

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91148
Folder ID Number: 91148-007

Folder Title:
Other (October - December 1989)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	6	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Calls in Support of Lebanon Agreement (1 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1)	C
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Pope John Paul II (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
01c. Handwritten Notes	Re: Presidential Phone Calls - Mitterrand (2 pp.)	10/23	(b)(1)	
01d. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Mitterrand (1 pp.)	10/23	(b)(1)	C
01e. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with King Fahd (1 pp.)	10/23	(b)(1)	C
01f. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Phone Calls in Support of Lebanon Agreement (1 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1)	C
02a. Memo	From Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft, Re: MiGs in Cuba [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	S
02b. Talking Points	Re: Soviet Delivery of MIG-29 to Cuba (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 5

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (October - December 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap1238
OA/ID Number: 91148-007
Date Closed: 7/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03a. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversations with King Hussein (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to King Hussein of Jordan (1 pp.)	11/14/89	(b)(1)	
03c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversations with King Hussein (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03d. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to King Hussein of Jordan (1 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	
04a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (2 pp.)	11/25/89	(b)(1)	✓
04b. Letter	Anthony Acland to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	✓
04c. Message	Re: Text of a Message from eh Right Honorable Margaret Thatcher (2 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	✓
04d. Letter	Ambassador Gerhard Herder to Joseph V. Reed (2 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	
04e. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush Re: Courtesy Translation (2 pp.)	11/89	(b)(1)	
04f. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush Re: [German] (3 pp.)	11/89	(b)(1)	

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04g. Cable	Re: Letter from Belize Prime Minister to President Bush on Nicaragua (2 pp.)	11/14/89	(b)(1)	C
04h. Letter	Chancellor Kohl to President Bush Re: Translation (2 pp.)	11/3/89	(b)(1)	
04i. Letter	Chancellor Kohl to President Bush Re: [German] (3 pp.)	11/3/89	(b)(1)	
05. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	
06. Memo	Robert M. Gates to Richard Kerr Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)	11/24/89	(b)(1)	C
07a. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy Re: Three Presidential Messages (1 pp.)	11/30/89	(b)(1)	S
07b. Message	Re: Text of Letter to Syrian President Assad (from President Bush) (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
07c. Message	Re: Text of Letter to Lebanese President Hraoui (from President Bush) (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
07d. Message	Re: Text of Letter to French President Mitterrand (from President Bush) (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
07e. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Messages... (1 pp.)	11/30/89	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07f. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Three Presidential Messages (1 pp.)	11/30/89	(b)(1)	S
08. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: NATO Wise Men's Group: Implementation Recommendations (2 pp.)	11/28/89	(b)(1)	S
09a. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy Re: The President's Telephone Calls to NATO Leaders, November 25-27, 1989 (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
09b. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Wilfried Martens of Belgium (1 pp.)	11/25/89	(b)(1)	C
09c. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands (2 pp.)	11/25/89	(b)(1)	C
09d. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (2 pp.)	11/25/89	(b)(1)	C
09e. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Poul Schlueter of Denmark (2 pp.)	11/26/89	(b)(1)	C
09f. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (2 pp.)	11/26/89	(b)(1)	C
09g. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Cavaco Silva of Portugal (2 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	C

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09h. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Xenofon Zolotas of Greece (1 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	C
09i. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Jan P. Syse of Norway (2 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	C
09j. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Steingrimur Hermannsson of Iceland (2 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	
09k. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Jacques Santer of Luxembourg (1 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	
10. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Thatcher and Europe (3 pp.)	12/6/89	(b)(1)	S
11a. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Lebanon -- Working to Avert New Fighting (2 pp.)	12/22/89	(b)(1)	S
11b. Proposal	Brent Scowcroft to Joseph W. Hagin, II Re: Schedule Proposal (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11c. Handwritten Note	Philip [Hughes] to Brent [Scowcroft]/Bob [Gates] (1 pp.)	12/22	(b)(1)	

Page 5 of 5

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Pinksheet Number: cap1238
OA/ID Number: 91148-007
Date Closed: 7/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8459

CHRON FILE THE WHITE HOUSE

NOTED

1989 OCT 23 PM 2:29

ACTION

WASHINGTON

October 23, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT:

Telephone Calls in Support of Lebanon Agreement

Purpose

To make telephone calls to the Pope, President Mitterrand, and King Fahd to show support of the Lebanon agreement.

Background

Lebanon's Deputies reached an agreement this weekend on a national reconciliation charter. Formal announcement will be tomorrow, October 24, but already General Aoun and others are reacting negatively.

The Lebanon agreement is an historic occasion, the necessary first step toward bringing lasting peace to Lebanon. But it is bound to be tenuous. It will need our support, both publicly and with General Aoun and the Syrians. In addition, the Deputies have been under great pressure from competing Lebanese factions; our public and private support for their decision could help to insulate them from reprisals.

We plan to release a White House Statement of support for the Lebanese agreement today, October 23. In addition, we believe it would be useful for you to telephone Pope John Paul II and President Mitterrand to encourage them to voice public support as well. Both the Pope and President Mitterrand also have influence with Aoun, and we believe you should seek their help with him. Finally, we believe a congratulatory call to King Fahd is appropriate; in that call, you could mention the necessity for Syria to live up to its part of the agreement.

Points to be made are attached at Tabs A, B, and C.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the points to be made at Tabs A, B, and C to the Pope, President Mitterrand, and King Fahd, respectively.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made to The Pope
Tab B Points to be Made to President Mitterrand
Tab C Points to be Made to King Fahd

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2010-0764-MR
MM 4/18/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
The Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
POPE JOHN PAUL II

- Your Holiness, I am calling you to ask your advice and help on Lebanon, where I am convinced a real opportunity exists now for peace.
- The Lebanese Parliamentarians have reached an agreement in Saudi Arabia on national reconciliation.
- This is truly an historic occasion. For once the Lebanese are talking, not shooting.
- There have been a lot of pressures on these men, but they have shown courage.
- This may be Lebanon's last hope. It is not totally perfect, I admit, but it needs our public and private support.
- The alternative is more civil war, more death, more tragedy.
- I urge you to give public support to the process launched by this agreement.
- Furthermore, I ask you also to speak to the Maronite Patriarch to ask him to show his support for this peaceful path.
- Finally, I ask your help with General Aoun. I know he listens to you, and would respect your appeal to give the national reconciliation process a chance to work.

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0764-MR
MM 4/18/2016

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Presidential Phone Calls



DATE:

10.23

TIME:

6¹⁰

~~incoming~~ outgoing

WITH:

Mullerand

SUBJECT:

Hope Bonn 'Not Oppose'

agreement

I said "not perfect but

earns us needed time"

He doesn't always listen to me.

I proposed him an additional

guarantee - would have

liked 5 perm. under Sec. 6 and

guarantee agreement.

FOLLOW UP:

might not commit Bonn

"population limits

Bonn told him we'd not

go along with his refusal

will approach him again

but will be insistent -

If have additional guarantee

increases chance of success -

tomorrow

(over)

Reimers has already
raised this with TAB -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0764-MR

MM 4/18/2016

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

612-
Oct-23-

- Mr. President, I am calling you as part of our continuing cooperation on Lebanon, where I am convinced a real opportunity exists now for peace.
- The Lebanese Parliamentarians have reached an agreement in Saudi Arabia on national reconciliation.
- This is truly an historic occasion. For once the Lebanese are talking, not shooting.
- There have been a lot of pressures on these men, but they have shown courage.
- This may be Lebanon's last hope. It is not totally perfect, I admit, but it needs our support.
- The alternative is more civil war, more death, more tragedy.
- I urge you to give public support to the process launched by this agreement.
- France has a key role to play. General Aoun listens to you, and would respect your appeal to give the national reconciliation process a chance to work.
- I have also spoken to the Pope and we will be issuing a statement of support for the Lebanon agreement. I hope we can work together to assure its success.
- I understand that you might be free to get together in early December; that's an excellent idea and I hope to be able to work out the scheduling soon.

I've proposed

Now in Spain - good visit F. Gonzales.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

got him
5:50 Oct-23

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING FAHD

- Your Majesty, allow me to congratulate you on the historic achievement at Taif.
- The Lebanese deputies would not have been able to reach this agreement without your leadership ^{you persistence} and strength.
- You have done a great service to Lebanon, to the Arabs, and to humanity.
- I am prepared to declare our support for the Taif results; would it be better to wait for the formal announcement or to go ahead with a statement now??? ^{diff. problem - 15 years.}
- I know you have worked hard to convince Syria to play a responsible role. I hope you will continue to do so.
- I (plan to) (have) spoken with President Mitterrand and the Pope to ^{lend} their support to this agreement and more importantly to urge Aoun to do so.
- If there is anything else we can do in this regard, please let me know.

Thank

→ Agreement unanimous - except for 3 people
what with 1
Agree Announce sup ① will continue → will never give up.
②

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0764 MR
MM 4/18/2016

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8459

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 23, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *RF*
FROM: C. DAVID WELCH *mw*
SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Calls in Support of Lebanon Agreement

The Lebanese Deputies meeting in Taif, Saudi Arabia, have reached an agreement on national reconciliation for Lebanon. Although formal announcement of the agreement will not come until tomorrow (October 24), Aoun and others are reacting already. The Saudis have approached us to ask for a public statement of support. We need to declare our support and encourage others to do so.

For this purpose, we suggest that the White House issue a brief statement of support. Second, we suggest that the President telephone the Pope and President Mitterrand to encourage them to declare publicly their support and to urge General Aoun to moderate his opposition. The President should also call King Fahd to congratulate him on the success of the Arab League's efforts and, particularly, Saudi Arabia's pivotal contribution. The State Department concurs in these suggestions; State will also be issuing a supportive statement. State has sent demarches to several key foreign capitals over the weekend to elicit their support as well.

Concurrence by: Adrian Basora *mw*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Philip Hughes to send the memorandum at Tab II to Cicconi forwarding the White House Statement.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you sign the memorandum to the President (Tab I) covering points to be made for the telephone calls to the Pope, President Mitterrand, and King Fahd.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
 Tab A Points to be Made to the Pope
 Tab B Points to be Made to President Mitterrand
 Tab C Points to be Made to King Fahd
Tab II Hughes/Cicconi Memorandum
 Tab A White House Statement

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0764-mr
mm 4/18/2016

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8459

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES CICCONI

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: Suggested White House Statement on Lebanon

Attached at Tab A is a suggested White House Statement on Lebanon which we would like to release now, given that Lebanon's Parliamentarians reached an agreement on national reconciliation.

Attachment
Tab A White House Statement

cc: Marlin Fitzwater
Roman Popadiuk

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/10/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The President welcomes the news that the conference of Lebanese Parliamentarians in Taif, Saudi Arabia, has resulted in an agreement for national reconciliation in Lebanon. We commend the Arab League's Tripartite Committee for its important role in facilitating this agreement. The President congratulates the Lebanese Deputies for their courage and statesmanship, which have yielded an extraordinary opportunity to bring lasting peace to Lebanon. This is the first step toward restoration of a sovereign, unified, and independent Lebanon, free of all foreign forces. The President calls upon all concerned in Lebanon and in the international community to join the United States in supporting the process of peace and reconciliation launched by the Taif agreement.

#

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8909100
RECEIVED: 13 NOV 89 11

TO: SCOWCOFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: RICE
BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 13 NOV 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CUBA

USSR

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MIGS IN CUBA

ACTION: OBE PER SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 16 NOV 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RICE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCIF:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/10/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJRP

CLOSED BY: NSJRP

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Memo	From Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft, Re: MiGs in Cuba [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Chronological Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Other (October - December 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 12/27/21

Date Closed: 7/10/2009	OA/ID Number: 91148-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2011-2630-MR(508)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 8/23/2017

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~CHRON FILE
9100NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 13, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
SUBJECT: MiGs in Cuba



The National Intelligence Daily (NID) will carry the report of the Soviet MiG deliveries to Cuba on Tuesday. We have been preparing an Administration response should that report become known.

The CIA and INR (we are told that DIA agrees) believe that Moscow views the MiG 29 as a logical, progressive upgrade of Cuba's air defenses rather than as an increased threat to US security. The CIA estimates that the deal for these aircraft was struck three or so years ago. We have known about it for several years. The MiG 29's range is similar to that of the MiG 23 though the 29 can carry the more advanced AA-10 missile. ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED] the AA-10 is not slated for delivery to Cuba. The net intelligence assessment is that the MiG 29 does not significantly upgrade Cuba's air defense capabilities or pose an increased offensive threat to the U.S. or other countries in the region.

The question of violation of the series of agreements on nuclear weapons in Cuba -- the last of which was Cienfuegos -- is more difficult to answer. The MiG 29, like its predecessor MiG 23, is assumed to be dual capable. ^{1.4(c)} [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] When MiG 23s were delivered to Castro in 1978, we accepted the Soviet's verbal assurances that the planes were not nuclear capable. We did not seek agreement that no further upgrade of the MiG 23 would take place but did tell the Soviets that we believed that a sharp increase in the numbers of these aircraft would constitute a threat to U.S. security. Cuba's inventory of MiG 23s gradually increased and the U.S. did not protest. We also said that we would watch to see if the plane was used in a ground-attack role: The Cubans have used it only as an air defense interceptor in exercises.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

All of that said, the Soviets continue to modernize, needlessly, the Cuban armed forces. We need to answer the political question of how to handle the delivery this time. Should the question arise, we could voice our dissatisfaction strongly, noting that this is one of several indications that "new thinking" has not penetrated Soviet regional policy. This would fit well in the context of our continuing demarches to the Soviets that their exports of advanced fighter aircraft to clients are destabilizing. The Cubans, in particular, have no neighbors who have a fighter-interceptor capability approximating that of the MiG 29. We could tell the Soviets that, given the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, we expected them to show restraint in the matter of advanced arms sales to Cuba. In our private demarche we may also want to demand that they not increase the numbers of MiG 29s further.

We understand Secretary Baker wants to refer to the MiG problem in his letter to Shevardnadze on Central America which would be sent soon. We could also consider a demarche to Dubinin. Finally, we may want a "preemptive" announcement of the discovery of the MiGs and the steps that we have taken, rather than waiting for the story to leak.

The Defense Department has been consulted and agrees with the suggested approach in the attached press guidance. The State Department agrees in principle but does not want to give this issue much visibility. We assume that State would be opposed to an Administration initiated announcement.

Draft press guidance is at Tab I.

R3 for BI
Bill Pryce concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss this matter with Secretary Baker and review the attached press guidance.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

OBE - already discussed w/ Martins

Attachments

Tab I Draft press guidance

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SOVIET DELIVERY OF MIG-29 TO CUBA

Q. Can you confirm reports that the Soviets have delivered MiG 29 aircraft to Cuba?

A. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE RECENTLY DELIVERED MIG 29 AIRCRAFT TO CUBA. WE HAVE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE CONSIDER THE DELIVERY OF MIG 29 AIRCRAFT TO CUBA TO BE OUT OF STEP WITH THE GENERALLY POSITIVE STATE OF U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS. IT IS ANOTHER INDICATION THAT SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN REGIONAL POLICY IS NOT ALWAYS INFORMED BY "NEW THINKING."

THERE IS NO REASON FOR THE SOVIETS TO CONTINUE TO UPGRADE AND MODERNIZE THE CUBAN AIRFORCES GIVEN THE SITUATION IN THE REGION: CUBA'S NEIGHBORS HAVE NO SUCH CAPABILITIES AND THE UNITED STATES POSES NO THREAT TO CUBA.

Q. How many aircraft have been delivered?

A. I CANNOT GO INTO THAT LEVEL OF DETAIL.

Q. Have you asked the Soviets to stop the deliveries?

A. YES.

Q. What will you do if they don't?

A. I'M NOT GOING TO GET INTO HYPOTHETICALS.

Q. Are these aircraft nuclear capable? Do the Cubans have nuclear weapons?

A. CUBA CURRENTLY HAS SEVERAL AIRCRAFT IN ITS INVENTORY WITH A THEORETICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. WE HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE, WHATSOEVER, THAT CUBA HAS OR WILL HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

Q. Is this an upgrade of Cuba's offensive capability?

A. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MODERNIZATION OF CUBA'S AIRFORCE AND WHAT IT SAYS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION'S CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO UPGRADE CUBA'S CAPABILITY IN SPITE OF THE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8908957
RECEIVED: 07 NOV 89 08

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 14 NOV 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JORDAN

TELCALL

PERSONS: HUSSEIN I

SUBJECT: PROPOSED TELEPHONE CALL TO KING HUSSEIN

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 10 NOV 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GANTT

WELCH

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING HUSSEIN

- Your Majesty, I ~~just~~ wanted to call to wish you a very Happy Birthday.
- I would also like ~~to~~ add my congratulations on Jordan's parliamentary elections last week.
- I recall when you mentioned that you were taking some difficult decisions ~~to~~ improve Jordan's economic situation and to broaden political participation.
- As I told you then, I think these are truly statesmanlike decisions and are a ~~mark~~ of your strength and leadership.
- On another matter, I wanted to let you know that I am pressing ahead in the peace process. Jim Baker has been working hard with ~~the~~ Israelis and Egyptians, as we have informed you through our Ambassador. I am seeing Prime Minister Shamir tomorrow.
- I think there may be a chance here for a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue to get started, but it will take some give on both sides. I appreciate your support with the Palestinians.
- I had a good chat with your brother, His Royal Highness Prince Hasan, when he was here in September.
- Again, my congratulations to you on your birthday and to your people on the elections.
- Please convey our best wishes to Queen Noor and to your family.

(TO BE USED IF NEEDED)

-- We are optimistic that Congress will approve an additional \$20 million in FMS for Jordan for FY 1990. It is not yet certain, but I believe our efforts and my phone calls are likely to pay off. We should know any day now.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 14, 1989

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to King Hussein of Jordan

DATE: November 14, 1989

PURPOSE: To congratulate King Hussein on his birthday (November 14) and Jordan's Parliamentary elections (November 8), the first elections in Jordan in over 22 years. Hussein moved to broaden political participation after riots last spring, in parallel with serious economic austerity measures. Hussein was undoubtedly disappointed by the election results, since an unexpectedly high number of Muslim fundamentalists were chosen. Hussein would welcome your support, particularly in view of the election's mixed results.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line Call

INTERPRETER: None Required

PHONE NUMBER: To be provided

CONTACT PERSON: To be provided

SUGGESTED TIMES: 7:30 a.m. - 2:00 p.m., November 9, 1989

TIME DIFFERENCE: +7 hours

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Wish King Hussein Happy Birthday.
2. Express your congratulations for the successful Parliamentary elections in Jordan.
3. Compliment the King on his courageous decisions in the political and economic spheres.
4. Mention the peace process, including your desire for his continued support with the Palestinians.
5. Convey warm regards to King Hussein and his family, recalling his brother, Crown Prince Hasan's visit in September.

Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING HUSSEIN

- Your Majesty, I just wanted to call to wish you a very Happy Birthday.
- I would also like to add my congratulations on Jordan's parliamentary elections last week.
- I recall when you mentioned that you were taking some difficult decisions to improve Jordan's economic situation and to broaden political participation.
- As I told you then, I think these are truly statesmanlike decisions and are a mark of your strength and leadership.
- On another matter, I wanted to let you know that I am pressing ahead in the peace process. Jim Baker has been working hard with the Israelis and Egyptians, as we have informed you through our Ambassador. I am seeing Prime Minister Shamir tomorrow.
- I think there may be a chance here for a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue to get started, but it will take some give on both sides. I appreciate your support with the Palestinians.
- I had a good chat with your brother, His Royal Highness Prince Hasan, when he was here in September.
- Again, my congratulations to you on your birthday and to your people on the elections.
- Please convey our best wishes to Queen Noor and to your family.

(TO BE USED IF NEEDED)

-- We are optimistic that Congress will approve an additional \$20 million in FMS for Jordan for FY 1990. It is not yet certain, but I believe our efforts and my phone calls are likely to pay off. We should know any day now.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

November 13, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to King Hussein of Jordan

Attached is a proposal for the President to call King Hussein of Jordan on Tuesday, November 14, to congratulate him on his birthday and Jordan's Parliamentary elections, the first elections in Jordan in over 22 years. A revived Parliament is a central feature of Jordan's effort to enhance public participation in government. Hussein made the decision to hold elections after riots last spring; he would welcome our support, particularly in view of the results which brought in an unexpectedly high number of fundamentalists.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call proposal to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal

Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8909277
RECEIVED: 17 NOV 89 12

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: VAN ERON
HUGHES

DOC DATE: 17 NOV 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS
GERMANY D R
BELIZE

GREAT BRITAIN
GERMANY F R
USSR

PERSONS: THATCHER, MARGARET
KRENZ, EGON

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY SINCE 15 NOV

ACTION: PRES NOTED SUMMARY OF LTR

DUE DATE: 21 NOV 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
VAN ERON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 7/10/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8909277

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 89111720 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
X 89112810 PRES NOTED SUMMARY OF LTR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0765-MR

MM 4/19/2016

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN⁷

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

**Prime Minister Thatcher Letter to President Gorbachev
November 15, 1989**

Prime Minister Thatcher sends you a copy of her letter to Gorbachev. She attributes great credit, for the historic events in East Germany, to his policies of Glasnost and democratization. She states that "the firmest basis for stability in the long-term is thorough-going reform in East Germany - including free elections with a multi-party system and complete freedom of movement...". She also emphasizes to him that neither the UK, nor any other Western country, has any intention of intervening in the GDR or acting in any manner which might be destructive to GDR or USSR security interests.

She informs Gorbachev that the UK is ready to enter into contacts with Soviet representatives in Berlin, as he had suggested, and that the contacts which have already taken place have proved useful. In conclusion, she reiterates that the UK remains committed to the 1971 Berlin quadripartite agreement.

Chairman Krenz of the German Democratic Republic - November 13, 1989

Chairman Krenz thanks you for your congratulatory message upon his election as Chairman. He is pleased by your willingness to develop stronger and more constructive relations and feels that this is a positive trend and will lend itself to safeguarding peace and stability in Europe.

Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany - November 9, 1989

Chancellor Kohl draws your attention to the need to conclude the IMF quota review before the end of 1989. He believes that a two thirds increase of IMF funds should sufficiently meet present commitments, such as, aid for Poland and the debt recovery strategy of the Brady Plan. He hopes that you will agree to a substantial increase in quotas and thereby help to ensure the leading industrial nations' role of safeguarding the stability of world economic growth.

Prime Minister Price of Belize - November 7, 1989

Prime Minister Price shares your concern over Ortega's suspension of a ceasefire with the Nicaraguan Resistance. In response, he has directed his foreign minister to write an appeal to his Nicaraguan counterpart urging him to restore the ceasefire and to allow the upcoming elections to take place. Price appreciates your continued interest in the peace and development of Latin America.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany - November 3, 1989

Chancellor Kohl wishes to underscore several points, concerning common environmental objectives, prior to the next world economic summit. He states that protection of the Earth's atmosphere is a global challenge and that international environmental research should be coordinated and increased. He also stresses the need to conclude global agreements which will help eliminate or contain the danger resulting from climatic changes. He strongly proposes that an international convention on the Earth's climate be held.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

The Honorable
Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
National Security Council
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington DC 20506

15 November 1989

Dear Brent,

You may be interested to see the text of a message from Mrs Thatcher to President Gorbachev which our Ambassador in Moscow is delivering today, 16 November. It responds to the message from Mr Gorbachev which Ambassador Zamyatin delivered to Mrs Thatcher late on 10 November, about which Charles Powell spoke to you on the telephone at the time. The message takes account of the co-ordination meeting in Bonn on 14 November.

I am also sending the text of the message to Secretary Baker.

Sincerely,
Antony

Antony Acland

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2008-0803-MR
2/3/2010 MM

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2008-0803-MR
7/30/2010 MM

TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
MARGARET THATCHER FRS MP TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV
DATED 15 NOVEMBER 1989

BEGINS

Thank you for your message conveyed to me on 10 November by Ambassador Zamyatin. Historic events are taking place and I share your view that developments in East Germany are encouraging. The lifting of travel restrictions for GDR citizens is most particularly welcome.

The events in Berlin over the weekend have made a great impression on public opinion in Britain and in other Western countries. I have been struck by the good sense of all concerned and their readiness to work together. Very great credit is due to your policies of Glasnost and democratisation, and I have paid sincere tribute to your role in my public statements.

I agree with you that the speed with which these changes are taking place carries its own risks of instability. I have publicly underlined the need to proceed in an orderly way which preserves stability and to take a measured view of the way ahead. As I told your Ambassador, the firmest basis for stability in the longer-term is thorough-going reform in East Germany - including free elections with a multi-party system and complete freedom of movement, so that there is genuine democracy and an economic system which can support it.

There is no repeat no intention on the part of any Western country to intervene in the GDR or to act in a way which might damage GDR or Soviet security interests. I am confident that Britain's allies and partners share this view. West Germany's leaders have been at pains to stress the importance of a step-by-step approach to change in the GDR and the need to avoid destabilising the wider European situation: and Chancellor Kohl has assured me of this personally when we spoke on the telephone.

We are very ready to enter into contacts with representatives of the Soviet Union in Berlin, as you suggest. The contacts which have already taken place between British officials in Berlin and the Soviet Embassy have proved useful and I hope that they will continue. Our Ambassador in Bonn is ready to meet the Soviet Ambassador to the GDR at any time. In this connection, the British Government remain committed to the quadripartite agreement on Berlin of 1971 and attach importance to the provision by which the four governments concerned will strive to promote the elimination of tension and the prevention of complications.

I very much hope that you and I can remain in regular contact about these issues.

ENDS

The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the German Democratic Republic

1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 232-3134

The Honorable
Joseph V. Reed, Jr.
Chief of Protocol
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

November 13, 1989

Dear Mr. Reed,

I permit myself to transmit to you the text of a reply telegram to the President of the United States of America, George Bush, requesting you to forward it to the addressee:

"The President of the
United States of America
George Bush

I thank you cordially for the felicitations on the occasion of my election as Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic.

I am certain that the changes and reforms underway in the German Democratic Republic and the willingness you have expressed for developing stronger and more constructive relations will provide good prerequisites for lending a new quality to the dialogue and cooperation between our two states.

This will be a valuable contribution the German Democratic Republic and the United States of America can make to promoting the positive trends in the world and to safeguarding peace and stability in Europa.

Egon Krenz

General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and
Chairman of the Council of State of the
German Democratic Republic"

Please accept, Dear Mr. Reed, the assurances of my
highest consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'G. Herder', written in dark ink.

Dr. Gerhard Herder

Courtesy Translation

The Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Chancellor

Bonn, November 1989

Dear George,

following my letter of 6 November concerning aid for Poland to help stabilize that country, I wish today to draw your attention to the following aspect as well.

The aid programme for Poland again emphasizes the central role which the International Monetary Fund has to play in coping with the payment difficulties of its member countries. It is important that this institution should continue to have sufficient funds of its own. At the present time, therefore, it is essential that the current review of IMF quotas should be brought to a successful conclusion.

Already at our economic summit in July we both welcomed the decision to conclude this review before the end of 1989. We should do everything possible to ensure that this decision is implemented on time.

His Excellency

Mr. George H.W. Bush

President of the United States of America

At the recent annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Washington, Mr. Camdessus recommended that the quotas be doubled. Such an extensive increase in the IMF's funds may not be absolutely essential, but my Government, too, thinks a substantial increase - of about two thirds - is necessary, not least because it would also enable the IMF to meet the requirements of the enhanced debt strategy proposed by Secretary Brady.

I therefore very much hope, George, that the United States, too, can now agree to a substantial increase in quotas. By taking such a step the leading industrial countries would be clearly indicating that they are playing their part in ensuring the stable development of the world economy.

Sincerely,

(sgd) Helmut Kohl

EMBASSY
OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit to you the following message from
Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl:

Bonn, den 9. November 1989

Lieber George,

im Anschluss an meinen Brief vom 6. November 1989 zur Frage
einer Stabilisierungshilfe für Polen möchte ich Ihre
Aufmerksamkeit heute noch auf folgende Angelegenheit lenken.

Die Hilfsaktion für Polen macht erneut die zentrale Rolle
deutlich, die der Internationale Währungsfonds bei der Bewältigung
von Zahlungsschwierigkeiten seiner Mitgliedsländer zu spielen hat.
Es ist wichtig, dass diese Institution auch weiterhin über
angemessene Eigenmittel verfügt. Einem erfolgreichen Abschluss der
laufenden Überprüfung der IWF-Quoten kommt daher im gegenwärtigen
Zeitpunkt besondere Bedeutung zu.

The President

The White House

Washington, D.C.

Bereits auf unserem Wirtschaftsgipfeltreffen im Juli dieses Jahres haben wir gemeinsam den Beschluss begrüsst, diese Überprüfung vor Ende 1989 abzuschliessen. Wir sollten alles tun, damit dieser Beschluss termingemäss in die Tat umgesetzt werden kann.

Auf der jüngsten Jahresversammlung des Internationalen Währungsfonds in Washington hat Herr Camdessus eine Verdoppelung der Quoten befürwortet. Eine derart umfangreiche Erweiterung der Mittel des Internationalen Währungsfonds mag nicht unbedingt notwendig sein. Aber auch meine Regierung hält eine substantielle Erhöhung seiner Mittel - um etwa zwei Drittel - für erforderlich, nicht zuletzt auch, damit der IWF den Anforderungen der von Secretary Brady vorgeschlagenen gestärkten Schuldenstrategie gerecht werden kann.

Ich würde es daher, lieber George, sehr begrüssen, wenn nunmehr auch die USA einer erheblichen Quotenerhöhung zustimmen könnten. Die führenden Industrieländer würden dadurch sichtbar zum Ausdruck bringen, dass sie ihrer Verantwortung für eine stabile Entwicklung der Weltwirtschaft gerecht werden.

Mit freundlichen Grüssen

Ihr

A courtesy translation is attached.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Karl Th. Paschke".

Karl-Th. Paschke

Minister

Washington, D.C., November 16, 1989

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04g. Cable	Re: Letter from Belize Prime Minister to President Bush on Nicaragua (2 pp.)	11/14/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (October - December 1989)

Date Closed:	7/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91148-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Translation

The Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Chancellor

Bonn, 3 November 1989

Dear George,

In accordance with our agreement to seek closer coordination of our countries' activities in implementing the declaration on environmental problems issued at the Paris Economic Summit, one of my aides, Baldur Wagner, had meetings with EPA Administrator William Reilly, White House environment and scientific advisors Michael Deland and David Bromley, and senior State Department and Department of Energy officials.

Those discussions have reaffirmed our governments' basic agreement on common environmental objectives. I would stress in this context our common conviction that protection of the earth's atmosphere is a global challenge to all nations which calls for a convention on the world's climate with the broadest possible international participation.

With preparations for the next world economic summit in your country now beginning, I wish to underscore the following points:

- The summit nations, together with the countries of Eastern Europe as major sources of aerosol emissions, have a special responsibility towards

His Excellency
Mr George Bush,
President of the United States
of America,
Washington, D.C.

the international community to take the earliest possible steps to protect the earth's atmosphere.

- We must intensify our research into climatic interactions and especially improve coordination. Considering the magnitude of the threat and its grave and unforeseeable implications for large sections of the earth's population, we cannot hold back counter-measures until we have absolute scientific certainty about the fundamental causes of those interactions and about future developments. It might then be too late.
- We should as soon as possible conclude international agreements which specifically require all concerned to play their part in eliminating or containing the danger emanating from climatic changes. In this the highly developed Western industrial countries should lead the way.

I am not unaware that the necessary fundamental energy policy changes presuppose an adjustment process which poses a formidable challenge to our national economies. It is difficult for any government to convince the people that changes of habit are essential in many spheres of life. But our highly developed industrial countries, with their liberal, efficient and flexible economic systems, are in the best position to undergo this process of adjustment without asking too great a sacrifice of the people.

Trusting in the efficiency of our national economies, we should therefore seek to bring about a convention on the earth's climate as soon as possible without insisting on the prior clarification of all details. In view of the magnitude of the global threat we should summon up this courage.

As you know, EPA Administrator William Reilly will be visiting me on 8 November and I shall take the opportunity to set out the German standpoint once more.

The Federal Government will also be presenting its position in the preparatory papers for the next world economic summit, in the hope that an agreement on the crucial question of a convention can be reached at the summit meeting in your country.

Sincerely,

(sgd) Helmut Kohl

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
DER BUNDESKANZLER

Bonn, den 3. November 1989

Seiner Exzellenz
dem Präsidenten der
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika
Herrn George Bush

Washington D.C.

Lieber George,

entsprechend unserer Absprache, die Aktivitäten unserer Länder zur Umsetzung der Umwelterklärung des Weltwirtschaftsgipfels von Paris enger miteinander abzustimmen, hat mein Mitarbeiter Ministerialdirektor Baldur Wagner Gespräche mit dem EPA-Administrator William Reilly, mit den Umwelt- und Wissenschaftsberatern des Weißen Hauses Michael Deland und David Bromley, sowie mit führenden Mitarbeitern des State Department und des Department of Energy geführt.

Bei diesen Gesprächen hat sich erneut bestätigt, daß zwischen unseren Regierungen hinsichtlich der gemeinsam anzustrebenden umweltpolitischen Ziele grundsätzliche Einigkeit besteht. Hervorheben will ich hierbei insbesondere unsere gemeinsame Überzeugung, daß der Schutz der Erdatmosphäre eine globale Herausforderung für alle Staaten dieser Erde darstellt, die den Abschluß einer Weltklimakonvention unter möglichst breiter internationaler Beteiligung erfordert.

Im Hinblick auf die beginnende Vorbereitung für den nächsten Weltwirtschaftsgipfel in Ihrem Land möchte ich hervorheben:

- Die Gipfelländer tragen gegenüber der Völkergemeinschaft zusammen mit den Ländern Osteuropas als bedeutende Verursacher der Emission von Treibgasen besondere Verantwortung, so bald wie möglich Schritte zum Schutz der Erdatmosphäre zu ergreifen.

- Wir müssen unsere Anstrengungen zur Erforschung der klimatischen Zusammenhänge intensivieren und insbesondere besser koordinieren. Angesichts der Größe der Bedrohung und der unabsehbaren, existenziellen Auswirkungen für große Teile der Erdbevölkerung können wir es uns jedoch nicht erlauben, mit Gegenmaßnahmen so lange zu warten, bis wir letzte wissenschaftliche Gewißheit über die ursächlichen Zusammenhänge und die zukünftige Entwicklung erreicht haben. Dann könnte es schon zu spät sein.
- Wir sollten möglichst bald zu internationalen Vereinbarungen kommen, die für alle Beteiligten konkrete Verpflichtungen enthalten, ihren Beitrag zur Abwendung oder Begrenzung der drohenden Gefahren der Klimaveränderungen zu erbringen. Dabei sollten die hochentwickelten westlichen Industrieländer eine Vorreiterrolle übernehmen.

Ich verkenne nicht, daß die dafür notwendige grundlegende energiepolitische Umstrukturierung einen Anpassungsprozeß erfordert, der unsere Volkswirtschaften vor große Herausforderungen stellt. Für jede Regierung ist es schwer, ihrer Bevölkerung klar zu machen, daß in einer Vielzahl von Lebensbereichen Änderungen der Gewohnheiten unumgänglich werden. Jedoch sind wir in unseren hochentwickelten Industrieländern mit ihren freien, leistungsfähigen und flexiblen Wirtschaftssystemen am ehesten in der Lage, diesen Anpassungsprozeß ohne zu große Opfer für die Bevölkerung zu durchlaufen.

Im Vertrauen auf diese Leistungsfähigkeit unserer Volkswirtschaften sollten wir deshalb möglichst bald eine konkrete internationale Weltklimakonvention erarbeiten und diese nicht davon abhängig machen, daß zur Umsetzung bereits alle Details geklärt sind. Angesichts der Größe der globalen Bedrohung sollten wir diesen Mut aufbringen.

Wie Sie wissen, werde ich den Administrator der EPA, Herrn William Reilly, am 8. November 1989 zu einem Gespräch empfangen und ihm bei dieser Gelegenheit nochmals die deutsche Position erläutern.

Die Bundesregierung wird ihre Position auch in die Vorbereitungspapiere für den nächsten Weltwirtschaftsgipfel einbringen in der Hoffnung, daß in der entscheidenden Frage der Vereinbarung einer Weltklimakonvention auf dem Gipfel in Ihrem Lande ein Erfolg erzielt wird.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'H' followed by 'Kohl'.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9277

November 17, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: G. PHILIP HUGHES
FROM: GEORGE VAN ERON *Bmfon*
SUBJECT: Heads of State Correspondence

Attached at Tab I is a summary of the Heads of State correspondence materials received by the Secretariat since Wednesday, November 15th.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached summary (Tab I) to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Summary for the President
Tab A Thatcher to Gorbachev Letter
Tab B Krenz - GDR
Tab C Kohl - FRG
Tab D Price - Belize
Tab E Kohl - FRG

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 17, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: President's Phone Call to King Hussein of Jordan

Please distribute a copy of the attached memorandum of telephone conversation between the President and King Hussein of Jordan to the appropriate regional Deputy Assistant Secretary and our Ambassador in Jordan on a NODIS basis.


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein of Jordan
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME November 15, 1989, 9:11 - 9:14am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call.

The President: Your Majesty, how are you?

King Hussein: Very fine, sir. Good to hear your voice.

The President: I wanted to call to wish you a very happy birthday.

King Hussein: Thank you very much, Mr. President. I appreciate that.

The President: I would also like to add my congratulations on your bringing off Jordan's parliamentary elections last week. That was a good thing.

King Hussein: Thank you. We are very proud of the elections. This is a new phase in Jordan. It will also be a good example to others.

The President: You have made some tough economic and political decisions. These are very statesmanlike. On another matter, I'll be seeing Shamir today. We're not letting up on the peace process. Jim Baker has been working very hard. We've tried to keep your Ambassador informed; I hope we've done that. I hope that we can get an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue started, but it will require some give on both sides. We will keep pressing, because we can serve as a catalyst.

King Hussein: I'm really very glad to hear that. We count on your efforts and pray for your success.

The President: We are staying firm on the Baker five points. The Israelis may be coming to realize that but we will know more in a few hours.

King Hussein: Our hopes are high. Noor sends her love and very best to you and Barbara.

The President: Thank you. We send our regards to you. Are you in Aqaba? How's the weather there?

King Hussein: Great -- hopefully, we will get you here again soon.

The President: I would like that. Again, best wishes and hope to talk to you again soon.

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 15, 1989

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
King Hussein of Jordan

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Stapleton Roy forwarding a copy of subject memorandum of telephone conversation (original at Tab A) to State for appropriate dissemination.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A for record purposes and sign the memo at Tab I transmitting a copy of the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation.

Attachments

Tab I Hughes Memo to Roy

Tab A Memo of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


CHRON FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9482

November 24, 1989



MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD KERR
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Study of Abortion Practices in China (C)

This is to confirm our telephone conversation earlier this week in which I requested a thorough study of abortion practices in China, particularly with respect to the use of involuntary abortion as a family planning measure. (C)

This should be a thorough examination drawing on whatever sources are available to the agency. We would appreciate having the study by December 15. (C)

Robert M. Gates
Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs

cc: David Miller
Karl Jackson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-0116-F/1
3/31/2010 MM

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CHRON FILE

9652


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 30, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Lebanon: Three Presidential Messages (Ø)

Attached for transmission to Embassy Paris is a letter from the President to President Mitterrand. The text of this message should be delivered as soon as possible, making it clear that it was received from the White House as a letter from the President. The cable should go as NODIS, NIACT Immediate, with an information copy to Damascus. Also attached are letters from the President to President Assad of Syria and President Hraoui of Lebanon, which should be cabled to Damascus only as NODIS, NIACT Immediate. In delivering these messages it should also be made clear that they were received from the White House as letters from the President. There will be no signed originals. (Ø)


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachments
Presidential Messages

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0766142
28 12/18/15

TEXT OF LETTER TO SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD

Dear Mr. President:

I wanted to share some of my thoughts about the Lebanon situation as I prepare to set off for Malta. In the spirit of my earlier message to you, I would like you to know exactly of my personal views. I believe this will contribute to the communication and understanding that are necessary as you and I work to strengthen our broader relations.

Mr. President, the Taif agreement brought for Lebanon a real hope for national reconciliation, peace, and unity. Its opponents will not be able to halt this historic development by actions such as Rene Moawad's murder.

I stand with the new President of Lebanon in his efforts to unify his nation and begin the process of healing. I have called upon all Lebanese to support him. General Aoun remains an obstacle that I am working to overcome.

I am convinced, Mr. President, that the only way to do this is to preserve and strengthen the vitality and consensus behind the government of President Hraoui. A resort to military action would divide Lebanon further and damage the national reconciliation process, perhaps irretrievably. We are trying every means to overcome General Aoun's opposition, but force, particularly if Syria is involved, will only give him undeserved legitimacy and added strength.

I respect your support for the Taif agreement. Together we can realize its promise of peace and unity for the people of Lebanon. More bloodshed will not help.

In closing, let me add that I have conveyed similar points to our colleague President Hraoui, for I believe that he represents the best hope for Lebanon to move out of its darkness.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature, possibly 'S', is written in black ink below the word 'Sincerely,'.

TEXT OF LETTER TO LEBANESE PRESIDENT HRAOUI

Dear Mr. President:

I am about to depart for Malta, but wanted to take a moment to write you about my growing concern over developments in your country.

You know from my earlier letter upon your election, as well as our public statements and John Kelly's telephone conversation, that the United States stands behind you and your government as the constitutionally elected, legal authority in Lebanon. My position of support and respect for you is being conveyed to all concerned.

We believe your leadership offers the best hope for fulfillment of the promise of the Taif process of national reconciliation and unity. I am aware of the difficulties posed by General Aoun's opposition, but I am deeply concerned that a non-violent solution be pursued by the Lebanese people themselves as we seek to overcome these problems. It is my belief that military intervention would be a serious mistake, especially if associated with your name, for it would only reduce the chances of attracting support to your new government and further polarize Lebanon.

Mr. President, I admire your courage and determination to help Lebanon and its people. Our prayers are with you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature, likely of George H.W. Bush, consisting of a stylized 'G' followed by a long, sweeping horizontal line that curves upwards at the end.

TEXT OF LETTER TO FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

Dear Francois:

I wanted to take a moment to follow up on our telephone call of November 30 and our discussion of Lebanon. I have communicated with President Hraoui and President Assad, enjoining both to avoid a resort to violence to overcome the opposition of General Aoun. I agree that force is not the solution, and I told President Hraoui that his name should not be associated with such a decision. It would be a tragedy that would only detract from his legitimacy and deepen Lebanon's divisions.

I also would like to continue our moves in concert. General Aoun should not take any hint from any of our actions that his position can continue. He should, in the interests of the nation he claims to protect, step aside in favor of those who support peaceful change and unity. On this point, France and the United States must remain as one.

I very much look forward to continuing our conversations when we see each other in Brussels and then again in the Caribbean. This latter occasion should give us a wonderful opportunity to confer without the usual distractions. With best regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature, possibly reading 'os', followed by a diagonal slash mark.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9652

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 30, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Messages on Lebanon

Following on your phone conversation with Mitterrand, we have prepared messages from you to both Syrian President Assad (Tab A) and Lebanese President Hraoui urging that everything be done to avoid a new round of fighting in Beirut. The message to Hraoui (Tab B) will be your second in a week, coming just a few days after your congratulatory note. The communication to Assad will also only be your second formal written message to him; as a result, we have drafted it so that Lebanon is placed in a somewhat larger context.

These messages from you complement energetic diplomacy, including: demarches in recent days to Syria, the Vatican, Paris, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, and Baghdad; a phone call from John Kelly to Hraoui; and numerous public statements by State and ourselves expressing support for Hraoui and calling for calm. Malta will also be an opportunity for you to raise Lebanon with the Soviets, who remain Syria's principal benefactor.

We have prepared a third message (Tab C) as well, in this case to Mitterrand. The objective is to let him know what we are doing to discourage violence and to express support for French efforts to isolate Aoun. This latter theme is essential in light of the fact that some of what the French are doing is being viewed as implicitly supporting the General in his obstinacy.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the texts at Tab A-C.

Attachments

Tab A Message to President Assad
Tab B Message to President Hraoui
Tab C Message to President Mitterrand

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0766-MR
MM 2/25/2016

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Declassify on: OADR

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9652

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 30, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS *RH*

SUBJECT: Lebanon: Three Presidential Messages

Pursuant to Bob Gates' instructions, David and I have prepared messages from the President to both Assad and Hraoui urging that everything be done to avoid any new outbreak of fighting in Beirut. In addition, we have prepared a third message to Mitterrand that would follow-up on the President's phone call and set the record straight about what we are doing and what we would like the French to do.

Concurrence by: Bob Hutchings *RH*
State Department (NEA/PDAS Jock Covey) *RH*

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Assad Message
Tab B Hraoui Message
Tab C Mitterrand Message

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0746-MR
E8 12/18/15

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CHRON FILE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0766-MR

MM 2/25/2016

November 28, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RS*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *2*

SUBJECT: NATO Wise Men's Group: Implementation
Recommendations

Non-log
Let's keep this possibility alive. I still like it.

Implementation of a possible initiative to create a "Wise Men's Group" to study the future role of the North Atlantic Alliance would entail four preliminary steps:

First, we would need to decide on what we hope the mandate for the Group would be. We recommend against an open-ended mandate on the 'future of the Alliance,' which could engender just the kind of self-doubt and angst that dominated the runup for the May NATO Summit and that were successfully (if temporarily) put to rest. The Group could, instead, profitably examine what goals and strategy the Alliance could set for itself to protect and encourage the peaceful revolution in Eastern Europe.

Second, we would need to reflect on the composition of the Group. Whether made up of three (as in the 1956 Committee of Three on non-military cooperation in NATO) or five (as with the group that prepared the studies leading to the 1967 Harmel Report), the number should be small and the individuals selected, all from outside of government, should command wide respect. We should have a short list in mind. Some candidates are: Lord Carrington, Henry Kissinger, Helmut Schmidt, Giscard d'Estaing, Giovanni Spadolini, Henri Simonet, Johan Holst, and Ernst van der Beugel.

Third, we would need to consider what we hope the Group's conclusions would be. Some likely conclusions might be:

- (a) The continued need for an organized Atlantic community and the forward commitment of the U.S. in Europe;
- (b) A stronger political agenda for the Alliance, centered on encouragement of democratic change within Europe and coordination of Western views on transnational and regional problems;
- (c) New consultative structures within NATO and between NATO and other states and other international organizations, perhaps including the Warsaw Pact;
- (d) Consideration of alternative force postures and correlative arms control positions that maintain a credible and

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effective deterrent, including nuclear forces, in a sustainable force structure that adapts to fundamental political changes in Europe.

Fourth, **we would need to prepare a letter for the President's approval that he would send to Allies this week so that he does not surprise them at NATO.** The letter would outline his ideas, and ask his colleagues to be prepared to consider this initiative in Brussels on December 4. If NATO leaders endorsed the idea, the general concept could be announced on December 4, with a more formal mandate set at the NAC Ministerial later in December. The Group could be asked to report its conclusions to the next NAC Ministerial in May (in Scotland).

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize us to proceed in implementing this initiative with the steps outlined above.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8909709
RECEIVED: 01 DEC 89 13

TO: HUGHES

CHRON FILE

FROM: HUTCHINGS

DOC DATE: 04 DEC 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
BELGIUM
SPAIN

TELCALL
NETHERLANDS
DENMARK

PERSONS: MARTENS, WILFRIED A
GONZALEZ, FELIPE

LUBBERS, RUUD
SCHLUTER, POUL

SUBJECT: PRES MEMCONS TO NATO LEADERS ON 25 - 27 NOV

ACTION: NOTED BY HUGHES

DUE DATE: 05 DEC 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF: 8909504

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ADON FILE

December 4, 1989

ACTION

NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Calls to NATO Leaders,
November 25-27, 1989

At Tabs A through J are Memoranda of Telephone Conversations for the President's telephone calls to Prime Minister Martens (Belgium), PM Lubbers (Netherlands), PM Gonzalez (Spain), PM Schlueter (Denmark), President Ozal (Turkey), PM Cavaco Silva (Portugal), PM Zolotas (Greece), PM Syse (Norway), PM Hermannsson (Iceland), and PM Santer (Luxembourg). The memorandum at Tab I transmits the MEMCONS to State.

AAB
Adrian Basora concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memoranda of Telephone Conversations at Tabs A through J be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you sign the memo at Tab I which transmits the Memoranda of Telephone Conversations to State.

Attachments

Tab I	Hughes Memorandum for Roy
Tab A	Memorandum of Conversation with Martens
Tab B	Memorandum of Conversation with Lubbers
Tab C	Memorandum of Conversation with Gonzalez
Tab D	Memorandum of Conversation with Schlueter
Tab E	Memorandum of Conversation with Ozal
Tab F	Memorandum of Conversation with Cavaco Silva
Tab G	Memorandum of Conversation with Zolotas
Tab H	Memorandum of Conversation with Syse
Tab I	Memorandum of Conversation with Hermannsson
Tab J	Memorandum of Conversation with Santer

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By *CAF* NARA, Date *7/10/09*

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9709

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Calls to NATO Leaders,
November 25-27, 1989 (U)

Distribution of the attached Memoranda of Telephone Conversations must be handled via NODIS channels and at the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. (C)

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Martens of Belgium
Tab B Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Lubbers of the Netherlands
Tab C Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain
Tab D Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Schlueter of Denmark
Tab E Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Ozal of Turkey
Tab F Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva of Portugal
Tab G Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Zolotas of Greece
Tab H Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Syse of Norway
Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Hermannsson of Iceland
Tab J Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Santer of Luxembourg

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0273-F
9/8/2009 MM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Wilfried Martens of Belgium (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME November 25, 1989, 7:46 - 7:50 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you, sir? (U)

Prime Minister Martens: Very fine. I had a Party meeting this morning. I apologize for being late to receive your call. (U)

The President: I just wanted to tell you that Manfred Woerner has invited me to come to Brussels December 4 to report on my meetings with Gorbachev. I have accepted. This is a good chance to get together. I look forward to seeing you and hope we have time for a brief chat. I am anxious to get the opinions of friends before I go. Do you have any thoughts for me? (U)

Prime Minister Martens: No. We had a good meeting Saturday in Paris. We are all agreed that the Allies must consult closely. Chancellor Kohl assured us that he will defend Germany's strong role in the EC and NATO. I have no doubt that you will defend our position in your meetings with Gorbachev. In Belgium, we see no difficulties. (C)

The President: It will be an important meeting, and very timely. There will be no surprises or deals. I was intrigued with Belgium's idea of a "second tier" closely associated with the EC which would give Poland and Hungary, and perhaps other East European countries, the chance to move closer to the Community. This is something to discuss with Gorbachev. (C)

Prime Minister Martens: The U.S. role is very important, especially with Poland and Hungary. Chancellor Kohl also mentioned your involvement. In Paris, we agreed that we should help only those countries that accept free elections. (C)

The President: It is interesting that now Czechoslovakia is beginning to move. Only Romania is swimming against the tide. I just wanted to check in with you. I believe in close consultations. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0273-F
2/20/00 MM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME November 25, 1989, 7:52 - 8:00 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Fine. It is good to hear your voice.
(U)

The President: I am just calling to tell you I am off to Malta soon and that I will be going to Brussels afterwards. I wanted to get your advice. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: We had a good meeting with our European colleagues in Paris. The atmosphere was very positive. Gorbachev is in favor of development toward democracy in central and eastern Europe. I have a feeling we should not be talking about national boundaries, which should be respected. We should also avoid talk of the German problem. Everyone agrees with that. And we should respect the maintenance of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. (U)

The President: I understand. It is a sensitive point. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: We can work together in the economic field with Eastern Europe. There are certain forms of association, including trade and special privileges. This is very important, George. To the extent that capital from other countries goes there with the possibility to export to the European market, it will be more attractive to investors. The IMF is moving to certain conclusions in this regard. Finally, we should be ready with credits and aid in the wintertime. You asked my advice. Make this a European project for Gorbachev and you. (U)

The President: I think we can move in that direction. It is understandable that we not project the German Question, but at some point one of these countries will say we do not want to be in the Pact. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I don't expect that to happen soon. There may be a chance for a Finnish pattern, but this is not a point for us to raise. Poland and Hungary need to know that for stronger economic cooperation and even integration with the EC, they do not have to leave the Pact. I talked with President Mitterrand two days ago. We believe it is better not to accept Austria as a full member but rather with some form of association. This would show that the same is possible also for Eastern Europe. It is in the interest of the West to sustain Gorbachev in his liberalization. I don't see much advantage in East European countries leaving the Warsaw Pact. If they do, they should go a way different from Western Europe, perhaps like Finland or Austria. It is their right to decide, but we should let them know that all forms of cooperation are possible even without their leaving the Warsaw Pact. (U)

The President: We cannot be publicly positioned as opposing their leaving the Warsaw Pact. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes. (U)

The President: These are interesting times, aren't they? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Absolutely. (U)

The President: Congratulations on forming your new government. Are you happy with it? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes. It is a new situation, though. (U)

The President: Will you be able to go to Brussels? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes, of course. I will see you there. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME November 25, 1989, 8:30 - 8:37 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Good morning, or rather afternoon. I wanted to see if you had any words of wisdom as I go to meet with Gorbachev. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Many thanks. It is going to be difficult. Probably the best way to help him -- to get him to let us help him -- is not to insist on the elimination of the two pacts. (U)

The President: Good point. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: All of the policy problems, defense agreements, and border problems can go backwards if the alliances are not maintained. (U)

The President: I agree. The problem is that at some point one or more of the East European states may decide on their own that they want out. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I am sure that will happen eventually. But we need to hold off, to gain time, gain four or five years, until disarmament negotiations are further along. (U)

The President: That would be a good idea. It would make it easier for Gorbachev to move forward. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Exactly. (U)

The President: I am going over to debrief at Brussels on December 4 at the invitation of Manfred Woerner. I hope to see you there. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes. I probably will be making my inaugural speech on that very day. If that does not happen, I will go. Otherwise, if I must be here, I will send my foreign minister instead. (U)

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- 2 -

The President: I understand. If you cannot come and would like me to send someone to see you and give you our impressions, I would be glad to do that. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I would be very grateful. I would appreciate that. (U)

The President: If you have any other ideas before Malta, I would welcome your advice. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Poul Schlueter of Denmark (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Poul Schlueter, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME November 26, 1989, 8:03 - 8:08 EST
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Schlueter: Fine. It is nice of you to call. (U)

The President: I am just checking in. I have checked in with our other Allies, and wanted to know if you had any thoughts before I leave for my meetings with Gorbachev. (U)

Prime Minister Schlueter: The twelve in the Common Market had a very good meeting with President Mitterrand in Paris Sunday. We sent a signal that we know our obligations and will meet them. We agreed that the timing of your meeting with Gorbachev is excellent. (U)

The President: Yes. (U)

Prime Minister Schlueter: Is the prime purpose to be weapons reductions? (U)

The President: I am not sure about that. We have made it clear that this is not an arms control meeting per se. We have a multilateral framework and would need to consult with our Allies. (U)

Prime Minister Schlueter: But no detailed negotiations? (U)

The President: No. We will also talk on the economic side. I can hear from him what his expectations are. I also want to find out what his limits of tolerance are. (U)

Prime Minister Schlueter: Yes. This will be important. It is a big concern that the Soviet economy is so lagging. (U)

The President: Do you have any thoughts about changes in Germany? (U)

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2

Prime Minister Schlueter: At Paris, Chancellor Kohl stressed that reunification is not a matter that needs to be dealt with now, and that Germany will remain 100 per cent in NATO and the EC. This is irreversible, he said. (S)

The President: I just wanted to check in. How is your beautiful bride? (U)

Prime Minister Schlueter: Fine. It has been very pleasant here. We have just been hunting in Jutland. (U)

The President: Give her our love. (U)

Prime Minister Schlueter: We shall meet on December 4. (U)

The President: Good. I will look forward to it. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0693-MR
SCS 6/20/11

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to President
Turgut Ozal of Turkey (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME November 27, 1989, 12:09 - 12:13 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you? I am calling about the Malta meeting. I wondered if you had any concerns or words of consultation or advice. I wanted to touch base with all of the NATO allies and assure you that there would be no deals made over your heads at Malta. I also wanted to get advice, especially from you, since you are so geographically close to the Soviet Union. (Ø)

Prime Minister Ozal: I would say to be careful and cautious, but also try to help the Soviet economy and democratization in Eastern Europe. (Ø)

The President: I think that is good advice. I just had a meeting with Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of our Federal Reserve Board. On the economic side, it is my intention to try to help, but real reforms are needed. (Ø)

Prime Minister Ozal: The situation is similar to our efforts in the 1980s. We had friends' help, but we made our own efforts. (Ø)

The President: Arms control will be for a summit and after consultation with our allies. He may bring it up, but I will say I need to consult with my allies. (U)

Prime Minister Ozal: I agree. (U)

The President: I wanted to touch base with you and other allies. There is a kind of euphoria now. We do want to help and are prepared to make suggestions. (U)

Prime Minister Ozal: I am sure they need help, but they should accept that Marxism is dead. (Ø)

The President: We'll be in Brussels at the invitation of Manfred Woerner to discuss Malta with our allies. (U)

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Declassify on: OADR

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- 2 -

Prime Minister Ozal: Our Prime Minister will be there. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1479-MR

5/27/2016 MM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Cavaco Silva of Portugal (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Anibal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME November 27, 1989, 12:16 - 12:34 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Anibal, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Fine. How is your family? (U)

The President: Fine. I am calling to get advice from an old friend about my Malta meeting. (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: It is a very important one. (U)

The President: There will be no surprises to our allies and no deals. I will be ready to talk with him on a wide array of economic things. I want perestroika to succeed, as you do. (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: It is important that the allies be united to achieve good results in disarmament and other fields. We agreed on that in Paris. (U)

The President: That is good to hear. I heard that from other allies. I appreciate that the allies are meeting. I wanted your ideas. (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: There should be economic reforms, not just political changes such as election laws and liberalization. Without structural adjustment, I think they will not succeed. We Portuguese understand. We had a totalitarian takeover attempt. We had to make many changes to put market mechanisms in place, adopt constitutional changes, and revise the banking system. We support the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but we should not destabilize the alliances. The EC also agreed that we should not weaken transatlantic ties. (U)

The President: I agree. This is a timely meeting. We started talking with Gorbachev last summer. I am glad to hear we are thinking along the same lines. (U)

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- 2 -

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Will you discuss regional problems?
(U)

The President: Yes. Absolutely. We will talk about Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and also Angola, which you are very interested in. (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Yes. I want to talk about this when I visit in January. (U)

The President: Yes. If you have thoughts about Angola before I leave for Malta, I would appreciate your personal message. You could hand it to our Ambassador. (C)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Yes. I have been there recently and talked to President Dos Santos. I think it is time for a lasting peace. I will see about a personal message, although our Foreign Minister has come to your State Department. Dos Santos wants a solution; everyone does. He has a problem in his Party, but he is in control. He wants a dialogue with Savimbi. (C)

The President: That is encouraging. If you have further thoughts before Malta, please tell me. I look forward to our meeting. (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: All the success to your summit. We in Europe will be following it with great interest. (U)

The President: We will do our best. We won't let you down. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Xenofon Zolotas of Greece

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Xenofon Zolotas, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME November 27, 1989, 12:28 - 1230 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call.

The President: Mr. Prime Minister?

Prime Minister Zolotas: Yes, I am the Prime Minister.

The President: I am pleased to say hello. I am calling about the upcoming meeting in Malta. I have been touching base with all of the countries in NATO, in a spirit of full consultation. I want to assure you there will not be some major arms control deal that does not have the full approval of NATO. I would welcome any thoughts you have.

Prime Minister Zolotas: I will be coming to the NATO meeting. If I have any thoughts I will send them.

The President: I look forward to seeing you December 4 in Brussels.

Prime Minister Zolotas: I fully understand your position. I am looking forward to the success of your deliberations with Mr. Gorbachev. Thank you for your call.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Jan P. Syse of Norway (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Jan P. Syse, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME November 27, 1989, 12:56 - 1:00 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Syse: Fine. How are you? (U)

The President: I am checking with our NATO allies and looking forward to the Malta meeting. I am going to Brussels December 4 and wonder if you have any words of wisdom. (U)

Prime Minister Syse: Words of wisdom? I don't know about that. Perhaps some questions. I welcome your idea of going to Brussels. May I raise one matter of special concern to us? Gorbachev, in Helsinki, talked about arms control at sea. This is a dangerous idea. We should not weaken the sea lanes to the Atlantic. There has been a constant Soviet buildup in the north. New offensive capabilities are being added. I would ask you to consider this special question and encourage Gorbachev to start cutting down naval forces up north as he has done in the Baltic. (U)

The President: I will be glad to do it. He has pressed us for naval reductions, but we are disinclined to do so. You make a good point of the need for cutting down Soviet forces up north. I will be glad to raise this point. I look forward to our meeting on December 4. I think Malta will be a good meeting. There has been so much euphoria that it may be hard to live up to that. The meeting is not meant to be a major summit. I want to hear his views, including on economic issues. I want to help him and know our allies do, too. It is important to keep the allies together. (U)

Prime Minister Syse: I agree. Also in Eastern Europe it is important to help. (U)

The President: I look forward to seeing you, and I look forward to a good Malta meeting. The changes are wonderful in Eastern Europe, but there is still a need for prudence. I look forward to seeing you in Brussels. (U)

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- 2 -

Prime Minister Syse: I look forward to meeting you. Thank you
for calling me. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Steingrimur Hermannsson of Iceland

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Steingrimur Hermannsson, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME November 27, 1989, 4:16 - 4:20 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call.

The President: How are you?

Prime Minister Hermannsson: Fine. It has been a busy period.

The President: I am calling to touch base before my meeting in Malta. I am calling NATO friends to say there will be no deals behind the backs of our allies. It will be an open agenda: he can raise any ideas, and I will raise any. I wanted to ask you for advice. On December 4 I will be going to Brussels at the invitation of Manfred Woerner. I hope to see you there.

Prime Minister Hermannsson: It is a good idea. I strongly support this meeting. I will be in Brussels and look forward to hearing your report. I have no specific advice. You are on the right track.

The President: I think so too. There is some criticism here that I am not responding to the enormous changes in Eastern Europe, but I think things are going well. There is no need for rhetoric. Gorbachev has problems enough at home. We will discuss arms control in broad terms, but this is not the place for deals on CFE or START.

Prime Minister Hermannsson: I agree. Things are very promising. Gorbachev has great problems--more than appear on the surface. The Western countries should help, but not interfere. I am just back from a meeting between EFTA and the EB. We agreed to help the East European countries. Iceland will participate in a small way in the fund for Poland.

The President: Good. I look forward to seeing you in Brussels on Monday.

Prime Minister Hermannsson: Thank you. I wish you the best of luck.

The President: Do you have many fish this summer?

Prime Minister Hermannsson: If you come, I can guarantee you will catch some.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Jacques Santer of Luxembourg

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Jacques Santer, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 27, 1989, 5:31 - 5:34 p.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President initiated the call.

The President: Where are you -- off in Japan? I hope it's not too early. I am calling in a spirit of consultation about my upcoming meeting with Gorbachev. First, I have been invited by Manfred Woerner to debrief at Brussels on December 4, which I'm happy to do. Second, I would like to have your thoughts or suggestions. I am calling all the allies.

Prime Minister Santer: This is a very important moment. I back all of your efforts. It is a very decisive moment in Europe. As I have said in the EC meeting, we need to support democratization and help them with their social, economic, and political difficulties. I support your efforts.

The President: This is encouraging. I am getting good responses. This not an arms control meeting. There will be no agenda. Any topic is open for discussion, but Gorbachev must know there will be no deals without consultations with our allies. I will discuss his economic problems and also regional problems. I look forward to debriefing you on Monday in Brussels.

Prime Minister Santer: Thank you. It is an important moment. We support you in all your efforts. Best wishes. Good luck.

The President: Thank you. I will see you in Brussels.

-- End of Conversation --

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8909790
RECEIVED: 05 DEC 89 09

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 06 DEC 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

EUROPE

PERSONS: THATCHER, MARGARET

SUBJECT: THATCHER & EUROPE

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 08 DEC 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
ZELIKOW

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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DOC 2 OF 2

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

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② 5/7/10

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 6, 1989

1989 DEC - G PM 8:40
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*Hey, Brent, you really
know how to hurt
a guy — charming
my + wife
see newspaper
GPB /*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Thatcher and Europe

The British press seized on your renewed endorsement of a more united Europe to portray you as taking the side of the rest of Western Europe against the Prime Minister. Your support for European integration is not new, and the media hyperbole exaggerated the negligible differences on concrete issues. This episode is a warning of how the bitter debate between Thatcher's and Delors' visions for Europe can affect our own policy objectives. While we want to avoid a row with Mrs. Thatcher, it would be helpful if she could be persuaded to play a more constructive role in the EC, and thus help tightly bind Germany to the West.

Britain and the EC: The Tory Turnabout

It is ironic that the Conservative Party, which since Macmillan's time has pushed for closer British ties to the Common Market, is now stereotyped as opposing integration. The Labour leadership, on the other hand, historically fearful of ties to the EC, has begun to sing the Community's praises. This turnabout stems from the change in the EC's own agenda for the future, set against the background of British domestic politics.

Mrs. Thatcher has strongly supported EC creation of a free trade area in Europe. The Conservative Party has long stood for free trade, with Labour warning against the impact of free trade on jobs. So the Single Market, with its relaxation of barriers to free movement of goods, was immensely appealing to the Prime Minister, and to most of her party. It was the brainchild of her former Trade Minister, Lord Cockfield. Her support for this goal was so strong that she joined in accepting the provision of the Single European Act eliminating a single member's veto power within the Community, a decision Thatcher now regrets and blames on Geoffrey Howe's Foreign Office.

Thatcher's difficulty is with integration that goes beyond free trade. First, she has little use for monetary union which would create a common central bank and European currency and subject the British economy to German economic and monetary discipline. Considering deregulation of the British economy to be among her historic achievements as Prime Minister, she is also rightly appalled at the prospect of surrendering control over budgetary

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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policy to 'Eurocrats.' As she told her party conference last year: "We have not worked all these years to free Britain from the paralysis of socialism only to see it creep in through the back door of central control and bureaucracy from Brussels."

Beyond economics, however, Thatcher fears the erosion of Britain's distinctiveness as a nation. In addition to a common Eurocurrency, Delors wishes to create common laws on worker rights and participation in industry, consumer protection, public health, education policy, legal rights for the accused, and other issues -- all encompassed in the EC's so-called "social dimension." Thatcher believes she must resist these moves to protect the essential sovereignty of the United Kingdom. She is opposing what, in Bruges last September, she called the "folly" of merging European countries into "some sort of identikit Europersonality."

Challenges to Thatcher's Position

The Labour Party, meanwhile, has come to welcome EC clashes with Thatcher's agenda as a substitute for its own inability to block the Prime Minister's domestic program. Thatcher must also deal with discontent within her own party. There is broad Tory support for the Prime Minister's basic approach to the EC. Yet the party worries that her style, tone, and tactics are giving the impression that the party is now against British economic engagement in Europe, a potential liability in the next general election (in late 1991 or 1992).

These Tory 'wets' believe that London can be more influential in shaping the EC's agenda as a constructive participant than as, to borrow Michael Heseltine's metaphor, a man alone in the desert -- sovereign but powerless. They are concerned about the stridency of her rhetoric, the deliberate adversarial quality of her dialogue with Delors, and her readiness to cross swords with the Community on every issue as a matter of principle, even where the particular proposal (such as one to improve teaching of foreign languages in secondary schools) would benefit Britain.

In the first-ever formal challenge to Thatcher's party leadership December 5 (from a long-disgruntled and unpopular backbencher), 60 out of 374 Tory MPs withheld their support through opposition or abstention, a number large enough to be troubling but no threat to her leadership position. The Prime Minister can be expected to reveal more about her attitude toward the future of the EC this weekend in Strasbourg, at a meeting of Community leaders.

The Challenge for the United States

Your remarks on the EC in Brussels were the latest in a consistent series of U.S. statements, beginning with your speech

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at Boston University in May, putting the Administration on the side of a stronger and more united Europe. (The attached article from the December 6 Financial Times demonstrates that the quality European press increasingly understands what you are trying to do.) The Prime Minister used your call to her on the morning of December 5 to effectively rebut, in the House of Commons, the claim that you had had a serious difference with her on the future of the EC.

This episode does spotlight Thatcher's need to find more common ground in her relationships in Western Europe and with the EC. There is a clear potential for improved UK relations with Western Europe. Mitterrand is worried about German steps toward reunification and, following a time-honored pattern, is bound to welcome closer ties with Britain to help manage a resurgent Germany. Several West European governments share some of London's concerns about EC activism in social policy and are also reluctant to yield new authority to officials in Brussels who are not democratically accountable.

Since the 1950s, U.S. leaders have relied on NATO and the EC to anchor Germany firmly in the West. By slowing EC development, Thatcher weakens that anchor. As you said in Brussels, "unification should occur in the context of Germany's continued commitment to NATO and an increasingly integrated European Community...." If the major transatlantic problems in the 1990s are those of political economy rather than the political-military challenges so familiar in the postwar era, then the EC may be the best available instrument in the coming decade for the Europeans to manage the German problem. It would be best all-round if Mrs. Thatcher took a more constructive attitude toward the EC, seeking consensus instead of staking out a defiant ideological position. The Prime Minister may get closer to her own long-term objectives if, while sticking to her principles, she changes her tone and tactics, so that Helmut Kohl will not continue to refer to her as "that woman."

Attachment

Tab A Article from December 6 Financial Times

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AMERICAN NEWS

Warm western breeze for Europe

Peter Riddell examines President Bush's transatlantic view

PRESIDENT George Bush's strong endorsement of European integration, in his speech to Nato leaders in Brussels on Monday, was the culmination of a gradual shift in US policy this year.

Transatlantic relations used to be uncertain and wary at times during the Carter and Reagan presidencies, but Mr Bush is determined to establish closer and firmer links. The signs so far are that he is succeeding - in terms of mood, if not substance.

Even so, there have been misconceptions about what this means in practice, both in relation to the form of European integration and to future US relations with Europe.

Mr Bush is genuinely interested in European issues. The latest visit is his third to Europe within six months, and characteristically he has been in frequent contact with a wide range of European leaders. He talks to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany by phone roughly once a week.

Moreover, much to the pleasure of the European Commission, Mr Bush has seen Mr Jacques Delors for bilateral meetings on both his visits to Brussels.

Also, there has been a change of policy to match the shift of style towards close consultation. First, after early doubts, the Bush administra-

tion has decided to take a positive view of the creation of a single European market, to appear in 1992.

Second, as the pace of change in eastern Europe has accelerated, Mr Bush has increasingly seen the political value of an integrated European Community as a source of stability in the continent.

Hence his call in Brussels "both for a continued, perhaps even intensified, effort of the 12 to integrate, and a role for the EC as a magnet that draws the forces of reform forward in eastern Europe." Last July, at the seven-country annual economic summit, the US agreed to the European Commission taking a role in chairing the effort by the Group of 24 to help Poland and Hungary, about which Mr Bush says he was "exceptionally pleased".

There is uncertainty in Europe about what this means. One State Department official closely involved talked of integration having a security dimension: "Europe is more than just trade." The US is concerned with the political direction of Europe rather than the form of integration. Mr Bush has taken no position on, say, European monetary union and the social charter.

So it is wrong to see Mr Bush siding with one group or

other in the debate before the EC's Strasbourg summit this month. His view is that the form of European integration is for the Europeans to decide.

Where the US differs from Mrs Margaret Thatcher is over the tone of the current British approach - the apparent lack of enthusiasm for, or rather the questioning attitude to, integration. Mr Bush and his advisers would like Britain to take a more positive view, and hence have more influence over the details.

Mrs Thatcher appeared taken aback on Monday by Mr Bush's plan for the future of Europe, and, in particular, by the reference to integration. ~~But talk of British isolation should not be exaggerated, as Mr Bush made clear on the telephone yesterday to Mrs Thatcher.~~

The other misconception is that the US is somehow retreating from Europe. While there are neo-isolationists among conservative Republicans, the administration remains firmly committed to a continuing US role in Europe. This will involve not only maintaining "significant military forces" but also what Mr Bush has called "a close US partnership with the EC."

He referred on Monday to looking for ways "to improve our ties so a new Atlanticism will pull in harness with a new

Europe."

The US is thinking of strengthening the political side of the relationship. This may be through the meetings of the troika (the immediate past, present and future presidents of the EC, at senior official/political director level) every six months. However, the US has stressed that this does not mean that the EC should supplant Nato.

There has been a shift in the balance of the relationship, with the US being less a commanding leader than a leading partner. In part, of course, this reflects the domestic budgetary constraints on the US ability to act on a large scale overseas.

But Mr Bush and his advisers also accept that the transatlantic balance has changed, with European countries taking the lead in deciding their own future. This may be unavoidable for the US, but Mr Bush has not been grudging; he has welcomed the change.

All this may add up mainly to a shift in mood. But it is significant. Mr Bush may at times be embarrassingly inarticulate, and is never likely to be regarded as charismatic or visionary, as he self-deprecatingly admitted on Monday. But he has succeeded in showing European leaders that he understands their concerns and shares most of their aspirations.



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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December 6, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Thatcher and Europe

In view of the President's talk with Mrs. Thatcher yesterday morning, we have prepared an analysis of the Prime Minister's views on the EC for the President.

Concurrences: Tim Deal *TD* and Adrian Basora *AB*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President attached at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Article from December 6 Financial Times

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/10/09

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11a. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Lebanon -- Working to Avert New Fighting (2 pp.)	12/22/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (October - December 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS (NLGB) on 7/8/11

Date Closed:	7/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91148-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-0768-MR
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	3/14/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.


PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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10314



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 22, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Lebanon -- Working to Avert New Fighting

*advisory proposition.
see me. RD*

The situation in Lebanon could explode at any moment. The Syrians have warned us again that their patience is not infinite;

(b)(1)
(b)(1) Aoun's call for elections on January 7 for a new Parliament (presumably a truncated body in the Christian enclave) has created a new deadline for action by Hraoui and Syria and its allies to avert this deepening of partition.

In tandem with our diplomacy to bolster Hraoui and the national reconciliation process, we have urged Syria not to resort to force. Our demarches bought a respite, (b)(1)

(b)(1) At our urging, the Tripartite Committee has gone through a further round of consultations, but the Committee has no effectiveness with Aoun. (b)(1)

(b)(1) In short, we have just about exhausted the diplomatic strategy set up after Hraoui's election. We need further momentum, or more bloodshed is all but certain.

In thinking this over with State/NEA, we come up with two ideas: a trip by Ambassador McCarthy to Lebanon, followed by a visit by Hraoui here. We would package this as follows: McCarthy would travel to northern Lebanon to meet Hraoui right before the January 7 elections; he would convey the President's invitation, and Hraoui -- who we believe would accept immediately -- would use the occasion to announce the visit. This news might detract attention and support for Aoun's pseudo-election and reinforce Hraoui's stature. (b)(1)

not really

Why would we even want to do this!!!

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(b)(1)

There is a risk that Aoun (or others) could take advantage of Hraoui's absence to stir up trouble. We believe that risk is manageable, however. In any event, Hraoui is likely to regard the political benefits of a visit as greater than the risks of his absence. *cancel*

We admit we are working with limited tools to keep Lebanon breathing. A Hraoui visit is the best of only a few, not-so-good ideas, but we believe it would generate at least some political momentum for Hraoui. If you agree, then the next step would be quickly to elicit from the schedulers a proposed date so that State can begin to plan the other parts of the scenario outlined above.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached schedule proposal for a working visit by Lebanese President Hraoui in February, with an invitation to be conveyed before January 6.

Attachment

Tab I Schedule Proposal for Joe Hagin

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Deputy Assistant to the President for Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: For a working visit by Lebanon's new President, Elias Hraoui, to discuss the situation in Lebanon.

PURPOSE: To strengthen President Hraoui and the legitimate government of Lebanon and to promote national reconciliation in Lebanon.

BACKGROUND: The political situation in Lebanon is deadlocked. General Aoun has threatened to hold elections on January 7 for a new Parliament, seated in the Christian enclave. Such elections would deepen partition and would damage the chances for national reconciliation. The potential for further violence is growing and Syrian patience with a political track to move Aoun aside is wearing thin. If an invitation for Hraoui to visit here were delivered and publicized prior to January 7, it would be a big boost to Hraoui and a major slap at Aoun. It would distract attention from any elections, thus reducing the potential for renewed fighting.

DATE AND TIME: February, 1990.

DURATION: One hour.

LOCATION: Oval Office

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0768-MR
SCS 3/14/11

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Declassify on: OADR

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PARTICIPANTS: The President; the Vice President; James Baker, Secretary of State; John Sununu, Chief of Staff; Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs; John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; John McCarthy, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon; C. David Welch, Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs (NSC).

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo op followed by meeting.

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC.

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House Press Pool.

RECOMMENDED BY: State Department and NSC.

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 10314

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

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DOCLOG CM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>SP</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		
NSC Secretariat			

RECEIVED

89 DEC 22 P 4: 25

<u>A</u> = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

SP

Lebanon's
Pres Elias Hraoui

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12/22

Brent/Bob:

As you know, usually when the President extends a visit invitation it is for a State (dinner) or Official Working (lunch) visit. This is more than David is asking for, but I thought I'd remind you that the six month visit schedule I just sent up to you has a "vacant" Official Working Visit slot in February that we could offer to Hraoui if you want. (That opening falls a little early to be used for pre-Summit Alliance consultations). On the other hand, you may judge Hraoui to be too uncertain a proposition to spend a Presidential luncheon.

Philip