Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91148
Folder ID Number: 91148-001

Folder Title:
Other (January - March 1989)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	6	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Stephen P. Farrar to Brent Scowcroft Re: U.S. Position at Upcoming G-7 Meeting (3 pp.)	1/31/89	(b)(1)	
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Background Papers on the Single European Act of 1992 (1 pp.)	2/4/89	(b)(1)	C
02b. Memo	Barry F. Lowenkron to Brent Scowcroft Re: The Single European Act of 1992: Background Papers for the President (1 pp.)	1/30/92	(b)(1)	C
02c. Report	Re: EC-1992 (3 pp.)	1/25/89	(b)(1)	C
02d. Report	Re: European Integration and the Single Market: Implications for the United States (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03. Memo	William H. Taft, IV to Brent Scowcroft Re: Force Structure and a Zero Growth Budget (1 pp.)	2/8/89	(b)(1)	
04a. Memo	William Tobey to Robert M. Gates Re: Flat Twin and Pawn Shop Radar Destruction (2 pp.)	2/17/89	(b)(1)	S
04b. Report	Re: Flat Twin Radar and Pawn Shop Van Destruction (2 pp.)	2/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - March 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap1232
OA/ID Number: 91148-001
Date Closed: 7/8/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04c. Report	Re: ACDA Rationale - Flat Twin Radar and Pawn Shop Van Destruction (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04d. Memo	Susan J. Koch to Stan Riveles Re: OSD Position on Flat Twin and Pawn Shop Destruction (1 pp.)	2/18/89	(b)(1)	S
04e. Memo	William T. Parsons to Stanley Riveles Re: Draft Gomel Cable (1 pp.)	2/16/89	(b)(1)	S
04f. Memo	Rear Admiral T. R. Fox to the Co-Chairmen Arms Control Verification Committee Policy Group (2 pp.)	1989	(b)(1)	S
04g. Report	Re: State Rationale (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04h. Memo	Re: Status of FLAT TWIN and PAWN SHOP Components (1 pp.)	2/13/89	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	Stephen P. Farrar to Brent Scowcroft Re: Next Steps in Preparing for the Paris Economic Summit (3 pp.)	2/28/89	(b)(1)	C
05b. Letter	Re: Nicholas F. Brady to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	2/17/89	(b)(1)	
06a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to James A. Baker, III and Nicholas F. Brady Re: Preparations for the 1989 Economic Summit (2 pp.)	2/22/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - March 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap1232
OA/ID Number: 91148-001
Date Closed: 7/8/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to James A. Baker, III and Nicholas F. Brady Re: Preparations for the 1989 Economic Summit (2 pp.)	2/22/89	(b)(1)	
07a. Memo	Don Mahley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Baker Letter to Genscher (2 pp.)	3/3/89	(b)(1)	S
07b. Cable	Re: CFE: German Position on CFE Proposal (2 pp.)	3/3/89	(b)(1)	C
07c. Cable	Re: CFE: Secretary's Letter to Foreign Minister Genscher (3 pp.)	3/3/89	(b)(1)	C
08a. Memo	Re: Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1 pp.)	3/11/89	(b)(1)	C
08b. Talking Points	Re: Possible JCS Concerns To Be Raised with the President (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
08c. Memo	Don M. Snider to Brent Scowcroft Re: JCS Meeting with the President, 10:30 a.m., Saturday, March 11, 1989 (1 pp.)	3/9/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - March 1989)

Pinksheet Number: cap1232
OA/ID Number: 91148-001
Date Closed: 7/8/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0207
ADD-ON

Other

January 31, 1989

CHRON FILE

ACTION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: STEPHEN P. FARRAR SPF

SUBJECT: U.S. Position at Upcoming G-7 Meeting

This memorandum provides background for previewing with Secretaries Brady and Baker this week's meeting of finance ministers and central bank chairmen of G-7 countries. The meeting, which begins Thursday evening, February 2, and runs through Friday, has been described by Treasury as a "low-key, get-acquainted session". However, the differences of view on managing the international economy guarantee a lively discussion on several issues.

Economic Policy Coordination

Discussions will focus on the need to continue to coordinate economic policies to accelerate progress in reducing trade imbalances while maintaining sustained non-inflationary growth and continued exchange market stability. The G-7 has maintained a surveillance system for more than a year in an attempt to promote broader agreement on individual country responsibilities for economic adjustment. Despite this system, differences remain over who should do what.

-- Our trading partners, especially Japan and Germany, will press the US for action to reduce the budget deficit and otherwise to reduce domestic demand.

-- Secretary Brady and Chairman Greenspan will press Japan and Germany to pursue policies that will result in faster domestic growth and a reduction of their trade surpluses.

-- Some G-7 countries may be losing interest in supporting exchange rate stability. While the dollar has strengthened in recent days, they believe that the dollar must decline further over the medium term if the US trade deficit is to be cut significantly more.

-- Japan will be prodded to faster action to eliminate structural rigidities, such as its distribution system, that are barriers to external adjustment.

-- The French may press for a greater measure of compulsion in multilateral policy coordination. They would like to see G-7 countries obliged to defend national currencies in a new global exchange rate regime, probably under the rubric of the IMF. Other countries, especially the US and the UK, will strongly resist, but the French may use their position as host to push the issue at the Paris Economic Summit.

The outcome is likely to be an agreement that the G-7 deputies should study the surveillance system in light of this week's discussion and report to the ministers at their next meeting in April.

International Debt

There is near unanimity today that the international debt strategy needs to be modified. All agree that the debt servicing burdens in the highly indebted countries are creating unsustainable political pressures. All also agree that any solution must be based on meaningful economic reforms in debtor countries. Beyond that, there is little consensus on what new approach to take.

-- The Treasury debt review seems to be pointing toward a strategy of increasing market incentives to speed a voluntary reduction of debt. This could be done in a variety of ways, such as by changing regulatory and tax treatment of principal and interest payments that banks may write down in rescheduling negotiations.

-- As you probably heard from Bill Butcher of Chase Manhattan earlier this week, commercial banks are anxious for more official resources to support the debt workout.

-- The Japanese and French each have proposals for new debt guarantee facilities to be managed by the IMF. The US has thrown cold water on both on the grounds that they place too much risk on taxpayers.

-- IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus has been aggressively pushing for a doubling of IMF quotas, largely to provide resources to deal with the debt problem. Most G-7 countries support Camdessus. The US has opposed any increase until there is a clearer understanding of the IMF's role in the future international financial system.

-- The Latin G-8 countries, led by Venezuela, are attempting to produce a consensus on a debt strategy based on ability to pay. They are likely to seek a dialogue with the US and other creditor countries later this year.

Treasury officials have hinted that the G-7 could agree this week to initiate a comprehensive review of the debt strategy to complement the assessment now underway in Treasury. The G-7 deputies would be asked to report in April.

Trade

Secretary Brady will urge greater commitment to progress in the Uruguay Round negotiations, especially in the areas of agriculture and financial services. He will also reiterate US concerns that the Europe 1992 exercise not increase barriers to participation by third countries. Treasury has been working hard to assure fair treatment in rules for financial services now being developed. There is likely to be little opposition at the meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you ask Secretary Brady to debrief you on the results of the G-7 meeting. You may also want to consider providing the Secretary with an opportunity to debrief the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

CHRON FILE 0318

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

January 31, 1989

other

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: NICHOLAS ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Secretary Baker's Meeting with House Leaders

The following memorandum is a pretty full record of the Secretary of State's meeting with House leaders this morning.

Participants: Speaker James Wright, Majority Leader Thomas Foley, Minority Leader Robert Michel, Congressman Hamilton Fish, Chairman Jack Brooks, Congressman William Broomfield, Chairman Anthony Beilenson, Chairman Dante Fascell, Congressman Dick Cheney, and Congressman Henry Hyde, Secretary Baker, Under Secretary-designate Kimmitt, various staff

The Secretary of State met this morning for an hour with a bipartisan group of House leaders whose jurisdictions cover foreign affairs, intelligence, and judiciary.

The Speaker began by picking up on the President's comment in his inaugural address about the need for bipartisanship in foreign policy and for disagreements to stop at the water's edge as they once did. The Speaker said he remembered such a time and that he wanted a new era with a new climate. In the past, rough spots had included Nicaragua and South Africa.

The Secretary said he wanted to try to establish a new regime for Executive/Legislative cooperation so that unity could be projected to the outside world. In his view, the War Powers Resolution was an important interference with what he wanted. Both branches had deeply held convictions with respect to their respective constitutional prerogatives. Neither branch could impose its view on the other, and it was unlikely the Supreme Court would settle the matter. What he was thinking about was a mechanism reflecting both branches' agreement to finesse the constitutional issues. He had in mind a "generic procedure." For example, in an exchange of letters between the President and the congressional leadership, both sides on the issue could reaffirm their constitutional views while committing themselves to consultation prior to sending the troops and to improved reporting thereafter. Congress would agree that the President could make serious commitments of forces, which would enjoy

congressional support to the end of the operation. The model he had in mind was Grenada, where the congressional leadership was informed of the operation the day before it was launched and stood by the President. That operation involved risk to American lives and required surprise. He noted that any legislation in the War Powers area would raise constitutional questions, which he hoped they could agree to finesse.

Minority Leader Michel said it was not really his field of expertise, but if this idea would discourage new legislation, he thought it probably was a good thing. Timing was an important question for Congress. As he remembered Grenada, consultations were rushed.

Chairman Brooks changed subjects by raising the issue of congressional access to National Security Decision Directives "through which Iran/Contra was done." He thought it important that the NSC act only in an advisory capacity. The Secretary said the Tower Board, of which General Scowcroft had been a member, recommended that the NSC not engage in operations. Chairman Brooks said that he understood that an NSDD purported to change the economy by giving the President authority to seize banks. [Bob Kimmitt told me that Brooks probably was referring to an NSDD, drafted by Oliver North, which purported to give the President authority to seize the banks in the event of nuclear war. On the ride back, the Secretary reacted with surprise and said the law would not permit the President to do this by Executive Order. (The Secretary's recollection of the law would seem sound based on the Supreme Court decision in the Steel Seizure Case during the Korean war.)]

Chairman Fascell said that War Powers was a gray area. It involved the right of the President to take the country to war. The only power Congress had to stop such an action was to cut off funds or to impeach the President; both options took time. The constitutional structure, which he said was sensible, involved arms length conflict between the branches. A rule of reason was necessary. It would not do to co-opt Congress by informing it at the last possible second. We need to get away from last-minute brinkmanship. The issue was what is reasonable. We cannot informally institutionalize a process that puts Congress in the position only of rubberstamping the President's action. At the same time, the President needs flexibility to discharge his responsibility to defend the country.

The Speaker recalled the four War Powers episodes of the last Administration: Grenada, Libya, Lebanon, and the Persian Gulf. Each was handled differently. Exigencies foreshortened prior consultation with respect to Libya and the Persian Gulf. There had been lots of time with respect to Lebanon, although that operation had proved ill-conceived. The Secretary repeated his call for a generic arrangement. Chairman Fascell said Congress

had a duty to the people, and consultation had to be improved so that trust could be restored with respect to CIA paramilitary operations and the handling of crisis situations.

Congressman Broomfield said War Powers should be put on a back burner. Let's give bipartisanship a chance. The key would be the relationship between congressional leaders and the Administration, and if War Powers were raised now, it would get the session off to a bad start. He had co-sponsored the War Powers Resolution, but he now admitted the Resolution should be repealed.

Congressman Hyde said we could reach an agreement on War Powers, but the President would have to veto any legislation. Congress would not repeal the Resolution. The key was better consultation so that Congress was there on the take-off and the Government would seem to be unified and not be made lilliputian through constant Executive/Legislative battling. Chairman Brooks asked "is that Hyde?" He said he agreed with him, and joked that, therefore, there must be something wrong.

Chairman Brooks said the critical thing about such issues was the timing of notification. There should be flexibility, but not so much that a truck could drive through the gap.

Congressman Hyde said the fact that the War Powers Resolution was the law on the books would mean some Members would carp. Chairman Fascell said that he agreed with Hyde. We should leave War Powers alone.

Majority Leader Foley said the problem often was that the Administration did not want a lot of daylight between a decision to act and an action, as in the case of the Persian Gulf operations. The Speaker suggested an Executive/Legislative task force under Foley's leadership through which the branches could keep talking about these issues. He also noted that a resolution of disapproval had been introduced with respect to the Persian Gulf and a lawsuit begun. Majority Leader Foley noted that nothing had happened. Chairman Fascell said he did not join the lawsuit because he thought it was stupid. The courts will not resolve the War Powers dispute, and we do not want the Constitution to be rewritten in the courts. Congressman Cheney warned against creating expectations that cannot be met.

The Speaker said the Administration had an interest in protecting classified information. He wanted to explore that issue as well. It was a source of misunderstanding. What was needed was mutual trust. There had been a big confrontation over Iran/Contra, but that was behind us. There was no need to pick that bone. He wanted to avoid it by holding off on the 48-hour bill. It was a red flag. What Congress wanted was an indication that the Administration intended to abide by the letter and spirit of the

law. The law did not need to be changed. We need to give each other the benefit of the doubt. Chairman Brooks commented that this was a good pitch.

Congressman Hyde said that there had to be trust between both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. It was hard to achieve such trust when the same facts are viewed so differently. He cited as an example the Contras, whom the liberals said were Somocistas and drug-runners and the conservatives said were freedom fighters similar to those who had been at Valley Forge. We need to trust our non-partisan professionals in the CIA and DIA in their analyses in order to avoid polarization. People tended to dismiss intelligence that contradicted their predilections.

Majority Leader Foley said the agencies were often handmaidens of policy. He cited the example of Daniel Graham as head of DIA. Minority Leader Michel said he did not know how Graham had behaved as head of DIA, although it was true he had strong policy views now. Picking up a suggestion of Secretary Baker, he said that putting pen to paper concentrated the mind. The Secretary suggested making an effort to draft an understanding.

The press was invited in to photograph the group and Majority Whip Coelho arrived just in time for the photograph. As the meeting broke up, Chairman Fascell said that, with respect to foreign assistance, which was of critical importance, the President needed to weigh in.

On the ride back, the Secretary said that what he had in mind was not a one-way street. In exchange for an agreement to hold meetings such as this on a regular basis, he wanted Congress to strip the Foreign Assistance Act of much micromanagement.

Comment: The meeting was fascinating from a number of perspectives. First of all, it was cordial while being serious. It also showed a weak Speaker who turns to Foley to handle important business. Thus, Majority Leader Foley would be the congressional leader on the task force. Second, it revealed real concerns, which often do not come through in conversations with congressional staff. For example, Chairman Fascell's concern about the War Powers Resolution has to do with the commitment of the country to a major war by the President. The Executive branch usually views the issues involving War Powers in terms of brief actions like the raid on Libya, Desert I, or the Persian Gulf, not wars like Korea or Vietnam. While one probably should not read too much into Fascell's comments, he clearly indicated a distaste for more War Powers legislation. Third, the Speaker's comments about the 48-hour rule clarify what Bill Working and I were told by intelligence committee staff about what Senator Cohen really wanted. Senator Cohen now appears not to be wedded to a 48-hour time period for notice of covert actions, but rather wants the Administration to reaffirm that it takes the law

seriously and does not agree that it means -- whether in statutory or constitutional terms -- that the President can withhold notification until the spirit moves him. As Secretary Baker said in the car, a rule of reason tied to the circumstances had to govern.

cc: Peter Rodman
Virginia Lampley
William Working

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0350

February 1, 1989

CHRON FILE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN PWR

SUBJECT: President's February 9 Speech

Bob Gates passed on to me your request for a redraft of the foreign policy insert for the President's February 9 speech. My effort is at Tab A. It follows the guidance that you gave Bob Blackwill.

The State Department's version is at Tab B, for your reference.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the draft at Tab A and give me further guidance.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachments

Tab A PWR redraft
Tab B State draft

NSC draft 2/1/89

The President's February 9 Speech

Insert on National Security Issues

I'd like to step back for a moment from our domestic affairs and raise our sights to the world at large -- a world of unprecedented change; a world that affects our lives more than ever before; a world of rare opportunities and [~~yes,~~] some serious challenges.

It is, truly, a time of extraordinary hope. The free nations of the world -- we and our democratic allies and friends -- are witnessing the vindication of our values and our way of life:

-- Never before in this century have our values of freedom, democracy, and human rights been a more powerful political force around the globe.

-- Never before, in decades, has the grand alliance of the industrial democracies been as solid, or so proven its power as a force for peace and security.

-- Never before, in decades, has our philosophy of economic freedom been so widely appreciated as the wellspring of social progress and technological advance.

So, we face the future not only with confidence, but with a sense of excitement, a sense that the tides of history are with us.

—>

And this is the foundation of our approach to perhaps the central problem of world peace -- our relations with our adversaries.

Their system is in crisis, and in responding to it they have embarked on major changes in their policies both at home and abroad. Both at home and abroad we see welcome changes -- changes we applaud -- in easing the grip of central control and working with us to solve international problems and reduce the danger of war.

Of course we cannot lower our guard, or abandon the policies of Western strength and solidarity that have brought us to this point. For they still retain a powerful military machine, in the service of objectives which still too often conflict with ours. But the free nations owe it to themselves to explore the opportunities for a more secure peace, while never missing an opportunity to advance the cause of freedom.

Here the President and the Congress must work together. As I said on the steps of this building a few weeks ago, the Vietnam

era, with all its mutual institutional suspicions, must surely be now behind us. Where we have worked together in the past, our foreign policies have succeeded brilliantly. Where we have been at odds, we have thwarted each other and our policies have suffered grievously.

As President I have the constitutional responsibility of leadership. But our system of checks and balances works best when we communicate with each other and act together. That is my philosophy.

In this budget, I ask your support for an effective program of security and economic assistance. This is a crucial instrument of policy -- which costs tiny amounts of money -- by which we help our friends defend and strengthen themselves. The savaging of these programs, which has done enormous damage to our policy, must end.

And, of course, the defense budget. It has been cut radically over the last four years, and I am proposing slightly less than my predecessors proposed. There should be no illusion that further cuts can be safely made. The defense sector has done its share in taking cuts to reduce the deficit.

For the future, I have [~~instructed the National Security Council to~~ directed a review of our national strategies and commitments, to

ensure that our defense programs have a strategic rationale. Perhaps there will be future savings here; we shall see. Congress will also have to do its part by streamlining its procedures, through two-year defense budgets and multi-year procurement.

Future progress in arms reduction, too, might generate savings. But we only undercut promising negotiations if we cut forces unilaterally. The INF Treaty should have proved once and for all that <u>maintaining</u> our strength is the key to success in arms control. Above all, we must look beyond counting specific weapons and work to developing a structure of peace and security for the 21st century. ~~Our defense strategy and arms control must complement~~ approach to

State Dept. draft
1/31/89

The President's February 9 Speech
Foreign Policy Insert

I'd ask you now to step back for a moment from our domestic affairs, to look at the broader horizon of America's role in the world. We've got to understand how our world is changing because more than ever, what happens out there will affect what we do here. That's a fact of life.

There are some other facts of life we must know. The old familiar post-war era is receding and receding fast. The conflict between ourselves and the Soviet Union -- the dominating relationship of the post-war period -- has softened, giving way to the promise of new and more constructive relations.

In Europe where the seeds of two world wars were once planted, a solid bloc of democracies is pursuing the vision of a common market, secure in a transatlantic alliance with us. In Asia, other friends and allies, especially Japan, have transformed the Pacific Rim into a prosperous reality that no statesman of the fifties or sixties would have predicted. Among the developing countries, new interest has grown in the formula for success -- free markets, free governments and freedom for every citizen.

We've also seen progress in resolving regional conflicts, in Afghanistan and Angola. Elsewhere in Asia, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, historic enemies have begun to rethink their animosities.

So we Americans can be optimistic. But optimism is not the only ingredient essential to success. Realism about the world is also essential. And realism requires that our generally rose-colored view be shaded by some gray and even by some black.

In our own neighborhood, for example, the new and encouraging trend toward democracy is threatened by severe economic problems, including debt and trade imbalances. The old anti-democratic scourges (are still there), whether from the outdated dictatorships of Cuba or Nicaragua which reject even Gorbachev's perestroika, or from the traditional threats of the Right.

Relations with our allies, whether in Europe or in Asia, are also complex. We must all avoid protectionism as we try to change very large trade imbalances many years in the making.

We face equally complex problems in dealing with the Soviet Union. Yes, there have been substantial changes in Soviet rhetoric and even in Soviet behavior, and they give us hope.

But the work is incomplete. We must build on the progress of the past, working to expand arms reduction and control; probing to see if the Soviet "new thinking" creates real opportunities to settle intractable conflicts in troubled regions around the globe; expanding the scope of our bilateral ties as glasnost and perestroika make that possible; and striving to ensure that progress in human rights is institutionalized within the Soviet Union and not subject to recall by decree.

Perhaps an additional test of Moscow's new thinking, of the Soviets' ability to cooperate in solving intractable, complex problems may lie in their response to the new set of transnational dangers. Terrorists and drug traffickers, and the proliferation of chemical weapons and missiles, all threaten international order. And we are all endangered by the deterioration of our global environment. These problems require cooperative and practical steps, not rhetoric by all nations. But someone must take the lead.

So success is not ordained. The world we face is full of promise yet full of danger. I truly believe that America can make the difference -- that only a fully engaged America can fulfill the promise of the age. There is no alternative to engaged American leadership. While the world <u>is</u> changing, only our leadership can ensure that change remains peaceful and constructive.

Full engagement means leadership and leadership means idealism, the values we cherish, the vision of a free and secure and peaceful world. But leadership also means realism about what moves nations. A realistic leadership knows how to exercise our influence, to use American power for good. And while there are instances when we must act alone to protect our interests, the United States has always worked for a community of free nations, who share common interests and common values and work together to achieve them.

That is why today, the United States must join its allies in building a New Compact, updated to the changing relationships of our times. The need is particularly acute in Western Europe. There, the armies of East and West still face each other. The Berlin Wall still stands. And the growing ferment on the other side of the Iron Curtain is clear beyond any doubt.

I have therefore asked Secretary of State Baker to visit Western Europe next week and consult with our allies. He will lay the groundwork on two outstanding East-West issues:

First, a common policy toward arms modernization and arms control to make deterrence more secure and peace more certain.

Second, a common policy on East-West economic relations to ensure that our resources are used to reinforce constructive change.

Secretary Baker will also reiterate to the Allies our commitment to free and fair trade, a commitment we share together.

A moment ago, I mentioned that although the United States sometimes had to act alone we have sought to use our leadership to fashion collective responses to common problems. I could make a similar observation about the source of that leadership. The President, in defense of the Constitution, must sometimes act alone. But the system of checks and balances works most effectively when the President and Congress act together. Nowhere is this more clear than in foreign policy.

The case for bipartisanship can be made in theory but the best case is made in practice. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Majority Leader, we know that in our hemisphere, in Central America, we have not acted together to protect our interests in the region. And there, of all the regional conflicts of recent years, the outcome has been unsatisfactory for everyone for the Congress, for the Executive Branch, and ultimately for the American people.

We are developing a fresh approach to that problem. And this I pledge to you: It will be effective in Central America because first of all, it's going to be united in Washington!

Bipartisanship does not mean agreement on every issue or the cessation of argument. In a free society, this is neither possible nor even desirable. But it does mean that we respect each other -- that we all work for the national interest. It does mean that we consult with each other -- that we take off together and land together.

So today, as on my inauguration, I extend to you the hand of friendship. Let the hand of the Executive and the hand of the Congress join together to form another New Compact. And let this compact tell the world that America is united.

I know -- we all know -- that our grip will be tested. Bipartisanship is a tough time-consuming process. Yet we all know that there is no substitute. We must reach out to each other.

I am prepared to begin today. Except for Central America, no issue has been more divisive of Congress and the Executive than covert action. Covert action tests the very essence of a democratic government -- the need for secrecy and speed versus the need for consultation and legal procedure -- both vital to the national interest.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0350 Add-on

February 2, 1989

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN PWR

SUBJECT: President's February 9 Speech

Attached is a redraft of the foreign policy insert, per the guidance I received from Bob Gates this morning.

I will pass this also to Bob Teeter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the redraft at Tab A and give me further guidance.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachment

Tab A Redraft

NSC draft 2/2/89

The President's February 9 Speech

Insert on National Security Issues

I'd like to step back for a moment from our domestic affairs and raise our sights to the world at large -- a world of unprecedented change; a world that affects our lives more than ever before; a world of rare opportunities -- and of serious challenges.

It is, truly, a time of extraordinary hope. The free nations of the world -- we and our democratic allies and friends -- are witnessing the vindication of our values and our way of life:

-- Never before in this century have our values of freedom, democracy, and human rights been a more powerful political force around the globe.

-- Never before, in decades, has the grand alliance of the industrial democracies been as solid, or so proven its power as a force for peace and security.

-- Never before, in decades, has our philosophy of economic freedom been so widely appreciated as the wellspring of social progress and technological advance.

So, we face the future not only with confidence, but with a sense of excitement, a sense that the tides of history are with us.

And this is the foundation of our approach to perhaps the central problem of world peace -- our relations with our adversaries.

Their system is in crisis, and in responding to it they have embarked on major changes in their policies both at home and abroad. Both at home and abroad we see welcome changes -- changes we applaud -- in easing the grip of central control and working with us to solve international problems and reduce the danger of war.

Of course we cannot lower our guard, or abandon the policies of Western strength and solidarity that have brought us to this point. The alliance of the democracies must rededicate itself to its shared ideals -- not letting petty disputes over beef hormones distract us from our more fundamental challenges. For our adversaries still retain the world's most powerful military machine, in the service of objectives which still too often conflict with ours. The free nations owe it to themselves to work together, to explore the opportunities for a more secure peace, while never missing an opportunity to advance the cause of freedom.

Here the President and the Congress, too, must work together. As I said on the steps of this building 20 days ago, the Vietnam era, with all its mutual institutional suspicions, must surely be now behind us. Where we have worked together in the past, our foreign policies have succeeded brilliantly. Where we have been at odds, we have thwarted each other and our policies have suffered grievously.

As President I have the constitutional responsibility of leadership. But our system of checks and balances works best when we communicate and collaborate. That is my philosophy.

In this budget, I ask your support for effective programs of security and economic assistance. These are crucial instruments of policy -- which cost very little -- by which we help our friends defend and strengthen themselves. The savaging of these programs, which has done enormous damage to our policy, must end.

And, of course, the defense budget. It has been cut radically over the last four years. There should be no illusion that further cuts can be safely made. The defense sector has done its share in taking cuts to reduce the deficit.

For the future, I have directed a review of our national strategies and commitments, to ensure that our defense programs have a strategic rationale. Perhaps there will be future savings here; we shall see. Congress will also have to do its part by streamlining its procedures, through two-year defense budgets and multi-year procurement.

Future progress in arms reduction, too, might generate savings. But we only undercut promising negotiations if we cut forces unilaterally. The INF Treaty should have proved once and for all that maintaining our strength is the key to success in arms control.

And arms agreements must be judged less by the mere numbers of specific weapons that are reduced, and more by how well they ensure a safer, more stable structure of security and peace for the 21st century.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 0246

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE OTHER

February 4, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Background Papers on the Single European Act of 1992

In response to your request for additional information on the Single European Act of 1992, I attach two background papers: a CIA analysis of the European state of play and implications of the Act for Europe itself at Tab A, and a State Department analysis of the implications of the Act for the U.S. at Tab B.

The potential significance of the Single European Act is considerable. It supports one of our principal long-term goals, greater European unity, but there is also danger that it could result in greater European protectionist pressures.

The Single European Act will present us with two challenges. The first will be to beat back protectionism in Europe so that trends in the world economy toward freer trade can grow and so that the U.S. business community -- confident of its ability to compete with Europe -- will have the opportunity to do so. The second will be to establish and maintain tight interagency coordination so that our policies toward Europe do not work at cross-purposes.

Attachments
Tab A CIA Analysis
Tab B State Analysis

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0805-MR
MM 1/8/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0246

January 30, 1989

ACTION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON

SUBJECT: The Single European Act of 1992: Background Papers for the President

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President, forwarding two background papers drafted by the State Department and the CIA on the Single European Act of 1992.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the attached materials to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove_____

Attachments

Tab I Memo for the President
Tab A CIA Analysis
Tab B State Analysis

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
2012-1566-MR
ES 6/14/13

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Report	Re: Report (3 pp.)	1/25/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - March 1989)

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By CS on 2/28/14

Date Closed:	7/8/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91148-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2010-0805-MR (501.02)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	2/5/2013	**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(1); (b)(3)

Central Intelligence Agency



BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
501.02
2010-0855-MR
duplicate of
2012-1555-MR
#502.03

Washington D C 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

25 JANUARY 1989

EC-1992: THE REVITALIZATION OF EUROPE (b)(1); (b)(3)

The 1992 program addresses the Community's original goal--sidetracked by the economic disruptions of the 1970s--to completely free the movement of goods, services, capital, and people. More broadly, the West Europeans see the 1992 program as a return to the original Europeanist program of moving toward unity along a functional path and a means of warding off Japanese and American economic competition. The innovative EC Commission of Jacques Delors latched onto the 1992 idea as a way of giving the Community and the Commission a sense of direction after years of bickering over budget and farm crises. (b)(1); (b)(3)

The substantial progress already achieved has boosted broader cooperation and stimulated a new commitment to regionalism across Europe. Since 1985 the members have approved almost half of the legislation needed to create the single market, achieving breakthroughs in key areas such as the mutual recognition of national standards and the freeing of all capital movements. The reforms have stimulated activity in other areas not covered by the original plans--protected national telecommunications and energy markets are opening slowly, and talks are under way to enhance monetary cooperation among the members. Perhaps most important, the 1992 reforms have forced businesses to plan for a future of heightened crossborder competition for market share within Europe. They appear to be rising to the occasion and many are out in front of governments in pushing economic integration. (b)(1); (b)(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2012-1555 MR
ES 25/13

(b)(1); (b)(3)

Notwithstanding this optimism, some contentious issues threaten to delay completion of the program beyond the end of 1992. A few issues--including the harmonization of indirect tax rates and workers' rights, as well as the removal of border controls--require unanimous approval of the member states. The United Kingdom appears the most reluctant to put its stamp of approval on the original proposals on these matters, forcing the Commission to search for compromises. We expect solid progress for the program over the next year or so. Good short- to mid-term economic prospects for the EC will smooth the way for approval of most, if not all, of the reforms. The pace of implementation, however, could be slowed by any deterioration in the economic environment thereafter or country-specific problems. Moreover, while the current rosy economic outlook seems to favor a deregulatory model of EC integration, a serious economic downturn in the early 1990s would intensify the debate about the program within member states and probably encourage the protectionist tendencies in the Community that EC critics now portray as a "Fortress Europe." (b)(1); (b)(3) (b)(1); (b)(3)

The 1992 reforms already have triggered a debate over the future of national sovereignty that is certain to reemerge if the EC presses further integration moves. Prime Minister Thatcher has openly expressed her opposition to any loss of national control, while other leaders have argued that Europeans must look beyond national borders to broader regional interests and objectives. In fact, the members already have ceded considerable sovereignty over trade, agriculture, and competition policy; currently one third of national economic legislation is for the purpose of implementing Community directives. Thatcher's arguments that a centralized Brussels bureaucracy will reimpose stifling economic regulations, nonetheless, may have more resonance. (b)(1); (b)(3)

Although the reforms will produce only modest economic benefits to Europe during the next decade, the program should significantly enhance Europe's clout in the world economy. For one thing, economic policy cooperation among the members is bound to increase; a rudimentary confederal EC central bank--probably with heavy West German influence and structured along the lines of the US Federal Reserve--may be operating by the late 1990s. We believe the members ability to reach common positions on macroeconomic policies will improve and spread to other issues as well, perhaps reducing the disunity that Europeans now display in G7 fora on issues such as LDC debt and global monetary reform. The Community will remain committed to the multilateral trading system, but the reforms are also certain to make it a more cohesive and confident trading bloc that will aggressively defend its interests.

(b)(1); (b)(3)

(b)(1); (b)(3) many Europeans view 1992 as an "historic one-time opportunity" to try to exact concessions from the United States. (b)(1); (b)(3)

Over the longer term--into the next century, we believe the single EC market may lead beyond economic cooperation to a single EC economy that has a common currency and macroeconomic policy. The profile and role of EC institutions will be raised as they are called on to police the large free market and manage economic policy for the whole Community. The members acting collectively in the Council of Ministers will undoubtedly retain the ultimate power of decision on core issues, but the influence of the Commission, Court of Justice, and European Parliament probably will increase markedly. (b)(1); (b)(3)

The 1992 reforms also will increase coordination of foreign and even military policies. Indeed, the 1987 reform of the EC constitution mandating the single market goal also created a small permanent secretariat in Brussels to assist the process of foreign policy coordination. Although this could simplify somewhat Washington's dealings with Western Europe in that a single European voice may slowly emerge, we also believe the EC members will use the coordination mechanism to strengthen their position when they differ with the United States. Middle Eastern issues are an obvious area of potentially greater US-EC friction. (b)(1); (b)(3)

European Integration and the Single Market: Implications for the United States

The drive of the European Community (EC) for greater unity has gathered momentum with the December 1992 target for completion of its single market and concomitant actions to coordinate other policies. This paper briefly summarizes US interests, the state of play in Europe and implications for US policies.

US Interests

Since the end of WW II, the US has strongly supported European integration, first to assure that Europe would not again give rise to war and secondly to develop a contributing partner for the common defense. As Europe regained its feet, we also engaged it as a partner in shaping and expanding a more prosperous global economic order.

These remain valid, fundamental US interests, still well-served by further progress toward unity in Europe. But, a stronger, more cohesive Europe is also becoming more assertive, striving harder to advance its own goals and to exert greater influence on collective Western policies. We face increasingly complex, sometimes contradictory sets of challenges and opportunities as we deal with the new Europe:

--"1992" promises a more open, vibrant EC economy of 320 million people providing an expanded market for US goods, added resources for Western defense, and greater global economic well-being. At the same time, we will face intensified competition, and already confront forces within Europe pressing for external barriers to confine the gains to Europeans or to accommodate the stress of internal adjustment.

--While Europe will have greater capacity to contribute to defense, it is also seeking to articulate its role and define Alliance military requirements. On these crucial issues, Europe will not always agree with us.

--In the East-West context, Western unity of purpose has been instrumental for progress on arms control, human rights and other key objectives. But, differing appreciations of developments in the East will make it more difficult for us to sustain our unique claim to leadership.

--On regional issues, greater confidence and coordination among Europeans has enhanced their contributions in cases such as the Persian Gulf patrol and Afghanistan, and has worked to moderate the extremes within Europe. Despite common ultimate goals, however, we will find ourselves working at cross purposes when European public or leadership views diverge from ours.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0855-MR
ES 6114113

--Similarly, on transnational issues, e.g., environment, terrorism, or drugs, Europe's support is usually critical for attainment of U.S. objectives on any global scale.

Implications for U.S. Policies

"1992" is the front burner issue with its complex set of benefits and potential problems. The U.S. must continue to press the EC, directly and through member states, for transparency in the process, and for open, fair and equal treatment of U.S. commercial interests.

At the same time, on the economic front broadly defined we must work ever more closely and vigorously with the EC to maximize the benefits that can accrue on both sides of the Atlantic and globally from a more robust European economy and more European policy activism. Some differences are inevitable in our $160 billion annual U.S.-EC trade relationship. Creativity and a sense of proportion are required from both sides in defending legitimate interests. We must also find a way to bring the EC on board for our pivotal agricultural policy objectives if we are to prevent a breakdown of the GATT Uruguay Round in whose success we have mutually high stakes. The ensuing revitalization and expansion of the multilateral trade framework would strongly reinforce momentum for an outward looking single market.

As we address these economic issues, we will also have to deal with the differing views of "Europe" which Europeans carry in their own minds. Mrs. Thatcher's may be less forward looking than ours while French and German views often assert a role for "Europe" which Europe is incapable of implementing, especially in the area of security. Shared values should make differences manageable, but we will have to constantly remind Europeans of our role and their responsibilities in NATO and with regard to serious global issues.

Looking ahead, we have to recognize that we can no longer deal with any one of the major policy areas in isolation from the others. At this point, U.S. appreciation of European integration is driven largely by the trade aspects. To sustain U.S. leadership, we will have to think carefully on how all the parts fit together and retain the initiative with clear and realistic goals in all areas of international policy concern.

The EC wants to enter into a full partnership with the U.S. We should aggressively encourage that approach, ensuring that the Europeans accept their share of costs as well as benefits.

CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0350 Add-on III

February 6, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN PWR

SUBJECT: President's February 9 Speech

Following Bob Gates's guidance at 6:00pm tonight, I did the attached revision which I transmit for the record. On his instruction I am passing this also to the speechwriters.
Attachment

Tab A Redraft

NSC draft 2/6/89, 6:00 p.m.

The President's February 9 Speech

Insert on National Security Issues

I'd like to step back for a moment from our domestic affairs and raise our sights to the world at large -- a world of unprecedented change; a world that affects our lives more than ever before; a world of rare opportunities -- and of serious challenges.

It is, truly, a time of extraordinary hope. The free nations of the world -- we and our democratic allies and friends -- are witnessing the vindication of our values and our way of life:

-- Never before in this century have our values of freedom, democracy, and human rights been a more powerful political force around the globe.

-- Never before, in decades, has the grand alliance of the industrial democracies been as solid, or so proven its power as a force for peace and security.

-- Never before, in decades, has our philosophy of economic freedom been so widely appreciated as the wellspring of social progress and technological advance.

So, we face the future not only with confidence, but with a sense of excitement, a sense that the tides of history are with us.

And this is the foundation of our approach to perhaps the central problem of world peace -- our relations with our adversaries.

Their system is in crisis, and in responding to it they have embarked on major changes in their policies both at home and abroad. The fresh breeze blowing in the East is refreshing to all of us who cherish the human aspiration for freedom and progress. We watch and applaud the loosening of the grip of central control and the greater willingness to work with us to solve world problems and reduce the danger of war.

Of course we cannot lower our guard, or abandon the policies of Western strength and solidarity that have brought us to this point. The alliance of the democracies must rededicate itself to its shared ideals -- we must lift our sights above beef hormones to a vision of the world we seek at century's end. Our adversaries still retain the world's most powerful military machine, in the service of objectives which still too often conflict with ours. The free nations owe it to themselves to stand together, while never missing an opportunity to move into new and uncharted territory in pursuit of a new, freer and more just world order.

I look forward to a meeting with my NATO partners in the nearest future, to renew our collaboration.

Here the President and the Congress, too, must work together. As I said on the steps of this building 20 days ago, the Vietnam era, with all its mutual institutional suspicions, must surely be now behind us. Where we have worked together in the past, our foreign policies have succeeded brilliantly. Where we have been at odds, we have thwarted each other and our policies have suffered grievously.

As President I have the constitutional responsibility of leadership. But our system of checks and balances works best when we communicate and collaborate. That is my philosophy.

In this budget, I ask your support for effective programs of security and economic assistance. These are crucial instruments of policy -- which cost very little -- by which we help our friends defend and strengthen themselves. The savaging of these programs, which has done enormous damage to our national interest, must end.

And, of course, the defense budget. It has been cut radically over the last four years. With the reductions I have made, the defense sector has done more than its share in taking cuts to reduce the deficit.

I have instructed the National Security Council to review comprehensively, in the next 90 days, the full range of our foreign policy and national security challenges. We will seek to ensure that our resources and capabilities are commensurate with our interests, commitments, and strategies. Defense management reform is a high priority. I am determined to pursue every possibility to extract all possible savings from more efficient management. Congress will also have to do its part by streamlining its procedures of oversight and budgeting, which have contributed in no small measure to the problem. I will provide to the Congress my suggestions in this regard.

Future progress in arms reduction, too, might generate savings. But we only undercut promising negotiations if we cut our forces unilaterally. The INF Treaty should have proved once and for all that maintaining our strength is the key to success in arms control.

And arms agreements must be judged less by the mere numbers of specific weapons that are reduced, and more by how well they ensure a safer, more stable structure of security and peace for the 21st century.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0611

CHRON FILE

INFORMATION

February 10, 1989

Natl Sec Adviser has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: LINTON F. BROOKS

FROM: EUGENE M. EBNER

SUBJECT: Taft Memorandum on Force Structure and Zero Growth Budget

This memorandum on Force Structure and Zero Growth Budget from Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft is for your information; no action is required.

Attachment
Tab A: Incoming memorandum

0611

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

February 8, 1989

Brent

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE ~~PRESIDENT~~ FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ~~AFFAIRS~~

Subject: Force Structure and a Zero Growth Budget

Governor Sununu asked at the meeting with the President the other day why, if the defense budget kept pace with inflation, force structure would have to be reduced. He deserved a better answer than he got. The matter has to do with where we have been and now are, as much as with where we are going.

Significantly, General Welch did not join his colleagues in citing force structure as a candidate for reduction. This is because the Air Force has reduced its active end-strength by about 6% in the last two years. Meanwhile, as the real defense program has fallen 11% in the past four years, the Army and Marine Corps have reduced their active end-strength only 1% and 2% respectively, and the Navy has actually grown by 2%. As I mentioned to you when we met last year, the force structure of these services, particularly the Navy, fits only with the greatest difficulty into the present program. Readiness, sustainability and modernization have all been starved to support it. Even the chiefs who have opposed force structure reductions in the past as strongly as they could now see them as inevitable, if the budget goes any lower.

Will

William H. Taft, IV

cc: Secretary of Defense-Designate

0665

CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

INFORMATION

February 15, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: LINTON F. BROOKS

FROM: EUGENE M. EBNER

SUBJECT: Defense Budget Guidance

Based on the revised Bush Defense Budget, Secretary Taft, Friday, 10 February, sent the military services the fiscal guidance needed to adjust budget totals to meet the overall 0-1-1-2-2 real growth levels. We understand that this guidance, in the form of reductions from the January 9 Reagan Budget, is as follows:

Budget Authority

Net Adjustments (in Billion Dollars)

	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993	FY 1994	FY90-94 TOTAL
Army	-1.8	-2.8	-4.0	-4.3	-4.6	-17.5
Navy	-2.3	-3.5	-4.9	-5.4	-5.9	-22.0
Air Force	-2.0	-3.2	-4.5	-4.9	-5.1	-19.7
Defense Agencies	-0.3	-0.5	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-1.7
Total*	-6.3	-9.9	-13.7	-14.8	-15.8	-60.5

---

* Figures may not add due to rounding.

These reductions were apparently not made within any strategic context or rationale. Rather, they were announced on a "fair share" basis in that each service is reduced by about 2 percent in 1990. This was done even though some military departments (e.g. Air Force) grew more than others in real terms in the original Reagan request for FY-91-92. The outyear reductions were also made on a pro-rata basis. We understand that reclamas will not be considered. The revised budget guidance levels and associated rates of real growth by service are shown in Attachment A.

The military departments are currently developing their proposals for a revised program to meet these targets and will submit their plans to the CINCs and OSD for review on February 24. The schedule to be followed after that time is:

Feb. 25 - Mar. 8	OSD Review of Service Budget Proposals
Mar. 8 - Mar. 10	"Mini" Defense Resources Board (DRB) Meeting
March 10	DRB Decisions to the Services
Mar. 10 - Apr. 10	Develop Budget Materials
April 10	Amended Budget to Congress

We will continue to work closely with both the Defense Comptroller and OMB during this budget review and will keep you informed of major policy and program proposals, once we become aware of them.

Don Snider and Virginia Lampley concur.

Attachment
Tab A Revised Defense Budget Levels

Revised Defense Budget Guidance Levels
(Current $ in Billions)

	FY89	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94
Army	78.2	78.7	81.3	86.2	88.7	92.1
(% RG)		(-2.3%)	(0.3%)	(3.4%)	(0.6%)	(1.6%)
Navy	97.4	99.4	101.6	106.4	112.6	119.1
(% RG)		(-0.9%)	(-0.6%)	(2.2%)	(3.5%)	(3.7%)
Air Force	94.6	98.5	103.4	110.2	114.4	117.1
(% RG)		(0.9%)	(2.1%)	(4.0%)	(1.5%)	(0.3%)
Defense Agencies & other	20.0	22.7	24.7	19.2	20.2	21.5
Total DOD	290.2	299.3	311.0	322.0	335.9	349.8
(% RG)		(0.0%)	(1.0%)	(1.0%)	(2.0%)	(2.0%)

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

0987

Other

CHRON FILE

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

February 17, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: LINTON BROOKS

FROM: WILLIAM TOBEY

SUBJECT: Flat Twin and Pawn Shop Radar Destruction

At Tab I is a draft cable to Embassy Moscow responding to the Soviet contention that they have completed destruction of the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop radar equipment near Gomel and Moscow, per the agreement of SCC-XXXVI. The issue has come to us for resolution. We will use a crosshatch cable to implement the decision. We believe that a PCC meeting would be unlikely to resolve these issues, as we have been in touch with PCC principals. Likewise the issue does not merit a more Senior meeting.

All agree that the Soviets have cut up, but have failed to crush, Flat Twin instrumentation containers at Gomel, and have failed to cut up the Flat Twin "turning device," in accordance with their SCC statement of December 11, 1988. All agree that these issues should be raised with the Soviets.

Agencies differ on two further issues:

(1) Crushing the Pawn Shop Vans. All agree that the Pawn Shop vans have been cut up, but not crushed. State, JCS and the SCC Commissioner believe that cutting up the vans renders them unusable, meets U.S. objectives for destruction of the radars and restores the Soviets to compliance. They further note that we did not raise the issue of the vans near Moscow in our 4 and 11 February 1989 demarches to the Soviets. OSD and ACDA argue that the Soviets have not done what they committed to do and to let the matter slide erodes our ability to enforce scrupulous Treaty compliance.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0805-MR
MM 3/23/2016

~~SECRET~~

(2) The Concrete Flat Twin Foundation. All agree that the foundation has probably been rendered unusable for its original purpose and that to repair it would be as difficult as starting from scratch. Therefore, State believes that the issue should be closed. OSD, JCS, and ACDA believe that while the foundation has probably been rendered unusable by partial excavation, the Soviets have not carried out the activities they agreed to -- specifically demolishing the foundation in a verifiable manner. They believe that failing to hold the Soviets to the letter of their commitment would erode our ability to enforce compliance with future agreements and that raising the issue with the Soviets incurs no costs.

NSC Staff Recommendation: That we include the Flat Twin foundation and Pawn Shop vans in the issues raised with the Soviets. The Soviets have not met the commitment they made for destruction of the radar equipment near Gomel and Moscow. But, we have yet to tell them what we find unsatisfactory; the Soviets may well take the additional steps or provide information as to why they are unnecessary. Moreover, if the Soviets refuse to take additional action, nothing in the demarche would preclude us from stating that although the Soviets have not completed the actions they agreed to in SCC-XXXVI, they have destroyed the radars and returned to compliance. In short there is nothing to lose, but a little to gain by raising these issues with the Soviets.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve clearing a crosshatch cable along the lines discussed above, and annotated at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Robert Blackwill and Condoleezza Rice concur.

Attachments

Tab I Draft Cable
Tab II Agency Positions
Tab III Latest Intelligence Assessment

Hold them to the commitments they made! RR.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: FLAT TWIN RADAR AND PAWN SHOP VAN DESTRUCTION

REFERENCES: (A) STATE 014985; (B) STATE 35266;
(C) STATE 44243; (D) MOSCOW 03378;
(E) MOSCOW 04869; (F) 88 GENEVA 13501;
(G) 88 GENEVA 13556

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE SOVIETS REPORTED ON JANUARY 16 THAT THE DISMANTLING AND ELIMINATION PROCEDURES AT GOMEL AND MOSCOW WERE COMPLETE (REF A). EMBASSY MOSCOW DELIVERED DEMARCHE TO MFA FEBRUARY 8 WHICH STATED U.S. POSITION THAT ALL AGREED DESTRUCTION HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED (REF B). TO PROVIDE THE SOVIETS SPECIFIC CORRECTIONS WHICH NEED TO BE COMPLETED AS WAS AGREED AT SCC-XXXVI, EMBASSY MOSCOW SHOULD DELIVER TO MFA THE TEXT OF LETTER FROM COMMISSIONER ELLIS TO COMMISSIONER KUKLEV CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 4 BELOW. ORIGINAL TEXT WILL BE PROVIDED SOVIET EMBASSY WASHINGTON.

3. FYI FOR EMBASSY: SOVIET SCC COMMISSIONER KUKLEV EXPLAINED THE PROPOSED SOVIET PROCEDURES FOR DESTROYING THE ELEMENTS OF THE FLAT TWIN AND PAWN SHOP RADARS DURING A DECEMBER 11, 1988 SCC PLENARY (REF F). ON DECEMBER 12, 1988, UNITED STATES DEPUTY COMMISSIONER ADAMS READ A STATEMENT (REF G) DETAILING THE U.S. UNDERSTANDING OF THE STEPS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIETS. THE U.S. VIEWED THESE TWO STATEMENTS AS REFLECTING THE SIDES' MUTUAL AGREEMENT REGARDING THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S DECISION TO DESTROY THE ELEMENTS OF THE FLAT TWIN AND PAWN SHOP RADARS IN THE AREAS OF GOMEL AND MOSCOW. END FYI.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF COMMISSIONER ELLIS' LETTER:

-

FEBRUARY , 1989

MR. COMMISSIONER:

YOUR LETTER OF JANUARY 16, 1989, STATED THAT THE DISMANTLING AND ELIMINATION PROCEDURES OF THE FLAT TWIN AND PAWN SHOP RADARS WERE COMPLETED IN THE GOMEL AND MOSCOW AREAS. [~~THE UNITED STATES HAS OBSERVED THAT~~ THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PAWN SHOP VANS NEAR MOSCOW AND GOMEL IS COMPLETE AND THIS DESTRUCTION RESOLVES UNITED STATES CONCERN ABOUT ~~THESE PAWN SHOP~~ VANS.]

OSD, ACDA WOULD DELETE

JCS, STATE, SCC WOULD RETAIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0805-MR
MM 3/23/2016

THE UNITED STATES JUDGES, THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF THE FLAT TWIN RADAR NEAR GOMEL HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURES AGREED TO BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AT SCC-XXXVI. SPECIFICALLY, THE FOLLOWING AGREED DESTRUCTION APPEARS NOT TO HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED:

- THE INSTRUMENTATION CONTAINERS, THOSE LARGE STRUCTURES WHICH WERE SUPPORTED ON THE FLAT TWIN PEDESTAL AT SARY SHAGAN, HAVE BEEN CUT UP CONSISTENT WITH YOUR DECEMBER 11, 1988 STATEMENT. HOWEVER, THE PIECES APPEAR NOT TO HAVE BEEN CRUSHED, AS YOU STATED THEY WOULD BE.

- THE BODY OF WHAT THE SOVIET SIDE REFERS TO AS THE "TURNING DEVICE" FOR THE FLAT TWIN APPEARS NOT TO HAVE BEEN CUT INTO PARTS AS AGREED.

STATE WOULD DELETE ACDA, JCS, OSD WOULD RETAIN

[- THE CONCRETE FOUNDATION OF THE FLAT TWIN PEDESTAL SUPPORT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ENTIRELY DEMOLISHED.]

STATE, JCS, SCC WOULD DELETE ACDA, OSD WOULD RETAIN

[- FURTHERMORE, ALTHOUGH THE PAWN SHOP VANS NEAR MOSCOW AND GOMEL HAVE BEEN CUT UP INTO SEVERAL PIECES, THE PARTS APPEAR NOT TO HAVE BEEN CRUSHED AS YOU STATED THEY WOULD BE.]

THE UNITED STATES REQUESTS THAT THESE ACTIONS BE COMPLETED AND THAT THE PARTS OF ALL EQUIPMENT REMAIN IN PLACE FOR 30 DAYS AFTER COMPLETION. IF THESE ACTIONS ARE TAKEN, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT, AFTER THE UNITED STATES HAS VERIFIED THEIR COMPLETION, THIS WOULD SATISFY OUR CONCERNS REGARDING THIS EQUIPMENT.

-
-

RICHARD H. ELLIS
COMMISSIONER

V. A. KUKLEV
USSR COMMISSIONER
U.S. - USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

END TEXT.

ACDA Rationale - Flat Twin Radar and Pawn Shop Van Destruction

Agencies agree that the Soviets have not completed all of the actions they committed to perform. While ACDA believes that the radar has been rendered militarily unusable and probably cannot be restored, it is important to insist that the Soviets carry out the actions they agreed to formally in the SCC. Specifically, the Soviet Component of the Standing Consultative Commission, during SCC-XXXVI (Fall 1988), agreed to cut up and crush Pawn Shop Vans at both Gomel and Moscow, to demolish the concrete foundation of the Flat Twin Pedestal support and cut up the Flat Twin turning device at Gomel.

ACDA believes that the United States should approach the Soviets at this time and require them to complete the destruction, as they proposed and agreed to during SCC-XXXVI, but which does not appear to have been completed. If the Soviets respond that they are unable to perform any of the measures they agreed to, they should provide detailed explanations for our consideration. We then have an opportunity to reconsider the issue.

Nevertheless, in order to maintain pressure on the Soviets to correct clear arms control violations and to set a precedent for firm United States policy, we should press them to carry out their formal commitments.

The U.S. SCC Commissioner's letter responds to the Soviet SCC Commissioner's letter of January 16, 1989 and provides the Soviets with specific actions they must take to meet U.S. concerns. By being specific the United States has demonstrated its willingness to work through and resolve this issue.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0805-MR
mm 1/8/2016

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN WNINTEL

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

15 FEB 1989

In reply refer to:
I-28907/89

MEMORANDUM FOR STAN RIVELES (ACDA/SP/SA)

SUBJECT: OSD Position on Flat Twin and Pawn Shop Destruction (U)

(S/NF/WN) We have reviewed the 14 February draft of a cable to Moscow on "Flat Twin Radar and Pawn Shop Van Destruction". OSD regards this issue as clear: the Soviet Union has not done all that it agreed to do with regard to the ABM radars at Gomel and Moscow and has not accurately reported its actions. The 9 February ACIS analysis concludes that, contrary to the agreed dismantlement procedures: (1) the Pawn Shop van pieces have not been crushed, (2) the Flat Twin radar pieces have not been crushed, (3) the Flat Twin's turning device has not been cut into discernible pieces, and (4) the Flat Twin's concrete foundation, although partially excavated, is not verifiably demolished.

(S) Notwithstanding the fact that the Soviets -- by stating that they would cut up and crush the radars' pieces -- agreed to do more in dismantling the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop radars than the USG requested, OSD believes that the agreement reached at SCC-XXXVI supersedes the SCC instructions and is a binding agreement with which the Soviet Union must strictly comply.

(S) We do not know why the Soviets have not carried out their commitments on the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop. The cost to the Soviet Union of carrying out all the agreed actions would be trivial. They may want to keep components in reparable condition. They may be testing the resolve of the new Administration on this issue. In any case, The United States must respond to the challenge and ensure the Soviets do precisely what they agreed do to. If we retreat on these issues, it will set an extremely negative precedent for resolution of the Krasnoyarsk violation.

Susan J. Koch
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Nuclear Forces & Arms Control Policy

CLASSIFIED BY: DIR, SACP
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0805-MR
MM 4/21/2016

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN WNINTEL

UNITED STATES COMPONENT
OF THE
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

February 16, 1989

MEMORANDUM

TO: Stanley Riveles
Chairman, SCC Backstopping Committee

FROM: William T. Parsons WTP
Executive Secretary, SCC

SUBJECT: Draft Gomel Cable

Commissioner Ellis supports the SCC Backstopping Committee's draft cable of February 14, 1989, concerning the destruction of the Flat Twin radar at Gomel and the Pawn Shop vans at Gomel and Moscow. However, the Commissioner believes that Soviet actions to date have resolved satisfactorily the problem concerning the Pawn Shop vans at Moscow and Gomel. For this reason, the Pawn Shop issue should not be pursued further. (S/NF)

The Commissioner concurs with the rationale of the JCS in support of this position. In particular, the Commissioner notes that the Soviet Union has met the longstanding, fundamental objective of the United States with regard to the Pawn Shop vans. This equipment has been cut up into many pieces, rendered unusable, and can no longer have any conceivable application in the Soviet ABM program. (S/NF)

Given that the crux of the violation at Gomel has always been the status of the Flat Twin radar located there, the Commissioner believes that the U.S. should concentrate on ensuring the verifiable destruction of that equipment. Continued reference to procedural details concerning the Pawn Shop vans at Moscow and Gomel will only detract from this central effort. (S/NF)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0806-MR
ER 12/14/15

THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Reply Zip Code:
20318-5000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CO-CHAIRMEN ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION COMMITTEE POLICY GROUP

Subject: Response to Soviet Questions on Gomel Corrective Action. (U)

1. (S) The JCS continue to believe that the equipment at Gomel has been reduced to an unusable condition, but also believe that not all Soviet steps have clearly been accomplished as stated by Commissioner Kuklev in his 16 Jan 89 letter to Commissioner Ellis. The JCS support the 14 Feb 89 SCC Backstopping Committee draft memo for a response to Soviet SCC Commssioner Kuklev. The JCS brackets are based on the rationale below.

2. (S) The JCS support the position that arms control agreements must be complied with and corrective action must be accomplished to remove violations. The Joint Staff does not, however, support reopening the Pawn Shop issue for the following reasons:

a. (S) The US requirement, in Presidential instructions, for resolution of the Gomel issue in SCC-XXXV, SCC-XXXVI, and the ABM Treaty Review was that the pieces of the equipment at Gomel be cut up or crushed, not cut up and crushed. The US did not require any action in regard to the Pawn Shop at Moscow. The original requirement for action to resolve the mobile ABM components (Pawn Shop) issue, stated by the US in SCC-XXXII, was to "cease using the components in question and to remove them from service in such a way that the US could be certain they no longer had any application in the Soviet ABM program." The JCS believe all the established US criteria for resolution of these Pawn Shop issues has therefore been met.

b. (S) The 4 and 11 Feb 89 US Demarches to Moscow stated US concern only with Gomel and requested only that equipment at Gomel remain in place. Under the agreement reached at SCC XXXVI the Soviets could have removed the Pawn Shop debris at Moscow as early as 8 Feb 89. Reintroducing an issue with the Moscow equipment could, therefore, be counterproductive to resolution of the

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0806-MR
MM 4/21/2016

CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR, J-5
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

overall issue. To raise an issue concerning only the van at Gomel without raising an issue concerning the other van at Moscow would be difficult to rationalize to the Soviets, since their procedures for destruction appear to have been the same at both locations.

c. (S) The Pawn Shop vans alone are not equipment unique to Soviet ABM systems. Therefore, reconstitution of the vans should not be a substantive issue.

d. (S) Some have suggested that the various inconsistencies in the Soviet actions represent an attempt to test US NTM. Not raising issues concerning the Pawn Shop would introduce some uncertainty and inconsistency into any Soviet effort to determine those capabilities.

T. R. FOX
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
International Negotiations

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

State Rationale

Bracket 1 - para. 4: In several demarches to the Soviets, we have noted our concern only with Gomel. Reintroducing an issue on the Moscow situation would be confusing to the Soviets, it would appear as though we were merely trying to create obstacles to resolution of the issue, and would dilute the message we are trying to get across on Gomel. Moreover, the intelligence indicates that the Pawn Shop vans are thoroughly destroyed, and therefore not worth raising. We should state this and put the issue to rest.

Bracket 2 - para. 4, tick 3: State would delete this statement: Intelligence coverage indicates that the Soviets have destroyed the concrete foundation of the Flat Twin pedestal support such that it is no longer usable. Were the Soviets to elect to rebuild a Flat Twin radar on this site they would have to construct an entirely new concrete foundation. Therefore, the Soviets have done what we asked, i.e., functionally demolished the concrete foundation.

Bracket 3 - para. 4, tick 4: State would delete this statement: The Pawn Shop vans near Moscow and Gomel have been demolished and are no longer usable. Since we have achieved our aim, it would be counterproductive to pursue the Pawn Shop issue by insisting that the Soviets further crush the Pawn Shop fragments. The generally smaller size of these remnants and their status -- crushed or non-crushed -- allows for a meaningful distinction from the larger pieces of the Flat Twin modules.

In general, unnecessary nitpicking on our part for no important compliance purpose is likely to discourage the Soviets from taking seriously our concerns regarding the more important Krasnoyarsk radar, since they would believe that reasonable measures to destroy a facility may not be accepted by us.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0806-MR
MM 3/29/2016

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04h. Memo	Re: Status of FLAT TWIN and PAWN SHOP Components (1 pp.)	2/13/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Other (January - March 1989)

Date Closed:	7/8/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91148-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

CHRON FILE

1227

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0806-MR
E8 12114115

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 28, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

FROM: STEPHEN P. FARRAR

SUBJECT: Next Steps in Preparing for the Paris Economic Summit

This memorandum provides a report on the first Sherpa meeting, held in France last weekend (February 24-26), and recommends next steps in preparing for President Bush's participation.

The Sherpa Meeting

The second of five Sherpa meetings was chaired by Jacques Attali, Special Counsellor to President Mitterrand and the French Sherpa. (The first Sherpa meeting, held last October and attended only by Allen Wallis for the U.S., was purely organizational.) At last weekend's meeting, Summit countries and the European Communities were each represented by three Sherpas -- one the personal Sherpa, one from finance and one from foreign affairs. U.S. representatives were Dick McCormack (personal), David Mulford (finance), and myself (foreign affairs).

The meeting achieved its goals of (1) beginning to identify issues for discussion by the Summit heads and (2) clarifying logistical arrangements. Concerning issues, all agreed that it was too early to be precise on how the Summit should approach the major international economic problems outlined below.

-- Trade. There was a general expectation that a way will be found around the agriculture stalemate between the U.S. and the EC before or at the April 5-6 GATT meeting. All agreed, however, that it will be important for the Summit to give a political push to the Uruguay Round. There was also agreement that regional trade arrangements, particularly the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement and the European single market, should be encouraged as helping to strengthen the multilateral trade system.

-- Macroeconomic Policy. There was an obvious division between the Germans and Japanese on the one hand, who favor a shift in emphasis to controlling inflation, and the United States on the other. The U.S. (Mulford) argued hard that markets would react negatively to abandoning efforts to eliminate external payments imbalances. This issue will be worked in the G-7 forum during the spring and early summer.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

-- Debt. The open and substantive discussion of the debt problem produced no apparent narrowing of differences. The French finance Sherpa presented a summary of the Mitterrand Plan (to create a guarantee pool funded by new issues of SDR's to allow discounted debt to be converted into long-term bonds). There was little effort to move the issue forward because all were aware of the ongoing USG review and of the plans for G-7 discussion in early April.

-- Environment. The French emphasized that Mitterrand wants the environment issue to be a centerpiece at Paris, but were unclear whether a global initiative would be proposed. The British favored Summit action on global climate change, while we and the Japanese stressed the need for careful scientific analysis before acting. Interestingly, no mention was made of the March 11 Hague Summit on the environment, and individual Frenchmen appeared privately almost apologetic about it. The French did express an interest in two specific issues related to the environment: Bangladesh flood control and a "Saharan Observatory" to fight desertification. More work will be done on these during the spring. The Bangladesh project would be expensive (put at $16 billion by the French), and it is unclear whether the problem can be solved without the cooperation of India.

-- East-West Economic Relations. All agreed that Gorbachev's success is far from assured, and that the West should allow economic relations to develop carefully and on a market basis.

-- Chemical Weapons. There was widespread interest in using the Summit to advance cooperation on chemical weapons. There seemed to be consensus on building on the Australian group, a 19-member group of Western nations which meets informally to seek ways to control the spread of pre-cursor chemicals.

-- Political Issues. There was strong support for Summit coordination of the problems of terrorism, drugs, and human rights. The French announced an interest in addressing money laundering and insider trading, and are preparing papers on the issues.

Concerning logistics, the French went to great lengths to reassure others that there would be no formal or planned contacts between the Summiteers and the 15-17 other heads of state that are expected to attend the Bicentennial festivities. The Bicentennial will end early in the afternoon of July 14, and from 3 p.m. the city of Paris will be entirely devoted to the Summit. The French are aware of the logistical problems -- mainly caused by the Arche de la Defense being 2-3 miles from the hotels where most heads will be staying -- and seem determined to solve them.

Next Steps

By the next Sherpa meeting (April 7-9), the U.S. position should be in reasonably sharp focus. The Sherpas will report to the President on last weekend's meeting. This report should be the basis for a meeting of the White House Summit Group (WHSG), ideally Tuesday or Wednesday, March 14 or 15. This will allow a discussion of the issues (based on the Sherpas' report) and logistics (an advance team will be in Paris March 8-10). Following that meeting, we will want to get the President's guidance early enough to work bilaterally to build support before the April 7-9 Sherpa meeting.

You should be aware that Secretary Brady wrote you on February 17 (see Tab I) asking to discuss the Summit preparatory process with you. We are checking with Treasury to determine whether Brady would consider a meeting of the WHSG to be an adequate forum.

RECOMMENDATION

That the White House Summit Group be scheduled to meet at an agreeable time on Tuesday, March 14, or Wednesday, March 15. You may want to discuss this with John Sununu.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Letter from Secretary Brady

cc: Karl Jackson
Robert Blackwill
Peter Rodman

Fri 3/17
4:00 pm
Sit Room



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1989

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
National Security Adviser
National Security Council
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Brent:

As you may recall, the next Sherpa meeting is set for February 24-26, the date agreed to when the French reluctantly agreed to a U.S. request to cancel the originally scheduled January meeting.

On the composition of the team a couple of considerations come to mind. First, I understand that Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs-Designate McCormack will attend the meeting as Head Sherpa. Second, as far as I know, your representation is still up in the air. Treasury will continue to be represented by David Mulford.

In any event, I think you and I and Jim Baker should discuss the Summit preparatory process when you get a chance. I am sending an identical letter to Jim.

Sincerely,

Nicholas F. Brady

CHRON FILE

0485(a

ACTIONS TAKEN ON AIR FORCE ONE EN ROUTE TO ALASKA 2-22-89

OPK

#0485 Add-on - Paris Economic Summit - Scowcroft discussed the package with Sec Baker, signed the memo at Tab I; memo was dated February 22, 1989 -- I will FAX a copy.

0485
ADD-ON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 22, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS F. BRADY
The Secretary of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Preparations for the 1989 Economic Summit

This directive establishes responsibilities for the 1989 Economic Summit, to be held July 14-16 in Paris.

I. Preparations with Other Summit Participants

The President has designated Richard McCormack, Under Secretary of State-designate for Economic Affairs as his Personal Representative ("Sherpa") for the preparation of policy aspects of the Economic Summit. Together with the other members of the Sherpa team, David Mulford, Under Secretary of the Treasury-designate for Monetary Affairs and the National Security Council's Senior Director for International Economic Affairs, he will represent the U.S. Government at preparatory meetings for the Summit. The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs will handle political issues on behalf of the Personal Representative.

II. Preparations within the U.S. Government

In carrying out its responsibilities for the Summit, the Sherpa team will report directly to the White House Summit Group (WHSG), co-chaired by the Chief of Staff to the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The WHSG will have primary responsibility for all matters relating to the Summit and will provide recommendations to the President for decision. It may call upon the NSC and the Economic Policy Council for recommendations as necessary.

The Sherpa team will coordinate preparation for the Summit with relevant officials at the Under Secretary level from concerned agencies, including the Vice President's Office, the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture and

Commerce, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Council of Economic Advisors and the National Security Council staff.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Brent Scowcroft

Brent Scowcroft

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

0485
ADD-ON

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 17, 1989

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: STEPHEN P. FARRAR SPF

FROM: ERIC MELBY EM

SUBJECT: Paris Economic Summit

Per Bob Gates' instructions this morning, we are forwarding a revised memorandum advising the Secretaries of State and ~~the~~ Treasury of the Sherpa team make-up and responsibilities for the Paris Economic Summit.

For your information, an organization chart revised to include the Secretaries of State and Treasury as members of the White House Summit Group is at Tab II.

Nicholas Rostow concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign memorandum to Secretaries Baker and Brady at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to Secretaries Baker and Brady
Tab II Revised Organization Chart

cc: Robert Blackwill

0485
ADD-ON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 22, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS F. BRADY
The Secretary of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Preparations for the 1989 Economic Summit

This directive establishes responsibilities for the 1989 Economic Summit, to be held July 14-16 in Paris.

I. Preparations with Other Summit Participants

The President has designated Richard McCormack, Under Secretary of State-designate for Economic Affairs as his Personal Representative ("Sherpa") for the preparation of policy aspects of the Economic Summit. Together with the other members of the Sherpa team, David Mulford, Under Secretary of the Treasury-designate for Monetary Affairs and the National Security Council's Senior Director for International Economic Affairs, he will represent the U.S. Government at preparatory meetings for the Summit. The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs will handle political issues on behalf of the Personal Representative.

II. Preparations within the U.S. Government

In carrying out its responsibilities for the Summit, the Sherpa team will report directly to the White House Summit Group (WHSG), co-chaired by the Chief of Staff to the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The WHSG will have primary responsibility for all matters relating to the Summit and will provide recommendations to the President for decision. It may call upon the NSC and the Economic Policy Council for recommendations as necessary.

The Sherpa team will coordinate preparation for the Summit with relevant officials at the Under Secretary level from concerned agencies, including the Vice President's Office, the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture and

Commerce, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Council of Economic Advisors and the National Security Council staff.


FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Brent Scowcroft

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

2/17/89

ORGANIZATION FOR THE PARIS ECONOMIC SUMMIT
July 14-16, 1989



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1370

CHRON FILE

March 3, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CLINT BROOKS/ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: DON MAHLEY

SUBJECT: Baker Letter to Genscher

We learned today through reading the traffic from Bonn (BONN 6907 attached at Tab I) that Secretary Baker had sent a personal letter to FRG Foreign Minister Genscher urging the FRG to agree to the conventional force negotiations zone proposal under consideration by the High Level Task Force (HLTF) in Brussels. Although State had indicated in telephone conversation with NSC Staff (Mahley) earlier yesterday that the U.S. intended to contact the FRG, the first indication we had of the letter was in the Bonn traffic. In fact, the letter text (STATE 67335)* is, as of 1600 hours today, not received by the NSC.

We have learned that State did informally "clear" the text of the letter with OSD (John Matheney, an office director in ISP). There is no evidence that the letter text was coordinated further among Washington agencies. A check of NSC Secretariat indicates that the cable transmitting the text was not crosshatched through the NSC for clearance.

From reading the Bonn cable, it is evident that the letter made several assurances to the FRG in an effort to convince them to accept the NATO zone proposal (see highlighted section of cable at Tab I). We have no substantive objection to any of these policy points, since they are ones that the U.S. has been pursuing as a preference in the HLTF discussions over the previous months. However, we believe that proper and orderly process demands that any such communications with a foreign government setting or reinforcing U.S.G. arms control policy absolutely require White House clearance before transmission. We would point out that on several occasions during the previous administration, despite protests from the NSC, personal letters were transmitted from the Secretary of State to foreign counterparts, containing policy statements, without prior White House clearance. We believe it is important to establish the precedent that current policy process requires White House clearance of arms control policy statements.

* Cable at Tab II

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0806-MR
MM 2/25/2016

~~SECRET~~

* THIS IS NOT A TURF FIGHT. THIS IS MAHLEY SURE THE STATE BUREAUCRACY ADHERES TO THE COORDINATION YOU AND BARRY ARE TRYING TO INSTITUTE

I agree in spirit

BD

There is the extenuating circumstance that this communication was time-sensitive (the HLTF was still meeting in Brussels). However, NSC Staff were intimately involved in the process of working out the instructions for the HLTF delegation and the issues involved. There is no reason to believe that White House clearance of the letter would have delayed it beyond the window of opportunity for it to be effective.

We do not recommend that a formal memorandum be sent protesting this incident, but we believe that State should be reminded that such letters must be cleared by the White House before transmission.

Philip Zelikow concurs PR

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize G. Philip Hughes to call Melvin Levitsky, Executive Secretary at State, pointing out the absolute necessity for any such letters to foreign government ministers being cleared by the White House prior to transmission.

Approve I think it is OBE now. I would prefer to wait for another cause celebre Disapprove ____

Alternatively, that you raise this subject with Secretary Baker.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachments

Tab I Bonn 06907

Tab II State 67335

TAB I

<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
<DTG> 031039Z MAR 89
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY BONN
<SUBJ>SUBJECT: CFE: GERMAN POSITION ON CFE PROPOSAL

<TEXT>
~~C O N F I D E N T I A~~L BONN 06907
USVIENNA FOR CFE DEL; VIENNA FOR CSBMS DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS:NATO, CSCE, CDE, PARM
SUBJECT: CFE: GERMAN POSITION ON CFE PROPOSAL
REF: (A) STATE 67335; (B) USNATO 1330
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WE DELIVERED THE SECRETARY'S LETTER ON CFE (REF A) TO GENSCHER'S PERSONAL STAFF IMMEDIATELY AT OPENING OF BUSINESS ON MARCH 3. SIMULTANEOUSLY, WE TOOK A COPY TO HOLIK'S DEPUTY, ROSSBACH. (HOLIK, BACK FROM BRUSSELS, WAS CLOSETED WITH GENSCHER AND THEREFORE UNAVAILABLE).
3. ROSSBACH TOLD US THAT THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT TO APPROVE THE PROPOSAL WORKED OUT AT YESTERDAY'S HLTF MEETING, INCLUDING THE INNER MBFR-LIKE SUBZONE, WAS OUT OF THE HANDS OF THE "EXPERTS" LIKE HOLIK OR HIMSELF, AND AT THE "POLITICAL LEVEL" (MEANING GENSCHER). ROSSBACH VERY CLEARLY INDICATED TO US HIS EXPECTATION THAT GENSCHER WOULD APPROVE THE PROPOSAL, PROBABLY DURING THE COURSE OF TODAY.
4. AT THE SAME TIME, ROSSBACH MADE CLEAR HIS PERSONAL UNHAPPINESS WITH THE "MBFR-STYLE" SUBZONE, WHICH HE ARGUED CREATED THE VERY FOCUS ON THE FRG WHICH THE EAST HAD ALWAYS SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH. HE FEARED THAT THE LOGIC OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD LEAD TO THE ISOLATION OF THE FRG AND TO PRESSURES ON THE GERMANS TO AGREE TO WHAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A SPECIAL ARMS CONTROL REGIME, SEPARATING THE FRG FROM ITS WESTERN PARTNERS (ESPECIALLY FRANCE) BUT TYING IT THE EAST. THIS WAS SOMETHING THE FRG HAS ALWAYS SOUGHT TO AVOID.
5. WE POINTED TO THE STRONG LANGUAGE IN THE SECRETARY'S LETTER AFFIRMING U.S. SUPPORT FOR SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATION OF A PACKAGE OF LINKED MEASURES THROUGHOUT THE ZONE OPPOSING THE CREATION OF SPECIAL ZONES OR CORRIDORS, AND CATEGORICALLY REJECTING A PHASED APPROACH OR SINGULARIZATION. ROSSBACH AGREED THESE ASSURANCES WERE IMPRESSIVE AND POINTED TO THE STATEMENT ON SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATION OF LINKED MEASURES AS BEING OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE FOR THE GERMANS. HE NEVERTHELESS WENT ON TO COMPLAIN AT SOME LENGTH AND WITH SOME BITTERNESS ABOUT THE FRENCH INSISTENCE ON A ZONAL APPROACH -- THE CAUSE OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM -- AND ABOUT TURKISH STUBBORNESS. THE FRENCH AND THE TURKS, HE ASSERTED, WERE BEING REWARDED BY GETTING WHAT THEY HAD DEMANDED; IT WAS ONLY THE GERMANS WHO, AT THE END OF THE DAY, WERE BEING ASKED TO PAY A PRICE.
6. TURNING TO THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION OF THE TIMETABLE FOR REACHING AGREEMENT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, ROSSBACH SAID THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THAT IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT NATO HAVE AN AGREED POSITION BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE VIENNA MEETING. (POLITICAL DIRECTOR KASTRUP MADE THE SAME POINT TO US IN TWO BRIEF TELEPHONIC DISCUSSIONS YESTERDAY EVENING.) THEREFORE, HE ASSUMED THE GERMAN DELEGATION TO THE HLTF WOULD BE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO GO

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0806-MR
ES 12/14/15

ALONG WITH THE CONSENSUS BY TOMORROW.
7. WE WILL CHECK BACK WITH ROSSBACH OR HOLIK LATER IN THE DAY TO CONFIRM WHETHER THE GERMAN DECISION IS POSITIVE.
DOBBINS

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01

TAB II

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRT: PERITO

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 030349Z MAR 89

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO NIACT 0000
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
RUFHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0000

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0807-MR
SCS 4/27/11

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 067335
USVIENNA FOR CFE DEL//VIENNA FOR CSBM DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, NATO, GE
SUBJECT: CFE: SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FONMIN GENSCHER
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.
3. FOR BONN. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER AT HIGHEST LEVEL, IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT, THE LETTER CONTAINED IN PARA. 5 FROM THE SECRETARY TO FONMIN GENSCHER. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
4. FOR USNATO. MISSION SHOULD DELIVER A COPY OF THE LETTER CONTAINED IN PARA. 5 TO FRG MISSION TO NATO AND TO AMB. HOLIK.
5. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER:
DEAR HANS-DIETRICH:
FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS NATO GOVERNMENTS HAVE WORKED DILIGENTLY TO CRAFT A SOUND AND VALID OPENING PROPOSAL FOR THE NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) WHICH WILL OPEN IN A FEW DAYS IN VIENNA. IN THE PROCESS, THE ALLIANCE HAS HAD TO WRESTLE WITH THE NUMEROUS POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES OF ITS MEMBERS, NOT IN THE LEAST THE FRENCH, WHO HAVE INSISTED ON AN APPROACH USING ZONES OR SUBLIMITS IN EXCHANGE FOR AGREEMENT ON OVERALL PARITY BETWEEN THE ALLIANCES FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. AS

YOU KNOW. THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A PROPOSAL WITHOUT ZONES. BUT WE WERE UNABLE TO MUSTER SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR OUR VIEWS. AS A RESULT, WE HAVE AGREED TO ACCEPT A ZONAL ARRANGEMENT.

OUR REPRESENTATIVES IN BRUSSELS ARE NOW CONSIDERING A U.K. PROPOSAL THAT WAS TABLED ON FEB. 23 WHICH INVOLVES A SERIES OF ZONES, CONFIGURED MUCH LIKE CONCENTRIC CIRCLES, TO WHICH SUBLIMITS WOULD APPLY. OUR DELEGATION HAS INFORMED ME THAT THERE IS EMERGING ALLIED CONSENSUS TO ACCEPT THIS APPROACH. HOWEVER, I UNDERSTAND THAT YOUR DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE INNERMOST ZONE WOULD MAKE THE PROPOSAL SUSCEPTIBLE TO A PHASED APPROACH IN THE NEGOTIATION WITH THE RISK THAT THE INNERMOST ZONE WOULD BE TRANSFORMED INTO A SEPARATE ARMS CONTROL AREA TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE OTHER CONCENTRIC ZONES. I FRANKLY DO NOT SEE SUCH A RISK.

WHILE THE SUBLIMITS APPROACH LARGELY SERVES POLITICAL INTERESTS, IT ALSO HAS A MILITARY RATIONALE IN THAT IT FORCES SOVIET FORCES OUT OF EASTERN EUROPE AND FARTHER BACK INTO THE USSR. AS SUCH, THE INNERMOST ZONE EXISTS FOR THE APPLICATION OF ONE OF A SET OF INTERDEPENDENT REDUCTIONS MEASURES, MEASURES THAT CASCADE THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE AREA

OF APPLICATION. FOR THIS APPROACH TO MAKE SENSE AND HAVE THE GREATEST EFFECT, ALL MEASURES IN ALL ZONES MUST BE APPLIED; OTHERWISE WE DO NOT ACHIEVE THE "SQUEEZING OUT" OF SOVIET STATIONED FORCES THAT IS SO IMPORTANT TO OUR SECURITY. AS A RESULT, THE CONCERNS RAISED BY YOUR DELEGATION THAT THERE MIGHT BE A PHASED APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS OR THAT THE FOCUS MIGHT TURN TO ONE ARMS CONTROL ZONE APPEAR TO ME NOT WELL-FOUNDED.

I UNDERSTAND YOUR LONG-STANDING CONCERN THAT THERE BE NO ARMS CONTROL BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE FRG AND FRANCE. BUT THE CURRENT WESTERN PROPOSAL DOES NOT ADMIT ONE. OUR APPROACH WOULD NOT ENHANCE SECURITY IF IT STOPPED AT ONE ZONE, AND, INDEED, THE UNITED STATES, AS DO OTHER ALLIES, INSISTS THAT THE PACKAGE OF LINKED MEASURES BE APPLIED SIMULTANEOUSLY

THROUGHOUT ALL ZONES. ADDITIONALLY, THERE WOULD BE NO POLITICAL SENSE IN ALLOWING REDUCTIONS TO OCCUR IN JUST ONE ZONE. AS YOU WELL KNOW, THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT FAVOR DISARMAMENT CORRIDORS, WEAPONS-FREE ZONES OR ANY OTHER CONSTRUCTS THAT RESEMBLE THEM. FURTHER, IT IS GORBACHEV HIMSELF WHO HAS SIGNALLED REPEATEDLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS WILLING TO ELIMINATE DISPARITIES FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. THUS, NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR NATO AS A WHOLE HAS A POLITICAL OR MILITARY INTEREST IN ALLOWING ANY PHASED APPROACH OR SINGULARIZATION TO OCCUR IN THE CFE NEGOTIATION. I CAN ASSURE YOU CATEGORICALLY THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH AN APPROACH.

AT A DIFFERENT LEVEL, SINCE THE FRG IS ALSO INCLUDED ALONG WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN MORE THAN ONE CONCENTRIC ZONE TO WHICH SUBLIMITS APPLY, THERE SHOULD BE LITTLE RISK OF A PUBLIC PERCEPTION THAT THE FRG IS BEING "SINGLED OUT."

NEEDLESS TO SAY, IT IS CRUCIAL THAT NATO AGREE ON AN OPENING PROPOSAL PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF MINISTERS IN VIENNA. WERE WE NOT TO, THERE COULD BE IMMENSE AND WELL-DESERVED CRITICISM FROM OUR PUBLICS AND OUR OPPOSITIONS. WE WOULD ALSO MAKE OURSELVES VULNERABLE TO WARSAW PACT COUNTERPROPOSALS WHICH WOULD EXPLOIT OUR LACK OF AGREEMENT. MOST IMPORTANTLY, WE MUST NOT MISS THE OPPORTUNITY TO SET THE AGENDA IN VIENNA AND DEMONSTRATE A DYNAMIC, UNIFIED, AND FORWARD-LOOKING ALLIANCE. THUS, THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY OPPOSES DEFERRING A RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM TO VIENNA. WE PREFER THAT OUR HLTF DELEGATIONS REMAIN IN BRUSSELS UNTIL CONSENSUS IS REACHED.

ALTHOUGH IT IS, TO BE SURE, A POLITICAL COMPROMISE THAT FULLY SATISFIES NO COUNTRY, I THINK THAT WE HAVE A SOUND AND WORKABLE PROPOSAL. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE WILLING TO JOIN CONSENSUS WITH THE 15 OTHER ALLIES SO THAT A UNIFIED NATO PROPOSAL WILL BE READY BEFORE MONDAY.

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT WE SHALL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET AGAIN NEXT MONDAY.

SINCERELY YOURS,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHRON FILE

1526

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON March 10, 1989

MEETING WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DATE: Saturday, March 11, 1989
LOCATION: Camp David
TIME: 10:30 a.m. - 11:30 a.m.
followed by luncheon with wives

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To discuss issues of mutual interest with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provide an opportunity for social interaction with the Joint Chiefs and their wives.

II. BACKGROUND

This meeting will give you an opportunity to meet informally with the Chiefs and conduct candid discussions in a relaxed setting. Intentionally no agenda has been set, but I anticipate the Chiefs will have several current issues on their minds -- FY 90 budget reductions, conventional force negotiations, the Defense Strategy Review you recently directed and your legislative strategy for the FY 90-91 Defense authorizations and appropriations. Our best estimate of the Chiefs concerns is at Tab A. I understand the Vice President may desire to discuss with the Chiefs the Competitive Strategies approach to defense planning.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President, The Vice President, Admiral Crowe, General Herres, Admiral Trost, General Gray, General Welch, General Vuono, General Scowcroft and Robert Gates.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

Chiefs will arrive at Camp David by helicopter shortly before the scheduled meeting. There will be no prepared agenda. Luncheon with wives will follow the discussions.

Attachments

Tab A Background Paper on Possible Issues
Tab B Biographical Data of Chiefs and Wives

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0807-MR
SCS 6/16/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

Prepared by:
Don M. Snider

cc: The Vice President
The Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POSSIBLE JCS CONCERNS TO BE RAISED WITH THE PRESIDENT

NOTE: These are estimates of items the JCS may raise. To ensure a candid, unstructured meeting there is no agenda nor have the Chiefs been explicitly asked for their concerns.

Budget. Resources and budget dominate the Chiefs' thinking. They have several specific concerns:

-- They worry that the lack of leadership in Defense will make it impossible to resist further cuts in the Defense topline. They are aware that some on the Hill are seeking significant cuts leading to negative real growth for Fiscal Year 1990.

-- They worry that the strategy review, which has just begun, will have profound, adverse consequences. They fear the review cannot be completed in time to provide a strategic rationale for choices before the revised Fiscal Year 1990 defense budget is submitted in April. At the same time, they are reluctant to make decisions without the completion of the review. They also worry about the long term consequences of possible shifts in regional emphasis arising from the review.

-- They are deeply concerned with the way the 2% reduction in Fiscal Year 1990 (needed to meet your decision to allow zero real growth) is being implemented. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has elected to "fair share" the cuts, directing each service to absorb proportional reductions, rather than imposing any priorities.

Ultimately the Chiefs are worried about maintaining our current military strategy in an era of declining resources and declining overseas support and access. While they may assert that commitments should be scaled back, they don't expect this to happen and thus see no way out of their dilemma. They will want the President and the Administration to articulate a rationale for maintaining our current military strength.

People. The Chiefs worry about their ability to recruit and retain high quality people. Recently the services failed to meet recruiting goals for the first time in years. The problem is most acute for the Army and Marines, but all the Chiefs worry that budget pressures will impact on the "people programs" needed to continue to maintain a trained, motivated military. They are also worried by the possible impact of some of the universal service ideas now surfacing in Congress.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0807-MR
ES 3/26/13

Military to Military Contacts with The Soviet Union. The Chiefs, especially Admiral Crowe, are pleased with the results of ongoing military to military talks with the Soviet Union and believe there are significant benefits in exposing senior Soviet military leaders to the American military.

Process. While the Chiefs may or may not raise the issue directly, they are concerned with how the interagency process is functioning. They fear that, especially with the leadership void at Defense, the State Department is making policy without adequate consideration of the views of others, including the professional military. They may use the recent chemical weapons initiative announced by Secretary Baker in Vienna as an example.

Arms control. The Chiefs accept arms control as inevitable but see little to be gained from it. They will stress the need for thorough, detailed analysis in START and will argue that progress must come very slowly and only after detailed examination of the issues. They will stress the huge amount of work required before the U.S. can complete tabling its START position. They will argue against any inclusion of aircraft or naval forces in conventional arms control. Finally, while supporting SDI research, they assign higher funding priority to other missions and worry about diverting funds from other military programs. They may argue against any attempt to jettison the ABM Treaty in the near term because they believe the Soviets are better positioned than the United States for rapidly fielding ABM defenses.

Individual concerns. In addition to these general concerns, individual service chiefs may raise the following:

-- Air Force Chief of Staff Welch will be heavily focused on the ICBM modernization decision and on the need to preserve some form of rail-garrison MX program.

-- Army Chief of Staff Vuono is concerned with a lack of strategic mobility and with the dangers of force reductions in Europe made unilaterally rather than as a result of conventional arms control negotiations.

-- Admiral Trost, Chief of Naval Operations, worries that the constant Soviet call for naval arms control negotiations of some form may prove impossible to resist.

-- Marine Commandant Gray worries about the future of the Marine Corps, fearing that budget pressures will lead to cutbacks in amphibious shipping and Marine Corps airpower which will change the fundamental nature of the service.

These individual concerns, while real, are probably overshadowed by the Chiefs common concern with budgets and people.

BIOGRAPHY

ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., was appointed the eleventh Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, by President Ronald Reagan on October 1, 1985. He was reappointed to a second two-year term in 1987. In this capacity, he serves as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council. Admiral Crowe served as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, prior to his current appointment.

Born on January 2, 1925, in La Grange, Kentucky, Admiral Crowe moved to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, at the age of five and grew up there. He attended Classen High School and the University of Oklahoma for one year. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1946 with the Class of 1947. His further academic achievements include a Master of Arts in Education from Stanford University and a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton.

His initial sea tour was aboard USS CARMICK (DMS-33), followed in June 1948 by studies at the Naval Submarine School, New London, Connecticut. He qualified in submarines on 31 March 1950 in the submarine USS FLYING FISH (SS-29), then served as Flag Lieutenant and Aide to the Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. He was assigned to the submarine USS CLAMAGORE (SS-343) from 1952-1954 and as Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President of the United States from 1954-1955. He served as Executive Officer of the submarine USS WAHOO (SS-565) in Honolulu, Hawaii, and Commanding Officer of the submarine USS TROUT (SS-566) in Charleston, South Carolina, prior to assignment as Commander, Submarine Division THIRTY-ONE in San Diego, California.

Significant shore assignments, prior to attaining Flag rank, include: Aide to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy); Director of East Asia and Pacific Branch, Politico-Military Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Senior U.S. adviser to the Vietnamese Riverine Force, Republic of Vietnam; and Director of the Office for Micronesian Status Negotiations, Department of the Interior.

After promotion to Rear Admiral in June 1974, he reported as Deputy Director, Strategic Plans, Policy, Nuclear systems and National Security Affairs Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. From January 1975 to June 1976, he served as Director, East Asia and Pacific Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

SHIRLEY MARY GRENNELL CROWE

Shirley G. Crowe, wife of Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, grew up in Okeene, Oklahoma, the only child of Alice Mary and Elisha Blake Grennell. She graduated from the University of Oklahoma in 1949 with a Bachelor of Fine Arts degree. While there, she was a member of Delta Delta Delta sorority.

Following graduation, Mrs. Crowe worked as a stewardess for American Airlines. She resigned from the job in 1954 when she married Lieutenant Crowe.

The Crowes have three children: Captain W. Blake Crowe, USMC, who is currently assigned at Quantico, Virginia; J. Brent Crowe is employed in the Washington D.C. area; and Bambi Crowe Lymburner, who is married to a Navy lieutenant.

Mrs. Crowe enjoys working with military wives groups and in church activities. She is a member of P.E.O., a philanthropic women's organization. She enjoys traveling with Admiral Crowe whenever possible.

The Crowes particularly appreciate their home, wherever it is, and always look forward to welcoming friends from far and near.

BIOGRAPHY

GENERAL ROBERT T. HERRES

General Robert T. Herres was appointed as the first Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, on February 6, 1987. In this position, he serves as the Nation's second highest ranking military officer.

General Herres was born December 1, 1932, in Denver where he attended East High School. He was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1954, and holds master's degrees in Electrical Engineering and Public Administration from the Air Force Institute of Technology and the George Washington University. He is also a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. General Herres was awarded an honorary Doctor of Engineering degree from the Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology.

General Herres began his flying career in fighter-interceptors, was graduated from the Aerospace Research Pilot School, served as chief of the Flight Crew Division with the Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program, and later moved into bomber and aerial refueling aircraft operations in the Strategic Air Command. General Herres has also performed duties as an intelligence analyst, in system development and acquisition, and in Command and Control System Management; has commanded a B-52 bomb wing, an air refueling wing, the Air Force Communications Command and Strategic Air Command's Eighth Air Force. As Commander of the Air Force Communications Command, he was responsible for the development, installation and worldwide operation of all Air Force communications, ground radars and air traffic control services. As Commander of Eighth Air Force, General Herres commanded a significant portion of our nation's nuclear deterrent--to include B-52s, FB-111s, aerial refueling tanker aircraft, and Minuteman and Titan missiles. He subsequently served as Director for Command, Control and Communications Systems in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Prior to his appointment as Vice Chairman, General Herres served as Commander in Chief of the bi-national North American Aerospace Defense Command and as the first Commander in Chief of the United States Space Command. In these capacities, he was responsible for the aerospace defense of North America, and for ensuring that military space systems adequately support national command authorities and U. S. forces worldwide.

General Herres is a command pilot, and is qualified for the senior missile, air traffic controller and space badges.

His military decorations and awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with one oak leaf cluster, Air Force Distinguished Service Medal and Legion of Merit.

General Herres is married to the former Shirley Jean Sneckner of San Antonio, Texas. They have three children: Julie, Michael and Jennifer.

SHIRLEY JEAN SNECKNER HERRES

Shirley J. Herres is the wife of General Robert T. Herres, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. She grew up in San Antonio, Texas, and is the daughter of Mrs. William R. Sneckner, who currently resides in San Antonio, and the late William R. Sneckner. She attended the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque.

Mrs. Herres has been active with military wives' organizations, working tirelessly on behalf of quality of life programs that benefit military families. Additionally, she has participated in numerous civic activities in communities in which they have lived. During her husband's military command and staff assignments, Mrs. Herres has served as official hostess for a number foreign and national dignitaries. She is a member of the International Club.

General and Mrs. Herres currently reside at Fort Myer, Virginia, and have three children: Julie Herres Latenser, Michael Herres, and Jennifer Herres Babeon.

ADMIRAL CARLISLE A. H. TROST
UNITED STATES NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS



Carlisle Albert Herman Trost became the U S Navy's 23rd Chief of Naval Operations on June 30, 1986.

The son of the late Elmer H. and Luella (Hoffman) Trost, he was born April 24, 1930, in Valmeyer, Illinois. He attended Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri prior to entering the U S Naval Academy in 1949. On June 5, 1953, he was commissioned an ensign, graduating first in his class from the Naval Academy.

Following graduation, Admiral Trost first reported to the destroyer USS Robert A. Owens (DD 827) and, in December 1954, detached to attend the Submarine School, New London, Connecticut. In June 1955, he reported to the submarine USS Sirago (SS 485) where he qualified as a submariner in July 1956. From January to June 1957, he attended the Advanced Nuclear Power course at the Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut, followed by further training at the Naval Nuclear Power Training Unit, Idaho Falls, Idaho until September 1957.

In November 1957, Admiral Trost reported to the nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Swordfish (SSN 579) and in December 1959 qualified to command submarines. From January until June 1960, he studied German at the Army Language School, Monterey, California, and was then assigned temporary duty in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Department, Washington, D.C. In September 1960, he reported to the University of Freiburg, Federal Republic of Germany, serving until January 1962 when he reported as executive officer of the nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Scorpion (SSN 589).

From May to July 1963, Admiral Trost attended the Polaris Command course at the Fleet Anti-Air Training Center, Dam Neck, Virginia. He then reported as executive officer of the Blue Crew of the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine USS Von Steuben (SSBN 632). In March 1965, he reported as Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, D C.

In January 1968, Admiral Trost assumed command of the Blue Crew of the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine USS Sam Rayburn (SSBN 635). In September 1969, he was assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration on the staff of Commander Submarine Force, U S. Atlantic Fleet. He reported in August 1970 as Executive Assistant and Naval Aide to the Under Secretary of the Navy, and later Secretary of the Navy, John W. Warner, serving until June 1973. In March 1973, his selection to flag rank was approved by the President. In June 1973, he assumed command of Submarine Flotilla One in San Diego, California, with additional duties as Commander Submarine Force Pacific Representative, West Coast.

In December 1974, Admiral Trost reported to the Bureau of Naval Personnel as the Assistant Chief for Officer Development and Distribution. In January 1976, he was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as Director, Systems Analysis Division. On August 22, 1978, he was promoted to vice admiral and reported as Deputy Commander in Chief, U S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

On February 14, 1980, Admiral Trost assumed command of the U.S. Seventh Fleet where he was awarded the Government of Japan's Order of the Rising Sun (2nd Class) and the Republic of Korea's Order of National Merit.

On September 15, 1981, Admiral Trost was assigned as Director, Navy Program Planning on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. On October 4, 1985, he was promoted to the rank of admiral and became Commander in Chief, U S. Atlantic Fleet and Deputy Commander in Chief, U S. Atlantic Command.

Admiral Trost's personal awards include the Distinguished Service Medal (2); the Legion of Merit (3); the Navy Achievement Medal; the Navy Expeditionary Medal; the Navy Occupation Service Medal (European Clasp); the National Defense Service Medal with Bronze Star; the Antarctica Service Medal; the Humanitarian Service Medal; and the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon.

He is married to the former Pauline Haley of Cottage City, Maryland. Admiral and Mrs. Trost have four children: Carl Michael, Laura Lee, Steven Glenn and Kathleen Susan.

PAULINE L. TROST

Pauline Louise Trost, daughter of Alfred and Katherine Haley, was born December 26, 1931 in Cottage City, Maryland. After graduating from Bladensburg High School, she attended Strayers Business College in Washington, D.C. and then worked as a Secretary in the Department of the Interior. She married Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost on May 1, 1954 and assumed the full-time role of Navy wife and mother.

Throughout her career as a Naval Officer's Wife, Mrs. Trost was actively involved with many naval organizations. As the wife of the Chief of Naval Operations, she served on the boards of several Navy Support Organizations, including the Navy Relief Society, the Navy Wifeline Association, the Naval Officers' Wives' Club of Washington, D.C., and the Navy Arlington Ladies of the Arlington National Cemetery. As the "First Lady of the Navy", Mrs. Trost was hostess to numerous foreign Chiefs of Naval Operations and their wives. She also travelled extensively with her husband to exotic places such as Rio de Janiero, Brazil, Cairo, Egypt, Sydney, Australia, Islamabad, Pakistan and Oslo, Norway.

Admiral and Mrs. Trost have four children - Carl Michael, Laura Lee Carrico, Steven Glenn and Kathleen Susan and one grandchild, Scott Louis Carrico.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
DIVISION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS • HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380 • TELEPHONE (202) 694-4309

GENERAL ALFRED M. GRAY, USMC

General Alfred M. Gray is the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.

Born in Point Pleasant Beach, New Jersey, General Gray enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1950. He served overseas with FMF, Pacific, attaining the rank of sergeant before being commissioned a second lieutenant in April 1952. Early tours included service with the 11th and 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division in Korea, the 8th Marines, 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, N.C., and Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., during which he saw service in Guantanamo Bay and Vietnam.

As a major, General Gray joined the 12th Marines, 3d Marine Division, Vietnam in October 1965, serving concurrently as regimental communications officer, regimental training officer, and artillery aerial observer. He took command of the Composite Artillery Battalion and U.S. Free World Forces at Gio Linh in April 1967. In September 1967, General Gray was reassigned to the III Marine Amphibious Force in Da Nang where he commanded the 1st Radio Battalion elements throughout I Corps until February 1968. Following a brief tour in the United States, he returned to Vietnam from June to September 1969 in conjunction with surveillance and reconnaissance matters in the I Corps area.

After his Vietnam tour, General Gray served as Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines; Battalion Landing Team 1/2; the 2d Marines; the 4th Marines; and Camp Commander of Camp Hansen, Okinawa, Japan. While commanding the 33d Marine Amphibious Unit and Regimental Landing Team-4, and concurrently serving as Deputy Commander, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, General Gray directed the Southeast Asia evacuation operations in 1975.

Advanced to brigadier general in March 1976, General Gray served as Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic, and the 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade. Promoted to major general in February 1980, he assumed command of the 2d Marine Division, FMF, Atlantic, Camp Lejeune, N.C., in June 1981. Following his promotion to lieutenant general on Aug. 29, 1984, he was reassigned as Commanding General, FMF, Atlantic/Commanding General, II MAF, and Commanding General, FMF, Europe. General Gray was promoted to general and became Commandant of the Marine Corps on July 1, 1987.

He is married to the former Jan Goss of Burlington, Vermont.

(Revised March 3, 1988 HQMC)

BIOGRAPHY

JAN GRAY

Mrs. Jan Gray is the wife of General A. M. Gray, the twenty-ninth Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. Born in Houston, Texas, she is the daughter of Lieutenant Colonel and Mrs. Ralph R. Goss (USAF, Retired), and has a twin brother, Jack. As an Air Force "angel," she grew up in locations all over the United States from Vermont to Alaska. Mrs. Gray was educated in Boston, Massachusetts, graduating from Katherine Gibbs in 1961. While working in private industry, she met General Gray in Washington, DC, and has been married to him for nearly eight years. Since joining the Marine Corps family, she has become deeply interested in programs benefiting young Marines and their families, and an active member in such organizations as the Marine Officers' Wives' Club. Her hobbies include travel, animals, and needlepoint.

General and Mrs. Gray live at Marine Barracks, 8th and I, in Washington, DC., with her constant companion, "Cozette"—her teacup poodle.

Biography

United States Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. 20330

GENERAL LARRY D. WELCH



General Larry D. Welch is chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. As chief, he serves as the senior uniformed Air Force officer responsible for the organization, training and equipage of a combined active duty, Guard, Reserve and civilian force of nearly 1 million people serving at approximately 3,000 locations in the United States and overseas. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he and the other service chiefs function as the principal military advisers to the secretary of defense, National Security Council and the president.

General Welch was born June 9, 1934, in Guymon, Okla., and graduated from Liberal (Kan.) High School in 1952. He received a bachelor of arts degree in business administration from the University of Maryland and a master of science degree in international relations from George Washington University, Washington, D.C. The general completed the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Va., in 1967 and the National War College at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., in 1972.

He enlisted in the Kansas National Guard in October 1951, serving with the 16th Armored Field Artillery until he enlisted in the U.S. Air Force. In November 1953 he entered the aviation cadet program and received his pilot wings and commission as a second lieutenant. He served initially as a flight instructor until his assignment in July 1958 to Headquarters Air Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.

General Welch then served in tactical fighter units in Europe, the continental United States and Alaska before transferring to the Republic of Vietnam where he flew combat missions in F-4C's over North and South Vietnam and Laos.

After completing the Armed Forces Staff College in July 1967, he was assigned to Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., under the assistant chief of staff for studies and analysis. Upon graduation from the National War College in July 1972, he was assigned to Tactical Air Command, where he served in wing deputy commander for operations, vice commander and wing commander positions.

In August 1977 he transferred to Headquarters Tactical Air Command where he served as inspector general, deputy chief of staff for plans and deputy chief of staff for operations. In June 1981 he became commander of the 9th Air Force and Air Force component commander for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. In November 1982 he was assigned as deputy chief of staff for programs and resources at Air Force headquarters and became vice chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force in July 1984. From August 1985 to June 1986 he served as commander in chief, Strategic Air Command, and director, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb. He assumed his present duties in July 1986.

(Current as of February 1988)

OVER

PERSONAL FACT SHEET - GENERAL LARRY D. WELCH

A. Personal Data

1. Born - June 9, 1934, Guymon, Okla.
Father - Oliver Evan Welch; mother - Nina Katherine Welch.

2. Wife - Eunice Ellis Welch.
Children - Brian E., Stewart R., Paul A. and Leslie A.

B. Education

Graduated - University of Maryland, bachelor of arts degree, 1971; George Washington University, Washington, D.C., master of science degree, 1972; Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va., 1967; and National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., 1972.

C. Service

1. October 1951 - August 1953, enlisted, Kansas National Guard.

2. November 1953 - August 1955, student, pilot training, Williams Air Force Base, Ariz., and later advanced pilot training, Craig Air Force Base, Ala.

3. August 1955 - July 1958, flight instructor, Williams Air Force Base, Ariz.; Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas; and Craig Air Force Base, Ala.

4. July 1958 - July 1962, team member, Single-Engine Standardization and Evaluation Team, Headquarters Air Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; also project officer, T-38 trainers.

5. July 1962 - September 1963, chief, Combat Operations Center, 366th Tactical Fighter Wing, and later pilot, 389th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Chaumont Air Base, France.

6. September 1963 - March 1966, pilot, flight commander and operations officer, 389th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Holloman Air Force Base, N.M.

7. March 1966 - October 1966, operations officer, 389th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Phan Rang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam.

8. October 1966 - February 1967, chief, Operations and Training Division, 366th Tactical Fighter Wing, Da Nang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam.

9. February 1967 - July 1967, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.

10. July 1967 - August 1971, director, air superiority studies, Fighter Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Studies and Analysis; later chief, Fighter Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Studies and Analysis, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

11. August 1971 - July 1972, student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.

(General Welch cont.)

E. Effective Dates of Promotions

Grade	Dates
Second Lieutenant	Apr 29, 1955
First Lieutenant	Oct 29, 1956
Captain	Jan 1, 1960
Major	Jul 15, 1964
Lieutenant Colonel	Nov 1, 1968
Colonel	Jun 1, 1971
Brigadier General	Jul 1, 1977
Major General	Sep 15, 1979
Lieutenant General	Jul 1, 1981
General	Aug 1, 1984

(Date of rank August 1, 1984)

END

NAME: Eunice E. Welch

MAIDEN NAME: Eunice Ellis

NAME SHE GOES BY: Eunice

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Biography

United States Army

Office, Chief of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20310

General Carl E. Vuono

Chief of Staff, United States Army

General Vuono is a native of Monongahela, Pennsylvania. He was commissioned a second lieutenant and awarded a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy in 1957. He also holds a Master of Science degree in Public Administration from Shippensburg University.

During his career, he has served in a variety of command and staff positions including three years in joint and allied assignments. His extensive overseas assignments include six tours: one in Korea, two in Vietnam, and three in Europe. General Vuono also has served in multiple assignments of increasing responsibility on the Army Staff in Washington, D. C., including a tour as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.

General Vuono has commanded at the platoon, battery, battalion, brigade, and division level. He was Commander of two artillery battalions in Vietnam. At Ft. Bragg, NC, he was Commander, Division Artillery, 82d Airborne Division. Subsequently, he was Assistant Division Commander, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Ft. Riley, KS, and during his last overseas tour he was the Commanding General of the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army, Europe.

General Vuono has received numerous awards from this country and several foreign nations for his service and for valor in combat. He is also a Master Parachutist.

On June 23, 1987, General Vuono assumed his duties as the thirty-first Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

MRS. VUONO, WIFE OF GENERAL CARL E. VUONO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, DOES NOT HAVE A BIO. THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED:

MRS. PATRICIA VUONO, MAIDEN NAME: HALL

GOES BY PAT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1526

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 9, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: LINTON F. BROOKS

FROM: DON M. SNIDER

SUBJECT: JCS Meeting with the President, 10:30 a.m., Saturday, March 11, 1989

Attached is the meeting memorandum for the President for Saturday's meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is based on our understanding as of noon Thursday; the Chairman's staff will call us if they learn of any plans by the Chiefs to raise specific topics.

We understand from the Vice President's staff that he may raise the issue of Competitive Strategies and solicit the Chiefs' views.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Background Paper on Possible Issues
Tab B Biographical Data of Chiefs and Wives

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0807-MR
SCS 6/16/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~