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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91148
Folder ID Number: 91148-006

Folder Title:
Other (July 1989)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	6	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy Re: Memoranda of Conversations from the President' Trip to Europe, May 26 - Jun 2, 1989 (1 pp.)	7/25/89	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memo	Robert D. Blackwill to G. Philip Hughes Re: Memoranda of Conversations from the President' Trip to Europe, May 26 - Jun 2, 1989 (2 pp.)	6/15/89	(b)(1)	S
01c. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister of Italy (7 pp.)	5/27/89	(b)(1)	S
01d. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister of Italy (2 pp.)	5/27/89	(b)(1)	S
01e. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Francesco Cossiga, President of Italy (4 pp.)	5/27/89	(b)(1)	S
01f. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Bettino Craxi, Secretary of the Socialist Party of Italy (3 pp.)	5/27/89	(b)(1)	S
01g. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister of Italy (2 pp.)	5/27/89	(b)(1)	S
01h. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister of Belgium (7 pp.)	5/28/89	(b)(1)	S
01i. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Manfred Woerner, Secretary General of NATO (3 pp.)	5/29/89	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (July 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap1237
OA/ID Number: 91148-006
Date Closed: 7/10/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01j. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Andreas Papandreu, Prime Minister of Greece (2 pp.)	5/30/89	(b)(1)	S
01k. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	5/30/89	(b)(1)	S
01l. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission (3 pp.)	5/30/89	(b)(1)	S
01m. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany [redacted] (3 pp.)	5/30/89	(b)(1)	S
01n. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (4 pp.)	5/31/89	(b)(1)	TS
01o. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (6 pp.)	6/1/89	(b)(1)	TS
01p. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (3 pp.)	6/1/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:	
Record Group:	Bush Presidential Records
Office:	Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:	Chronological Files
Subseries:	
WHORM Cat.:	
File Location:	Other (July 1989)
Pinksheet Number: cap1237 OA/ID Number: 91148-006 Date Closed: 7/10/2009 FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S Re-review Case #: P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	

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
White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2008

By MM NARA, Date 10/21/2013

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


July 25, 1989



MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversations from the President's
Trip to Europe, May 26 - Jun 2, 1989

Attached for your information are the Memoranda of Conversations
of the President's Trip to Europe, May 26 - Jun 2, 1989. (8)


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachments

- Memorandum of Conversation for the May 27 Meeting with
Italian Prime Minister De Mita
- Memorandum of Conversation for the May 27 Expanded Meeting
with Italian Prime Minister De Mita
- Memorandum of Conversation for the May 27 Meeting with
Italian President Cossiga
- Memorandum of Conversation for the May 27 Meeting with
Secretary of the Socialist Party of Italy Craxi
- Memorandum of Conversation for the Additional May 27 Meeting
with Italian Prime Minister De Mita
- Memorandum of Conversation for the May 28 Meeting with
Belgian Prime Minister Martens
- Memorandum of Conversation for the May 29 Meeting with NATO
Secretary General Woerner
- Memorandum of Conversation for the May 30 Meeting with Greek
Prime Minister Papandreu
- Memorandum of Conversation for the May 30 Meeting with
Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez
- Memorandum of Conversation for the May 30 Meeting with EC
Commission President Delors
- Memorandum of Conversation for the May 30 Meeting with FRG
Chancellor Kohl
- Memorandum of Conversation for the June 1 Expanded Meeting
with UK Prime Minister Thatcher

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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(w/~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments)

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June 15, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversations from the President's
Trip to Europe, May 26 - Jun 2, 1989

Attached at Tabs I - XIV are the subject memoranda. The only missing MEMCON is the President's meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Ozal, in Brussels on the morning of May 29. The notetaker for the meeting was Charles Thomas, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Jim Collins is aware that we need a final version of this MEMCON and has promised to forward it to the NSC.

We suggest, that consistent with your usual procedures, copies of these memoranda be made available to State and Defense, with the exceptions of the MEMCON for the President's May 30 meeting with Chancellor Kohl (Tab XII) and the MEMCON for the President's small June 1 meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher (Tab XIV).

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memoranda of Conversations be filed for the record.

Approve *✓ [Signature]*

Disapprove _____

That you approve release of all attached Memoranda to the Department of State with the exceptions of the MEMCON of the President's May 30 meeting with Chancellor Kohl (Tab XII) and the MEMCON of the President's small June 1 meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher (Tab XIII).

Approve *✓ [Signature]*

Disapprove _____

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(w/~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments)

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Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 27 Meeting with Italian Prime Minister De Mita
Tab II	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 27 Expanded Meeting with Italian Prime Minister De Mita
Tab III	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 27 Meeting with Italian President Cossiga
Tab IV	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 27 Meeting with Secretary of the Socialist Party of Italy Craxi
Tab V	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's Additional May 27 Meeting with Italian Prime Minister De Mita
Tab VI	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 28 Meeting with Belgian Prime Minister Martens
Tab VII	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 29 Meeting with NATO Secretary General Woerner
Tab VIII	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 30 Meeting with Greek Prime Minister Papandreu
Tab IX	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 30 Meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez
Tab X	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 30 Meeting with EC Commission President Delors
Tab XI	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 30 Meeting with FRG Chancellor Kohl
Tab XII	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 31 Small Meeting with FRG Chancellor Kohl
Tab XIII	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's June 1 Meeting with UK Prime Minister Thatcher
Tab XIV	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's June 1 Expanded Meeting with UK Prime Minister Thatcher

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister of Italy (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Maxwell Rabb, U.S. Ambassador to Italy
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
(notetaker)
Interpreter

Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister
Giulio Andreotti, Foreign Minister
Rinaldo Petrignani, Ambassador to the U.S.

DATE, TIME May 27, 1989, 10:10 a.m. - 11:45 a.m.
AND PLACE: Villa Madama, Rome

Prime Minister De Mita renewed his welcome and said he was sure Rome would get the President off to a good start for his European visit. Italy and the U.S., he said, now face an exceptional international situation. Today, we are building on peace and no one is prepared for that. We must be ready for the future. Therefore, the Atlantic Community, which has been the equilibrium for keeping the peace, should be the center of future efforts to build peace. Solidarity within the Alliance should grow, should take advantage of this new era. In previous decades, there were arguments about whether the Alliance was the correct choice for civilization. But now the Western Alliance has won, because its military position of strength deterred the Soviet Union. Now that the Alliance was winning, it would be a shame if it was troubled by self-doubt. (C)

The President thanked the Prime Minister for his welcome. He said it was no accident that Italy was chosen as the first stop

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on his trip. This decision signaled the importance of this bilateral visit and the closeness of the U.S.-Italian relationship. Americans felt very special about Italy in their hearts, and the President wanted all Italians to understand that. There were few bilateral problems, so it was possible to concentrate on broader questions. (U)

The President agreed that the Alliance was winning -- Western values, and the resulting peace and economic prosperity were capturing public attention. As a result of this success, there were pressures on the Alliance. So the President felt the Allies must have a united and successful Summit in Brussels. NATO would be judged on whether it could settle one contentious issue: SNF (short-range nuclear forces). (C)

The President believed the Germans, torn asunder by their domestic politics, had been reluctant to move toward the kind of compromise that the President thought must come out of the Summit. Recognizing that the conventional force imbalance was a major problem, and recognizing that Soviet forces were the biggest threat, the U.S. had come up with a conventional arms control proposal on which the Prime Minister had been briefed. That proposal should be an enormous help with the German problem. The President had made an appeal to Helmut Kohl to compromise, to accept a text which would be sustainable politically because of this U.S. conventional arms control initiative. The President felt Chancellor Kohl should accept the U.S. compromise text on the SNF issue. If the Prime Minister agreed with that assessment, the President would love to have the Prime Minister's support in Brussels if the matter was not resolved before the Summit. (C)

Prime Minister De Mita said he had talked about the SNF issue with the German Chancellor. He thought he understood the German position. There was, the Prime Minister thought, no real objective conflict in views. The Prime Minister and Chancellor Kohl had discussed the unacceptability of a "third zero" and an eventual negotiation on SNF missiles after a significant agreement reducing conventional weapons. The problem was in the timing of the relationship between SNF negotiations and a conventional forces agreement. (C)

Prime Minister De Mita then turned to the general problem of Germany, which was not always discussed between the U.S. and Italy. The problem stemmed from the fact that East-West relations were no longer characterized by conflict. In the

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"space" that was opening up, many things can happen. So the U.S. and Italy should endeavor to be sure that the elements that fill up this new space should not be a source of conflict in Europe. Washington and Rome must help those conservative Germans, including Chancellor Kohl, who want to remain within "Europe," within the Alliance. Others in Germany have different ideas. (S)

The President asked if the Prime Minister was concerned about reunification and a neutral Germany. (C)

No, replied Prime Minister De Mita. The problem of reunification was not immediate; if it was immediate, the U.S. and Italy would not be able to handle it. But the problem does exist in the long run. Italy was worried about those forces in Germany who would like the FRG to be equidistant between the USSR and the West. Next year in Germany there would be difficult elections. The Prime Minister put the problem in this way: Do we wish to help the Kohl Government or will we remain indifferent to the outcome of the next German election? If the Allies keep Kohl's situation in mind, and their strategic objectives in mind, a compromise could be found. But the result must not be a mess. If the Prime Minister understood the U.S. position correctly, the U.S. did not exclude SNF negotiations, if the CFE negotiation "makes good progress." This is a reasonable position. So the SNF negotiations could begin when there was a good result in the CFE talks. Prime Minister De Mita knew it was difficult to define when a good outcome has been achieved. But the U.S. and Italy had to be mindful of the timing of the West German elections. When Prime Minister De Mita spoke to Chancellor Kohl, Kohl said that he was not for the "third zero." (S)

Secretary Baker asked if the Germans were willing to say explicitly that a third zero has been excluded. (C)

Prime Minister De Mita said that, in his press conference a month ago, Chancellor Kohl had said it must be clear that we Germans do not want a denuclearized Europe, a zero option. (C)

Foreign Minister Andreotti observed that the Allies had always been able to find agreements. Germany has always done its duty, while some countries, like Holland, seem to be more clever and did not accept INF missiles when Italy and the Germans did. In addition to the concerns described by the Prime Minister, Germany was also dealing with the 50th anniversary of Germany's invasion of Poland. So this psychological element must be taken into

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account when thinking of German and East European reaction to the whole SNF issue. (C)

Continuing, Foreign Minister Andreotti said that too much emphasis was being given to the SNF problem. President Reagan's nuclear-free world was a wonderful vision and Reagan's idea was that such a vision should be implemented step by step. The question was to explain how the West intended to get to a nuclear-free world and how conventional arms negotiations would push the world closer to this noble goal. Foreign Minister Andreotti thought inclusion of aircraft in the West's CFE approach was a good idea. Too much emphasis should not be given to SNF missiles because the Alliance might lose prospects for a successful NATO Summit. (C)

The President said the world press was focused on the SNF issue, so it would be difficult to push it off to another meeting. The Alliance must find a compromise solution on SNF at the Summit. The President thought it could be done. Otherwise, the Summit would be overridden, soured by that one contentious issue. (C)

Prime Minister De Mita understood that, because SNF had been discussed so intensively, the Allies could not pretend at the NATO Summit that the problem did not exist. Yet he agreed with Minister Andreotti that, in celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance, the Allies should stress NATO's political accomplishments. It would be a mistake not to emphasize the triumphs of Western values throughout the world. The Allies should stress the strong justifications for the Alliance's continued existence. At the same time, NATO should describe how it wished to proceed in the future, to stay together, and avoid concentrating on one divisive item. The Eastern Bloc was changing strategy and causing problems. NATO's challenge was to assess East-West relations. This was the real subject for discussion in Brussels, rather than this or that specific problem. (C)

Prime Minister De Mita added that the Alliance also needed to talk about disarmament. Prime Minister De Mita knew President Bush was about to put forward a conventional arms control proposal in Brussels. Prime Minister De Mita thought President Bush had to stress the importance and the meaning of this proposal. The Alliance would be looking at the future by trying to bring about a conventional military equilibrium at the lowest possible level. Within the context of the U.S. proposal, the

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Allies could say that, if "concrete results" were reached in CFE, there could also be an eventual SNF negotiation. This vaguer formula would get past the SNF problem at the NATO Summit and avoid a serious problem with the German friends. Thinking aloud, Prime Minister De Mita suggested that the Alliance could say SNF negotiations would begin when the CFE talks reached a "positive result." "For a given time," the Alliance would say it could not do without nuclear weapons, and thus could not denuclearize Europe. On SNF modernization, the Allies could say that if short-range nuclear forces are kept in Europe ("if in the SNF negotiation, we keep something...") then those forces would be modernized if necessary. (C)

The President asked Secretary Baker to review the three central points for the U.S. on SNF. But, first, he wanted to reply to what Prime Minister De Mita and Foreign Minister Andreotti had said. The Summit's emphasis must be on the future of NATO. The Alliance should address the tremendous changes in the USSR, in Eastern Europe, and around the world. This was a time of great optimism, of bringing the Soviet Union into the community of nations. The West's success was so great, and the future was so exciting, that the President did not want the SNF issue to destroy the climate of celebration. (C)

Secretary Baker commented that, because the President wanted to stress larger issues at the Summit and because the U.S. recognized the problems of its German friends, Washington had been trying to work out the SNF problem with Bonn for several months. The President had taken three actions that were very forthcoming: first, indicating a willingness to delay production of a follow-on system to the Lance missile until the end of 1991 or early '92; second, embracing the principle of SNF negotiations dependent upon "tangible implementation" of a CFE agreement; and third, deciding to propose, at the NATO Summit, speeding up the CFE negotiations through a major new NATO conventional arms control initiative. All this would, it was hoped, meet Chancellor Kohl's problems in Bonn. Secretary Baker also noted that the U.S. was anxious that the text of the President's arms control initiative not become public until the President presented it at the Summit in Brussels. (C)

Secretary Baker added that with these three actions, there remained two important principles that mattered to the U.S. and to other members of NATO: first, explicit rejection of a third zero and, second, an understanding that any agreement on SNF forces cannot be implemented before there is full implementation

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of a CFE agreement that would redress the significant imbalance of conventional forces in favor of the Warsaw Pact. Secretary Baker believed this last point was acceptable to the Federal Republic. (C)

Foreign Minister Andreotti asked why, if the Alliance spoke of reducing nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, it was necessary to say that the West needed nuclear weapons for all time. This changed the policy of the Reagan Administration, which wished to get rid of all nuclear weapons, and it gave the other side a propaganda advantage. Foreign Minister Andreotti recalled that NATO had a difficult moment in the 1960s when it moved from massive retaliation to flexible response; the Foreign Minister was Defense Minister at the time. The Alliance found a good strong formula that took into account the psychological situation in Bonn. (C)

Secretary Baker said the U.S. had taken into account changing circumstances in Germany and the psychological factors there. That was why Washington had substantially changed its position on modernization and agreed to the principle of SNF negotiations in certain circumstances. The U.S. was not suggesting that the provision ruling out a third zero say that there can never be a third zero. That was not the U.S. formulation. But the U.S. was suggesting that the text be silent on the duration of the period when there would be no third zero. This approach should therefore, in the U.S. view, be acceptable. The SNF negotiation should seek lower and equal levels, but not go to zero. The German language saying that under the present circumstances there should not be a third zero created major problems because the present circumstances end tomorrow. (S)

Foreign Minister Andreotti said the Alliance should not express a view one way or the other. (C)

Secretary Baker recalled that General Scowcroft had made a good point that, in the 1960s, it took five years to develop Alliance consensus on the flexible response doctrine and the Allies did not have five years to solve the SNF problem. (C)

The President asked if West German Foreign Minister Genscher could accept Foreign Minister Andreotti's formulation. (C)

Foreign Minister Andreotti said it was important not expressly to rule out the zero option, since Genscher could not accept that. (C)

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Secretary Baker said there should be some statement in the text of NATO's Comprehensive Concept document that an SNF negotiation would not produce a zero outcome for SNF missiles. (C)

Prime Minister De Mita said that lower and equal levels did not mean zero. (C)

Secretary Baker answered that it could mean just that. (C)

Foreign Minister Andreotti asked why the Allies should today exclude the possibility that, in thirty years, there would be no SNF missiles. (C)

Secretary Baker replied that the U.S. was not saying that forever and always there would be no zero. But, in connection with an SNF negotiation, the Alliance must say it was not going for zero now. The text of the U.S. language did not say NATO needed SNF missiles forever. But it must say that the Allies were not aiming for the third zero in this SNF negotiation. There were strong views in the United States, including in the Congress, that America needed those SNF weapons to help defend the 324,000 U.S. troops in Europe. The Alliance was faced not only with substantial Warsaw Pact conventional advantages, but also with a tremendous Warsaw Pact SNF advantage. Public opinion in U.S. and some other Allied countries would not support any position that does not make clear that the Alliance was not intending to go to zero. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita said that the SNF problem had to be solved without making a statement of principle, without saying yes to the zero option or no to the zero option. This was not only a German problem; it was a problem for other members of the Alliance. If this problem was not solved, there will be problems with other countries. Mrs. Thatcher was inflexible on everything, pretty close to a Cold War approach. At the same time, she has the closest sentimental attachment to Gorbachev. (S)

The President said the U.S. was working with the Germans, getting close to a common position. The U.S. now understand Italy's views better. A discussion of SNF could go on all day. (C)

Prime Minister De Mita, concluding, said that the Allies needed to work the SNF problem out. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister of Italy

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Maxwell Rabb, U.S. Ambassador to Italy
William Reilly, Administrator of the EPA
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State
Margaret Tutwiler, Assistant Secretary of State
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Interpreter

Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister
Giulio Andreotti, Foreign Minister
Luigi Cavalcini, Foreign Ministry Chief of Staff
Andrea Manzella, Secretary General of Presidency of the Council of Ministers
Umberto Vattani, Prime Minister's Office
General Franco Angioni, Prime Minister's Office
Ugo de Mohr, NATO Adviser
Mr. Perlot, Foreign Ministry Director General
Interpreter

DATE, TIME May 27, 1989, 11:48 a.m. - 12:02 p.m.
AND PLACE: Villa Madama, Rome

Prime Minister De Mita opened the expanded discussion by asking the President for his views on the evolution of East-West relations.

(C)

The President said he saw tremendous change in Eastern Europe, with Poland and Hungary obviously in the forefront. The President recounted his offer of assistance in Poland's economic recovery, provided the Poles could persist in making needed

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economic reforms. His overall goal was not to stir up trouble but to make it clear that, as the East moved toward greater freedom and human rights, the U.S. would respond. (C)

The President continued, saying that his policy would not involve a "post-Yalta" arrangement, sitting with the Soviets to divide up spheres of influence. The goal was differentiation based on movement toward democracy and economic liberty. While this called for a certain amount of delicacy, to avoid seeming to exhort people to the barricades as occurred with Hungary in 1956, Western values had intrinsic appeal. The U.S. would reach out, selectively, in every way it could. Actions would not be so "flamboyant" that the Soviets would feel the need to take action to reverse movement toward freedom. The next few years would be exciting. Eastern Europe would be a high priority for the Administration. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita asked for an overall assessment of East-West relations. (C)

The President said they were pretty good. Despite what some had said, the President wanted Gorbachev to succeed and had told him so personally in New York. Caution was still needed, since foreign policies could not be based on one individual. However, the U.S. wanted good relations with the Soviet Union and was conducting its policies so that the Soviets knew that. A summit meeting with Gorbachev was still up in the air. The President's proposals would show he was prepared to be forthcoming, but the President was not interested in a public relations or charm school battle with Gorbachev. The U.S. had asked for help on arms sales to Central America and there had been frank discussions on this issue. The Soviets had shown interest in changing their policies. Angola was one example. There were possibilities for a more constructive Soviet role in restraining their Middle Eastern clients. So the President thought the Soviets might be able to be more helpful on Central America as well. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Francesco Cossiga, President of Italy

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Maxwell Rabb, U.S. Ambassador to Italy
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Interpreter

Francesco Cossiga, President
Giulio Andreotti, Foreign Minister
Rinaldo Petrignani, Ambassador to the U.S.
Sergio Berlinguer, Secretary General of Quirinale Palace
Giovanni Dominico, President's Diplomatic Adviser
Ludovico Ortona, President's Spokesman
Interpreter

DATE, TIME May 27, 1989, 12:32 p.m. - 1:09 p.m.
AND PLACE: Quirinale Palace, Rome

President Cossiga welcomed the President on behalf of his government and people. He was touched that the President chose to begin his first visit to Europe as President in Rome. He praised, as well, the exemplary performance of Ambassador Rabb.
(U)

The President thanked President Cossiga and joined in his praise for Ambassador Rabb. He said the choice of Rome as the first stop on his trip was no accident. Relations between America and Italy had never been better. In his briefings for this trip, the President had noticed that hardly any issues seemed to divide the two countries, an indicator of the excellent state of the relationship. (C)

The President asked if, incidentally, President Cossiga could fit an official visit to the United States into his schedule during

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the fall, perhaps in October. Such a visit could keep attention focused on the fine relationship between the United States and Italy. (C)

President Cossiga expressed his gratitude for the invitation and said he would certainly come. The Foreign Ministry and the State Department would agree on the date and work out the details. (C)

The President noted that many Americans were already preparing for the 500th Anniversary celebration of Columbus' voyage of 1492. There was great interest in this celebration in the United States as well as in Latin America and the Caribbean. (U)

The President, continuing, said he had already discussed the NATO Summit with Prime Minister De Mita and Foreign Minister Andreotti and there was no need to review the subject again. The President did, however, want President Cossiga to hear directly that he, the President, welcomed the changes in the Soviet Union. The policy reviews, which were proper and prudent for a new Administration, were mostly finalized. The United States was prepared to move forward in a realistic way with Moscow. (C)

The President did think a word of caution was still in order. A foreign policy must be based on reality, not on the charisma of a new leader. As Commander-in-Chief, the President felt a profound responsibility for the lives of soldiers and sailors, so when he put forward arms control proposals he wanted to be sure that they would enhance peace and not threaten it. The President observed that the Alliance was on the winning side and its values were prevailing. There was less of a threat to peace. There was, therefore, no reason not to move prudently. Those were the views the President would take to the NATO Summit. (S)

The President added that euphoria about Gorbachev caused some people to feel there were no problems anymore. The President was sorry to say that there were still problems. Yet, as the President had himself told Gorbachev, no one in America wanted perestroika to fail. Secretary Baker had met Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and the Soviets knew that the US supported reform in the Soviet Union. The US and Italy were entering an exciting new era. (C)

The President thanked the Government of Italy for its helpful decisions on Alliance issues, such as the transfer of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing. Italy had shown real leadership. The President could still remember how Italy's war against domestic terrorism and the freeing of Colonel Dozier had shown strength and earned the respect of all Americans. (C)

President Cossiga thanked the President for his comments. He understood why the President had carefully examined his policies

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before taking action. President Cossiga believed that, in ordinary life, prudence and care are major virtues. (C)

President Cossiga remarked that the NATO Summit would be an important celebration of the Alliance's great success. The Allies had demonstrated that, without firmness, there might not be any glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union today. There were certainly important changes occurring in the USSR. It was too early to foresee the outcome. (C)

President Cossiga recalled that he had recently travelled with Foreign Minister Andreotti to Poland. They were able to meet freely with people from the whole range of political and social life. At an Italian Embassy reception, which Jaruzelski attended, were guests who, during the period of Stalinization, had been sentenced to death. This symbolized the important changes now underway. Poland needed Western support. (C)

The President asked President Cossiga for his opinion of General Jaruzelski. The President commented that, when he had met the General, Jaruzelski had made an unexpectedly favorable impression. (C)

President Cossiga replied that, during his recent visit to Poland, he spoke to General Jaruzelski for hours. President Cossiga believed that General Jaruzelski had qualities that were not immediately apparent. He also thought General Jaruzelski was determined to pursue a new course and that, without General Jaruzelski, Poland could not have proceeded as far as it had. President Cossiga thought that General Jaruzelski was responsible for getting the Communist Party to sit at the Roundtable with Solidarity and accept the outcome of the negotiations. General Jaruzelski, President Cossiga thought, was a man who had suffered for measures he had had to implement in the past. History would be more generous to the General than recent critics. It was very likely that General Jaruzelski's role had prevented a repetition of Soviet intervention as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. President Cossiga thought the winds of freedom were blowing in Poland. The just-passed laws on religious freedom were of great importance. The officials of the Church in Poland had also displayed great insight and prudence. President Cossiga left Poland convinced that, if economic and political reforms did not progress, all the recent achievements would be jeopardized. (C)

The President said he had talked with General Jaruzelski long before the Roundtable negotiations and had urged him to be more forthcoming with labor. General Jaruzelski had cited some extreme demands from the union leaders, such as a call for five years paid maternity leave. The answer was obvious: the President advised General Jaruzelski to recognize free unions and then negotiate with them, but the President had not realized that labor was making such tough demands. (C)

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President Cossiga said that it was difficult to predict how the Opposition would ultimately express its views. Solidarity was just the peak of the iceberg. Yet Poland could not turn back now. (C)

Secretary Baker asked if Poland would be in a political position to sustain the economic changes that must be adopted in order to move forward. In the 1970's, credit had been made available and that did not work. The US could not repeat that example unless Poland made the free market reforms needed for real growth. (C)

President Cossiga said he was convinced that the political leadership and the new Opposition could support the needed changes that would allow them to receive aid from the West. Poland was no longer asking for more money. They were asking for Western businesses to invest in Poland and teach the Poles how a market economy works. (C)

Secretary Baker asked how companies would be assured of being able to keep their profits. (C)

President Cossiga responded that laws were the guarantee. Still, the opportunities for investment were not there yet, though Fiat chairman Agnelli's interest in Poland was a promising sign. (C)

The President said he was looking forward to his visit to Poland. (U)

President Cossiga said the Poles were looking forward to the President's visit as well. He said his Polish police escorts had all still been wearing the tie pins received during the President's trip to Poland as Vice President. It was a small point, but a revealing one. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MM 4/18/2016

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Bettino Craxi, Secretary of the Socialist Party of Italy

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Maxwell Rabb, U.S. Ambassador to Italy
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
John Holmes, U.S. Embassy, Rome (notetaker)

Bettino Craxi, Secretary of the Socialist
Party of Italy
Gennaro Acquaviva, Senator

DATE, TIME May 27, 1989, 3:10 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.
AND PLACE: Villa Taverna, Rome

Mr. Craxi explained that Italy was in the midst of a government crisis which would be resolved after the European Parliament elections in June. (S)

The President asked whether a new government would officially take office by the beginning of July. (S)

Mr. Craxi said yes, perhaps in July, if everything went well -- which he thought would be the case. (S)

The President said it would be nice to have an Italian government in place by the time of the Economic Summit on July 14. (S)

Mr. Craxi said "we will try." He then expressed his concerns about the lack of progress in the Middle East. (S)

The President said he and the American people shared these concerns. In Lebanon, the Syrians would not withdraw and there was no ceasefire. (S)

Mr. Craxi asked the President to keep an open mind on the idea of elections on the West Bank. The Palestinians could accept such elections, he said, but not if the Israelis remained as military occupiers. The Israelis could be on the borders of the West Bank, but not in the villages. (S)

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The President said the U.S. was working to persuade the Israelis to be more open-minded and adopt better election procedures. It was not clear that the Israelis would talk to whoever would win the elections. (S)

Mr. Craxi said that (Shimon) Peres had warned him that the PLO would control anyone who was elected. (S)

Secretary Baker commented that the Israelis had promised to accept the election results. (S)

Mr. Craxi thought the Israelis were ambiguous. They promised to talk to the winners, but if the talks do not work out there would be a period of controlled autonomy. The result would be a return to the present state of confusion. (S)

The President noted that, in fact, the Israeli theory was that the next stage should be one of controlled autonomy. (S)

Mr. Craxi thought this would be acceptable if the period of controlled autonomy was limited. (S)

Secretary Baker said this was possible; the Israelis talk of five years, the Palestinians of two. (S)

Mr. Craxi said that another issue before the U.S. and Italy was the prospect of a more united Europe while, at the same time, the Soviet Union was "creaking." (S)

The President was optimistic. The U.S. wanted Gorbachev to succeed. Although the Administration had been accused of dragging its feet, of taking too much time, the U.S. would engage the Soviets. First, the President wanted to achieve a unified outcome to the NATO Summit. The German problem was difficult; Kohl was torn by his political difficulties. In terms of broader developments it was too bad that one negotiating point, SNF, was hanging over the Allies as if it were the key to the Alliance. (S)

Mr. Craxi said that, of course, the West had never been stronger, because of the weakness of the other side. (S)

The President agreed. The Eastern economies were not working; time favored the West. There was no need to panic, no need to think the Allies were in a day-to-day public relations war. (S)

Mr. Craxi commented that he did not overestimate difficulties within the Alliance. The Allies had always managed to reach agreement. (S)

The President asked when Mr. Craxi would be coming to the United States. (U)

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Mr. Craxi thought it might be this year. (U)

Secretary Baker commended Mr. Craxi for helping make the G-5 into the G-7. (S)

Mr. Craxi offered Secretary Baker credit for this development and then acknowledged his own contribution. Mitterrand and Kohl had been against Italy, he said. (S)

Secretary Baker noted that the United Kingdom had not been enthusiastic. (S)

Mr. Craxi recalled that the French had called a meeting and proposed a "directoire." Prime Minister Thatcher had objected strongly. (S)

Secretary Baker thought it was good for the membership in the financial group to be identical to that of the Summit Seven. (S)

Mr. Craxi felt the Reagan Administration had done well with international monetary issues. (S)

The President commented that exchange rate fluctuations had not been eliminated. (S)

Secretary Baker said this was a problem to work on. (S)

Mr. Craxi observed that the U.S. and Italy were dealing with two great economic powers -- the FRG and Japan -- who did not always assume their proper responsibility. (S)

The President said that the U.S. had some major trade difficulties with Japan. U.S. firms still did not have adequate access to the Japanese market. Under U.S. law, the President had taken certain steps a couple of days earlier to say that, in this period of negotiations, something had to be done. Certain steps are necessary to show that the U.S. was serious. (S)

Mr. Craxi recalled an old Latin saying, "Woe to the victors." In conclusion, he said that it had been a great pleasure to see the President. He now had to travel to northern Italy because of some local elections in that region. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister of Italy

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister

DATE, TIME May 27, 1989, 5:20 - 5:25pm
AND PLACE: Villa Taverna, Rome

Prime Minister De Mita told the President that, as a citizen of the free world, he was very happy with the President's conventional arms control initiative. It would have a great effect on the world and in Europe. (C)

The President said that the spirit this morning had been very good. (C)

Prime Minister De Mita turning to the SNF issue, noted the tension between Great Britain and Germany. He hoped that Prime Minister Thatcher could eventually agree to the "communique." (C)

The President observed that there were still difficulties on the issue of a "third zero." President Mitterrand had been very diplomatic and generous. (C)

Prime Minister De Mita said that, when he had heard the President's proposals, he thought they would help with Germany. The German situation was very difficult. There had been many criticisms of Germany in recent weeks. Chancellor Kohl was in a difficult situation. It was impossible to say exactly why this was so, because the German economy was so strong. Perhaps it was a product of the emotions of the German people, "searching," as they had so many times before. (S)

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The President asked the Prime Minister whether Gorbachev had awakened Germany's aspirations for unity. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita thought that Gorbachev had done this, but what was most important was for Germany to have a chance to express itself. The Germans did not feel that they were treated like the French or the British, despite their great strength. (S)

The President asked whether the June elections for the European Parliament were likely to have an impact. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita thought they would, especially in Germany. He noted that detente and East-West relations were a major problem. (S)

The President said that, in his Boston University speech, he had reiterated his intention to remain fully involved with Europe, not to turn isolationist. He wanted the Prime Minister to know how he felt on this subject. Most Americans, though not all, felt the same way. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita said that there was a consensus in Europe that the speech was very important. (S)

Continuing, Prime Minister De Mita said it was difficult to know how to proceed with Eastern Europe on economic matters. Some wanted to go too far too quickly. The U.S. and Italy should cooperate closely on such issues. (S)

The President said he would like to help Poland and Hungary bilaterally, but there must be economic reform or the U.S. would just be wasting money. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita agreed. The East Europeans had told him that they welcomed Western economic help but did not want Western advice. (S)

The President returned to the idea of a united Germany and said he would like to say the Germans should do what they wish, but he must be responsible. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita said one could think about the problem on two levels. On the level of ordinary people, a desire for reunification was strong. At the political level, the entities wanted to remain distinct. (S)

The President referred to the unrest in China and said he had been very circumspect recently about the student riots there. It was tough to know what line to take. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister of Belgium

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Maynard Glitman, U.S. Ambassador to Belgium
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Margaret Tutwiler, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Spokesman
Philip Zelikow, Director for European Security Affairs, NSC Staff (notetaker)

Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister
Leo Tindemans, Foreign Minister
Guy Coeme, Defense Minister
Frans Roelants, Foreign Ministry Secretary General
Alexis Reyn, Chef de Cabinet
Jan Grauls, Diplomatic Adviser, Prime Minister's Office
Philippe Nieuwenhuys, Adviser to the Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME May 28, 1989, 6:45 - 7:32pm
AND PLACE: Chateau Stuyvenberg, Brussels

Prime Minister Martens welcomed the President and commented that this was a difficult time for the Belgian government because of the SNF issue. The Prime Minister hoped for a solution at the Summit. (X)

The President thanked the Prime Minister for his hospitality and noted that bilateral relations were very strong. He admired the Prime Minister's economic success in lowering the government deficit without serious inflation or major tax increases. The U.S. was also trying to get its fiscal house in order. The President thought tax increases would slow economic growth and cause a net loss in revenue. He was working with Congress. (X)

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The President said he was not pessimistic about NATO or East-West relations. His policies were realistic. Their development had taken some time, and criticism for this had been expected. The President said it should be clearly understood that his Administration wanted Gorbachev and perestroika to succeed. The West had won the battle of ideologies and the Communist model was dead. Western values were prevailing. The Allies should try to capitalize on that success and reduce arms, but not be naive or base their foreign policies on one person. (C)

Turning to security issues, the President said the differing viewpoints on SNF were well understood. The President said he planned to make an important conventional arms control proposal, challenging the Soviets to reduce to equal levels of manpower stationed on foreign territory in Europe. The world would see the fairness in having the two largest powers deploy the same number of soldiers in Europe. This dramatic arms control proposal should strengthen Kohl in fighting his political battles. Yet, whatever the outcome of the SNF issue, it should not be allowed to affect the basic principles underpinning NATO strategy. (C)

The President was optimistic about the opportunities for change. The Soviets were moving toward the West on arms control, and Western values. The U.S. was prepared to help with the Soviet economy but would do so with eyes wide open. All these developments were good for the security of Europe. (C)

Prime Minister Martens commented that he and Foreign Minister Tindemans had recently been in Poland. It had been interesting to hear the Polish government talk of its willingness to accept an opposition role. The Prime Minister thought the key was in Polish statements that they wanted a free market economic system. South Korea had been cited as an example. The same trend was seen in African countries, such as Dakar, which the Prime Minister had just visited. Although it was dangerous when so much depended on one person, the real reason for change in the East was economic. (C)

The President urged the Prime Minister not to underestimate the unquenchable thirst for freedom. In Chile, for example, a totally repressive regime allowed a free market economy to operate. However, the Chilean people still agitated for political change. Once Gorbachev had unleashed perestroika and glasnost, he could not put the genie back in the bottle. Ortega, in Nicaragua, now announced he was a socialist in the "Swedish model." If true, this would be a conversion without precedent since Christ had walked the earth. Ortega was being convinced by the failure of his economy and the increasing trend toward democracy among his neighbors. These were exciting times. The Allies just needed to be prudent in proposing and making significant reductions in armed forces. (C)

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The President appreciated that the Prime Minister took a tough decision in accepting deployment of INF missiles and got "bloodied" for it. This showed courage, and firmness. No one would ever convince the President that these deployment decisions did not compel the Soviets to be forthcoming at the negotiating table. Changes were encouraging, but the Alliance should not disperse out of euphoria. (C)

Prime Minister Martens asked for an elaboration of the President's conventional arms control proposal. (C)

The President asked Secretary Baker or General Scowcroft to provide one. (U)

Secretary Baker said the proposal would pick up on Warsaw Pact acceptance of Western figures for tanks and armored troop carriers, with reduced equipment to be destroyed. It would urge agreement on reducing land-based combat aircraft and helicopters on each side to a level fifteen percent below the current NATO total. These Alliance-to-Alliance ideas would be complemented by a U.S.-Soviet manpower ceiling of 275,000 for troops stationed in Europe. The U.S. would cut 20% of its combat manpower, with withdrawn forces to be demobilized and deactivated. The U.S. would cut about 30,000 troops (29,200 being 20% of the combat manpower), and the Soviets would have to cut 325,000. (C)

The President added that the Soviets could decide where they wanted to take their troop cuts, but the U.S. cuts would be in combat forces. (C)

Secretary Baker said that, in the U.S. view, these moves should allow the timetable for an agreement to be accelerated to six months to a year. This timetable would be important in resolving the SNF issue. On that point the U.S. felt that negotiations, though accepted in principle, should await the beginning of implementation of a CFE agreement. This should take about a year. In any case, however, the U.S. was reluctant to proceed with SNF negotiations until a CFE agreement had been concluded and its implementation had begun. (C)

Secretary Baker asked that information about the President's CFE proposal not be made public in advance of the Summit meeting. (C)

Returning to SNF, Secretary Baker said the President had recognized the FRG's particular problems and the significance of the changes in the East. The U.S. had been forthcoming, beginning with the Secretary's meetings with NATO leaders in February. The U.S. had delayed decisions on production and deployment of a modernized system until late 1991 or 1992 and had agreed in principle to SNF negotiations, all to accommodate the concerns of the Federal Republic. These moves should now be considered along with the President's conventional arms control

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proposal. It would be good to have an agreement on SNF and not dampen the Summit by kicking the problem over to a later date.

(S)

Foreign Minister Tindemans said that, of course, the President's proposal was extremely interesting. It would be the event of the Summit meeting. (S)

Prime Minister Martens, after cautioning that he was negotiating on the SNF issue on the basis of a political agreement within his government, asked the President for a commitment to early SNF negotiations, running parallel to the CFE talks. However, he said his priority was the conventional talks and that he was against the "zero option." Forces should be updated where necessary, without any production or deployment decision before 1991 or 1992. NATO did not need to decide on development. The President's conventional arms control proposal had overcome some of the problem, reducing the issue to one of immediate negotiations versus a link to an accelerated CFE timetable. (S)

The President hoped his conventional arms control proposal would take precedence over SNF negotiations. His fast track approach should change political calculations. (S)

Secretary Baker emphasized the accelerated timetable for implementation of CFE reductions as well, with 1992 or 1993 as the target date. He hoped this would give the Belgian government latitude as an alternative to parallel SNF talks. (S)

Prime Minister Martens asked if he had correctly understood that an agreement would be sought in six months to one year. (S)

Secretary Baker said that was what the U.S. thought was reasonable, in light of the convergence in the positions of the two sides. (S)

Defense Minister Coeme thought the linkage between the outcome of the Vienna CFE talks and the beginning of SNF negotiations was potentially dangerous. (S)

The President said he would prefer no linkage, just a concentration on the conventional forces. The conventional force imbalance was destabilizing and should be addressed. This may be tough for those who, like some elements in the FRG, put SNF reductions over everything else, but the accelerated timetable could accomplish what everyone wants -- conventional reductions and SNF negotiations. (S)

Secretary Baker said the conventional imbalance was a primary requirement for the SNF deterrent. It was therefore prudent to link the two problems. This would also give the East an incentive to move more quickly toward a CFE accord. (S)

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The President said this was true despite the Eastern advantage in SNF. He asked Ambassador Glitman to elaborate on the disparities. (C)

Ambassador Glitman noted that, according to our count, the disparity was 14 to 1 and was 11 to 1 according to Eastern figures. (U)

Prime Minister Martens said these disparities were a justification for SNF negotiations designed to correct the imbalance. (C)

Secretary Baker replied that the Western SNF forces were counterforce weapons designed against Eastern conventional forces. He asked if General Scowcroft agreed. (S)

General Scowcroft said the principal function was to counter the conventional imbalance. (S)

The President said the short-range nuclear forces were there to deter attack. He said the Allied views were different from those of the Soviet Union on this point but he agreed that linkage to the CFE outcome might help speed an agreement on conventional force reductions. (S)

Secretary Baker said that the President understood political problems in Europe, but the President had political problems too. One was the military's very strong belief that ground-based nuclear missiles were needed to defend the 325,000 U.S. soldiers in Europe. The Secretary understood the appeal of a third zero. That was why a conventional agreement was needed before embarking on that slippery slope. (C)

The President said he hoped not to refer to U.S. politics at the NATO meeting. There were some in America who did not support the commitment to NATO, but the President would not rely on this argument. However, when it came to protection of "our kids," the President had to listen to his military commanders. In his role as Commander-in-Chief the President felt SNF was vital as long as there was a massive conventional imbalance. (C)

Prime Minister Martens wondered whether this argument against early SNF negotiations would still be valid if it was clearly accepted that a third zero outcome was ruled out by the Alliance. (C)

The President said the argument would be less valid, but valid. The levels of SNF were affected by the conventional imbalance. He looked forward to a lively discussion of this subject at the Summit. He hoped a solution to the problem could be negotiated with the Germans. (C)

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Prime Minister Martens said his government had reviewed the positions of many countries, including the Germans. His government would propose some ideas. (C)

Foreign Minister Tindemans thought that, rather than each government putting forward a position, it would be better to have experts draft a document and then have a political discussion of it. (C)

Prime Minister Martens said this practice worked well in the EC, with the EC Commission proposing papers to the Council of Ministers. (C)

The President promised to consider the procedural question. He asked the Prime Minister for all possible consideration of what he, the President, had suggested during the meeting. (C)

Prime Minister Martens referred to an earlier discussion on Zaire during the drive from the airport. (U)

The President asked the Prime Minister when he would decide upon a course of action. (U)

Prime Minister Martens said he would inform the government the next morning (May 29). If the government accepted the results from Dakar then King Hassan would mediate and the Moroccans would organize a meeting to confirm the conclusions. He thanked the President for his help and noted that (President) Mobutu (of Zaire) had said the Belgians were clumsy and the Americans have lost their sangfroid. (S)

The President commented that Mobutu was a flamboyant person who was useful in some ways. He had some human rights problems. Perhaps the Belgian government had sobered him down. (S)

Prime Minister Martens said Belgium had an enormous effort in Zaire, five billion francs worth. (C)

Secretary Baker asked if this was commercial debt. (U)

Prime Minister Martens said it was a 25 year debt rescheduled with a grace delay of 14 years, but intervention was needed for payment of interest charges. (C)

The President said the problems were with the system and the need for reform. Without reform, money was being poured down a rathole. (C)

Prime Minister Martens said Mobutu had accepted adjustment from the IMF. (C)

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General Scowcroft said the question was whether he would perform or not. (C)

The President asked about (Senegalese President) Diouf. (U)

Prime Minister Martens said Diouf was a good man, having difficulty with reintegrating 90,000 citizens from Mauritania but maintaining a political system with opposition parties. He was a serious man at the Francophone summits. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Manfred Woerner, Secretary General of NATO

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Alton Keel, Permanent U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Council
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)

Manfred Woerner, Secretary General
Marcello Guidi, Deputy Secretary General
James Cunningham, Director of the Secretary General's Private Office

DATE, TIME May 29, 1989, 9:00 a.m. - 9:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: NATO Headquarters, Brussels

The President said that the SNF issue was still unresolved. He asked the Secretary General, as the host for the Summit meetings, for his advice. (C)

Secretary General Woerner said that one clear priority was to keep the Summit from being dominated by the missile issue, although the press would focus on it. He wished to avoid spending the morning discussing SNF instead of the main purpose of the Summit, which was to look forward to the great opportunities lying ahead. The Allies should create a group chaired by Deputy Secretary General Guidi to see if there was anything that could be done. (C)

The President thought this was a good idea. (C)

Secretary General Woerner asked for the President's support. (C)

The President asked how much time the prepared interventions should take. (U)

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Secretary General Woerner expected they would average about ten minutes each for the sixteen heads of state and government. (U)

General Scowcroft commented that the President's intervention was slightly longer than ten minutes. (U)

Secretary General Woerner asked that the intervention not last more than twelve minutes. (S)

The President said he wished to be forward looking and mention his decision on COCOM no exceptions policy and Jackson-Vanik, but he did not wish to take advantage. He recalled sitting through speeches at the United Nations. (S)

Secretary Baker observed that those in the room would be interested in the President's major conventional arms control proposal. (S)

The President said the U.S. would not move any further on SNF. It would be unwise, he said, to be driven by the lowest common denominator. (S)

Secretary General Woerner said he did not wish to contradict the President. (S)

Secretary Baker said he had detected a little more flexibility on when the SNF negotiations might commence and the conditions thereto, but none on the question of the third zero. The UK, French, and Dutch may support the U.S., so Genscher might worry that he will be isolated. (S)

Secretary General Woerner said he was more pessimistic. The Alliance needed to emphasize its political objectives. (S)

The President said his CFE proposal alters the previous Western approach to the talks in an unprecedented way. The West would be moving forward in CFE. This would bring SNF negotiations closer. Things were different now and, naturally, time would be needed to study the situation. The President hoped Genscher would take this suggestion. (S)

Secretary General Woerner advised the President not to set a new deadline for arriving at a decision on SNF. This would put all the public expectations and pressure on the Alliance. German domestic pressure would continue. Those who blocked agreement should not be allowed to claim victory on the issue of SNF negotiations with only "details" to be worked out. Genscher was popular because he said the weapons are no good and negotiations will solve everything. The Allies needed to explain to its publics the rationale for nuclear weapons. (S)

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Continuing, Secretary General Woerner urged the President to point out that the U.S. had come a long way to gain an agreement. People asked why SNF would be needed if there was conventional stability. This view was dangerous because, even if there was a conventional balance, SNF weapons would still be necessary. This point was not easy to explain. The Secretary General also remarked that the President had given a good speech on Eastern Europe; he should repeat that message. (2)

Governor Sununu asked whether there was any Allied support for the Secretary General's language on the SNF issue. (2)

Secretary General Woerner said this text could be a basis for compromise except for Genscher. Genscher might accept tying SNF negotiations to a CFE agreement. But Genscher could not accept exclusion of the possibility of a third zero. There had been bitter arguments between Genscher and Kohl which threatened the coalition. Kohl could accept the Secretary General's formulation but Genscher could not. (8)

Secretary Baker said the Alliance could not let itself be driven by a representative of five percent of the German electorate. It was clear from the (Quad) breakfast that no compromise was possible on the issue of the third zero. (8)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Andreas Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
(notetaker)

Andreas Papandreou, Prime Minister
Karloos Papoulias, Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME May 30, 1989, 11:10 - 11:19am
AND PLACE: NATO Headquarters, Brussels

The President said he just wished to say hello. He knew the Prime Minister was preparing for elections. (U)

Prime Minister Papandreou said he was pleased to meet the President. He met with Secretary Baker for constructive discussions in Athens in February. He congratulated the President for his conventional arms control initiative. The Summit was a real triumph, with "no asterisks." The Prime Minister said he had not expected it. (C)

On the question of U.S. bases, Prime Minister Papandreou said the U.S. and Greece were having very professional meetings. The process was being interrupted until after the elections. The next Greek government would resolve the issues. There were difficulties, but Prime Minister Papandreou thought they could be overcome. One such difficulty was the amount of time needed to absorb the costs of new developments. (C)

Prime Minister Papandreou said he sought to strengthen the relationship between Greece and the U.S. These relations were far better today than eight years ago, when Cyprus played such a negative role in public opinion. (Turkish Prime Minister) Ozal was close and friendly with the Prime Minister, but the Prime

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Minister felt Ozal had not put enough pressure on Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash. Prime Minister Papandreou had said so to Ozal but Ozal did not reply. Greece and the U.S. needed to work hard on the Cyprus issue. Perhaps not today or tomorrow, but some day the problem there could explode. The UN Secretary General was working on the problem too, but the Turkish side had not been willing to give an inch, even though Greek Cypriots have agreed to bizonality and political equality. Both of these were big concessions. (S)

The President said he had been impressed by Cypriot President Vassiliou. The President knew President Vassiliou was trying for a fresh approach, but the parties involved had never been able to develop a compromise acceptable to all. At some point, the U.S. might be in a position to be helpful. (C)

The President said he would like to see the problem solved. (C)

Prime Minister Papandreou concluded the meeting by promising to be in touch with Secretary Baker. (U)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01k. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	5/30/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (July 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/24/2023

Date Closed:	7/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91148-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(66)	MR Case #:	2012-1596-MR(513.02)
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	2/2/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1596-MR
mm 2/2/2016

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
(notetaker)

Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister
Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez, Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME May 30, 1989, 11:20 a.m. - 11:27 a.m.
AND PLACE: NATO Headquarters, Brussels

The President thanked Prime Minister Gonzalez for his help on Panama. He wondered if the Prime Minister had any ideas about how best to resolve the issue. The President was afraid that the OAS was backing off a bit. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said that pressure from Latin American countries on Noriega was growing. He was not sure when this pressure would get stronger. (S)

The President said the pressure must stay on. He recalled that he had raised the question of the Panamanian Defense Forces with Prime Minister Gonzalez. The President thought that Noriega had been lying to the PDF, telling them that they would be persona non grata if Noriega left. That was not true. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said it is quite obvious that the PDF realizes that it has a continuing role in Panama. Spain had passed that message along. Noriega had tried to involve the PDF in his problems, but Noriega may be a prisoner of the National Strategic Council. (S)

The President said he had been reading about that. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez commented that Noriega had created and corrupted this body. Now that he wants to get out, this body is

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resisting because they worry about what will happen to them. Perhaps the leadership will come to understand they can play a role without Noriega. (S)

The President said the U.S. had sent word to key figures in the PDF that the U.S. had no problem with them, only with Noriega. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez did not want to be optimistic, but he thought there would be results with Noriega. (S)

Governor Sununu asked if Spain had special contacts with the PDF. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said the Spanish ambassador had normal contacts ^{3.3(b)(1)} [REDACTED]

(S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez, turning to the Summit, remarked that the atmosphere of the Alliance was superb, the cohesion impressive. (U)

The President said one could feel the cohesion in the air. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Jacques Delors, President of the
European Commission

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Robert Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce
Alfred Kingon, U.S. Ambassador to the
European Community
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President
and Press Secretary
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of
State
Margaret Tutwiler, Assistant Secretary of
State for Public Affairs and Spokesman
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)

Jacques Delors, President of the European
Commission
Frans Andriessen, Vice President
Sir Roy Denman, Head of Delegation, Mission
of the E.C. to the U.S.
David Williamson, Secretary General
Pascal Lamy, Chef de Cabinet
Johannes Wijnmaalen, Chef de Cabinet for the
Vice President
Horst Krenzler, Director General
Claus Ehlermann, Spokesman
Gianluigi Giola, Deputy Director

DATE, TIME May 30, 1989, 1:55 p.m. - 2:20 p.m.
AND PLACE: European Commission Headquarters, Berlaymont,
Brussels

President Delors said he was pleased with the results of the
just-concluded NATO Summit and asked the President for his
assessment. (U)

The President said he was very pleased with the outcome of the
Summit. The Alliance had shown itself at its best. The German
question related to short-range nuclear forces (SNF) had
dominated early discussions, and Secretary Baker had taken a
strong leadership role in finding a solution. The resolution of
the SNF issue and the new proposal for reducing conventional

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forces were historic accomplishments. The conventional arms control proposal had won broad acceptance within the Alliance. U.S. generals had also certified that the proposal was militarily sound. The first tentative Soviet reaction was fairly good and upbeat. The U.S. would push forward now, challenging the Alliance to move faster. Although there was skepticism in the press and among some military people on "our side," things could be changed if the Alliance could keep the momentum going. All the Allies had agreed that the Summit was a success. (C)

President Delors then asked Secretary Baker for his comments. (U)

Secretary Baker said the Summit meeting had resulted in a double victory for the Alliance. There had been questions, before the Summit, about Allied unity. The Alliance was now very unified, with broad and deep acceptance of the President's conventional arms control initiative and gratitude for it, welcoming leadership by the new American President. The SNF issue had been resolved in a way that adapted to changing circumstances in Europe, while putting priority on solving asymmetries in the balance of conventional forces. The Comprehensive Concept document provides for no reduction of SNF forces to zero. Although it did not say so in those words, due to certain sensitivities, this message was quite clear in the document. (Dutch Foreign Minister) Van den Broek had done a good job in chairing the final Foreign Ministers' meeting. (C)

President Delors asked Secretary Mosbacher to comment on his meetings in Brussels. (U)

Secretary Mosbacher said his meetings had gone well. Progress had been made in several areas. With respect to financial institutions, the issue of national treatment was on the way to a good settlement. Standards would be more transparent and open. The Secretary knew the EC would be discussing these questions further. (C)

Vice President Andriessen said the most important result was an improvement in public perception. The goals and objectives of the U.S. and the EC were better known. The creation of economic opportunities in a more integrated European market would be beneficial for other operators. The EC wanted an open market. The Vice President was determined to let the single European market function in a multilateral world trading framework and shared the position of the United States in this respect. He looked forward to intensifying contacts between the U.S. and the Community. (C)

The President commented that his Boston speech had spoken of a united Europe and of shared values, such as a commitment to democracy, human rights, and free markets. He had made clear

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that integration of Europe meant a stronger Alliance and more prosperous trading partners. (U)

Continuing, the President said he hoped to continue the political dialogue between the U.S. and the EC. In addition, he noted the recent meetings at the EC of U.S. Trade Representative Hills and Senator Roth and observed that a good exchange of views was going on. The President hoped that a single market would result in a more open, vigorous Europe. There had been lingering doubts about this prospect in the U.S., but there was more understanding now. The big thing was how the single market would be implemented, the details. The most important of these details, the President said, would be in agriculture. The success of the Uruguay round follow-on would be critical. (S)

Overall, the President concluded, problems might come up but the EC should know the U.S. was encouraged by and supportive of what the EC was trying to do. There had been problems in the past, but the Administration was not in a "posture of doubt;" it wanted more interaction with the EC. (U)

President Delors replied that only a stronger EC could strengthen the multilateral trading system. That was why integration was so important. (U)

The President then asked President Delors whether the arrangements were set for his visit to the United States. (S)

President Delors said he hoped they were. (S)

The President asked President Delors when he would be coming. (S)

President Delors said the U.S. had to decide this. (S)

The President, after briefly conferring with Ambassador Kingon, said he understood that the matter now rested with President Delors. (S)

President Delors said there were details to be worked out. (S)

The President then said that, in any case, President Delors was welcome to come to the United States. He urged President Delors to firm up the arrangements and said he did want to meet with him in Washington. (S)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01m. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany [redacted] (3 pp.)	5/30/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (July 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By EF On 5/9/22

Date Closed: 7/10/2009	OA/ID Number: 91148-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0763-MR (500.12)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 8/17/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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Deed of Gift Restrictions


- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)
Vernon Walters, Ambassador to the FRG

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
Hans Klein, Minister for Economic Cooperation
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.
Horst Teltschik, Chancellery Adviser on Security Policy
Dieter Kastrup, Foreign Ministry Political Director
Walter Neuer, Head of Chancellor's Private Office
Uwe Kastner, Chancellery Director for USA and Europe

DATE, TIME May 30, 1989, 5:30 p.m. - 6:20 p.m.
AND PLACE: Federal Chancellery, Bonn

Chancellor Kohl said the day was a good one for the FRG after the joint labors of Brussels. The Summit outcome was a cornerstone in the U.S.-German relationship. As the Federal Republic celebrated its 40th anniversary, it was clear that the FRG's success would be inconceivable without the United States. Beyond the material help in the Marshall Plan, America's spiritual help was immeasurable. Without going into the details of the Summit, the Chancellor wanted the President to be sure that Germans understood that there could be no secure future for the FRG without NATO and without German friendship with the United States. (2)

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Chancellor Kohl wanted to raise U.S.-German relations and his hopes for improved cooperation in exchanging young people between the two countries. He also hoped the U.S. and Germany could tap the resource of the millions of Americans who had served as soldiers in the FRG. (U)

Chancellor Kohl also wanted to discuss burdensharing. Nine hundred thousand soldiers moved about in a small country, as wide as the length of Long Island. Chancellor Kohl and the President also needed to discuss low-level flights. In the months ahead, Chancellor Kohl hoped for an intensified discussion of burdensharing and, with a view to U.S. domestic politics, it might be good to come to reasonable agreements on this issue. (Z)

Chancellor Kohl, referring to an earlier discussion of the EC, said that, without any overestimation, the FRG was the real engine of the EC. The Federal Republic paid in the most money and drew the most benefits. In 1989, 55% of the FRG's exports would go to the EC. In heading to 1992, Bonn's policy was to avoid a 'fortress Europe' at all costs, and the FRG was not alone. There would not be a U.S.-EC trade war. An agreement was needed on goods and services. In 1948, West Germany had opted for a free market. From this lesson, it was clear that the FRG would never revert to protectionism. These were the points the Chancellor Kohl wanted to make. Later, perhaps the Chancellor and the President could talk about the Warsaw Pact, Poland and Hungary. (Z)

The President said he was pleased with the Brussels result. Reaction at home had been positive. With regard to NATO, the President would be misleading the Chancellor if he did not say that some in the U.S. wanted someone else to take on the NATO burden. But a majority of Americans, as the President made clear in Brussels, realized how important the U.S. relationship to NATO really was. This Summit meeting would help. (Z)

The President was thinking about how to push forward now quickly after the euphoria in Brussels. The HLTF needs to have the new proposal ready by September 7; then the Allies must move CFE forward. This would be an interesting test for Gorbachev. The President's general feeling was that Gorbachev would find positive elements in the NATO initiative, partly because of the cost of conventional forces to the Soviet economy. So the President was somewhat hopeful, and determined to try to make the CFE process work. (S)

The President felt that German-American relations probably had never been better. There was a feeling of goodwill toward Germany in the U.S. There would be differences, but the relationship would endure and only get better and better. (John) McCloy's funeral was a symbol of this. As for exchanges, the U.S. and the FRG should intensify efforts to exchange more young

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people, see what could be done about that. There would be budgetary constraints because of the U.S. budget deficit, but the U.S. would work on the problem. On burdensharing, exercises were needed to maintain readiness, but the U.S. and the FRG needed to explain their purpose better. On trade, both the U.S. and Europe needed to keep markets open, especially on agriculture, where all were guilty. The President hoped to talk about this issue at the Economic Summit. The U.S. would work with the EC as best it could. Consultation had gotten much better and the U.S. never wanted to "blindsides" the FRG. There would be no surprises. Consultation was crucial. (C)

Foreign Minister Genscher said that, on the subject of the European Community, he had followed the President's Boston speech with great attention. There was a great opportunity on both sides of the Atlantic because of 1992. The EC had a 340 million person market. The President saw in Brussels yesterday how members of the EC could talk -- and some men and women fight, especially as the night gets longer. In ten to fifteen years, there would be three major economic areas: Japan, the EC, and the U.S. and Canada. The Foreign Minister was not afraid of Japan. He had told Nakasone that, as MacArthur said, we in Europe shall return. On terrorism and drugs, the U.S. and the FRG must work even more closely together. (S)

The President asked about the UK role in the EC. What were Prime Minister Thatcher's concerns? Were they manageable? How would the EC accommodate neutrals like Austria or Switzerland? (S)

Chancellor Kohl said he held Prime Minister Thatcher in very high esteem. He had known her for 18 years. He respected her very much. She is intelligent. (1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)) For a long time, the English Channel was a border for the UK. Half the population of the UK has never crossed the Channel. That would change over time, but now the British were behind the views of the rest of Europe. (1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6))

(1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6))

Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand were very close, as were their countries. When Chancellor Kohl was younger, France was Germany's sworn enemy. That had changed. (1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6))

(S)

Chancellor Kohl said that as time passed European national "competencies" would gradually shift to the EC. This was inevitable. Norway would vote for membership in the EC in three or four years. Sweden and Finland would also have to be accommodated. Chancellor Kohl wished the Germans would have pursued the thoughtful economic policies of Finland for the last forty years; Chancellor Kohl had great admiration for the Finns. As for Switzerland, Chancellor Kohl was not sure the Swiss would agree to join the EC. As for Austria, it had applied for membership but it was unclear what would happen when EC defense cooperation intensified, if there were neutrals within the EC. (S)

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SCS 2/17/06

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs (notetaker)
Interpreter

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Horst Teltschik, Chancellery Adviser on
Security Policy
Interpreter

DATE, TIME May 31, 1989, 9:10 a.m. - 10:05 a.m.
AND PLACE: Federal Chancellery, Bonn

Chancellor Kohl opened with a discussion of exchange programs. He emphasized the value of student exchanges and mentioned possibilities for a congressional exchange program, starting with the leadership in the U.S. Senate. They could spend four or five days in the FRG, including meetings with military units so they can see how a conscript army works. It would be good for the Senators to meet with these young people. A similar program could be followed for the U.S. House of Representatives during a second phase. Also, the Soviets were mounting a massive offensive in this area, with more and more visitors all the time. (C)

Chancellor Kohl also wanted the President to understand that, for him, there were two pillars in his foreign policy: the EC and NATO. (C)

The President suggested that the Chancellor not forget the importance of state officials as well. (U)

Chancellor Kohl said that Mr. Weidenfeld would do more about this problem, and suggested that General Scowcroft could talk to him. The Chancellor also wanted to establish a scholarship for ten American students. Could the Chancellor and the President be joint patrons? (C)

The President said he would like that very much if there was no Congressional prohibition. (C)

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Chancellor Kohl admitted that it sounded crazy but said the U.S. and the FRG must get back to the year 1910. That was when the largest exchanges were taking place. The Chancellor joked that he was a nut on this issue. (Ø)

The President said he did not worry about American young people going to Moscow if they had something to compare it with. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl noted he had spoken to (Egyptian) President Mubarak about this. Mubarak had studied in Moscow and told the Chancellor not to worry. (Ø)

The President commented that Mubarak was a good man. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl said he wished that (Israeli Prime Minister) Shamir would reach out more. He should know that any other leader in Egypt would be worse for him to deal with. (Ø)

The President said he was under pressure from the American Jewish community but would persist in his approach. The U.S. had a problem on the settlements issue and the President would do something publicly about it. (Ø)

The President said he was especially disturbed about the problems in Lebanon. It was hard to know what to do. The President would not send the Marines back in, but he was frustrated. He loved the Lebanese people. The crisis in Lebanon was a pressing concern in the U.S., especially in the Catholic community. The President had discussed Lebanon with the Holy Father. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl said that, if he could be of help, the President should let him know. This was a critical area -- one where Christians, Jews, and Moslems come together. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl then asked the President for his views on the situation in Japan, noting his regret about Nakasone's problems. (Ø)

The President said it was a tough period for Japan. The U.S. knew that Uno, and Takeshita, were good men. The President said he had reluctantly taken a 301 decision. There is an anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States and the President was worried about it. The U.S. needed a close relationship with Japan and the Japanese were buying U.S. bonds. The President described the FSX problem. There was an ugly undercurrent in U.S.-Japanese relations and it worried the President. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl said he had encountered the same situation three or four years earlier. When the Chancellor came into office there was a depressing attitude toward Japan all over Europe. The Chancellor was in Japan and the Japanese said the Germans had lost out, could not keep up. The Chancellor promised the Germans

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would be back later. The Japanese told the Chancellor last year that he was right; the Germans were back. Now, for example, BMW sells motorcycles in Japan. The U.S. and Germans could do it. The Japanese did not have more brain cells than the Americans or Germans did. Nor did the Chancellor think the Japanese could continue as they had in the past. The Chancellor said the Japanese will have a cultural crisis, and recounted a story about Japanese children identifying their home as being their kindergarten school. The absence of any home life was the reverse of the traditional Japanese lifestyle. The Japanese had gone from one extreme to the other. They were not better people; they were just organized better, and work harder. The SPD now had a program for a 30-hour work week. In 1988 the Germans were investing more in research and development and were up to the per capita level of investment of the U.S. and Japan. The U.S. and the FRG should do more joint research and development. The Chancellor wanted thousands of ties between the U.S. and Germany in every conceivable field. (S)

Chancellor Kohl cited another problem. The Germans had an inferiority complex. By the year 2000 there would be three main economic areas -- Japan, the U.S. and Canada, and Western Europe. Within this room, the Chancellor said he felt the FRG should stay within the second rank, not stick its neck out. That was why the Germans pushed France out in front. That was the problem with Prime Minister Thatcher. She got irritated with the FRG even though the Chancellor spoke last at the EC meetings. The Chancellor did not want to push her into a corner, but wanted to bring her in. That was also why he wanted to bring the U.S. in. (TS)

The President said he wanted to be sure the U.S. did not appear to have exclusive friends in Europe. That was why he had taken Mitterrand to Kennebunkport. The U.S. would have problems with Mitterrand, but these were also because the French felt there was a U.S.-Great Britain special relationship. That was also a problem with Germany. (TS)

Chancellor Kohl characterized France as a capricious lady that can always be wooed. The only Cardinal in France does not receive his hat from the Pope, but from the head of state -- ever since Louis XIV. One must accept these French idiosyncrasies and deal with them. (S)

The President said all countries had their special concerns. The U.S. would cater to them, but not grovel. (S)

Chancellor Kohl said it was fantastic that the President took Mitterrand to Kennebunkport. With President Reagan, the relationship just did not work. The President had dealt with him exactly right. Mitterrand used to say he did not take instructions from U.S. Presidents. He could not talk with

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President Reagan. He talked with the President and he loved it. The Chancellor urged the President to please continue this approach with Mitterrand. There was no jealousy on the part of the Chancellor. (~~TS~~)

The President recounted a story about former Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki. (~~TS~~)

Chancellor Kohl asked the President when he would be going to Poland. (U)

The President said it would be just before the Economic Summit. (U)

Chancellor Kohl said the U.S. and the FRG should help Jaruzelski. The Poles were a bit too arrogant, but it was important to help them. (~~TS~~)

The President said he would like to consult with the Chancellor about this subject before his trip. (~~TS~~)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01o. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (6 pp.)	6/1/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Chronological Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Other (July 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 10/23/2013

Date Closed:	7/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91148-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(70)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	7/10/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



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4368

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs (notetaker)

Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Charles Powell, Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister

DATE, TIME June 1, 1989, 10:35 a.m. - 11:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: Number 10 Downing Street, London

Prime Minister Thatcher, after a brief discussion of the relative merits of parliamentary versus presidential government, commented that the President must be thrilled with the way the Summit had turned out. (U)

The President said that if it had not been for the Prime Minister's "anchor to windward," the Summit would not have been a success. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher
(b) (1) (S)

(b) (1)

The President said he now wanted to keep the pressure on for progress in arms control. (C)

Prime Minister Thatcher

(b) (1)

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(C)

The President acknowledged that verification of a chemical weapons ban would be tough. He said that perhaps the U.S. proposal in 1984 was wanting in this respect, but the international community must try to achieve a ban. (C)

Prime Minister Thatcher

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(C)

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The Prime Minister |

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The Prime Minister |

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The President |

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~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher |

(b) (1)

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~~(S)~~

The President |

(b) (1)

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~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher |

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~~(C)~~

The President agreed, citing the example of China. The U.S. had to move carefully. The President supported democracy but did not want to jeopardize a great relationship. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher |

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~~(C)~~

The President described his meeting with Wan Li in the White House. The U.S. would conduct itself properly and work closely with the regime while supporting democracy. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher |

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The President agreed. He had made modest proposals to address this problem but the Prime Minister was right; the West must deal properly with the debt issue. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher

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Prime Minister Thatcher

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The President asked if the Prime Minister was worried about Germany's future and the possibility of reunification. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher

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~~(TS)~~

The President

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Prime Minister Thatcher said East Germany was economically better

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The President asked what the Prime Minister thought of Austria's desire for membership in the EC. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher |

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The President asked the Prime Minister for her views on the Middle East. He said the visits of Middle Eastern leaders to Washington had gone well. The Shamir visit went better than the President had expected, but |

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The President was not too optimistic. On Lebanon, the President was really depressed. It was an awful situation and the President felt emotionally involved. Things used to work there.

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(S)

Prime Minister Thatcher |

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(S)

The President raised the issue of American and British hostages in Lebanon. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher |

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The President |

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~~(TS)~~

Mr. Powell |

~~(TS)~~

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Prime Minister Thatcher |

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~~(C)~~

The President praised the role of the Prime Minister. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher |

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The President |

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~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher |

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The President |

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~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher |

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The President |

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Prime Minister Thatcher

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The Prime Minister commented that Ambassador Acland would stay in Washington for another year, until 1991. ~~(C)~~

The Prime Minister said she would be going to the next meeting of the International Democratic Union and asked if it was true that Vice President Quayle might be the next chairman of the IDU. ~~(C)~~

The President was embarrassed to say he had not heard that. The U.S. had an internal problem with the IDU, since the Democrats wanted to be part of it rather than be in the Socialist International. But the President would look into the question and would be pleased about the Vice President assuming the chairmanship. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher

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(b) (1)

The President said he had thought of asking President Reagan to go to the Tokyo meeting. ~~(C)~~

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The President, after a brief discussion of the environment, commented on the Strategic Defense Initiative, saying he could not take SDI away. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher

(b) (1)

Prime Minister Thatcher asked if the U.S. was contemplating holding an international conference on global warming. ~~(C)~~

The President said he was worried that there were too many conferences. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher

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4368

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Henry Catto, U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)

Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Sir Geoffrey Howe, Foreign Secretary
Sir Antony Acland, Ambassador to the U.S.
Sir Percy Cradock, Foreign Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister
Sir Robin Butler, Cabinet Secretary
Mr. Charles Powell, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
Bernard Ingham, Press Secretary for the Prime Minister

DATE, TIME June 1, 1989, 11:35 a.m. - 12:35 p.m..
AND PLACE: Number 10 Downing Street, London

Prime Minister Thatcher said there was much to discuss: NATO Summit follow-up, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, China, South Africa, Namibia, and Argentina. The Prime Minister said she was bewildered in knowing what to say about Lebanon. (C)

The President said this was a good summary, and yielded the floor to the Prime Minister. (U)

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Prime Minister Thatcher asked Foreign Secretary Howe whether, in his meeting, there had been a discussion of the refugee problem in Hong Kong. (Ø)

Foreign Secretary Howe reported on his meeting with Secretary Baker. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher remarked that there had been no discussion of Cambodia and that she would be asked in the House of Commons about Lockerbie. She also expected to be asked whether there had been a discussion of nuclear non-proliferation or the dangers of missile proliferation. (Ø)

The President replied that, on the topic of Cambodia, the United States would continue to support Prince Sihanouk. He was a bit of a weak reed, but he was the only reed in town. The U.S. was strongly opposed to Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, and was listening to its Asian friends on Hun Sen. In the Sino-Soviet summit meeting, Gorbachev and Deng did not make any real progress on Cambodia as far as the U.S. could see. The President was afraid that it would be tough to keep the Khmer Rouge out. (Ø)

Secretary Baker said it was important to support the non-Communist resistance and those in Hanoi who might be reasonable. It was a difficult problem because of the large number of players. (Ø)

The President said he was amazed to hear about the problems in Hong Kong. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher said the problems in Hong Kong had been aggravated by recent events in China which had weakened those Chinese officials who had worked with the UK to negotiate the Hong Kong agreement. The people of Hong Kong were very anxious at the moment and this has been made worse by the flood -- 700 a day -- of boat people. The British authorities had been trying to repatriate these people, but there was no more space for them. The British government might have to stop allowing them to come. (Ø)

The President said this revealed something about conditions in Vietnam. There were some in America who wanted to give Vietnam a chance, but the problem of the boat people was just another indicator of the repressive nature of the Vietnamese government. (Ø)

Foreign Secretary Howe said these refugees were economic migrants and Hong Kong was the only place where they were accepted. The British had to send 35,000 Chinese a year back to the mainland but are accepting Vietnamese boat people -- a nasty political problem. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Thatcher repeated that the UK might have to stop the boat people from landing in Hong Kong. (S)

Secretary Baker noted that there would be a conference on June 13-14 to seek a comprehensive solution to the Indochinese refugee problem. The U.S. had encountered similar problems with Soviet Jews, and migrants from Central America and Mexico. The U.S. was looking at whether to change the definition of asylum. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher said that must be done or "we" would be swamped. It was a new problem, harming the whole notion of asylum. The world should put pressure on Vietnam to stop this outrage. The Prime Minister observed that the press would want to know if the Vietnamese problem had been discussed. (S)

Secretary Baker said that he and Foreign Secretary Howe had talked about it at some length. (S)

Secretary Baker said the U.S. was extremely grateful for the Prime Minister's treatment of (Nicaraguan President) Ortega. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher said Ortega was awful, talking drivel. (S)

Secretary Baker said the U.S. was also grateful for the Prime Minister's help with the Namibia accords. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher said that it was lucky she was there when the crisis arose. (S)

The Prime Minister commented that the NATO Summit had gone extremely well. It would help stop the euphoria about the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister said she was very grateful to the President for the speeches he had been making. (S)

On Lebanon, the Prime Minister talked to Perez de Cuellar and had tried to do what she could with the Arab League. She wondered how one could pressure Syria. (S)

The President said that Aoun was not very sympathetic either. (S)

Secretary Baker said the U.S. had sent word to Iraq asking that Baghdad stop sending weapons to Aoun. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher said the situation would be more difficult if General Aoun "went under." (S)

Secretary Baker said this was absolutely true. (S)

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