

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91149
Folder ID Number: 91149-003

Folder Title:
Other (June 1990) [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	6	7

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Fiber Optics (1 pp.)	6/8/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Cover Letter	Ambassador D. J. Hall to Timothy E. Deal Re: COCOM (1 pp.)	6/7/90	(b)(1)	
01c. Text	Re: Letter of 7 June from the Prime Minister to President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl, and Prime Minister Kaifu (1 pp.)	6/7	(b)(1)	
02. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points [Houston Economic Summit] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03. Cable	Re: Letter from Prime Minister Antall to the President on June 7 Warsaw Pact Summit (4 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	C
04a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04b. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush Re: [French] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04c. Letter	Prime Minister Andreotti to President Bush Re: Unofficial Translation of the Letter from T.H. Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister of Italy, to T.H. George Bush, President of the United States of America (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Chronological Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Other (June 1990) [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1244

OA/ID Number: 91149-003

Date Closed: 7/14/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04d. Letter	Prime Minister Andreotti to President Bush Re: Italian (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04e. Letter	President Carlos Andres Perez to President Bush Re: Unofficial State Department Translation (1 pp.)	6/2/90	(b) (1)	
04f. Letter	President Carlos Andres Perez to President Bush Re: Spanish (2 pp.)	6/4/90	(b)(1)	
04g. Letter	President Felipe Gonzalez to President Bush Re: English (2 pp.)	5/30/90	(b)(1)	
04h. Letter	President Felipe Gonzalez to President Bush Re: Spanish (2 pp.)	5/30/90	(b)(1)	
05a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Preparations for the Houston Economic Summit (3 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	S
05b. Declaration	Re: Houston Declaration on Securing Democracy and Prosperity (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05c. Memo	Eric Melby to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting with Governor Sununu on Houston Summit, 11:15 a.m., June 15 (1 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	S
05d. Report	Re: Western Assistance for the USSR: An Initiative for the Houston Summit (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 4

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06a. Memo	Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: French Views on NATO (2 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	S
06b. Letter	Robert F. Ellsworth to Brent Scowcroft (3 pp.)	5/23/90	(b)(1)	
06c. Memo	Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: NATO as a "Political" Organization (5 pp.)	3/26/90	(b)(1)	S
07. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Chief of Staff Re: Coordination of Administration Action on Taiwan and the GATT (1 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	
08a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Background Reading on the Houston Economic Summit (1 pp.)	6/15/90	(b)(1)	S
08b. Background Report	Re: International Debt (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
08c. Background Report	Re: The Uruguay Round (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
08d. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Background Reading for the President for the Houston Economic Summit (1 pp.)	6/8/90	(b)(1)	S
09a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	6/22/90	(b)(1)	S

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09b. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush Re: Courtesy Translation (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09c. Letter	Office of the Prime Minister Tokyo to President Bush Re: [Page 1] (1 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	
10a. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: White House Summit Group Meeting, June 20, 9 a.m., Situation Room (3 pp.)	6/19/90	(b)(1)	✓
10b. Declaration	Re: Houston Declaration on Securing Democracy and Prosperity (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11a. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush Re: Department of State Translation (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
11b. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush Re: French (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
11c. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush Re: French (2 pp.)	6/7/90	(b)(1)	
11d. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush Re: French (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004615
RECEIVED: 08 JUN 90 11

COCHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 08 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: COCOM
USSR

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FIBER OPTICS

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 12 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF: 9003563 9004344

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/14/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND _____ W/ATTCH _____

OPENED BY: NSJRP

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4615

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 8, 1990

INFORMATION

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TD*

SUBJECT: Fiber Optics

The British Embassy forwarded to me for our information the text of Thatcher's letters to Mitterrand, Kohl, and Kaifu regarding fiber optics (Tab I).

Concurrence by: Robert Blackwill *RB*

Attachment

Tab I Text of Thatcher Letters

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0782-MR

10/30/2014 MM



British Embassy

3100 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington DC 20008

Telex Domestic USA 89-2370/89-2384

Telex International 64224(WUI)/440015(ITT)

Telephone (202) 462-1340

Mr Timothy E Deal
Special Assistant to the President
International Economic Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
17th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue NW

Your reference

Our reference

Date 7 June 1990

Washington DC 20506

Dear Tim

COCOM: OPTICAL FIBRE TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROJECTS FOR THE USSR

1. As I mentioned to you on the telephone, I have been asked to let you have the text of a message which the Prime Minister sent on 7 June to President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Kaifu in support of the President's message to them of 5 June. The text of this is attached.

Finura

D J Hall

D J Hall

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0782-MR
10/30/2014 MM



LETTER OF 7 JUNE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, CHANCELLOR KOHL AND PRIME MINISTER KAIFU

"President Bush has written to inform you of his decision to refuse an application for an export licence by an international consortium to install a transcontinental fibre optics system across the Soviet Union. I am writing to let you know that, after careful consideration, the British Government has taken a similar decision in respect of an export licence application from a different group of companies, also to lay a fibre optics link across the Soviet Union.

I strongly support President Bush's remarks on the importance of preventing the damage which the export of such technology to the Soviet Union would cause to our collective security. I hope very much that you will feel able to take a similar position if you receive applications from companies in your country. I believe that it is in our common interest to work closely on this question."

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0782-MA

10/30/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004707
RECEIVED: 12 JUN 90 12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 12 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ECONOMIC SUMMIT

ANSA



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMIT INITIATIVE FOR SCOWCROFT 12 JUN MTG RE HOUSTON ECONOMIC
SUMMIT

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 15 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF: 9004172 9004617

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL

NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSALW

CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 1 OF 1

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: mc

LOG # 4707

URGENT ~~NOT PROOFED~~ **RECEIVED** D

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG mc A/O _____

90 JUN 12 P12. 45 SEQUENCE TO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>Bill Sittmann</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>has copy</u>	<u>I</u>
<u>Bob Gates</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>has copy</u>	
<u>Brent Scowcroft</u>	<u>3</u>		
<u>Bill Sittmann</u>	<u>has</u>	<u>Seen</u>	
<u>Situation Room</u>			
<u>West Wing Desk</u>	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
<u>NSC Secretariat</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>TRP</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	<u>I = Information</u>	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

APNSA has
 Greenspan is out-of-town. He is in "General Agreement" w/ paper. Has some questions w/ regard to technical aspects.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4707

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ADMIN FILE

June 12, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TE*

SUBJECT: Summit Initiative: Your Meeting at 3:30 p.m.,
June 12

*Natl Sec Advisor
has seen*

Attached are talking points on the proposed Summit initiative for use at your meeting today with Baker, Brady, et al (Tab I).

Attachment
Tab I Talking Points

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/14/09

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Talking Points

- At Houston, the President must be able to demonstrate American leadership on international economic issues.
- He has said Houston should stress the link between democracy and free markets.
- The proposed Charter for Democracy and Growth involves an ambitious plan to review international economic institutions in order to focus them better on promoting democracy and free markets.
- This is an idea whose time has come. Yet, there will be resistance -- and with good reason given the magnitude of the task.
- But I fear if the President does not take the lead at Houston, someone else will in the next year or so, and the President will be seen as reacting to their proposals.
- The NATO Summit will deal with the new political architecture for the postwar era.
- The Houston Declaration could be its economic counterpart.
- Nothing in this exercise, however, will be intended to undercut existing economic policy coordination through the G-7 process. On the contrary, it should strengthen it.

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2010-0782-MR
10/30/2014 MM

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004793
RECEIVED: 14 JUN 90 15

TO: PRESIDENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: ANTALL, JOZSEF

DOC DATE: 12 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HUNGARY
HS

SUMMIT



PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: CABLE TO PRES FM PM ANTALL OF HUNGARY RE HUNGARIAN EVALUATION OF
SUMMIT RESULTS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 18 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
CLARK
HUTCHINGS
STATE

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/14/09

COMMENTS: _____

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CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 1 OF 1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

LOG 9004793
DATE 12 JUN 90

SUBJECT: CABLE TO PRES FM PM ANTALL OF HUNGARY RE HUNGARIAN EVALUATION OF
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

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WASHINGTON, DC 20590

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/14/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9004793

REFERRAL

DATE: 14 JUN 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: ANTALL, JOZSEF

DATE: 12 JUN 90

SUBJ: CABLE TO PRES FM PM ANTALL OF HUNGARY RE HUNGARIAN EVALUATION OF
SUMMIT RESULTS

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE DATE: 19 JUN 90

COMMENT:

FOR



GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

4793

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRF VANERON

SIT: BENFO BLACKWILL HUTCHINGS PRES_MSGS VAX

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG 141514Z JUN 90

FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

TO RUEHC:SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7062
INFO RUEADWW WHITE HOUSE WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BUDAPEST 06964
EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE PASS NSC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPDC, PREL, WTO, HU, US

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER ANTALL TO THE
- PRESIDENT ON JUNE 7 WARSAW PACT SUMMIT

REFS: (A) STATE 178617

- (B) BUDAPEST 6933

1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.)

-
BEGIN SUMMARY

2. SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER ANTALL'S JUNE 12
----- RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S PRE-MOSCOW
SUMMIT MESSAGE (REF A) WAS PRESENTED TO US BY THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY JUNE 14. ACCORDING TO A MINISTRY
STAFFER, ANTALL'S LETTER ALSO RESPONDS TO THE
PRESIDENT'S SUGGESTION TO HUNGARIAN PRESIDENT GONCZ,
AT THE WHITE HOUSE MAY 18, THAT HUNGARY'S NEW LEADERS
ARE WELCOME TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY BY PHONE OR
LETTER ON MATTERS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN- IN HIS
LETTER, ANTALL STRESSES GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF
THE U.S. MILITARY ROLE IN EUROPE, WHICH ANTALL
HIMSELF STRONGLY SUPPORTS, AND URGES THAT THE JULY
NATO COUNCIL MEETING FURTHER EMPHASIZE THE ENHANCING
OF NATO POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN ORDER TO
STRENGTHEN THE WARSAW PACT REVIEW PROCESS AND
GORBACHEV'S OWN POSITION. ANTALL'S CAREFULLY-
FORMULATED MESSAGE ALSO EXPRESSES A PREFERENCE FOR
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER TIMING OF A VISIT TO THE U.S.,
ALTHOUGH MFA STAFFERS NOTE THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO
TWO ENGAGEMENTS: MRS. THATCHER IN BUDAPEST
SEPTEMBER 18-20, AND TO ADDRESSING THE COUNCIL
OF EUROPE IN STRASBOURG OCTOBER 2. END SUMMARY.
>END SUMMARY>

3. BEGIN TEXT. (MFA TRANSLATION:
THE HONORABLE GEORGE H. W. BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

U. S. A.

BUDAPEST, JUNE 12, 1990

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

-- MAY I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS MY MOST
SINCERE THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER CONCERNING YOUR RECENT
TALKS WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. YOUR INFORMATION HAS
GREATLY ASSISTED MY WORK AT THE WARSAW TREATY SUMMIT

MEETING IN MOSCOW. THEREFORE, I AM PARTICULARLY
DELIGHTED TO RECIPROCATATE YOUR FRIENDLY GESTURE AND
INFORM YOU ABOUT THE HUNGARIAN EVALUATION OF THE
SUMMIT RESULTS.

-- AS IT IS ALREADY KNOWN, ISSUES ON THE SUMMIT
AGENDA INCLUDED THE ALL-EUROPEAN PROCESS, THE
PERSPECTIVES OF CREATING NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY
STRUCTURES AND OF STRENGTHENING STABILITY. CONTRARY

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2010-0782-MR

10/30/2014 MM

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

TO THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL AIMING AT THE MODERNIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION. THE ISSUE OF REVISING THE NATURE, FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITY OF THE WARSAW TREATY WAS DISCUSSED ON MY INITIATIVE.

-- I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THAT AS A RESULT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CHANGE OF SYSTEM THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES, LEADERS OF THE STATE-MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY UNEQUIVOCALLY COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO IMPLEMENT A PLURALIST POLITICAL DEMOCRACY, A MARKET ECONOMY WITH AN APPROPRIATE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, RULE BY LAW, AND REINFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEIR DOMESTIC POLITICS. THEY ALSO COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO THE IDEA OF CREATING A EUROPEAN REGION UNITED IN POLITICAL, SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN AND LEGAL TERMS. I SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THIS WILL HAVE TO INDISPENSABLY INCLUDE THE RESPONSIBLE PARTICIPATION BY BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, AND THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE LINE THAT UP TILL NOW DIVIDED OUR CONTINENT MUST BE ABOLISHED, AND NOT TO BE REDRAWN FURTHER EAST. THE MILITARY PRESENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPE CONSTITUTES A STABILIZING FACTOR.

BT

#6964

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BUDAPEST 06964
EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE PASS NSC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPDC, PREL, WTO, HU, US

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER ANTALL TO THE WHICH WILL RETAIN ITS DETERMINING POSITIVE INFLUENCE EVEN AFTER THE RESTORATION OF GERMAN UNITY. FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE HUNGARIAN POSITION IN THIS ISSUE, I WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED BY PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S REMARKS AT THE SUMMIT WELCOMING THE MILITARY COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPE AND EMPHASIZING ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

-- I WAS DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION IN THIS SPIRIT BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE DIVISION OF NEITHER EUROPE, NOR THAT OF THE GERMAN NATION CANNOT BE MAINTAINED. IT IS OF PRINCIPAL IMPORTANCE THAT GERMAN UNITY IS ACCOMPLISHED AS PART OF THE ALL-EUROPEAN PROCESS. THE COMMITMENTS OF GERMANY DERIVING FROM ITS MEMBERSHIP IN NATO AND THE EEC PROVIDE THE NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE GUARANTEES TO FULLY ACHIEVE ITS SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT THREATENING THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ITS NEIGHBORS AND OF THE ENTIRE CONTINENT. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT GERMANY

WILL BECOME AN INTEGRAL PARTNER IN BUILDING THE UNIFIED EUROPEAN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, HUMANITARIAN AND LEGAL SPACE. THE 2 PLUS 4 TALKS WILL BE CAPABLE OF CREATING THE NECESSARY GUARANTEES FOR THIS. THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY ENDEAVORS TO MAINTAIN WITH THE NEW UNIFIED GERMANY THE ALLIANCE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS BASED ON AGREEMENTS EXISTING WITH THE GDR. BOTH GERMAN STATES COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO US IN THIS REGARD.

-- ALL PARTICIPANTS OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT SHARE NEED FOR THE INSTITUTIONALIZED FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALL-EUROPEAN PROCESS.

-- IN THIS CONTEXT I UNDERLINED THE HUNGARIAN POSITION, THAT THE NEW STRUCTURE OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE SHOULD BE BASED ON BILATERAL AND INTER-REGIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED ON THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

BASIS OF THE HELSINKI PRINCIPLES, AND ESTABLISHED THROUGH THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE ALL-EUROPEAN PROCESS. IT SHOULD BE BASED ON THE ALREADY EXISTING AND PROPERLY FUNCTIONING EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS. IT IS ALSO DESIRABLE TO RELY ON THE STABLE AND ESTABLISHED ATLANTIC COOPERATION IN THE PROCESS OF CREATING THE UNIFIED EUROPE, WHICH HAS DEMONSTRATED IN TWO WORLD WARS THAT EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA ARE INSEPARABLE, INDEPENDENTLY WHICH SIDE IS TAKEN BY THE INDIVIDUAL STATES.

-- THE MAIN ISSUE OF THE SUMMIT FOCUSED ON THE FUTURE OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION. IN THIS CONTEXT I EMPHASIZED THE POSITION OF THE HUNGARIAN PARLIAMENT, AND THAT OF MY GOVERNMENT, THAT AS A REMNANT OF A BIPOLAR IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION, THE ORGANIZATION HAS LOST ITS VIABILITY IN ITS PRESENT FORM. THEREFORE, NOT ITS MODERNIZATION OR DEMOCRATIZATION, BUT ITS COMPREHENSIVE REVISION IS REQUIRED. WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE MILITARY STRUCTURE OF THE WARSAW TREATY WILL NOT BE NECESSARY ANY LONGER IN THE PROCESS OF BUILDING THE NEW EUROPE. THEREFORE IT WOULD BE PRACTICABLE TO ABOLISH IT BY THE 1992 HELSINKI CSCE SUMMIT.

-- PURSUANT TO OUR FIRMLY REPRESENTED OPINION, THE SUMMIT DECIDED TO SET UP A SPECIAL TASK FORCE OF DELEGATES FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE STATE-MEMBERS, WHICH IS CHARGED TO SUBMIT ITS PROPOSALS WITHIN FOUR MONTHS CONCERNING THE COMPREHENSIVE REVISION OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION, INCLUDING ALSO THE START OF THE IMMEDIATE DISMANTLING OF THE MILITARY COOPERATION STRUCTURE.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, THE VIEWS OF THE STATE-MEMBERS REVEALED THAT THE REVISION AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE WARSAW TREATY MAY ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF THE BROADENING OF THE ALL-EUROPEAN PROCESS WILL KEEP PACE WITH THE CREATION OF A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION SYSTEM, WITHOUT DISRUPTING THE EXISTING BALANCE OF POWER. THEREFORE I AM OF THE OPINION THAT IT WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE IF THE NATO

#6964

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WHITE HOUSE PASS NSC

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPDC, PREL, WTO, HU, US

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER ANTALL TO THE COUNCIL MEETING SCHEDULED FOR EARLY JULY, WHICH WILL ALMOST COINCIDE WITH THE START OF THE AFOREMENTIONED TASK FORCE, WOULD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE THE PARALLELS OF THE WAY OF THINKING AND DEVELOPMENT WITHIN BOTH ALLIANCE SYSTEMS, AND WOULD STRONGLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY SUPPORT THE THOUGHT OF STRENGTHENING THE POLITICAL NATURE OF NATO, GOING BEYOND THE CONFRONTATIONAL IDEOLOGICAL APPROACHES AND DOCTRINES, AND THAT OF DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION. I AM CONVINCED THAT SUCH AN INITIATIVE WOULD PROVIDE EFFECTIVE AND SPECIFIC HELP NOT ONLY IN IMPLEMENTING MY GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY AND FURTHERING THE COMMON EUROPEAN INTEREST, BUT ALSO IN STRENGTHENING THE POSITIONS OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, WHOM WE BOTH HIGHLY REGARD.

-- FINALLY, IT IS ALSO OF IMPORTANCE THAT THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

HUNGARIAN SIDE AGAIN GAVE SPECIAL EMPHASIS TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BASKET THREE AND THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS. INCLUDING THE COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF NATIONAL MINORITIES. WE HAVE ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE STATE-MEMBERS HARMONIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF VALUES AND NORMS IN THIS AREA AS WELL. TO MY GREAT REGRET, ONLY SLIGHT DEVELOPMENT WAS ACHIEVED IN THIS ISSUE. I AM CONVINCED THAT ON THE BASIS OF OUR SHARED VALUES, THE UNITED STATES, AND PERSONALLY YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, WILL BE ABLE TO OFFER ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN THIS REGARD.

-- I BELIEVE THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND OF THE UNFOLDING ALL-EUROPEAN COOPERATION, THE ISSUES COVERED ABOVE FULLY JUSTIFY TO WELCOME YOUR MOST HONORING PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH REGULAR CONTACTS BETWEEN US.

-- I AM ALSO GREATLY HONORED TO ACCEPT YOUR KIND INVITATION TO WASHINGTON. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO MY VISIT AS WELL AS TO DEEPENING AND BROADENING OUR COOPERATION, WITH GREAT EXPECTATIONS. AS FOR MY PART, LATE SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER SEEMS TO OFFER THE MOST OPPORTUNE DATES.

YOURS SINCERELY,
S
DR. JOZSEF ANTALL
END TEXT.
FURSCH
BT
#6964

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

CHRON FILE
RECORD ID: 9004720
RECEIVED: 12 JUN 90 15

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: VAN ERON
SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 13 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS
FRANCE
VENEZUELA

AUSTRALIA
ITALY
JAMAICA

PERSONS: HAWKE, ROBERT
ANDREOTTI, GIULIO

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS
PEREZ, CARLOS A

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY FOR 13 JUN

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 15 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON

LOGREF: 9001062 9003686

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
VAN ERON

Pls copy only:

Mitterrand 6/8

Andreotti 6/6

Perez 6/2

Gonzalez 5/80

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/14/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4720

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

Prime Minister Hawke of Australia - June 12, 1990
(Received June 12)

PM Hawke writes on behalf of the Australian commercial space launching service, Cape York Space Agency Pty Ltd (CYSA). CYSA has the potential to offer significant long-term economic benefits and is capable of making an important contribution to Australia's industrial and technological development. United Technologies' USBI has been chosen as Australia's international partner in this project. PM Hawke hopes that you will approve of USBI's participation as CYSA's program manager.

President Mitterrand of France - June 8, 1990
(Received June 11)

President Mitterrand acknowledges your letter on the modernization of COCOM and agrees that the list should be streamlined to eliminate obsolete items.

Prime Minister of Andreotti of Italy - June 6, 1990
(Received June 11)

PM Andreotti acknowledges your May 25 letter concerning China. He shares your assessment that isolation serves no end and that ties with China should be maintained. He hopes that during the Houston Summit, the G7 will identify a joint position towards China which will achieve common objectives and establish a more satisfactory balance in Asia.

President Perez of Venezuela - June 2, 1990
(Received June 8)

President Perez appreciates your letter of June 1 concerning Venezuelan participation at the Rome (pledging) Conference on behalf of Nicaragua. He informs you of his recent meeting with Dr. Montealegre, one of President Chamorro's economic advisors, who proposed a solution to Nicaragua's outstanding debt with Venezuela. Perez accepted his proposal and has begun to implement a framework agreement which will permit Nicaragua to receive oil soon. Venezuela's program of cooperation with Nicaragua will be formally introduced at the Rome Conference.

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0782-MR
10/30/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Acting Prime Minister Patterson of Jamaica - May 31, 1990
(Received June 8)

✓ Acting PM Patterson appreciates your concern regarding the illness of PM Manley. He reports that Manley's specific virus, which led to his bout of pneumonia, has been identified and that he is responding positively to treatment. He thanks you for your offers of logistical and other support.

President Gonzalez of Spain - May 30, 1990
(Received June 8)

✓ President Gonzalez acknowledges your April 12 letter concerning his meetings with the Vice President on the Nicaraguan transition. Spain is participating in a Managua seminar on the Spanish transition. This seminar is designed to establish and to consolidate an atmosphere of cooperation and coexistence among Nicaraguans. Spain will also participate in the Donors Conference in Rome which will examine the Nicaraguan economic crisis.

Gonzalez is convinced that the best way to increase private investor confidence is to obtain peace through the demobilization process in Nicaragua. He hopes that you will assist in this effort.

President Mitterrand of France - May 2, 1990
(Received June 11)

President Mitterrand invites you to designate a U.S. representative at the EBRD signing ceremony in Paris on May 29.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

Monsieur le Président, Cher George,

J'ai pris connaissance avec beaucoup d'intérêt de votre récent message, présentant les orientations que vous proposez pour la modernisation du contrôle des exportations stratégiques au sein du comité de coordination (COCOM).

Comme vous-même, je considère que l'efficacité et la légitimité de ces contrôles exigent qu'ils soient adaptés aux évolutions de la situation internationale et des technologies.

Or, les contrôles existants ne nous paraissent plus convenir, sous ces deux points de vue, aux exigences de l'heure. Je suis heureux que nos jugements sur ce point convergent désormais. Le souci de la préservation de nos intérêts stratégiques et celui de notre contribution à la reconstruction des économies de l'Est européen ne sont pas contradictoires: nous devons donc nous entendre pour réduire les contrôles aux stricts besoins de notre sécurité.

Vous évoquez différentes possibilités concrètes de modernisation du régime des contrôles.

J'approuve votre volonté de définir rapidement une liste réduite de biens et technologies particulièrement sensibles dont nous devrions continuer d'assurer la protection à l'avenir; les biens ne figurant pas sur cette liste bénéficieraient, ipso facto, d'une levée des contrôles. Ce sont des principes que la France avait elle-même préconisés. J'attacherais du prix à ce que nos deux pays s'entendent pour aboutir, sur ces bases, au sein du COCOM à la définition rapide d'un régime de contrôle profondément renoué.

Durant les quelques mois nécessaires à la négociation d'une liste restreinte de produits stratégiques, nous devons continuer à procéder à l'élimination des contrôles sur les articles désormais manifestement dépassés par l'évolution technologique. La France continue en outre à soutenir l'idée que le niveau de contrôles consenti à la Chine dès 1985 peut, sans aucun préjudice pour notre sécurité, être immédiatement accordé à l'ensemble des pays visés par le COCOM. Nous espérons que cela sera prochainement décidé pour tous les secteurs, et bien sûr en tout premier lieu pour ceux que les délégations au COCOM se sont accordées à considérer comme prioritaires pour la reconstruction économique des pays de l'Est européen.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de ma très haute considération et de mes sentiments amicaux.

Signé : François MITTERRAND

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Letter	Prime Minister Andreotti to President Bush Re: Unofficial Translation of the Letter from T.H. Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister of Italy, to T.H. George Bush, President of the United States of America (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed:	7/14/2009	OA/ID Number:	91149-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04d. Letter	Prime Minister Andreotti to President Bush Re: Italian (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed:	7/14/2009	OA/ID Number:	91149-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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Kuala Lumpur
2 June 1990

His Excellency
George Bush
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

Dear Mr. President and Friend:

Thank you for your letter of June 1, communicating your interest in Venezuelan participation at the (Rome pledging) conference to be hosted by the Government of Italy June 6 and 7, on behalf of Nicaragua.

The Nicaraguan people have demonstrated their great efforts to advance the cause of peace and democracy, and now need the support of the international community to consummate a happy ending to their difficult transition.

Our government has demonstrated its efforts to offer assistance to Nicaragua, despite, as you well know, our own limited economic capacity to offer the help which we would otherwise like to extend.

Last week I met with an economic advisor to the president of Nicaragua -- Dr. Haroldo Montealegre, who proposed his government's solution to its outstanding debt with Venezuela. We accepted his proposal and we have begun to implement a framework agreement which will permit Nicaragua to receive oil soon.

Our program of cooperation Nicaragua will be formally presented to the Rome (pledging) Conference, where Venezuela will be represented by Dr. Beatrice Rangel, who is instructed to make contact with your government's representative, Dr. Ronald Roskens.

Sincerely,

Carlos Andres Perez

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04f. Letter	President Carlos Andres Perez to President Bush Re: Spanish (2 pp.)	6/4/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed:	7/14/2009	OA/ID Number:	91149-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04g. Letter	President Felipe Gonzalez to President Bush Re: English (2 pp.)	5/30/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed: 7/14/2009	OA/ID Number: 91149-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04h. Letter	President Felipe Gonzalez to President Bush Re: Spanish (2 pp.)	5/30/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed:	7/14/2009	OA/ID Number:	91149-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
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AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004806
RECEIVED: 14 JUN 90 17

TO: SUNUNU, J

FROM: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 14 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ECONOMIC SUMMIT
INTL TRADE

ENVIRONMENT
ANSA



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PREPARATIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 18 JUN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MELBY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL

MELBY

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/14/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4806
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG CM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>		<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	✓	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	✓	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room	<u>4</u>	<u>CM 1/14</u>	<u>N/R</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____
 Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Preparations for the Houston Economic Summit (3 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed:	7/14/2009	OA/ID Number:	91149-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Declaration	Re: Houston Declaration on Securing Democracy and Prosperity (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed: 7/14/2009	OA/ID Number: 91149-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS AT THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT

July 9 - 11, 1990

HOUSTON, TEXAS

1. First Session
Monday, July 9, 3:00 pm - 5:00 pm
-- Overview of Economic Summit; Declaration on
Democracy and Prosperity; Transition from Command
Economies
2. Second Session
Monday, July 9, 7:30 pm - 9:00 pm Dinner
-- Continuation of afternoon discussion
3. Third Session
Tuesday, July 10, 9:00 am - 12:15 pm
-- Trade; Developing Countries and Debt
4. Fourth Session
Tuesday, July 10, 12:45 pm - 2:30 pm Luncheon
-- Narcotics and Regional Issues
5. Fifth Session
Tuesday, July 10, 2:30 pm - 4:00 pm
-- Environment
6. Sixth Session
Wednesday, July 11, 9:00 am - 11:00 am
-- Other issues; Economic Communique
7. Seventh Session
Wednesday, July 11, 1:00 pm - 1:30 pm
-- Reading of Houston Communique

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05c. Memo	Eric Melby to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting with Governor Sununu on Houston Summit, 11:15 a.m., June 15 (1 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed:	7/14/2009	OA/ID Number:	91149-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05d. Report	Re: Western Assistance for the USSR: An Initiative for the Houston Summit (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed: 7/14/2009	OA/ID Number: 91149-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004741
RECEIVED: 13 JUN 90 10

TO: SCOWCROFT

ORIGINAL FILE

FROM: RODMAN

DOC DATE: 14 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

NATO



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON NATO

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 16 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RODMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
RODMAN

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/14/09

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 1 OF 1

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Encl. Views on NATO
National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MEN LOG # 4741
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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MSA/O

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>		
Bill Sittmann	<u>4</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>CPA</u>	<u>N</u>

APNSA Has Seen

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____
Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 14

To: Bob Gates

From: Peter Rodman

This is what
Adrian Basora referred
to at yesterday's
staff meeting.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE
4741

June 14, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PWR*
SUBJECT: French Views on NATO

Interesting
BD
Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

I was in Paris last week to take part in an NDU-CREST conference on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but I also had the opportunity to talk to a few interesting local folks on current NATO issues. Thierry de Montbrial spoke at a dinner I went to. I had lunch with Marc de Brichambaut, who is roughly Chevenement's Wolfowitz at the MOD. I had breakfast with Jean-Louis Gergorin.

Thierry's was a rather cynical performance. He criticized Americans for being too "sentimental." We were asking the Europeans to ask us to stay. He blurted out: "We will not ask you to stay." He agreed that Western strategy for the foreseeable future should focus on "European construction" and the Atlantic Alliance, together. But his enthusiasm seemed under control.

De Brichambaut and Gergorin were much more constructive. Bob Ellsworth had seen them both recently and had asked them what French officials had in mind these days when they told Americans that NATO had to be "restructured." Was this a polite brushoff, or were there some French ideas? (Ellsworth wrote you recently passing on the answers he got, at Tab I).

First of all, de Brichambaut told me, it meant changes in Alliance military strategy in light of the revolution in the East. He hoped for close UK-French bilateral consultation on these issues, because (of course) of the awkwardness (to the French) of the NATO forums.

Second, however, he endorsed the idea (which he had mentioned to Ellsworth) of an EC caucus in the NAC, provided the EC came around to such an idea.

*Travel
some*

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PER E.O. 13526

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MM 2/5/2016

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Beyond this, of a more practical nature, was his indication that France is now prepared to reach more public arrangements with NATO in the logistical area on the things it now does quietly.

Gergorin endorsed these ideas. He suggested a joint U.S.-French task force, perhaps composed of outsiders as well as insiders, to review all these ideas. General Lanxade was the key figure on the French side.

Gergorin also commented that the idea of a multinational corps in NATO was laughable. It reminded everyone of the MLF embarrassment of the mid-60's. (Chevenement has already criticized it publicly as unworkable.)

As you know from my earlier paper in March (Tab II), and the discussion we had at a beer and pretzel session, I see merit in coopting the French if at all possible.

NATO has to adapt to both revolutions -- the one in Western Europe as well as the one in Eastern Europe. The revolution in Eastern Europe threatens to undermine public support for defense and for NATO; the revolution in Western Europe -- if we could harness it to NATO -- could be NATO's salvation and an important way to make it "relevant" to the changes in Europe. An EC caucus in the NAC would reflect the big change since 1949 that there is now a European pillar, at least politically.

A "constitutional" restructuring of the Alliance that made NATO more acceptable in French eyes would be a coup for the West and for the President. Such a shift in French policy would also have its healthy impact in Germany. The French can sometimes be difficult on security issues, but when they're good they're very good... I think they can be coopted, and I think you should pursue this with Lanxade.

PRK for

Concurrence/Comment by: Bob Blackwill, Arnie Kanter

*But how
would it
work?*

Attachments

Tab I Ellsworth Letter dated
 May 23, 1990
Tab II Memorandum dated May 26, 1990

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH
2001 L STREET, N. W., SUITE 801
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
202/628-1144

May 23, 1990

Hon. Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent,

In Paris on Monday and yesterday, I took the opportunity (inspired partly by our mutual friend Peter Rodman) to visit with a couple of my friends who are French Mandarins, if that captures the cultural tone. De Brichambaut is in the MOD and Gergorin is in industry, but remains a darling of the French political class.

I asked them if they thought there were some way to get beyond the French telling us they would come back into a "New NATO" and we saying, What about a French SACEUR?

It seems that several papers are being written on this sort of issue. De Brichambaut is writing one for his boss and several people are writing papers in the Quai. In addition, President Mitterand is said to be thinking hard about these things, especially since his Key Largo meeting with President Bush.

There are essentially two alternative lines of thought being set forth in some of the papers.

One is called the Dark, or Realistic, alternative and it goes like this. The new Germany will be bigger, more eastern, more German and more neutralist than the FRG -- and much less responsive to American influence. The likelihood is that Germany will soon be nuclear-weapon-free, with very limited foreign or even German military forces: in effect a free floating, happy giant.

Hon. Brent Scowcroft
May 23, 1990
Page 2

But after five years, when Germany wakes up to the Russians, watch out. Already there have been a few mistakes made in arms control negotiations, going back at least to the INF outcome.

If American influence in Germany will be modest, French influence will be even less, and France should do nothing that would tend to get it entangled in any further arms control negotiations, especially nuclear negotiations -- or that would tend to make France responsible for German errors.

As for French -- and European -- security architecture, Paris should use a somewhat enhanced WEU, plus substantially enhanced bi-lateral relations with the U.S. and the U.K., always keeping everything open for Germany but avoiding the risks of entanglement.

The alternative line of thought is called Constrictive Commitment, and would involve getting more deeply engaged in a modified NATO. (But with the clear understanding that Paris would retain its autonomy of decision-making on the possible use of its nuclear forces just as we always have.) There would be a much larger political role for the NATO Council through the development of an EC caucus, on the model of the EC caucus in the UNGA. Militarily, the SACEUR should be a U.S. officer but -- in light of the probable diminution of the U.S. nuclear presence in Germany -- the SACEUR's role would probably be somewhat diminished. There would be, however, a broad and active coordination among European and U.S. Chiefs of Staff, perhaps using the institution of SHAPE. If the NPG begins to lose its steam (thought to be the case already), there should be closer consultation among U.S., British and French nuclear planners. Everything should be open to the Germans.

On the best way to proceed, it is clear that Mitterand is thought to be too reactive a politician ever to put forward anything along these lines. If the U.S. wants to put forward a new proposal, though, Mitterand could be enlisted as a strong supporter if such proposal were explained to him well ahead of its being made public. He would be greatly flattered, for example, if

Hon. Brent Scowcroft
May 23, 1990
Page 3

President Bush called him and said he was sending a high-level emissary over to Paris to consult, on President Bush's behalf, on a new proposal for NATO. (It would be a nice touch, though not essential, if such emissary were to be fluent in French.)

The NATO Summit (in early July?) could issue a mandate to the NATO Perm Reps to work out the details in time for a NATO Revision Summit in December or January.

Hope this may be helpful to you, Brent. Keep up the good work. Your exquisitely good judgment, and that of President Bush, and the sound instincts of both of you, are serving all of us with excellent results.

As ever,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'B. Scowcroft', written in a cursive style.

bcc: Mr. Peter W. Rodman

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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March 26, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *pmr*

SUBJECT: NATO as a "Political" Organization

*Provocative
we need a
beer & pretzel
session in this.*

1935

D

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

The notion that NATO should evolve into a "political" rather than "military" organization is a cliché of the current period. It is either a truism (since the military confrontation is indeed easing) or else escapism, since it implies an aversion to addressing continuing needs of security. Facile repetition of the cliché only encourages Europeans to put NATO way down on their list below a number of other institutions doing Europe's "political" business (EC, CSCE, Council of Europe, EBRD), most of which have the appeal of having their center of gravity in Europe itself.

NATO's center of gravity, of course, is not in Europe but somewhere in the Atlantic. This, I believe, is the deeper problem. Even for Europeans who take security seriously (especially the French), the problem is less an aversion to the link with the United States than aversion to the American structural preponderance within the Alliance. In its organization and procedures, it continues to reflect "America plus all the rest" rather than the more equal partnership of "America plus Europe" that 20 years of European integration would logically and politically warrant. Gimmicks such as forming a NATO verification staff or pushing NATO toward out-of-area discussions thus miss the point. NATO, in my view, will simply not hack it as a "political" organization in the new era unless its own arrangements are better adapted to reflect the real new transatlantic balance.

Today's new uncertainties about NATO's future, therefore, warrant a fresh look at building a "European pillar" within the Alliance, as indeed the President foresaw in his BU speech.

"Dumbbellism" and Its Difficulties

The long-standing objections and obstacles to "dumbbellism" have not disappeared; nor is it an accident that European integration has not advanced very far in the defense field. There is the

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AS AMENDED
2007-0496-MR
12/28/2009 MM

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concern that it would weaken the American link as well as the grip on Germany. There is the desire of smaller countries (Italy, Benelux) not to be dominated by their European neighbors. There are the German and British desires to preserve their special bilateral links to us. Today, moreover, the receding of the Soviet threat may sap any new defense exertions such as a European enterprise in this area.

But there is another possibility. SDI and then Reykjavik spurred serious Europeans to expand their own cooperation. The French push to revive the Western European Union; expanded French-German cooperation; an informal "cabal" (for a time) of the French, British, and Germans; new elaborations of French strategic doctrine -- all reflected a new felt need to assert more influence over defense decisions as well as to respond to new uncertainties about extended deterrence. The key question now is whether more recent events -- CFE and the perception of the beginning of U.S. troop withdrawal; the yearning to seize more control over Europe's unfolding destiny; the greater plausibility of Western Europe as a strategic power in light of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and weakening of the Soviet Union (on top of START and British/French nuclear modernization) -- might not give fresh impetus to European security cooperation.

The value of a European pillar would be manifold, both as a hedge against worst-case outcomes and as a new concept for the Alliance in new conditions. For one thing, it is in the strategic interest of the West as a whole to ensure that, if there is an American pull-back from Europe, the West Europeans fill the vacuum -- and in present circumstances this is easier for them to accomplish by strengthening cohesion than by increasing forces. But the immediate benefit to the Alliance would be that "Europeanizing" our allies' defense effort may be the only way to sustain public support for it in a new age of seductive calls for a "European peace order."

The Institutional Confusion

Another obstacle to a European pillar is Europe's institutional confusion -- the lack of "interoperability" among NATO, the EC, and the WEU:

- The EC is strengthening its political cooperation but may be distracted and diluted after 1992 by the task of absorbing the East Europeans. This being said, the EC remains the West European institution with the most political impetus.
- The WEU has at present little more than symbolic significance. Yet, the French had hopes for it as a system parallel to the EC.

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- The proliferation of bilateral and trilateral relations among Europeans (French-German; French-Spanish-Italian in the Western Med; possible UK-French) may complicate the matter further -- or else seem to obviate the need for a wider institution.
- NATO's Eurogroup could perhaps become the nucleus of a European entity within the Alliance, though it may never overcome its Uncle Tom image.

Ad hoc arrangements may sometimes work, such as the WEU's Persian Gulf activity in parallel with us a few years ago. But I fear that the present situation -- in particular, our desire to preserve NATO -- calls for something more durable.

Where to Go?

Personally, I suspect there will be a renewed effort within Europe to construct new arrangements in the defense field, in parallel with EC-92. The French will want new ways to harness the Germans; the British, if they're smart, will want the same -- and this should cause less heartburn in Number 10 than social charters and monetary unions. Already, Bundeswehr planners are reportedly expressing interest in strengthening French-German cooperation, as a response to expectations of U.S. troop reductions.

If the foregoing analysis makes sense, then the first requirement for us is a declaratory policy that endorses European defense cooperation -- as we have done in the recent past, but now keyed to today's new conditions. We should talk up our willingness to consider a "constitutional" shift within the Alliance, to reflect the new transatlantic balance, to harness the new positive force of West European unity, and to give Western defense solidarity a firmer popular basis in Europe.

Second, if some of the smaller European countries come to us pleading for continued American leadership, we should mobilize them to plead that case in European circles. Serious Europeans who care about both defense and the European identity (e., the French) know full well that no rational European defense system is possible without the intimate link with the U.S. that the Alliance will continue to provide. The 1987 Platform of the WEU, in fact, states the point eloquently.

Third, we should encourage the West Europeans to sort out their institutional confusion. Perhaps the WEU can serve a "bridging" function between the EC and NATO, acting as the defense caucus within the EC and as the European caucus within the Alliance.

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4

This would require a constitutional change in the EC as well as in NATO, but we shouldn't shy away from suggesting it if it's a logical solution.

Fourth, we should use CFE to help us shape such a pattern of allied consultation. NATO is right now proving its worth as the most logical and natural forum for our collective CFE deliberations. But, so far, these have followed the traditional pattern of the U.S. vetting its initiatives. As CFE shifts from U.S. and Soviet cuts to broader issues of national and stationed forces, there will be less room for U.S. unilateralism and more need for a more equal -- and better institutionalized -- U.S.-European give-and-take. The WEU could help the Europeans shape their own policies, within the Alliance framework.¹ If we are creative, we can establish a new pattern of collaboration that has broader, and lasting, political significance.

Fifth, as this develops, the day may finally dawn for Henry's pet idea of a European SACEUR, in partnership with CINCEUR, to reflect co-management of the defense of Europe. Or perhaps a European CINC of all European forces in the Alliance.

Sixth, the WEU could perhaps throw some kind of umbrella over the East Europeans, solving the riddle of what to do with the Warsaw Pact orphans now looking for a home. (This, of course, is an issue in itself. I think NATO should articulate some general principle that Soviet reintervention in "neutral" Eastern Europe would constitute a threat to the West. But the WEU could work directly with East Europeans on other aspects of their self-defense.)

Many of the above ideas will make us nervous, as they amount to a dilution of American control over Alliance policy. My thesis, however, is that this is already happening. Either we will see a further enervation of NATO, accompanied by further European escapism about security, or we will see some form of institutionalizing -- within the Alliance -- the new transatlantic balance that already exists. Serious Americans and serious Europeans should move fast and think boldly, or else NATO, the WEU, and all serious Western defense efforts could fall victim to the seductive silliness of the "European peace order."

We have been lucky so far (i.e., the GDR election). But the centrifugal forces in the West will grow stronger -- what with

¹The WEU could also coordinate European efforts in CFE verification (as well as out-of-area efforts like the Gulf). It is probably a more acceptable candidate for these tasks than NATO itself.

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5

trade squabbles, burdensharing debates, Soviet blandishments, and every country's hunger for a peace dividend. One of the most powerful forces at work now is Western Europe's growing sense of control over its own destiny. We must harness this before it runs away from us.

Comment by: PUR for Bob Blackwill and Arnie Kanter: They disagree with parts of the analysis herein and several of the conclusions.

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NSC/S PROFILE


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CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: SUNUNU, J

DOC DATE: 13 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: TAIWAN
INTL TRADE

GATT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUNUNU CONCURS W/ CIRCULATION OF GATT COORDINATION MSG TO AGENCIES

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 14 JUN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PAAL

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 7/14/09

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DOC 3 OF 3

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	<u>SI 10/16</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>1</u>	<u>10/16</u>	<u>DBZ/OWR</u>
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A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>LMS 6/14</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

See attached note

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: June 13, 1990

TO: General Scowcroft

FROM: GOVERNOR JOHN H. SUNUNU

The attached is fine with me.

Circulate as appropriate.

APNSA Has Seen

*said OK to
Send to Agencies*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE CHIEF OF STAFF
HAS SEEN

June 12, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Coordination of Administration Action on Taiwan
and the GATT

As we discussed earlier, I believe that the paragraph below, on coordinating Administration actions with respect to Taiwan and the GATT, should be circulated to relevant departments and agencies.

"Recently there has been considerable discussion about whether Taiwan should become a party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Taiwan's potential accession to the GATT has both economic and political dimensions that cannot be considered in isolation. Therefore, all Administration actions and statements with respect to the Taiwan/GATT issue should be coordinated in advance with the National Security Council."

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004617
RECEIVED: 08 JUN 90 15

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 15 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: ECONOMIC SUMMIT

INTL TRADE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND MATERIAL RE HOUSTON ECONOMIC SUMMIT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 12 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF: 9004172 9004627

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/14/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGAD

CLOSED BY: NSALW

DOC 2 OF 4

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Background Reading on the Houston Economic Summit (1 pp.)	6/15/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed:	7/14/2009	OA/ID Number:	91149-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08b. Background Report	Re: International Debt (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed: 7/14/2009	OA/ID Number: 91149-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE URUGUAY ROUND

SUMMARY

The Uruguay Round is the Administration's top trade priority. It has the potential to be the most significant and enduring trade policy accomplishment of your Presidency.

While the negotiations are scheduled to end in December, major issues remain. The Summit represents an important opportunity to secure a political commitment to an ambitious agreement.

Summit Objective

The goal of the Summit countries is the successful conclusion this year of an ambitious, balanced, and comprehensive Uruguay Round agreement. Our objective in Houston is to get clear agreement among the Heads to achieve substantial results in all areas. We are particularly seeking a clear commitment from the Europeans to fundamental reform of agricultural trade.

* * * * *

BACKGROUND

The Uruguay Round negotiations are entering the final stage.

The Uruguay Round was launched by the GATT Trade Ministers in 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay. There are 97 nations participating in the talks.

Unlike previous multilateral trade negotiations, which were limited to the goods sector, the Uruguay Round seeks to expand GATT to trade in services, investment, and intellectual property rights (IPR). In addition, the talks are aimed at modernizing and updating existing GATT disciplines, including the rules on agriculture, which are notably ineffective.

While the talks have made progress, the important issues remain unresolved. These issues will require hard bargaining and politically sensitive decisions by the participants.

The Uruguay Round is the key to your trade strategy.

The United States has taken the lead in pushing for an ambitious agreement. We were the first to propose a new round of GATT negotiations in the early 1980s, in part to deflect the protectionist pressures that were beginning to accumulate. We are the major proponent of a big Uruguay Round package.

While we have been successful at managing politically sensitive trade issues -- like Super 301 and steel -- we have done so by subordinating them to the broader goal of a Uruguay Round agreement. Accordingly, failure of the round could lead to a resurgence of efforts by the Congress to assert greater control over trade policy.

There has been limited appreciation of the round, but its visibility is increasing as business and the Congress become aware of the high stakes.

OUTLOOK

The most contentious Uruguay Round issues are likely to be agriculture, the so-called "new issues," and section 301.

Three broad issues run through the Uruguay Round negotiations:

The first concerns the rules governing agricultural trade and production. This involves the U.S., the European Community (EC), and a group of smaller agricultural exporting nations known as the "Cairns Group."

The second is a North-South debate that centers on the so-called new issues of services, investment, and IPR. While most industrialized nations provide roughly equivalent treatment in these areas, major aberrations are found in many developing countries.

The third issue is U.S. unilateralism -- our use of section 301 to challenge unfair trade practices outside the rules and procedures of the GATT.

1. AGRICULTURE: The Europeans are the key.

Several weeks ago, in your Rose Garden speech for World Trade Week, you laid down a marker with the European Community by saying that: "There simply cannot be a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round without fundamental agricultural reform."

While the GATT Trade Ministers agreed last year on the goal of "substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection, sustained over an agreed period of time," there is no consensus yet on the type or amount of reform required. Despite pressure from the U.S. and the Cairns

Group, the EC thus far has offered to make only modest changes in its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

A credible Uruguay Round agreement must address the three main components of existing farm programs: domestic supports, import restrictions, and export subsidies. Most governments, including the U.S. and EC, subsidize their farmers through price supports. These supports typically are coupled with import restrictions, e.g., section 22 and the European "variable levy," designed to insulate high domestic farm prices from the world market. Support programs encourage farmers to produce as much as possible, which tends to generate chronic surpluses. These surpluses must be disposed of on the world market. Export subsidies are used to bridge between the high domestic price and the lower world price.

The U.S. and the Cairns Group support a comprehensive agreement that contains specific commitments with respect to domestic supports and import restrictions and totally eliminates export subsidies. However, the EC has resisted fundamental reform. While paying lip service to general reductions in support and protection, it wants the flexibility to increase protection on specific products, such as U.S. corn gluten feed and soybeans. It also insists on preserving its ability to provide export subsidies, so that high-priced European products can be sold on the world market.

A compelling intellectual case can be made for agricultural reform. The OECD recently estimated the cost of agricultural support and protection to taxpayers and consumers in OECD countries at \$245 billion. These costs are likely to increase. There is no economic justification for export subsidies.

Our strategy is to increase the pressure on the EC, which is already isolated in GATT. We anticipate that this will strengthen the hand of reform-minded elements within the EC. At the OECD Ministerial, Ambassador Hills and Secretary Yeutter refused to agree with their European counterparts to a proposed communique, thereby setting the stage for Houston.

2. THE NEW ISSUES: Broad agreement among Summit countries.

Most industrialized nations already provide roughly equivalent treatment to foreign investment, services, and IPR. Consequently, the discussion in Houston is likely to focus on how to persuade the developing countries to agree to new rules and disciplines.

The developing countries are likely to link progress on the new issues to concessions by developed nations on textiles, antidumping, and safeguard measures (such as ending the steel voluntary restraint agreements). Accordingly, the final negotiations may raise politically sensitive trade-offs.

3. UNILATERALISM: The U.S. is likely to be criticized.

Other Summit participants may criticize the United States' use of section 301. They will argue that the U.S. has no right unilaterally to challenge the trade practices of other nations outside the internationally agreed rules and dispute settlement procedures of the GATT. The Europeans are likely to be particularly vociferous on this point, particularly if challenged on agriculture.

Our response has been that, where no rules or effective dispute settlement procedures exist, we have no choice but to resort to section 301.

If a big Uruguay Round package is fashioned, the U.S. will come under intense pressure to limit section 301. As you know, there is strong Congressional interest in section 301. Accordingly, while Ambassador Hills privately has signalled some flexibility, she has been careful to hold back, since the outlines of the final package are not yet apparent.

The Houston Summit is an important opportunity to secure a commitment to an ambitious agreement.

The 1978 Bonn Summit launched the final stage of the Tokyo Round negotiations. The Houston Summit can perform a similar function. Indeed, without a high-level commitment on agriculture, the negotiations are unlikely to move forward.

Consequently, in preparing for the summit, you might consider how best to achieve two objectives:

- o Securing a strong commitment from the Europeans on agriculture; and
- o Developing the requisite international support and commitment to completion of the round in December.

The stakes are high. A big Uruguay Round package will open new markets to American exports and strengthen the world trading system. Because the agreements of the round will be implemented by all 97 GATT nations and generalized through the "most-favored-nation" principle, there is no substitute for a successful round from the standpoint of encouraging free and fair trade worldwide. Increased trade will promote economic growth, thereby facilitating the integration of Eastern Europe and Latin America into the world economic system and helping to meet the expectations of their peoples.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08d. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Background Reading for the President for the Houston Economic Summit (1 pp.)	6/8/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed:	7/14/2009	OA/ID Number:	91149-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004914
RECEIVED: 19 JUN 90 10

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 20 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R
SINGAPORE
ISRAEL

JAPAN
MARSHALLS
USSR

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT
LEE KUAN YEW

KAIFU, TOSHIKI
KABUA, AMATA

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY FOR JUN 20

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 22 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON

LOGREF: 9003451 9003537

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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NSC CHRON

*Kohl letter
only*

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/14/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 1 OF 1

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PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02

By SS NARA, Date 3/4/24

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6/22/90 4914

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

**Chancellor Kohl of the FRG - Not Dated
(Received June 19)**

Chancellor Kohl informs you that the USSR has asked him to assist in the organization of a "broad consortium" on matters of economic reform and long-term financing. He has agreed to discuss this matter at the Houston Summit and hopes that a combined Western effort in assisting the USSR towards a market-oriented economy will be determined.

Gorbachev has also requested a short-term credit initiative on the part of private German banks, in which the Federal Government would act as guarantor. This request is being favorably considered. In connection with this, Kohl will urge the USSR to adopt a constructive approach to questions concerning German unification and its involvement in NATO and the EC. He hopes that a short-term initiative of this kind will effectively benefit the USSR's fulfillment of its obligations towards Western banks in general. He will inform you of further developments when you meet.

**Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan - June 14, 1990
(Received June 19)**

✓
✓ PM Kaifu writes a seven page letter concerning the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) Talks. He is firmly determined to honor what his government has committed itself to in the Interim Report. He strongly believes that the SII Final Report must be completed prior to the Houston Economic Summit. Not finishing the Final Report could be seen as a "symbol of conflict" between Japan and the U.S. Therefore, he has instructed his SII team to complete the Final Report at the fifth SII plenary session in Tokyo on June 25-26 and requests that you give similar instructions to the U.S. SII team.

He looks forward to frank discussions at the Economic Summit on how to improve and promote our global partnership.

**Prime Minister Lee of Singapore - June 14, 1990
(Received June 19)**

PM Lee strongly supports your decision to certify China's MFN status. He notes that Deng Xiaoping is over 85 years old and that "Long March" veterans cannot be made to change their thinking on how they should govern China. However, he is convinced that their potential successors already recognize and accept the fact that China has no choice but to become part of the world economy and cannot remain a closed society. He believes that the successors to the Long March veterans will come

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Courtesy Translation

~~Geheim~~

PRÉS NOTED SUMMARY

Dear George:

During the past few months there have been growing indications that the Soviet economy is undergoing an exceptionally difficult phase as a result of which negative repercussions for the country's international financial position cannot be ruled out. At the same time the Soviet Union has taken decisive steps in the direction of a "regulated market economy" by means of a reform program submitted to the Supreme Soviet.

President Gorbachev has now openly addressed the difficulties facing the Soviet national economy. He has informed me that the success of the Soviet Union on its course of Perestroika and reform is vitally important not only for the Soviet Union, but also for Europe and the world as a whole. Consequently, he has sought the support of the western partner countries in realizing Soviet reforms, including support in the form of long-term credits. In this connection he has asked me to assist in the organization of a "broad consortium".

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0701-MR
5/4/2010 MM

I have agreed to discuss this matter at the economic summit in Houston. I should like to draw this matter to your attention and suggest that we discuss all aspects of the situation in the Soviet Union in greater detail at our coming meeting. Today I would like to express my conviction that it is in our joint interests to support President Gorbachev's policy to the best of our ability. For this reason the outcome of our summit meeting should be not only a political but also an economic sign of our wish to cooperate. In this context I feel it is obvious, in view of the size of the Soviet Union and the concrete help it requires, that the western partners must combine their efforts to approach the task of advising and assisting the Soviet Union on its course towards market-oriented economic reforms. At the same time we should consider concrete steps for facilitating the Soviet Union's integration into the international division of labour and bringing it closer to the international economic organizations and financial institutions.

I very much hope that these views will meet with your approval.

President Gorbachev has also requested a short-term credit initiative on the part of private German banks, in which the Federal Government would act as guarantor. We are currently examining this request favorably. In this connection I would urge the Soviet Union, for its part, to adopt a constructive approach to questions arising on the path towards German unity - and this applies in particular to anchoring a future United Germany within the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. Moreover I would like to expressly

~~Geheim~~

- 3 -

underline that I view a short-term initiative of this kind, which would effectively benefit the Soviet Union's fulfilment of its obligations towards western banks as a whole, as a starting-point and at the same time as an impetus for medium-term action on a broad basis.

I will inform you of further developments when we meet.

Yours sincerely,

Helmut Kohl

Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
TOKYO

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

June 14, 1990

Dear



Ever since our last meeting at Palm Springs, I have devoted all my energies to solving the full range of economic issues pending between Japan and the United States. The very candid exchange of views at that time with you, George, made me acutely aware that an expeditious solution of the pending issues was imperative in further strengthening our bilateral relationship. My efforts have since then produced such concrete results as the compilation of the Interim Report of the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) Talks, and the solution of specific trade issues such as supercomputers, satellites and forest products.

It is my strong belief that our shared task is to lend further impetus to the positive developments hitherto achieved, and to cultivate a cooperative relationship -- the Japan-U.S. global partnership -- in a rich soil of friendship and trust befitting the relations between the two great democracies across the Pacific. Serious efforts to solve the pending issues, as we have witnessed on both

sides

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
U. S. A.

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004952
RECEIVED: 19 JUN 90 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: MELBY
DEAL

DOC DATE: 19 JUN 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ECONOMIC SUMMIT
INTL TRADE
ANSA

ENVIRONMENT
USSR



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: WH SUMMIT GRP MTG ON 20 JUN RE ENVIRONMENT / TRADE & SOVIET UNION

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 22 JUN 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MELBY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL
MELBY
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 7/14/09

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSDAI

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DOC 1 OF 1

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: WEA

LOG # 4952

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG WEA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>JRP 6/21</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508
June 19, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TE*

FROM: ERIC MELBY *EM*

SUBJECT: White House Summit Group Meeting, June 20, 9 a.m.,
Situation Room

Members
ED

It is essential at tomorrow's WHSG meeting to get agreement among principals on what we wish to accomplish at Houston and how best to position the President to achieving it. From past experience with the WHSG, you will have to push for decisions. With less than three weeks to go, we cannot duck the key issues. We recommend that you proceed systematically through the following points.

1. Briefing the President

Three sessions have been set up:

Monday, June 25 - Summit Overview and Environment (only date on which Reilly is available)
Tuesday, June 26 - Trade
Thursday, June 28 - Soviet Union/Political Issues

At Tab III is a suggested agenda/briefer for each session. We need agreement on these. You mentioned there may also be additional briefings at Kennebunkport on July 2 or 3.

2. Draft Communique

There is consensus that the thematic paper prepared by the Sherpas is too long and detailed to serve as a communique. In the proposed message to the Summit Heads, we have the President suggesting a shorter communique focussed on what Heads actually discuss (the Soviet Union, trade, and the environment, possibly other topics). The thematic paper can be used, as appropriate, as a record of what officials were able to agree on.

McCormack may want to delay drafting the communique until after next week's briefing with the President. The other Sherpas will be highly exercised if they do not receive it by Monday, June 25, so that they can discuss it with their Heads in advance of the June 29 Sherpa meeting. You should tell McCormack to produce a draft by COB Thursday to give us sufficient time to revise it if necessary and to clear it through the White House. (The section

on the environment invariably involves complicated negotiation here.)

We should decide whether to continue Summit practice of having a separate Political Statement or just one Communique.

3. Trade

The key issue is agriculture, especially a commitment to reduce export subsidies. Trade negotiators on both the U.S. and EC are bogged down over specific language which contains four years' worth of coded messages. The President should try to get his colleagues to vault over the technical language of the negotiators, agreeing to a clear political commitment to liberalize agricultural trade, assuming, of course, that the EC makes a similar effort.

4. Environment

It should be possible for the President to reach a consensus at Houston on the environment if we reduce the current laundry list of environmental measures. Kohl is most vocal on an aggressive environmental statement; if we can get him to back off his desire for a Summit commitment to negotiate CO₂ and forestry protocols, we should be able to craft a statement which is forward-leaning.

5. G-24 for Central America

We need to know if this is an issue we are going to push at Houston. Press reports suggest a tepid response in Central America, unless there is new money. The Europeans appear willing to go along, but are unlikely to take out their checkbooks. Specifically, the EC Commission asserts that it would support an effort only for Central America since many Caribbean countries and dependencies are covered by special multilateral and bilateral programs.

6. China

We need to decide how to handle China at Houston. At the G-7 Deputies meeting last Friday, we understand the others told Mulford that they could not -- or would not -- hold the line after Houston.

7. Participation in Houston

As Houston approaches, there will be increasing demands from Cabinet officers to participate in the Summit. We believe we must hold the line, limiting participation to Baker and Brady. We understand Carla Hills has told Cabinet Affairs she wants to be in Houston to have a bilateral with Kaifu. This is not the time for a bilateral spat on trade with the Japanese. Her friends on the Hill are also lobbying for her to attend the Summit itself. If the President decides to invite Cabinet officers for social events (the rodeo and the Tuesday night

dinner), they should nonetheless be discouraged from conducting bilaterals while in Houston. Such meetings risk diverting attention from the main event.

8. Other Issues

There are two issues which you may wish to bring up which we have not included on the agenda. The first is the Soviet Union. Tim and Bob Blackwill are working on an options paper for the President, laying out possible responses to the Soviet request for economic assistance. This may not be the meeting to discuss such a sensitive issue. The second concerns the proposed Charter on Democracy and Prosperity (Tab IV). We circulated the draft charter to Darman, Porter, Boskin, Zoellick and Mulford. Porter and Boskin are supportive; Zoellick believes it needs some sort of political implementing actions to make it operational (e.g., the enshrinement of the G-24 concept); Brady and Mulford strongly oppose the idea, although they are less critical if only Finance Ministers are charged with the review of the international institution. We believe it could stand on its own as a declaration of principle or serve to initiate the institutional review we have suggested. With the Soviet Union, trade, the environment, and debt, we don't need to overload the agenda, but some document linking democracy and growth would give a unifying theme to the President.

Concurrence by: Robert  Blackwill

Attachments

Tab I	Agenda
Tab II	Participants
Tab III	Proposed Agendas for Briefing Sessions with the President
Tab IV	Houston Declaration on Securing Democracy and Prosperity

WHITE HOUSE SUMMIT GROUP MEETING

9:00 - 10:00 a.m.

Tuesday, June 21, 1990

Situation Room

Agenda

1. Briefings for the President
2. Draft Communique
3. Soviet Union
4. Trade
5. Environment
6. China
7. U.S. Participation at Houston

Participants

Brent Scowcroft (Co-Chairman), Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State

Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury

Richard Darman, Director, Office of Management and Budget

Michael Boskin, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

Roger Porter, Assistant to the President for Economic and
Domestic Policy

Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Richard McCormack, Under Secretary of State for Economic and
Agricultural Affairs

David Mulford, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International
Affairs

Timothy Deal, Senior Director for International Economic Affairs,
NSC

Robert Blackwill, Senior Director for European and Soviet
Affairs, NSC

Eric Melby, Director for International Economic Affairs, NSC

DRAFT

HOUSTON ECONOMIC SUMMIT BRIEFING

Monday, June 25, 1990
2:15 - 3:15 pm
Cabinet Room

ENVIRONMENT

Agenda

- I. Introduction. General Scowcroft
- II. Summit Setting. Secretary Baker/
Secretary Brady
- III. U.S. Position. Administrator Reilly
- IV. Discussion. All Participants
- V. Summary. General Scowcroft

DRAFT

HOUSTON ECONOMIC SUMMIT BRIEFING

Tuesday, June 26, 1990
1:30 - 2:30 pm
Cabinet Room

TRADE

Agenda

- I. Introduction. General Scowcroft
- II. Key Issues. Ambassador Hills/
Secretary Yuetter
- III. Discussion. All Participants
- V. Summary. General Scowcroft

DRAFT

HOUSTON ECONOMIC SUMMIT BRIEFING

Thursday, June 28, 1990
1:15 pm - 2:15 pm
Cabinet Room

SOVIET UNION

Agenda

- I. Introduction. General Scowcroft
- II. Summit Dimension. Secretary Baker
- III. Discussion. All Participants
- V. Summary. General Scowcroft

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10b. Declaration	Re: Houston Declaration on Securing Democracy and Prosperity (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June 1990) [2]

Date Closed:	7/14/2009	OA/ID Number:	91149-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9004687
RECEIVED: 11 JUN 90 17

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: ROY, J

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 20 JUN 90
SOURCE REF: 9013134

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
HS

COCOM



PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: LTR FM FRENCH PRES MITTERRAND RE COCOM

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE DUE DATE: 14 JUN 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE LOGREF: 9001062 9003686

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASORA
BLACKWILL
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/14/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAMM CLOSED BY: NSDAI DOC 3 OF 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

4687

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9013134

Date June 20, 1990

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: The President

From: French President Mitterrand

Date: 8 June 90

Subject: COCOM

WH Referral Dated: 11 June 90

NSCS ID# (if any): 9004687

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

_____ A draft reply is attached.

_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.

_____ A translation is attached.

_____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

XX We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.

_____ The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.

_____ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: President Mitterrand is responding to an earlier letter
from the President on this topic. His expression of support,
while welcome, does not appear to merit prolonging the correspondence
on this issue.

UNCLASSIFIED


Director
Secretariat Staff

S/S 9013134

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9004687

REFERRAL

DATE: 11 JUN 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

DATE: 08 JUN 90

SUBJ: LTR FM FRENCH PRES MITTERRAND RE COCOM

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 14 JUN 90

COMMENT:

FOR

GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

60 JUN 11 7 11:03

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 132369
EL/JF
French

No. 4687

Dear George:

I was very interested in your recent letter describing the approach you propose for updating the control on strategic exportations within the context of the Coordinating Committee (COCOM).

Like you, I believe that the effectiveness and legitimacy of those controls require that they be adapted to the changes in the international situation and in technology.

Indeed, from those two viewpoints, existing controls seem no longer consistent with current requirements. I am happy that our opinions on this point now coincide. The concern for preserving our strategic interests and contributing to the reconstruction of the Eastern European economies are not contradictory: we must therefore agree to reduce the controls so that they cover our security needs only.

You describe various concrete possibilities for modernizing the control list.

I agree with your determination to develop quickly a short list of particularly sensitive goods and technology which we

should continue to protect in the future; the goods not included on such a list would, ipso facto, no longer be controlled. These are principles that France itself had advocated. I would attach great value to our two countries agreeing, on those bases, on a rapid definition within COCOM of a thoroughly reformed control system.

During the few months required for negotiating a limited list of strategic products, we should continue to undertake the elimination of controls on items that have been superseded by technological progress. Moreover, France continues to support the idea that the level of controls granted to China in 1985 can, without prejudice to our security, be granted immediately to all the countries affected by COCOM. We hope that this will be decided soon for all the sectors and, of course, first and foremost, for those that the delegations to COCOM have agreed to consider as priorities for the economic reconstruction of the countries of Eastern Europe.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my very high consideration and friendship.

Signed: François Mitterrand

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

Monsieur le Président, Cher George,

J'ai pris connaissance avec beaucoup d'intérêt de votre récent message, présentant les orientations que vous proposez pour la modernisation du contrôle des exportations stratégiques au sein du comité de coordination (COCOM).

Comme vous-même, je considère que l'efficacité et la légitimité de ces contrôles exigent qu'ils soient adaptés aux évolutions de la situation internationale et des technologies.

Or, les contrôles existants ne nous paraissent plus convenir, sous ces deux points de vue, aux exigences de l'heure. Je suis heureux que nos jugements sur ce point convergent désormais. Le souci de la préservation de nos intérêts stratégiques et celui de notre contribution à la reconstruction des économies de l'Est européen ne sont pas contradictoires: nous devons donc nous entendre pour réduire les contrôles aux stricts besoins de notre sécurité.

Vous évoquez différentes possibilités concrètes de modernisation du régime des contrôles.

J'approuve votre volonté de définir rapidement une liste réduite de biens et technologies particulièrement sensibles dont nous devrions continuer d'assurer la protection à l'avenir ; les biens ne figurant pas sur cette liste bénéficieraient, ipso facto, d'une levée des contrôles. Ce sont des principes que la France avait elle-même préconisés. J'attacherais du prix à ce que nos deux pays s'entendent pour aboutir, sur ces bases, au sein du COCOM à la définition rapide d'un régime de contrôle profondément renoué.

Durant les quelques mois nécessaires à la négociation d'une liste restreinte de produits stratégiques, nous devons continuer à procéder à l'élimination des contrôles sur les articles désormais manifestement dépassés par l'évolution technologique. La France continue en outre à soutenir l'idée que le niveau de contrôles consenti à la Chine dès 1985 peut, sans aucun préjudice pour notre sécurité, être immédiatement accordé à l'ensemble des pays visés par le COCOM. Nous espérons que cela sera prochainement décidé pour tous les secteurs, et bien sûr en tout premier lieu pour ceux que les délégations au COCOM se sont accordées à considérer comme prioritaires pour la reconstruction économique des pays de l'Est européen.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de ma très haute considération et de mes sentiments amicaux.

Signé : François MITTERRAND

*Ambassade de France
aux Etats-Unis*

L' Ambassadeur

192/DE

June 15, 1990

Dear General Scowcroft :

Please find herewith the text of a message from President François MITTERRAND, that I was asked to forward to President George BUSH.

A copy of this message has already been conveyed to you on June 7, 1990.

With high regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,



Jacques Andréani

General Brent SCOWCROFT
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON DC

Monsieur le Président, *cher George,*

J'ai pris connaissance avec beaucoup d'intérêt de votre récent message, présentant les orientations que vous proposez pour la modernisation du contrôle des exportations stratégiques au sein du Comité de Coordination (COCOM).

Comme vous-même, je considère que l'efficacité et la légitimité de ces contrôles exigent qu'ils soient adaptés aux évolutions de la situation internationale et des technologies.

Or, les contrôles existants ne nous paraissent plus convenir, sous ces deux points de vue, aux exigences de l'heure. Je suis heureux que nos jugements sur ce point convergent désormais. Le souci de la préservation de nos intérêts stratégiques et celui de notre contribution à la reconstruction des économies de l'Est européen ne sont pas contradictoires : nous devons donc nous entendre pour réduire les contrôles aux stricts besoins de notre sécurité.

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.../...

Son Excellence M. George BUSH
Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique

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Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président,
l'expression de ma très haute considération.

*et de nos
sentiments amicaux*

François Mitterrand

François MITTERRAND

*Ambassade de France
aux Etats-Unis*

L' Ambassadeur

JUN 11 1990
Washington, June 8, 1990

Dear General Scowcroft,

Please find herewith the text of a message addressed to President Bush by President Mitterrand, that I was asked to forward to him.

I would be grateful if you would be so kind as to convey this message to the President.

With my best regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,



Jacques Andréani

The Honorable
Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

Monsieur le Président, Cher George,

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Signé : François MITTERRAND