

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91149
Folder ID Number: 91149-012

Folder Title:
Other (December 1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	6	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Cable	White Houset to Elysee Palace Re: Letter to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	12/1/90	(b)(1)	C
01b. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Message to Mitterrand on Lebanon (1 pp.)	11/29/90	(b)(1)	C
01c. Message	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02a. Memo	David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft Re: US Policy on the "European Pillar" (2 pp.)	12/1/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Summary	Re: Summary of Conclusions (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to Former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03b. Draft Letter	President Bush to Former Prime Minister Thatcher (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03c. Letter	A. M. Wood to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	11/22/90	(b)(1)	
03d. Letter	Former Prime Minister Thatcher to President Bush (1 pp.)	11/22/90	(b)(1)	
03e. Message	Re: Text of a Message from the Prime Minister to the President, Dated 22 November (2 pp.)	11/22	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (December 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1253
OA/ID Number: 91149-012
Date Closed: 7/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04. Talking Points	Re: Contingency Points for CSCE Closed Session Topic: Future of CSCE (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05. Cable	U.S. - Chile Relations: Letter from President Aylwin to President Bush Seeking Action on GSP and Kennedy Amendment (6 pp.)	11/21/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (December 1990)

Pinksheet Number: cap1253
OA/ID Number: 91149-012
Date Closed: 7/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009420
RECEIVED: 29 NOV 90 19

TO: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 01 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
LEBANON

SYRIA
HS

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS
ASSAD, HAFIZ

AOUN, MICHEL

SUBJECT: PRES MSG TO PRES MITTERRAND RE LEBANON

ACTION: PRES APPROVED CABLE

DUE DATE: 03 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GANTT
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 2 OF 2

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 9420

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	<u>1</u>	<u>12/1R</u>	<u>D</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>12/1R</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

90 DEC 1 09:11

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
SIT: NSFEG HOTLINE OUT ZELIKOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 010335Z DEC 90

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ELYSEE PALACE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
0000

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

RECALLING OUR DISCUSSION IN PARIS, I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT I
RAISED THE SUBJECT OF LEBANON WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD IN GENEVA. (I
DID SO IN OUR ONE-ON-ONE, SO AS TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR HIM TO ACT
IF HE SO CHOSE.) I TOLD ASSAD WE THOUGHT AOUN SHOULD BE ALLOWED
TO LEAVE SO THAT THIS CHAPTER OF LEBANON'S HISTORY COULD BE
CLOSED. I ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THE RELEASE OF AOUN WOULD DO A
LOT FOR SYRIA'S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE.

ASSAD SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT BUT HE WOULD TRY. WE WILL
CONTINUE TO REINFORCE YOUR EFFORTS TO GAIN A SATISFACTORY
SETTLEMENT OF THIS PROBLEM.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0731-JMR
5/16/2011 MM

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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0114

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9420

November 29, 1990

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT/RICHARD HAASS *OK RH*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Message to Mitterrand on Lebanon

A short message to President Mitterrand, to be sent through White House channels, is attached at Tab I. It lets Mitterrand know that we did raise the Aoun issue with Assad.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize, for the President, transmission of the message to President Mitterrand attached at Tab I.

Approve

8

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Message to President Mitterrand

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *MM* NARA, Date *10/28/2013*

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MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
VIA BLUE CHANNELS

Dear Francois:

526 Recalling our discussion in Paris, I wanted you to know that I raised the subject of Lebanon with President Assad in Geneva. (I did so in our one-on-one, so as to make it easier for him to act if he so chose.) I told Assad we thought Aoun should be allowed to leave so that this chapter of Lebanon's history could be closed. I also made clear that the release of Aoun would do a lot for Syria's relations with France.

Assad said it would be difficult but he would try. We will continue to reinforce your efforts to gain a satisfactory settlement of this problem.

Sincerely,

George Bush

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0731-MR
5/16/2011 MM

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 01 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: EUROPE WEST
EC

NATO

PERSONS:

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: US POLICY ON EUROPEAN PILLAR

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 06 DEC 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOMPERT LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAF NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN CLOSED BY: NSMEN DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 1, 1990

#9474
APNSA Has Seen
Very interesting - threat
B

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID C. GOMPERT 
SUBJECT: US Policy on the "European Pillar"

As a result of intensive interagency discussion, including several meetings of Bob Gates' European Strategy Steering Group, we have arrived at an agreed internal document setting forth a U.S. stand on a European Pillar within the Alliance. Such a document is timely for four reasons:

- (1) The upcoming NATO Ministerials and surrounding discussions will confront us with European views on this issue.
- (2) The NATO strategy study commissioned at the London Summit must begin to come to grips with this question if we are to avoid it becoming a meaningless review.
- (3) The EC has begun a specific process to consider what its role in security policy-making should be, starting this month.
- (4) The British, out of a desire to steer the European Pillar away from the EC, are energetically advocating a variant of the WEU which is designed to preserve and strengthen NATO. We understand that Douglas Hurd intends to deliver a speech describing this idea within the next 7-10 days.

The thrust of the policy statement is:

- (1) The Alliance should have the broadest possible political-security charter, but stopping short of insisting on mandatory use of NATO for out-of-area contingencies.
- (2) We are open-minded about a European identity centered on the WEU, with certain conditions which will ensure NATO's decision-making capacity is not weakened.
- (3) We are willing to look at a variety of ways -- except for a change in SACEUR's nationality -- in which the European role in NATO's command structure can be expanded.

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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AS AMENDED

2000-0233-F/5
6/22/2009 MM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
2

- (4) We intend to keep in Europe at least a robust corps, supplemented by air and naval units and enough infrastructure to support force regeneration. (JCS is not ready to give the Europeans a new troop number; our hesitation on this will prompt continued questions and anxiety on the continent.)

This overall policy stance, which will be carefully but consistently drawn upon in discussions with Allies, goes in the direction of creating conditions that would bring the French fully back into the Alliance, as we have discussed.

While all agencies have signed off, I have asked that Cabinet principals be shown the paper without delay. Because the paper already takes Colin Powell's views into account, I doubt that principals will have a problem, but I will let you know.

I urge you to read the attachment.

Concurrences by: Arnold Kanter *AK*

Attachment

Tab I Summary of Conclusions from European Strategy Steering Group, November 29-30

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~~SECRET~~

Summary of Conclusions
European Strategy Steering Group
November 29-30, 1990

1. This summary of conclusions is a resource document to be drawn upon by officials, **as appropriate**, as guidance in planning further work within the USG and preparing for consultations with foreign officials. The summary itself is for internal USG use only.
2. Our overall goal is to keep NATO strong and viable for the foreseeable future, as the foundation for Atlantic cooperation in addressing political and security concerns and to maintain the United States position as a European power. To achieve this goal, we need:
 - To emphasize America's continuing commitment to the Alliance, including a substantial U.S. military presence in Europe;
 - To agree on a purpose for NATO that goes beyond deterrence of the Soviet Union (see point 4) while leaving open the possibility of a complementary European role in handling true out-of-area contingencies;
 - To adapt NATO's political structures to encompass European desires for a distinct security identity within the Alliance framework; and
 - To adapt NATO's military command structure as necessary to make the US overseas presence more sustainable, encourage -- within a transatlantic framework -- greater European responsibility for Europe's defense in years to come, and -- if possible -- draw France closer to the Alliance.
3. In discussing the US military commitment to Europe, Secretary Cheney should be prepared to state at the DPC that, as the President has assured our Allies, the United States will maintain substantial nuclear and conventional forces in Europe that will constitute a significant contribution to NATO's residual force levels. This presence will at least include a robust corps, composed of a corps headquarters, associated corps units, and two ground force divisions, supplemented by appropriate air and naval forces and sufficient infrastructure to support force regeneration.
4. The United States has identified five core security functions for the North Atlantic Alliance. They are to:

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AS AMENDED
2000-0233-F/5
6/22/2009 JAM

- Deter and defend against a threat of aggression from the Soviet Union against the territory of any NATO member state.
 - Deter and defend against any threat of aggression from countries other than the Soviet Union, such as states in the Middle East and North Africa, against the territory of any NATO member state.
 - Dissuade the Soviet Union from seeking to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to reimpose hegemony over Central/Eastern Europe through the threat or use of force.
 - Promote a stable security environment in Europe based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes.
 - Serve, as provided for in Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, and for coordinating their efforts at arms procurement and arms control.
5. A preoccupation with new institutions and wiring diagrams can divert attention from our essential goal: a viable NATO that is the foundation for Atlantic cooperation on political and security concerns and maintains the position of the United States as a European power. Any changes in NATO should be consistent with that end, anticipating European trends in order to shape them to NATO's advantage.

Thus, the U.S. is sympathetic to European desires to develop a greater European identity on security issues in keeping with the continued viability of NATO and its principle of unity of security within the Alliance. To keep NATO strong, we would prefer to see the European security identity develop within the framework of the Alliance. We want to keep European leaders from feeling torn between a NATO security structure and a European security structure.

European governments will necessarily take the lead in devising a policy to achieve this distinct security identity. As they seek our views in this process, we should indicate that we are open-minded about a European identity, as long as that identity strengthens the Alliance and does not marginalize it. In our view, a European security identity centered in the Western European Union could meet that goal. If adopted, the WEU option should meet the following four criteria:

- (a) The WEU is moved to Brussels. Its member states would be

represented on the WEU Council by the same individuals as represent them on the NAC. Its military advice would be provided by the appropriate members of NATO's Military Committee.

- (b) Decisionmaking on issues related to NATO's core security functions should occur within NATO, even if consultation on some of those issues also occurs elsewhere.
- (c) WEU consultative processes should not require prior agreement within the WEU before an issue can be discussed and decided within NATO. This does not preclude prior agreement on a position by WEU members as long as NATO processes are not delayed and NATO's decisionmaking prerogatives are preserved.
- (d) The WEU does not form an independent military structure, outside of NATO, that has any role in the performance of NATO's core security functions.

As European support grows for a transformation of the WEU, European governments will need to recognize the limitations in the membership of that organization that might increase divisiveness within the Alliance. If the WEU becomes the focal point for creation of a European security identity, the United States will raise as a serious concern some implications of the fact that Denmark, Norway, Greece, and Turkey are currently not in the WEU. We need more information on the views of European states on the issue of future WEU membership and association, and time to consider how strongly to press our preference.

These criteria are designed to leave room for the WEU's potential to organize European military capabilities for out-of-area operations. The close ties and dual-hatting between the WEU and NATO may actually facilitate consultation within the Alliance on these issues, as needed. Ideally, in a future crisis like the one we face now in the Gulf, we could witness a coordinated and meaningful response by both NATO and the WEU, by both Americans and Europeans.

- 6. The U.S. is prepared to consider adapting NATO command structures to make the US overseas presence as sustainable politically as possible and to encourage and reflect greater European responsibility for Europe's defense in years to come. The U.S. also seeks to draw France closer to the military structures of the Alliance in a way that will support a continued U.S. military presence in Europe, including an integrated NATO military structure which includes Germany.

The command structure of NATO should reflect the reassessment of risks to the Alliance, the new NATO strategy and its resultant force structure, and national contributions to NATO's defense. Although it is too soon to see where this process will take us, the U.S. is prepared to look at some emerging concepts and is in fact doing so in the ongoing Military Committee command structure review.

- (a) Alliance forces, including U.S. forces, would be organized into multinational corps. These corps structures would function in peacetime, and not just be contingent structures that could be activated to supplant national corps only in a crisis.
 - (b) The question of SACEUR's nationality need not even be introduced to Allies by the US.
 - (c) The US would be prepared internally to review the peacetime responsibilities of NATO's Military Committee.
7. In reviewing the concepts listed above, and in the context of pursuing our objectives, any NATO command structure should conform to the following principles:
- (a) Peacetime command relationships must be able to transfer smoothly to an effective wartime command structure. There must be unity of command during crisis and transition to war.
 - (b) Elements of the peacetime command structure which are essential for Allied forces to be interoperable in wartime must be maintained.
 - (c) The chain of command should be simple, and reduced where possible to reflect the smaller size of NATO forces. At the same time, the chain of command must be capable of accommodating NATO's increased reliance on the reconstitution of military forces.
 - (d) The command structure must be capable of assimilating forces which have not been committed to NATO in advance of a crisis or hostilities.
 - (e) The command structure must be capable of accommodating the likelihood of more flexible and mobile forces.
 - (f) Allocation of key decisionmaking positions (aside from SACEUR) should be generally commensurate with national military contributions and regional responsibilities.

Significant additional work will be needed within the USG to translate these concepts and principles into clearcut goals for a revised NATO command structure. This organization may have a simplified chain of command, as described above, and structures capable of assimilating French or other forces not now in the integrated structure.

8. This material supplements the guidance on NATO's future mission and responsibilities already sent, on November 11, in State 382263.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009240
RECEIVED: 23 NOV 90 13

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: ZELIKOW
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 06 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

HS



PERSONS: THATCHER, MARGARET

SUBJECT: DRAFT LTR TO FORMER PM THATCHER RE RESIGNATION

ACTION: OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

DUE DATE: 07 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF: 9009226 9009241

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR INFO

GOMPERT
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSMJT

DOC 4 OF 4

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

9240

December 6, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW

SUBJECT: Draft Letter to Former PM Thatcher Re Resignation

State Department has drafted a letter to be sent to former PM Thatcher regarding her resignation. NSC concurs with the draft letter with some changes which we have made. The letter is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I which forwards the draft letter for his signature.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Mrs. Thatcher
Tab B Incoming letter

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/15/09

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9240

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter to Former Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher

Purpose

To reply to Prime Minister Thatcher's letter informing you of her resignation.

Background

Prime Minister Thatcher's letter informed you of her resignation and describes her government's decision to reinforce British forces in the Gulf. An appropriate reply is attached at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Mrs. Thatcher
Tab B Incoming letter

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 10/28/2013

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Margaret:

It was with profound regret that I learned of your resignation as leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. While I look forward to working with John Major and have every expectation that relations between our two countries will be as solid as ever, it just will not be the same without you.

We have all benefited greatly over the past eleven years from your wisdom and determination. Your decision to reinforce UK forces in the Gulf is only the latest example. I have had the greatest respect for the way in which you have been able to mold the world about you -- conducting a peaceful revolution at home while shaping attitudes on East-West relations, on vital principles, far beyond Britain's shores. I know that you will continue to fight for what you believe in and that you will remain a force in British and world politics.

Barbara and I send you and Denis our very best wishes and hopes for the future.

With warmest personal regards,

The Right Honorable
Margaret Thatcher
House of Commons
London, England



BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

22 November 1990

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House G/WW
Washington DC 20503

Dear Mr Scowcroft,

I enclose a message from the Prime Minister to President Bush. I would be grateful for your help in transmitting it to the President.

The message refers to an announcement, to be made in London shortly, of further British military deployments to the Gulf. I enclose details of that announcement

Yours sincerely,

Andrew Heck

for A M Wood
Charge d'Affairs



BRITISH EMBASSY

9240

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

The Honorable
Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Room 1/WW
Washington DC 20500

28 November 1990

Dear Brent,

I have been asked to pass to you the enclosed original of a message to the President from The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher FRS MP; a telegraphic version of which was, I think, passed to you last week.

Sincerely
Antony

Antony Acland



9240

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

22 November 1990

Dear George,

By the time you receive this message, you will probably already have heard this morning's announcement from 10 Downing Street of my decision to make way for a successor, and to resign as Prime Minister as soon as the Parliamentary Party has completed the necessary procedures for electing a new leader. I shall of course remain in charge of the Government until my successor has been appointed.

You have always shown me the greatest kindness and consideration, and I have very much admired your leadership. It will be needed more than ever over these next few months in the Gulf. But I am sure you can count on my successor, whoever he is, to give you full support: and Cabinet today will take the decision to send additional forces to stand alongside yours in Saudi Arabia.

Denis joins me in sending you and Barbara my warmest good wishes for the future.

*It has been marvellous to work
with you and I shall continue to give
full support to everything we believe in.*

Yours ever



PRES NOTED SUMMARY

TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT, DATED
22 NOVEMBER

Begins

Dear George

By the time you receive this message, you will probably already have heard this morning's announcement from 10 Downing Street of my decision to make way for a successor, and to resign as Prime Minister as soon as the Parliamentary Party has completed the necessary procedures for electing a new leader. I shall of course remain in charge of the Government until my successor has been appointed.

You have always shown me the greatest kindness and consideration, and I have very much admired your leadership. It will be needed more than ever over these next few months in the Gulf. But I am sure you can count on my successor, whoever he is, to give you full support: and Cabinet today will take the decision to send additional forces to stand alongside yours in Saudi Arabia.

Denis joins me in sending you and Barbara my warmest good wishes for the future.

It has been marvellous to work with you and I shall continue to give full support to everything we believe in.

Yours ever.

Margaret

Ends

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0727-MR
MM 4/7/2015

The Secretary of State for Defence will announce at 1530 GMT on 22 November the following further British military deployments to the Gulf:

- a) A UK Mechanised Brigade (8,500 men) and support elements (5,500 men) to establish a UK Armoured Division. The Division will be fully operational by the end of January.
- b) Two extra mine counter measures making five in all. The extra ships will be on station in the Gulf by mid-January.

British Embassy, Washington

22 November 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9009240
DATE 22 NOV 90

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM THATCHER RE HER ANNOUNCEMENT TO RESIGN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

11/25/90

0533

Sheik Benyan

COPY: 1

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 7/15/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9009240
DATE 22 NOV 90

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM THATCHER RE HER ANNOUNCEMENT TO RESIGN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE

11/25/90

TIME

8:30

SIGNATURE

(Signature)

COPY: 1

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 7/15/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES




November 28, 1990

UNCLASSIFIED with
(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment)

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Letter to Former Prime Minister Thatcher

Attached you will find a draft letter for the President's use in responding to a letter from former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Draft response
2. Incoming correspondence

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

CAP 7/15/09

UNCLASSIFIED with
(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment)
DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9009240

REFERRAL

DATE: 23 NOV 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: THATCHER, MARGARET

DATE: 22 NOV 90


SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM PM THATCHER RE HER ANNOUNCEMENT TO RESIGN

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 26 NOV 90

COMMENT:

FOR


GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Received in
S/S-RMD on
11/25/90 at 8:30 a.m.
(signature)*

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9010023
RECEIVED: 26 DEC 90 14

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 24 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

Other

KEYWORDS: CSCE

HUMAN RIGHTS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY POINTS FOR CSCE CLOSED SESSION / FUTURE OF CSCE

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 29 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF: 9008535 9009021

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DYKE
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 16023

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>24.19.24</u>	<u>R</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

NSA Has Seen

CONTINGENCY POINTS FOR CSCE CLOSED SESSIONNat Sec Advisor
has seenTOPIC: FUTURE OF CSCE

- There has been a lot of discussion over the past two days about how the CSCE can help prevent conflict in the future.
- { My view is that the CSCE should concentrate on the causes of conflict. This means the CSCE must keep advancing in practical ways the fundamental principles and human rights mentioned in my remarks yesterday afternoon.
- X -- CSCE has been successful so far as a political process. ~~There is some fear -- a legitimate fear -- that we can get too caught up in institutions and bureaucracies.~~ We might turn CSCE into just another item of government business.
- X -- We can avoid this danger by remembering the importance of individual rights and minority rights and that the CSCE relies on the help of individuals and private non-governmental groups in order to protect these rights. President Havel's personal experience is a good example.
- Support for these rights and for the development of democratic institutions and procedures will not guarantee that conflicts won't arise -- but it will go a long way, and it will keep CSCE from becoming bureaucratized.
- ✓ Nevertheless, we are prepared to accept some degree of institutionalization of CSCE. But we government leaders must maintain our strong political interest, and we should review how these modest steps work out before more CSCE organization is built.

((If widespread support emerges, including from Soviets, for a stronger CSCE emergency mechanism:))

- We are prepared to support the idea of a CSCE emergency mechanism, if the CSCE chairman determines that a nation's request for an emergency meeting has additional support. This is an idea our foreign ministers can pursue further at the first meeting of the CSCE Council next year.

**BUT BEST TO LEAVE THIS
FOR DECISION AT
MINISTERIAL MTG. SET FOR
JUNE IN BERLIN.**

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009262
RECEIVED: 23 NOV 90 19

CHRON FILE

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 09 JAN 91
SOURCE REF: 9024861

KEYWORDS: CHILE

HS

PERSONS: LETELIER, ORLANDO

MOFFITT, RONNI

SUBJECT: CABLE TO PRES FM PRES AYLWIN RE US CHILEAN RELATIONS

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE DUE DATE: 27 NOV 90 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: STATE LOGREF: 9009263 9009309
FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
JOHNSON
NSC CHRON
SALVETTI, L

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSDAI DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

9262

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9024861

Date January 9, 1991

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Bush

From: President Patricio Aylwin of Chile

Date: November 21, 1990

Subject: Cable to President Bush from President Aylwin
regarding U.S.-Chilean Relations

WH Referral Dated: November 23, 1990

NSCS ID# (if any): 9009262

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

 A draft reply is attached.

 A draft reply will be forwarded.

 A translation is attached.

 An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

 X We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.

 The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.

 Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:

The letter from President Aylwin to President Bush was written at
the request of the USG and therefore, does not require a response.


Director
Secretariat Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9009262
DATE 21 NOV 90

SUBJECT: CABLE TO PRES FM PRES AYLWIN RE US - CHILEAN RELATIONS
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE

11/23

TIME

2236

SIGNATURE

Wm. M. L.

COPY: 1

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
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WASHINGTON, DC 20520

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9009262

REFERRAL

DATE: 23 NOV 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

0004661
150 NOV-23 10:43 PM

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: AYLWIN, PATRICIO

DATE: 21 NOV 90

SUBJ: CABLE TO PRES FM PRES AYLWIN RE US - CHILEAN RELATIONS

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 26 NOV 90

COMMENT:

FOR

George Van Eron
GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED

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By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

~~SECRET~~

100-103-1001
by Wherry
9/23/03

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Cable	U.S. - Chile Relations: Letter from President Aylwin to President Bush Seeking Action on GSP and Kennedy Amendment (6 pp.)	11/21/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (December 1990)

Date Closed:	7/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91149-012
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information