

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91149
Folder ID Number: 91149-010

Folder Title:
Other (November 1990) [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	6	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Reactions to our Demarche on Yugoslavia (2 pp.)	11/1/90	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft Re: Public Theme for the President's Trip (2 pp.)	11/1/90	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
03a. Memo	Michael Hayden/Robert Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Answer to Horst Teltschik on CSBMs (2 pp.)	11/6/90	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
03b. Draft Cable	White House to German Federal Chancellory Re: CSBMs (2 pp.)	n.d.	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
03c. Cable	Horst Teltschik to General Brent Scowcroft Re: CSBMs (2 pp.)	11/2/90	(b)(1)	C
03d. Letter	Hans-Dietrich Genscher to James A. Baker, III Re: Courtesy Translation (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03e. Cable	Re: Reply to Foreign Minister Genscher on CSBMs [FOIA exemptions redacted] (3 pp.)	11/1/90	~~(b)(1); (b)(3)~~	~~C~~
04a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl of Germany (1 pp.)	11/8/90	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Chronological Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Other (November 1990) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1251

OA/ID Number: 91149-010

Date Closed: 7/15/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	~~C~~
04c. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl of Germany, November 8, 1990 (1 pp.)	11/8/90	(b)(1)	~~C~~
05. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl of Germany (3 pp.)	11/11/90	(b)(1)	~~S~~
06. Memo	David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft Re: European Views on NATO's Future (4 pp.)	11/12/90	(b)(1)	S
07a. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Hawke of Australia (4 pp.)	11/15/90	(b)(1)	~~C~~
07b. Memo	William F. Sittmann to J. Stapleton Roy and David A. Weiss Re: Transmittal of Presidential Telcon with Bob Hawke, Prime Minister of Australia (1 pp.)	11/16/90	(b)(1)	~~C~~

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (November 1990) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1251
OA/ID Number: 91149-010
Date Closed: 7/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008718
RECEIVED: 01 NOV 90 17

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HUTCHINGS
GOMPERT

CHRON FILE
DOC DATE: 01 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: YUGOSLAVIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REACTIONS TO OUR DEMARCHE ON YUGOSLAVIA

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 05 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CA NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Reactions to our Demarche on Yugoslavia (2 pp.)	11/1/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (November 1990) [1]

Date Closed: 7/15/2009	OA/ID Number: 91149-010
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.~~

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008689
RECEIVED: 01 NOV 90 10

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: GOMPERT

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 01 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: PUBLIC STATEMENTS
GERMANY
EUROPE

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
FRANCE
PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PUBLIC THEME FOR PRES EUROPEAN TRIP

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 05 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOMPERT LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPERT

NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 7/15/01

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

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Public Themes on Pres's Trip
National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MKN
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 8689
 SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 DOCLOG De A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>SH</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>King</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>h</u>	<u>copies</u>
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N</u>

NOV 1 11:19

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other B. H. ...

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

01 12

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8689

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 1, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID C. GOMPERT 
SUBJECT: Public Theme for the President's Trip

The President will have the opportunity for a major address in Prague and several lesser public statements in Germany and Paris (including his CSCE intervention). While he will need to address a number of particular European policy matters (e.g., support for the Central European democracies, NATO's future, CSCE itself), I recommend that we develop a single message which places our goals and policies for Europe in a wider framework. This message should be designed to: (a) capture Europe's attention; (b) lend coherence to our views on the various political, economic and security matters; and (c) serve as a point of departure for our future diplomacy in and beyond Europe. The message should also encompass our stand in the Gulf, thus tying together the two halves of the President's trip.

The essence of the President's message would be a call for a new European-American partnership, based on:

1. The very values and principles that produced our success in Europe.
 - rule of law
 - political and economic freedom
 - individual and minority rights
 - etc.
2. The openness of this partnership to new members who we drawn by those values and principles (e.g., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, we hope even the USSR).
3. A partnership of equality, in view of Europe's impressive success and prospects in economic growth and integration.
4. European acceptance of more responsibility, as a necessary condition for an equal and effective partnership.
5. The reflection of such a partnership and its basic principles in our institutions (NATO's European pillar,

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0751742
EX 412115

an effective U.S.-EC relationship, a successful GATT based upon responsibility and openness).

6. A recognition that this partnership should not and cannot be confined to Europe. The same principles which produced success and guide us in Europe should be the basis for an American-European partnership in the World.
7. Look outward Europe -- you have a new responsibility that comes with your success. You should share that success. As the success of the partnership expands in the world, it will be more lasting and meaningful here in Europe.
8. The proposition that what we have stood for -- together -- in Europe constitutes the basis for a new and compelling view of international order in general. (Simply put, the principles that we defended during the Cold War and that helped us win the Cold War are the very principles on which post-Cold War international order should be based.)
9. A challenge to these principles (freedom, rule of law) is a challenge to what we stand for in Europe. It is therefore a challenge to the new partnership -- indeed, to the people in Wenceslas Square.
10. This is what we're about -- from the Square to the Gulf.

I want to emphasize that this is not the speech outline; we can work with the framework, placing emphasis where we think it's most needed.

The Prague speech itself is the centerpiece and a major, substantive policy opportunity. I would therefore like your agreement to proceed with a first draft in this directorate, along the lines of the above message and themes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve in principle the general message and themes as a basis for a first draft (and/or give me your comments).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you advise David Demarest that we'll do a first draft in order to formulate the basic policy message and then, of course, work with the speechwriters (after you are satisfied with the first draft).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008820
RECEIVED: 06 NOV 90 12

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HAYDEN
HUTCHINGS

DOC DATE: 06 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R
CSCE

CSBM

PERSONS: TELTSCHIK, HORST
BAKER, J

GENSCHER, HANS D

SUBJECT: ANSWER TO TELTSCHIK ON CSBMS

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 09 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAYDEN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAYDEN
HUTCHINGS
KANTER
NSC CHRON
RICE

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 1 OF 1

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BS - Teltschik on CSBMs

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MFN

LOG # 8820

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG AC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>Ken Hill</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1/11</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	<u>8</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>2</u>	<u>APNSA Has Seen</u>	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	<u>4</u>	<u>2/5 11/13</u>	<u>D</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>11/13 AC</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>9/11 11/13</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NELLY

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8820

November 6, 1990

ACTION

Nat Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/CONDOLEEZZA RICE

FROM: MICHAEL HAYDEN/ROBERT HUTCHINGS

SUBJECT: Answer to Horst Teltschik on CSBMs

You've received a message from Horst Teltschik (Tab II) asking you to support a German proposal to include two "cosmetic" naval measures in a CSBM package. Foreign Minister Genscher sent Secretary Baker a similar message (Tab III), portions of which the German CSBM negotiator shared with the Soviets and others.

German concerns focus on the Conflict Prevention Center that will be considered at the CSCE Summit. What this institution might do, at least initially, will be defined by measures now under negotiation in CSBMs. Chief among these is a CSBM information exchange, which the Soviets are stonewalling in the hope of getting a concession on naval forces. To gain Soviet agreement, the Germans want to offer an exchange of data on naval command structures and a commitment to put naval strategies on the agenda of the next Doctrine Seminar. These may be innocuous steps in themselves but they cross the firebreak on naval forces created by the Madrid mandate and can only whet the Soviet appetite for more significant measures after Paris.

Our negotiators in Vienna report that the Soviets are thoroughly isolated on the naval question and believe that breaking ranks now is the worst possible tactic. The British and others have even proposed that we ratchet up the pressure on the Soviets and threaten to accept a CPC only "in principle" in Paris if there is no CSBM information exchange. Even if the Soviets do not blink, we can probably live with the consequences -- especially since less than a full-up CPC will be seen as a product of Soviet intransigence.

Your reply (Tab I) makes these points, while reassuring Teltschik that we remain committed to a Conflict Prevention Center as agreed at London. Your response tracks with Secretary Baker's message to Genscher (Tab IV).

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2010-0751MR
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-2-

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Horst Teltschik at Tab I, to be sent via White House privacy channels.

Approve



Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I	Proposed Message to Horst Teltschik
Tab II	Message from Horst Teltschik
Tab III	Genscher Letter to Baker and Response
Tab IV	Baker Response

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0768-MR
SCS 2/25/13

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO GERMAN FEDERAL CHANCELLERY

VIA SKIPPER CHANNELS

DEAR HORST,

I SHARE YOUR HOPE THAT AT THE UPCOMING SUMMIT WE CAN ESTABLISH A CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTER THAT HAS A FULL MEASURE OF SUBSTANCE AND MEANINGFUL ACTIVITIES. TO THAT END WE HAVE DIRECTED OUR NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA TO PRESS HARD FOR A CSBM PACKAGE THAT WILL HELP GIVE THE CENTER PURPOSE AND DIRECTION.

IT APPEARS WE WILL HAVE AGREEMENT ON THE MEASURE ON UNUSUAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND, OF COURSE, THE CENTER WILL HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN SETTING UP THE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK AND ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION MEETINGS. I AGREE THAT THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE MEASURE IS LESS CERTAIN AS THE SOVIETS STILL INSIST ON GOING BEYOND THE MADRID MANDATE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO INCLUDE NAVAL FORCES. THIS WE CANNOT ACCEPT, AS CONCESSIONS IN THIS AREA WOULD NOT SERVE OUR COMMON INTERESTS AND COULD LEAD THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER MISTAKENLY, TO ANTICIPATE FURTHER CONCESSIONS IN THE PERIOD FOLLOWING PARIS.

HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AN INFORMATION EXCHANGE MEASURE CONSISTENT WITH MADRID IS BEYOND OUR REACH. THE U.S. DELEGATION IN VIENNA TELLS US THAT THE SOVIETS ARE INCREASINGLY ISOLATED ON THIS ISSUE. OUR RELATED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS LEAD US TO BELIEVE THEY CAN BE WON OVER AS THEY HAVE LITTLE TO GAIN IN BEING SEEN AS THE SOLE IMPEDIMENT TO A SUBSTANTIAL CSBM AGREEMENT AND A MEANINGFUL CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTER. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AS WE APPROACH END GAME FOR THIS ROUND OF CSBMS, I BELIEVE THE

BEST COURSE IS TO MAINTAIN SOLIDARITY AND FORCE THE SOVIETS TO
FACE THE DILEMMA THEY HAVE CREATED FOR THEMSELVES. RATHER THAN
TRY TO MEET SOVIET DEMANDS ON AN ISSUE WHERE THEY ARE
INCREASINGLY ISOLATED, WE BELIEVE IT IS TIME TO MAKE IT PLAIN
THAT THEIR INTRANSIGENCE IS PUTTING AT RISK THE CREATION OF A
MEANINGFUL CPC.

WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR A STRONG AND EFFECTIVE
CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTER WITH THE CSBM INFORMATION EXCHANGE AS
PART OF ITS CONTENT. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT SOLIDARITY IN KEEPING
THE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS IS THE BEST
WAY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS.

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Cable	Horst Teltschik to General Brent Scowcroft Re: CSBMs (2 pp.)	11/2/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (November 1990) [1]

Date Closed: 7/15/2009	OA/ID Number: 91149-010
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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03d. Letter	Hans-Dietrich Genscher to James A. Baker, III Re: Courtesy Translation (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
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File Location: Other (November 1990) [1]

Date Closed: 7/15/2009	OA/ID Number: 91149-010
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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (November 1990) [1]

Document Declassified
 (Document Follows)
 By ES on 7/15/22

Date Closed: 7/15/2009	OA/ID Number: 91149-010
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0751-MR (502.04)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 7/23/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ORIGINAL

AUTH 11 DRAFT 27
CLEAR 1 201/201 2 201/201
3 201/204 201/205 201/201
6 201/201 S/S 8 S/S-0 201

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EUR/RPM/D:MTAUBER:MST
11/01/90 7-1135 SERPMD 679/1041
D:LSEAGLEBURGER

EUR:RGHSEITZ T:CDELL C:MFOULON P:RNORLAND
PM:RWALPOLE S/P:JHOLMES ACDA:PCORDEN OSD:BSYINGTON
JCS/J-5:LGETZFRED EUR/RPM:RCALDWELL (b)(3) EUR/CE:WMENOLD
S/S: S/S-0: NSCS: D:LLITZENBERGER

IMMEDIATE BONN

IMMEDIATE CSCE C, SECRETARY IMMEDIATE, +

VIENNA FOR USDEL CSBMS; USVIENNA FOR USDEL CFE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CSBMS, NATO, PREL

SUBJECT: REPLY TO FM GENSCHEER ON CSBMS

REF: VIENNA 11888 EXDIS NOTAL

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER ASAP THE TEXT AT PARA 3 OF ACTING SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER'S REPLY TO A RECENT LETTER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHEER TO SECRETARY BAKER (REFTEL). THE LETTER DISCUSSES A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE ON THE QUESTION OF NAVAL INFORMATION IN CSBMS. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. DEAR MR. MINISTER:

IN THE ABSENCE OF SECRETARY BAKER, I AM RESPONDING TO YOUR RECENT LETTER TO HIM IN WHICH YOU SHARED YOUR THOUGHTS ON HOW TO FULFILL THE LONDON SUMMIT DECLARATION'S CALL FOR A MEANINGFUL PACKAGE OF CSBMS TO BE READY FOR THE PARIS CSCE SUMMIT. THE CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTER (CPC), AND ITS CORE FUNCTIONS -- THE UNUSUAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES MECHANISM, THE CSBMS/CFE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, AND THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0751-MR
88 7/23/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 2

INFORMATION EXCHANGE -- ARE PRIORITIES FOR US AS WELL. WE FULLY AGREE THAT WITH PROGRESS BEING MADE ON THE FIRST TWO OF THESE MEASURES, THE ABSENCE OF AN INFORMATION EXCHANGE WOULD BE REGRETTABLE. WE MUST USE THE REMAINING TIME BEFORE PARIS TO SECURE THIS MEASURE.

WE REMAIN CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT THE WEST DOES NOT NEED TO ABANDON ITS LONGSTANDING OPPOSITION TO INCLUSION OF NAVAL FORCES IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT WE HAVE AN INFORMATION EXCHANGE. THE SOVIETS SURELY REALIZE THEY ARE ISOLATED IN THEIR INSISTENCE ON NAVAL CONTENT IN CSBMS. IN THE CSCE PREPCOM, FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE SEEN RECENT INDICATIONS THAT ALLIED UNITY ON NAVAL ISSUES HAS PRODUCED A MORE REASONABLE SOVIET ATTITUDE. MOREOVER, EVEN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN AND NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES APPEAR TO BE GROWING WEARY OF SOVIET OBSTRUCTION TO AGREEMENT IN THIS LAST MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE AREA. COMPROMISES THAT PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO BELIEVE THEY MAY GET A MORE SYMPATHETIC HEARING FOR THEIR NAVAL AGENDA IN THE POST-PARIS PERIOD WOULD SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL.

NOW IS THE TIME FOR NATO ALLIES TO REMAIN UNITED AND CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT NAVAL FORCES ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MADRID MANDATE. IN THIS WAY, WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WILL COME TO SEE THEIR INTERESTS BETTER SERVED BY MOVING FORWARD WITH A CPC THAT CONTAINS AN INFORMATION EXCHANGE THAN BY BEING SEEN AS OBSTRUCTING THE CSCE PROCESS AT ONE OF ITS MILESTONE EVENTS.

THEREFORE, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT IF WE MAINTAIN NATO SOLIDARITY ON THIS IMPORTANT MATTER AS WE APPROACH THE CSCE SUMMIT, WE CAN ACHIEVE THE COMMON OBJECTIVES TO WHICH WE AGREED AT LONDON.

SINCERELY,

LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER

yy

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PAGE 3

USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA //POLAD//
USNMR SHAPE BE//POLAD//INTAFF/SPACOS//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD/XP//
CINCUSAEUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD/XP//
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAF//
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//DOS/N5//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5//

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008856
RECEIVED: 07 NOV 90 11

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 08 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R
TELCALL

EC

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS RE PRES TELEPHONE CALL TO CHANCELLOR KOHL 8 NOV

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 10 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 2 OF 2

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8856

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 8, 1990

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl of Germany

DATE: November 8, 1990

PURPOSE: To receive Kohl's call.

BACKGROUND: Kohl is probably calling about the Uruguay Round, as he promised he would do in your last telephone conversation. As the EC has now tabled a minimalist proposal on agriculture, you should stress that additional flexibility will be required of the EC if we are to reach agreement.

Kohl may also mention your forthcoming visit, which notionally will include brief public remarks in Speyer followed by a luncheon and meeting at the Chancellor's residence in Ludwigshafen.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open

INTERPRETER: Gisela Marcuse, Department of State

PHONE NUMBER: To be provided by WHCA

CONTACT: Robert Hutchings

TIME DIFFERENCE: +6

SUGGESTED TIMES: 2:50 - 3:30 p.m., November 8

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Uruguay Round
2. Visit to Germany

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0751-mr

EG 5/1/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAB A

1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CHANCELLOR KOHL

- I am glad the EC has finally agreed to put forward a negotiating position on agriculture. I appreciate your support in this.
- However, the EC position is far removed from what we agreed at Houston would be needed to reduce export subsidies, barriers to market access, and internal supports. The EC offer does not appear to address these issues directly, especially export subsidies and market access.
- We must break the deadlock on agriculture to save the Round. Germany and the rest of the EC will gain a lot from a comprehensive GATT agreement, as will the emerging democracies in Central Europe.
- It is important that your negotiators be allowed the flexibility to look for ways to bridge the differences on agriculture.
- I need your help to persuade the EC to join with us in bringing the Round to a successful conclusion. Your leadership will be critical.

Your Visit to Germany

- It appears the arrangements are set for my visit. I look forward to seeing you and Hannelore on November 18.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0751-142
E8 5/1/15

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8856

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 8, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZ/H*
SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl of Germany,
November 8, 1990

We are awaiting confirmation from Bonn that the Chancellor will place the call between 2:50 and 3:30 p.m. our time, November 8. (Kohl will have just returned from a visit with Prime Minister Mazowiecki to the German-Polish border.) As Kohl promised (during his last telephone conversation with the President) to call again regarding the Uruguay Round, our talking points focus on that issue.

in draft
Eric Melby and Adrian Basora concur.
AAB

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0751-MR
E8 5/1/15

**National Security Council
The White House**

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LOG # 8856

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG AL A/O _____

	90 NOV 8 A 9:55	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill		_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann		_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates		_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft		<u>1</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann		_____	_____	_____
Situation Room		_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk		<u>2</u>	<u>24.11.8</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat		<u>3</u>	_____	<u>OBS/OWR</u>
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_____		_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Call will be
at 1:30*

**National Security Council
The White House**

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LOG # 8856

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

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DOCLOG AL A/O _____

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Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>24.11.8</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>OBS/OWR</u>
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90 NOV 8 A 9: 55

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Call will be
at 1:30 =*

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: BENKO

DOC DATE: 08 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY

TELCON

PERSONS:

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY ON 8 NOV

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 12 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BENKO LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9008905

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SITTMANN
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90111618 FOR DECISION
X 90111912 SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 7/15/09

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8905

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl
of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl
Stephen Benko, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME: November 11, 1990, 1:38 - 1:48 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Helmut? How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello George. I've just come from a meeting with Prime Minister Mazowiecki. He asked me to convey his best regards. But the real reason for my call is that I have been thinking about you very much in the past few days because of the elections. We are all specialists in winning and sometimes losing elections. I am pleased that apparently things went well for you at the ballot box. It should provide you with a solid foundation for the years to come. (C)

The President: It's very sweet of you to call. Of course, there were some personal disappointments, Florida and Texas, for example. But in historical terms, we did better -- we defied history -- than a party in power usually does. We did better. Normally the party in power loses more seats. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That's exactly what I meant when I said a solid foundation. Here in Germany newspapers were full of prophesies which didn't come true. (C)

The President: Well, I'm very glad you called. Public opinion is very important because of the enormous problem in the Middle East, and that's holding up well. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That's exactly what I meant, the importance of public opinion. It's very important when you look at Boston and Massachusetts. (C)

The President: That was from the Helmut Kohl speech at Harvard about how you turn things around. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: (Laughs.) Yes, but it was unprecedented. (U)

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AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
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The President: Exactly. But it was a very good thing for my party if you look at Massachusetts and elsewhere. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I am thinking particularly of the next two years. (U)

The President: Yes. But we have tough economic problems. A recession, if we have a full one, will be over soon, and that will help in 1992. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: The second point I wanted to raise is that on GATT. We now have a basis for discussion. (C)

The President: That's good news. I'm not sure I had heard about it. (C)

The Chancellor: I do believe we have a good basis. (C)

The President: Good. We must break the agricultural deadlock if we are to save the Round. (C)

The Chancellor: I hope we'll be able to succeed in working this problem together. The third point I wanted to raise is the Middle East conflict, obviously. (C)

The President: We're going forward together. I'll announce very soon that we're sending more forces to the area, as I believe Gerhard Stoltenberg knows. It is a sizable force, and if that doesn't get Hussein's attention and cause him to abide by the UN resolutions, I don't know what will. Maybe we need more UN resolutions. Secretary Baker is talking to various countries about that. I look forward to talking with you about it. We have varying reports of the effectiveness of the sanctions. They are having an effect, but the question is whether it is enough. I continue to worry about the lives and safety and health of the so-called "guests," the hostages in Iraq and Kuwait. This is the one that really plays on my soul, because we are not going to change our policy because of his brutality. What is your latest thinking? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me say first of all, that we totally agree, that one shouldn't give in to that sort of brutality. There is one factor of reaction, which is his reaction to the sanctions once they begin to bite. That is the decisive question. (C)

The President: Yes it is. I'm certain that we can't go on forever. That is an unacceptable answer. The stance of the U.S. and around the world is that we can't let it go on forever. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: I look forward to seeing you to talk about it all. I think that not very far from now, on November 18, we'll be seeing each other. (C)

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Chancellor Kohl: Let me say that I look very much forward to that visit, and look forward to seeing Barbara too. Is she coming? (U)

The President: She will be, and she looks forward to seeing you and Hannelore. I appreciate your phone call, and am very, very grateful for it. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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8905

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 14, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: STEPHEN E. BENKO *SEB*

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation for the President's telephone conversation with Chancellor Kohl of Germany on November 8, 1990.

RJH *AAB for DG*
Robert Hutchings and David Gompert concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That the memorandum of telephone conversation at Tab A be filed for the record.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09

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The White House**

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~~Ken Hill~~

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Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>		<u>NR</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>

<u>A</u> Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008947
RECEIVED: 12 NOV 90 09

CHRON FILE

TO: GOMPERT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 12 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EUROPE
FRANCE
PERSIAN GULF

NATO
EC
GREAT BRITAIN



PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: EUROPEAN VIEWS ON NATO FUTURE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 15 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOMPERT

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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<u>Bill Sittmann</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>N</u>	
<u>Bob Gates</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
<u>Brent Scowcroft</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
<u>Bill Sittmann</u>			
<u>Situation Room</u>			
<u>West Wing Desk</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>57.12/28</u>	<u>✓</u>
<u>NSC Secretariat</u>	<u>6</u>		<u>N/R</u>

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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 (Date/Time)

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(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Memo	David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft Re: European Views on NATO's Future (4 pp.)	11/12/90	(b)(1)	8

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (November 1990) [1]

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 10/29/2013

Date Closed:	7/15/2009	OA/ID Number:	91149-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0233-F/5(173)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	6/22/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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8947

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 12, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID C. GOMPERT 
SUBJECT: European Views on NATO's Future

148

My recent talks in Paris, London and Bonn revealed more clearly where the Allies are headed on the question of how to reconcile the goals of an effective NATO and a common European security policy. Their views and a proposed strategy follow.

Paris

Admiral Lanxade and Mitterrand's chief foreign policy aide, Hubert Vedrine, see the creation of a European pillar as the vehicle which could bring France more or less fully back into NATO, provided French forces would not come under the authority of an American SACEUR in peacetime. They are also now satisfied, and believe Mitterrand will be satisfied, that our doctrines governing nuclear use are compatible. They now favor a revitalized WEU linked to NATO as the European pillar.

What is now clear is that the French see a WEU pillar in NATO not only as helpful in sustaining American involvement in Europe's security via NATO but also as a means to organize a European RDF-like capability. The French have been struck not only by the power of our Gulf deployment, but also by Europe's inability to act at a distance in defense of vital interests. They are therefore considering French participation in -- perhaps command of -- a European multinational corps which would be both part of NATO's force structure and available for WEU out-of-area contingencies. Such a plan would require, of course, that arrangements be worked out to associate French forces with NATO. It would also require some understanding about the need for a decision in NATO (i.e., involving us) before all or part of such a European NATO-assigned force could be used elsewhere. I raised these issues in Paris and was assured that the French were willing to accept practical solutions.

Such an approach could have definite benefits for us:

- The new European security grouping would not be in the EC but instead in an institution with much closer historical and practical ties to the Alliance: the WEU.

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
Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED

2000-0233-F/5
6/22/2009 MM

- Fuller French involvement in NATO would, in and of itself, help reinvigorate the Alliance as the main vehicle for the U.S. to play a role in post-Cold-War Europe.
- An out-of-area focus for the WEU would help preserve NATO's pre-eminence in the traditional Atlantic area and vis-a-vis the USSR.
- A European RDF-type force -- unless it proves to be a mirage -- could augment or even substitute for U.S. forces in responding to Third World (e.g., North African) contingencies.

(b)(1)



The main danger in the WEU concept is its potential to become an independent political and military counterpoint to the Alliance. The British have developed a plan to address this concern.

London

The British are convinced that some form of "European pillar" is inevitable and are not altogether averse to it themselves, though their main goal is to preserve NATO. (b)(1)



The British have seized the initiative in search of an institutional formula that would square a European security grouping with an effective NATO. Specifically, they propose to move the WEU from London to Brussels and double-hat NATO's European permreps as the WEU's permreps. The WEU would not have its own military structure and would focus largely on issues, (e.g., out-of-area problems) which are not at the heart of NATO.

This proposal, which was presented to me in London, has been well received by the French and Germans. While cautioning against the creation of a WEU "voting bloc" within NATO, I did not discourage the British from pushing their idea.

Bonn

Whatever is not operationally relevant to the Germany's unification program is not getting the usual thorough German attention. They have thus given the European pillar less attention than the British and French. Nonetheless, their position is crucial to all parties and, from our perspective, a

helpful one. I was told in the strongest terms that Germany views the Alliance as Europe's principal security mechanism; any European initiative will have to be consistent with a viable and effective NATO.

The German Foreign Ministry likes the British WEU idea, especially if it could open the door to fuller French participation in the Alliance. However, the Germans will be at best ambivalent about the French emphasis on improving Europe's capacity to act "out-of-area." The Germans are having a tough enough time deciding whether German forces can operate outside of Germany under UN auspices.

Our Strategy

These developments are now moving in a favorable direction. While we should avoid any American initiatives and not hesitate to set limits, it is important that we express a clear desire to see the Europeans take more responsibility. **It is most important that we understand that the alternative to the Anglo-French approach is not things as they used to be but probably an EC-based European pillar which would weaken rather than work within NATO, and without the collateral benefit of closer French ties to the Alliance.** Given this premise, we should:

- say unequivocally that we are ready for a European pillar provided it does not damage NATO;
- make known that the British idea is preferable to other variants;
- insist that the outcome include full (though not necessarily formal) French participation in NATO;
- indicate that we are not opposed to a European out-of-area capability;
- guard against NATO's being left with only a narrow scope, such as a mere cover for our force presence and an insurance policy against a renewed Soviet (or Russian) threat;
- oppose an outcome in which WEU members would feel obligated to pre-consult and pre-decide a "European position" on all issues to be taken up by NATO;
- foster the kind of NATO-WEU institutional links (political and military) that would facilitate coordination on future out-of-area contingencies;
- be flexible about peacetime command arrangements, provided that SACEUR remains an American and that military integrity and readiness are not compromised;

- favor U.S. participation in at least two of the NATO multinational corps, lest by insisting on a single, predominantly American corps we weaken our leverage and lose the political benefits of "multinationalizing" our presence in Germany.

We need to be prepared on an interagency basis to participate actively on this question in bilateral, "quad," and NATO (NAC and military) channels. A meeting of Bob Gates' European Strategy Group is planned for the end of November to approve the approach we will take in the diplomacy surrounding the December NAC Ministerial. Arnie and I will work with OSD and JCS on command arrangements.

Concerning the dialogue with Lanxade, he and I agreed that the two Presidents might simply acknowledge and encourage the talks, but not get into substance let alone reach any agreement. We also agreed that the next round (probably after the December NAC Ministerial) include limited State/DOD and Quai/MOD participation. In the meantime, while there is no need for me to refer to our special dialogue with Lanxade and Vedrine (which only Arnie knows of outside of my office), I need to reveal the substance of the Elysee's position to my colleagues at State and DOD.

Conclusion

In sum, we have the opportunity of turning a potential threat to NATO into a gain provided we continue to be open-minded about giving the Europeans greater responsibility within the Alliance framework.

Concurrence by: Arnie Kanter

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009100
RECEIVED: 16 NOV 90 08

TO: ROY, J
WEISS

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 16 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: AUSTRALIA
INTL TRADE

TELCON
PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS: HAWKE, ROBERT

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES TELCON W/ PM HAWKE ON 15 NOV

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 20 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PAAL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 7/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 2 OF 2

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9100

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Hawke of Australia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Robert Hawke
Notetaker: Douglas H. Paal

DATE, TIME November 15, 1990, 7:47 - 8:15 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

(Throughout this conversation, the Australian side became inaudible from time to time. Points where verbatim reconstruction of the conversation is not possible are marked as follows: "...")

The President: Hey, Bob Hawke, my old friend, how are you doing?
(U)

PM Hawke: How are you, George? I have called to express my deep concern with the situation reached so far in the Uruguay Round. I wonder if you have two or three minutes to allow me to set out my reaction to this situation... (C)

The President: Bob, I look forward to hearing your views. I am as concerned as you are about the state of the Uruguay Round. I spoke with (President) Delors and (Prime Minister) Andreotti about this on Tuesday. (C)

PM Hawke: It is my considered position that the Uruguay Round is in an absolute crisis... I know your concern. I saw you meeting with Andreotti. I also read Clayton Yeutter's excellent speech on the prospects for agriculture in the Round. I share the pessimism about achieving any result in the Uruguay Round. I think it is fair to say that the U.S. and Australia agree on two propositions. First, the requirement to create a more fair and open international trading system is absolutely vital. Failure would be an international economic tragedy... a political tragedy as well. When international trends are running so favorably... (C)

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Second, we have agreed that as to the success or failure of the Uruguay Round, the fact is there cannot be any successful result unless there is success with agriculture. All the rest depends on agriculture. To be precise, George, the success of the entire Uruguay Round hinges on the position of the Europeans. I for one do not see this position as last minute jockeying for advantage. I feel very strongly that there is a fundamental absence of political will on the part of the Europeans. The unsatisfactory offer of the EC on agriculture is not... comparable with the Cairns Group. Their offer is backdated to 1996, a year when supports are particularly bloated. The thirty percent cut over ten years has already taken place. The offer also fails... on agricultural access. (C)

On the whole, unless political will is expressed from the top, the Round will fail completely. I believe we should seriously contemplate Heads of Government involvement... There is virtually no chance that Brussels will work. We need to focus on the six major blockages in the Round. I am not optimistic at this time. (C)

Common sense and prudence should put us on guard to work against the worst case scenario. I propose to look at a Heads of Government meeting, possibly in January to... The list of possible participants could include the U.S., France, Germany, ..., the U.K., Japan, Australia, Mexico, Argentina and Indonesia. Obviously such a meeting would not be a matter of discussing detail. Rather, it would provide renewed impetus to successful completion of the Round. I hope to call the European Heads of Government... Rocard and Kohl and raise the possibility of Heads of Government involvement. (C)

I am sorry to take so long, George, but I wanted to show you how I see the situation. I would like to hear your views on how you contemplate the Brussels meeting. Is there anything, George, that we can do to press the Europeans on the Round? (C)

Finally, I have a technical question about the deadline for the fast-track legislation of 1st March. I would be interested to know how binding is the deadline and... This is not only an economic question. History shows that increased autarchy and protectionism can undo all that you and you and your predecessor achieved. (C)

The President: Bob, let me reply to your various points. First, I agree that without success on agriculture this will not be a successful round. I made this point repeatedly to Andreotti and Delors. They were rather heated meetings. I pointed out that they had not followed up what the G-7 had decided. They took exception and said they had. (C)

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There is no question that I agree with you that we have to have a satisfactory outcome on agriculture. They accused me of trying to get the Cairns Group up in arms. I told them that the Cairns Group, Australia included, does not need the U.S. to get them going. They have to look at the impact on the whole third world. Jim Baker is going to talk to Delors in Europe. I just talked with him in his car on the way to the airport. He will be there tonight. (C)

This weekend I will have bilaterals with Mitterrand and Kohl. You know he has an election coming up just before the Round. My suggestion, on your meeting, is that it deserves serious consideration. You should go ahead with your calls. They are very timely, very useful. Let the next week or so pass. (C)

On the technical point on the fast-track legislation deadline in the spring, I will get my people to get you the technical answer. If the question is, can we do something after that, I have to get the answer. You are right. (C)

PM Hawke: Thanks. If I may just respond. I will go ahead and make the calls. I take the point that we should wait and see how the bilaterals come out. I just ask that if all you and we are doing through the established processes and the Brussels meeting look like they are running into the sand, you would give serious consideration to the proposal I have made. While waiting for now, George, ... (C)

The President: I have no problems in principle. Obviously, when we get down to the crazy things like timing and schedules, but no problem in principle. It will be terrible if there is no success. In principle, agreed. I will try to kick some players into action. Our problem is the EC and the EC machinery and a couple of countries. (C)

PM Hawke: Let's keep in touch on how your meetings and... (C)

The President: I will ask our people, as soon as Baker and Hills complete their meetings, to get it to you personally. (C)

PM Hawke: I must say that Carla Hills...excellent in cooperation with us. George, obviously I could not complete this conversation without asking about the Gulf. (C)

The President: I wish you would ask in two weeks when we will know the results of my trip. We are moving more troops. The sanctions appear to be working. To be honest, I cannot say to what degree. I still want a peaceful solution. I am increasingly concerned about the embassy and the condition of the hostages. We have a lively debate at home with some of the usual critics. It is almost a post-Vietnam syndrome debate.

Meanwhile, we continue to build our forces so that if we need to use force we will prevail and prevail rapidly. (C)

Overall, I think it is going well. I think I can handle the controversy. The press just loves controversy. Can you imagine if this were World War II and the press asking Franklin Roosevelt or some general, or some Australian general, and then turning to ask Hitler his point of view? They tend to blame things here. (C)

I have taken on a little water. Tonight I will do a CNN interview and spell out our goals and objectives once again. Maybe you can catch that. Basically I am in a good frame of mind on this. I am pleased the UN Security Council is holding. You have seen the speculation on a UN resolution on the use of force. There is no decision. I will talk to Mitterrand and Gorbachev. I feel good about this. There are no time lines about working this. Basically you got me on a morning when I feel fairly upbeat. (C)

PM Hawke: George, you know we remain supportive of what you are doing. There can be no conditionality on anything, including the release of the hostages. We share the hope that this will be resolved peacefully as a rational judgment by Saddam Hussein in the interest of his own people. If other means are necessary, I hope you will be able to consult with us as much as possible. I understand the constraints. I know what you mean when you say you have taken some water aboard, but Australia continues to support you as you press for a peaceful... If the circumstances change, I hope you can consult as early as possible. (C)

The President: Bob, that is understandable. You know I get a sense of camaraderie, maybe it is a World War II memory, when I see Australians taking part in boarding parties and other activities. It makes me feel warm. We know you have got kids there, as we have got a hell of a lot. (C)

PM Hawke: We are with you. (C)

The President: Give Hazel our love. (U)

PM Hawke: On the first matter, I hope you will stay in touch with us. In its way, it poses a threat to the world situation comparable to the threat in Iraq. (C)

The President: Barbara, if she were sitting here, would say the same thing. I hope our paths cross soon. (C)

PM Hawke: Same to you, George. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 16, 1990

16/11/90

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH:

for KARL JACKSON *DB*

FROM:

DOUGLAS PAAL *DB*

SUBJECT:

Telcon with Bob Hawke, Prime Minister of
Australia on November 15, 1990

At Tab A is the Telcon between the President and the Prime
Minister of Australia of November 15, 1990.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum
of Telephone Conversation at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann/State-USTR Memorandum of Transmittal
Tab A Telcon

cc: Eric Melby
R. Haass

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 7/15/09

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Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 16, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DAVID A. WEISS
Executive Secretary
U.S. Trade Representative

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Telcon with
Bob Hawke, Prime Minister of Australia (U)

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0752-MR
JL 8/2/11

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of the President's telephone conversation with Prime Minister Hawke on November 15, 1990. This should be distributed by the Department of State to a minimum number of recipients via NODIS channels and should not be distributed below the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. This may be sent to the Embassy in Canberra but distributed to the Chief and Deputy Chief of Mission only. Please ensure that the actions indicated by the President are carried out with respect to the Uruguay Round's fast-track legislation and debriefing the Australians on consultations in Europe. (U)



William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

cc: Stephen P. Farrar

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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Ken Hill

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

1

Ky

A

Bill Sittmann

2

W

TABE

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

3

LMH/16

D

NSC Secretariat

4

LMH/16

D

90 NOV 16 P 1:46

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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