Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91148
Folder ID Number: 91148-002

Folder Title:
Other (April 1989) [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	6	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Outline	Re: Presidential Dinner in Honor of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar (2 pp.)	1/23/89	(b)(1)	C
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Presidential Dinner in Honor of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
01c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01d. Memo	Jeremy Curtin to Brent Scowcroft Re: President's Dinner with UNSYG Perez de Cuellar (2 pp.)	1/23/89	(b)(1)	C
02. Cable	Re: Suggested Language for the NATO Summit Declaration (4 pp.)	4/27/89	(b)(1)	C
03. Memo	Eugene M. Ebner to Brent Scowcroft Re: Budget Decision Update (2 pp.)	4/13/89	(b)(1)	S
04. Memo	Arnold Kanter/Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft Re: Les Aspin Comments on Lance Modernization (1 pp.)	4/13/89	(b)(1)	C
05a. Memo	For Ambassador Robert Blackwill and Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway Re: List of papers (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05b. Paper	Re: European Saceur (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (April 1989) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1233
OA/ID Number: 91148-002
Date Closed: 7/9/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05c. Paper	Re: U.S.-Soviet Defense Ministers Meetings on Force Developments (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05d. Paper	Re: Open Skies (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05e. Paper	Re: Regularized Meetings between SACEUR and CINC of the Warsaw Pact (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05f. Paper	Re: NATO Arms Market (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05g. Paper	Re: NATO Training Impacts on European Environment (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05h. Paper	Re: Burdensharing - The Need for Summit Attention (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05i. Paper	Re: Monitored Storage (2 pp.)	4/18/89	(b)(1)	C
05j. Paper	Re: Joint Verification Experiments in the CFE (2 pp.)	4/19/89	(b)(1)	S
05k. Paper	Re: Joint Armament Inventory (2 pp.)	4/19/89	(b)(1)	S
05l. Paper	Re: Permanent Observers (2 pp.)	4/18/89	(b)(1)	C
05m. Paper	Re: Post-CFE Force Structure (2 pp.)	4/19/89	(b)(1)	C
05n. Paper	Re: Tank Production Decreases (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05o. Paper	Re: Military Doctrine (2 pp.)	4/19/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
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WHORM Cat.:
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Pinksheet Number: cap1233
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Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05p. Paper	Re: Military Glasnost (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05q. Paper	Re: CW [Chemical Weapons] Initiative (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (April 1989) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1233
OA/ID Number: 91148-002
Date Closed: 7/9/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

1/23/89

THE WHITE HOUSE CHRON FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHINGTON

0010

ED

January 23, 1989

Other

PRESIDENTIAL DINNER IN HONOR OF
UN SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR

DATE: January 24, 1989
LOCATION: The Private Residence
TIME: 7:30 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the newly effective UN and to underscore the need for continued UN reform.

II. BACKGROUND

Your dinner for the Secretary General will be seen as a signal of the importance you attach to the UN, which has become a more effective problem-solving institution under Perez de Cuellar. Your talking points (Tab A) reaffirm our commitment to the UN, stress the importance of UN peacekeeping operations and reiterate the need for continuing UN administrative and budgetary reform. You should also remind the UNSYG that, given budgetary constraints, Congressional support for increased UN payments, will be difficult to achieve, though we are committed to that goal. Currently, the UN is starting to implement the southern Africa peace accords, which we mediated. We seek significant downsizing of the UN peace force in Namibia (UNTAG), a position we understand the UNSYG supports.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Guest list to be provided by the Social Office.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photo Only.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

7:30 p.m., Cocktails, followed by Dinner. Should end by 9:30 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0808-MR
ES 12/14/15

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff (2)

VI. REMARKS

Points to be Made attached at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Biographic Data on Perez de Cuellar

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
PRESIDENTIAL DINNER IN HONOR OF
UN SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR

U.S. COMMITMENT:

-- I congratulate you on your success in making the UN a more effective institution, with a restored role in addressing central international questions of the day.

-- My Administration is prepared to work closely with you to make the most of your good offices.

UN PEACEKEEPING:

-- The UN role in international peacekeeping has, of course, been particularly important. The Nobel Peace Prize is a fitting tribute to the vital work of the UN in troublespots around the world.

-- We look forward to implementation of the southern Africa peace plan, which should bring independence to Namibia and total and complete withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

-- I understand that the UN will be able to reduce the size of UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance) in Namibia; keeping UN expenditures to the minimum needed to meet security requirements is extremely important to us.

-- You will have our full support if the UN undertakes peacekeeping operations to resolve conflicts elsewhere, for example, in the Western Sahara or Cambodia.

UN FUNDING:

-- A request for funds to meet our current assessment to the UN was included in the budget submission for FY-90. I will work hard to gain Congressional support for this funding.

-- We will also seek funds to begin paying some of our arrearages. We recognize our obligations to the UN. Paying our arrearages, however, will take a number of years.

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2010-0808-MR
ES 12/14/15

-- At the same time, it is essential that the UN continue the administrative and budgetary reforms which you have started to enact.

-- Adoption by consensus of the "no growth" budget outline during the 43rd General Assembly was a very important step. It will be equally important for the full budget process to continue on this same track of fiscal responsibility.

-- Equally important are the reforms in personnel levels and in secondment of staff to the UN Secretariat.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (April 1989) [1]

Date Closed:	7/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91148-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 23, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JEREMY CURTIN JC

SUBJECT: President's Dinner with UNSYG Perez de Cuellar

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President for his 01/24/89 dinner with UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar.

Under Perez de Cuellar, the UN is becoming a more effective problem-solving institution more compatible with U.S. interests than in the past. UN peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf and southern Africa directly support important U.S. policy objectives. The General Assembly has eschewed most of the anti-U.S. rhetoric which characterized its debates in recent years. In response to U.S. demands, the UN is undertaking administrative and budgetary reforms; in return, we are seeking to restore the U.S. contribution to the UN to its assessed level.

Perez de Cuellar remains concerned about U.S. arrearages, totaling about $400 million. The UN still faces a "cash crisis," often blamed on the U.S. shortfall. Our FY-90 budget submission includes funds to meet our full current assessment, but it makes only a start on paying our arrearages over six years. Given budgetary restraints, a return to full funding is not assured.

As exemplified by Gorbachev's speech to the General Assembly, the Soviets have adopted a more positive, activist approach to the UN. Soviet activism has been constructive, e.g., in southern Africa, but it also carries the risk of increased Soviet influence in UN affairs worldwide, perhaps to the detriment of U.S. interests. An activist approach of our own is needed to counter the Soviets and to take advantage of the potential of the "New UN" as an effective international institution.

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0808MR
ES 12/14/15

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve (BS) Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo for Signature to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Biographic Data on Perez de Cuellar

Document No. 022593

2290

CHRON FILE
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 4/3/89 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 2:00 TODAY

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NATO TREA

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☑	MCCLURE	☑	☐
SUNUNU	☐	☑	NEWMAN	☐	☐
SCOWCROFT	☑	☐	PORTER	☑	☐
DARMAN	☐	☐	STUDDERT	☐	☐
BATES	☑	☐	UNTERMEYER	☐	☐
BREEDEN	☐	☐	ROGERS	☐	☑
CARD	☐	☑	PINKERTON	☑	☐
CICCONI	☐	☑	WINSTON	☐	☑
DEMAREST	☑	☐	_____	☐	☐
FITZWATER	☐	☑	_____	☐	☐
GRAY	☑	☐	_____	☐	☐
HAGIN	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐

REMARKS:

Please provide your comments/recommendations directly to Chriss Winston's office with an info copy to my office by 2:00 TODAY Monday, April 3, 1989. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

April 3, 1989

Chriss Winston: The NSC concurs on draft text with proposed changes.

Brent Scowcroft

James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

IN COMMEMORATION OF
THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The White House Rose Garden
April 4, 1989

Your Excellencies, fellow citizens:

Forty years ago today some of the most accomplished and far-sighted statesmen of their generation -- men such as Robert Schuman, Lester Pearson, Dean Acheson, and Ernest Bevin -- gathered here in Washington to take the first step toward effecting an international agreement to safeguard the peace and prosperity of the community of free nations. That treaty proved to be the foundation of the most successful alliance in modern history. ~~the North Atlantic Treaty Organization~~

Gathered here today are many distinguished Americans who -- as officials, or members of Congress, or private citizens -- have served the Atlantic Community and the ideals it embodies. We pay tribute to them.

The North Atlantic Treaty, symbolized a bold ~~and continued~~ commitment to safeguard the very freedoms for which ~~our Countries~~ had fought so hard only a few years earlier. Equally, it ~~symbolized~~ the shared values ~~upon which our Western heritage is founded~~ values which have given form to many other ~~key~~ documents of the post-war period, from the U.N. Charter to the ~~host of agreements resulting from the CSCE~~ process. And, while

--because of the strength it mobilized--

planting firmly the banner of freedom, the North Atlantic Treaty ~~also~~ became the basis of the longest peace -- matched by an unparalleled prosperity -- Europe has known ~~this century~~.

By any standard, NATO has been a resounding success. ~~But~~ Like any human institution, it is continually tested and challenged. But we ~~while the North Atlantic Treaty should indeed be celebrated for its accomplishments, the anniversary we mark today must not be regarded as a mere celebration of the past. True, the Alliance has endured and prospered these forty years, a record which gives testimony to the common values which undergirded its creation. But never have the bonds which unite our countries been broader or more profound; never has our shared concern for upholding the rights of the individual been stronger~~. have held together.

Today, in a changing world, ~~NATO has not lost its relevance. It has strengthened from a security alliance, pure and simple, into a community of genuinely shared interests~~ -- where a common heritage and mutual concerns to safeguard ~~fundamental values have framed our dialogue with the East~~. our Alliance not only keeps the peace and freedom of the Atlantic world; it has made possible the common effort to build a more constructive relationship with the East. Europe is entering a period of unprecedented change and enormous hope. Without our moral and political unity over four decades, this would not be happening. Our values of freedom and democracy turn out to be the most powerful political force around the world today -- most particularly in Europe.

On this anniversary, I join my fellow Americans and citizens of the fifteen other allied countries in saluting what has been accomplished. Equally, we salute a bright future, and recommit ourselves to the ~~our~~ shared vision of an Europe ~~in which divisions of the past are erased and a new era of peace and respect for freedoms is ushered in.~~ undivided, in which security and peace are assured for all the nations of the continent on the basis of freedom, true democracy, human rights, and the rule of law -- fulfilling the dream and vision of 40 years ago.

TIME STAMP

89 APR 3 A10:54

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

RODMAN

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 2290

ACTION OFFICER: [redacted] DYKE DUE: 1:00PM, 3 APR

URGENT

- ☐ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates
- ☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi
- ☒ Prepare Memo SCOWCROFT to WINSTON W/INFO CICCONI
- ☐ Appropriate Action
- ☐ Prepare Memo for Hughes

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* *PHONE** to action officer at ext. _____

	FYI		FYI		FYI
☐	☐ Beers	☐	☐ Kelly	☐	☐ Rice
☐	☒ Blackwill	☐	☐ Lampley	☒	☐ Rodman Concurs
☐	☐ Brooks	☐	☐ Leach	☐	☐ Rostow
☐	☐ Cabelly	☐	☐ Lowenkron	☐	☐ Saunders
☐	☐ Charles	☐	☐ Mahley	☒	☐ Snider
☐	☐ Childress	☐	☐ McCue	☐	☐ Tahir-Kheli
☐	☐ Curtin	☐	☐ Melby	☐	☐ Tobey
☐	☐ Donley	☐	☐ Menan	☐	☐ Working
☐	☐ Ebner	☐	☐ Miller	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Farrar	☐	☐ Miskel	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Grant	☐	☐ Paal	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Grimes	☐	☐ Pastorino	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Haass	☐	☐ Perina	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Heiser	☐	☒ Popadiuk	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Jackson	☐	☐ Porter	☐	☐ _____

INFORMATION
- ☒ Hughes
- ☒ Scowcroft (advance)
- ☐ ~~Perito~~
- ☒ Gates (advance)
- ☒ Secretariat
- ☒ Exec. Sec. Desk

COMMENTS

Logged By AC

Return to Secretariat

CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2427 Redo

April 11, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN PWR
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

SUBJECT: Presidential Speech on Western Europe

Attached is a draft of a possible Presidential speech on Western Europe. We look forward to a chance to talk to you about its ideas and about the best time for its delivery.

While most speeches about NATO are yawners, this one may grab attention, particularly in Europe:

-- It marks various steps away from recent U.S. policy, e.g., a ringing endorsement of nuclear deterrence and a pledge, in effect, to avoid repetitions of Reykjavik.

-- It speaks positively of EC-1992 and a European "pillar," as a great boon to the West in a period of fluidity in the international system. (One purpose or this is to make the strategic case for not letting our economic agencies declare war on the EC at this point in history.)

There are some new wrinkles here and there, which are underlined, and which you should look over carefully.

Prpc fm Arnie Kanter, Deane Hoffmann, and Nick Rostow concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the attached, and meet with us to discuss content and timing.

Approve ✓ Disapprove_____

Discussed w/ Blackwill 5/17

Attachment

Tab A Proposed Western Europe speech

NSC draft: 4/10/89

Western Europe Speech

When Harry Truman spoke at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, he explained its goal in his typical down-to-earth way:

> "In this pact, we hope to create a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression -- a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all our citizens."

And what a success it's been! Behind the shield of our collective defense, Europe revived and the free nations prospered. Aggression was deterred; the world was made safer. Our adversaries now talk seriously of peace. Has any alliance in history ensured the freedom and prosperity of so many nations with such success, and for so long?

The Challenge

Throughout those four decades, there were those who warned of problems in the Alliance. The prophecies of doom were wrong. Yet, problems there have been -- and problems there are today. We do ourselves no favor by ignoring them. In the coming years, the Atlantic Alliance will be tested as never before:

-- Many perceive the threat from our adversaries as diminishing, which diminishes the political will in our countries to maintain or modernize our defenses.

-- America's pursuit of nuclear arms reduction with the Soviet Union has sometimes unnerved our allies, who -- while they are eager for arms reduction -- also fear the erosion of our nuclear guarantee and chafe at the dependency that leaves their destiny so much in the hands of others.

-- As all our governments wrestle with economic challenges, there are tough disputes over trade and the equitable sharing of the common defense.

These challenges must be mastered. But if we master them, history offers us a unique chance to shape the future. For a new era of change is also testing our adversaries, and finding them wanting. Their system is in profound crisis:

-- In **Eastern** Europe, a powerful yearning for self-**determination** is asserting itself, which will not be satisfied by mere easing of the grip of illegitimate regimes.

-- In the Soviet Union, we see an extraordinary experiment in reform, bringing many welcome changes. Whatever the future extent -- or durability -- of this experiment, it already amounts to a dramatic confession of failure.

Perhaps we will see, down the road, a real end to the cruel division of Europe imposed by Soviet power. Perhaps we will see, down the road, a real end to the Soviet military threat to the West. That is our vision -- a Europe of security and freedom for all, East and West.

Today, it's the democracies that are vibrant, as we advance full-steam-ahead into the Information Revolution of supercomputers and telecommunications, transforming the technological base of world prosperity. It's no accident that this new burst of innovation came from the creativity of the free nations. And democracy is spreading around the world. The cause of human rights can't be suppressed. Our principles of economic freedom are being vindicated everywhere -- even in Communist countries. And the connection between political freedom and economic progress -- that lesson, too, is finally appreciated as never before.

About nine years from now, the Communist Manifesto will be 150 years old. That document preached a new social and economic system, and promised that capitalism would end up on the trash

heap of history. Yet today, it is Marxism that is everywhere discredited...despised...discarded.

My Commitment

As the democracies enter a new era of testing and of hope, let me declare America's commitment to its allies:

-- First, our major alliances in the Atlantic and the Pacific remain the cornerstones of our foreign policy. What was a bold innovation in 1949 is now a permanent fact, sustained by both moral principle and vital interest. This is a pledge backed by both American political parties, by the President and Congress united, and by our people.

-- Second, America remains committed to the defense of Europe by whatever means may be necessary, in accordance with the agreed Alliance strategy. Our nuclear forces remain the ultimate deterrent of aggression -- and there is no substitute. That's why modernization is so important. The most basic asymmetry in the European balance is geography -- the inescapable preponderance of Soviet power. The American nuclear guarantee is the equally inescapable counterweight.

-- Third, we remain equally committed to contribute to the conventional defense of Europe -- subject to our very real

hope to reach a more secure balance, at lower levels, through negotiations. I will strongly oppose legislative attempts to withdraw U.S. troops from Europe unilaterally. Moscow will still command a standing army of four and a half million men -- after the cutbacks announced by Mr. Gorbachev in December. We are prepared to maintain U.S. ground and air forces in Europe so long as a Soviet military threat to the continent exists.

-- Fourth, we will pursue better relations with our adversaries in every area, and on a broad agenda of arms reductions -- strategic nuclear, conventional, chemical. NATO's success over 40 years has brought us to an extraordinary moment of opportunity in East-West relations. We will seize that opportunity -- in constant consultation with our allies, sensitive to their vital interests and concerns. There will be no surprises for our allies on such important matters.

-- Fifth, the United States continues, as it has for the entire postwar period, to endorse and support European integration as one of the historic developments of our time. We welcome a larger European role in the world. We welcome the political role of the European Community, and we are eager, if the EC agrees, to develop and intensify the mechanisms of our consultation and cooperation on world issues.

The Threshold of the Next Century

I make these pledges because there is no doubt in my mind that America's goals for a new century of peace cannot be achieved except in partnership with our fellow democracies. If we have the wisdom to maintain the strength and unity that have brought us to this hopeful point, the future holds tremendous promise.

Look at Europe. Look at the breathtaking advance in European integration scheduled for 1992 -- a single European market.

European unity and NATO partnership are not in conflict; they reinforce each other. The founders of the Alliance in 1949 saw it as one of their principal aims to ensure a climate of security so that European integration -- which had already begun -- could proceed. European unification has meant the ending of hatreds, the fostering of democracy, the economic and social regeneration of a continent, and the strengthening of the West.

Nineteen-ninety-two will mean a new resurgence of the vast genius and potential of Europe. In today's new era of technology, it means Europe's opportunity to remain in the first rank. In an era of new hope for an end to Europe's divisions, resurgent Western Europe will be a magnet, drawing the economically and politically impoverished countries of Eastern Europe westward, toward our way of life. In today's new era of political change

sweeping across the continent, the strategic importance of what is happening on the Western side of the line cannot be overestimated.

There will be problems in Atlantic relations, but these problems are soluble. The United States and other nations will fight hard against protectionism and unfair barriers that deny access -- you can be sure of that. We want to see what President Kennedy used to call an "outward-looking" Europe, a European Community that uses its new strength to contribute to a global expansion of trade, not to constrict it. We need to create with our European friends specific new mechanisms to manage the transition to 1992 cooperatively.

In the security dimension, the dividend can be just as great. European defense coordination can mark a new stage of Atlantic relations. In the coming new era, the West needs a stronger "European pillar," in the framework of the Alliance. We support the historic endeavors of defense cooperation between France and Germany. We support the British and French independent nuclear deterrents and their modernization, cooperation between those two countries, and their special role in European security; we will make no agreements with the Soviet Union that compromise those forces. We value the contribution of the Eurogroup in NATO's councils. We applaud the revitalized Western European Union and its landmark "Platform" of October 1987, which expressed Europe's

own identity and interests but in partnership with the United States. We welcomed the WEU's coordination of European efforts to help protect the Persian Gulf.

I do not fear European defense cooperation. Granted, part of its motivation is to be a little more independent of us. But Europeans should see defense as an enterprise they engage in for their own future, not as a favor to the United States. And our security interests are parallel, indeed indivisible; no advocate of this European coordination conceives of a plausible defense of Europe without the continuing partnership with the United States.

Such efforts, which can increase the effectiveness of Europe's role in Western defense, should also be taken account of in any measurement of how burdens are being shared.

Conclusion

Nineteen-ninety-two, of course, will be a notable date for another reason -- commemorating the discovery of the New World. We have five centuries to celebrate, not just four decades.

We all know Canning's words about the New World called into existence to redress the balance of the Old. Twice in this century, the New World came to the rescue of the civilization

that gave birth to us. And we Americans, with our great and growing cultural diversity, like to think that we have enriched that common heritage.

How fitting it is that Europe's own resurgence will mark the next advance of that civilization! The North Atlantic Treaty expressed the will of its members, and I quote: "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." Those are values that Europe gave to all of us, and nurtured over its long history. The modern vitality of Europe -- its prosperity, its freedom, and its unity -- is the vindication and culmination of everything we cherish.

They are universal values -- whether expressed in the American Bill of Rights, or the French Rights of Man, or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or in the power of the idea of democracy as we see today on every continent. America -- and the world -- owe a moral debt to Europe that is beyond measure.

Today's challenges to the West are without precedent. There are dangers -- most of all if we fail to stand together. But our success for 40 years points the way to the future.

Harry Truman, on that memorable occasion, put it this way:

"We do not believe that there are blind tides of history which sweep men one way or another. In our own time we have seen brave men overcome obstacles that seemed insurmountable and forces that seemed overwhelming. Men with courage and vision can still determine their own destiny. They can choose slavery or freedom -- war or peace. ... If there is anything certain today, if there is anything inevitable in the future, it is the will of the people of the world for freedom and for peace."

How right he was!

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
~~Bob Perito~~ Dooley	1	MD	A
Philip Hughes	2	~~JPK~~	
Bob Gates	3	✓	✓
Brent Scowcroft	4	✓	
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	4/7	N
NSC Secretariat	6		N/R

89 APR 11 A10:52

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

<DIST>SIT: BLACKWILL DYKE HUTCHINGS SNIDER VAX ZELIKOW

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUFHNA<DTG> 271308Z APR 89
<ORIG>FM USMISSION USNATO
<TO>TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1675

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR THE NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION

<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 02455
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: NATO, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR THE NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION
REF: (A) USNATO 1590; (B) USNATO 1822
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS DRAFT OPERATIVE PORTIONS FOR A SUMMIT DECLARATION WHICH WOULD FORM THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE "AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE" WHICH MISSION BELIEVES SHOULD BE CONTAINED IN THE DOCUMENT. AS WE POINTED OUT IN REFTEL, SUCH AN AGENDA IS LIKELY TO BE THE BEST WAY TO TRANSMIT A SENSE OF VISION FOR THE ALLIANCE. WHILE THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF WILL CONTINUE WORK ON THE DECLARATIVE PORTIONS OF THE DECLARATION DRAFT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE BEST MEANS OF INSERTING US IDEAS INTO THE PAPER WILL BE THROUGH THESE OPERATIVE PORTIONS.
3. WE SUBMIT CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE AREAS OF COMMON DEFENCE, THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP AND OVERCOMING THE DIVISION OF EUROPE. EACH OF THESE AREAS FOCUSES ON TOPICS WHERE WE AND THE DEPARTMENT HAVE BELIEVED THAT SPECIFIC, CONCRETE INITIATIVES COULD BE AGREED. THE MISSION PROPOSED A NUMBER OF SUCH INITIATIVES IN REFS (A) AND (B).
4. ACTION REQUESTED: IF WE ARE TO INFLUENCE THE FINAL DRAFT COMMUNIQUE SUCCESSFULLY IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO INSERT BOTH OUR LANGUAGE AND IDEAS FOR POSSIBLE INITIATIVES. THE LANGUAGE TRANSMITTED BELOW GOES AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TOWARDS ESTABLISHING AN OPERATIVE STRUCTURE WITHOUT SPECIFIC INITIATIVES. REQUEST DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATION TO SUBMIT THESE TEXTS AS WELL AS WORD ON SPECIFIC INITIATIVES THE US WISHES TO PROPOSE. WE NEED WASHINGTON'S VIEWS ON THIS PROPOSED LANGUAGE AND ON THE I.S. INFORMAL DRAFT PRIOR TO THE SPC MEETING ON THE MORNING OF MAY 2.
5. BEGIN TEXT OF SUGGESTED LANGUAGE:
MAINTAINING THE COMMON DEFENSE

FROM ITS INCEPTION OUR ALLIANCE HAS BEEN DEFENSIVE IN PURPOSE, AND THIS WILL REMAIN SO. WE SEEK TO PREVENT WAR AND TO PRESERVE PEACE IN FREEDOM.

DESPITE SIGNS OF DECREASED TENSION IN EUROPE, SUFFICIENT MILITARY FORCES REMAIN THE FOUNDATION OF ALLIANCE SECURITY. WE ARE DETERMINED TO TAKE ALL OF THE STEPS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT OUR FORCES, BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL, ARE SUFFICIENTLY CAPABLE, DIVERSIFIED, SURVIVABLE AND FLEXIBLE TO ENSURE THAT MILITARY FORCE CAN NEVER BE USED AGAINST US.

WE ARE COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING THESE FORCES AT THE LOWEST LEVEL CONSISTENT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE. THE PRINCIPLE OF SHARING BOTH THE RISKS AND THE BURDENS OF DEFENSE IS CENTRAL TO OUR PARTNERSHIP. WE WILL NOT ALLOW CIRCUMSTANCES TO DEVELOP WHICH COULD RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE COMMITMENT OF ALL MEMBERS TO THE SECURITY OF ALL OTHERS.

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SHARES OF THE BURDENS OF OUR DEFENSE HAS ALWAYS BEEN DETERMINED BY THE RESOURCES WHICH INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS CAN CONTRIBUTE. RESPECTIVE SHARES HAVE NEVER BEEN STATIC IN SIZE; NOR SHOULD THEY BE.

TODAY, WE HAVE REAFFIRMED THE COMMITMENT OF EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES TO SHARE FAIRLY IN THE RESPONSIBILITIES AS WELL AS THE REWARDS OF OUR ALLIANCE. IN THIS CONTEXT, OUR EUROPEAN MEMBERS ARE DETERMINED TO ASSUME A GREATER ROLE, COMMENSURATE WITH THE CONTINUED GROWTH IN THEIR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRENGTH.

ALL ALLIES ALSO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO INCREASED EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY OF OUR DEFENSE. WE ARE DETERMINED TO ACCELERATE PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARDS MORE ECONOMICAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT. WE WILL WORK TO ENSURE THAT COMMERCIAL BARRIERS ARE NOT ERECTED TO HINDER THIS DEVELOPMENT.

WE WILL ALSO INVESTIGATE WITH INCREASED VIGOR POSSIBILITIES FOR ROLE SPECIALIZATION OR TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITIES AS A MEANS OF INCREASING EFFICIENCY. OUR GOAL WILL BE TO ENSURE THAT EACH ALLY PROVIDES THE CONTRIBUTION MOST SUITED TO ITS ABILITIES AND CAPABILITIES, THUS STRENGTHENING THE OVERALL ALLIANCE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USNATO 02455

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: NATO, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR THE NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION
REF: (A) USNATO 1590; (B) USNATO 1822

EFFORT.

TOWARDS AN ENHANCED PARTNERSHIP

OUR PARTNERSHIP IS BASED ON ENDURING INTERESTS AND VALUES WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE WELL-BEING OF OUR DEMOCRATIC NATIONS. IT CENTERS ON THE COMMITMENT TO COMMON ACTION WHICH GUIDED ITS FOUNDERS FOUR DECADES AGO.

MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE RECOGNIZE THAT PROTECTING THE SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF OUR DEMOCRACIES IS A TASK WHICH TRANSCENDS THE RESOURCES OF ANY ONE NATION OR REGIONAL GROUP. WHATEVER OTHER ARRANGEMENTS MAY DEVELOP AMONG US, THE TRANSATLANTIC SCOPE OF NATO IS ESSENTIAL TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR SECURITY.

THESE ENDURING INTERESTS DO NOT MEAN THAT WE REJECT CHANGE. OUR WESTERN SOCIETIES ARE BUILT ON THE ASSUMPTION OF PROGRESS AND THUS OF CHANGE. THE BASIC GOALS OF OUR PARTNERSHIP INCLUDE A DESIRE FOR CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF RELATIONS AMONG THE ALLIES AND WITH OTHER NATIONS. WE WISH OUR COOPERATION TO DEEPEN AND BECOME MORE MEANINGFUL. WE WISH TO OVERCOME BARRIERS AMONG NATIONS AND AMONG PEOPLES.

AS WE APPROACH A NEW CENTURY, IT WILL BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT FOR NATO TO RECOGNIZE THE CHAGES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED ALREADY WITHIN WESTERN SOCIETIES AND IN OUR RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER.

THE CHALLENGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THESE DEVELOPMENTS WILL IN MANY WAYS BE AS DAUNTING AS THOSE WHICH FACED OUR FOUNDERS FORTY YEARS AGO. OUR SUCCESS IN MEETING THEM WILL TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT DETERMINE THE WORLDWIDE ATTRACTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL TO NATIONS LESS PRIVILEGED THAN WE ARE.

TO ENSURE THE CONTINUING SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS, WE HAVE AGREED UPON THE FOLLOWING STEPS:

- -- WE WILL EXPAND THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF OUR EFFORTS WITHIN NATO TO ENSURE THAT OUR RESPECTIVE

APPROACHES TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AFFECTING OUR COMMON SECURITY ARE COMPLEMENTARY AND MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE. WE WILL LOOK WITH RENEWED ATTENTION TO PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY WHICH CALL FOR INCREASED CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES OF MEMBER STATES.

- -- WE WILL RESIST THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANY NEW BARRIERS BETWEEN US, WHETHER POLITICAL, TECHNOLOGICAL OR ECONOMIC IN NATURE: THERE WILL BE NO FORTRESS EUROPE IN 1992, NOR WILL NORTH AMERICA RETREAT FROM ITS COMMITMENTS TO OR ITS PRESENCE IN EUROPE.
- -- GIVEN THE DRAMATICALLY INCREASING DEGREE TO WHICH OUR POLITICAL, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS INTERACT WITH OTHER REGIONS, WE WILL EXPLORE WAYS BY WHICH OUR CLOSE COOPERATION WITH JAPAN, AUSTRALIA AND THE OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES OF THE WORLD CAN BE STRENGTHENED IN SUPPORT OF COMMON GOALS.
- -- WE WILL ENSURE THAT, THROUGH THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY AND OTHER BODIES, THE POLITICAL MECHANISMS OF THE ALLIANCE WORK EVEN MORE CLOSELY WITH PARLIAMENTARIANS FROM ALLIANCE COUNTRIES. SIMILARLY, WE WILL SEEK TO INVOLVE NEW GENERATIONS MORE DEEPLY IN SHAPING THE GOALS OF THE ALLIANCE.
- -- RECOGNIZING THAT OUR SECURITY INCREASINGLY DEPENDS ON A CONCERTED RESPONSE TO CONCERNS OF A GLOBAL NATURE, SUCH AS THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT, THE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE WELFARE OF OUR PEOPLES, WE WILL EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN OUR PROGRAMS OF SCIENTIFIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION.

OVERCOMING THE DIVISION OF EUROPE

THE DIVISION OF EUROPE AND THE DENIAL OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE PEOPLES OF EASTERN EUROPE REMAIN THE MOST DANGEROUS AND PAINFUL CONSEQUENCES OF WORLD WAR II. FROM ITS INCEPTION, THE ALLIANCE HAS SOUGHT TO OVERCOME THIS DIVISION. OUR SENSE OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLES INVOLVED DEMANDS THESE EFFORTS. THE SEARCH FOR A STABLE PEACE IN EUROPE REQUIRES THAT THEY SUCCEED.

NATO'S APPROACH TO THIS TASK HAS FROM THE BEGINNING BEEN GUIDED BY OUR BELIEF THAT A LASTING PEACE IN EUROPE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USNATO 02455

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: NATO, PARM, PREL
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CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY WHEN ALL NATIONS AND ALL PEOPLES ARE GUARANTEED THE BASIC RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION WHICH ARE ENSHRINED IN THE UN CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

OUR STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING THESE GOALS WAS SET FORTH IN THE REPORT ON THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE (HARMEL REPORT), ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL IN 1967. THIS DOCUMENT REMAINS THE BASIS OF OUR PEACE POLICY. THE TWIN PILLARS OF DEFENSE AND DIALOGUE WILL CONSTITUTE OUR ESSENTIAL APPROACH.

EVENTS OF RECENT MONTHS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE RIGHTNESS OF THIS STRATEGY. CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE RAISE HOPES OF TRUE PROGRESS TOWARDS THE GOAL OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACEFUL ORDER IN EUROPE STATED IN THE HARMEL REPORT. SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS IS NOW IN SIGHT. WE ARE DETERMINED NOT TO MISS THE CHANCE TO ACHIEVE DEMOCRACY THROUGHOUT EUROPE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY.

WE HAVE THUS CONCLUDED TODAY THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD REINTENSIFY ITS EFFORTS TO OVERCOME THE DIVISION OF EUROPE BY MAKING MORE CONCRETE AND OPERATIONAL THE STRATEGY SET FORTH IN THE HARMEL REPORT. WE HAVE AGREED THAT OUR GOAL SHOULD BE A BROAD EXPANSION OF MUTUALLY-BENEFICIAL CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, BASED AS BEFORE ON OUR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL APPROACHES TO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES.

THE PURPOSE OF THESE CONTACTS WILL BE TO TAKE THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE A STEP FURTHER. WE WILL PURSUE A VISION OF A EUROPE REUNITED IN PEACE. WE WILL SEEK CONCRETE PROGRESS TOWARDS THIS GOAL BY FOCUSING ON THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF TENSION IN EUROPE. OUR GOAL WILL BE TO REMOVE THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN THE ARTIFICIAL DIVISION OF THE CONTINENT.

TO THAT END, WE HAVE AGREED THE FOLLOWING STEPS:

-- OUR BASIC TOOL WILL REMAIN COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE. WE ARE READY TO EXPAND COOPERATION IN ALL FIELDS SET FORTH IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THIS COOPERATION WILL BE MEASURES WHICH ACTUALLY IMPROVE THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN OF EASTERN NATIONS.

-- TO THIS END, WE CHALLENGE NATIONS OF THE EAST TO PURSUE REFORMS WHICH WILL SUPPORT SUCH EAST-WEST COOPERATION. THESE INCLUDE INTRODUCTION OF DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS AND MARKET MECHANISMS. WALLS WHICH DIVIDE NATIONS AND PEOPLES SHOULD BE TORN DOWN. THE EXTENT TO WHICH INDIVIDUAL EASTERN STATES PURSUE SUCH POLICIES WILL BE A FACTOR IN OUR READINESS TO DEEPEN COOPERATION.

-- IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR WESTERN DEMOCRATIC VALUES, OUR FOCUS WILL BE ON THE INDIVIDUAL. RECENT EVENTS HAVE AGAIN SHOWN THAT DIVISIONS IN EUROPE RESULT ABOVE ALL FROM DENIAL OF OPPORTUNITY AND FREEDOM TO INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS. PROVISION TO CITIZENS OF EASTERN COUNTRIES OF MODERN STANDARDS OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING, HEALTH, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY ARE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A STABLE ORDER IN EUROPE.

-- OUR PROGRAM FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT HAS BEEN PUBLISHED SEPARATELY. IT REMAINS AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR STRATEGY. IN ADDITION, WE URGE ACCEPTANCE OF WIDE RANGING MEASURES OF OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY SUCH AS THOSE NOW BEING DISCUSSED IN VIENNA. SEVERAL ALLIES ARE READY TO SUPPLEMENT THESE MEASURES WITH INDIVIDUAL STEPS TO ALLOW EVEN MORE DIRECT INSPECTION OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND MANUFACTURING CENTERS.

-- IF PROGRESS TOWARDS OPENNESS CONTINUES, WE WILL CONSIDERS MEANS TO EXTEND WESTERN EXPERIENCE AND KNOW-HOW TO EASTERN COUNTRIES IN A VARIETY OF WAYS. EXCHANGES IN TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL FIELDS, ESTABLISHMENT OF COOPERATIVE TRAINING PROGRAMS, EXPANSION OF EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES ALL OFFER POSSIBILITIES WHICH HAVE NOT YET BEEN EXHAUSTED.

-- RECENT EXPERIENCE IN AREAS SUCH AS HEALTH, DISASTER ASSISTANCE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT DEMONSTRATE ADDITIONAL POSSIBILITIES FOR INCREASE COOPERATION. WE WILL WORK WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND BILATERALLY TO INTENSIFY COOPERATION IN THESE AREAS.

6. END TEXT SUGGESTED LANGUAGE.

KEEL

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03<SSN> 2455<STOR> 890427091907 MSG000230980747
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03<SSN> 2455<STOR> 890427092021 MSG000230980821
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CHRON FILE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

OA/R

2644

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

April 13, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: EUGENE M. EBNER

SUBJECT: Budget Decision Update

We understand that as a result of ongoing budget negotiations with the Congress to avoid a possible sequester, Defense will be required to take a $3.9 Billion cut in 1990 in addition to the $6.3 Billion reduction already made in the Bush Budget. This would result in about -1% real growth in 1990 rather than the zero real growth previously projected. Outlays would also be reduced by $1.5 Billion in addition to the $2.6 Billion already announced. Thus, the total reduction in 1990 from the Reagan program would be $10.2 Billion in Budget Authority and $4.1 Billion in outlays. As far as we know, no changes were made to the defense budget in 1991 and beyond. It is also unclear as of this time as to whether these additional reductions will be reflected in the budget amendment transmitted by Secretary Cheney to the Congress on April 25, but it is logical to assume that they will.

The Secretary did make the following tentative major program decisions today:

TRIDENT - retained procurement schedule as in President's budget (no delay)

V-22 - Cancelled program

Anti-Submarine Warfare -
Maintained SSN-21 procurement schedule as in the President's budget but deleted one of four SSN-21s planned for procurement in 1995. Also, terminated SSN-688 program after FY 1989 buy

F-14D - Cancelled new production but continued the remanufacture program

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ES 12/14/15

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F-15E - Reduced total program from 278 to 200 aircraft and ceased procurement of F-15E after 1991. Also terminated LANTERN pod set procurement.

Anti-Air Warfare Ships -
As proposed by the Navy, deleted one DDG-51 in FY 1991 and one DDG-51 in 1994.

National Aerospace Plan (NASP) -
Transferred funds to NASA

These reductions, in addition to the tentative decisions already made (see previous memo), yield $7.7 Billion in budget authority savings for 1990 --- leaving an additional $2.5 Billion needed to reach the new $10.2 Billion reduction target. Defense is currently working towards identifying further program adjustments. We will keep you informed.

Don Snider concurs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONFIDENTIAL 2628

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

OA/ID

April 13, 1989

INFORMATION

Thanks BS
Natl Sec Advisor has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

SUBJECT: Les Aspin Comments on Lance Modernization

Arnie saw Les socially last night. In the course of conversation, Les reiterated what he has told others recently about his view of what Congress needs -- especially from the Germans --in order to fund Lance modernization.

He said that the present Congressional requirements were minimal, and that he was reasonably confident that he could put together a coalition of moderate and conservative Democrats to support the R&D for Lance follow-on that is in the FY 1990 and FY 1991 budget (i.e., through the German election) with nothing more from the Germans than we have now. He added that people who were saying that a German commitment was essential to secure Congressional funding were using the Hill as an excuse to try to lock Lance modernization into the defense program.

In response to Arnie's question, Les said that Congressional support was not tied to any specific program of Lance modernization, and that an Administration decision on a specific approach was not a precondition to getting the Hill to go along on R&D funding. Indeed, Les volunteered that he was worried about the political sustainability of a modernization program based on MLRS (although he thinks that MLRS is the way to go on military and cost-effectiveness grounds). He said that he was struggling to find a suitably discreet way to get the Pentagon to take a serious look at alternative approaches to modernization so that there would be a well prepared fallback, if necessary, but he recognized the cost if any such contingency planning leaked. On a related matter, he added that he was thinking about raising publicly the issue of the arms control implications of using MLRS in a nuclear role, and especially the problem of "launcher distinguishability."

Virginia Lampley and Don Mahley concur.

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National Security Council
The White House

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Philip Hughes	2	[illegible]	I
Bob Gates	3	[illegible]	
Brent Scowcroft	4	[illegible]	✓
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5		N
NSC Secretariat	6		N

89 APR 13 P8:42

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR ROBERT BLACKWILL
AMBASSADOR ROZANNE RIDGWAY

Attached are two-page papers* on the initiatives assigned to us at our meeting on April 14. The topics are indexed below:

	TAB		
NO	1	-	European SACEUR
w/o the openness	2	-	US-Soviet Defense Meetings on Force Developments
" YES	3	-	Open Skies
NO	4	-	SACEUR Meetings with Warsaw Pact Counterpart
YES	5	-	NATO Arms Market (Common Defense Market) West-West
YES	6	-	Training Impact on the Environment
NO	7	-	Burdensharing (but put in a speech)
YES	8	-	Monitored Storage
NO	9	-	CFE Verification Experiments
YES	10	-	Joint Inventory of CFE Armaments
YES	11	-	Permanent Observers Experiment
YES	12	-	Post-CFE Force Structure
YES	13	-	Tank Production Decrease
~~OK~~ NO	14	-	Military Doctrine
~~OK~~ NO	15	-	Other Military Glasnost Themes
	16	-	CW Initiative

* Should be considered "draft"

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2003-0368-F/1

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05b. Paper	Re: European Saceur (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	~~S~~

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (April 1989) [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 10/23/2013

Date Closed:	7/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91148-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2003-0368-F/1(105.05)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	9/17/2008	**MR Disposition Date:**	

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P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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EUROPEAN SACEUR

Proposal:

The position of Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, which has traditionally been held by an American, should be held by a European officer. By relinquishing our claim on this position, the U.S. would send a strong signal that it expects Europeans to assume the major responsibility for planning Europe's defense. This would be consistent with our efforts to encourage greater burdensharing.

Analysis:

Advocates of this view, including former President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, appear to believe that such a change will strengthen the European pillar of the NATO Alliance. But a European SACEUR is not likely to engender increased defense support from European governments. For the most part this will continue to depend on public and parliamentary perceptions of the threat.

The idea of a European SACEUR may have some merit from a burdensharing perspective, but less as an immediate objective than as a long-term result of a redistribution of allied roles, risks, and responsibilities. For the immediate future, the U.S. will remain the single, most important contributor to NATO's defense. No other nation can come close, for example, to matching our commitment after reinforcement of some 22 divisions and 2,800 aircraft. On burdensharing grounds alone, it would seem inequitable to place such forces under a commander from a nation which makes a much smaller contribution to the common defense.

A European SACEUR would weaken the U.S. position of leadership in NATO and could prompt increased pressure for U.S. force reductions in Europe. The net result might be a weakened U.S. contribution with no noticeable strengthening of the European contribution. In fact, the past forty years of stability in Europe can be largely attributed to strong U.S. leadership, to which SACEUR has made an important contribution.

(b)(1)



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

Additionally, the selection process for a European SACEUR could prove difficult. Based on national contributions, the logical choice would be either a UK or Bundeswehr general.





In any case, both flanks would likely want to nominate their own candidates. Some of these could bring with them a regional bias. The very potential power of SACEUR, with the right of direct access to the Head of Government of any NATO nation, makes it imperative that his selection not become a divisive issue. That is the case today with a U.S. SACEUR, but might not remain so if the choice were thrown open among competing European candidates.

Finally, there is no pressure from NATO governments today to change the nationality of SACEUR. It is quite likely, in fact, that these governments would oppose such a move.

With the above in view, we believe that the proposal for a European SACEUR should not be pursued for the time being. Further study is needed as to its advisability as a long-term goal.

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U.S.-Soviet Defense Ministers Meetings on Force Developments

Proposal: U.S. and Soviet Defense Ministers should meet periodically to discuss developments in their respective military forces.

Content and Goals of Such Meetings: Meetings on "force developments" could include a wide variety of issues which are relevant to the security interests of each side, including manning and equipment levels, deployment, structure, doctrine, military production and spending. Such meetings could serve useful purposes, including:

- Build mutual confidence/understanding. Better understanding of our respective military policies, doctrines, and capabilities would enhance US-Soviet stability.

- Influence Soviet behavior toward our security objectives.

- Provide a forum for advancing Western concerns about Soviet military policies.

- Encourage greater Soviet openness about military policies and activities.

It is important that we consult with our NATO allies to ensure their confidence that Allied interests are fully protected and represented.

Discussion: The concept of U.S.-Soviet Defense Ministers meetings is not new. Three such meetings have taken place over the past year, including Secretary of Defense Carlucci's meetings with Soviet Defense Minister Yazov in Bern, Switzerland, in March 1988, on the margins of the summit in Moscow in May, and again in Moscow in August, during Secretary Carlucci's visit to the USSR. At these meetings discussions were held on military doctrine, deployments, and spending; arms control; regional issues; human rights; and bilateral contacts. The Allies were briefed on these meetings through "Dear Colleague" letters from Secretary Carlucci to each NATO MOD and briefings in NATO.

These meetings have generally been well-received by the Allies, and Allied military contacts with the Soviet Bloc are now beginning to pick up. The West German MOD met MOD Yazov during his visit to Moscow with Chancellor Kohl in October 1988 and the French MOD is meeting with Yazov in Moscow this month. Other military/defense contacts are planned, including with Eastern Europe.

SecDef is considering inviting MOD Yazov to the U.S., perhaps in October.

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The success of past U.S.-Soviet MOD meetings in promoting mutual understanding and advancing Western concerns and their favorable reception by our Allies support the current proposal to set up periodic U.S.-Soviet MOD meetings. It is not clear, however, how this proposal improves upon past practice, unless regularly scheduled meetings are envisioned. We believe, in fact, that concentrating on "force developments" would focus the meetings too narrowly. Inclusion on the agenda of past meetings of such issues as arms control, regional issues, human rights and bilateral contacts has served to advance both U.S. and Allied interests.

Another important question is whether it is proper or wise to advance a proposal for a bilateral U.S.-Soviet contact as a "NATO initiative." It seems likely that such a proposal would lead to or at least encourage efforts to promote a substantial increase in NATO-Warsaw Pact MOD meetings and other military contacts, possibly on an institutionalized basis. Although the trend is already moving in that direction, the proposal for U.S.-Soviet MOD meetings would be likely to speed it up. This would not necessarily be in our interest; it could reinforce the already growing perception in Western Europe of a declining Soviet threat and provide the Soviets an increased opportunity to play "wedge" politics among the Allies.

Recommendation: We should oppose making U.S.-Soviet MOD meetings a NATO proposal, and favor instead keeping it in the bilateral arena.

OPEN SKIES

Initiative: Revival of a proposal for US/USSR negotiated rights of low level reconnaissance, popularly known as "Open Skies."

Background: The "Open Skies" proposal has appeared over time as both a bilateral US/USSR measure and as a multilateral European-wide measure. As first proposed by President Eisenhower in 1955, the "Open Skies" proposal took the form of a sweeping bilateral inspection regime that would lay the political foundation for eventual disarmament. Equally dramatic was the accompanying proposal that the US and USSR exchange blueprints of their military establishments. At the 1958 Geneva Surprise Attack Conference, the proposal reappeared in a somewhat more concrete and limited form. The West included aerial inspection as one "technique for observation and inspection of the instruments of surprise attack," and the Soviet bloc proposed aerial photography zones of 800 km on either side of the East/West line of contact, including some western US territory. The idea then resurfaced as an associated measure in the MBFR negotiations, closely linked to the verification of specific reductions. Most recently, the US floated the idea during deliberations on the NATO proposal for the Vienna Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs). The Allies opposed the measure.

The above chronology reveals that we have come full circle since the Eisenhower Administration, although we find ourselves in the same place for different reasons. "Open Skies" began as a broad concept of inspection and openness, rejected (by the Soviets) as a means of deliberate espionage without the benefits of concurrent reductions. In response, the idea evolved into a verification measure directly tied to reduction proposals. Over time, however, as the technology of verification developed in the direction of satellite surveillance, the military and intelligence value of "Open Skies" diminished. When proposed as a CSBM, "Open Skies" returned to its original purpose as an openness measure in and of itself, as a builder of trust with considerable public appeal, but this time it promised little return as a verification measure.

Allied rejection of "Open Skies" as a CSBM is a reflection of both traditional skepticism of the measure as dressed up espionage and concern about the practical complexities of applying the measure to 35 nations. Several variants were criticized as overly ambitious, technically difficult, too costly, too risky from the point of view of safety in the crowded skies over Europe, and too sensitive with respect to the negotiation of equipment allowed aboard aircraft and the sharing of data among Allies. In the end, the Allies were able to agree only on a strengthening of the Stockholm Document's provision for a short aerial overflight in conjunction with on-site inspections of ground force activities.

There is no point in reviving the proposal as a NATO initiative now, certainly not without consultations with the major detractors: the Germans and the French. Furthermore, if we were to include US territory in an East/West aerial reconnaissance proposal, we would undermine the integrity of

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the mandated zone for both the CFE and the CSBM Negotiations. The option remains, however, of a US initiative on a bilateral US/USSR "Open Skies" measure.

Pros: Reciprocal rights of low level reconnaissance over the entire Soviet Union and the entire United States, despite obvious negotiated restrictions, would be a real advance in US/Soviet openness toward each other as it would open vast amounts of territory currently off limits. Such a measure would have significant public appeal, and the US could not be accused of putting forth an asymmetrical proposal. Although aerial surveillance is no substitute for continuous coverage from satellite imagery collection systems, it can be of use in checking questionable military activities or as a supplement to satellite imagery. Furthermore, an independent "Open Skies" initiative could act as a broad deterrent to cheating on a number of arms control provisions already in force. The state refusing to permit a routine or requested overflight would incur a political price. An "Open Skies" initiative could also have application to issues beyond arms control, such as openness with respect to natural and industrial disasters. Finally, "Open Skies" would directly challenge the mentality that allowed for the 1983 KAL tragedy.

Cons: "Open Skies" challenges the limits of US readiness to subject its territory to close aerial inspection. At the same time, we should not overestimate the benefits of collection from aerial overflight. If civilian air routes are used, they already direct air traffic to the least interesting areas. A practical concern is that dedicated aircraft or temporarily assigned aircraft to "Open Skies" missions would most likely siphon funds from already limited intelligence collection budgets. A more general concern is that awareness of the increasing sophistication of satellite technology makes "Open Skies" seem irrelevant. Furthermore, public diplomacy points for an "Open Skies" proposal would be somewhat negated by comparison with the far more provocative Eisenhower proposal that included an exchange of military establishment blueprints.

Conclusion: At the heart of an assessment of an "Open Skies" initiative is the tradeoff between the benefits of removing the Soviet "veil of secrecy" and the costs of US readiness to be so open. A number of related ideas have emerged based on joint satellite surveillance projects. The US has resisted such ideas due to sensitivities about the sharing of satellite technology and data. Although the availability of increasingly sophisticated commercial satellites challenges this resistance, it will be some time before the resistance weakens. At the same time, the sophistication of satellite technology chips away at the relevance of "Open Skies" to intelligence collection and to protection of sensitive sites and activities. We should thus take advantage of the political opportunity to advance an idea that would clearly demonstrate that one of the most poignant symbols of the Cold War -- the Gary Powers incident -- has been overcome.

Prepared by: BWSymington:ESN:NP:bws:x73645:4-18-89

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Regularized Meetings between SACEUR and CINC of the Warsaw Pact

Proposal: There should be meetings on a regular basis between the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (presently US Army General John Galvin) and the Commander-inChief of the Warsaw Pact (presently General of the Soviet Army Petr Lushev).

Content of Possible Meetings: Conceptually, such meetings could be held for a variety of purposes and to address a range of issues. For a minimalist approach, such meetings might be designed merely to establish contact, let the two military leaders size each other up, and establish the basis for further communications, particularly in a crisis. For a more ambitious approach, the two leaders could address one or more of the following:

1) Exchange of information on forces, details of upcoming exercises or deployments, and information on doctrinal/strategic/tactical developments.

2) Exchange of information on Soviet and East European announced unilateral reductions and any other force changes, and any possible force changes NATO may be making over the next two years.

3) Discussion of any actions/force developments which either side finds potentially destabilizing.

4) Review of NATO/Warsaw Pact implementation of CSBMs.

5) Discussion of possible reductions and CSBMs being addressed in CFE and the CSBM negotiations.

6) Review of and exchange of possible new ideas on East-West defense/military contacts, including all bilateral contacts between member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Discussion of further East-West military exchanges, such as NATO/Pact meetings at lower levels and visits to alliance academies or training schools (e.g. NATO Defense College).

7) Establishment of a hotline between SACEUR and CINC/Warsaw Pact.

8) Exchange of representatives or Military Liaison Missions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Moscow and Brussels (this is an idea developed under the auspices of the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute).

Current US/NATO Position: In recent years, the US and NATO have rebuffed Soviet/Warsaw Pact efforts to arrange meetings between SACEUR and the CINC of the Warsaw Pact.

Some 2-3 years ago, the Warsaw Pact attempted to deliver a communication to SACEUR suggesting a meeting. NATO political authorities took

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the position that if members of the Warsaw Pact wished to communicate with NATO, they should do so with individual member countries of NATO using bilateral channels.

Soviet authorities have also suggested to U.S. authorities, including Soviet MOD Yazov to Secretary of Defense Carlucci in March 1988, that USCINCEUR (who is also SACEUR) meet with Soviet Commanders; the U.S. has taken the position that meetings involving CINCEUR/SACEUR would be inappropriate but that meetings between the Commander-in-Chief, US Army Europe, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Group of Forces Germany are appropriate (indeed such a meeting was included on the two year program of military contacts agreed to in June 1988 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Soviet General Staff during the later's visit to the U.S.)

NATO in about 1970 appointed former NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio to be an "MBFR explorer", to explore with Warsaw Pact countries possible substance and modalities for negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. Warsaw Pact countries refused to receive him. This is believed to have been the first and last time NATO has ever endorsed having a representative of NATO per se meet with representatives of Warsaw Pact countries. In subsequent negotiations on MBFR and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, representatives have represented their individual countries and not the Alliance.

Two key considerations in the NATO allies' refusal to have NATO officials meet with Warsaw Pact officials appear to be concern that meetings between such representatives would tend to equate the Warsaw Pact politically and morally with NATO and that NATO representatives might make statements or take positions on which all 16 members of the Alliance might not agree, and that attempts to coordinate in advance statements or positions would be at a minimum a significant burden. They might also be concerned that NATO representatives might discuss issues which are the subject of on-going negotiations (e.g., CFE and CSBMS) and cause problems for these negotiations. France, which objects to bloc-to-bloc approaches, could be expected to object to having NATO representatives meet with Warsaw Pact representatives; while France is not a member of the NATO integrated military command, France might want to keep even a greater distance from NATO military authorities if SACEUR were to become involved in discussions with the Warsaw Pact.

Recommended Position: That the U.S. not put forward to our NATO allies a proposal for regularized SACEUR-CINC/Warsaw Pact discussions. If further consideration is to be given to this suggestion, there should first be a discrete, close-hold discussion individually with key allies, such as the UK, FRG, and France.

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NATO ARMS MARKET

Proposal. The proposal would be to create a NATO defense armaments market which would operate under rules similar to the "EC Single Market", except it would be open to all NATO members and limited to defense items. A nation needing military goods would put out a request for proposal and any company in the market would be able to bid on a equal basis. A nation could not restrict outsiders or give preference to a domestic industry. The open market for cooperative development and R&D would be limited to uniquely military items. Overall procurement would be open for all goods and services purchased by the respective MOD's. Items procured by the MOD's that are common to defense and non-defense would be procured under the same procedures as for other EC government procurement except it would not be limited to the EC countries.

Analysis. The European community is working towards a single market to be fully organized by 1992. As part of the single market, all internal trade barriers would be eliminated. The single market is not inherently protectionist, but we have concerns that certain European protectionists will attempt to use this opportunity to put their own spin on various "1992" proposals which could raise barriers against arms imports from non-EC nations. Some French interests in particular are talking in terms of a European arms market which would use "temporary tariffs" supposedly to protect infant or weak defense industries until they could become mature and compete with the U.S.

The proposal to create a NATO arms market would build on the EC single market idea but would be on a NATO wide basis to include Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Canada and the United States in addition to the EC nations. It would preclude the possibility of trade barriers against the external acquisition of military goods and supplies. This would, of course, force the U.S. to be more open.

The COCOM problem would remain the same as is already the case with the European Market. The only change would be that the U.S. and a few other nations would be on the inside rather than on the outside.

If the numerous obstacles could be overcome, a NATO arms market would develop a uniquely large market for defense goods which should permit large and more economical production runs and benefit all NATO nations. However, NATO arms market could have serious implications for our policy of a North American defense industrial base. We would thus need to consult with the Canadians before broaching it to our other allies. Japan's desire for participation in advanced defense systems would make it a interested party also.

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Though this proposal might prove to be worth exploring with the allies, it would need to be carefully veted with concerned US Agencies. A scaled down version of this approach would be to propose a "free trade" market for defense products, formalizing and broadening the bilateral agreements we currently have with allies that exempt defense products from tariffs or other similar barriers. The objectives would be to put down a marker and establish an alternative to existing notions of erecting such barriers in the EC.

NATO TRAINING IMPACTS ON EUROPEAN ENVIRONEMENT

Proposition: NATO field commanders can take action to lessen the impact of our military training on the total European environment. People throughout Europe are voicing their opposition to the effects that noise, dust, erosion, maneuver damage and accidents have on their environment.

Analysis: The environmental issue receiving the greatest attention throughout NATO today is low level flying in the FRG. The fundamental NATO strategy in the Central Region is forward defense-to defend against an attack by Warsaw Pact forces at the inner German border, giving up as little territory as possible. This strategy is based on the capability to effect a Follow-On Forces Attack primarily through employment of Offensive Counter Air operations. Essential to this concept are allied forces stationed in or committed to the Central Region training at 100-300 feet above the ground. This means that 1200 fighter aircraft that train in the FRG fly 67,000 hours of low level flying which places an extreme noise burden on the 61 million people living in the FRG. The problem of low-level flying is not new. We have reduced USAFE low-level sorties from 31,500 in 1985 to 17,800 in 1987, a 45 percent reduction in three years. Additionally, USAFE exports approximately 5,000 sorties annually. There is a minimum level to sustain our readiness for NATO's forward defense strategy. To complicate the problem even further, introduction of future weapon systems such as the F-15E/F-16 LANTIRN, are optimized for very low level training. The US position taken during recent meetings to analyze ways of lessening the low-level flying impact on the environment includes agreement to reduce number of sorties slightly, reduce the maximum airspeed at low level, reduce the number of low-level flying periods, increasing altitudes during certain types of low-level training, study further ways of exporting sorties, and to cooperate with the GAF to the maximum extent possible to help accommodate the German public perceptions.

In an effort to export more sorties out of the FRG the US is involved in several other initatives. We are participating with NATO to expedite the evaluation of a potential NATO Tactical Fighter Center to be located at either Goose Bay, Canada, or Konya AB, Turkey. This training center was initiated to standardize training and to increase the interoperability of NATO air forces and more recently, is looked upon as a vehicle for exporting noise from the Central Region. We are assisting the development of an ACMI range in the North Sea which will eventually result in some reduction of sorties flown in the Central Region, even though not low level. NATO has recently made the decision to move the Tactical Leadership Program from the FRG to Belgium which will reduce low-level sorties in the FRG. The need to qualifiy on future weapon systems which require night low-level sorties, in addition to adverse political/environment considerations has forced the need to look for a new location to conduct air and ground training. King Hassan of Morocco has made an offer to the US for such a training center that is expensive and chances of expanding the program to

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include our NATO allies is questionable. Any discussions with European governments is time sensitive. We have not yet developed fully the US evaluation of the King's proposal and it would be inappropriate to introduce a third facility to NATO that competes with the Goose Bay/Konya AB decision. More than one NATO nation has serious concerns with training outside the NATO area.

Other measures include a more equitable distribution of low-level flying areas and computer scheduling for better tracking of flights. A long-term measure to reduce low-level training requirements is further development of low-level simulators. A GAF low-level simulator contract calls for a helmet-mounted design that will be easily adaptable to other aircraft types if the concept proves valuable at providing needed training. The GAF is attacking this problem with vigor, but has little hope it will provide any significant answer prior to two years.

In an effort to reduce the size, scope, and intensity of NATO ground training exercises, several actions have been taken. The hours of ranges have been reduced, weekend firing eliminated, main gun tank ranges have been moved, maneuver damage control organizations have been established, the number of heavy caliber rounds fired has been decreased and helicopter flights have been both reduced and re-routed away from population centers.

A primary initiative in 1989 was "Reforger 89 Enhancement Program" which merges Exercise Reforger 89 with Reforger 90. This program increased the number of command and combat support units participating yet reduced the track and wheel maneuvering by 40 percent. With increased number of headquarters and both V and VII Corps involved, the quality of the training will increase. The direction for the future exercises includes more efficient use of training dollars with the latest technology in simulation capability. It is important to remember that all cannot be simulated - the one aspect of battle that cannot be trained with simulators is the "friction of war".

Even with all that has been accomplished to lessen the impact that military training has on the European environment, more can be envisioned for the future. The Army is studying ways to "engineer" the training areas to reduce noise, developing less noisy rounds and looking further into NATO cooperative simulator development and production.

A wide spectrum of programs are on-going and envisioned for the future, but any one by itself does not warrant presidential level action. Instead, the Summit Declaration might have a statement which urges all NATO commanders to continue to be sensitive to the adverse effects that the presence their troops have on the surrounding population and environment, and to encourage them to take every measure possible to lessen the impact. Further, the Heads of Government could ask the FRG to work with the sending states and prepare a comprehensive study on what further actions might be taken.

BURDENSHARING - THE NEED FOR SUMMIT ATTENTION

Proposition:

The President should underscore the need for NATO to maintain a concentrated effort to achieve more equitable sharing of the roles, risks, and responsibilities for the common defense. The intervention should stress the need for definitive follow-up actions on the recommendations of the NATO Report on Burdensharing agreed by NATO Defense Ministers last December.

Analysis:

One of the major outcomes of US efforts to bring the seriousness of the burdensharing issue to the attention of the allies last year was a NATO decision to complete a comprehensive examination of the problem. The result was a detailed report on allied burdensharing, completed and endorsed by NATO Defense Ministers in December 1988, which provides a basis for continued NATO efforts to establish more equitable sharing of the roles, risks, and responsibilities for the common defense including recommendations in the near-term for all countries to;

- meet agreed force goals, particularly those involving conventional defense improvements and sustainability especially in battle decisive ammunition.

- provide adequately for common funded programs, for example, infrastructure.

- support progress in armaments cooperation.

- improve assistance to lesser developed industrial nations, i.e., Turkey, Greece, and Portugal.

And, recommendations for NATO to examine long-term opportunities in three principal areas with specific follow-up action in the spring 1989 report to NATO Defense Ministers to include;

- improved rationalization and division of labor (i.e., specialization) with a view to enhancing defense contributions through better coordination of the efforts of the individual nations and the identification and optimal use of their unique capabilities and strengths. In addition seek to eliminate duplication in training, logistics, and other areas.

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- improve reserve and mobilization potential with a view to increasing conventional defense capability through enhanced training and equipping and improving mobilization processes.

- examine new areas for common and joint funding.

The NATO effort over the past year has been hailed rightly as an unprecendented and completely fair examination of the burdensharing issue. However, since the US elections the momentum has been lost while the Alliance has waited to see what policies evolve from the new US administration. Consequently, it is imperative that, at this first opportunity, our NATO allies get a stong and clear message from the President that the burdensharing issue is, and will remain, a top priority problem which NATO must get on with managing. This will set the stage for NATO's Secretary General Woerner to re-establish the momentum and ensure realistic and timely follow-up and further progress on the burdensharing issue.

Alternatively, without timely NATO action on the burden-sharing issue, we can anticipate increasing frustration in Congress and a much higher probability for enacting punitive legislation that could restrict our flexibility both in terms of dealing with our allies and achieving meaningful arms control agreements with the Soviets.

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Monitored Storage

SUMMARY: To reduce offensive readiness, the West should propose in CFE a ceiling on the number of treaty-limited items (TLIs) that can be held in active units. Equipment in excess of the active ceilings (but within overall limits) would be placed in storage at declared, monitored sites. The High Level Task Force is working this issue, with considerable results, and may have it agreed as early as the end of this month. Nevertheless, it is a significant part of the CFE proposal, reducing further (up to 15 percent) the amounts of armaments that may be in ready, active units; it may therefore justify holding until it can be announced in a Summit initiative.

BACKGROUND: NATO has long viewed a storage regime as critical, both to protect its own stored equipment, including US POMCUS, and as a way to subject WP equipment to increased monitoring and reduced readiness. The Alliance came close to including alliance-wide active unit ceilings in the proposal it unveiled at the beginning of negotiations in early March 1989. These ceilings were, however, withdrawn at the last minute when it became impossible to reach agreement within the alliance on how to allocate storage in the central region versus active unit equipment on NATO's flanks. (Turkey in particular has ambitious plans to modernize and increase its artillery and ATC inventory, and wants to insure that stored equipment in the center region does not cut into its ability to field active equipment in Turkey.) The following chart demonstrates how the arithmetic of the current proposal sets up this conflict:

	Tanks	Arty	ATCs
Total Holdings	20000	16500	28000
Active Unit Ceilings in Extended Central Zone (1)	11300	9000	20000
Residual to be Allocated between Flanks or Storage	8700	7500	8000

(1) For NATO, zone excludes TU, GR, NO, and IC.

Nevertheless, a storage measure is foreseen in the following intra-alliance understanding: "Among the stability measures referred to in paragraph 5 of the proposal a measure is needed to ensure that a quantity of equipment within the overall ceiling must be placed in monitored storage." The NATO proposal also specifies that stored equipment would be subject to an exceptions regime as well, under which stored equipment

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could be temporarily activated for exercises and other purposes (maintenance, alerts, etc.).

In Vienna, the USSR indicated its primary concerns about the NATO proposal were its treatment of storage and its exclusion of aircraft. Regarding storage, the Soviets have flogged the NATO proposal for not reducing the concentration of forces in the central zone. (The proposal limits the central zone -- FRG, the Benelux, GDR, CZ, and HU -- to 8000 tanks in active units, but with no geographical restrictions on stored equipment, which for the West is virtually exclusively in the this central region.) Because the USSR does not store equipment forward, it views the NATO approach as inequitable. To compensate for their lack of storage in Eastern Europe, the Soviets wish to drive US forces out of the central region, or to reduce the size of the FRG's Bundeswehr. A storage measure provides a response to the Eastern critique, since monitored storage can hardly be considered an offensive, "short-warning" threat.

Discussion. The initiative would focus attention on--and plugs a gap in--NATO's current proposal. It would also provide a rejoinder to Eastern criticisms of the NATO proposal as allowing excessive forces in the center. Its emphasis on monitoring increases transparency and shows openness of the West. This measure is not a "new initiative." There is already intra-NATO agreement on the need for and the broad outlines of a storage measure. The USG has already played a leading role in fleshing out this measure, most recently by tabling a draft storage measure at a working level HLTF meeting in Brussels. Nevertheless, it is not publicly known that such a provision is provided for and it is a signficiant element of our proposal. For those who call for deeper NATO reductions, a "further" cut by up to 15 percent in equipment in active units could be impressive. Our reinforcement difficulties due to geography easily explain the need to preserve equipment, even if in tightly monitored storage sites, and why we are not calling for destruction of the equipment. Critics who believe we are going too far already will be happy that we are putting severe limits on Soviet readiness by this measure.

Recommendation. The USG is already pursuing this initiative through existing NATO CFE working groups. It is a significant proposal, which if explained well enough can have an important effect. We should consider making our final detailed exposition of this measure at the Summit.

Prepared by: LKautz:OSD/ISP-ESN:18 April 1989:x73645.

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Joint Verification Experiments
in the CFE

Summary: The USG could propose a series of CFE verification related experiments as a way of developing and testing the verification problem and requirements for a future CFE treaty. These experiments could be kept totally within NATO, alliance-to-alliance, or US-USSR.

Background. The US Mission to NATO proposed in October 1988 that NATO's opening CFE position include a proposal for conventional joint verification experiments, based in part on the experience gained from the nuclear testing joint verification experiment agreed at the December 1987 Washington summit and carried out in August and September 1988. The US Mission sought to have discussion of complicated verification issues begin early in the negotiation and to create a series of momentum-sustaining activities that would envigorate the talks should they bog down.

A major difficulty in designing verification experiments in the conventional area is that there is not yet agreement on the standards, risks or methods of verification of any future CFE agreement within the USG, let alone within NATO. However, there has been a lot of work done over the years in bits and pieces on the problem. A great deal is known about sensors in general, for example, but less has been done on how and where to apply them to verification of a conventional armed forces agreement. The DoD is working on a Program Budget Decision for FY90 ($15M) and FY91 ($35M) that would examine the technologies to support conventional arms control. There is, however, a contract with IDA already underway to design a sensor experiment.

Discussion. The real question is whether, given the lack of a consensus within the USG on the issues related to verification of conventional arms control, there still are not joint verification experiments that could generate political interest, tackle issues that will have to be tackled sometime in the future anyway, yet not prejudice eventual USG positions on the verification of a future CFE agreement.

It is already clear that a future CFE agreement will include tanks, artillery and armored troop carriers. Both proposals contain these categories of equipment. It is also clear that, whether now or later, both sides must address the issues of monitored storage, on-site inspections and verification of residual levels. Thus a basis exists for designing experiments that must eventually be carried out, whatever the USG decides on verification in the future. In addition, such experiments might

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spur the USG on to complete the necessary work on conventional verification. One experiment might focus on a NATO and Warsaw Pact tank division, examining the problems and modalities for verifying equipment holdings based on a prior data exchange. Another could focus on monitored storage. Each side could develop its own verification demonstration to begin the process.

The great risk in moving ahead is that, even in these areas, the experiments might be ahead of our understanding of the issues and create precedents difficult to undo. The joint verification experiment in the nuclear testing area proved much more difficult to negotiate and yielded less support for our position than anyone anticipated. Still, it would not be inappropriate to see the current CFE talks as a race to see who gets left at the first few obstacles. Will the blame fall on NATO, for excluding aircraft, or on the Warsaw Pact, for trying to make the negotiations too complex? In such an environment, it is probably better to have a package of initiatives, such as the joint verification experiments, than to be left empty-handed when the talks stall.

Recommendation: If necessary, and not made redundant by other "openness" initiatives, the USG could push ahead with the concept of joint verification experiments at the NATO summit. The President should explain the overall concept and propose one or two actual experiments, such as the verification of equipment levels in an armored division. It might also be worth considering approaching the Germans for co-sponsorship, given that one of the divisions in question will be stationed in the FRG.

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- BP/P
- CFE-V/121

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JOINT ARMAMENT INVENTORY

Summary. A joint NATO/Warsaw Pact armament inventory could serve as an initiative to emphasize NATO's CFE proposal, focus on negotiation of the current phase and have some public appeal. It could be characterized as a move to expedite negotiations and avoid delay over a complex issue if left to later in the talks. Under such an initiative, both sides would move now to establish a combined team(s) of experts to inventory items of equipment common to both NATO and Warsaw Pact proposals (to begin, we might select one category e.g., tanks). Such an inventory would take into account all aspects of the verification problem, such as current holdings, locations, methods of storage and existing force structure as well as definitional and counting-rule problems. These teams and a possible Working Group on definitions of the Vienna negotiations would complement each other's work.

Background. This initiative could take advantage of the groundwork done by the US proposal to NATO for addressing the armament data required for a meaningful and effective conventional arms control agreement. At the 23 February High Level Task Force meeting at NATO, the United States distributed a paper proposing development of a verification concept based on detailed information on equipment life cycles and the table of organization and equipment (TO&E) for a single weapon category, e.g. tanks, as a first step toward a more comprehensive verification regime. This would begin the process of building an inventory and force structure "map" of Pact forces through extensive meetings and on-site inspections.

The Warsaw Pact had long proposed an initial exchange of data to identify force asymmetries; wherever an asymmetry existed, the side with the greater inventory would reduce to the level of the lower side. However, the Warsaw Pact's position during the opening round of the CFE negotiations appears to back away from the previous Soviet emphasis on early data exchange. An initiative for a joint inventory of armaments would challenge the Soviets on the lack of detail in their proposal and highlight the basic openness of the West.

Discussion. An effective verification regime for CFE will require reams of information on equipment life cycles and unit TO&Es. (The NATO proposal, if implemented, would still leave 129,000 residual treaty-limited items to monitor.) To get the negotiations moving, and to make this problem manageable, the US should propose setting up an inventory as described. In practice, it could begin as a "test of concept" based on the provision of detailed information on elements common to both proposals, although as a first step it would perhaps be better to concentrate on one system, e.g. tanks. Such a test would demonstrate the kind of information and procedures necessary for a verification regime, and provide some detailed information to fill intelligence gaps.

Combined teams of experts could inspect and inventory sites to develop the life cycle and unit inventory information NATO would require to help verify residual ceilings. How much equipment is at any one phase of its life cycle (e.g., stocks at production facilities in the zone)? Inspectors would follow tanks going to/from repair facilities within the zone, and moving into and out of the zone. Inventories of repair facilities, stocks in storage, and unit stocks) will be developed by the teams. NATO currently has a low level of confidence in its information on Pact stocks at most stages of this cycle.

The teams of experts will also collect complementary information on the force structure in which the equipment is used. Through numerous visits to units, detailed information will be exchanged on location, TO&E, and number of pieces of equipment actually on hand. NATO confidence in its information directly correlates with the Pact unit's geographic proximity to the West. DIA and CIA have done only preliminary work on the technicalities necessary to check this information. While these inventories may not be capable of a count in which we could be perfectly satisfied, they could establish a higher degree of confidence that the number of reductions intended by the USSR will conform to our idea of the magnitude required to reach the agreed ceiling.

The joint armaments inventory would challenge publicly the Soviets on data and the openness issue in a way that would determine if they are serious about the hard details of the CFE negotiations that will make or break an agreement. Proposing work on the issues at hand, would shift public attention away from the Soviet "vision" of the future to the near-term details where the NATO proposal is strong.

On the negative side, data issues are extremely complex and are unlikely to hold public attention. We should, therefore, continue to emphasize the inventory/inspection nature of such a measure and its intent to avoid an MBFR-type data impasse. The greatest difficulty is that we are moving ahead in a complex area. Though there has been in the past general interagency agreement to design such an approach, a lot of work is required to put it into practice.

Recommendation A Summit initiative on a joint armaments inventory could spotlight NATO as proposing real measures to further the speedy conclusion of an agreement. It has the advantage of being something that most believe would be helpful.

Prepared by: PGephard:OSD/ISP-ESN:19 April 1989:x73645.

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PERMANENT OBSERVERS

Initiative: A proposal for a bilateral US-Soviet exchange of permanent observer teams assigned respectively to a US and Soviet division stationed in the FRG and the GDR. The proposal should be presented as an experiment designed to lay the groundwork for a more extensive network of permanent observers, perhaps roving observers and military liaison teams to be developed in the context of conventional arms control negotiations in Vienna. This initiative is characterized as a bilateral experiment for several reasons. NATO could never agree in time to a more ambitious project. Implementation would be less of an administrative burden and therefore could be done quickly. Coordination would have to be effected, however, especially with the host nation. Perhaps the best outcome would be a German lead -- a Kohl-Bush initiative -- in which the FRG also exchanged observers with an Eastern nation. In this case, some further coordination would be required with selected allies.

Background. The concept of fixed observation sites was advanced at the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference in Geneva, at MBFR and other negotiations. Proposals included stationing observers at major transportation hubs, key geographical points and military installations, with a view to either observing that no dangerous activity is taking place or that the announced activity (such as troop withdrawals) is underway. Proposals for permitting observers freedom of movement are more rare, with the existing Military Liaison Missions (MLM) in the GDR and FRG the most prominent exception.

The USG and the UK floated a roving observer proposal to the NATO working group charged with developing confidence-building measures for the CSBMs talks. In its original form, the proposal would have allowed quite a bit of latitude to teams stationed in each of the countries within the zone of application (Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals--no US territory involved) to wander about the host country. After vociferous objections from France and the FRG, a measure emerged permitting only a limited number of "evaluation visits" to previously declared military installations, provided these visits are requested a week in advance. Though this measure still represents an important advance, it is clear that nothing more extensive is likely to escape from NATO now.

With respect to liaison teams, the USG has supported an exchange of missions in the past as part of an approach to reduce the risk of war from miscalculation or accident, and we have long experience with the exchange of attaches. Recent dialogue between former Secretary Carlucci and MOD Yazov, as well as subsequent events and planned follow-on events, has laid the foundation for a more formal and sustained link between the two militaries. The idea of a Warsaw Pact-NATO liaison set up has appeal, but is very difficult to implement.

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Discussion. The specific parameters of a US-FRG proposal for an essentially bilateral US-Soviet exchange of permanent observers will determine its fate. Although billed as an experiment, the FRG may be reluctant to shoulder the burden of intrusive access (as it was in response to the UK/USG roving observer proposal for CSBM negotiations). If ever expanded into a European-wide permanent observer/liaison regime, the FRG would bear an even greater burden for the West.

With known FRG concerns in mind, the US should focus for now on observation opportunities rather than rights to rove. For example, the US should propose that observers have the right, upon permission from the appropriate military authorities, to visit all installations connected with the designated division, receive briefings and observe the training activities of division components. Observers should also be granted reliable means of communication with their authorities and would receive information on the activities of their assigned units relating to existing obligations (e.g., the Stockholm Document).

Long term objectives for expanding such an observation regime should be outlined but only in general. They could include a series of agreements between CSCE or NATO-Warsaw Pact states to create liaison teams at military headquarters and to permit roving observer teams. The idea for liaison teams would build upon a host of existing agreements, such as the Hot Line, and might include the right to request explanations of activities that could be misinterpreted as well as guaranteed access to appropriate authorities 24 hours a day -- akind of risk reduction concept. Roving observers would have in fact what MLMs have only in theory -- the right to tour any area open to citizens of the host nation.

A final note: any proposal must take into account US sensitivity to the inclusion of its territory in any multilateral conventional arms control initiative. The mandated zone of application for both the CFE and the CSBM negotiations is Europe (with various caveats and exclusions). If a permanent observer proposal is to be advanced in the context of either of these negotiations, it must not include, nor potentially include, US territory. If a measure permitting Soviet observers on US territory, it should be proposed bilaterally, not in the context of any NATO event.

Recommendation: The USG should consult with the FRG on the above proposal for exchange of permanent observers. The Chancellor should be encouraged to take the lead in making this a Kohl-Bush initiative. If acceptable to the FRG, coordination should proceed with the UK, as one of the original promoters of such an idea, and then with France, as perhaps the greatest detractor. Both have major forces in Germany and legitimate interests in this issue.

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Post-CFE Force Structure

Summary. NATO could develop a plan for its future force structure, after the initial phase of CFE, with the object of apportioning NATO's reductions among its members and making other force structure and defensive organization decisions. Tasking NATO to undertake such a study could also be used to examine further cuts and restructuring measures that we might propose for the second phase of the negotiations. In this way, some pressure to match the Warsaw Pact's "vision" might be relieved. At the same time, for different audiences, such a study can be characterized as a sound defense-arms control integration as recommended by the Trilateral Commission's report.

Background. NATO's CFE proposal envisions follow-on phases, after intial reductions to parity, consisting of further reductions of equipment and restructuring of forces to enhance defensive capabilities and reduce offensive capabilities. NATO has not gone into greater detail on such follow-on measures, because their definition will prove a difficult political task and could undermine the current proposal on the table. However, the Soviets and a number of Western observers have criticized NATO's initial proposal, which calls for a residual force level for both sides at 5-10% below current NATO levels, as "lacking vision." In practical terms, as the HLTF has agreed, decisions must also be taken on who reduces what within the alliance.

NATO has been understandably reluctant to develop proposals for force restructuring and further cuts. It was difficult to reach agreement on the current NATO proposal. Though much analysis still needs to be done, it is apparent that deep cuts in NATO's current levels would require a change in strategy, including abandonment of forward defense. Maintenance of NATO's forward defense strategy has been a pre-requisite of the FRG during the development of the NATO proposal. Extensive analysis by SHAPE, JCS, the RAND corporation, and the German MoD indicate that cuts much below 80% of NATO's current forces would require adopting a new defensive force structure and strategy that would allow for substantial penetration of FRG territory. The analyses also seem to agree that such changes could end up favoring the attacker and thus make the military situation in Europe less stable. It is work that we as a Government must undertake, and the alliance will need to be brought in at some time.

Discussion. A definition of the future of force structure in Europe has definite appeal as an answer to those who charge that NATO lacks vision. Actually providing second-phase proposals at this stage of negotiations, however, presents definite risks. First and foremost, it threatens to undermine the proposal currently on the table. If NATO could reduce to

30% or even 50% below current levels in the second phase, why should we wait? A more serious difficulty is that much lower force levels than are currently in place would seem to require adjustments in strategy, tactics and force posture that (1) would make forward defense of the FRG impossible and (2) require a mobile, maneuver oriented force that would probably look to the public like it was less, not more, defensively oriented. NATO will certainly look more, not less, wobbly, if it appears to be heading toward a more ambitious proposal, barely two months after tabling the last one. Finally, there is a vision of a more stable Europe
contained in our current proposal, one which the Soviets appear to accept in broad outline. NATO needs to press ahead and aggressively defend the details and the underlying strategic vision of its current proposal, which contains the basis of a very good CFE agreement.

Recommendation. This idea could serve a useful purpose at the Summit. It should be limited in what it promises, however. NATO should be tasked to accomplish the necessary work on post-CFE force postures, including apportionment of reductions, reorganization of the defense corps sectors and any related changes in force structure. For public purposes, we might include in this charter a sober examination of future phases of CFE that might be possible based on the assumption that the Warsaw Pact agrees to and implements NATO's current proposal.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05n. Paper	Re: Tank Production Decreases (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (April 1989) [1]

Date Closed:	7/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91148-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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05o. Paper	Re: Military Doctrine (2 pp.)	4/19/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (April 1989) [1]

Date Closed:	7/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91148-002
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05p. Paper	Re: Military Glasnost (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (April 1989) [1]

Date Closed:	7/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91148-002
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Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
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05q. Paper	Re: CW [Chemical Weapons] Initiative (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (April 1989) [1]

Date Closed: 7/9/2009	**OA/ID Number:** 91148-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S **Re-review Case #:** **P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**	**Appeal Case #:** **Appeal Disposition:** **Disposition Date:**
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