUSH

THE WORLD LOOKS WITH GREAT CONCERN ON THE CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF. THE HOUR IS COMING FOR A FINAL DECISION: WAR OR PEACE.

AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT, I WISH TO INFORM YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THE POLAND FULLY SUPPORTS -- AND NOT ONLY IN WORDS -- THE U. N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS DEMANDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT AND THE RETURN OF INDEPENDENCE TO KUWAIT, PROFOUNDLY ACKNOWLEDGES THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND YOURSELF AIMED AT

~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT AND EXPRESSES ITS DEEP HOPE THAT THESE EFFORTS WILL BE CROWNED WITH SUCCESS. POLAND WILL SUPPORT MULTINATIONAL EFFORTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION AIMED AT RESTORING RESPECT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER. POLAND EXPRESSLY STANDS IN SOLIDARITY WITH THIS INTERNATIONAL EFFORT.

I ALSO EXPRESS THESE WORDS AS A NOBEL PEACE PRIZE LAUREATE. I AND MY COUNTRYMEN FERVENTLY WISH THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS INITIATED BY THE UNITED STATES OFFERING A FINAL CHANCE WILL BRING THE DESIRED RESULTS. WHILE DEMONSTRATING TO IRAQ THE MAGNITUDE OF RESPONSIBILITY RESTING UPON IT FOR THE CHOICE BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR.

MS. LECH WALESA

END TEXT.

BEGIN TEXT OF PRESS STATEMENT:

-- IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORSENING CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND CURRENT EFFORTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND LECH WALESA HAS SENT A LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES GEORGE BUSH. POLAND ATTACHES GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO THE INITIATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THIS REGARD. POLAND ADHERES TO THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLETE RESPECT FOR AND EXECUTION OF RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING THIS CRISIS.

END TEXT.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS THIS MESSAGE VIA NIACT IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE TO THE WHITE HOUSE AND TO THE SECRETARY'S PARTY

SIMONS

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02g. Cable	Re: Letter from Prime Minister Sharif to President Bush on the Gulf Crisis (3 pp.)	1/15/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Date Closed:	7/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91150-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02h. Letter	Chancellor Kohl to President Bush Re: Translation (2 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Date Closed:	7/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91150-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02i. Letter	Chancellor Kohl to President Bush Re: [German] (2 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Date Closed:	7/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91150-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0217

January 17, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN 
FROM: GEORGE VAN ERON 
SUBJECT: Heads of State Correspondence Summary
as of January 17

Attached at Tab I is a summary of the Heads of State correspondence received by the Secretariat since Wednesday, January 9.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached summary to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

Attachments

Tab I	Summary for the President	
Tab A	Pope John Paul II	- Vatican City
Tab B	President Kaunda	- Zambia
Tab C	President Walesa	- Poland
Tab D	PM Sharif	- Pakistan
Tab E	Chancellor Kohl	- Germany

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100816
RECEIVED: 01 FEB 91 09

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE



FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 05 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS
HAITI

ITALY

PERSONS: ANDREOTTI, GIULIO

TROUILLOT, ERTHA PASCAL

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY AS OF 1 FEB

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 05 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON

LOGREF: 9100755 9100763

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
VAN ERON

P/s copy only:
Andreotti: 1/2

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
2-5-91

0816

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

**Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy as President of the EC
January 2, 1991 (Received January 30)**

✓ PM Andreotti shares your view on improving relations with the USSR. As a preliminary measure, the EC provided emergency food and medical assistance to the Soviet Union. Its longer term goal is to gradually include the USSR in the world economy, an aim which is currently hindered by the EBRD statute that deals with loans to the USSR. He hopes that you will support an initiative in EBRD that overcomes this impediment.

**President Trouillot of Haiti - December 28, 1990
(Received January 31)**

✓ President Trouillot appreciates your support for Haiti's struggle towards democracy. She also invites you to attend the inauguration of the new government on February 7.

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0717-MR
MM 6/12/2015

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075

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 134171
BL/AO
Italian

The Prime Minister
of the Republic of Italy

Rome, January 2, 1991

Dear George:

Thank you for your gracious letter of December 21, in which you gave me some evaluations of the economic relations with the USSR, also in reference to the report of the International Financial Institutions.

I am pleased to note that the decisions and policies adopted by the Council of Europe on December 14 and 15 with regard to relations with the USSR are basically in harmony with the attitude of the United States.

As I remarked in my letter to you of December 15, right after the conclusion of the Rome Meeting, the European Community, too, decided to aid the USSR to face its most urgent food and medical supply needs. At the same time, a technical assistance program was launched, to be carried out over the next two years through specific projects in the sectors of public and private management, financial services, energy, transport and distribution of foostuffs.

H.E. Mr. George Bush
President of the
United States of America

The projects which will be carried out within the framework of the above-mentioned technical assistance program are aimed first and foremost at helping the USSR to mobilize its own resources. These are also the objectives of the more long-term forms of cooperation in some sectors of common interest which seem fundamental to the development of the Soviet economy, such as energy, telecommunications, transport, and food industry, for which the Council has requested the Commission to suggest the most suitable instruments and context.

Regarding the longer-term outlook, also the Twelve have been concerned with the gradual inclusion of the USSR in the world economy, and to that end are offering, like the United States, to facilitate the development of relations with the International Financial Institutions, and in particular with the Monetary Fund, relations which must constitute the principal framework of macro-economic assistance. By the same token, the Community hopes that the present limits imposed by the Statute of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development regarding loans to the USSR will be overcome.

I hope that the principal members of the EBRD which are not members of the EC, and among them especially the United States, will also support this initiative.

At a time in which the difficulties for the present Soviet leadership are multiplying, the Community, through the decisions and the policies adopted in Rome, also wanted to express its support to this leadership on its path toward

reforms. This message, I am pleased to note, is being considerably reinforced by the substantive accordance with the attitude adopted by the U.S. Administration vis-a-vis the USSR.

I avail myself of the occasion to send you my best wishes for the New Year.

s. Giulio Andreotti



*Al Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

2.

I progetti che verranno attuati nell'ambito del suddetto programma di assistenza tecnica mireranno soprattutto ad aiutare l'URSS a mobilitare le proprie risorse. Allo stesso obiettivo saranno dirette le forme di cooperazione a più lungo termine in alcuni settori di interesse comune che appaiono fondamentali per lo sviluppo dell'economia sovietica, come l'energia, le telecomunicazioni, i trasporti e l'industria alimentare, per le quali il Consiglio ha invitato la Commissione a proporre gli strumenti ed il contesto più adatti.

Sempre in una prospettiva a più lungo termine, anche i Dodici si sono preoccupati del graduale inserimento dell'URSS nell'economia mondiale ed a tale fine si propongono, come gli Stati Uniti, di agevolare lo sviluppo dei rapporti con le Istituzioni Finanziarie Internazionali - ed in particolare con il Fondo Monetario - rapporto che debbono costituire il principale quadro dell'assistenza macroeconomica. Nella stessa prospettiva, la Comunità auspica un superamento dei limiti attualmente imposti dallo Statuto della Banca Europea per la Ricostruzione e lo Sviluppo sui prestiti all'URSS.

Mi auguro che anche i principali membri non comunitari della istituenda BERS, e fra essi in particolare gli Stati Uniti vorranno associarsi a questa iniziativa.

In un momento in cui le difficoltà per l'attuale dirigenza sovietica si stanno moltiplicando, con le decisioni e gli orientamenti adottati a Roma la Comunità ha voluto anche esprimere il proprio sostegno per tale dirigenza sulla via delle riforme. Un messaggio che - lo constato con grande soddisfazione - risulta notevolmente rafforzato dalla sostanziale coincidenza con l'atteggiamento nei confronti dell'URSS assunto dall'Amministrazione americana.

Colgo l'occasione per inviarti i più cordiali saluti e auguri per il Nuovo Anno.

Giulio Andreotti

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101226
RECEIVED: 19 FEB 91 12

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: FRY
KANTER

DOC DATE: 19 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS
GERMANY

ARMS CONTROL
EUROPE



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: WITHDRAWAL OF W-79 ARTILLERY ROUNDS FM GERMANY

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 22 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FRY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FRY
KANTER
NSC CHRON

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0717-MR
mm 6/12/2015

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 8.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By ~~cap~~ NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

*Wunderbar 8W-14 Artillery Rounds
from Germany*

PROOFED BY: DAD

LOG # 1226

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 27 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>[Signature]</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>HM 3/28</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
<i>Fry</i>	<u>6</u>	_____	_____

31 FEB 20 A 9.15

☐ A = Action
 ☒ I = Information
 ☐ D = Dispatch
 ☐ R = Retain
 ☐ N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Memo	Mike Fry to Brent Scowcroft Re: Germany (1 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Date Closed:	7/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91150-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101281
RECEIVED: 21 FEB 91 09

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SITTMANN
VAN ERON

DOC DATE: 22 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: HS
MEXICO

AUSTRALIA

PERSONS: HAWKE, ROBERT

SALINAS, CARLOS

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY AS OF 22 FEB

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 26 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON

LOGREF: 9101277 9101285

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NSC CHRON

VAN ERON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSJEB

DOC 1 OF 1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9101281

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91022215 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
X 91022815 NOTED BY PRES

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 7/15/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
2-28-91

1281

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

**Prime Minister Hawke of Australia - February 20, 1991
(Received February 21)**

PM Hawke acknowledges your letter regarding the Soviet peace proposal. He recognizes the difficulty in securing a genuine peace proposal, not one that Iraq will exploit. However, he is confident that your decisions will be guided by the shared war aims of the coalition governments.

**President Salinas of Mexico - January 22, 1991
(Received January 21)**

President Salinas acknowledges your January 3 letter concerning Mexican-Panamanian relations. Mexico maintains its representation in Panama at the level of Charge d'Affaires and hopes that the necessary conditions for full normalization of relations, particularly the right to asylum, will be fulfilled. He agrees that it is of mutual interest for Panama to participate in the process of consolidating democracy and development. Therefore, Mexico will continue to closely monitor the situation.

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0717-mr
mm 6/12/2015

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Letter	Prime Minister Hawke to President Bush Re: [Soviet proposals] (1 pp.)	2/20/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Date Closed: 7/15/2009	OA/ID Number: 91150-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05c. Letter	President Carlos Salinas de Gortari to President Bush Re: Department of State Translation (2 pp.)	1/22/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Date Closed:	7/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91150-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05d. Letter	President Carlos Salinas de Gortari to President Bush Re: Spanish (2 pp.)	1/22/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Date Closed:	7/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91150-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

1281

February 22, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: GEORGE VAN ERON *mvj*

SUBJECT: Heads of State Correspondence Summary
as of February 22

Attached at Tab I is a summary of the Heads of State
correspondence received by the Secretariat since Wednesday,
February 20.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached summary to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments .

Tab I Summary for the President
Tab A PM Hawke - Australia
Tab B President Salinas - Mexico

cc: Carnes Lord

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101362
RECEIVED: 25 FEB 91 14

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 24 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EUROPE
EC

NATO



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CRACKS IN EUROPEAN PILLER

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 28 FEB 91 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: GOMPERT LOGREF:
FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPERT
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

Cracks in the European Pillar

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: DAD

LOG # 1362

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG AC A/O _____

Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
NSC Secretariat

91 FEB 26 AM 1:16

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

1

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8

4

APNSA Has Seen

3/18

A

5

6

N/R

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
February 25, 1991

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

1362

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID C. GOMPERT *DCG*
SUBJECT: Cracks in the European Pillar

Good memo
D

Overview

Even as our European allies are pulling with us in the Gulf, some of them are pushing for adoption of a European security institution separate from NATO but with overlapping and potentially competing responsibilities. At French initiative, but with German compliance and a touch of British ambivalence, the WEU is being positioned as the security arm of the EC, with prospective military missions in regions contiguous to the NATO Treaty area (e.g., Eastern Europe and the Med/Maghreb).

This drift threatens to deviate from our conception of the WEU as a complement to NATO, focused on meeting out-of-area security challenges through NATO-WEU coordination. After months of patiently cautioning the allies that the European pillar must be organically tied to the Alliance, we (NSC, State, DoD) concluded that a more pointed U.S. message was necessary lest they assume we were, as one European put it, "relaxed." This more assertive American stance, coupled with serious division in the WEU and in the EC, appears to have slowed the rush toward an EC-based European pillar, but evoked a sharply negative French reaction, including from Admiral Lanxade.

Continued Quest for European Political Union

Logic would suggest that the combination of Moscow's shift to the right and the display of American power in the Gulf would lead the allies to conclude: first, that NATO and the U.S. role in Europe have renewed importance; and second, that Europeans must build up their own capacity to protect vital interests in other regions. But the impulse to press on with European union -- strongly felt in Paris, Bonn, Rome, and elsewhere -- has produced an alternative "logic," especially among the Eurocrats:

- The spotty European performance in the Gulf crisis is cited by the "unionists" as proof that new steps are needed to institutionalize common European foreign and security policies. The difficulty of forging common policies in practice only fuels the urge to do so by declaration.

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PER E.O. 13526

2000-0233-F/3
3/14/2011 MM

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- The earlier British-led proposal to strengthen the WEU's ties to NATO has been met by pressures to subordinate it to the EC.
- The earlier French willingness to concentrate the WEU on out-of-area roles -- thus usefully complementing NATO's mission -- has been blunted by Bonn's aversion to participate in such a role (except under a UN fiat).
- As a result, the WEU is groping for a distinctive mission. Since, as mentioned above, the out-of-area focus seems increasingly problematical, the French now raise the possibility of an independent WEU role in Eastern Europe. Unless we agree to confine NATO to the narrow role of insurance protection against a resurgent Soviet threat, such WEU responsibility in Europe will cut into, compete with, and confuse NATO's purposes.

Positions of the Key Allies

Having tantalized their allies with the possibility of re-joining NATO's military structure, the French of late have offered nothing more on this score and are now promoting: (a) the idea of a looser NATO structure; and (b) the option of a WEU command -- essentially accountable to the EC -- that might act instead of NATO to defend allied interests in or around Europe (e.g. in Eastern Europe or against threats from the Maghreb). It appears that the French have found the Germans and others so accommodating on the proposition of a European pillar separate from NATO that they no longer feel they need to offer their own re-integration into NATO as a quid pro quo.

The British have tried to anchor the WEU in NATO, but have shown too much flexibility in an effort to entice the French to return to NATO's military structure. We suspect them of being accommodating on this issue to offset their go-slow stance on the other major track of European integration: monetary union.

The Germans have been all too agreeable to French proposals out of a political motive to build European union upon a Franco-German foundation. Oddly, they seem to believe that by simply asserting their fidelity to NATO and their desire to keep us in Europe, they can agree to French positions on a separate European security entity without harming the Alliance. Whether the Germans will be equally malleable when the discussion turns to vital details is an open, and critical, question.

The U.S. Position and Next Steps

The British tell us that movement toward a European pillar is inexorable; all we can do is try to shape it. We fundamentally share this assessment.

We have told all the allies -- some of the small ones are least enamored with an EC security institution -- what we would not

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3

welcome: direct subordination of the WEU to the EC; a WEU defense structure with missions that overlap with NATO's; and a weakening of NATO's command structure. At the same time, we have reiterated our support for a sensibly designed WEU-based European pillar with missions that complement NATO's.

Having applied the brakes, we need now to decide where and how to steer the debate. Despite our enhanced leverage because of developments in the USSR and the Gulf, we cannot quash European security cooperation; the process of European political integration, however bumpy, has an underlying momentum which the U.S. cannot and should not try to arrest. But we will have to decide how flexible, how insistent, and how prescriptive we should be.

Clearly, we must be more assertive with the Germans, whom we have allowed the French to seduce. At the end of the day, whatever Washington and Bonn can agree on will likely prevail. But the Germans must be persuaded to adopt a more hard-headed, less romantic view of the French and steel themselves against French threats to withdraw their forces from Germany if Bonn does not follow their lead.

As for the French, it is not yet time to surrender all hope that Mitterrand and Lanxade have the agility and the will to bring France back into NATO's military structure in conjunction with a new WEU and adaptations in the Alliance. Yet my own exchanges with Lanxade have left me increasingly pessimistic and the Quai openly favors maximizing independence from the U.S. of the European security institution. The President's meeting with Mitterrand in late March (or early April) will be decisive for gauging what is possible.

We will ask Bob to call together his European Strategy Steering Group in March to consider:

- An integrated U.S. view of how the European pillar can strengthen and complement the Alliance.
- A strategy for dealing with the main European actors (Bonn, London, Paris), including whether to try to coopt or to isolate the French.
- An operational consultative plan, e.g., interagency bilaterals with the principal allies, followed by reinforced Quad talks, culminating in NATO deliberations leading up to a June Ministerial and a Fall Summit on the future of the Alliance.

cc: Arnold Kant 

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~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101558
RECEIVED: 04 MAR 91 11

CHRON FILE



TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 04 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ARGENTINA
TELCALL
SP

CUBA
HUMAN RIGHTS

PERSONS: MENEM, CARLOS

SUBJECT: TELCALL TO PRES CARLOS MENEM OF ARGENTINA ON 4 MAR / SP

ACTION: STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 07 MAR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PACELLI

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAE NARA, Date 7/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: QEB LOG # 1558
URGENT NOT PROOFED: ✓ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: DOCLOG ✓ A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>OBZ/OMK</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP ✓ Sununu Other

Should be seen by: (Date/Time)

COMMENTS Ev son has distribute
Phone Call to Pres Menem,
Argentina
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
President can take call
at 4 P.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1558

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3-4
91 MAR -4 PM 3:25

March 4, 1991

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Carlos Menem
of Argentina

DATE: March 4, 1991

PURPOSE: To urge President Menem to support
appointment of a Special Rapporteur on
Cuban human rights.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line Call

INTERPRETER: Interpreter required; President Menem
does not speak English but understands
it.

PHONE NUMBER: 54-1-331-7931

CONTACT PERSON: Andrew Sens, Department of State
647-2407

TIME DIFFERENCE: +2

SUGGESTED TIMES: 4:00 p.m., EST

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Urge Argentine support for U.S.
position on Cuban human rights.
2. Again thank President Menem for his
support of Operation Desert Storm.

Date of Submission:

Action:

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

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Declassify on: OADR

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2001- 2588-F/1
9/7/2012 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CARLOS MENEM OF ARGENTINA

Human Rights in Cuba

- I know that Vice President Quayle was unable to reach you over the weekend. What we wanted to discuss with you is our position on UN monitoring of the human rights situation in Cuba.
- I certainly appreciate the close consultations our delegations are maintaining at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva on this issue.
- The United States and a number of other countries have submitted a resolution asking for the appointment of a special rapporteur to review Cuban human rights. This resolution is now cosponsored by 17 countries.
- We had originally proposed formation of a new Working Group to go back to Cuba, but we compromised after a number of delegations told us they favored a Special Rapporteur.
- I understand your position is that the rapporteur should make a private visit and issue a report that is not made public.
- We think it is very important that this be a public process to call attention to the dismal human rights situation in Cuba and to put Castro on notice that the whole world is watching.
- Our proposal is not in any way an indication of dissatisfaction with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, and I believe he knows that. We simply feel that a special expert will be able to give specific attention to Cuba.

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2001-2588-F/1
9/7/2012 MM

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2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- I believe that use of confidential procedures for an investigation and report will be viewed by all, including Castro, as a retreat by the world community.
- I hope that we can have your support for a tougher, public process. The people of Cuba deserve it.

Persian Gulf

- Let me again tell you how pleased I was with Argentina's decision to send naval vessels to participate in the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1558

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 4, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. PRYCE *WTP*
FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI/NANCY BEARG DYKE *DAP* *NB*
SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Schedule Proposal for
President Menem of Argentina, Regarding Cuban
Human Rights

Attached at Tab I is your Telephone Schedule Proposal memorandum to the President to return a call from Argentine President Menem. The Vice President was unable to reach Menem over the weekend.

We support a proposal at the UNHRC discussions in Geneva for appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Cuba who would visit Cuba and issue a public report. This morning, Argentine Foreign Minister Di Tella called to explain why Argentina is supporting an alternative, and softer, Rio Group proposal.

The Argentines support having a rapporteur appointed under UN General Assembly Resolution 1503 procedures. This is a private proceeding in which a rapporteur makes a nonpublicized visit to Cuba and issues a report to the UNHRC which is not made public. Di Tella said that this would be a vehicle by which the Latins all agree that Cuba is a serious abuser of human rights. Next year, Di Tella said, Argentina could work out a compromise with the United States between Argentina's preference that the UN Secretary General continue to monitor the situation, and the U.S. proposal for a (public) special rapporteur. Di Tella's statement telegraphs that Argentina's two-step approach will not be tough on Castro, and it is unacceptable to us.

The Vice President did get through to Venezuelan President Perez on the weekend to explain our position. Perez, however, was noncommittal, promising only to discuss the subject with his Foreign Minister.

The points to be made at Tab A emphasize the President's support for a tough stance.

DAP
Concurrence by: Richard Haass

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2001-2588-F/1
9/7/2012 MM

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2

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal to the President at
Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101687
RECEIVED: 06 MAR 91 21

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: ZELIKOW
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 06 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

AP

PERSONS: THATCHER, MARGARET

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR PRES MTG W/ THATCHER ON 7 MAR

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 09 MAR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GANTT

GOMPERT

NSC CHRON

ZELIKOW

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres' Mtg w/ Thatcher Mar 7, 445 pm

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WJH

LOG # 1687

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG WJH A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>WJH</u> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>copy</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>24.3/11</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N/R</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

President's Mtg w/ Margaret Thatcher.

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

E4 Sec's Office has dispatched

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1687

March 6, 1991

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT *PZ In DB*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Mrs. Margaret
Thatcher on Thursday, March 7, at 4:45 pm

The memorandum for the subject meeting is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign forward the Memorandum to the President attached at
Tab I.

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 7/15/09

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B List of Participants
Tab C Biography (updated)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH
MARGARET THATCHER

DATE: March 7, 1991
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 4:45 p.m.-5:15 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. Purpose

To renew your long acquaintance with Margaret Thatcher and gain her perspective on the future of the ideals she has championed, and their relationship to your vision of a new world order.

II. Background

The change of leaders in British government is brutally swift, the more so for Margaret Thatcher, suddenly brought down by her own party rather than by the deliberate appeal to the electorate. Mrs. Thatcher has adjusted gradually to the abrupt transition from 18-hour days and the constant public spotlight to being another Member of Parliament, with no paid staff and a modest income. Friends have helped her hire a small staff and find a good residence in central London, but the personal adjustment has been hers alone.

Some bitterness lingers, understandably, from the circumstances of her fall from power. But Mrs. Thatcher has plainly emerged from this winter with renewed enthusiasm for public life. While careful not to criticize her one-time protege and current successor, John Major, she is deciding whether to remain in the House of Commons or accept a peerage and enter the House of Lords. In either spot she will use her stature, and her leadership of the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, to speak out for the ideals that characterized her tenure in power. After seeing you she will be going on to give an important address on the East Coast and go on with a speaking tour across the country.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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2010-0202-MR
09/17/2010 MM

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You will find her quite pleased, naturally enough, about the victory over Iraq. She still has little use for the visionaries of a united Europe or the Eurocrats in Brussels. You might wish to use this meeting to reflect on the future of conservatism, and what the key challenges will be for conservatives in seizing the historic opportunities that have opened for creation of a new world order. Her insights on the Soviet Union, the future of Europe, the Middle East, and Southern Africa are also likely to be as stimulating as ever.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The Participants List is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo and writing pool

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity followed by brief meeting.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	List of Participants
Tab C	Biography (updated)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
MARGARET THATCHER

- It is great to see you at this time, as we share our pride in the victory of the coalition forces over Iraq. I can remember that crucial meeting we had in Aspen at the beginning of the crisis. Those discussions helped shape my thinking for the duration.
- I would like to hear about your plans, in Parliament and with the Margaret Thatcher Foundation.
- You have a tremendous opportunity to help lead the battle of ideas in the post-Cold War era. We will all be challenged to take of this opportunity we now have to create a new world order. What do you think should be the main focus for conservative ideas in the period ahead?
- I would also like to get your sense of developments in Europe, the Soviet Union, the Middle East and southern Africa. That's a short list -- where would you like to start?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 1 OF 2

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
MARGARET THATCHER

- IT IS GREAT TO SEE YOU AT THIS TIME, AS WE SHARE OUR PRIDE IN THE VICTORY OF THE COALITION FORCES OVER IRAQ. I CAN REMEMBER THAT CRUCIAL MEETING WE HAD IN ASPEN AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS. THOSE DISCUSSIONS HELPED SHAPE MY THINKING FOR THE DURATION.
- I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR ABOUT YOUR PLANS, IN PARLIAMENT AND WITH THE MARGARET THATCHER FOUNDATION. YOU HAVE A TREMENDOUS OPPORTUNITY TO HELP LEAD THE BATTLE OF IDEAS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA. WE WILL ALL BE CHALLENGED TO TAKE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY WE NOW HAVE TO CREATE A NEW WORLD ORDER. WHAT DO YOU THINK SHOULD BE THE MAIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0202-MR
9/17/2010 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

List of Participants

U.S.

The President

John Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National
Security Affairs

Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)

U.K.

Margaret Thatcher, Member of Parliament

Sir Denis Thatcher

Sir Antony Acland, Ambassador to the United States

Andrew Bearpark, Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08c. Report	Re: Margaret Thatcher [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	3/6/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	℄

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
 By MM (NLGB) on 5/22/2017

Date Closed:	7/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91150-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-0202-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	5/12/2017

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]



(b)(3)

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0202-MR
5/12/2017 MM

Margaret Roberts THATCHER

UNITED KINGDOM

Member of Parliament (since 1959)

Addressed as: Mrs. Thatcher

*How dull it is to pause, to make an end,
To rust unburnish'd, not to shine in use!
As tho' to breathe were life.*

Thatcher quoting Tennyson, January 1991



A dynamic politician who thrived on the rough-and-tumble of international and domestic politics, Margaret Thatcher has kept an uncharacteristically low profile since stepping down as Prime Minister in November 1990. She has been a virtual stranger to the House of Commons: her appearance there on 28 February was only the third since she left office, and there has been rampant speculation that she will leave Parliament at the next election. Thatcher has refused to confirm or deny such rumors, but her pointed suggestion to her constituency members that the Conservative Party needed a matriarchal figure suggests that predictions of her departure from politics are off the mark. So, too, does her willingness to take on the honorary presidency of the No Turning Back Group, an association of rightwing Tory MPs, and the Bruges Group, which is made up of academics and MPs who are opposed to European federalism. (b)(3)

Despite her relatively low profile, Thatcher has clearly signaled her intention of playing a role in international affairs. She has met in the United Kingdom with the Bulgarian President and the Polish Foreign Minister and has made several trips abroad, including a well-publicized visit with former President Reagan in California. According to the British press, she received twice weekly Persian Gulf war briefings from Sir Charles Powell, her former foreign affairs adviser (he presently holds the same post on Prime Minister John Major's staff). Thatcher is reportedly slated to travel to Moscow later in 1991 for meetings with Boris Yel'tsin and President Mikhail Gorbachev, her old sparring partner. Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans has told the press that she has expressed an interest in serving as an intermediary between Gorbachev and the Baltic states. She has also been in touch with French President Francois Mitterrand, who called to wish her a happy new year. Observers have suggested a variety of international roles for the former Prime Minister, including the presidency of the EC Commission and the ambassadorship to the United States. The Thatcher Foundation, her proposed international think tank, has failed to generate sufficient financial interest, however, and its future is in question. (b)(3)

"I Have Changed Everything"

During her nearly 12 years at 10 Downing Street, Thatcher used a combination of grit, determination, and self-confidence to place her stamp on a decade. Her supporters paid tribute to her command of detail, her directness, and her iron will. Her detractors claimed that she was autocratic, inflexible, and narrowminded; the Labor Party's Denis Healey once accused her of practicing "Rottweiler politics." Her isolation on the issues of South African sanctions and German unification, as well as her continued foot-dragging on EC monetary union, prompted many observers to accuse her of failing to keep pace with a changing world. She also demonstrated a singular obliviousness to the depth of public resentment of the gov-

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(cont.)

LDA M 91-10875

ernment's poll tax. The combination, together with mounting criticism of her autocratic governing style, helped trigger the events that led to her resignation. (b)(3)

"I Am A Warrior"

Thatcher has taken Winston Churchill and Abraham Lincoln as models. She once noted that, like her, Lincoln had to fight for what he believed in. "I have to fight every day still," she told an interviewer in 1989, and shortly after leaving office she vowed: "I shall go on fighting for everything I believe in." Observers note that she loves to argue and relishes a debate with someone worthy of her mettle. According to a friend, she especially likes her meetings with Gorbachev because he gives as good as he gets. Press accounts of her impending trip to the Soviet Union have speculated on the possibility of a television debate between the two. (b)(3)

"99.5 Percent Perfect"

"Margaret is 99.5 percent perfect," her father once reportedly said. "The other .5 percent is that she could be a little warmer." A notorious workaholic, she has little patience or talent for relaxation or chitchat. In social settings she gravitates to the company of men and the discussion of business. She has a legendary lack of humor and claims that vacations cause colds and interfere with one's working rhythm. Even during her schooldays, says a childhood chum, she was obsessed with work and politics. During the early 1950s she squeezed part-time legal study into a schedule already filled with work as a research chemist, Tory party duties, and responsibilities as a wife and mother: she passed the bar exam only four months after giving birth to twins Carol and Mark. According to the press, Thatcher sleeps only three to five hours a night; she recently told the press that she is amazed at how little some people seem to do with the 24 hours of a day. (b)(3)

The daughter of the late Alfred Roberts, a greengrocer and local politician, Margaret Roberts was born on 13 October 1925. She was greatly influenced by her father: "I owe just about everything to him," she says. The doting Roberts often took schoolgirl Margaret to university lectures, where he encouraged her to question speakers. By contrast, Thatcher's mother, who died in 1960, was a stolid homebody whom Thatcher rarely mentions. Thatcher's older sister, by far the more popular of the two girls, plays little part in her life. A devout Methodist, Alfred Roberts instilled in his daughter a respect for independence and hard work. Encouraged by him, she secured admission to Oxford and became the first woman to head the Oxford University Conservative Association; she used the post as a springboard to local and national Tory politics. (She says that she once aspired to a career in the civil service in colonial India.) (b)(3)

Thatcher began campaigning for a seat in Parliament in 1950, but it was nine years before she was successful. Two years later, in 1961, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan appointed her joint parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance. In 1964, when the Conservatives were defeated by Labor, she moved into the Tory shadow cabinet, handling gas, coal, electricity, and nuclear energy; then transportation; and finally, education and science issues. When the Conservatives returned to power in 1970, she retained the education and science portfolio—the only woman to serve in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Edward Heath. Heath resigned the prime-ministership in 1974; almost a year later Thatcher deposed him as Tory leader. She was recently made a member of the Order of Merit, one of the highest honors the Queen can bestow. Membership is limited to 24. (b)(3)

Thatcher is married to Denis Thatcher, who was created a baronet in the resignation honors list; although he is now addressed as Sir Denis, Thatcher herself has declined to be referred to as Lady Thatcher. The Thatchers became grandparents in February 1989. (b)(3)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101652
RECEIVED: 06 MAR 91 12

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 07 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: HS
JORDAN
TOGO

AUSTRALIA
URUGUAY

PERSONS: HAWKE, ROBERT
LACALLE, LUIS A

HUSSEIN I
EYADEMA, GNASSINGBE

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY AS OF 6 MAR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 09 MAR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON

LOGREF: 9101605 9101607

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NSC CHRON
VAN ERON

P/s copy only:

/Hussein 3/9

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1652

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

Prime Minister Hawke of Australia - March 5, 1991
(Received March 5)

PM Hawke urges you and Congress to halt the current legislation that increases the ceiling on the Export Enhancement Program (EEP). As a fair trader, he believes Australia should not be subjected to competition from EEP subsidized wheat. From his point of view, Australia is "caught in the crossfire" of a subsidies war between the U.S. and the EC.

This issue is so critical to Australians that a parliamentary, bipartisan delegation has been sent to the U.S. He also urges you to continue supporting the reduction and, ultimately, the elimination of agricultural export subsidies in the Uruguay Round.

King Hussein I of Jordan - March 4, 1991
(Received March 5)

King Hussein forwards a copy of his recent speech regarding the cessation of hostilities in the Gulf. In it he describes his efforts for a peaceful solution and reiterates his "duty to strive to heal wounds and focus on all that is constructive."

President Lacalle of Uruguay - February 26, 1991
(Received March 5)

President Lacalle appreciates the photo of his recent Washington visit.

President Eyadema of Togo - Not Dated
(Received March 6)

President Eyadema extends his condolences to the families of those who died in the plane crash outside of Colorado Springs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0718-MR

MM 11/28/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1605

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT VANERONSIT HAASS CHARLES MONTGOMERY PAVITT ROSTOW WELCH WHSR_IRAQ WORKING
OLEARY PRES_MSGS VAX-----
PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG 050811Z MAR 91

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9816

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 02298

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, JO

SUBJECT: TFKU01: KING SENDS COPIES OF SPEECH TO
PRESIDENT, SECRETARY, OTHER WORLD LEADERS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WE RECEIVED ON MARCH 4 FORM LETTERS FROM THE KING TO PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY BAKER COVERING COPIES OF HIS MARCH 1 SPEECH. AS THEY WERE HANDED TO US, WE GLIMPSED STACKS OF OTHER LETTERS ADDRESSED TO WESTERN LEADERS.
3. THE TEXT, USED FOR BOTH LETTERS. FOLLOWS. WE ARE POUCHING ORIGINALS TO NEA/ARN.

4. TEXT:

"AMMAN

3 MARCH, 1991

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT/DEAR FRIEND (TO THE SECRETARY),
I HOPE THAT YOU WILL KINDLY FORGIVE MY INTRUSION ON
YOUR TIME BY TAKING THE LIBERTY OF SENDING YOU THE
OFFICIAL ENGLISH TEXT OF MY ADDRESS IN ARABIC TO
JORDANIANS, ARABS AND MUSLIMS AT THE END OF
HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF.

FOR A LONG TIME I HAD TRIED TO HELP RESOLVE THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT AMICABLY.
SUBSEQUENTLY, AND DESPITE MY BEST EFFORTS FROM THE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262010-0718-MR
mm 11/28/2016~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

OUTSET TO REVERSE THE TRAGIC PROCESS WHICH BEGAN ON
THE SECOND OF AUGUST 1990. WHEN IRAQ INVADED AND
OCCUPIED KUWAIT. I WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL. I FEEL THAT IT
IS A SACRED DUTY TO STRIVE TO HEAL WOUNDS AND FOCUS ON
ALL THAT IS CONSTRUCTIVE AND MEANINGFUL FOR THE
STABILITY. HARMONY. PEACE AND SECURITY FOR ALL THE
PEOPLE IN THIS REGION AND THE WORLD. I KNOW WE SHARE
THE SAME COMMITMENT TO THESE WORTHY OBJECTIVES.
WITH MY HIGHEST ESTEEM, PRIDE IN OUR FRIENDSHIP AND
WARM WISHES.

YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,
HUSSEIN I." END TEXT.
HARRISON

BT

*2298

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101644
RECEIVED: 05 MAR 91 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE
DOC DATE: 11 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: NATO
FRANCE
CANADA

EC
GREAT BRITAIN
GERMANY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NATO & EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 08 MAR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOMPERT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
KANTER
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

European Pillar

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: hms

LOG # 1644

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 2 A/O _____

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

~~Ken Hill~~

~~Bill Sittmann~~

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

91 MAR 6 P 1. 15

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2

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5

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8

SA-3/1

SA 3/26

A

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
1644

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1991

91 MAR 11 AM 10:09

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: NATO and European Integration

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2000-0233-F/3
3/14/2011 MM

As you engage Europe's leaders in the aftermath of the Gulf War, you will find them anxious to reach an understanding which will provide for both a strong NATO and a common European security policy. These two goals must be reconciled if we are to avoid an independent European defense entity, which could harm the credibility and effectiveness of NATO, reduce our influence in Europe, and weaken domestic support for our European presence.

Since last year's NATO Summit, fears that the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe would raise doubts about the need for NATO have proved exaggerated. Indeed, when the Soviets and their former satellites formally agreed last week to dissolve the Warsaw Pact, NATO was alive and well. The turn of events in the Soviet Union has strengthened our allies' desire to keep us engaged in Europe, militarily and politically. Moreover, NATO proved to be a valuable mechanism for consultation and logistical coordination in support of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. A consensus has emerged that NATO remains indispensable not only as insurance against new dangers from the Soviet Union but also as a transatlantic political forum, a deterrent to non-Soviet threats (especially along Europe's Southern flank) and a source of reassurance to the new democracies of Central Europe.

At the same time, the Europeans, led by France and Germany, appear more determined than ever to achieve progress toward political union. They reason that progress toward a true union requires that they forge common foreign and security policies, as well as common economic policies. Paradoxically, the uneven performance of the Europeans in the Gulf is cited as proof that the EC must formalize common foreign and security policies, rather than as evidence that such common policies will remain elusive. Even though common foreign and security policies -- much less political union -- are years away, the Europeans have built up a head of steam on this issue. They are actively working on institutional blueprints with major implications for the future of the Western security system.

The Europeans are concentrating on a Franco-German idea, partially supported by the UK, to make the nine-nation Western European Union (WEU) the defense arm of the EC-12 (Ireland, Denmark and Greece are in the EC but not the WEU). They assert that this will be accomplished in a way that does not weaken NATO but will rather strengthen it by making the Europeans more responsible and cohesive. While we prefer the WEU over the EC as the focal point for European

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

Security Cooperation -- because of the former's historical ties to NATO -- we are concerned that this approach could:

- appear to compete with NATO as the main forum and guarantor of European security and stability;
- lead to redundant command and force structures -- one for NATO, one for the WEU;
- confront NATO -- specifically, those NATO members who are not in the EC or WEU -- with a rigid European voting bloc, thus impeding decision-making on everything from new weapons systems to arms control to force deployments.

There are potential benefits for us in a properly designed "European pillar." It could help sustain support for European defense spending by making Europeans feel more responsible for their security. It could enable the Europeans to create a capacity to project force "out-of-area" -- a capacity which proved sadly lacking in the Gulf but which could permit a more proportionate European role in future crises (e.g., in North Africa). Finally, it could open the way for the French to participate militarily in NATO.

We have told the Allies our support for a European pillar will require that the WEU:

- be tied to NATO (e.g., co-located headquarters and double-hatted permanent representatives);
- focus on security problems beyond NATO's scope, notably out-of-area threats;
- not act as a voting bloc in NATO;
- not duplicate NATO's command and control system; and
- allow for participation by Turkey and Norway (who are not in the EC).

Reconciling our conditions and European aspirations for political union will require skillful diplomacy throughout the year, starting with your meetings with Mitterrand, Major, and Mulroney.

Our triumph in the Gulf and developments in the USSR have raised the stock of both the U.S. and NATO in Europe. But we cannot suppress the Europeans' desire to achieve greater cohesion in security affairs. Instead of trying to quash this impulse, which in any case may wax and wane in the years ahead, we should steer it toward a workable outcome, recognizing that one way or another the Europeans will be more assertive and unified within the Alliance. If we can find the right arrangements, NATO will emerge different but stronger.

Your briefing material for upcoming discussions with Allied leaders will suggest a line you might take to influence the direction of the issue.

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1644

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 5, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID C. GOMPERT *DCG*
SUBJECT: Memo to the President on the European Pillar

The question of European security cooperation and its relationship to NATO are certain to be on the minds of Mitterrand, Major, Mulroney, and possibly other Allied leaders when they meet with the President in the weeks and months ahead. With good reason, the President has not focussed on this complex issue. To help get him up to speed prior to his meetings next week, I have prepared the attached memo at Tab I.

Concurrence by: Arnold Kanter *AK*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2000-0233-F13
3/14/2011 MM

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

*I concur in David's memo.
Brent: The Eurocrats are chasing
form without function; institutions without
content. We need to make clear
what is at stake... including sustaining
strong domestic support for NATO...
without letting our actions and
reactions accelerate and focus
what otherwise is likely to be
continued European meandering
toward the trappings of an
elusive political union.*

- Arnie

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102007
RECEIVED: 18 MAR 91 14

TO: GATES

CHRON FILE

FROM: ZELIKOW
GOMPERT
KANter

DOC DATE: 18 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EC
FRANCE
EUROPE

NATO
GREAT BRITAIN



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR MTG OF EUROPEAN STRATEGY STEERING GRP ON 5 MAR

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 21 MAR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSJEB

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9102007

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 GATES
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91031818 FOR INFORMATION
X 91061317 OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2007
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	<u>24.6/13</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>OB5/UNR</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2007

March 18, 1991

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2000-0233-F/3
3/28/2011 MM

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT/ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting of the European Strategy Steering Group on Tuesday, March 19, at 5:00 pm

DBZ/OWR

You already have the package of discussion papers for this meeting. State will complete its revision of the chronology of European activities, and possibly revise its comments on the DOD paper. If and when these two papers come over we will amend the package accordingly.

We recommend that you use this meeting to explore the nature of existing disagreements, define and preview issues for discussion by principals, and put aside areas of agreement.

We suggest you open the meeting, however, by dispensing with a bit of secondary business. There is some uncertainty in Washington about the formal USG position on the timing of a NATO Summit this year, and you should poll agency views. We have earlier provided you (and General Scowcroft) with our recommendation that this Summit should be held in the autumn, with a complete statement on the results of NATO's political as well as military review, taking full account of developments in the EC and WEU (and in the Soviet Union). Manfred Woerner told General Scowcroft that he prefers to move more quickly to a summer Summit in order to maintain the momentum of change, show Alliance vitality, and reach conclusions in NATO before the EC completes its work.

Unfortunately, we think a summer Summit declaration would be an interim report on ongoing work, and that -- given the number of diversions on principals' attention -- more time is needed to do it right. We also think that the pace of events related to the European pillar and the development of a common European security and defense policy is not so rapid as to require moving the Summit to the summer.

You could open the discussion of the main issues by asking David to summarize the main points of the discussion in Martinique and Bermuda on the question of a European security or defense identity. That summary could lead into a review of issues, which are listed in the draft agenda for meeting of principals.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Those issues are:

1. Review of developments in Europe and the President's discussions with President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Major

David's summary will have opened this discussion. You could ask other agencies if they wish to comment on the diplomatic situation. The most recent development is the British tabling at NATO on March 14 of their specific proposal for NATO-WEU links. That proposal was scheduled for permreps discussion in another NAC 'brainstorming' session on the day of your meeting, March 19. We have asked State to reassure themselves that Ambassador Taft intends to be reserved in commenting on the British ideas. A copy of the British proposal is attached for your review at Tab I. The British will be expecting us (and others) to comment more formally on their ideas in the near future. That point leads to the second issue.

2. Does the U.S. believe a European defense entity, such as the WEU, should be located within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance?

A threshold issue raised by the Joint Staff paper is the question of whether -- given its limited membership -- we should express any preference for the WEU at all, or for any particular European arrangement in organizing their defense identity. The WEU's status as the vehicle for a European defense identity is now agreed among its members (with the Dutch having registered their dissent). But the question of US support for the WEU is essentially a reflection of the general posture of disengagement recommended by the Joint Staff, a posture which we consider short-sighted and which our Atlanticist friends (especially in London) would find very unsettling.

You could turn to DOD to introduce their paper, and then ask State to introduce their comments. Beyond the overall tone of our engagement on these issues with Europe, we should determine if the specific questions identified in the agenda paper remain under dispute. You should try to encourage JCS to identify their concerns about NATO-WEU links with some precision, especially as they relate to the concrete British proposals -- most or all of which seem innocuous, although some of the rhetoric on NATO-WEU transparency may cause concern.

There may, of course, be some types of NATO-WEU links that all will agree we should not tolerate. We should work to identify those and communicate them quietly to Allies, especially the British.

3. Should the U.S. encourage Europeans to develop their own coordinated military potential that could eventually (1) support U.S. national military action beyond Europe or the

NATO area, or (2) take independent action in conflicts outside of Europe and the NATO area where we might not wish to play a direct role?

No one is suggesting that we oppose European development of an independent or supplemental out-of-area military capability. Nor does anyone believe the Europeans are about to embark on a crash program to spend billions to create one. Yet the political significance of this European design remained evident in Kohl's March 13 support for a German out-of-area capacity, with Kohl highlighting the importance of full German participation in a future European multilateral framework for out-of-area action.

We believe experience has shown we cannot rely on NATO to become the primary framework for the conduct of out-of-area military action. Some in OSD and JCS say all they wish to do is hold open the possibility that NATO could play this role, if other mechanisms are unavailable or unworkable. If that view reflects the considered DOD view, your group might find agreement around a formula like the following:

- The U.S. supports a European defense identity, such as the WEU, to take primary responsibility for coordination of European military action beyond Europe and NATO defense responsibilities.
- The U.S. nevertheless recognizes that NATO will continue to serve as a transatlantic forum for consultations on any issues that affect Allies' vital interests. When member states act to protect their interests outside of the NATO area, NATO will continue to play a vital part in organizing whatever support Allies decide may be needed under the circumstances in order to protect their common security.

We will revise the draft agenda for the principals' meeting in light of the discussion in your group.

Concurrence by: Heather ^{or HW} Wilson

Attachment

Tab I British March 14 Proposal in NATO on NATO-WEU links

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11b. Cable	Re: Brainstorming Exercise on Strategy Review -- New UK Paper on NATO - WEU Relationship (4 pp.)	3/15/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Date Closed:	7/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91150-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101415
RECEIVED: 26 FEB 91 16

TO: PEREZ, CARLOS A

FROM: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 21 MAR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: VENEZUELA
FRANCE
OPEC

HS
OIL

PERSONS: PEREZ, CARLOS A

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: PRES RESPONSE TO LTR FM PRES PEREZ OF VENEZUELA RE ENERGY POLICY &
WORLD OIL MARKET

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 18 MAR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JOHNSON

LOGREF: 9101325 9101332

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR INFO
JOHNSON
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY MEM DATE 3/21 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 6 OF 6

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 1415

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>WED</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>WMA 3/21</u>	<u>D</u> <i>FAKED</i>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

91 MAR 21 PG. 52

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP _____ Sununu _____ Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Date 3/21/91 ?

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12a. Letter	President Bush to President Carlos Andres Perez (3 pp.)	3/21/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Date Closed:	7/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91150-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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1415

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

91 MAR 21 PM 3:42

March 21, 1991

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/4/24

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Reply to Venezuelan President Perez on Energy Policy

Purpose

To reply to CAP's February 15 letter, which again proposed a dialogue between oil producing and consuming nations.

Background

This is the fourth time around the track on this issue with CAP. He raised it during your UNGA meeting last September, during your South America trip in December, in your long February 8 phone conversation, and finally in this letter. On each of the three previous occasions, you have told CAP that we didn't think much of the idea.

The producer/consumer issue was discussed recently with our International Energy Agency (IEA) partners. All opposed formal IEA/OPEC talks, as suggested by CAP. Even the French seem to have backed off this idea. There was consensus that bilateral talks should be expanded where possible. Saudi Oil Minister Hisham Nazir has told Secretary Watkins that Saudi Arabia opposed a formal multilateral dialogue, preferring the very solid bilateral dialogue between our two countries.

Your reply to CAP, which is considerably longer than usual Presidential messages, attempts to lay out, in very friendly but unambiguous language, what we are and are not prepared to do. The key points: Appreciation for CAP's efforts to stabilize world oil supplies after Iraq invaded Kuwait; our determination to avoid a multilateral oil dialogue which might attempt to replace market mechanisms for pricing and production; our willingness to continue the present pattern of bilateral contacts between oil producers and consumers; and a willingness to explore with Venezuela ways to broaden our dialogue. The letter is based on a draft received from State, which was also cleared by the Energy Department.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

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CAP is a tenacious man, and this letter may not deter him from coming back to you yet again. We believe, however, that this letter articulates a credible and defensible U.S. policy; it is one with which our key allies in the IEA are comfortable. We will want to blunt some of CAP's efforts by stepping up the tempo of our bilateral consultations (with Venezuela and others) to show that we are sensitive to the broad issues that CAP is also concerned about. We are working with State and Energy on this issue.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to President Perez at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to President Perez
Tab B Letter from President Perez

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1415

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 20, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM T. RYCE/TIM DEAL

FROM: DONALD C. JOHNSON/ERIC MELBY

SUBJECT: Reply to Venezuelan President Perez on Energy Policy

CAP sent a letter to the President on February 15, once again pressing for a dialogue between oil producers and oil consumers. The detailed reply at Tab A, which has been cleared by the Departments of State and Energy, seeks to lay out clearly for CAP our thinking.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to President Perez
Tab B Letter from President Perez
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

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White House Guidelines


E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

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Declassify on: OADR

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1710
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 19, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff

SUBJECT: Letter dated February 15, 1991 from
President Carlos Andres Perez
regarding world oil market
ID #9103413


A copy of the attached original correspondence was
forwarded to the National Security Council under
S/S 9103413 on March 13, 1991.

No further action is required.

for Soadiah Larkin
Office of the
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 13, 1991

9103413

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Letter from President Bush to President Perez
on Energy

Attached is a draft response to a letter from Venezuelan President Perez to President Bush. President Perez calls for a multilateral energy dialogue between oil producing and oil consuming countries to promote market stability.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Draft response.
- Tab 2 - Incoming correspondence.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12c. Draft Letter	Department of State Draft Reply to President Perez (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Date Closed: 7/15/2009	OA/ID Number: 91150-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12d. Cable	Re: Letter from President Perez to President Bush Reiterating Call for Producer-Consumer Dialogue on Petroleum (3 pp.)	2/16/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Date Closed:	7/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91150-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12e. Letter	President Carlos Andres Perez to President Bush Re: [Spanish] (2 pp.)	2/15/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - April 1991) [1]

Date Closed:	7/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91150-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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