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2009-0275-S

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Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
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OA/ID Number: 91148
Folder ID Number: 91148-005

Folder Title:
Other (June - September 1989) [2]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Meeting with Secretaries Cheney and Baker, Wednesday, September 13, 7:15 a.m. (1 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	TS
01b. Memo	Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item - Taiwan Arms Sales (1 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	C
01c. Memo	Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item - Korean FX Update (1 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	C
01d. Memo	Karl D. Jackson to Brent Scowcroft Re: The Korean Fighter Program (KFP) (2 pp.)	7/19/89	(b)(1)	C
01e. Memo	Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item - Cambodia (1 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	TS
01f. Memo	Karl D. Jackson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Post - Paris Cambodia Policy (3 pp.)	9/9/89	(b)(1)	TS
01g. Report	Re: Cambodia [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	9/6/89	(b)(1)	TS
01h. Graph	Re: Cambodia (1 pp.)	9/6/89	(b)(1)	TS
01i. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: B-C-S Breakfast Item: Jordan Reprogramming (1 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	S

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Pinksheet Number: cap1236

OA/ID Number: 91148-005

Date Closed: 7/10/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01j. Memo	Doug Paal to General Scowcroft Re: Late Development - China FMS (1 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	
01k. Memo	Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item - Peace Pearl Deadline (1 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	S
01l. Memo	John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item on September 13 -- Arms Control at the Ministerial (2 pp.)	9/11/89	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	From Brent Scowcroft to POTUS, Re: Lebanon [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03a. Letter	President Bush to Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1 pp.)	9/20/89	(b)(1)	
03b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Kohl (1 pp.)	9/18/89	(b)(1)	S
03c. Letter	Chancellor Kohl to President Bush Re: [German] (1 pp.)	8/30/89	(b)(1)	
03d. Letter	Chancellor Kohl to President Bush Re: Courtesy Translation (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03e. Draft Letter	Re: Department of State Draft Reply (President Bush to Chancellor Kohl) (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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04. Memo	Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: Lebanon and Syria (3 pp.)	9/20/89	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	Bret Coulson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Calls to Senators Regarding the Urgent Military Assistance Package for Jordan (1 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	
05b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Senators Leahy and Kasten (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Senator Inouye (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05d. Talking Points	Re: Jordan Desperately Needs the \$20 Million Now (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05e. Memo	Bret Coulson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Calls to Senators Regarding the Urgent Military Assistance Package for Jordan (2 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	
05f. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Senators Leahy and Kasten (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05g. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Senator Inouye (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05h. Talking Points	Re: Jordan Desperately Needs the \$20 Million Now (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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06. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Lebanese Ambassador Abdullah Bouhabib (3 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	S

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

September 12, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: Breakfast Meeting with Secretaries Cheney and Baker,
Wednesday, September 13, 7:15 a.m.

The following items have been submitted for your breakfast meeting tomorrow with Secretaries Cheney and Baker:

Taiwan Arms Sales	DOD	Tab A
Korean FX Update	DOD	Tab B
Saudi Arms Deal	DOD	Tab C
Cambodia	State	Tab D
Reprogramming Funds for Jordan	State	Tab E
China FMS	State	Tab F

Attached at Tab G are five additional items which were added by State but, due to the number of items on the agenda, they withdraw these items. Since the items had already been prepared, I have attached them for your information.

afghan \$200 mil

Attachments
As stated

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Declassify on: OADR

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2000-0116-F/1
9/4/2007 MM

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Memo	Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item - Taiwan Arms Sales (1 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	<i>ℰ</i>

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Subseries:
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Document Partially Declassified
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 By MM on 10/23/2013

Date Closed:	7/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91148-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0116-F/1(165.10)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	3/31/2010	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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September 12, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DOUGLAS PAAL *DP*

SUBJECT: Breakfast Item - Taiwan Arms Sales

Secretary Cheney will raise three issues regarding defense cooperation with Taiwan.

-- The sale of 22 excess M-60 tanks to Taiwan.

(b) (1)

M-60 Tanks. State is likely to reverse itself and agree to this sale. The tanks' potential use on Taiwan can only be defensive. The number (22) is small, and the risk of provocation to Beijing very low. The M-60s will supplement Taiwan's troubled M-48 coproduction program.

(b) (1)

Concurrence by: ^{JA} Dyke.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


Declassify on: OADR

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2000-0116-F/1
3/31/2010 MM

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Jackson



Doug

(b) (1)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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September 12, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

DOUGLAS PAAL *DP*

SUBJECT:

Breakfast Item - Korean FX Update

Secretary Cheney plans to provide an update on the Korean Fighter Program (KFP, or FX). There will be no effort to reach a decision on the Program at the breakfast. The essential point concerns U.S. efforts to keep offsets for the KFP below thirty percent.

For your background, attached is a copy of an earlier memorandum on the project by Karl Jackson.

Attachment

Tab A Jackson/Scowcroft Memorandum dated 7/19/89

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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July 19, 1989

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2000-0116-F/1
3/31/2010 MM

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: KARL D. JACKSON

SUBJECT: The Korean Fighter Program (KFP)

Senators Heinz and Dixon appear to be fomenting opposition to the Korea Fighter Program on similar grounds to their nearly successful opposition to the FS-X (Tab A).

The major differences between the two programs are:

Japan's FS-X is a co-development program; the KFP is a co-production program. FS-X involves far more technology transfer than the KFP, e.g. developing co-cured composite wings, new radar and avionics, and an enhanced engine. KFP, in contrast, involves purchasing 12 planes off-the-shelf, building 36 planes from kits and manufacturing only 72 planes from scratch in South Korea.

The KFP involves no significant transfer of technology to Korea other than basic aircraft assembling skills that they would have attained from a co-production agreement with any country. When the KFP program is concluded Korea will not have the capacity to compete with the United States in the design and manufacture of high performance aircraft. The KFP involves no threat to the competitiveness of the U.S. aerospace industry.

The KFP program will be essentially the same type of co-production that we have done with many NATO allies as well as Japan and Australia. Most American manufacturers agree that co-production arrangements are the only way to do business in the high performance aircraft manufacturing field. Most industrialized countries simply refused to buy large numbers of items off-the-shelf.

The advantages from the co-producing country's viewpoint are primarily producing the weapon closer to home and garnering prestige rather than in technology transfer. Having a production line located in-country, under the control of one's own nationals provides a greater sense of control over one's own destiny in the field of national security. The costs to any nation

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that insists on co-production are almost always higher than they would have been to buy the planes off-the-shelf from the U.S.

The existence of a Korean production line for advanced aircraft would be an advantage to the United States in wartime; hence, Korean co-production, all other things being equal, further strengthens allied defense capabilities.

Korea originally considered co-production of a European fighter because of the greater advantages expected in off-sets and technology transfer. However, our arguments about the U.S.-ROK security agreement and the advantage of interoperability have prevailed, and Korea has now narrowed its choice to either the F-16 or the F-18.

The KFP will cost \$3-4.5 billion for 120 F-16 or F-18 fighters. The production share going to American companies will be approximately 70-80 percent, roughly twice the level allocated to American firms under the FS-X agreement.

From a political viewpoint the KFP presents difficulties because the Koreans have stated that they are doing this to become competitive in the aircraft industry. This rhetoric is designed for consumption within Korea, providing a rationale for spending the higher sums involved in co-production in comparison with an off-the-shelf purchase. When the KFP has run its course more Koreans will have gained experience in assembling aircraft; however, it is fanciful to think that the KFP will allow Korea to leap into the aerospace industry as a significant competitor of the U.S.

Korea, unlike Japan, has no absolute prohibition on exporting weapons to third countries. However, U.S. technology will be protected from unauthorized transfer by the provisions of the MOU itself.

The U.S. manufacturers competing for the KFP, particularly McDonnell Douglas have been engaged in offering Korea exorbitant off set arrangements. Reportedly, the off sets now being offered are in the 100-150 percent range. When Minister of Defense Lee met with Secretary Mosbacher the Korean side agreed to limit offsets to 30 percent. This is a reasonable off set by the standards of international aviation deals. DoD appears willing to settle for 30 percent; Commerce remains nervous Congressional reaction to a 30 percent off set.

Attachments

Tab A Congressional Record July 17, 1989
Tab B Korean FX Program (DoD)
Tab C Lee-Mosbacher Meeting July 18, 1989

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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~~TOP SECRET/CODEWORD ATTACHMENT~~

September 12, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DOUGLAS PAAL 
SUBJECT: Breakfast Item - Cambodia

Attached is Karl's most recent memorandum for you on Cambodia. One point from Karl not included that is relevant to the breakfast agenda is a suggestion that Secretary Baker tell Shevardnadze of U.S. unhappiness over Soviet military aid to the PRK. Baker can say the U.S. will give the USSR 60 days to end the flow of supplies. If Moscow does not, then the U.S. will go ahead with lethal assistance. In any event, this line will help win support in Congress for Administration action on Cambodia.

Attachment

Tab A Jackson/Scowcroft Memorandum dated 9/9/89 with
TS/CODEWORD attachment

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~~TOP SECRET/CODEWORD ATTACHMENT~~
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01f. Memo	Karl D. Jackson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Post - Paris Cambodia Policy (3 pp.)	9/9/89	(b)(1)	TS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 9, 1989

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5/13/2005 KO

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: KARL D. JACKSON *KDJ*
SUBJECT: Post-Paris Cambodia Policy

Background:

There have been two major developments over the last month on Cambodia: the suspension without agreement of the Paris Conference and evidence that Soviet arms shipments to Phnom Penh far exceed the total arms inputs available to the loose anti-Hun Sen coalition from all sources.

The Vietnamese and the PRK were the prime causes of the failure -
of the Paris Conference. (b)(1)

[REDACTED] and the
evident willingness of Sihanouk to consider a variety of modalities for a compromise, Hun Sen slammed the door on compromise by saying on August 28 that, details notwithstanding, there would be no power sharing before an election and that the election would basically be held under a PRK government but only if the other parties agreed to banning the KR, suspension of foreign assistance to all groups, and a cease fire in place.

Nguyen Co Thach stated on the same occasion that Vietnam would not consider any agreement in which the Khmer Rouge had a role. In a press conference, which he subsequently retracted, he stated that Vietnam reserved the right to bring its troops back to Cambodia if requested to do so by the Phnom Penh regime. Ambassador Koh reported to me that in a conversation in Paris Rogachev stated that he saw no reason why the USSR should exercise leverage because "their man was firmly in control."

To add insult to injury, the PRK and the Vietnamese were much more skillful and active than the other delegations in briefing the press, and, as a result, the fact that Vietnamese/PRK

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intransigence doomed the conference has received scant attention in the press and accounts have tended to place the responsibility for failure on Sihanouk and/or the Khmer Rouge.

(b)(1)

Secretary Baker intends to bring this matter up with Shevardnadze during their forthcoming talks. In order to maintain his negotiating leverage, the Secretary wants to avoid any indications from within the government that we might be backing away from the lethal option.

POLICY ISSUES

Paris Conference

- Vietnam and the PRK are responsible for the absence of a positive result in Paris.
 - U.S. policy, at a minimum, should avoid rewarding them, or their allies, for intransigence on the Cambodia issue.
 - At this time we should not raise the level of representation in Vientiane or allow Laos greater access to the international financial institutions.
- In Paris, Sihanouk's dependence on China, and by extension the KR, was amply demonstrated; Sihanouk's present resource base partially explains his refusal to cut himself adrift from the Khmer Rouge and China.
 - Sihanouk also believes that no one has been able to extinguish the KR by force of arms -- not Sihanouk (1968-70), not Lon Nol and the Americans (1970-75), and not Vietnam and the PRK (1979-89). For this reason, Sihanouk believes that there can be no true peace unless the KR, in some fashion, can be brought into the interim coalition government.
 - US policy should remain predicated upon Sihanouk and the NCR as the vital balancing element between the KR and the PRK, without which peace is inconceivable.
 - US policy should be to enhance symbolic and non-lethal (and if politically possible lethal) assistance to the NCR. Any visible slackening of US support for Sihanouk and the NCR would drive them into complete dependence on China and the NCR.

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--Secretary Baker, and perhaps the President, should meet with Sihanouk if he attends the UNGA. (If Sihanouk does not attend the UNGA, an opportunity should be found for the President and/or the Secretary of State to mention that our policy of enhanced assistance to the NCR has not changed because of Paris.)

Soviet Assistance

-- Vietnam and the PRK believe that they have already won the game. In Vietnam's eyes, the Paris Conference gave Hun Sen new legitimacy, and the Vietnamese withdrawal, paired with large Soviet arms deliveries to Phnom Penh, should allow Hun Sen to hang on, for the time period necessary, to establish his international legitimacy.

--Vietnam has stated that if the KR and/or the NCR were ever on the brink of winning, Vietnam would reserve the right to reintroduce its troops.

--In addition to raising Soviet arms shipments with Shevardnadze, attention must be publicly drawn to the Soviet arms in flow and the hypocrisy of Soviet condemnation of the comparatively meager U.S. assistance to the NCR.

US Public Diplomacy

-- The press blames Sihanouk and/or the KR for the absence of peace in Cambodia.

--We must be more active in briefing the press on what actually happened in Paris, that: China made concessions; the KR would have been required to go along with these concessions, and the PRK refused genuine power sharing with non-communists and the KR alike.

DECISIONS

1. Maintaining or Enhancing Support for Sihanouk and the NCR.
2. Meeting Sihanouk.
3. Soviet Arms Shipments.
4. Post Paris Public Diplomacy.
5. Ambassador for Vientiane?

Attachment

Tab A CODEWORD on Cambodia

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AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	3/22/2005	MR Disposition Date:	7/31/2014

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CAMBODIA:

Soviet Military Deliveries on the Rise

Soviet military deliveries to Cambodia are proceeding at a record pace: an estimated \$390 million of arms and support material has already been shipped this year, probably to strengthen Phnom Penh in anticipation of Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia later this month. 1.4(c)

1.4(c)

Cambodia has gotten an estimated 12,900 metric tons of equipment, as compared with about 5,600 tons during all of last year. About 70 percent of the tonnage has been sent since late May, and, although most of it is not identified, it probably consists of munitions, military vehicles, and support material. 1.4(c)

In addition to new material, Cambodia began receiving MiG-21 fighter aircraft that arrived in Vietnam in 1984 for Cambodian forces. 1.4(c)

Comment: Before it was known whether the Cambodian factions at the Paris talks last month would reach a political settlement, Moscow probably hoped to send as much aid as possible to Phnom Penh in case the talks resulted in a call for an end to military aid to all parties to the conflict. Because the talks failed and a civil war possibly is imminent, Moscow may begin to funnel even more aid to the regime, 1.4(c)



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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0759-MR
7/31/2014 MM

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01h. Graph	Re: Cambodia (1 pp.)	9/6/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Chronological Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Other (June - September 1989) [2]

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 10/23/2013

Date Closed:	7/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91148-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0116-F/1(172.07)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	3/22/2005	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.


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**Soviet Military Deliveries to Cambodia,
1984 - August 1989**



(b)(1); (b)(3)

323401 9-89



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 12, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *rw*
FROM: C. DAVID WELCH *cdw*
SUBJECT: B-C-S Breakfast Item: Jordan Reprogramming

As it was asked to do several weeks ago, DOD has come up with \$20 million to reprogram as FY90 FMS assistance to Jordan. But State's job of setting out a legislative strategy to move the money through the reprogramming process has run into Congressional obstacles. Senator Leahy's staff at Foreign Operations Subcommittee will not attach the reprogramming to the foreign aid bill because of the ceiling on foreign assistance outlays. The alternative is to attach it to the defense appropriation bill (where the Senate Budget committee advises that the ceiling headroom is sufficient), but Leahy's people disagree with moving the action to the defense bill, since this would legislate foreign assistance out of their hands. Moreover, Senator Inouye has not agreed yet to champion the Jordan case from his Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations. The net result is that this Congressional bickering over jurisdiction -- and bargaining -- is holding up the reprogramming. Moreover, we may lose the legislative vehicles available -- the Defense bill goes to full committee markup on Thursday. State now suggests that Cheney agree to attachment of the Jordan money to the defense bill. Then, Inouye has to be brought around ASAP to back the effort. The issue for breakfast is to agree on a strategy, and State's idea seems to be the most effective one at this stage, and then set out what everyone must do to make it work. That may involve some calls to the Hill (Inouye and staff) by Cheney.

Concurrence by: *GL* Ginny Lampley

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2016-0759-MR
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Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Sep 12, 1989

NOTE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: DOUG PAAL

SUBJECT: Late Development - China FMS

Secretary Baker plans to suggest that the President send one final message urging the Chinese to pay the amount due.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01k. Memo	Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Breakfast Item - Peace Pearl Deadline (1 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	8

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Chronological Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Other (June - September 1989) [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 10/23/2013

Date Closed:	7/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91148-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0116-F/1(45)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	3/31/2010	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

~~SECRET~~

September 12, 1989






INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DOUGLAS PAAL 
SUBJECT: Breakfast Item - Peace Pearl Deadline

Secretary Baker wants you and Secretary Cheney to look closely at the implications of China not meeting the deadline to pay up in order to continue Peace Pearl. Baker wants the President to be aware of these implications.

State has been trying to obtain from Defense options to present to the Chinese other than to pay the full \$55.9 million by September 15. Defense insists and State now accepts that there is no other option. Accepting less money would amount to subsidizing Peace Pearl in the aftermath of Tiananmen, and would require going to Congress for the shortfall.  (b) (1)
of other FMS items  (b) (1) would violate the President's June 5 policy on new arms sales and deliveries.



On balance, we have no choice but to insist on full payment. If China refuses to pay, we can try to confine the damage. I am not convinced Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun will allow the damage to spread.

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
2000-0116-F/1
3/22/2005 MM

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Non-log

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 11, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*
FROM: JOHN GORDON *JG*
SUBJECT: Breakfast Item on September 13 -- Arms Control at the Ministerial

Secretary Baker plans to discuss arms control for his upcoming Ministerial at your next breakfast. You and he have already discussed most of the issues. The only real work we see on your part is whether to join with Baker to put pressure on Secretary Cheney to move quickly on ALCMs and on nuclear testing, or to try to dampen Baker's enthusiasm for pressing on ALCMs.

A brief summary of where each issue stands follows:

START: ALCMs. The PCC is continuing to grapple with this issue. It is unlikely that we will be in any shape to present it to the Soviets in Wyoming. This will be a major change to our position and we see no way to sort it out -- especially its relationship to the rest of our START position -- before the end of this week. That said, we are doing everything possible to keep the pressure on in the interagency to bring this issue to closure.

START: Other issues. We expect to be in good position to move forward on **unit of account** (but not on NDM limits) and many of the verification and stability issues. As we briefed you over the weekend, **STOF** will be ready, we can make a detailed **PPM** proposal, set a date for the **data exchange** and sign the strategic air **exercise notification** (an open issue is who will sign this agreement -- something best sorted out by Cheney and Baker). We are pressuring JCS to be able to offer **RV inspections** at least for ICBMs (the Navy is going very slow on SLBM RV inspections). We will have nothing new to say on missile tagging and cruise missile telemetry encryption.

Nuclear Testing. This issue will be ready, short of some very high-level blocking. All agencies except OSD have agreed that we should move ahead. OSD will probably agree to include seismic in the negotiations, but will strongly object to on-site inspection. Bob Gates will have a deputies meeting the evening before the

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0760-MR
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breakfast and he will be able to give you an update on where agencies stand. We hope to use the interagency paper for White House decision and avoid an NSC meeting on the topic.

CFE. We have no work to do bilaterally in this area, but there are some indications that the Soviets may propose something. At this point we do not know more, other than that they may be planning a verification initiative of their own. If they lay something down, we should listen attentively, and avoid negotiating for NATO in this bilateral setting.

CW. We may be in a position to make a counter offer to the Soviets sufficient to close the deal on the MOU. The Germans have agreed to the formulation that will allow the Soviets to deduce the size of our stocks in the FRG, but we will avoid giving the size directly. State thinks this will work with the Soviets.

Arnie is working the other CW paper in a principals only PCC and will have a paper for your use at a principals only NSC on Friday.

Defense and Space. Hank Cooper's plan for "open laboratories" is moving along well, but has not yet been vetted by the PCC or higher levels. If the plan doesn't run into any serious objection, we should be ready to propose. Hank would have the Soviets visit Los Alamos and the alpha laser at San Juan Capistrano. As we have mentioned, the only downside is the possible forum we give the Soviets to charge treaty violations.

^{MB} Bob Blackwill, ^{CR} Condi Rice, ^{GF} Don Mahley, ^{GR} Heather Wilson, Rich Davis, and Will ~~Mokey~~ concur.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Memo	From Brent Scowcroft to POTUS, Re: Lebanon [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Chronological Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Other (June - September 1989) [2]

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**
By MM on 3/23/2023

Date Closed: 7/10/2009	OA/ID Number: 91148-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0760-MR(501)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/26/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0760-MR
MM 4/26/2016



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Lebanon



The evacuation of our Embassy from Beirut has had a mixed impact upon our diplomacy in Lebanon. Our pullout has caused some to believe that we have washed our hands of Lebanon. Aoun, not surprisingly, has blasted us publicly for "abandonment." ^{3.3(b)(1)}

^{3.3(b)(1)} Asad, ^{3.3(b)(1)} feels that his position that Aoun cannot be dealt with has been vindicated. The mainly Maronite Lebanese-American community is upset, claiming that we have left the Christians to a terrible fate at the hands of the Syrians.

There are also opportunities. The Christians have been shaken up and may be more willing to compromise. Aoun's political position, already under question by important parts of the Maronite community, has been considerably weakened. Thus, we have potential leverage with Damascus to promote Syrian engagement in a political process wherein their own demands of Lebanon are scaled back.

But our advantage is at best a potential one, and its value diminishes with time. Asad may indeed feel he has a green light, or at least a freer hand. He could try new military escalation, or at a minimum be more intransigent. Without a presence in Beirut, we are hampered in encouraging political moderation within the Christian enclave. If the Christians feel totally abandoned, they may become even more immobilized internally, leaving Aoun to wage a futile war from his bunker with Iraqi military supply. The Israelis may feel it is time to ring Asad's bell with a confrontation in Lebanon. Rabin warned me that the Syrians have been testing Israeli tolerance with aerial reconnaissance and naval deployments that are pushing the edge of the envelope. The Syrians may even feel they could derive benefit for their position in Lebanon from reflexive Arab sympathy in any clash with Israel.

It is not enough, therefore, to wait for things to happen. We need to consider how to fill the vacuum left by our departure. In my view, this requires that we decide and communicate the conditions for our return to Beirut, articulate in public our views and objectives, approach Syria, and pace our diplomacy with that of others, especially the Arab League.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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The terms for our return: We have decided to engage with Aoun on the conditions under which we could go back to Beirut. There is some internal debate here. One view is that our departure was forced by Aoun's desire to involve us in his campaign against Syrian occupation. In this view, Aoun went too far to change, and any assurances cannot be trusted in any case. The bottom line is that Aoun is either going to win or to lose. Until the outcome is clear, the United States should not return. The flaw in this thinking is that events could carry on basically as they are for an indefinite period during which we would be frozen out of the game in Beirut. Also, it would look to everyone like a U.S. attempt to oust Aoun, an impression we should avoid.

The path we are considering avoids setting terms that Aoun can meet by facile assurances, while making clear his responsibility to bring about circumstances whereby our people can do their job efficiently and safely. Such circumstances do not include Aoun's departure from the scene. Beyond private and public assurances regarding our security, we would look for Aoun to drop his conditions that the United States must recognize him as Prime Minister and that our Ambassador must present credentials to him; to agree to deal directly with our Ambassador; and to ensure there are no more demonstrations at our Embassy. The problem is that Aoun's word is worthless. On balance, however, if Aoun does back down, we should go back.

Our Views and Objectives: An essential component of a strategy for Lebanon is our public diplomacy. Throughout the Lebanese crisis we have stuck to the same public line, varying it only to turn up the heat on the Syrians or Aoun. This refrain -- stressing the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of a Lebanon free of all foreign forces -- no longer plays well. An alternative would be to speak out more forcefully, probably offending everyone somewhat, by laying out our view of basic principles for a solution. This would include what it will take to stop the fighting, to start a political reform process, and eventually to obtain the withdrawal of all foreign forces. Last Saturday's White House statement welcoming renewal of the Arab League initiative was a step in this direction, but we may need more specificity in further public statements.

Approach to Syria: There is also merit in making an approach to Syria. You have not communicated directly with Syria in this Administration. The basis of our dialogue with Damascus is thin and generally negative in content. I would advocate engaging Asad directly, and you might consider sending a secret emissary -- such as Dick Helms -- carrying a message from you that would set our regional policies in context, discuss our agenda with Syria, open a dialogue on the hostage issue, and develop a personal channel to Asad. The message on Lebanon would be a straightforward presentation to Asad of our views on the proper limitations of Syria's ambitions in Lebanon -- no support for Syrian irredentism or permanent presence, normalization of relations on the basis of Lebanese sovereignty, no partition or vassalization of the state. But we would also communicate our

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understanding of Syria's legitimate security interests. On bilateral relations and the peace process, the idea would be to offer the hope of an improved dialogue with Syria while giving our views, thus putting Asad more on the spot with the responsibility for excluding himself -- rather than us acting to cut him out. Asad would see this an important sign of our seriousness. There is a lot that is unpleasant and brutish about the Syrian regime, but it is not an outlaw nation of the Libya stripe, or implacably anti-American as was Iran under the Ayatollah. The French and Soviets have managed to touch base with all the parties, and we should be able to do the same. Alternatives would be to send a letter via our Ambassador, or to make a phone call; the latter, of course, dilutes the exchange somewhat, while the former has not produced much in the past. There are no guarantees of any results, but the risk is not that high.

Supportive Diplomacy: The renewed Arab League Tripartite Committee initiative is the key, since it provides an Arab vehicle for bringing Syria along. The Arabs have much stronger influence with Syria than we do, but in the crunch they are reluctant to stand up to Syria. We need to brace the Arab League on handling Syria, while realizing that the Arabs will count on us to bring the Christians along. We have given the Tripartite Committee a strong public push as requested by the Saudis. The French sent a strong message to Aoun, telling him to accept the Tripartite initiative, after your call to Mitterrand. Like us, the French are concerned that Aoun's dismay over the Arab League's handling of the issue of Syria's presence will torpedo the chances for a ceasefire and the beginning of a political process. We should jointly press Aoun to agree to the ceasefire and convening of the Parliament on September 30, where Aoun can make his points about Syria's presence in negotiations, not on the battlefield. The Soviets can help by pressing Damascus to agree to the ceasefire and to observe the commitment not to rearm the Muslims. Delivering Christian agreement will require keeping the Iraqis (and Saudis) out of the weapons supply game so that Asad is assured and Aoun doesn't get overconfident. (The idea that we should support Iraqi arming of Aoun as a counter to Asad is flawed, as in the end Syria would trump whatever Iraq pours in.) We have leverage with Aoun and so do the French, who are now closer to us in their strategy. The strongest leverage on Syria is continued Saudi withholding of financial subsidies. It would be difficult to expand our sanctions on Syria without hurting U.S. business; Syria is somewhat more vulnerable to action by our allies, who have, however, been reluctant to support additional sanctions.

Even with all this, the chances for success in Lebanon are low. In my judgment, though, we should give it a try, including sending an emissary to Syria; we would get the credit for acting, and may even accomplish something. If we stay where we are, that means being less active than even the Arabs, accepting that the French and Soviets will lead the international community's efforts, and staying away from Beirut while it burns.

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7221

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 20, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *RP*

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH *mw*

SUBJECT: Lebanon

Per your request, attached is a memorandum for the President on the current situation in Lebanon.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~


CHRON FILE

7203

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 20, 1989



Dear Helmut,

Thank you for sharing with me the text of your moving speech to the Bundestag on September 1. Germany bears a special burden, which you expressed with eloquence and courage. You and your countrymen deserve our praise for addressing these painful issues and, more than that, for having built on the ruins of the war a vibrant democracy committed to peace, freedom, and the dignity of man.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Dr. Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Bonn

*P.S. I hope your health is A-1.
as*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7203

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1989

P6:45

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter to Kohl

Purpose

To reply to Kohl's recent letter, transmitting the text of his speech on the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II.

Background

Kohl's speech to the Bundestag on September 1 squarely recognized German responsibility for the war and the suffering caused "in the name of Germany and also by German hands." It is the kind of painful acceptance of national responsibility that one hears too infrequently in the Federal Republic these days. Your personal acknowledgement and words of praise would be a welcome gesture.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Kohl at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Kohl

Tab B Incoming from Kohl

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0760-MR
MM 1/8/2016

EMBASSY
OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honor to transmit to you the following message
from Chancellor Helmut Kohl:

"Lieber George,


der 50. Jahrestag des Beginns des 2. Weltkrieges lenkt die
Erinnerung zurück an die unermesslichen Leiden, die dieser Krieg
über die Menschen in Europa und in der Welt gebracht hat, und
verpflichtet alle Länder und Völker in besonderem Masse, ihre
Kräfte zusammenzufassen, um gemeinsam eine Zukunft des Friedens
und der Zusammenarbeit zu bauen, bei der der Mensch mit seiner
Würde und seinen Rechten im Mittelpunkt der Politik steht.

Beide Grundgedanken finden ihren Ausdruck in der
Regierungserklärung, die ich am 1. September 1989 vor dem
Deutschen Bundestag abgeben werde. Ich erlaube mir, Ihnen den
Text dieser Erklärung vorab zu übermitteln.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen
Helmut Kohl
Bundeskanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland"

A courtesy translation is attached.

Respectfully yours,



Karl Th. Paschke
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Washington, D.C. August 30, 1989

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

COURTESY TRANSLATION

Dear George:

The 50th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II reminds us of the immeasurable suffering that this war inflicted on the people in Europe and worldwide. It imposes a special duty on all countries and nations to pool their resources in order to build jointly a future of peace and co-operation in which the individual vested with dignity and rights is at the forefront of politics.

These two basic ideas are reflected in the statement that I shall make in the German Bundestag on 1 September 1989. I am taking the liberty of sending you in advance a copy of the statement.

Yours sincerely,

Helmut Kohl

Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Kohl Delivers Government Statement 1 Sep

AT0109080389 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 0710 GMT 1 Sep 89

[Government statement delivered by Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the Bundestag session in Bonn on 1 September—live]

[Text] Madame President, ladies and gentlemen:

Today in Germany, in Europe, and all over the world we are commemorating the beginning of World War II 50 years ago. As freely elected representatives of the German people, we have a special duty here. We are facing this assignment with the seriousness that this day demands of us.

On this day we are full of grief and awareness of the responsibility we feel when remembering World War II. We have a special responsibility because of the fact that World War II was unleashed by that criminal regime which had the power of state and government in Germany at that time.

We grieve for the suffering caused to individuals and peoples in the name of Germans and also by German hands. We grieve for the many innocent victims also found among our own people. According to the will of its originators, this war was a merciless, racial war of destruction. It reached a dimension of horror that was unprecedented and that must never be reached again. It was the ultimate consequence of a totalitarian ideology, which, in its mania, idolized one race.

We owe it to the innocent victims to keep the memory of this alive—above all to the victims of the shoa [holocaust], the unprecedented genocide of European Jews; the Poles, on whom Hitler declared an absolute war of enslavement and eradication; the Sinti and Roma [gypsies]; and the many other victims of the Nazi terror regime.

We grieve for the victims of the deprivation of rights and oppression, which Hitler's dictatorship first brought over Germany and then over the world.

We grieve for the innocent victims at the frontlines of the war and at home, for the victims of expulsion.

In our commemoration we also include the millions of soldiers from so many nations who died as prisoners of war or returned home mutilated by war. Who could forget the women who waited in vain for their husbands and the mothers who waited in vain for their sons? How many children lost their fathers and mothers?

Remembering the innocent victims means remembering the horror, making it present in one's mind in the truest sense of the word. It must be an admonishment to us and, therefore, it must not be negotiated away in comparisons. Let us beware of using—either thoughtlessly or with polemic intentions—terms like fascism or resistance for topical issues.

There is not only the temptation to negotiate about past events, but those who close their eyes to the suffering of our time are also thoughtless and without feelings.

At this moment we should also think of those—individuals and peoples—who are still not permitted to live in peace and freedom. After this world war and the rage of destruction of the years between 1939 and 1945, after Auschwitz and Babi Yar, Oradour and Lidice, our world can never again be what it was before. Therefore, traditions and things that are apparently matters of course have again and again to be subjected to critical examinations.

Ladies and gentlemen, continuity is only acceptable if it consciously continues what is good; and what is good cannot be destroyed. This includes the free and democratic traditions in our people's history, and the ethical substance from which we, above all the founding fathers and mothers, formed the Federal Republic of Germany, the freest and most democratic body politic that has ever existed on German soil.

To be sure, there were still quite a few people after 1945 who were incorrigible and did not want to listen to reason. However, they were resolutely condemned and rejected once and for all by the large majority of those who have survived—and we are grateful for this. These survivors had physically experienced the effect of the old fatal ideology. They knew its disastrous influence too well.

In history, evil does not last, and that makes us hopeful. In his chimera of a racial state, Hitler disregarded every historical experience. History has passed him by. After 12 years, the so-called thousand-year reich lay in ruins.

It is true, too many people in Germany, as well as some people abroad, had been blinded and misled by the tyrant. However, the judgment on the Nazi dictatorship depends solely on its crimes, its destructive war, and the genocide it committed. The wounds that World War II caused are not yet healed, as we know. They have burnt themselves into the nations' memory, and they have marked people in a personal way—every individual who experienced this time of terror, even as a child.

I cannot forget the pictures of 1939—when I was 9 years old—and the following war years. I still remember today the terrors of the bomb nights in my native town, the people killed in the streets, and the destroyed houses. Others still remember today the cattle wagons of the death trains, crowded with people on their way to the concentration camps; the battlefields of the war where millions of soldiers suffered from fear and misery and were killed; the seemingly endless columns of emaciated women, children, and old people fleeing and being expelled; the refugee trains where mothers clung on to their children who had frozen to death; those who were innocent and lost their lives and those who survived the terrors.

They all remind us not to forget that the inalienable dignity of man must remain the yardstick of our action at

all times and everywhere. Ladies and gentlemen, the touchstone is always the dignity of the weakest.

In Germany, above all, remembrance of the past must not be lost. It is a burden for us Germans. However, it has also helped us shape our body politic, our Republic, in a responsible way. It remains the prerequisite for our ability to continue to do so.

Unlike the case following World War I, following 1945 there was no discussion about war guilt. Hitler wanted, planned, and unleashed the war. There can be no argument about that. We must resolutely reject any attempt to mitigate this judgment. This is a demand of the truth and of political-moral decency.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is also a demand of a correctly understood patriotism, because Hitler's intention to destroy was finally also aimed at our own people. With total defeat in sight, he intended to drag our own people into the abyss along with him. He talked about the community of the people; however, in reality, he wanted to separate—not include or integrate—many groups of our people. He was dominated by the chimera of race, and everything else was subordinated to it, including the idea of own nation. He talked about providence, but in reality, he intended to destroy religious ties and Christian morality.

They did not care about the ethical culture of our country or Europe. They only cared about their own arbitrary actions [Willkuer].

Today we may gratefully note that our FRG, our liberal community, fundamentally differs from everything that the Nazi dictators were striving for. For more than 40 years, and with joint efforts, we have established a Republic pledged to freedom and peace and which enjoys great world respect. Our FRG is firmly founded on those values which Hitler hated most deeply and which he fanatically fought against.

Ladies and gentlemen, the men and women who discussed the Basic Law in the Parliamentary Council were fully aware of this difference. They often acted on the basis of their own experiences. They had experienced the rise of Nazism, but hardly any of them could imagine at that time, where Hitler's dictatorship would lead. Therefore, their guiding concept was: Nip things in the bud. Because the evil did not start in 1939 but years before, even before 1933. That which at the beginning might have been stopped, became more and more difficult to stop or reverse.

The antecedents of World War II also teach us that power—no matter for which purpose it is granted—can be controlled only by counter-balancing power. The guilt of the Nazi rulers is not whitewashed in any way when we note today that at that time, parts of the social and political elites failed on the domestic front. Too many refused to be loyal to the Weimar democracy. Later on, a great number—some of them to the very end—

indulged in the illusion that the fanaticism of the Nazi rulers might be tamed by compromises and cooperation.

It is also true that European powers—often perhaps unwillingly—promoted a development which objectively favored Hitler's plans. They, too, misjudged him.

The widespread desire for, as Neville Chamberlain said after the 1938 Munich Agreement, peace in our time, was understandable for him, but this desire was a bad adviser. At that time, and today too, it was necessary to attentively see through the plans of a dictatorship.

Only a comprehensive balance of power is able to reliably guarantee a lasting peace. True peace, however, requires much more. Therefore, in our Basic Law, we unreservedly support the inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of any human community, of peace, and of world justice.

Ladies and gentlemen, from the experiences of the interwar period, we must conclude that a fair settlement is impossible if goodwill exists on one side only. The antecedents of World War II taught the community of free peoples how important it is to be vigilant. This teaching is still true, even though we may witness an extremely fundamental change in the relations with our neighbors in the East and southeast of Europe.

We all hope that the encouraging developments of our time will be lasting and that they will continue. We will do what we can to contribute to this, because we Germans particularly have a special duty to do this.

This is not the least of the consequence of the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939. We Germans understand the special responsibility that results for us from the fact that after the conclusion of this pact, which many call the Devil's Pact, Hitler brought war to Poland. Thus, that country became the first victim of the Nazis' racial war of destruction. The agreements made at that time were a shameless neglect of the independence and territorial integrity of Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, and Romania.

Nothing could justify this attack on international law and, not least, on the right to self-determination. We unreservedly condemn it and the subsequent acts of violence.

The FRG has repeatedly stated that the 1939 agreements are not legally valid for the FRG. This also means that we do not consider the pact itself and its additional protocol as any justification for subsequent violations of international law by the German Reich and also by the Soviet Union. The Hitler-Stalin Pact was the product of the cynical cooperation of two dictatorships. One of them perished once and for all in the inferno it unleashed. The Soviet Union is right in the middle of a painful process of self-examination in the spirit new thinking 36 years after Stalin's death.

During World War II a development started that was carried out by force after the end of the war. Our

fatherland was divided. For the Germans in the GDR and for many peoples in central, eastern, and south-eastern Europe the end of the war became the starting point for the replacement of one dictatorship with another. The division of Germany and of Europe can be partly explained by World War II, but it cannot be justified in any way. Therefore, statements like the ones by General Secretary Gorbachev in Bonn this June, according to which the postwar period is coming to an end, are a sign of hope for all individuals and peoples who are directly suffering under the division of Germany and Europe and wish for the current state of affairs finally to be peacefully overcome.

Madame President, ladies and gentlemen, for many generations the once-divided Poland has undauntedly stuck to the idea of its national unity. In particular the memory of Poland's fate can help us Germans to bear the burden of the division as long as we have not realized the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination.

In our common wish for national self-determination we feel particularly linked with the Polish people. Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, who was awarded the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade and who himself had to suffer terrible things under the Nazi terror regime, said in this connection some time ago: Overcoming the division of Germany is also in Poland's interest. We want a democracy to the west of our country.

Professor Bartoszewski, as a friend of the Germans, signed the joint declaration of Polish and German Catholics of September 1989, under the title: For Freedom, Justice, and Peace. The new Polish premier, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, is also one of the signatories.

At this time and in this place I would like to convey to the Polish premier our particularly good and cordial wishes for his difficult office. [applause]

We want him to be successful. We want to do everything possible to support him, and I would like to say this also on my own behalf.

Madame President, ladies and gentlemen, [word indistinct] the current political and social changes in the Warsaw Pact opens up the historic chance to implement human rights for all Europeans to whom they have been denied over the past decades, and thus also for all Germans. The FRG Government is firmly determined to make use of this opportunity. It remains our goal—and this was said by Konrad Adenauer at the German meeting of Silesian expellees on 11 June 1961—I quote, that Europe will at one time become a great common home for all Europeans, a home of freedom, unquote.

In a future Europe, the most important thing must be self-determination and human rights as well as sovereignty of the peoples, rather than borders and national territories. It is not sovereign states, but sovereign peoples that will eventually complete the building of Europe. Never again must Europe embark on the fatal road from

humanity via nationality to bestiality, as the German writer Grillparzer had predicted in the last century.

Terrible things were inflicted on the Polish people in the name of the Germans and by the Germans. Who remembers that the concentration camps on Polish soil were also supposed to extinguish this people's elite as well? Reconciliation is only possible if we tell the whole truth. The truth is also that over 2 million Germans—innocent people—lost their lives when they were fleeing and being expelled. The loss of their homes has inflicted deep wounds on many millions of our compatriots.

This bitter experience must not be repressed. However, we want to learn from it. What sense would it make for Germans and Poles to mutually square accounts? Some people in our country and in Poland are still doing so. Ladies and gentlemen, the future generations will judge us by what we are doing now for them to live in peace and freedom. The example of German-French reconciliation and friendship proves that trenches that existed for decades and even centuries can be overcome.

The example of our relationship with the state of Israel and Jews throughout the world shows that with goodwill on all sides, even wide differences can be bridged. We want understanding between the German and the Polish peoples. That is our duty, and it also corresponds to both peoples' wish.

This wish that we all have is also expressed in the message sent by the federal president to the Polish president earlier this week. Fifty years after the outbreak of World War II, the time has come for lasting reconciliation. We are aware of the bitterness against Germany created in the war—in Poland, France, and later in the Soviet Union which had to mourn over 20 million victims of the war. Most European peoples were suffering immensely. Many of them are today our partners and even friends.

We are grateful to all those who extended their hands in reconciliation following the war, after the end of the tyranny and the war—primarily the American people who sent us an unforgettable signal of active charity and political farsightedness by providing, very soon, generous food supplies and reconstruction aid. Statesmen such as President Harry S. Truman and George Marshall, as well as very many private citizens contributed their share to such works of peace.

In France, there was (Joseph Rolland) who, several months after his liberation from the Dachau concentration camp, wrote—I quote—The more our enemies have obliterated the features of the human face, the more we must respect and even embellish these in themselves—unquote.

Regarding understanding with Poland, there have been trailblazing steps in recent years. Let me particularly mention here the diverse initiatives in the sphere of the churches. The Warsaw Treaty of 1970, which was signed by colleague Willy Brandt, was another step in this

direction. We will continue to keep to the letter and spirit of this treaty. We should not argue about it any further. In its preamble, Poland and the FRG state their willingness to guarantee a peaceful future for the young generation which has grown up in the meanwhile, and—I quote—to create lasting bases of peaceful coexistence and the development of normal and good relations—unquote.

Ladies and gentlemen, at the beginning of the 1980's, when Poland suffered through a difficult time, the FRG people expressed their solidarity in a wave of great helpfulness. I am convinced that the social opening up in Poland will be favorable for our efforts. The possibilities of our two peoples' understanding each other are becoming all the better, the more progress the development toward personal freedom is made in Poland, because true reconciliation is not only a question of people's will but, of course, also of the political facts.

In the long run, prejudices and distrust do not have any chance where borders can be crossed, where information and views are freely exchanged, and where people, particularly young people, can meet in freedom.

Thus, reconciliation between Germany and France was so successful not least because it is based on the common foundation of democracy and constitutionality and because a completely new understanding of each other grew out of increasingly frequent meetings and talks between Frenchmen and Germans. Where freedom is lost, peace is soon gambled away—at first at home and soon, also, abroad.

Hitler's dictatorship and World War II warn us again and again against the alluring power of extremism or totalitarianism. The danger of extremism is always present, also in a liberal society. Therefore, it is essential for a liberal democracy to counter such temptations as early as possible.

Against the backdrop of the history of the Nazi dictatorship, this means to save people by means of the constitutional state from one day being subjected to the entanglements of totalitarianism.

Ladies and gentlemen, liberal democracy is not an abstract principle. It affects every individual in a very direct manner. It involves his freedom, his personal happiness. Should we not contribute together to keeping ourselves all aware of this? The people have to be protected against that ambiguity in a totalitarian dictatorship, which is composed of temptation and violence, of justice and injustice, of adjustment and coercion.

The Nazi regime entangled men of goodwill in a confusing, diabolical net, and it became progressively more difficult to escape from this net. The borderlines between good and evil were increasingly erased. The honesty of the individual became less and less a guarantee for correct behavior. Therefore, a true picture of our parents' and grandparents' generations cannot easily be portrayed in the black and white of a wood-cut print.

Until today, we Germans have felt particularly painfully the ambiguous character of human existence in the war unleashed by Hitler. It is part of the tragedy of this time that the loyalty of millions of people and their love for their fatherland were abused for criminal purposes at the front and at home.

It is part of the perfidious and perverse nature of totalitarian systems that they purposefully entangle people in situations in which there is hardly any alternative any more between becoming guilty and endangering oneself.

On the one hand, there are the soldiers who fought and suffered at the fronts of World War II. Most, really most, of them were sincerely convinced that they were loyally serving their country. There were many examples of courage and human greatness that deserve our respect. Such an attitude does not deserve to be disparaged or mocked, because it involves the experience of death and pain, of fear, and, in many cases, of tormenting doubts of conscience.

On the other hand, there are the crimes of the Nazis. They cannot be removed from the events of the war. Many people had to suffer under this contradiction at that time.

Ladies and gentlemen, when we are speaking of the ruins left by Nazism, we should always be aware of the devastation caused in the hearts and minds of people. They are a psychological burden not only to those who were entangled in this net, they are a burden to the grandchildren and children who have to try to find a just assessment of their parents and grandparents' generation—perhaps they have to try much harder than one sometimes realizes.

We have to be wary of making precipitate judgments from today's point of view. Which of us, ladies and gentlemen, could claim with a clear conscience that, faced with evil, he would have the strength to be a martyr? Which of us can understand what it meant at that time to be aware of the danger and to risk one's own well-being and also the well-being of one's family? People today are not better or worse than the people in the past, but fortunately they are not forced to make a decision under the conditions of a totalitarian dictatorship.

We gratefully remember that even in the darkest period of our history, under the signs of war and dictatorship, it was not possible to destroy the spirit of humanity. There were many moving examples, mostly unknown ones, of helpfulness, of generosity, and humanity—also across the front lines. There were men and women who worked in the resistance, and among them there were many who had first served Hitler's regime until they realized that they, like the majority of the Germans, had been misled, betrayed, and used. They had the strength to turn around, and many of them paid for this with their lives.

Democracy alone does not normally demand anything of the people that is beyond their strength. It offers them

protection against the terrible decision that the Nazi dictatorship forced them to make, namely, either becoming an accomplice all too easily or having to prove heroic courage.

In remembering Hitler's dictatorship in particular, it is therefore important to resist movements that proclaim a comprehensive salvation from all evils of the world as their program. Whoever—no matter under which sign—promises absolute salvation, is certainly embarking upon the road toward new evil. He has not learned anything.

Madame President, ladies and gentlemen, the abysses of our recent past teach us that there is no middle road between democracy and dictatorship, there cannot be any common values, any moral compromise. Freedom and bondage are as irreconcilable as fire and water.

Dictatorship may have the ability to deceive and dazzle people, but only democracy provides them with self-determination, the convincing aim of human standards. The greatness of democracy lies in its solidity and predictability on this basis which is often considered as something very sober by many people, and this is also a reason why it does not seem at all glamorous to many people.

Democracy is simply not suited for the state of unending enthusiastic frenzy, but for the bland, normal events of everyday life. It does not rely on heroic or extraordinary things, but on human, humane things, on normal things in the best sense of the word.

The expression of a lively democracy consists of parties and the conflict between the parties, the right to opposition. That is why Hitler fought so bitterly and mercilessly against the parties, because he knew very well that as soon as he had eliminated the parties democracy would be dead, too. We should remember more often that the great politicians of the postwar period—Kurt Schumacher, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and Andreas Hermes, first chairman of the Christian Democratic Union—had all experienced the prisons, concentration camps, and death cells of the Nazi dictatorship.

The conclusion we draw from the experiences of the period up to 1933 must be: Extremism on the political right or left can be successful and come to power only if the citizens turn away from the democratic parties or stand aside. Doom can hardly be prevented if, in addition, social or political elites proffer their hands to these people, perhaps in the illusion that they will be able to come to grips with them.

If we nip things in the bud together, extremism will not have a chance. If, on the other hand, we play it down as something normal, our democracy, too, can become fraught with danger. It is never too early, ladies and gentlemen, to fight against this.

Let us not overstrain our democracy. It is a precious and fragile thing. Let us not misunderstand it as a panacea

for all the needs and problems of this world. Let us defend the free and democratic system at all times and everywhere, because it alone guarantees the citizens' freedom and justice, and it alone protects the individual from the dangers of the totalitarian system. Every one of us is called upon to do so.

Madame President, ladies and gentlemen: Justice, respect for the law, and legal security are as important for the existence of democracy as the air is for breathing. This is the most important legacy of German resistance. Those who today consistently defend the rule of law will not have to put up resistance tomorrow. It was a central goal of resistance to restore justice, respect for the law, and legal security. That at least holds true for the large majority of all those who bravely rose against the National Socialist regime.

Let us therefore equally pay tribute to the joiner (Johann Georg Elser), Colonel Claus Graf Schenk zu Stauffenberg, the Kreisau Group around Helmut Graf von Moltke, the White Rose around the brother and sister Scholl, and great, steadfast personages such as Julius Leber and Karl Goerdeler, and the very many others who courageously resisted tyranny for reasons of conscience.

To apply the term resistance, which inseparably refers to the dictatorship, to current political events at will not only means disparaging the German resistance, but it is historically wrong and dangerous. Claiming to have the monopoly, National Socialism radically fought all other ideologies. It considered Christians and socialists, liberals and trade unionists, conservatives and communists equally its enemies. If persons of entirely different persuasions had not worked together, we Germans would not have been able to make a new start after 1945.

It is not success or failure that are decisive for the ethical greatness of resistance. The assassination attempt on Hitler had to be ventured—at all costs. Colonel Henning von (Preskow) who had an essential influence on Stauffenberg's acting and thinking from 1943 on made particularly impressive statements. Several hours before he died, he summarized what had been the deepest motives of his action. I quote—I not only consider Hitler the arch enemy of Germany but the arch enemy of the world. When I stand in front of God's judgment seat in a few hours to account for what I have done and for what I have failed to do, I think that I can defend with a clear conscience what I did in the struggle against Hitler. If God promised Abraham that he would not destroy Sodom if there were but ten righteous men in it, I also hope that God will not destroy Germany for our sake. End of quote. We are profoundly grateful to the men and women of the German resistance.

We also highly respect those who rejected the regime of injustice by emigrating or escaping. Among them were people who, out of love for their fatherland, fought against the Hitler dictatorship from outside. Let us think of the writers who tried to stir up the world by the power of their pen and to make the world aware of what was

happening in Germany. Most emigrants did not leave their fatherland with a light heart. Many of them found it hard to return later on. We are all the more grateful to those who helped us reconstruct our Republic, because it is this cooperation that has essentially furthered work for reconciliation and peace in our time.

Ladies and gentlemen, for well-founded reasons, I want to recall a man whom I consider one of the great heroes of the 20th century—Raul Wallenberg. In 1944, at the age of 32, he risked his life to save hundreds of Jews in Budapest from being murdered. In 1945 he was abducted to the Soviet Union. Since then he has been missing. In my talks with General Secretary Gorbachev, I pointed out that the fate of this great, courageous man is unknown, and I hope very much that in this epoch of change, in which the oppressive legacy of Stalinism is being freely discussed in the Warsaw Pact states, the fate of Raul Wallenberg can really be convincingly explained. I very much welcome the fact that the Soviet authorities recently invited relatives of Raul Wallenberg to Moscow.

Madame President, ladies and gentlemen, on this 1 September I particularly address the young people in Germany. They do not bear any guilt whatsoever for the dictatorship and the world war—not collectively, because in principle this does not exist, nor individually because their age has saved them from this. Nevertheless, they, too, bear responsibility because the past remains the present. None of us, no German, can escape it. Let us see this not only as the burden of history but also as an opportunity. Those who know the history of this century have a sharp eye for temptations also in our time. Let us resist the temptation to despise the values of love for one's homeland and of patriotism, which were discredited during the Nazi period because they were abused at that time.

Disparaging patriotism would be to Hitler's liking. Colonel General Beck, one of the dead of the men of 20 July 1944, realized this when he wrote in deep shock, I quote: This man does not have any fatherland, unquote.

Love for one's fatherland and love for freedom, patriotism, and European spirit must never again go separate ways—this is a conclusion that we have to draw together.

It is equally necessary to link inseparably virtues like courage, loyalty, and readiness to make sacrifices for fundamental ethical norms. Thus, the soldiers of our Bundeswehr do not swear loyalty to one single person, but they swear to defend those values that are rooted in our liberal Constitution, the Basic Law, which was proclaimed 40 years ago. Madame President, ladies and gentlemen, the generation of the founders of our FRG shaped the second German democracy out of the experiences of history. It brought our country back to the path of that liberal tradition that could not be destroyed by war or the rule of terror. We can be proud of our liberal Constitution and the Basic Law. We express support for the absolute priority of the values of the individual in all spheres of his life, for the rejection of war and violence as a means of politics and of

any revanchism—a decision that was supported in the Stuttgart Charter of 1950 also by the Germans who had been expelled from other countries—and we support the goal of a free and united Germany in a free and united Europe.

It is evidence of profound humaneness that the fathers and mothers of our Basic Law granted the right to asylum to all those who are persecuted for political, religious, and racial reasons, because the humaneness of a community is not only proved by the respect for the freedom and dignity of its own citizens but also by being open to victims of oppression and violence in other countries. All these decisions established the foundation for the fact that our community, as a peace-loving partner pledged to justice and freedom, has achieved a degree of recognition in the world which no one dared dream of in 1945 after the end of the war and the rule of terror.

It fills us with satisfaction that 40 years after the founding of the FRG we are able to note this.

Ladies and gentlemen, today we are witness to the beginning of a new epoch in Europe. We have to be willing to participate in decisively shaping this new beginning. Europe, all of Europe, is facing a comprehensive change, a profound change in economy and society.

For the first time since the end of World War II, there emerges the chance that we might be able to step out of the shadow of the East-West conflict. What is happening on our old continent fascinates people all over the world. Who could be more interested in this advance of freedom than our people? The crumbling of the decades-old encrustations in Europe gives rise to new hopes also for the unity of our fatherland. Time is working for and not against the cause of freedom.

On this day of remembering, let us direct our gaze forward. Despite all grief that we feel in remembering 1 September 1939, we are aware of our responsibility for the young generations. At one time, these generations, ladies and gentlemen, will judge us as to whether we drew the correct lessons from the experiences with war and dictatorship, whether we lived up to the task of creating a better and more peaceful world.

We have the vision of a future in which the peoples of the world are peacefully united in common freedom and we will not and must not stop working for this.

Remembering 1 September 1939, we know that this is the most important, most valuable legacy we can leave to the coming generations. [applause]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7203

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

September 15, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ADRIAN A. BASORA (Acting) *AKB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *R2H*
SUBJECT: Letter to Kohl

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President attaching for his signature a reply to Chancellor Kohl, who had written to transmit the text of his speech to the Bundestag on the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War. It is a moving speech, which warrants a personal reply, particularly in light of our participation in the Polish ceremonies (sans German representatives) marking the anniversary. State's draft reply (Tab II) was flat. We rewrote it.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Kohl
Tab B Incoming from Kohl
Tab II State Incoming

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/10/09

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 12, 1989

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Presidential Reply to Chancellor Kohl

I have attached a draft reply from the President to FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who sent the President a message forwarding the text of his speech on the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Draft Reply from the President

Tab 2 - Letter from Chancellor Kohl

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Drafted: EUR/CE:GEPhillips *CEP*
9/6/89 647-2155

Cleared: EUR:JDobbins *CEP*
EUR/CE:JSeymour
EUR/CE:WFMenold
P:EEdelman *CEP*

S/P:RGEORGE *ytf*

C:NBurns *ytf*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DRAFT REPLY

Dear Helmut:

Thank you for your recent letter transmitting the text of your statement on the 50th Anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War. I found your words both deeply moving and, at the same time, heartening. If we work together, it is in our power to lead the world on a steady course toward democracy and respect for the individual. As you have so eloquently noted, it is our duty to do so.

I look forward to seeing you on your next trip to Washington. Until then, please accept my very best wishes.

Sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency

Dr. Helmut Kohl,

Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,

Bonn.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

~~SECRET~~

7354

September 20, 1989

Good debate
[Signature]

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Lebanon and Syria

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

I have been concerned for some time that our policy in Lebanon was a disservice both to Lebanon and to our real strategic stakes in the region.

Lebanon is a snake pit from which we have already been driven once and into which I would hesitate to thrust the United States a second time, given that our hand today is even weaker than the first time. I would caution against high-level emissaries or Presidential letters throwing us into a high-visibility role in a diplomacy that we cannot back up with real power.

Our Strategic Stakes

Given that our goal of making Lebanon "whole and free" is not realizable at present, our immediate strategic stakes in Lebanon would seem to be twofold: (a) to help prevent a Syrian-Israeli conflagration there, and (b) as a means of leverage over Syria, the country that remains the pivotal regional obstacle to our strategy in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Asad's Syria is today weaker than ever -- fortunately -- due to various factors: its isolation in the Arab world (from its posture in the Iran-Iraq war); its economic mess; its loss of the Palestinian card it once aspired to play (a casualty of the intifada); visible Soviet efforts to rein it in; -- and, its being bogged down in Lebanon. Yet, Syria remains armed to the teeth with modern Soviet weaponry, and another Syrian-Israeli war, this time with ballistic missiles and CW warheads, is a chilling prospect. In the Arab-Israeli diplomacy, Syria retains a significant blocking position -- more significant perhaps than either the Soviets or the PLO. At an international conference, Syria would undoubtedly be the most radical, determined for a host of reasons to block Arafat from any further moderate moves.

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0760-MR
MM 1/8/2016

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2

Finding means of leverage against Syria is thus one of our most important tasks. In this regard, the recent formation of the "Arab Cooperation Council" (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, North Yemen) is a positive development. It confirms Egypt's reentry into the Arab fold; it strengthens Jordan at a delicate moment in Palestinian politics; it is, in short, a counterweight to Syria. As you know, I have long felt that Iraq's new alignment with the moderate Arabs (and with us) has an objective basis in its need for counterweights to its radical neighbors Syria and Iran.

The Role of Iraq

Iraq, of course, still needs to be tamed. Joint air patrols with Jordan on the Israeli border do not facilitate either peace or Jordan's security; Iraqi CW, missile, and nuclear development can only provoke the Israelis. Its recent attempt to arm Aoun with FROG missiles was reckless.

All this being said, I think we blew an opportunity to make creative use of the leverage against Syria which the Iraqis provided by their involvement in Lebanon. (I leave aside Aoun's own recklessness, which is even more responsible for the waste of this leverage.) **The only time the Arab League diplomacy ever seemed to be getting anywhere was a few months ago when the Iraqi intervention was giving the Syrians fits.** Once the Iraqi missile threat was removed (with our help), the Syrians no longer had anything or anyone to fear. They went in for the kill -- though they failed -- and the diplomacy has gone nowhere since.

It stands to reason that Syrian willingness to compromise is a function of what counterweights exist to its hopes for dominance. The Christians survive at all only because of continued Iraqi aid. I find it odd to read in the draft memo to the President (No. 7221) that our diplomacy rests on (a) the need to see that "Asad is assured" (page 3); (b) the need to marshall more leverage against Aoun (page 3); and (c) the theory that the weakening of Aoun somehow gives us "potential leverage with Damascus" (page 1).

Perhaps, in the end, there will be no way to prevent Syrian domination of Lebanon. But we need not be Syria's instrument. The French, for all their vainglory, at least have their strategic head on straight, for a change (in my view).

The evacuation of our Embassy under Christian pressure is the humiliating result of a policy that seems to have earned the contempt of all sides.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

3

A U.S.-Syrian Dialogue

I favor a dialogue with Syria -- I was there when it began in 1974. But this dialogue is fruitful only when we have leverage, which, unfortunately, we have systematically frittered away in Lebanon by ganging up with Syria against all its weaker adversaries.

A dialogue with Syria on Lebanon in these conditions is not worth a whole lot. A dialogue on the peace process will be essential - when and if our scheme for elections gets Palestinian support and starts to gather steam. In the meantime, I fear we would only embarrass ourselves by deeper White House involvement in our present policy in Lebanon.

Comment: by Richard Haass/David Welch:

There is a lot of assertion here that does not bear scrutiny, e.g., that Syria is vulnerable economically and that Iraqi arms to Aoun led to Arab League diplomatic success. More troubling is the prescription that would have us essentially write off helping Lebanon in favor of employing that country as "leverage" on Syria. If there is any lesson for us in the post-1982 period, it should be that Syria will trump any direct challenge to its interests in Lebanon -- even if Syria cannot get everything it wants, it has better position and staying power than any of its adversaries. (The Arab League seems to have recognized this reality, as distasteful as we may find it.) The question is whether our diplomacy can contribute to scaling back Syrian objectives in Lebanon to a point that we can live with. Our argument is that we can make a contribution via a dialogue with Syria, where we would be straight with them on our views on the limits of their ambitions but also on their security concerns. We repeat that this is not a high-risk option, nor would it require us to discard the tools of pressure that we currently apply on Syria, such as sanctions.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # _____

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES

19

DTG

RELEASER

FROM/LOCATION

1. Philip Hughes / THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. FLD GANTT FOR BRENTSCUW CRAFT / KENNEDYPORT ME

2. _____

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7. _____

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09

7507- PRES CALLS TO SENATORS

6455- 1990 ECONOMIC Summit

7075A/01- Suggestions for Invitees 3 Oct.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

September 22, 1989

Jo P. 10'
9/24

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

VIRGINIA A. LAMPLEY *val*

FROM:

BRET COULSON *BC*

SUBJECT:

Presidential calls to Senators regarding the
urgent military assistance package for Jordan

We have prepared talking points (Tabs A and B) for the President for phone calls to Senators Leahy, Kasten, and Inouye on the \$20 million package in military assistance for Jordan that we are seeking to have added as an amendment to the FY'90 DoD Appropriations bill.

In addition to the talking points, a more in-depth background paper on the importance of this military package to Jordan is attached (Tab C), as is the amendment language itself (Tab II).

As we were unable to attach this initiative to the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill without either exceeding foreign aid ceilings or adversely impacting other important aid programs, we are seeking to carry the transfer package on the DoD Appropriations bill.

It is crucial that the calls to Leahy and Kasten occur prior to the call to Inouye. Inouye will only agree to the transfer package being included in the DoD Appropriations bill if Leahy and Kasten concur with this initiative which is within their committee's area of jurisdiction. We have been informed by State Department that the senators will agree to support the inclusion of the transfer in the DoD Appropriations bill if they receive Presidential phone calls requesting them to do so.

The DoD Appropriations bill is now scheduled to be brought up on the Senate Floor for consideration at noon on Monday, September 25. Thus, it is crucial that the President make the calls to the Senators today, or no later than Monday morning.

Not available
Richard Haass concurs.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7507 SEEN

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Telephone calls to Senators Leahy, Kasten,
and Inouye

DATE: September 22, 1989

PURPOSE: To seek support for inclusion of \$20 million
package in military assistance for Jordan in
the DoD Appropriations Bill

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line Call

INTERPRETER: None Required

PHONE NUMBERS: Senator Patrick Leahy 224-4242
Senator Bob Kasten 224-5323
Senator Daniel Inouye 224-3934

SUGGESTED TIME: Friday, September 22, 1989

TOPICS OF
DISCUSSION: These calls are meant to secure support for
the inclusion of an amendment to the Defense
Appropriations bill that would transfer \$20
million in Defense funds to Jordan as
additional FMS funding. Because Sen. Inouye
will only agree to the transfer if Leahy and
Kasten agree to this initiative within their
committee's area of jurisdiction, the order
of the calls is crucial. However, we
understand that they all will support this
initiative if they are personally requested
to do so by you.

Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made/Senators Leahy and Kasten
Tab B Points to be Made/Sen. Inouye
Tab C Backgrounder

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
SENATORS LEAHY AND KASTEN

- King Hussein is a very close friend of the United States. His country has been a force for moderation and stability in the region for many years, and has pursued policies that have been essential for Israel's security.
- When the King was here last April he explained the grave economic situation Jordan is facing and the serious impact it is having on Jordan's armed forces, the institutional linchpin supporting King Hussein.
- The King asked for our help and I promised to do my best.
- It is in this regard that I am calling -- we must urgently provide additional military assistance to Jordan. The FY89 aid levels were the lowest in many years.
- We are seeking to insert in the FY90 Defense Appropriations bill the transfer of \$20 million in Defense funds to Jordan a additional FMS funding.
- I realize that a transfer of this nature carries with it jurisdictional and procedural problems. But without this money Jordan will be unable to maintain the U.S. equipment in its inventory.
- We had hoped to have this initiative attached to the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, but were unable to do so under foreign aid ceilings without adversely impacting other important aid programs.
- Thus, we are seeking to carry the transfer on the Defense Appropriations bill in order to skirt the foreign aid ceiling problem.
- I made this commitment to help a friend who has helped us in many ways. I made this commitment because it is in our national interest. I ask that you agree to this request.
- This is our last resort. I intend to call Dan Inouye and ask him for his help on this. Can I count on your support?

P.L.
" I have one problem with it -
need to talk secure J.A.R. I've discussed it "
I ~~ask~~ ^{asked} Bob Gates - Monday.
" Bob Gates call him to go see
Action - Monday / matter - think we can
clean it up Couldn't talk unsecure "

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
SENATOR INOUE

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- This is our last resort. I have called Senators Leahy and Kasten and explained the importance I place on helping Jordan in this way. They have agreed to support this package.
- I need your help on this. Would you introduce the transfer language as an amendment to your bill?

- 1) Tmed - but For Ops vs. it
- 2) Everyone complaining about transfers
- 3) Not finished yet - "I'll try"

JORDAN DESPERATELY NEEDS THE \$20 MILLION NOW

- Jordan's economy is in serious difficulty with its foreign currency reserves depleted, cuts in Gulf subsidies and remittances from abroad, and is now suffering a major foreign exchange crisis. Jordan has an estimated \$7 billion debt with an expected \$1 billion annual debt service for 1989 and 1990. The steady decline in U.S. assistance has resulted in Jordan now paying the U.S. three or four times more than it receives as it struggles to replay high FMS credits from previous years.

- This crisis has left Jordan's armed forces near bankruptcy. As a result, the operational readiness of the armed forces is rapidly decreasing. There is already a growing resentment in military circles over the budget cuts the armed forces have experienced over the past two years. The effects are immediately apparent:

-- Approximately half of the air force has been grounded, and half of the pilots have been furloughed.

-- Jordan is being forced to sell off U.S. equipment to pay operating costs. T-37 trainers, S-76 helicopters, and F-5A/B fighters have been sold. Two C-130 transports are up for sale, and the F-5E/F fighters may be next if funds do not become available to maintain and upgrade them.

-- Jordan's air defense is particularly hard hit. Half of the U.S.-origin I-Hawk air defense missiles have been taken out of service, and systems have gone to reduced operations to conserve parts.

-- Funds for spare parts for the Jordanian army's inventory of largely U.S.-origin equipment will run out this month.

- The consequences of this drastic standdown of Jordanian forces are readily apparent:

-- They will be completely vulnerable to any Syrian attack.

-- The moral of the armed forces - the mainstay of the nation - will be shot, and the forces are likely to be very restless. The survival of the monarchy, which was shored up by the army's actions during the April riots, may be at risk.

-- Jordan will become almost totally reliant on their Soviet-origin air defense equipment.

Handwritten notes:
DOS fouled it up - 20 mil gets secured
For Sp. Dist. - getting squeezed on all fronts
It is a scary prospect - agree with you in the end

- The thirty-year military-to-military relationship between the U.S. and Jordan is being increasingly jeopardized. The Jordanians have been forced to cut back their participation in our highly successful combined exercise program because of the lack of operating funds and spare parts. The rising generation of mid-level officers - the policy makers of the next decade - are becoming increasingly disillusioned with the lack of U.S. responsiveness to Jordan's defense needs.

-- U.S. military assistance has cascaded downward as follows: \$39.9 million in FY 1987, \$26.5 million in FY 1988, and \$10 million in FY 1989.

-- The U.S. is fading to third or fourth place as a supplier of equipment.

-- The Jordanian officer corps sees a decreasing return for King Hussein's moderation and promotion of U.S. interests in the Arab World.

-- The ability of the U.S. to help Jordan take risks for peace in the region is being put in jeopardy.

- The infusion of \$20 million in FY89 funds will allow them to recover their readiness swiftly - though only for a few months. The funds would go for spare parts for which they have had cases pending, but neither the cash nor U.S. financing to cover. The effect on Morale will be immediate and more long-lasting.

AND THE \$48 MILLION FOR FY90 MAY BE TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE

- The \$48 million which some of the committees have earmarked for Jordan for FY90 will not be available for some months to come, and it will not make up the deficiencies in stockage of spare parts and ammunition resulting from the declining assistance levels of the last two years. Any funding for FY90 will also be needed for long postponed upgrades, such as the M60A1 and basic TOW.

DRAFT
Sept. 12, 12 noon

AMENDMENT

Offered by

SEC. . Up to \$20 million of funds available to the Department of Defense in fiscal year 1990 may be transferred to, and consolidated with, funds made available to carry out the provisions of Section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act and may be used for any of the purposes for which such funds may be used, notwithstanding Section 10 of Public Law 91-672 or any other provision of law; Provided, That funds transferred pursuant to this section shall be made available only for Jordan to maintain previously purchased U.S.-origin defense articles; Provided further, That funds transferred pursuant to this section shall be available to Jordan on a grant basis notwithstanding any requirement for repayment; Provided further, That for purposes of section 10 of Public Law 91-672, funds so transferred shall be deemed to be authorized to be appropriated for the account into which they are transferred; and Provided further, That the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives shall be notified through regular reprogramming procedures prior to the transfer of funds pursuant to the authority granted in this section.

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 7507

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 27 AIO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3 4</u>	<u>AP/NSA</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4 5</u>	<u>Has Seen</u>	
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>CM 7/22</u>	<u>Decom to Scowcroft</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N/R</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

CC: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Telephone Calls to Senators Leahy,
Kasten & Drouze on Sept. 22 (today)

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7507
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
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89 SEP 26 18:59
 RECEIVED
 NSC SECRETARIAT
 R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

~~Cancel~~ WWD
 Please note that
 the attached was
 sent to the Pres
 on 9/24

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7507

September 22, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: VIRGINIA A. LAMPLEY *Val*

FROM: BRET COULSON *BC*

SUBJECT: Presidential calls to Senators regarding the
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Not available
Richard Haass concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That the President make calls to Senators Leahy, Kasten, and Inouye.

Attachments

- Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
 - Tab A Talking Points for Leahy and Kasten
 - Tab B Talking Points for Inouye
 - Tab C Backgrounder
- Tab II Jordan Military Assistance Amendment

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7507

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone calls to Senators Leahy, Kasten,
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DATE: September 22, 1989

PURPOSE: To seek support for inclusion of \$20 million
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SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line Call

INTERPRETER: None Required

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Senator Bob Kasten 224-5323
Senator Daniel Inouye 224-3934

SUGGESTED TIME: Friday, September 22, 1989

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DISCUSSION: These calls are meant to secure support for
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Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachments

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]

DRAFT
Sept. 12, 12 noon

AMENDMENT

Offered by

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8907611
RECEIVED: 26 SEP 89 12

TO: HUGHES

~~SECRET~~

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 26 SEP 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

MEMCON

PERSONS: BOUHABIB, ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF GATES MTG W/ AMB BOUHABIB

ACTION: NOTED BY HUGHES

DUE DATE: 29 SEP 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF:

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FOR ACTION

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DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/10/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NOTED

September 26, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH *mw*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador
Abdullah Bouhabib of Lebanon

Attached is a Memorandum of Conversation between Bob Gates and
Ambassador Bouhabib of Lebanon on September 21, 1989.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I be filed for record
purposes.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/10/09

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0761-MR
EG 12/18/15

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Lebanese Ambassador Abdullah Bouhabib

PARTICIPANTS: Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
C. David Welch, Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC

Abdullah Bouhabib, Lebanese Ambassador to the U.S.
Sulayman Rassi, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Lebanon

DATE, TIME September 21, 1989, 9:40 a.m. - 10:10 a.m.
AND PLACE: Robert Gates' Office

Ambassador Bouhabib: I came in to discuss a number of matters before my return to Beirut on family business. (I am not being withdrawn!) We are still consulting in Lebanon regarding the Arab League's latest initiative. There are some positive elements in the proposals. There will be "no 'no'" from our side. The "Lebanese-Lebanese" parts of the proposals are very good; the "Syrian-Lebanese" parts, we are not happy with. The two-year period (for Syrian re-deployment to the Biqa' Valley) is a big shift in the Tripartite Committee's position. Furthermore, the whole package looks non-negotiable: once we start negotiations at a Parliamentary meeting, all those Parliamentarians from Syrian-controlled areas will say that those parts of the accord are sacred because they affect Syria. Any effort to change these parts will therefore lead to stalemate in the negotiations. And look what's happening today -- a Sunni member of Parliament was assassinated in West Beirut, perhaps because he refused to go to Syria recently.

Ambassador Bouhabib: What assurances do we have that Syria will leave Lebanon after two years? The proposals say that the Arab League is willing to volunteer its help in such negotiations. What assurances do we have that the Arab League will play any role, since Syria's assent is required? Furthermore, Syria is supposed to negotiate with the new national reconciliation Cabinet -- what happens if a minister of that Cabinet resigns? Does Syria then say that the government has collapsed and it no longer is required by the terms of the accord to negotiate with

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it? It is not easy for Lebanon to take a position on these proposals. These are the basic issues that bother us, not a ceasefire or a willingness to engage in political dialogue. We are ready to allow the Lebanese-Lebanese discussions to go forward.

Ambassador Bouhabib: The second issue I wanted to raise is the terms for the return of your Embassy to Beirut. I cannot speak in this respect for General Aoun, who has taken a personal position on this matter. However, I would like to carry some ideas to him. I understand your need for assurances against a repetition of the threats. Anyhow, this is good for us, too, since third parties could take advantage of statements by Aoun to undertake actions that he would be blamed for. It is very important that the Lebanese see Aoun embrace the Embassy and the Ambassador, so that no Lebanese has any doubt about our view. This must be said and done publicly. I believe written assurances would mean nothing.

Mr. Gates: The civil war began when I was first on the NSC staff, working for General Scowcroft. In 1982, I was Deputy Director of the CIA; some of our best people were killed in Beirut in the Embassy bombing. During that period, I sat through many meetings here in the Situation Room on the Marine Barracks bombing and the aftermath. I have watched Lebanon closely for a long time. The lessons for me are simple: it is a continuing tragedy with many missed opportunities.

Mr. Gates: We regard the Tripartite initiative as an important opportunity, not to be missed. We are pleased that General Aoun sees some positive elements in it. We feel strongly that Aoun should accept a ceasefire, lifting of the blockades, and beginning of the political dialogue, as laid out in the September 16 report of the Tripartite Committee.

Mr. Gates: Second, General Aoun should allow Parliament to meet on September 30 for negotiations to address the concerns that he has about some of the proposals. The time has long past to move from the battlefield to the conference room. It would be a tragedy to lose this opportunity; all sides must take risks.

Mr. Gates: Regarding the U.S. Embassy, it was a tragedy that after the last fourteen years of civil war and after the killings of our soldiers, kidnappings, and shelling, our friends in Lebanon forced us to leave. We do not see our absence as permanent or prolonged, but we will not go back until our people can live safely and do their jobs meaningfully. The State Department, Assistant Secretary Kelly in particular, can spell out our conditions more specifically. One consideration in all of this is the nature of Aoun's response to the Tripartite initiative, as an indication of his seriousness. I know that these are the views of the entire Administration; everyone is united on these points, and there is total agreement in the Administration on how we see things.

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Ambassador Bouhabib: It is very unfortunate how this happened. We did not mean it. Of course, it is up to the United States how to evaluate the security situation.

Mr. Gates: It is also up to Aoun to take steps. Things must happen on his part. Both sides cannot simply assess the situation passively. Again, Kelly can lay out the specifics. One consideration is the reaction to the Tripartite Committee. This is an important opportunity to move from the battlefield to the conference room, as I said earlier.

Ambassador Bouhabib: What we are being given is not something to negotiate with the Syrians, since the other side will not negotiate on the points of interest to Syria. How can the United States give us, perhaps along with the Tripartite Committee, assurances that any agreement will be implemented? The United Nations Security Council statement yesterday was ridiculous.

Mr. Gates: We take seriously the efforts of the Saudis and others in the Tripartite Committee to try to bring this tragedy to a close. Lebanon has other friends too -- us and the French. At the appropriate time and when circumstances require, we can exercise influence for an appropriate outcome. But we are all clear on the necessary first step.

Ambassador Bouhabib: You were badly represented at the 1983 Lausanne and Geneva Conferences. Would the United States be present at the Parliament's meeting? To help?

Mr. Welch: We have not addressed the issue of a U.S. role. It is an interesting question, especially in the context of a clear acceptance by Aoun of the Tripartite Committee package.

Mr. Gates: In my former incarnation as an intelligence officer, I was by nature pessimistic. The challenge for us in our diplomatic roles, and for political leaders, is to find the handholds on a wall to begin climbing over the obstacle. The Tripartite Committee has created niches and all parties should take advantage of them.

Ambassador Bouhabib: Supposing all goes right, and realizing that we speak as two sovereign nations, would it be possible for the United States to send someone, not necessarily from the government, who would sit with us and talk to us? Someone who understands us... One idea I have had is someone like Joe Rodgers. This would be a confidential mission.

Mr. Gates: We can consider this idea and talk about it.

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