

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91148
Folder ID Number: 91148-004

Folder Title:
Other (June - September 1989) [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	6	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Day in Portugal (3 pp.)	2/17/89	(b)(1)	S
02a. Note	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: [Attached memo on Iran] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	C
02b. Memo	From Paul J. Hare and Dennis Ross to The Secretary, Re: Implications of Khomeini's Death [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	6/5/89	(b)(1)	S
03a. Summary	Re: [Heads of State Correspondence Summary] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03b. Memo	Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft Re: Heads of State Letters (1 pp.)	7/20/89	(b)(1)	C
04. Minutes	Re: Head of Agency Meeting (7 pp.)	7/21/89	(b)(1)	S
05. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: IEPR Breakfast on July 28, 1989 (2 pp.)	7/28/89	(b)(1)	S
06a. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: Sanctions on Iran (1 pp.)	8/10/89	(b)(1)	C
06b. Paper	U.S. Sanctions Affecting Iran [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Chronological Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Other (June - September 1989) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1235

OA/ID Number: 91148-004

Date Closed: 7/9/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07a. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: Strategy on U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia (2 pp.)	8/15/89	(b)(1)	S
07b. Memo	Richard A. Clarke and John H. Kelly to The Secretary Re: Tank Sales to Saudi Arabia (1 pp.)	8/12/89	(b)(1)	S
07c. Outline	Re: I. Issue (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
08a. Coversheet	Charles to Hughes Re: Memcon... (1 pp.)	8/17/89	(b)(1)	S
08b. Memo	Sandra Charles to G. Philip Hughes Re: President's Meeting... (1 pp.)	8/17/89	(b)(1)	S
08c. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with USG Experts on Iran [FOIA restrictions redacted] (8 pp.)	8/8/89	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)	S
09a. Memo	Richard N. Haass/Robert D. Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to President Francois Mitterrand of France (1 pp.)	9/6/89	(b)(1)	C
09b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Mitterrand of France (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
09c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

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10a. Memo	POTUS to Brent Scowcroft Re: Read It! (1 pp.)	9/9/89	(b)(1)	
10b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Thinking About Next Steps in CW [Chemical Weapons] Arms Control (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10c. Memo	Philip Zelikow/John Gordon to Brent Scowcroft Re: Thinking About Next Steps in CW [Chemical Weapons] Arms Control (2 pp.)	8/22/89	(b)(1)	S

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TIME STAMP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENTLIMITED ACCESS
1044

89 FEB 21 A 9: 44

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: _____

ACTION OFFICER: **FOR INFORMATION**

DUE: _____

☐ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates☐ Appropriate Action☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi☐ Prepare Memo for Hughes☐ Prepare Memo _____ to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. _____

FYI

- ☐ ☐ Beers
☐ ☒ Blackwill
☐ ☐ Brooks
☐ ☐ Cabelly
☐ ☐ Charles
☐ ☐ Childress
☐ ☐ Curtin
☐ ☐ Donley
☐ ☐ Ebner
☐ ☐ Farrar
☐ ☐ Grant
☐ ☐ Grimes
☐ ☐ Haass
☐ ☐ Heiser
☐ ☐ Jackson

FYI

- ☐ ☐ Kelly
☐ ☐ Lampley
☐ ☐ Leach
☐ ☐ Lowenkron
☐ ☐ Mahley
☐ ☐ McCue
☐ ☐ Melby
☐ ☐ Menan
☐ ☐ Miller
☐ ☐ Miskel
☐ ☐ Paal
☐ ☐ Pastorino
☐ ☐ Perina
☐ ☐ Popadiuk
☐ ☐ Porter

FYI

- ☐ ☐ Rice
☐ ☐ Rodman
☐ ☐ Rostow
☐ ☐ Saunders
☐ ☐ Snider
☐ ☐ Tahir-Kheli
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INFORMATION ☒ Hughes☒ Perito☒ Secretariat☒ Scowcroft (advance)☒ Gates (advance)☐ Exec. Sec. Desk

COMMENTS

Sent to President:
Sunday, 19 Feb.
Also disseminated to:
Scowcroft, Gates, Hughes, Blackwill

Logged By AC

ariat

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONLIMITED ACCESS
1044

February 17, 1989

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: James A. Baker, III 
Subject: My Day in Portugal

On Wednesday, I met with Portugese Prime Minister Cavaco Silva and Foreign Minister Deus Pinheiro. These were very good sessions. Our thinking on East-West developments is exceptionally close. They approach the alliance from a strong Atlantacist perspective. They are rightly proud of Portugal's democratic and economic achievements since the 1970's, and they seem eager to "graduate" to an additional security role and a more developed economic relationship (relying more on enhanced trade and investment versus assistance).

Silva's comments underscored the recurring theme of the importance of Western Europe's economic success to alliance attitude. He (and others) are proud of their economic performance, especially in contrast with the admitted stagnation of the USSR and Eastern Europe. And he appears confident about the economic future. (A number of my calls have been on former finance ministers, including Silva; this alumni network seem especially interested in the economic components of the West's long-term security and appeal.)

By way of example, Silva related a conversation he had had with Grosz, the head of the Hungarian Communist Party, about establishing private business and employing free-market techniques; Silva jested that Grosz sounded like a West European. Silva believes that democracy will become an increasingly important economic factor, because it fosters the innovation and competition that is necessary for modern economies to succeed. (He recognizes the reform process in Eastern Europe may prompt an over-reaction by the USSR at some point, but commented that the cost of Soviet intervention today would be much higher than before.)

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- 2 -

Silva said the Soviets must have Western capital, technology, and goods if they are to rebuild their economy. This gives the West leverage. It does not mean the West should give away assistance. Indeed, Silva has doubts about the credits being offered the USSR by others.

Silva stressed his support for a strong alliance. He said that our strength is our shared values and that we should take a "global" (integrated) approach -- so we can exploit the East's economic needs to achieve our human rights, political, and security objectives. He hopes we use the NATO Summit for this purpose (and he feels a "formal" or purely celebratory meeting would be a mistake).

Silva's comments about Western Europe's ascendancy were definitely not intended to exclude the U.S. He stated strongly that there should be no decoupling -- whether via WEU, SNF, or anything else. He said Portugal wants close ties both with its European partners and the U.S.

Silva was particularly pleased that Portugal had completed its consultations over Lajes with us before you were sworn-in. He wanted to start with a clean slate and without causing you a problem. He hopes we can now follow through with the Congress so that Portugal's armed forces can be modernized, enabling them to play a larger alliance role. He also noted the importance of the ESF funds, which are largely dedicated to the Azores. (He sees no anti-Americanism in Portugal, and doesn't want any to develop in the Azores.)

We also covered a number of other specific topics. Silva said it would be a great mistake not to modernize the SNF -- but even he linked this to pressuring the Soviets on arms control. He also asked how soon we can move on START; I said we are reviewing our START strategy as quickly as possible, but we wanted to be sure our approach made sense and that we also need to be sure we have a treaty we can get ratified. We also talked briefly about Central America.

Silva is also eager for Portugal to play a greater role in Africa. With five centuries of experience, he believes Portugal has the know-how and insight to be helpful. He said the government in Luanda is ready to talk to UNITA, but not Savimbi. I stressed the importance of national reconciliation before we can normalize relations with Angola. Silva added that in two weeks he is going to Guinea-Bissau, where the government wants to advance a direct dialogue between UNITA and the MPLA.

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- 3 -

Foreign Minister Pinheiro also mentioned East Timor at our separate meeting. He said he didn't expect us to side with them, but hoped we'd urge the Indonesians to enter into a dialogue. I said we'd look into the matter.

Finally, Silva said he had fond memories of his weekend with you and Barbara at Kennebunkport. He is a good leader, with a fine mind, who wants to help us. I think we need to accord him the treatment he warrants.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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02a. Note	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: [Attached memo on Iran] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June - September 1989) [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/27/2023

Date Closed: 7/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 91148-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0816-MR(501)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 1/8/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

The Secretary of State

June 13, 1989


CHRON FILE

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NOTE FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

Attached is a 3½-page memo on Iran which seems to me to be a very good summary. I hope you can read it.


Specifically, however, I think the suggestion in there that probes which we receive regarding the hostages and/or our relations with Iran should be handled here rather than by ^{1.4(c)} the NSC makes sense.

You don't need the mixed messages and crossed wires on this issue that bedeviled your predecessor.

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2010-0816-MR
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GP
6-30



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Memo	From Paul J. Hare and Dennis Ross to The Secretary, Re: Implications of Khomeini's Death [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	6/5/89	(b)(1)	S

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Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June - September 1989) [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/27/2023

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AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0816-MR(501.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 1/8/2016

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
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United States Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

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INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

June 5, 1989

TO: The Secretary

8912776

'89 JUN-05 6:31 PM

THROUGH:

P - Mr. Kimmitt *RMK*

FROM:

NEA - Paul J. Hare, Acting *PH*
S/P - Dennis Ross *4*

SUBJECT:

Implications of Khomeini's Death

Summary

In the initial aftermath of Khomeini's death the clerical establishment appears to be hanging together. Iranian leaders are coalescing behind Khamenei's selection as Khomeini's successor, and the Armed Forces have affirmed their loyalty to Rafsanjani, who is likely to emerge as the power broker behind the scenes. During the initial forty day mourning period no Iranian politician is likely to risk taking steps in our direction which could open him to charges of changing Khomeini's policies. There is little chance of movement on the hostages, though in time we may receive probes, which should be handled in the Department, rather than ^{1.4(c)} the NSCS. In our regional dialogue with the Soviets, we will want to warn them against trying to exploit the situation.

The Likely Scenario

Khomeini's death is a watershed event for Iran. After the first emotional reaction has subsided, the ruling clerics will have to find ways to adjust Iran's foreign and internal policies to fit Iran's needs for economic reconstruction and relief from Iraqi military pressure. Serious disagreements remain among the clerics about how best to meet those needs, and any abrupt changes in policy could provoke open conflict within the ruling elite.

The initial response of the clerical establishment has been to hang together. President Ali Khamenei's appointment as supreme jurisprudent in Khomeini's place is probably a

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- 2 -

compromise. Until his appointment Khamenei was a Hojjat al-Islam, a lesser rank than Ayatollah. He is not likely to be a serious rival for Hojjat al-Islam Rafsanjani, with whom he has worked closely in the past. Equally significant, the Army and the Revolutionary Guards have reaffirmed their loyalty to Commander-in-Chief Rafsanjani. In the early running things seem to be going Rafsanjani's way, but he will probably face challenges from his rivals, and the radicals in particular are likely to have a strong voice in his policy making for some time to come.

The initial forty day mourning period will be critical. Consummate pol that he is, Rafsanjani will try to be Mark Anthony to Khomeini's Caesar, exploiting the rhetoric of grief and mourning and identifying himself with Khomeini's purposes. The fact that he was apparently the last senior Iranian leader to see Khomeini before he died, apart from Khomeini's son Ahmed, will help him. Under the surface he will be making the deals he has to make with his rivals, including Ahmed, promising that he will take a collegial approach to power. He will also want to show the bazaar and ordinary Iranians that he can get reconstruction moving, and try to strengthen control over the Revolutionary Guard, the regime's praetorians, a move the Guard may resist. The Tehran mob (hizbollahis) will be a wild card. It could be a messy and protracted business.

During this period, normal state business will be difficult to conduct. Foreign policy will be particularly sensitive. An Iranian politician will want to lay himself open to charges of moving too quickly in the direction of either East or West. Rafsanjani's plans to visit the Soviet Union later this month will be put on hold if for no other reason than the forty day mourning period. His freedom of maneuver in our direction will be severely restricted. He could try to engage us through intermediaries who can be disavowed, with the eventual aim of playing us off against the Soviets. But he will be extremely cautious, and do nothing which would cut across his strategic objective of consolidating internal control. (Almost certainly, a move toward us would be portrayed as a betrayal of the Khomeini legacy.) Operationally, it would be useful to avoid crossed wires for the President to reiterate to the ^{1.4(c)} NSC staff that you have the responsibility for dealing with Iranian probes.

Done
2/11/89
Bob G
Please discuss
1/10

We should not expect any early movement on the hostages. There may be probes designed at low cost to test our reactions,

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and possibly in time even a cheap gesture like the release of the remains of a hostage. The timing will depend almost entirely on the constellation of forces inside Iran, rather than on anything we do or say. Rafsanjani knows that with Khomeini gone Iran's interests require a relationship with the U.S., but he will be patient, concentrating instead on Western Europe and Japan, and a visit to the Soviet Union, since Khomeini has blessed this. Movement towards the Europeans and the Soviets will have the advantage of generating pressure on us at no cost in concessions to Iran.

Policy Implications

1. Public Posture

Our public reactions to Khomeini's death should downplay any expectation of quick change in the U.S.-Iran relationship. Such expectations are unlikely to be met, for one thing, and giving voice to them will only draw public statements from Rafsanjani and the other clerics rejecting any suggestion that they are considering changes in Khomeini's policies towards the U.S. We should stress that we would like a more normal relationship but that the ball remains in Iran's court. Iran must show that it no longer sees the hostages as an asset and that it no longer views terrorism as an instrument of policy. We also should stress to our European friends that this is not a time for moving closer to Iran until we see some concrete movement on its part.

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50
good.

2. Communications with Iran

In the initial mourning period of forty days we should not initiate exchanges with the Iranians. To intermediaries who offer to be channels--the Pakistanis, the Japanese, who helpfully gave us advance word of Khomeini's death--we should stick to barebones statements of our policy: our offer to open a direct dialogue with authoritative representatives of the GOI without preconditions or intermediaries, remains on the table; improvements in the relationship will only be possible once Iran decides to act as a responsible member of the international community; the hostages and terrorism are our top priority; and actions are required, not words. We should avoid globaloney or highminded sentiments about turning a new page. This will be perceived as weakness or offensive, and it will do Rafsanjani no good to be the recipient of it. We should avoid saying or doing anything which tends to confirm the Iranians in

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- 4 -

their exaggerated view of their "strategic importance". Later we may want to have more to say, privately and publicly, about willingness to live with Islamic Iran, and Rafsanjani. But we would be well-advised to exercise as much restraint as possible in the initial period.

3. Markers for the Soviets

We will want to reiterate to the Soviets that they should not intervene in internal Iranian affairs, bearing in mind that a post-Khomeini succession struggle contains the seeds for escalating Superpower involvement in Iran. Soviet willingness not to try to exploit a possible opportunity will be a good test of the new political thinking, and the Soviets need to know we will carefully monitor their actions. We have an opportunity to convey the right kinds of messages to the Soviets during the regional experts talks on the Middle East in June and on Afghanistan and Iran in late July.

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

Letter from Wojciech Jaruzelski, Chairman, Polish Council of State, dated June 30, 1989.

General Jaruzelski wrote before your visit to review the reforms Poland is attempting to implement, outlined Poland's grave economic condition and the need for economic support for the reform program. His letter calls for consideration by the Economic Summit leaders for six groups of measures including, e.g., subsidized food assistance or credit guarantees for food purchases, rapid agreement on an IMF program involving credits of \$2 billion, restructuring of Paris Club debt, reduction of non-guaranteed debt and debt service costs, World Bank and government guaranteed credits for modernization and export-oriented investment, and encouragement of investment in, and management training for, Polish industries in specific sectors.

Letter from West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, dated July 11, 1989.

✓ Chancellor Kohl wrote to give you a read out of his June 22 meeting with South African National Party Leader F.W. de Klerk. Chancellor Kohl assessed that, "though not yet fully experienced in foreign affairs", "de Klerk offers an opportunity of initiating... the long overdue comprehensive dialogue between the South African government and all major political forces of South Africa..." The Chancellor encouraged you to meet with de Klerk.

Message from Japanese Prime Minister Sousuke Uno, dated July 11, 1989.

Prime Minister Uno sent you a message before the Paris Economic Summit to announce that Japan would expand its current capital recycling program from \$30 billion over three years to more than \$65 billion over a five year period. He further announced Japan's decision to increase capital flows to highly indebted countries to which the G-7 Strengthened Debt Strategy is applied, by providing \$4.5 billion in parallel lendings with the IMF and by providing more than \$5.5 billion in untied credits to these countries bilaterally or in conjunction with multilateral development banks.

Letter from French President Mitterrand, dated July 12, 1989.

President Mitterrand replied to your letter of June 6 concerning the CFE initiative explaining his reason for approving the NATO Summit initiative in Brussels and agreeing that the Western nations must develop by September 7 a treaty proposal on conventional disarmament. He made 3 points in connection with the negotiations:

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- the concept of negotiations should be approved by all participating states and should not include or exclude any particular weapons system because of its nuclear capability;
- France will make its sovereign judgement on the methods for applying agreed reductions to preserve its autonomous strategy; and
- aircraft reductions within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone should not be offset by increases outside the zone.

Letter from President Arias of Costa Rica, dated July 10, 1989.

President Arias wrote to you to urge effective action to prevent the destruction of tropical forests, which, along with their animal inhabitants, are being destroyed faster than at any previous point in history. Linking environmental to economic problems, he advocated debt swaps ✓ to finance ecology programs, "an Environmental Rehabilitation and Development Fund" to finance ecological projects in the Third World, reduction of developed countries' agricultural subsidies, and efforts to negotiate global treaties recognizing elements of the environment as "common resources".

Letter from Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso, dated July 13, 1989.

President Sassou-Nguesso wrote to express his satisfaction at what he sees as your commitment to seek better economic relations between the developed and developing countries and to complain about the World Bank's and IMF's conditions as an "obstacle" to an agreement between them and the Congo. He enclosed a copy of his letter to Barber Conable of the World Bank, amplifying his complaints.

Letter from Greek Prime Minister Tzannetakis, dated July 5, 1989.

✓ Prime Minister Tzannetakis wrote to thank you for your greeting at the time of his appointment as Prime Minister.

Letter from Japanese Foreign Minister Mitsuzuka, dated July 4, 1989.

Prime Minister Mitsuzuka wrote to thank you for your hospitality during his Washington visit, express appreciation for your remarks about the global importance of U.S.-Japan relations, and stressed the importance of "cooperation and joint efforts" in tackling bilateral issues.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 20, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PHILIP HUGHES *Philip*
SUBJECT: Heads of State Letters

Attached per your request (Tab I) are summaries of the six letters received before and during the President's recent trip to Europe from Heads of State and Government. Also attached (Tabs A-F) are the letter texts. You may wish to simply show the summary to the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you show the attached summary (Tab I) to the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Summary of Letters
Tab A	Letter from Wojciech Jaruzelski 5386
Tab B	Letter from West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl - 5504
Tab C	Message from Japanese Prime Minister Sousuke Uno - 5512
Tab D	Letter from French President Mitterrand
Tab E	Letter from President Arias of Costa Rica
Tab F	Letter from Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso
Tab G	Letter from Greek Prime Minister Tsannetakis - 5410
Tab H	Letter from Japanese Foreign Minister Mitsuzuka - 5411

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2010-0816-MR

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CHRON FILE

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RECORD ID: 8905720
RECEIVED: 20 JUL 89 19

TO: MERCHANT

FROM: LEVIN

DOC DATE: 25 JUL 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: LEGAL ISSUES
AGENDA

IRAN CONTRA
MINUTES

PERSONS: FERNANDEZ, JOSEPH E

SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR 21 JUL HEAD OF AGENCY MTG IN US VS FERNANDEZ & MINUTES
OF MTG

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 24 JUL 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LEVIN LOGREF: 8905681

FILES: PA NSCIF: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/9/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC CLOSED BY: NSMEN DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

5720
add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 25, 1989

TO: BRIAN MERCHANT

FROM: DAN LEVIN *DL*

The attached copy of Minutes
of Head of Agency Meeting is
for record purposes only and
should not be distributed.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Minutes	Re: Head of Agency Meeting (7 pp.)	7/21/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June - September 1989) [1]

Date Closed: 7/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 91148-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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CHRON FILE 5938

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 28, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TD*
SUBJECT: IEPR Breakfast on July 28, 1989

After you left, the group discussed several issues, not all of which were on the agenda.

Debt

Brady said that the next candidate for commercial bank debt negotiations is the Philippines. Dallara noted that the Filipinos are probably optimistic in believing that they can wrap up the negotiations by the end of August. The GOP is receiving conflicting advice, but the package that finally emerges from these talks probably will have a greater new money element than the Mexican deal. Zoellick underscored the desirability of having several negotiations proceed simultaneously. *OK*
yes

Venezuela

Dallara mentioned that he had met with a group of senior officials from U.S. firms with operations in Venezuela who are caught up in a major foreign exchange scandal there. (Bill Pryce and I met with the same group yesterday). The Venezuelan law in question is inflexible: no bail after arrest and no travel. State will take the lead in drafting a stiff demarche to CAP. Most American executives have left Venezuela to avoid incarceration. As a result, normal business operations are suffering and new investment plans are on hold pending a resolution of the legal proceedings. Venezuela's action could have an adverse impact on debt negotiations and trade talks. *R*

Vietnam

Dallara noted that IMF Executive Director Camdessus is working quietly with the Vietnamese to have them clear up arrears to the international institutions and thus become eligible again for IMF programs. This appears to be Camdessus' personal initiative. Baker noted that this effort is ill-timed given the Cambodian negotiations, i.e. we don't want to do anything to strengthen Vietnam's hand. *Cam*

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Declassify on: OADR

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2011-1469-MR
ES 6/10/13

Soviet and Czechoslovak Membership in the IMF

According to a Treasury banking source, Camdessus has said he wants to be the IMF Executive Director that brings the USSR into the Fund. Others noted increased Soviet interest in the GATT and IMF. Baker said he saw no reason to change our policy of opposing Soviet membership in these bodies.

Regarding Czechoslovakia's request for IMF membership, Dallara and McCormack asserted that Czechoslovakia is acting as a stalking horse for the USSR. If Czechoslovakia enters, a Soviet application would follow immediately. Baker said that he saw a difference between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. If Czechoslovakia began to move down the path of political and economic reform -- and he thought that day was not far away -- we may wish to support Czechoslovakia's candidacy. But so long as the Czechoslovaks maintain their rigid, centrally planned economy and politically repressive system, they are not good candidates.

Cuba

Robson said that the Treasury will have to make a tough decision soon regarding an application by a U.S. network to televise the Pan American games in Cuba. Foreign asset control regulations prohibit the network from paying the Cubans for TV rights. It may be possible to set up some sort of escrow account for sports programs in Cuba to avoid turning the funds over to the Cuban government.

Panama

Baker asked where matters stood on Panamanian sanctions. I said that the President had approved the actions proposed in the early July memorandum. On economic sanctions, I pointed out that we are still awaiting State's paper (which is with Aronson) for review by the DC. Baker suggested that we defer action on the economic sanctions until the expiration of the OAS mission's mandate on August 23. Robson responded that Treasury could live with a short delay now that Congressional hearings on enforcement of the sanctions have concluded.

Votes in Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)

Baker and Brady met separately after the breakfast to discuss the MDB voting issue, sparked by your July 25 memorandum to them. Dallara said that Brady thought that Baker should have raised the matter directly with him rather than sending a memorandum to you. Regardless of Treasury's reaction, your memo accomplished its purpose in drawing attention to the need to tighten procedures when the Treasury plans to vote no or abstain on an MDB loan. It is not clear how Treasury will respond to your suggestion for a PCC meeting to review the issue.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 10, 1989

OBE-NFAR

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Sanctions on Iran

Attached at Tab I is the paper requested on current U.S. sanctions affecting Iran, how they were imposed, and what action is required to rescind them.

Concurrence by: *for* Nick Rostow

Attachment

Tab I Paper on U.S. Sanctions Against Iran

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2010-0816-MR

MM 1/8/2016

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Declassify on: OADR

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06b. Paper	U.S. Sanctions Affecting Iran [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Chronological Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Other (June - September 1989) [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By mm on 3/27/2023

Date Closed: 7/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 91148-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0816-MR(505.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 1/19/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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U.S. SANCTIONS AFFECTING IRAN

Political

In 1979, in response to Iran's seizing of U.S. hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, President Carter, using his constitutional powers to break relations with foreign governments, broke diplomatic relations with Iran. Under these same constitutional powers, the President can restore U.S. relations with Iran at any time.

In 1979 (also in response to the hostage issue) President Carter froze Iranian financial assets in the United States under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). In 1981 President Carter lifted the IEEPA freeze, thereby releasing Iran's financial assets and lifting economic sanctions, but left in place export controls on military items. The specific disposition of Iran's assets is outlined below.

In 1988, President Reagan agreed to pay compensation directly to the families of the airbus shootdown to avoid dealing with the Iranian Government. This Administration has reiterated this position in a formal approach. The President could authorize contact with the Iranian Government on the compensation issue.

Economic

-- THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL: The Tribunal was established in 1981 by the Algiers Accord to settle USG and U.S. private claims against Iran, and Iranian government and private claims against the United States. On January 19, 1981, President Carter issued a series of Executive Orders, in accordance with the Algiers Accords, that "unfroze" about \$10B in Iranian assets, moving about \$6B of these assets into three accounts under the Tribunal to be used in settling these claims, and returning \$4B to Iran.

- Dollar Account #1, used to settle claims of bank syndicates that include a U.S. bank, and which originally held \$3.6B, was virtually closed out in 1987.
- Dollar Account #2, used to settle non-syndicated U.S. bank claims with an original balance of \$1.4B, currently has a balance of \$800 million. All the major claims have been settled against this account, and the balance will be owed back to Iran when the final small claims (about \$8 million total) are settled. We have objected to the return of these funds to Iran primarily because the balance in the Security Account is not sufficient to settle private U.S. claims. To release the funds in Dollar Account #2, our representative at

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2010-0816-mR

RM 1/19/2016

the Tribunal could be instructed by the State Legal Advisor not to object to release of some or all of these funds. Congress cannot pass legislation to prevent this since the funds are in the Bank of England under an escrow account for which the Bank of Algeria is the escrow agent.

-- The Security Account, used to settle USG and U.S. private claims, originally had a balance of \$1B and a requirement imposed by the Tribunal that the balance never fall below \$500 million. Thus far \$1.3B in claims has been paid out of this account, and \$2-4B in claims are left to be settled. Iran has used the interest from the Security Account to replenish the balance whenever it has dropped below \$500 million. However, in the future, the interest will not be great enough to replenish the balance and Iran will have to draw the money from its own national funds or from the balance in Dollar Account #2. We have argued for use of Dollar Account #2 for this purpose to block return of a large sum of money to Iran which we fear would be used to purchase military equipment, and because there is no guarantee Iran would provide national funds.

-- EXPORTS: In January 1984 the Secretary of State determined that Iran was a country that "repeatedly supports acts of international terrorism," and formally put Iran on the "terrorism list" under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act. Concurrent with this designation, the Department of Commerce imposed certain export controls on goods destined for Iran and denied export licenses for items on the munitions list to Iran (including U.S. aircraft, helicopters and related parts, marine outboard engines, crime control items, and all goods and technical data subject to national security control if destined for military end use). As a result of this designation, several other sanctions automatically went into effect including: no foreign tax credits for taxes paid to Iran; restrictions on DOD from entering into contracts with any entity owned or controlled by Iran, and a requirement for Congressional notification before any export over \$1 million was approved that would contribute to Iran's military or terrorist potential.

Because of hostile Iranian military actions in the Gulf, and pursuant to E.O. 12613 of October 29, 1987, President Reagan imposed further export controls to include fourteen specific categories of U.S. products with potential military application. In addition, we blocked the export of CW precursors to Iran.

-- IMPORTS: As part of the same 1987 E.O. noted just above, President Reagan banned the import into the U.S. of all Iranian-origin goods and services, including crude oil, pistachio nuts, caviar, and textiles, with a few exceptions such as Iranian

oil refined in a third country, goods that had already left Iran on the effective date of the Executive Order, and such things as news publication/broadcast material, mail, and Tribunal awards. This sanction was imposed under the terms of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 as a result of Iranian support of terrorism and military action against U.S. and non-belligerent flag vessels in the Persian Gulf.

Lifting the economic sanctions imposed in 1984 would require removal of Iran's designation as a "terrorist supporting" state. This change would require a Presidential determination and report to Congress that Iran: a) has not provided support for international terrorism, including support or sanctuary for any major terrorist or terrorist group during the preceding six month period, and b) has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. Such a report must be sent to Congress at least 30 days before the proposed rescission of "terrorist state" would become effective. Congress would have to pass legislation, which the President could veto, to leave Iran on the terrorist list.

Lifting the ban on imports and the foreign policy export controls imposed in 1987 would require a presidential decision and an instruction to Commerce to revoke the import ban and foreign policy export controls. The import ban would be easier to lift because of the types of goods involved. Revoking the 1987 foreign policy export controls could be done on a category-specific basis since some of these controls like those governing export of equipment with military application, should remain in place. Some categories, such as commercial aircraft, might be considered for release. Congress could pass legislation to block such a decision, which the President could then veto.

-- DIPLOMATIC PROPERTIES: In 1979, after Iran seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the Secretary of State took control over Iranian diplomatic property in the United States under the Foreign Missions Act. The Secretary could reverse this decision. It could be blocked by legislation, which could be vetoed by the President.

Military

-- ARMS SALES: In 1979 under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) President Carter suspended deliveries of military equipment, goods and services and material that might be militarily useful for policy reasons because of the hostage crisis. The suspension subsequently continued because of the Iran/Iraq war in 1980. Military exports to Iran also are affected by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Act of 1986 that prohibits the export of items on the Munitions List to countries on the EAA "terrorism list." A Presidential decision to resume arms sales could follow Iran's removal from the "terrorist list" as outlined under the Export section. Congress could pass legislation to prohibit such sales.

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3.3(b)(6)

-- OPERATION STAUNCH: In 1984 Operation Staunch was adopted during the Iran/Iraq war to block third country arms sales to Iran to complement our own arms embargo and as a policy decision to keep Iran from winning the war. We have continued that policy because there is a ceasefire but no permanent peace settlement. Our arms embargo also included Iraq, but we did not apply Operation Staunch to Iraq. An interagency decision could lift Operation Staunch. Restrictions on U.S. arms sales could only be lifted when Iran is removed from the terrorism list.

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Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

APNSA

See me
①

August 15, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Strategy on U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia

State and DoD have prepared the strategy paper on tank and aircraft sales to Saudi Arabia (Tab I) for you and Secretaries Baker and Cheney as the result of your breakfast discussion on this subject last month. The strategy, which mainly addresses the mechanics of a sale, is a good one.

- On aircraft, the strategy would be to defer any further technical talks or action on an aircraft sale until the tank sale clears, assuring the Saudis that such discussions will begin once the tank sale is through. Since technical briefings by the contractor have begun with Bandar, the Saudis should not object to this. We would develop a detailed strategy for the aircraft sale like the one developed for the tank sale at an appropriate time.
- On tanks, the strategy would be to begin congressional briefings on a proposed tank sale in late August up to the time of the King's visit September 14. These briefings would be done by Secretary Baker and other senior officials. In tandem, contractor analysis on the economic impact of the sale would be circulated.

Based on the result of those consultations, inform the King that we will go forward with a tank sale this fall;

Submit the informal notification to Congress on September 25 and the formal on October 16. Any delay in either notification would push this issue into next calendar year which we want to avoid.

The strategy does not address the possible political ramifications of a Saudi tank sale and what needs to be done to counter them. Based on informal consultations with Israel and AIPAC, it does not appear this will be a highly contentious sale, although judging from past history, that cannot be ruled out. Much could well depend on the tone of the King's visit and any

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statements he makes concerning Saudi support for the peace process and its acceptance of the tenets the PLO endorsed concerning Israel's right to exist and support for 242 and 338. Prior to the King's arrival, we will be working with the Saudis on the text of such a statement. DoD is also attempting to find some "quids" for Israel to sweeten a Saudi tank deal. Depending on the extent of political opposition, the President may have to engage in some lobbying efforts with the congressional leadership to insure success; however, we would need to determine carefully when such intervention is warranted.

We have one other point of disagreement with State -- when contractor briefings on the M1A2 for the Saudis should begin. We believe that an exception to the National Disclosure Policy (ENDP) for briefings on the M1A2 tank, which the Saudis want to buy instead of the M1A1 but which the Army may not produce, should be held up until the Army makes a production decision (expected later this month). We believe it would be inappropriate to brief the Saudis on something we may not produce. State argues that since we would be willing to sell the Saudis most of the M1A2 upgrades if the Army agrees to produce them, we should let the contractors begin caveated briefings now.

If you agree with the points outlined above, we recommend you contact both Secretaries during the next week to express our concerns. If they are on board, State and DoD should be directed to begin congressional staff consultations later this month following an Army production decision on the M1A2.

Attachment
Tab I State/DOD Strategy Paper

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S/S S/12
United States Department of State


Washington, D. C. 20520

August '12, 1989

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

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TO: The Secretary 
THROUGH: T - Reginald Bartholomew
FROM: NEA - John H. Kelly 
PM - Richard A. Clarke 
SUBJECT: Tank Sales to Saudi Arabia

Secretary Cheney will probably raise with you on your trip the subject of a tank sale to Saudi Arabia. He has a memo with him similar to our attachment which explains a sensitive game plan as to how we would handle such a sale with the Congress and the Israelis. I understand this subject came up at your last breakfast with Cheney and Scowcroft.

The attached memo has been cleared by the NSC and DOD staff levels and incorporates comments here from P, T, SP, H, and PM.

Attachment: As stated

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2010-0817-MR

mm 1/8/2016

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07c. Outline	Re: I. Issue (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June - September 1989) [1]

Date Closed: 7/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 91148-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8906493
RECEIVED: 17 AUG 89 08

TO: HUGHES

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FROM: CHARLES

DOC DATE: 17 AUG 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAN
AP

MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON / PRES MTG W/ USG EXPERTS ON IRAN 8 AUG

ACTION: NOTED BY HUGHES

DUE DATE: 21 AUG 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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DOC 1 OF 1

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6493

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

IRON FILE

August 17, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: 48 SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with USG Experts on Iran

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum of conversation the President's meeting on August 8 with USG experts on Iran.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I for record purposes.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0817-MR

mm 1/8/2016

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08c. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with USG Experts on Iran [FOIA restrictions redacted] (8 pp.)	8/8/89	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Chronological Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Other (June - September 1989) [1]

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**
By MM on 4/7/2023

Date Closed: 7/9/2009	OA/ID Number: 91148-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0817-MR(507.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 1/19/2016

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6493



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with USG Experts on Iran (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
James Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Richard N. Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Sandra Charles, Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Ambassador Reg Bartholomew, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Department of State
Ambassador John Kelly, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asia Affairs
Dr. Stephen Fairbanks, Analyst for Iran, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Mr. Lawrence Pope, Director, Office of Northern Gulf Affairs, Bureau of Near East and South Asia Affairs, Department of State
[REDACTED] Intelligence Officer on Iran, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency

DATE, TIME August 8, 1989, 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Cabinet Room.

The President opened the discussion, reviewing current events in the hostage situation and recent statements by Iran and Hizbollah. He said he could not tell the assembly what he would do, but he would like their views on what they expected would happen. He remarked that the situation was tense. He was uncertain what Israel was going to do, and did not want to get blindsided or get anyone else killed. He acknowledged sadly that Americans had been pushed to the fore on this. (S)

Ambassador Bartholomew spoke first, saying he thought the President's idea of calling this gathering was a good one. He said those invited would focus on Tehran, what has happened and what might happen. (S)

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0817-MR

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Mr. Fairbanks acknowledged that there was a new situation in Tehran: Ayatollah Khomeini was dead; there was no subsequent power struggle; a successor had been chosen in one day; and the presidential election had gone smoothly. Constitutional changes were in place and the presidency was stronger than ever. Rafsanjani would be president once he was sworn in. Mr. Fairbanks noted that Rafsanjani wanted change and to restore Iran's economy, and that he had stated this publicly and during his campaign. He also wanted improved relations with the outside world, an issue of controversy in Iran. He believed that Rafsanjani's August 4 offer on the hostages related to the need to improve Iran's economy with help from the outside world. In order to get that help, Iran must first improve its image with the outside world. Mr. Fairbanks posed two issues for which there were no good answers: how Iran domestic politics would play out and how much influence Iran had with hostage holders in Lebanon. (S)

1.4(c) [redacted] cited two trends in Iran: growing constitutional and institutional power together with the absence of a more moderate approach. 1.4(c) [redacted]

1.4(c) [redacted] noted two departures from Iran's traditional foreign policy: one, an opening to the Soviets; and two, an attempt by Iran to consolidate its relations with radical Palestinian groups. 1.4(c) [redacted]

1.4(c); (b)(3); (b)(6) [redacted] discussed the change in Iranian policy toward the Soviets, noting that for a time Iranian rhetoric against the Soviets was harsh, particularly during the Gulf war. Now he said the Soviets had changed their rhetoric about Iran as well. They, like others friendly to Iran, had accepted the Islamic revolution in Iran. Whenever a country accepted the Islamic revolution, like the Soviets had done, Iran then adopted a more moderate posture toward them. (S)

In addressing the hostage issue, 1.4(c); (b)(3); (b)(6) [redacted] used a metaphor from an interview given by Ayatollah Khomeini on the tenth anniversary of Iran's revolution. When asked why Iran had agreed to a ceasefire in its conflict with Iraq, Khomeini had said it was like being on a boat or a ship. The leadership in the country were the captains, the country was the boat. It was the captains' responsibility to raise or lower the ship's sails depending on the state of the seas, and to steer the rudder or to drop anchor. Iran's acceptance of UNSCR 598 was viewed as an

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opportunity not a defeat. Both successes and defeats were opportunities. Captain Lidbeck posited that the kidnapping of Sheikh Obeid might well be an opportunity for Rafsanjani to get the hostage issue behind him. Whether the hardliners would prevent him from doing so was the question. (S)

The President then asked if Rafsanjani said to release the hostages, would they be released. (S)

1.4(c)

Mr. Pope explained that from the French and German experience on hostage release some points were clear: first, you had to deal with Iran; next Iran contacted the kidnappers; and then the French and Germans were told to contact the kidnappers directly, which they did. They then paid them money. (S)

The President asked if Rafsanjani knew who was being held where and by whom. (S)

Ambassador Bartholomew said he did. (S)

1.4(c); (b)(3); (b)(6)

suggested that there was some question about Montashemi's role and if he retained influence with the hostage takers separate from the government. He noted sometimes the Iranian government did one thing, while factions in Iran appeared to deal with other powers. (S)

Ambassador Kelly returned to the French and Germans, 3.3(b)(6)

Occasionally there were arguments with the people who had the captives concerning the price. He expected that for the US hostages there would be a major additional price, possibly release of the Dawa prisoners in Kuwait. When Hizbollah decided to release the US hostages, he believed that the message to us would be to do something about the Dawa prisoners. (S)

1.4(c)

agreed that that would be on the table. (S)

Ambassador Bartholomew stated that he did not believe Hizbollah was a monolith. He believed they were divided by family and clans. Different elements in Hizbollah were linked to different people in Iran as channels or champions. He noted Montashemi's running Hizbollah when he was Ambassador in Damascus. From 1983-86 Hizbollah had built itself up. He mentioned Mughnia and his blood tie with the Dawa prisoners, noting that when blood was involved the price would be higher. Rafsanjani would have to cajole and offer incentives before the US hostages could be moved. (S)

Ambassador Kelly agreed, saying that for Hizbollah money alone might not be sufficient. (S)

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General Scowcroft then commented that it was curious that all of these assumptions were based on no policy change in Iran. During the French and German hostage situation he believed there had been a different policy in Iran; it now appeared that policy had changed. (S)

Ambassador Bartholomew agreed, but said that Rafsanjani had not precipitated the change, the Israeli kidnapping did. He was seeking to capitalize on the event if he could. (S)

Secretary Baker noted however that Rafsanjani had made comments that were then contradicted by Montashemi-Pur (the Interior Minister). (S)

Mr. Pope then mentioned another consideration was whether Khomeini would resign early so that Rafsanjani could assume the presidency and name his cabinet. If so, that would be a signal. (S)

Secretary Baker asked if there was any reason to interpret a political change from Rafsanjani's statements. (S)

Mr. Pope said there indeed was a change, but the question was how long before it could take affect. (S)

The President asked if Rafsanjani could remove Montashemi-Pur. (S)

Mr. Pope said he would do better coopting or exiling him. (S)

The President then asked who the chief honcho with Hizbollah was. (S)

Mr. Pope responded that Iran had leverage. (S)

Secretary Baker then asked who was the most influential member of Hizbollah on the hostages. (S)

Mr. Pope replied that it was not Fadllalah. Certainly Musawi, Nasrallah and Mughnia were key Hizbollah members. (S)

1.4(c)

The President then asked if anyone had any idea as to what Israel would do and how that would affect the fate of the hostages. (S)

Ambassador Kelly said that based on his talks in Israel, he believed they would hold off on retaliation because of the current strains in US/Israeli relations. Rabin and the military were trying to conclude a big swap of their hostages and ours for the prisoners in Israel. They did not expect an immediate resolution. It was clear that they had grossly miscalculated the

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repercussions of the Shiekh Obeid kidnapping. He concluded that the outlook was that this would be a long haul process. (S)

1.4(c); (b)(3); (b)(6)

then added that in addition to Israel, we should keep in mind Syria and Lebanon. He stated that Syria also had a role in helping to free the hostages. Syria had stepped up its shelling of East Beirut and was taking advantage of our preoccupation with the hostages. (S)

The President asked about Syrian influence with the hostages. (S)

Ambassador Kelly responded that it was clear from the Charlie Glass incident that they did have influence. In that case they had interdicted Hizbollah and disarmed them and set up a dragnet in southern Lebanon. (S)

Ambassador Bartholomew agreed, adding that geographically Hizbollah could be cut off, along with the Iran Revolutionary Guards if Syria wanted to shut them down. (S)

Governor Sununu asked what Syria would do if we asked. (S)

Ambassador Bartholomew replied that the only constraint on Syria was its relations with Iran. This relationship was based on the principle of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend", as in the case of Iraq. Syria got oil from Iran. Hizbollah served Syrian policy objectives in Lebanon. He thought if we asked again they might do something token, but he did not know what. (S)

1.4(c)

The President concluded from this that Syria could not launch a full court press without Iran. (S)

The Governor then asked if there were any inducement we might give Syria. (S)

Ambassador Bartholomew replied that there was a way to solve the problem but it was prejudiced by the situation in Lebanon. Lebanon was being shelled by Syria. An inducement would have to come in an overall settlement with recognition of Syria's special security interest in Lebanon. This would be built on the proposal that all Lebanon's neighbors have a special interest. He believed there would have to be ways to devise a settlement without derogating Lebanese sovereignty. However, he felt Syria would not settle for less than the whole loaf. (S)

Governor Sununu asked if by the "whole loaf" he met recognition of Syria's role and land they would get in reaching a settlement. (S)

Ambassador Bartholomew responded that the Arab League leaders had already had to figure in the Syrians. Syria wanted recognition.

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They were concerned that a potential outcome in Lebanon would be one in which Syria had no say in the government. Therefore, Syria wanted nothing less than determining who governed Lebanon. (S)

The President asked if this meant that Assad required more recognition in order to get him to do more. He said he knew Assad did not like to be isolated. He had a "bad guy" image. He wondered if there was something we could do. He was thinking about hostages and the amorality of the Lebanon situation and the Middle East peace process which were tied together. He said that he did not want to miss getting the hostages released. (S)

The President then asked each participant to answer the following question in turn: what would you do as President? (S)

1.4(c); (b)(3); (b)(6)

started off saying that over time -- and it would take Iran time -- we should recognize that the Islamic government was here to stay. We should discontinue our rhetoric linking them to state terrorism. We also should work on an arrangement on the assets because Rafsanjani needed a quid pro quo. Recalling the ship metaphor, he said we should view this as an opportunity for Iran that was thrown in their laps by the Obeid kidnapping. He believed it could be turned to their advantage particularly since Iran's economy was in poor shape. (S)

1.4(c)

Mr. Pope recommended that the President issue a statement on the Islamic republic to show that US policy had changed. It should be similar to the statement Shevardnadze made when he went to Iran. (S)

The President asked if the statement should be made on Rafsanjani's inauguration, and whether there should be no reference to state terrorism or the hostage question. (S)

Mr. Pope replied that the statement should say we were not trying to undermine the government but accepted the Islamic republic as a fact, and that we were ready to engage in a dialogue. The statement also should talk directly about state terrorism and hostages. (S)

Secretary Baker commented that in that sense it would be a restatement of our current policy. (S)

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Other items Mr. Pope suggested the President consider included

3.3(b)(6)

On the economic side, he said he did not agree with leveraging the European community on the credit issue as a disincentive. He concluded that our objective should be direct negotiations, and in the interim we should use intermediaries to help clear the ground. (S)

Secretary Baker stated that direct negotiations should consist of discussions on terrorism and US relations with Iran. (S)

Mr. Pope agreed, but suggested that we not raise the hostages directly, but continue to use intermediaries. On intermediaries, Mr. Pope believed we should arm the Pakistani Foreign Minister but he did not think overall that the Pakistani channel was good because they were too close to Iran, too vulnerable and too susceptible to Iran pressure. They had Afghanistan and Iranian terrorism in Pakistan to worry about. He felt Japan was a good channel, they had been faithful and had done a good job thus far. (S)

Mr. Fairbanks agreed that a statement was a good idea. He said that Rafsanjani needed something to show domestically that he had gotten from us. Iran feared that we might undermine its revolution. Iran continued to support a "neither east nor west" foreign policy and wanted to balance this by improving relations with the United States. He believe it would not be unnatural for Iran to move after a US gesture. (S)

Ambassador Bartholomew stated that we should not alter our current policy line much. He accepted that Iran wanted to move, but noted that we cannot go too far in trading for hostages. He agreed with the idea of a statement that we did not take issue with the Iran revolutionary government. He also said we should hold to the notion of direct talks and offer to have them on the direction of our relationship. We should be up front and say that the first thing on the US agenda would be hostages and terrorism. He explained that while these should be the first thing on the agenda, there should be no preconditions for talks. He also believed we should not use the Pakistanis because they were too close to Iran. He said the Japanese were all right and wondered if there was anyone else. (S)

The President then interjected that he had said everyone should focus on the hostage issue and everyone had focused on Iran. He was learning. (S)

Ambassador Kelly stated that if Rafsanjani was serious, there were things to do. 3.3(b)(6) on the 17 Iranians taken by the Christians in Lebanon, we could go to the Christians and ask them to spring the seventeen; and a statement by the President would give a push to test Iran and to see what direction it was headed. (S)

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The President replied that he favored a statement along the lines discussed. He then asked for Mr. Haass' views. (S)

Mr. Haass said we needed to address the Syrian angle. He proposed a letter to Assad. He continued that we needed to see what the Soviets were willing to do with the Syrians. He stated that on the hostages Syrian acts had been acts of omission, whereas Iranian acts had been acts of commission. (S)

Secretary Baker said we should think about what we wanted in a letter to Assad from the President. We had to think it through carefully before playing our trump card, particularly the tone of the letter. (S)

The President then asked Ms. Charles what she recommended he do. (S)

Ms. Charles responded that the internal situation in Iran would take some time to sort out; therefore, we would have to have patience until Rafsanjani consolidated his position and could bring the radicals on board. She agreed with the others that there were clear signs of change in Iran's rhetoric; it was more positive than it had been for several years. She also mentioned that we should bear in mind that future revelations on Pan Am 103 were likely to affect our dialogue with Iran, particularly if we were thinking of returning assets. This would require good public relations work with the victims' families even though the assets were Iran's. (S)

Finally, Ms. Charles expressed concern that while we were waiting to begin a direct dialogue with Iran, we not lose sight of the hostage issue. For the first time in several years, the issue was a matter of international concern again. She suggested that perhaps the ICRC or UN might play a role in keeping international interest focused on the issue by engaging with all the parties who had hostages at stake. The ICRC President had already offered to do this. (S)

The President responded that he recalled that Mr. Sommaruga had made such an offer during their telephone conversation. (S)

The meeting concluded at 4:00 p.m.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

CHRON FILE

6996

September 6, 1989

~~SUSPENSE~~ Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS/ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Francois Mitterrand
of France

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President requesting a phone call to French President Mitterrand. Although we told the French (after the evacuation was completed) of our decision to close Embassy Beirut, a call from President Bush to President Mitterrand would still be in order given the French stake in Lebanon and the legacy of our consultations. The purpose of the call would be to explain the reasons behind our closing Embassy Beirut and to reassure Mitterrand of our commitment to return and our intention to stay involved diplomatically.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposal at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0817-MR
mm 3/23/2016

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6996

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Mitterrand
of France

DATE: Thursday, September 7, 1989

PURPOSE: To discuss the situation in Lebanon.

SECURE OR OPEN: OPEN

INTERPRETER: YES (Alex Toumayan)

PHONE NUMBER:

CONTACT PERSON:

TIME DIFFERENCE: +6 hours

SUGGESTED TIMES: Thursday morning

TOPICS OF
DISCUSSION:

1. Thinking behind decision to close
U.S. Embassy Beirut
2. Future of U.S. policy toward
Lebanon.

Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0817-MR

mm 1/8/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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6996

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

- I wanted to speak to you directly to explain just why I decided to withdraw our personnel from our Beirut embassy.
- To be blunt, we had no choice. There was an immediate danger facing our people. Aoun had begun to make direct threats. He also made it clear that he would not deal with our Ambassador and end the intimidation of our staff until a number of unacceptable political conditions were met.
- We do not intend to sever our diplomatic ties to Lebanon. This move was a necessarily quick response to a new security threat, and nothing more. No one should read a political signal into it.
- We hope to return our Embassy staff to Lebanon as soon as their safety can be reasonably assured in what will remain, for some time, an inherently dangerous environment.
- I have appreciated your advice on Lebanon and remain determined to work with you in formulating a common Western approach to the political crisis there. We continue to hold to the notion that any viable approach must involve a cease-fire, internal political reform, and the withdrawal of foreign forces. As ever, I look forward to having the benefit of your thinking.

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0817-MR
mm 1/8/2016

DATE: 9-9-89

FROM THE PRESIDENT

To: Brent

Read it!

#1 is TOOMUCH

#2 probably best but let's discuss it.

#3 may be seen to walk back and

#4 walks away.

Everyone knows that verification is tough; but if we back away from a ban, we lose all credibility with 3rd world and others..... I cannot do that.

Let's keep on challenging the beauracracy to come up iwth new ideas.. new ways ot verify... new thinking.

In the meantime we must saty with fasv oring a ban.

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0817-MR
MM 1/8/2016

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Thinking About Next Steps in CW [Chemical Weapons] Arms Control (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (June - September 1989) [1]

Date Closed:	7/9/2009	OA/ID Number:	91148-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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6592

August 22, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ADRIAN BASORA (Acting)

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW/JOHN GORDON

SUBJECT: Thinking About Next Steps in CW Arms Control

We have prepared a short "thinkpiece" for the President on our current impasse in CW arms control that is designed to orient him to the current problem and to the basic decisions that will need to be made. The memo is attached at Tab I.

Based on your discussion with Arnie and John, we did a quick redraft of the memo to incorporate brief descriptions of the four policy options. Our goal was to focus on the underlying policy choices and their attendant risks, while providing brief descriptions of the specific options.

The memo argues that we can take our CW policy down one of two roads. We can push for a global ban in the hope of advancing our CW non-proliferation objectives and accepting the serious costs and risks of an arms control treaty that cannot meet our normal verification standards. Alternatively, we can hold out until we realize substantial verification improvements (which are not now on the horizon), recognizing that it would be widely criticized as a retreat from our longstanding commitment to a global ban, and would likely undercut our efforts to curb CW non-proliferation and use in the Third World. Whatever we do could have serious consequences for Congressional support not only for CW arms control, but also for CW modernization and our other arms control efforts. The final selection of a particular option will be driven, in large part, by the President's sense of priorities among these competing considerations, as well as the political dimension.

As you requested, we have informally shared a draft of the memo with interested agencies and this version reflects their comments.

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0758-MR
@ 12/21/10

GENERAL SCOWCROFT
TAB I REFLECTS
OUR ATTEMPT TO
INCORPORATE
CHANGES YOU REQUESTED
LAST EVENING
V.R. Gordon
Aug 24

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dm
Don Mahley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President attached at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

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