

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91147
Folder ID Number: 91147-008

Folder Title:
Persian Gulf Chronology 1990 - 91 (Prepared May 1992) [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	6	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Timeline	Re: H+2 = Presidential Statement Time (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS
01b. Note	Brent Scowcroft to James A. Baker, III Re: Note for Secretary Baker (1 pp.)	2/22/91	(b)(1)	TS
01c. Note	Brent Scowcroft to Richard Cheney Re: Note for Secretary Cheney (1 pp.)	2/22/91	(b)(1)	TS
02. Chronology	Re: Chronology US - Iraq Relations, 1980 - 1990 (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03a. Talking Points	Re: Themes for Pre H-Hour Presidential Calls to Foreign Leaders (1 pp.)	1/16	(b)(1)	
03b. Talking Points	Re: Themes for Pre H-Hour Presidential Calls to Congressional Leadership (1 pp.)	1/16	(b)(1)	
04a. List	Re: Persian Gulf Chronology (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS
04b. Note	With Perez de Cuellar Re: H Hour (1 pp.)	1/16/91	(b)(1)	
04c. List	Re: Mode of Communication (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS
04d. Talking Points	Re: Themes for Pre H-Hour Presidential Calls (1 pp.)	1/16	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Persian Gulf Chronology 1990 - 91 (Prepared May 1992) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1230
OA/ID Number: 91147-008
Date Closed: 7/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04e. List	Re: Mode of Communication (2 pp.)	1/15/91	(b)(1)	TS
04f. List	Re: Mode of Communication (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS
04g. Draft Report	Re: Tactical/Pre-Hostilities Consultations (3 pp.)	1/13	(b)(1)	TS
04h. Note	Re: [Handles] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05a. Schedule	Re: SVTS Room Schedule 1990 (22 pp.)	1/3-12/28	(b)(1)	S
05b. Schedule	Re: SVTS Room Schedule 1991 (10 pp.)	1/2-6/25	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Persian Gulf Chronology 1990 - 91 (Prepared May 1992) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1230
OA/ID Number: 91147-008
Date Closed: 7/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

(H+2 = Presidential Statement Time)

~~TOP SECRET~~

COUNTRY	MODE OF COMMUN.	BY/TO WHOM	WHEN
UK	Secure Phone	Pres-Major	Done
FRANCE	Secure Phone	Pres-Mitterrand	H-12
TURKEY	Phone	Pres-Ozal	H Hr
GERMANY	Phone	Pres-Kohl	H+1
ITALY	Phone	Baker-De-Michelis	H+2
CANADA	Phone	Pres-Mulroney	H-1
SPAIN	Phone	Baker-Ordonez	H+2
USSR	Phone	Baker-Bessmertnykh	H+2
NATO SYG	Phone	Baker-SYG	H+2
CZECH	Call in	Amb	H+2
BELGIUM	Call in	Amb	H+2
DENMARK	Call in	Amb	H+2
GREECE	Call in	Amb	H+2
HAGUE	Phone	Baker-VandenBrok	H+2
NORWAY	Call in	Amb	H+2
AUSTRALIA	Phone	Pres-Hawke	H+1
JAPAN	Phone OR Call in	Pres-Kaifu Murata	H+2
KOREA	Call in	Amb	H+2
LUXEMBOURG	Phone	Kimmit-Poos	H+2
NEW ZEALAND	Call in	Amb	H+2
CHINA	Call in	Amb	H+2
SAUDIS	Call in	Baker-Bandar	H-10

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0911-MR
MM 11/23/2016

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

COUNTRY	MODE OF COMMUN.	BY/TO WHOM	WHEN
KUWAIT	Call in	Amb	H-2
EGYPT	Phone	Pres-Mubarak	H-2
BAHRAIN	Call in	Amb	H+1
OMAN	Call in	Amb	H+1
QATAR	Call in	Amb	H+1
UAE	Call in	Amb	H Hr
BANGLADESH	Call in	Amb	H Hr
MOROCCO	Call in	Amb	H+2
NIGER	Call in	Amb	H+2
SENEGAL	Call in	Amb	H+2
PAKISTAN	Call in	Amb	H+1
ARGENTINA	Call in	Amb	H+2
ISRAEL	Call in Phone	Amb-Baker Arens-Cheney	H-1
SYRIA	Call in	Amb	H-1
LEADERSHIP	Calls	Leaders-Pres Committees- Baker-ForRel Cheney-Armed Services Webster-Intel	H+ 1-1/2
UNSYG	Phone Call	PDQ-Baker	H+2
Former Presidents	Phone	President	H-2

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 22, 1991

NOTE FOR SECRETARY BAKER

Jim --

Here's the proposed notification list.
If you concur, you might want to show it
to the President. If not, let's discuss.



Brent Scowcroft

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0911-MR

MM 11/23/2016

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 22, 1991

FOR SECRETARY CHENEY

Dick --

Here's the notification list. If you
have any problems, give me a call.



Brent Scowcroft

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0911-MR

mm 11/23/2016

~~TOP SECRET~~

CHRONOLOGY US-IRAQ RELATIONS, 1980-1990

Sep, 1980	Iran-Iraq war begins.
Sep 29, 1980	Saddam Hussein says Iraq will accept UNSC ceasefire resolution if Iran accepts it.
Apr 2, 1981	US lifts freeze on a sale to Iraq by Boeing for five passenger planes.
Mar 1, 1982	Iraq dropped from State Department's list of nations sponsoring terrorism.
July, 1982	Senior Interagency Group recommends US should provide Iraq with defensive intelligence.
Sep 13, 1982	Commerce Dept approves sale of six small jets to Iraq valued at \$25m.
Dec 15, 1982	Dept of Agriculture announces Iraq granted \$210m in CCC loan guarantees. (Note: This inaugurated program that provided Iraq a total of some \$4-5 billion in CCC credits over the next 7 years.)
Mar 5, 1984	State Department condemns Iraq for using lethal chemical weapons against Iran.
Mar 30, 1984	US imposes stricter regulations on the sale of sensitive chemical compounds to Iran and Iraq.
Apr, 1984	NSDD 139 authorizes CIA to establish a formal liaison relationship with Iraqi intelligence.
Nov 26, 1984	President Reagan and Iraqi FM Aziz announce (in Wash DC) resumption of diplomatic relations broken by Iraq in 1967.
Apr 26, 1985	Commerce Dept postpones indefinitely planned trade mission to Baghdad.
Sep 13, 1985	Iraq purchases 45 civilian Bell helicopters.
Mar 20, 1986	US officials at Geneva Conference on Disarmament condemn Iraq for using chemical weapons against Iranian forces.
Apr 1, 1987	US refuses Iraqi request for C-130 aircraft and artillery radar systems.
May 17, 1987	<u>USS Stark</u> hit by Iraqi missile.
May 19, 1987	US and Iraq agree to joint inquiry into Stark attack. Baghdad prepared to pay reparations.

May 29, 1987 President Reagan accepts proposal to protect Kuwaiti tankers flying American flag.

July 20, 1987 UNSC resolution 598 calling for a cease-fire passes unanimously.

July 21, 1987 Iraq says UNSC vote is "positive" and Iran calls it "null and void."

July 22, 1987 US Navy begins escorting tankers in Persian Gulf.

Oct 16, 1987 US authorizes almost \$1b in CCC guarantees.

Jun 15, 1988 Iraq cancels FM Aziz-SecState Shultz meeting because State Dept official met with Kurdish leader Talabani on June 9th.

Jul 1, 1988 Iraqi FM Aziz confirms Iraq used chemical weapons but charges that Iran had used them earlier in early stages of the war.

Jul 18, 1988 Iran accepts UNSC res 598; Iran-Iraq war ends.

Sep 16, 1988 Iraq formally rejects UN request to investigate alleged use of chemical weapons against the Kurds.

Oct 5, 1988 US agents arrest an Iraqi in New York on charges of smuggling cluster bombs and antipersonnel weapons from Italy to Iraq.

Nov 3, 1988 US provides \$1b in CCC guarantees and EXIM guarantees \$200m in short-term credit.

Jan 16, 1989 US officials announce Iraq developing biological weapons at Salman Pak.

Mar 27, 1989 Saddam Hussein and King Fahd sign a non-aggression agreement in Baghdad.

Mar 27, 1989 Iraq agrees to pay \$27.3m in compensation for USS Stark attack.

May 5, 1989 Commerce Dept intercepts a shipment of vacuum pumps to Iraq because they might be used to produce nuclear fuel.

May, 1989 Commerce Dept blocks delivery of high-speed capacitors to Iraq.

Aug, 1989	Banco Nazionale de Lavoro investigation made public; irregularities with CCC program alleged.
Oct, 1989	NSD 26 approves use of limited economic and political incentives to moderate Iraq's behavior.
Oct 6, 1989	Sec. Baker and FM Aziz meet in Wash DC.
Nov, 1989	First half (\$500m) of FY90 agricultural credit guarantees released. \$200m in short term credit guarantees available from EXIM bank.
Jan, 1990	President signs waiver to allow EXIM short-term loan insurance program to continue.
Feb 15, 1990	VOA broadcast calls for overthrow of certain regimes, including Saddam's.
Feb 19, 1990	Saddam criticizes US presence in Persian Gulf at Amman Arab Cooperation Council Summit.
Mar 15, 1990	Farzhad Barzoft, a British citizen and reporter, hanged following Mar 10 conviction for espionage.
Mar 19, 1990	US Senators visit Iraq.
Mar 28, 1990	UK arrests five individuals attempting to smuggle US-made electronic triggers to Iraq.
Apr 2, 1990	Saddam accuses US of supplying Israel with cover to attack Iraq; notes Iraq has chemical weapons that could destroy half of Israel.
Apr 5, 1990	Iraqi UN diplomat deported for abuse of privileges.
Apr 9, 1990	Iraq expels US diplomat in retaliation.
Apr 9, 1990	US Commerce Dept. announces cancellation of an aerospace trade mission to Iraq.
May 21, 1990	Dept of Agriculture found irregularities in Iraqi purchases through CCC credits and recommends suspending action on Iraqi request for second \$500m CCC tranche. (FYI: never approved)
Jun/Jul 1990	US stops export of special furnaces that could contribute to Iraqi nuclear weapons development.
Aug 2, 1990	Iraqi troops invade Kuwait.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Jan-1991 10:57 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Wilma G. Hall

(HALL)

FROM:

Richard N. Haass
(HAASS)

SUBJECT:

UNSC resolutions and reparations

wilma: in response to the President's question on reparations,
the facts are as follows:

UNSC Resolution 674 of Oct 29 calls upon Iraq to observe international law, etc in how it treats Kuwaits and others in occupied Kuwait, and then in para 8 "reminds Iraq that under international law it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising...as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq" and in para 9 "invites states to collect relevant information regarding their claims...for restitution or financial compensation by Iraq...."

No resolution explicitly uses the word "reparations" but this is clearly the intent behind 674.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Jan-1991 10:57 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Wilma G. Hall

(HALL)

FROM:

Richard N. Haass
(HAASS)

SUBJECT:

UNSC resolutions and reparations

wilma: in response to the President's question on reparations, the facts are as follows:

UNSC Resolution 674 of Oct 29 calls upon Iraq to observe international law, etc in how it treats Kuwaits and others in occupied Kuwait, and then in para 8 "reminds Iraq that under international law it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising...as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq" and in para 9 "invites states to collect relevant information regarding their claims...for restitution or financial compensation by Iraq...."

No resolution explicitly uses the word "reparations" but this is clearly the intent behind 674.

-
2. BEGIN TEXT OF SC RESOLUTION ~~678~~ (29 NOV)

-
CANADA, FRANCE, ROMANIA, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:-

-
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

-
--RECALLING AND REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990),
661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666
(1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990) AND 674 (1990),
- ~~677 (1990)~~

--NOTING THAT, DESPITE ALL EFFORTS BY THE UNITED
NATIONS, IRAQ REFUSES TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATION TO
IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 660 (1990) AND THE ABOVE SUBSEQUENT
RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, IN FLAGRANT CONTEMPT OF THE
COUNCIL,

--MINDFUL OF ITS DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND
PRESERVATION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

-
--DETERMINED TO SECURE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
DECISIONS,

-
--ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS,

-
--1. DEMANDS THAT IRAQ COMPLY FULLY WITH RESOLUTION 660
(1990) AND ALL SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS AND
DECIDES, WHILE MAINTAINING ALL ITS DECISIONS, TO ALLOW
IRAQ ONE FINAL OPPORTUNITY, AS A PAUSE OF GOOD WILL, TO
DO SO;

-
--2. AUTHORIZES MEMBER STATES CO-OPERATING WITH THE
GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT, UNLESS IRAQ ON OR BEFORE
15 JANUARY 1991 FULLY IMPLEMENTS, AS SET FORTH IN
PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE, THE FOREGOING RESOLUTIONS, TO USE ALL
NECESSARY MEANS TO UPHOLD AND IMPLEMENT SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 660 (1990) AND ALL SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT
RESOLUTIONS AND TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY IN THE AREA;

-
--3. REQUESTS ALL STATES TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SUPPORT
FOR THE ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPH 2
OF THIS RESOLUTION;

-
--4. REQUESTS THE STATES CONCERNED TO KEEP THE COUNCIL
REGULARLY INFORMED ON THE PROGRESS OF ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN
PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF THIS RESOLUTION;

-
--5. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 03846
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS ALLDIP; NICOSIA FOR BSO; LONDON FOR
MILLIKAN; PARIS FOR ROSENBLATT; GENEVA FOR PATTERSON;
JCS FOR CHAIRMAN, DIRECTOR, DIRECTOR J5
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IR, RU, UNSC
SUBJECT: SC ADOPTS RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING USE OF FORCE

-
END TEXT.

Brent Scowcroft

We Didn't 'Coddle' Saddam

Gov. Bill Clinton and Sen. Al Gore, aided and abetted by more than a few Democratic congressmen and the editorial pages of several of this country's leading newspapers, have worked hard to deceive the American people. In pursuit of the White House, they have energetically promoted a campaign to discredit U.S. policy toward Iraq prior to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, to malign President Bush's proven foreign policy competence and to obscure their own inconsistency. Most of the president's critics today were conspicuously absent yesterday, when the president successfully resisted Saddam's violent ambitions in the gulf.

The facts—based on the entire record and not selective portions of it—are clear. During the worst days of the Iran-Iraq war in the mid 1980s, the United States was intent on preventing either Iraq or Iran from dominating a part of the world of undeniable strategic importance to the United States. No American president operating in the strategic and diplomatic climate of the 1980s could ignore the threat that either Iran or Iraq might dominate the Persian Gulf.

There was a broad bipartisan consensus behind the open U.S. policy of providing political and economic support to Iraq during the latter stages of its war with Iran. The U.S. Navy openly intervened in the gulf. Congress debated and approved Operation Earnest Will. Congressional intelligence committees reviewed and concurred with our activities in the region.

At the war's end, Congress did not challenge our policy of trying to moderate Iraqi behavior with a mix of limited incentives and strong disincentives. Our purpose, broadly understood and supported at the time, was to convince Iraq that moderate international and domestic behavior would be rewarded. We were right to attempt to convince Saddam that he had more to gain

from peaceful relations with the West and southern gulf states than from confrontation, radicalism and aggression. We were right to try to induce stability into the region without the force of American arms and the risk of American lives.

Our policy had universal support within the Arab world. Kuwait strongly supported it. So did moderate states like Egypt. So did every European

Taking Exception

power. So did virtually every American expert on the Middle East. So did most members of Congress. Our policy contributed substantially to our subsequent success in forging a victorious U.N. coalition to defeat Iraqi aggression in Kuwait.

We in no way "coddled" Saddam. Our public and our private statements critical of Iraqi policies, including its human rights abuses and its threats against Israel and gulf neighbors, were so sharp that our Arab allies—including Kuwait—cautioned us about our harshness.

To give Saddam incentives to moderate his behavior, the Bush administration, with considerable congressional support, authorized \$1 billion in credit guarantees—not loans or cash—to U.S. exporters selling grain to Iraq. Only half of those funds were ever released. The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, which has been accused of illegal transactions with Iraq, was not involved in any of the credit guarantees approved by the Bush administration. Contrary to our critics' assertions, no investigation—by Congress, the U.S. attorney or a federal agency—has established that Iraq misused credit guarantees to purchase weapons or diverted commodities to a third country.

In fact, this extension of credit guarantees was

more than offset by Iraqi hard currency payments to the United States for earlier agricultural exports that reduced Iraq's debt to the United States by more than \$450 million. Most of the money still owed by Iraq to the United States is for credit guarantees extended during the Iran-Iraq war. The administration intends to recover this debt from Iraq's frozen assets.

Perhaps the most egregious falsehood that our political critics have forced on the public is that the Bush administration sold high technology to Saddam to enhance his nuclear, chemical and biological weapons program. The U.S. government's export controls toward Iraq were tougher than those of any other industrial country. We followed a strict policy of denying the export of weapons to Iraq. Whenever we learned of an attempt to evade U.S. law, we stepped in and clamped down and worked hard to get other countries to do the same. Between 1985 and 1990, about \$500 million of so-called dual-use exports, which under current legislation were not prohibited for military reasons, were shipped to Iraq, in part to allow U.S. companies a fair opportunity to compete with foreign companies selling to Iraq. Most of these were for such items as low-level computers and heavy-duty trucks.

Our export control policy succeeded. During Desert Storm, coalition forces did not encounter any U.S.-supplied weapons on the battlefield, and the more than 40 inspections conducted since the end of the war by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.N. Special Commission demonstrate conclusively that U.S. technology made no significant contribution to Iraq's military capability. Saddam built the world's fourth largest army with more than \$100 billion of his own oil revenues and with loans from his neighbors. He fielded

troops with weapons mostly from the former Soviet Union, China and Western Europe. No one can fairly conclude that the United States created Iraq's military machine.

We have no reason to conceal any of this from Congress. The charge of a coverup is outrageous and irresponsible. The administration has provided literally thousands of documents to Congress at a cost of tens of thousands of man hours and hundreds of thousands of dollars. We have not denied Congress access to a single document.

Similarly, there is no justification for the charges of illegal conduct or wrongdoing by senior administration officials. Career prosecutors—not political appointees—in the Department of Justice have gone over every allegation in detail and found them baseless. The demand for an independent counsel when there is no basis for one is sheer McCarthyism—an attempt to transform a legitimate policy debate into a criminal conspiracy. The Justice Department's refusal to be stampeded into allowing the law to be used for partisan purposes was precisely the response that anyone who respects the law should have expected.

These are the facts about U.S. policy toward Iraq. It is too bad that our critics have chosen to distort them into unfounded accusations and lies. It would be better if their energies and ours were spent in constructive debate about how best to deal with the challenges posed by governments such as Iraq—bad, but important actors on the world scene. We would welcome such debate, but regrettably, it has not occurred. Mr. Clinton, Mr. Gore and their teammates are too busy rewriting history to learn from it.

The writer is national security adviser to the president.

10-10-92

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 16, 1991

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The Oval Office

9:01 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Just two hours ago, allied air forces began an attack on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. These attacks continue as I speak. Ground forces are not engaged.

This conflict started August 2nd when the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless neighbor. Kuwait -- a member of the Arab League and a member of the United Nations -- was crushed; its people brutalized. Five months ago, Saddam Hussein started this cruel war against Kuwait. Tonight, the battle has been joined.

This military action, taken in accord with United Nations resolutions -- and with the consent of the United States Congress -- follows months of constant and virtually endless diplomatic activity on the part of the United Nations, the United States and many, many other countries. Arab leaders sought what became known as an Arab solution -- only to conclude that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to leave Kuwait. Others traveled to Baghdad in a variety of efforts to restore peace and justice. Our Secretary of State, James Baker, held an historic meeting in Geneva -- only to be totally rebuffed. This past weekend, in a last ditch effort, the Secretary General of the United Nations went to the Middle East, with peace in his heart -- his second such mission. And he came back from Baghdad with no progress at all in getting Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.

Now the 28 countries with forces in the Gulf area, have exhausted all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful resolution, have no choice but to drive Saddam from Kuwait by force. We will not fail.

As I report to you, air attacks are underway against military targets in Iraq. We are determined to knock out Saddam Hussein's nuclear bomb potential. We will also destroy his chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam's artillery and tanks will be destroyed. Our operations are designed to best protect the lives of all the coalition forces by targeting Saddam's vast military arsenal. Initial reports from General Schwarzkopf are that our operations are proceeding according to plan.

Our objectives are clear. Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait. The legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place and Kuwait will once again be free. Iraq will eventually comply with all relevant United Nations resolutions. And then, when peace is restored, it is our hope that Iraq will live as a peaceful and cooperative member of the family of nations, thus, enhancing the Security and stability of the Gulf.

Some may ask, why act now? Why not wait? The answer is clear: The world could wait no longer. Sanctions, though having some effect, showed no signs of accomplishing their objective. Sanctions were tried for well over five months, and we and our allies concluded that sanctions alone would not force Saddam from Kuwait.

While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically

MORE

raped, pillaged and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities -- and among those maimed and murdered, innocent children.

While the world waited, Saddam sought to add to the chemical weapons arsenal he now possesses an infinitely more dangerous weapon of mass destruction -- a nuclear weapon.

And while the world waited, while the world talked peace and withdrawal, Saddam Hussein dug in and moved massive forces into Kuwait.

While the world waited, while Saddam stalled, more damage was being done to the fragile economies of the Third World, the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, to the entire world including to our own economy.

The United States, together with the United Nations, exhausted every means at our disposal to bring this crisis to a peaceful end. However, Saddam clearly felt that by stalling and threatening and defying the United Nations he could weaken the forces arrayed against him.

While the world waited, Saddam Hussein met every overture of peace with open contempt. While the world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared for war.

I had hoped that when the United States Congress, in historic debate, took its resolute action, Saddam would realize he could not prevail and would move out of Kuwait in accord with the United Nations resolutions. He did not do that. Instead, he remained intransigent, certain that time was on his side.

Saddam was warned over and over again to comply with the will of the United Nations. Leave Kuwait or be driven out. Saddam has arrogantly rejected all warnings. Instead he tried to make this a dispute between Iraq and the United States of America.

Well, he failed. Tonight, 28 nations -- countries from five continents: Europe and Asia, Africa and the Arab League -- have forces in the Gulf area standing shoulder to shoulder against Saddam Hussein. These countries had hoped the use of force could be avoided. Regrettably, we now believe that only force will make him leave.

Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military commanders to take every necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible and with the greatest degree of protection possible for American and allied servicemen and women. I've told the American people before that this will not be another Vietnam. And I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back.

I'm hopeful that this fighting will not go on for long, and that casualties will be held to an absolute minimum.

This is an historic moment. We have, in this past year made great progress in ending the long era of conflict and Cold War. We have before us the opportunity to forge, for ourselves and for future generations, a new world order -- a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.

When we are successful, and we will be, we have a real chance at this new world order -- an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the U.N.'s founders.

We have no argument with the people of Iraq -- indeed, for the innocents caught in this conflict, I pray for their safety.

Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq -- it is the

MORE

liberation of Kuwait. It is my hope that somehow the Iraqi people can, even now, convince their dictator that he must lay down his arms, leave Kuwait, and let Iraq itself rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.

Thomas Paine wrote many years ago: "These are the times that try men's souls." Those well-known words are so very true today. But even as planes of the multinational forces attack Iraq, I prefer to think of peace, not war. I am convinced not only that we will prevail, but that out of the horror of combat will come the recognition that no nation can stand against a world united. No nation will be permitted to brutally assault its neighbor.

No president can easily commit our sons and daughters to war. They are the nation's finest. Ours is an all volunteer force -- magnificently trained, highly motivated. The troops know why they're there. And listen to what they say, for they've said it better than any president or prime minister ever could.

Listen to "Hollywood" Huddleston, Marine Lance Corporal. He says, "Let's free these people so we can go home and be free again." He's right. The terrible crimes and tortures committed by Saddam's henchmen against the innocent people of Kuwait are an affront to mankind and a challenge to the freedom of all.

Listen to one of our great officers out there, Marine Lieutenant General Walter Boomer. He said, "There are things worth fighting for. A world in which brutality and lawlessness are allowed to go unchecked isn't the kind of world we're going to want to live in."

Listen to Master Sergeant J.P. Kendall of the 82nd Airborne: "We're here for more than just the price of a gallon of gas. What we're doing is going to chart the future of the world for the next hundred years. It's better to deal with this guy now than five years from now."

And finally, we should all sit up and listen to Jackie Jones, an Army Lieutenant, when she says, "If we let him get away with this, who knows what's going to be next?"

I have called upon "Hollywood" and Walter and J.P. and Jackie and all their courageous comrades in arms to do what must be done. Tonight, America and the world are deeply grateful to them and to their families. And let me say to everyone listening or watching tonight: when the troops we've sent in finish their work, I am determined to bring them home as soon as possible.

Tonight, as our forces fight, they and their families are in our prayers. May God bless each and every one of them, and the coalition forces at our side in the Gulf -- and may He continue to bless our nation, the United States of America.

END

9:15 P.M. EST

Jan 16/1100am

THEMES FOR PRE H-HOUR PRESIDENTIAL CALLS TO FOREIGN LEADERS

-- I wanted to talk to you directly on where we stand in the Gulf.

-- It now appears conclusive that all efforts to pressure or persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait have failed.

-- I had hoped that our Congressional vote of last Saturday might convince him of US determination, but this was not the case.

-- Similarly, Javier Perez de Cuellar did no better with Saddam in Baghdad than Jim Baker did in Geneva with Aziz.

-- Saddam may still believe we are bluffing, or he may have concluded that he can survive any war and emerge as a hero in Arab eyes as the leader who stood up to the world.

-- In any event, the time for speculation and appeals is over. I want you to know that military action will commence in ____ hours.

-- For obvious reasons of tactical surprise, I ask that you not divulge this information. [IF ASKED: Your commanders in the field will have been alerted through normal military channels.]

-- Let me just close by saying how much I have appreciated your support. This international coalition has been and remains remarkable. I am convinced that there is great opportunity here if we stay the course. It means a great deal to me personally to know I can count on you.

Jan 16/1100am

THEMES FOR PRESIDENTIAL CALLS TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

- I wanted to talk to you on where we stand in the Gulf.
- What I am going to say will be sensitive, so I ask that you be alone and that there be no one else listening.
- It now appears conclusive that all efforts to pressure or persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait have failed.
- I had hoped that the Congressional vote of last Saturday might convince him of US determination, but this was not the case.
- Similarly, Javier Perez de Cuellar did no better with Saddam in Baghdad than Jim Baker did in Geneva with Aziz.
- Saddam may still believe we are bluffing, or he may have concluded that he can survive any war and emerge as a hero in Arab eyes as the leader who stood up to the world.
- In any event, the time for speculation and appeals is over. I want you to know that military action will commence in ____ hours.
- For obvious reasons of tactical surprise, I ask that you not divulge this information.
- I would like to send one of my closest aides, Bob Gates, to see you in your office between 5 and 6 p.m. today. He will have with him a copy of the report we were asked to provide in H. J. Res. 77, and will be able to answer any questions you might have.
- Let me just close by saying how much I have appreciated your support and counsel. I am convinced that there is great opportunity here if we stay the course. It means a great deal to me personally to know I can count on you and the Congress.

**Report for Use in Connection with Section 2(b) of the
Joint Congressional Resolution Authorizing the Use of
Military Force Against Iraq**

The report that follows is a summary of diplomatic and other peaceful means used in an attempt to obtain compliance by Iraq with the twelve U.N. Security Council resolutions relating to its invasion and occupation of Kuwait. It is not a definitive rendition of these means, because the Administration cannot, of necessity, include at this time all the factual data that would support a complete historical record. This report, therefore, should be considered in light of formal and informal information already provided to the Congress and that which will be provided in the future

1. Background

For over five and a half months, the international community has sought with unprecedented unity to reverse Iraq's brutal and unprovoked aggression against Kuwait. The United States and the vast majority of governments of the world, working together through the United Nations, have been united both in their determination to compel Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and in their strong preference for doing so through peaceful means. Since August 2, we have sought to build maximum diplomatic and economic pressure against Iraq. Regrettably, Iraq has given no sign whatever that it intends to comply with the will of the international community; nor is there any indication that diplomatic and economic means alone would ever compel Iraq to do so. Instead, Iraq has continued to reject the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions and refuses to recognize them.

From the beginning of the Gulf crisis, the United States has consistently pursued four basic objectives: (1) the immediate, complete, and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait; (2) the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait; (3) the protection of U.S. citizens abroad; and (4) the security and stability of a region vital to U.S. national security. In pursuit of these objectives, we have sought and obtained action by the UN Security Council, resulting in twelve separate resolutions that have been fully consistent with U.S. objectives.

The last of these twelve resolutions, UN Security Council Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990, authorizes UN Member States to use "all necessary means" to implement Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions of the Security Council, and to restore international peace and security in the area, unless Iraq fully implements those resolutions on or before January 15, 1991.

The nearly seven week "pause of goodwill" established in UN Security Council Resolution 678 has now passed. Iraq has taken no steps whatever to fulfill these requirements. Iraq has forcefully stated that it considers the Security Council's resolutions invalid and has no intention of complying with them at any time. Iraqi forces remain in occupation of Kuwait, and have been substantially reinforced in recent weeks rather than withdrawn. Iraq has strongly and repeatedly reiterated its annexation of Kuwait and stated its determination that Kuwait will remain permanently a part of Iraq. The Iraqi closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait has in no way been rescinded.

In short, the Government of Iraq remains completely intransigent in rejecting the UN Security Council's demands -- despite the exhaustive use by the United States and the United Nations of all appropriate diplomatic, political and economic measures to persuade or compel Iraq to comply.

This has been a truly international effort. More than two dozen other countries have sent their own military forces to the Gulf region, including more than 250,000 troops. They have given or pledged substantial funds and other assistance to us for our operations, including over \$8 billion in calendar year 1990 alone. They have taken on the responsibility for assisting those nations that have suffered the most from the effects of international sanctions against Iraq and higher energy prices. As additional costs are incurred during 1991, we will look to our allies to shoulder their fair share of our military expenses and exceptional economic assistance efforts.

2. Diplomatic and Political Actions

The extensive diplomatic and political efforts undertaken by the United States, other countries, regional organizations including the Arab League and the European Community and the United Nations to persuade or compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait have not succeeded. The UN Security Council and General Assembly have overwhelmingly and repeatedly condemned the Iraqi invasion and demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. The Security Council has invoked its extraordinary authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, not only to order comprehensive economic sanctions, but to authorize the use of all other means necessary, including the use of force. The Security Council has directed other UN organizations (e.g., the International Atomic Energy Agency) to take appropriate actions toward the same end within their areas of competence, and they have done so where relevant.

The President, the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials have engaged in an exhaustive process of consultation with other governments and international organizations. The

Secretary of State alone has, since August 2 of last year, held more than 250 meetings with foreign heads of state, foreign ministers and other high foreign officials. He has traveled over 125,000 miles in the course of these contacts. While this extensive diplomacy has been very successful in maintaining international solidarity in support of our objectives, it has not caused the Government of Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.

Most recently, on January 9, the Secretary of State met at length in Geneva with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, who in six and one-half hours of talks demonstrated no readiness whatever to implement the U.N. Security Council resolutions. The Iraqi Foreign Minister even refused to receive a diplomatic communication from the President intended for Saddam Hussein. On January 13, the U.N. Secretary-General was rebuffed by Iraq for a second time, in this case in a direct attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait peacefully. Many other heads of state, foreign ministers and private persons have made similar attempts. In short, the international community has in an unprecedented way directed the full scope and vigor of its political and diplomatic means to produce an Iraqi withdrawal.

These exhaustive efforts have produced not the slightest indication of any intention by Saddam Hussein to meet the demands of the international community for immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. For our part, the Administration made clear that there could be no reward for aggression lest we undermine prospects for an expanded constructive role for the UN Security Council and for a new, more peaceful world order. Attempts to link resolution of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait with other issues were rejected on the grounds that these issues were unrelated to Iraq's aggression and that such efforts would only serve to divert attention from the immediate challenge posed by Iraq.

3. Economic Sanctions

Since August 2 (in the case of the United States) and August 9 (in the case of the Security Council and the other UN Member States), comprehensive economic sanctions have been imposed on Iraq, prohibiting all trade and financial transactions with Iraq, with the exception of goods for a very limited category of essential humanitarian purposes. These sanctions have since August 25 been backed by an extensive maritime interception effort involving warships of many states, and since September 25 by rigorous controls on air traffic to and from Iraq. The United States and other countries have engaged in tireless efforts during this period to uncover and defeat attempted evasions of these sanctions around the world, whether by direct attempts to pass through the allied interception cordon or by the use of financial and trade intermediaries.

Our efforts have resulted in a very substantial reduction of the volume of trade to and from Iraq, and significant shortages in Iraq's financial resources. The most serious impact on Iraq thus far has been on the financial sector, where hard currency shortages have led Baghdad to take a variety of unusual steps to conserve or obtain foreign exchange. The sanctions have shut off 97% of Iraq's exports and more than 90% of its imports, and have prevented Baghdad from reaping the proceeds of higher oil prices or its seizure of Kuwaiti oil fields. The departure of foreign workers and the cutoff of imported industrial inputs has caused problems for a variety of industries.

Notwithstanding the substantial economic impact of sanctions to date, and even if sanctions were to continue to be enforced for an additional six to twelve months, economic hardship alone is highly unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popular discontent in Iraq. Due to a reduction of domestic consumption, cannibalization of Kuwaiti facilities, smuggling, and use of existing stockpiles, the most vital Iraqi industries do not appear to be threatened. The price of foodstuffs for the Iraqi population has sharply increased and rations have been reduced, but there is still access to sufficient staple foods, and new supplies are being injected from the fall harvest and smuggling.

While we might succeed in substantially reducing the overall Iraqi supply of food and other essential consumer commodities, Saddam Hussein has made clear his willingness to divert such supplies to his military forces, even at the cost of severe deprivation of his civilian population. Even if the international community were prepared to deprive the Iraqi civilian population of food, there is no reason to believe that this would change Saddam Hussein's policies.

The ability of Iraqi armed forces to defend Kuwait and southern Iraq is unlikely to be eroded substantially over the next six to twelve months even if effective sanctions could be maintained. Iraq's infantry and artillery forces probably would not suffer significantly, since Iraq could maintain the relatively simple Soviet-style weaponry of these forces. Low-technology defensive preparations could also be expanded. Iraq's armored and mechanized forces would be degraded somewhat, but Iraq has large stocks of spare parts and other supplies that would ameliorate this effect. Iraqi air forces and air defenses would likely be hit far more severely by continued effective sanctions, but in any case, Iraqi air defense and air forces would play a limited role -- in relation to the ground forces -- with respect to Iraq's ability to hold Kuwait.

In short, while sanctions might degrade to some extent the operational readiness of some portion of the Iraqi armed forces, it is clear that Iraq would still retain very large and powerful land and air forces, as well as substantial capability to replace ammunition and other essential replacement items. Delay would also have important military consequences that might make any eventual military action more costly and increase U.S. and coalition casualties. Iraq has already exploited its five-month occupation of Kuwait to increase significantly its ability to resist coalition efforts to restore that country's sovereignty and to increase further its already formidable military capability. Iraq has increased the size of its forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations by 450,000 personnel and has increased the overall size of its armed forces by mobilizing many thousands of combat veterans and reservists. Additional time has already permitted the Iraqis to extend and reinforce their fortifications along the Saudi border; more time would only make these defenses more formidable. Delay also would give the Iraqis more time to further develop, produce and weaponize weapons of mass destruction, thus making any eventual conflict more destructive and strengthening Iraq's ability to coerce other nations with the threat of mass destruction. Delay may also degrade the readiness of coalition forces.

In short, international sanctions have not caused Iraq to comply with the January 15, 1991 deadline in UN Security Council Resolution 678, or to retreat from its insistence that its annexation of Kuwait is permanent. Even if the world community were able to maintain the current high level of success in sanctions enforcement, these economic results would not produce such compliance.

Further, the longer the sanctions continue, the more likely it is that leaks in the sanctions enforcement system will develop, that intermediaries will devise ways to circumvent sanctions, and that Iraq will find means of using its own resources to fill critical shortfalls. Even more important, if the coalition fails now to carry through on the UN Security Council's demands for immediate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, there will be strong pressures and temptations on various countries to ease their enforcement of sanctions and to compromise on demands that Iraq meet existing objectives fully and unconditionally.

In summary, diplomatic and economic pressures have not diminished Iraq's intransigence despite five and one-half months of unparalleled international effort, and continued reliance upon them alone could risk achieving the basic objective of bringing about Iraq's complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

January 16, 1991

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 16, 1991

Dear Mr. President:


Pursuant to section 2(b) of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (H.J. Res. 77, Public Law 102-1), I have concluded that:

1. the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with U.N. Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 677, and 678; and

2. that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.

Enclosed is a report that supports my decision.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

cc: The Honorable George J. Mitchell
Majority Leader

The Honorable Robert J. Dole
Republican Leader

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
President Pro Tempore of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 16, 1991

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to section 2(b) of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (H.J. Res. 77, Public Law 102-1), I have concluded that:

1. the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with U.N. Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 677, and 678; and

2. that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.

Enclosed is a report that supports my decision.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

cc: The Honorable Robert H. Michel
Republican Leader

The Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

**Report for Use in Connection with Section 2(b) of the
Joint Congressional Resolution Authorizing the Use of
Military Force Against Iraq**

The report that follows is a summary of diplomatic and other peaceful means used in an attempt to obtain compliance by Iraq with the twelve U.N. Security Council resolutions relating to its invasion and occupation of Kuwait. It is not a definitive rendition of these means, because the Administration cannot, of necessity, include at this time all the factual data that would support a complete historical record. This report, therefore, should be considered in light of formal and informal information already provided to the Congress and that which will be provided in the future

1. Background

For over five and a half months, the international community has sought with unprecedented unity to reverse Iraq's brutal and unprovoked aggression against Kuwait. The United States and the vast majority of governments of the world, working together through the United Nations, have been united both in their determination to compel Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and in their strong preference for doing so through peaceful means. Since August 2, we have sought to build maximum diplomatic and economic pressure against Iraq. Regrettably, Iraq has given no sign whatever that it intends to comply with the will of the international community; nor is there any indication that diplomatic and economic means alone would ever compel Iraq to do so. Instead, Iraq has continued to reject the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions and refuses to recognize them.

From the beginning of the Gulf crisis, the United States has consistently pursued four basic objectives: (1) the immediate, complete, and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait; (2) the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait; (3) the protection of U.S. citizens abroad; and (4) the security and stability of a region vital to U.S. national security. In pursuit of these objectives, we have sought and obtained action by the UN Security Council, resulting in twelve separate resolutions that have been fully consistent with U.S. objectives.

The last of these twelve resolutions, UN Security Council Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990, authorizes UN Member States to use "all necessary means" to implement Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions of the Security Council, and to restore international peace and security in the area, unless Iraq fully implements those resolutions on or before January 15, 1991.

The nearly seven week "pause of goodwill" established in UN Security Council Resolution 678 has now passed. Iraq has taken no steps whatever to fulfill these requirements. Iraq has forcefully stated that it considers the Security Council's resolutions invalid and has no intention of complying with them at any time. Iraqi forces remain in occupation of Kuwait, and have been substantially reinforced in recent weeks rather than withdrawn. Iraq has strongly and repeatedly reiterated its annexation of Kuwait and stated its determination that Kuwait will remain permanently a part of Iraq. The Iraqi closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait has in no way been rescinded.

In short, the Government of Iraq remains completely intransigent in rejecting the UN Security Council's demands -- despite the exhaustive use by the United States and the United Nations of all appropriate diplomatic, political and economic measures to persuade or compel Iraq to comply.

This has been a truly international effort. More than two dozen other countries have sent their own military forces to the Gulf region, including more than 250,000 troops. They have given or pledged substantial funds and other assistance to us for our operations, including over \$8 billion in calendar year 1990 alone. They have taken on the responsibility for assisting those nations that have suffered the most from the effects of international sanctions against Iraq and higher energy prices. As additional costs are incurred during 1991, we will look to our allies to shoulder their fair share of our military expenses and exceptional economic assistance efforts.

2. Diplomatic and Political Actions

The extensive diplomatic and political efforts undertaken by the United States, other countries, regional organizations including the Arab League and the European Community and the United Nations to persuade or compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait have not succeeded. The UN Security Council and General Assembly have overwhelmingly and repeatedly condemned the Iraqi invasion and demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. The Security Council has invoked its extraordinary authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, not only to order comprehensive economic sanctions, but to authorize the use of all other means necessary, including the use of force. The Security Council has directed other UN organizations (e.g., the International Atomic Energy Agency) to take appropriate actions toward the same end within their areas of competence, and they have done so where relevant.

The President, the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials have engaged in an exhaustive process of consultation with other governments and international organizations. The

Secretary of State alone has, since August 2 of last year, held more than 250 meetings with foreign heads of state, foreign ministers and other high foreign officials. He has traveled over 125,000 miles in the course of these contacts. While this extensive diplomacy has been very successful in maintaining international solidarity in support of our objectives, it has not caused the Government of Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.

Most recently, on January 9, the Secretary of State met at length in Geneva with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, who in six and one-half hours of talks demonstrated no readiness whatever to implement the U.N. Security Council resolutions. The Iraqi Foreign Minister even refused to receive a diplomatic communication from the President intended for Saddam Hussein. On January 13, the U.N. Secretary-General was rebuffed by Iraq for a second time, in this case in a direct attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait peacefully. Many other heads of state, foreign ministers and private persons have made similar attempts. In short, the international community has in an unprecedented way directed the full scope and vigor of its political and diplomatic means to produce an Iraqi withdrawal.

These exhaustive efforts have produced not the slightest indication of any intention by Saddam Hussein to meet the demands of the international community for immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. For our part, the Administration made clear that there could be no reward for aggression lest we undermine prospects for an expanded constructive role for the UN Security Council and for a new, more peaceful world order. Attempts to link resolution of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait with other issues were rejected on the grounds that these issues were unrelated to Iraq's aggression and that such efforts would only serve to divert attention from the immediate challenge posed by Iraq.

3. Economic Sanctions

Since August 2 (in the case of the United States) and August 9 (in the case of the Security Council and the other UN Member States), comprehensive economic sanctions have been imposed on Iraq, prohibiting all trade and financial transactions with Iraq, with the exception of goods for a very limited category of essential humanitarian purposes. These sanctions have since August 25 been backed by an extensive maritime interception effort involving warships of many states, and since September 25 by rigorous controls on air traffic to and from Iraq. The United States and other countries have engaged in tireless efforts during this period to uncover and defeat attempted evasions of these sanctions around the world, whether by direct attempts to pass through the allied interception cordon or by the use of financial and trade intermediaries.

Our efforts have resulted in a very substantial reduction of the volume of trade to and from Iraq, and significant shortages in Iraq's financial resources. The most serious impact on Iraq thus far has been on the financial sector, where hard currency shortages have led Baghdad to take a variety of unusual steps to conserve or obtain foreign exchange. The sanctions have shut off 97% of Iraq's exports and more than 90% of its imports, and have prevented Baghdad from reaping the proceeds of higher oil prices or its seizure of Kuwaiti oil fields. The departure of foreign workers and the cutoff of imported industrial inputs has caused problems for a variety of industries.

Notwithstanding the substantial economic impact of sanctions to date, and even if sanctions were to continue to be enforced for an additional six to twelve months, economic hardship alone is highly unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popular discontent in Iraq. Due to a reduction of domestic consumption, cannibalization of Kuwaiti facilities, smuggling, and use of existing stockpiles, the most vital Iraqi industries do not appear to be threatened. The price of foodstuffs for the Iraqi population has sharply increased and rations have been reduced, but there is still access to sufficient staple foods, and new supplies are being injected from the fall harvest and smuggling.

While we might succeed in substantially reducing the overall Iraqi supply of food and other essential consumer commodities, Saddam Hussein has made clear his willingness to divert such supplies to his military forces, even at the cost of severe deprivation of his civilian population. Even if the international community were prepared to deprive the Iraqi civilian population of food, there is no reason to believe that this would change Saddam Hussein's policies.

The ability of Iraqi armed forces to defend Kuwait and southern Iraq is unlikely to be eroded substantially over the next six to twelve months even if effective sanctions could be maintained. Iraq's infantry and artillery forces probably would not suffer significantly, since Iraq could maintain the relatively simple Soviet-style weaponry of these forces. Low-technology defensive preparations could also be expanded. Iraq's armored and mechanized forces would be degraded somewhat, but Iraq has large stocks of spare parts and other supplies that would ameliorate this effect. Iraqi air forces and air defenses would likely be hit far more severely by continued effective sanctions, but in any case, Iraqi air defense and air forces would play a limited role -- in relation to the ground forces -- with respect to Iraq's ability to hold Kuwait.

In short, while sanctions might degrade to some extent the operational readiness of some portion of the Iraqi armed forces, it is clear that Iraq would still retain very large and powerful land and air forces, as well as substantial capability to replace ammunition and other essential replacement items. Delay would also have important military consequences that might make any eventual military action more costly and increase U.S. and coalition casualties. Iraq has already exploited its five-month occupation of Kuwait to increase significantly its ability to resist coalition efforts to restore that country's sovereignty and to increase further its already formidable military capability. Iraq has increased the size of its forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations by 450,000 personnel and has increased the overall size of its armed forces by mobilizing many thousands of combat veterans and reservists. Additional time has already permitted the Iraqis to extend and reinforce their fortifications along the Saudi border; more time would only make these defenses more formidable. Delay also would give the Iraqis more time to further develop, produce and weaponize weapons of mass destruction, thus making any eventual conflict more destructive and strengthening Iraq's ability to coerce other nations with the threat of mass destruction. Delay may also degrade the readiness of coalition forces.

In short, international sanctions have not caused Iraq to comply with the January 15, 1991 deadline in UN Security Council Resolution 678, or to retreat from its insistence that its annexation of Kuwait is permanent. Even if the world community were able to maintain the current high level of success in sanctions enforcement, these economic results would not produce such compliance.

Further, the longer the sanctions continue, the more likely it is that leaks in the sanctions enforcement system will develop, that intermediaries will devise ways to circumvent sanctions, and that Iraq will find means of using its own resources to fill critical shortfalls. Even more important, if the coalition fails now to carry through on the UN Security Council's demands for immediate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, there will be strong pressures and temptations on various countries to ease their enforcement of sanctions and to compromise on demands that Iraq meet existing objectives fully and unconditionally.

In summary, diplomatic and economic pressures have not diminished Iraq's intransigence despite five and one-half months of unparalleled international effort, and continued reliance upon them alone could risk achieving the basic objective of bringing about Iraq's complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

January 16, 1991

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

STATEMENT BY
THE PRESS SECRETARY

January 16, 1991

The Briefing Room

7:08 P.M. EST

MR. FITZWATER: I have a statement by the President of the United States.

The liberation of Kuwait has begun. In conjunction with the forces of our coalition partners, the United States has moved under the code name Operation Desert Storm to enforce the mandates of the United Nations Security Council. As of 7:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Operation Desert Storm forces were engaging targets in Kuwait and Iraq.

President Bush will address the nation at 9:00 p.m. tonight from the Oval Office.

I'll try to get you more as soon as we can. Thank you very much.

END

7:09 P.M. EST

PERSIAN
GULF -
CHRONOLOGY

~~TOP SECRET~~

✓ United Kingdom

H-12 ✓

✓ France

H -2 ✓

1 ✓ Turkey

H -2

✓ Germany

H -1

✓ 5 Canada

H -1

✓ 3 Australia

H -1

4 Egypt

H -1

not home Italy
Perez de Cuellar

H-2

H.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0911-MR

mm 11/23/2016

Presidential Phone Calls



DATE: 1-16-91

TIME: 6¹⁰
incoming/outgoing

WITH: Perez de Cuellar

SUBJECT: H. L. Hunt

I understand
Some force needed
but I understand

FOLLOW UP: _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

COUNTRY	FORCES	MODE OF COMMUN.	BY/TO WHOM	WHEN
✓ UK	A, N, G, Bases	Secure Phone	Pres-PM Major	H-12
FRANCE	A, N, G	Phone	Pres-Pres Mitterrand	H-2
TURKEY	Bases	Phone	Pres-Pres Ozal	H-2
GERMANY	-----	Phone	Pres-Kohl	H-1
ITALY	A, N	Phone	Baker- De-Michelis	H-1
CANADA	A, N	Phone	Pres-Mulroney	H-1
SPAIN	N, Bases	Phone	Baker-Ordenez (Pres-Gonzales)	H-1
USSR	-----	Phone	Baker- Bessmertnyhk	H-1
NATO SYG	-----	Phone	Baker-SYG	H-1
CZECH	G	Call in	Amb	H Hr
BELGIUM	N	Call in	Amb	H Hr
DENMARK	N	Call in	Amb	H Hr
GREECE	N	Call in	Amb	H Hr
HAGUE	N	Phone	Baker-VandenBrok	H Hr
NORWAY	N	Call in	Amb	H Hr
AUSTRALIA	N	Phone	Pres-Hawke	H-1
JAPAN	-	Phone OR Call in	Pres Kaifu <i>Baker</i> Murata	H Hr
KOREA	-	Call in	Amb	H Hr
LUXEMBOURG		Phone	Kimmit-Poos	H Hr
NEW ZEALAN	-	Call in	Amb	H Hr
CHINA	-	Call in	Amb	H Hr
✓ SAUDIS	A, N, G, Bases	Call in	Baker-Bandar	H-12 10 1/2

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0578-F
9/25/2006 MM

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

COUNTRY	FORCES	MODE OF COMMUN.	BY/TO WHOM	WHEN
KUWAIT	A, G	Call in	<i>Baker to</i> Amb	H- ² Hr ?
EGYPT	G	Phone	Pres-Mubarak	H-1
BAHRAIN	G, A, Bases	Call in	Amb	H-1
OMAN	G, A, Bases	Call in	Amb	H-1
QATAR	G, A, Bases	Call in	Amb	H-1
UAE	G, A, Bases	Call in	Amb	H-1
BANGLADESH	G	Call in	Amb	H Hr
MOROCCO	G	Call in	Amb	H Hr
NIGER	G	Call in	Amb	H Hr
SENEGAL	G	Call in	Amb	H Hr
PAKISTAN	G	Call in	Amb	H Hr
ARGENTINA	N	Call in	Amb	H Hr
ISRAEL	-	Call in	<i>Baker - Shoval</i> Amb <i>Cheney Owens</i>	H- ² Hr
SYRIA	G	Call in	Amb	H-1/2
LEADERSHIP		Meeting	Gates	H-2 Hands over HJ Res 77 Deter mina- tion
UNSYG				H- 1 Hr

~~TOP SECRET~~

Jan 16

THEMES FOR PRE H-HOUR PRESIDENTIAL CALLS

-- I wanted to talk to you directly on where we stand in the Gulf.

-- It now appears conclusive that all efforts to pressure or persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait have failed.

-- I had hoped that our Congressional vote of last Saturday might convince him of US determination, but this was not the case.

-- Similarly, Javier Perez de Cuellar did no better with Saddam in Baghdad than Jim Baker did in Geneva with Aziz.

-- Saddam may continue to believe we are bluffing, or he may have concluded that he can survive any war and emerge as a hero in Arab eyes as the leader who stood up to the world.

-- In any event, the time for speculation and appeals is over. I wanted you to know that I have given the order to commence military action, and that hostilities will begin in ____ hours.

-- For obvious reasons of tactical surprise, I ask that you keep this information to yourself. [where appropriate: and to your military commander in the field]

-- Let me just close by saying how much I have appreciated your support. This international coalition has been and remains remarkable. I am convinced that there is great opportunity here if we stay the course. It means a great deal to me to know I can count on you.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1/15/91

COUNTRY	FORCES	MODE OF COMMUN.	BY/TO WHOM	WHEN
UK	A, N, G, Bases	Secure Phone	Pres-PM Major	H-12
FRANCE	A, N, G	Phone	Pres-Pres Mitterrand	H-2
TURKEY	Bases	Phone	Pres-Pres Ozal	H-2
GERMANY	-----	Phone	Pres-Kohl	H-1
ITALY	A, N	Phone	Baker- De-Michelis	H-1
CANADA	A, N	Phone	Pres-Mulroney	H-1
SPAIN	N, Bases	Phone	Baker-Ordonez (Pres-Gonzales)	H-1
USSR	-----	Phone	Baker- Bessmertnyhk	H-1
NATO SYG	-----	Phone	Baker-SYG	H-1
CZECH	G	Call in	Amb	H Hr
BELGIUM	N	Call in	Amb	H Hr
DENMARK	N	Call in	Amb	H Hr
GREECE	N	Call in	Amb	H Hr
HAGUE	N	Phone	Baker-VandenBrok	H Hr
NORWAY	N	Call in	Amb	H Hr
AUSTRALIA	N	Phone	Pres-Hawke	H-1
JAPAN	-	Phone OR Call in	Pres-Kaifu <i>Baker</i> Murata	H Hr
KOREA	-	Call in	Amb	H Hr
LUXEMBOURG		Phone	Kimmit-Poos	H Hr
NEW ZEALAN	-	Call in	Amb	H Hr
CHINA	-	Call in	Amb	H Hr
SAUDIS	A, N, G, Bases	Call in	Baker-Bandar	H-12 10 1/2

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0578-F
9/25/2006 MM

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

COUNTRY	FORCES	MODE OF COMMUN.	BY/TO WHOM	WHEN
KUWAIT	A, G	Call in	<i>Baker</i> Amb	H Hr ⁻² ?
EGYPT	G	Phone	Pres-Mubarak	H-1
BAHRAIN	G, A, Bases	Call in	Amb	H-1
OMAN	G, A, Bases	Call in	Amb	H-1
QATAR	G, A, Bases	Call in	Amb	H-1
UAE	G, A, Bases	Call in	Amb	H-1
BANGLADESH	G	Call in	Amb	H Hr
MOROCCO	G	Call in	Amb	H Hr
NIGER	G	Call in	Amb	H Hr
SENEGAL	G	Call in	Amb	H Hr
PAKISTAN	G	Call in	Amb	H Hr
ARGENTINA	N	Call in	Amb	H Hr
ISRAEL	-	Call in	<i>Baker - Shoval</i> Amb <i>Cheney Aens</i>	H Hr ⁻²
SYRIA	G	Call in	Amb	H-1/2
LEADERSHIP		Meeting	Gates	H-2 Hands over HJ Res 77 Deter mina- tion
UNSYG				H ⁺ <i>Hr</i>

~~TOP SECRET~~

COUNTRY	FORCES	MODE OF COMMUN.	BY/TO WHOM	WHEN
UK	A, N, G, Bases	Secure Phone	Pres - PM Major	H-12
FRANCE	A, N, G	Phone	Pres - Pres Mitterand	H-2 <i>gscm</i>
TURKEY	Bases	Phone	Pres - Pres Ozal	H-2
GERMANY	-	Phone or Priv channel	Pres - Kohl	H-1
ITALY	A, N	Phone Priv channel	Baker - de Muech	H-1
CANADA	A, N	Phone	Pres - PM Mulroney	H-1
SPAIN	N, Bases	Phone Priv channel	Baker - Calvo (P - Gonzalez)	H-1
USSR	-	Phone	Baker - Baumensteyn Pres - Gorbachev	H-1
NATO SYG	-	Phone Priv channel	Baker - SYG	H-1

2300
2400
2400

2400

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0912-MR
M.M. 11/23/2016

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

COUNTRY	FORCES	MODE OF COMMUN.	BY/TO WHOM	WHEN
CZECH	G	<i>Call in</i> Cable	<i>Call CWO in case</i>	H H Hour
BELGIUM	N	Cable		H Hour
DENMARK	N	Cable		H Hour
GREECE	N	Cable		H Hour
NETHERLANDS	N	<i>phone</i> Cable	<i>Baker - Van Den</i>	H Hour
NORWAY	N	Cable		H Hour
AUSTRALIA	N	Phone	Pres - Hawke	1 H-2
JAPAN	-	<i>Phone</i> Priv channel	<i>Pres - Kaifu</i> <i>or</i> <i>Murata</i>	H
KOREA	-	Cable		H Hour

copy

*copy Pres
Rein for m*

H

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

COUNTRY	FORCES	MODE OF COMMUN.	BY/TO WHOM	WHEN
BANGLADESH	G	Cable		H Hour
MOROCCO	G	Cable		H Hour
NIGER	G	Cable		H Hour
SENEGAL	G	Cable		H Hour
PAKISTAN	G	Cable		H Hour
ARGENTINA	N	Cable		H Hour
ISRAEL	-	Secure phone call in	Cheney - Arens Seowcroft - Shoval <i>Baker</i>	H-2
SYRIA	G	Priv channel		H- $\frac{1}{2}$
LEADERSHIP		Meeting	Gates	(hands over HJ H-2 Res. <i>77</i> determination)

UN SC *7/11/77*

~~TOP SECRET~~

H

~~TOP SECRET~~

COUNTRY	FORCES	MODE OF COMMUN.	BY/TO WHOM	WHEN
NEW ZEALAND	-	Cable		H Hour
CHINA	-	Cable		H Hour
SAUDI ARABIA	A, N, G, Bases	Call in	Baher Seeweroff -Bandar	H-12
KUWAIT	A, G	Phone / Cable priv channel	<i>Alwaleed</i> <i>Al</i>	<i>2</i> H-6
EGYPT	G	phone	Pres-Mubarak	H-1
BAHRAIN	G, A, Bases	priv channel	<i>Ans.</i>	H-1
OMAN	G, A, Bases	priv channel		H-1
QATAR	G, A, Bases	priv channel		H-1
UAE	G, A, Bases	priv channel		H-1

When
Khalid
knowing,

0100

~~TOP SECRET~~

DRAFT/Jan 13/Haass

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tactical/Pre-Hostilities Consultations

Assuming that "H" stands for the moment hostilities are begun, and all numbers given refer to hours, a list of notifications is as follows:

I. Middle East:

--Saudi Arabia: ^{H-1} Bandar/Freeman H-24; call in Bandar here, who would phone Fahd and use a code; double track via privacy channel message to Freeman?

--Kuwait: H-12; privacy channel via Freeman/Gnehm to Amir

--Egypt: ^H H-2; privacy or cabinet channel message to Mubarak

--Other GCC, including, Bahrein, Oman, Qatar, UAE: H-12; privacy channel messages to ambassadors who would inform heads of state

--Israel: ^{H-1} H-12; Scowcroft to Shoval *change to Cereno*

--Syria: H-hour or just prior; privacy channel to amb to Assad

II. Europe

--UK: ^{12 others H-1} H-48; President secure call to Major

--France: ^{H-1} H-6; President secure call to Mitterrand or Scowcroft secure call to Lanxade; also could use cabinet channel

--Turkey: H-6; privacy channel to Abramowitz to Ozal

--Germany: H-2; privacy channel via ambassador or cabinet channel to Kohl

--Italy: H-1; privacy channel via ambassador

--Canada: ¹ H-2; cabinet channel to Mulroney

--Spain: H-2; privacy channel message via ambassador to Gonzalez (deserves notice given B-52 use of Spanish bases)

--NATO SYG: H-1; privacy channel message to Woerner via Taft; ask Woerner to convene NAC at H-hour or H+1.

--USSR: H-1; privacy channel message to Matlock to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

1999-0578-F
9/25/2006 MM

~~TOP SECRET~~

III. Asia/Pacific

P --Australia: H-6; Scowcroft call to/call in Amb Cook here, who can reach Hawke via secure phone

? --Japan: H-1; via privacy channel or ambassador here

--Korea & NZ: H-hour; via privacy channel or ambassador here

--China: same as above

IV. Congress

--Leadership: H-1 Presidential phone calls to 4 leaders

--Others: H-hour calls by Cheney/Baker/Scowcroft/Gates/Sununu to chairman/ranking members normally invited to Cabinet Room consultations

NOTE: There are some issues worth highlighting:

--The above list does not include the lesser participants in either the defense of Saudi Arabia or the naval enforcement of sanctions effort. This list includes Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Pakistan, Argentina, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, and Norway. They could be informed at H-hour, with ambassadors informed just before via privacy channel.

--We will probably want a message to travel flash to all diplomatic posts that would go out shortly after H-hour stating what has happened and alerting foreign governments to a scheduled Presidential address.

--We might want to send tailored messages for Iran and possibly Jordan at this time.

--All the activity that would be required in the hours before H-hour is a potential problem. Key people here will be busy; more important, the Iraqis may notice or somehow learn of a number of US ambassadors going in to Gulf and other governments. We may want to instruct (say this Monday) all our ambassadors in countries that would receive prior notice to set up now a secret mechanism that would allow them to communicate on an open line a

~~TOP SECRET~~

coded message of some sort to the head of state or his chief aide at the appropriate time. Alternatively, we could do the same thing here for those countries that would receive advance word and who have secure communications home. The connection could be Scowcroft/Gates and the resident ambassador.

--Under the above approach Syria would get no advance notice. They have little need for it militarily, and must be considered somewhat suspect. That said, we may want to give them a few minutes heads up (something like H-15 minutes) to give Assad the satisfaction of being told in advance.

--More generally, some of the numbers regarding the amount of advance notice are less than what we were considering before the Baker trip. This reflects the modesty of the requests made to Baker when the issue was discussed.

Please keep this little key ready for a phone call from me. By telling you over the phone the word corresponding to the date, I can inform you of the date for the beginning of military operations. The dates refer to times at Baghdad. Unfortunately I probably will not be able to give you as much notice as you might like, but I will do the best I can.

January 15	Foxtrot
16	Golf
17	Hotel
18	India
19	Juliet
20	Kilo
21	Limo
22	Mike
23	November
24	Oscar
25	Poppa
26	Quebec
27	Romeo
28	Sierra
29	Tango
30	Uniform
31	Victor

Early in the day

*Prime resp ESTD protect
lives*

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Schedule	Re: SVTS Room Schedule 1990 (22 pp.)	1/3-12/28	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Persian Gulf Chronology 1990 - 91 (Prepared May 1992) [1]

Date Closed:	7/7/2009	OA/ID Number:	91147-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

109-DC's
(PCC's)

8896 on
Pension Gues.

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Schedule	Re: SVTS Room Schedule 1991 (10 pp.)	1/2-6/25	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Persian Gulf Chronology 1990 - 91 (Prepared May 1992) [1]

Date Closed:	7/7/2009	OA/ID Number:	91147-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

2. BEGIN TEXT OF SC RESOLUTION ~~1678~~ (23 NOV)

CANADA, FRANCE, ROMANIA, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:-

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

--RECALLING AND REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990),
661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666
(1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990) AND 674 (1990),

--NOTING THAT, DESPITE ALL EFFORTS BY THE UNITED
NATIONS, IRAQ REFUSES TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATION TO
IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 660 (1990) AND THE ABOVE SUBSEQUENT
RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, IN FLAGRANT CONTEMPT OF THE
COUNCIL,

--MINDFUL OF ITS DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND
PRESERVATION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

--DETERMINED TO SECURE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
DECISIONS,

--ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS,

--1. DEMANDS THAT IRAQ COMPLY FULLY WITH RESOLUTION 660
(1990) AND ALL SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS AND
DECIDES, WHILE MAINTAINING ALL ITS DECISIONS, TO ALLOW
IRAQ ONE FINAL OPPORTUNITY, AS A PAUSE OF GOOD WILL, TO
DO SO;

--2. AUTHORIZES MEMBER STATES CO-OPERATING WITH THE
GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT, UNLESS IRAQ ON OR BEFORE
15 JANUARY 1991 FULLY IMPLEMENTS, AS SET FORTH IN
PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE, THE FOREGOING RESOLUTIONS, TO USE ALL
NECESSARY MEANS TO UPHOLD AND IMPLEMENT SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 660 (1990) AND ALL SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT
RESOLUTIONS AND TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY IN THE AREA;

--3. REQUESTS ALL STATES TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SUPPORT
FOR THE ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPH 2
OF THIS RESOLUTION;

--4. REQUESTS THE STATES CONCERNED TO KEEP THE COUNCIL
REGULARLY INFORMED ON THE PROGRESS OF ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN
PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF THIS RESOLUTION;

--5. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 03846
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS ALLDIP; NICOSIA FOR BSO; LONDON FOR
MILLIKAN; PARIS FOR ROSENBLATT; GENEVA FOR PATTERSON;
JCS FOR CHAIRMAN, DIRECTOR, DIRECTOR J5
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, RPAL, IR, KU, XF, UNSC
SUBJECT: SC ADOPTS RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING USE OF FORCE

END TEXT.

-
2. BEGIN TEXT OF SC RESOLUTION ~~1178~~ (23 NOV)

-
CANADA, FRANCE, ROMANIA, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:-

-
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

-
--RECALLING AND REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990),
661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666
(1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990) AND 674 (1990),

- 677 (1990)
--NOTING THAT, DESPITE ALL EFFORTS BY THE UNITED
NATIONS, IRAQ REFUSES TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATION TO
IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 660 (1990) AND THE ABOVE SUBSEQUENT
RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, IN FLAGRANT CONTEMPT OF THE
COUNCIL,

--MINDFUL OF ITS DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND
PRESERVATION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

-
--DETERMINED TO SECURE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
DECISIONS,

-
--ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS,

-
--1. DEMANDS THAT IRAQ COMPLY FULLY WITH RESOLUTION 660
(1990) AND ALL SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS AND
DECIDES, WHILE MAINTAINING ALL ITS DECISIONS, TO ALLOW
IRAQ ONE FINAL OPPORTUNITY, AS A PAUSE OF GOOD WILL, TO
DO SO;

-
--2. AUTHORIZES MEMBER STATES CO-OPERATING WITH THE
GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT, UNLESS IRAQ ON OR BEFORE
15 JANUARY 1991 FULLY IMPLEMENTS, AS SET FORTH IN
PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE, THE FOREGOING RESOLUTIONS, TO USE ALL
NECESSARY MEANS TO UPHOLD AND IMPLEMENT SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 660 (1990) AND ALL SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT
RESOLUTIONS AND TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY IN THE AREA;

-
--3. REQUESTS ALL STATES TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SUPPORT
FOR THE ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPH 2
OF THIS RESOLUTION;

-
--4. REQUESTS THE STATES CONCERNED TO KEEP THE COUNCIL
REGULARLY INFORMED ON THE PROGRESS OF ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN
PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF THIS RESOLUTION;

-
--5. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 03846
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS ALLDIP; NICOSIA FOR BSO; LONDON FOR
MILLIKAN; PARIS FOR ROSENBLATT; GENEVA FOR PATTERSON;
JCS FOR CHAIRMAN, DIRECTOR, DIRECTOR J5
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, RPAL, IR, RU, XF, UNSC
SUBJECT: SC ADOPTS RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING USE OF FORCE

-
END TEXT.

Wilma Hall 12/14/90
a full set for
the front office

RTT

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

UN Security Council Resolutions on Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

Resolution 660 (Aug. 2, 1990)

The Security Council,

Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the military forces of Iraq,

Determining that there exists a breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,

Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Condemns* the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;

2. *Demands* that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990;

3. *Calls upon* Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and especially those of the League of Arab States;

4. *Decides* to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the present resolution.

VOTE: 14 for, 0 against, 1 abstention (Yemen)

Resolution 661 (Aug. 6, 1990)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990,

Deeply concerned that that resolution has not been implemented and that the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait continues with further loss of human life and material destruction,

Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,

Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has expressed its readiness to comply with resolution 660 (1990),

Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United

Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Determines* that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;

2. *Decides*, as a consequence, to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;

3. *Decides* that all States shall prevent:

(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;

(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in

Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products;

4. *Decides* that all States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that Government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs;

5. *Calls upon* all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or license granted before the date of the present resolution;

6. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) To examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution which will be submitted by the Secretary-General;

(b) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the present resolution;

7. *Calls upon* all States to cooperate fully with the Committee in the fulfillment of its task, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the present resolution;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the

necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for the purpose;

9. *Decides* that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 above, nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and *calls upon* all States:

(a) To take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies;

(b) Not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty days;

11. *Decides* to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq.

VOTE: 13 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen)

Resolution 662 (Aug. 9, 1990)

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) and 661 (1990),

Gravely alarmed by the declaration by Iraq of a "comprehensive and eternal merger" with Kuwait,

Demanding, once again, that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990,

Determined to bring the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,

Determined also to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait,

1. *Decides* that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void;

2. *Calls upon* all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation;

3. *Further demands* that Iraq rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait;

4. *Decides* to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the occupation.

VOTE: Unanimous (15-0)

Resolution 664 (Aug. 18, 1990)

The Security Council,

Recalling the Iraqi invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait and resolutions 660, 661 and 662,

Deeply concerned for the safety and well being of third state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,

Recalling the obligations of Iraq in this regard under international law,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to pursue urgent consultations with the Government of Iraq following the concern and anxiety expressed by the members of the Council on 17 August 1990,

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter:

1. *Demands* that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to such nationals;

2. *Further demands* that Iraq take no action to jeopardize the safety, security or health of such nationals;

3. *Reaffirms* its decision in resolution 662 (1990) that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq is null and void, and therefore, demands that the Government of Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel, and refrain from any such actions in the future;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on compliance with this resolution at the earliest possible time.

VOTE: Unanimous (15-0)

Resolution 665 (Aug. 25, 1990)

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990) and demanding their full and immediate implementation,

Having decided in resolution 661 (1990) to impose economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Determined to bring an end to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq which imperils the existence of a Member State and to restore the legitimate authority, the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait which requires the speedy implementation of the above resolutions,

Deplored the loss of innocent life stemming from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and determined to prevent further such losses,

Gravely alarmed that Iraq continues to refuse to comply with resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), and 664 (1990) and in particular at the conduct of the Government of Iraq in using Iraqi flag vessels to export oil,

1. *Calling upon* those Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstance as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661 (1990);

2. *Invites* Member States accordingly to co-operate as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) with maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, in accordance with paragraph 1 above;

3. *Requests* all States to provide in accordance with the Charter such assistance as may be required by the States referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution;

4. *Further requests* the States concerned to co-ordinate their actions in pursuit of the above paragraphs of this resolution using as appropriate mechanisms of the Military Staff Committee and after consultation with the Secretary-General to submit reports to the Security Council and its Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation of this resolution;

5. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

VOTE: 13 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen) ■

UN Security Council Resolutions on Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

Resolution 666 (Sep. 13, 1990)

*The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution 661 (1990),
paragraphs 3 (c) and 4 of which apply,
except in humanitarian circumstances,
to foodstuffs,*

*Recognizing that circumstances
may arise in which it will be necessary
for foodstuffs to be supplied to the
civilian population in Iraq or Kuwait in
order to relieve human suffering,*

*Noting that in this respect the
Committee established under para-
graph 6 of that resolution has received
communications from several Member
States,*

*Emphasizing that it is for the
Security Council, alone or acting
through the Committee, to determine
whether humanitarian circumstances
have arisen,*

*Deeply concerned that Iraq has
failed to comply with its obligations
under Security Council resolution 664
(1990) in respect of the safety and well-
being of third State nationals, and
reaffirming that Iraq retains full
responsibility in this regard under
international humanitarian law includ-
ing, where applicable, the Fourth
Geneva Convention,*

*Acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations,*

1. *Decides* that in order to make
the necessary determination whether
or not for the purposes of paragraph 3
(c) and paragraph 4 of resolution 661
(1990) humanitarian circumstances have
arisen, the Committee shall keep the
situation regarding foodstuffs in Iraq
and Kuwait under constant review;

2. *Expects* Iraq to comply with its
obligations under Security Council
resolution 664 (1990) in respect of third
State nationals and reaffirms that Iraq
remains fully responsible for their
safety and well-being in accordance
with international humanitarian law
including, where applicable, the Fourth
Geneva Convention;

3. *Requests*, for the purposes of
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution,
that the Secretary-General seek
urgently, and on a continuing basis,
information from relevant United
Nations and other appropriate
humanitarian agencies and all other
sources on the availability of food in
Iraq and Kuwait, such information to
be communicated by the Secretary-
General to the Committee regularly;

4. *Requests* further that in seeking
and supplying such information
particular attention will be paid to
such categories of persons who might
suffer specially, such as children under
15 years of age, expectant mothers,
maternity cases, the sick and the
elderly;

5. *Decides* that if the Committee,
after receiving the reports from the
Secretary-General, determines that
circumstances have arisen in which
there is an urgent humanitarian need
to supply foodstuffs to Iraq or Kuwait
in order to relieve human suffering, it
will report promptly to the Council its
decision as to how such need should be
met;

6. *Directs* the Committee that in
formulating its decisions it should bear
in mind that foodstuffs should be
provided through the United Nations
in co-operation with the International
Committee of the Red Cross or other
appropriate humanitarian agencies
and distributed by them or under their
supervision in order to ensure that
they reach the intended beneficiaries;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General
to use his good offices to facilitate the
delivery and distribution of foodstuffs
to Kuwait and Iraq in accordance with
the provisions of this and other
relevant resolutions;

8. *Recalls* that resolution 661
(1990) does not apply to supplies
intended strictly for medical purposes,
but in this connection recommends that
medical supplies should be exported
under the strict supervision of the
Government of the exporting State or
by appropriate humanitarian agencies.

VOTE: 13 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions
(Cuba and Yemen)

Resolution 667 (Sep. 16, 1990)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990) and 666 (1990),

Recalling the Vienna Conventions of 18 April 1961 on diplomatic relations and of 24 April 1963 on consular relations, to both of which Iraq is a party,

Considering that the decision of Iraq to order the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and to withdraw the immunity and privileges of these missions and their personnel is contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, the international Conventions mentioned above and international law,

Deeply concerned that Iraq, notwithstanding the decisions of the Security Council and the provisions of the Conventions mentioned above, has committed acts of violence against diplomatic missions and their personnel in Kuwait,

Outraged at recent violations by Iraq of diplomatic premises in Kuwait and at the abduction of personnel enjoying diplomatic immunity and foreign nationals who were present in these premises,

Considering that the above actions by Iraq constitute aggressive acts and a flagrant violation of its international obligations which strike at the root of the conduct of international relations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that Iraq is fully responsible for any use of violence against foreign nationals or against any diplomatic or consular mission in Kuwait or its personnel,

Determined to ensure respect for its decisions and for Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Further considering that the grave nature of Iraq's actions, which constitute a new escalation of its violations of

international law, obliges the Council not only to express its immediate reaction but also to consult urgently to take further concrete measures to ensure Iraq's compliance with the Council's resolutions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Strongly condemns* aggressive acts perpetrated by Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait, including the abduction of foreign nationals who were present in those premises;

2. *Demands* the immediate release of those foreign nationals as well as all nationals mentioned in resolution 664 (1990);

3. *Further demands* that Iraq immediately and fully comply with its international obligations under resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990) of the Security Council, the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations and international law;

4. *Further demands* that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and in Iraq and take no action to hinder the diplomatic and consular missions in the performance of their functions, including access to their nationals and the protection of their person and interests;

5. *Reminds* all States that they are obliged to observe strictly resolutions 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990) and 666 (1990);

6. *Decides* to consult urgently to take further concrete measures as soon as possible, under Chapter VII of the Charter, in response to Iraq's continued violation of the Charter, of resolutions of the Council and of international law.

VOTE: Unanimous (15-0) ■

UN Resolution 669 (Sept. 24, 1990)

*The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution 661 (1990)
of 6 August 1990,*

*Recalling also Article 50 of the
Charter of the United Nations,*

*Conscious of the fact that an
increasing number of requests for
assistance have been received under
the provisions of Article 50 of the
Charter of the United Nations,*

*Entrusts the Committee estab-
lished under resolution 661 (1990)
concerning the situation between Iraq
and Kuwait with the task of examining
requests for assistance under the
provisions of Article 50 of the Charter
of the United Nations and making
recommendations to the President of
the Security Council for appropriate
action.*

VOTE: Unanimous (15-0)

UN Resolution 670 (Sept. 25, 1990)

The Security Council

*Reaffirming its resolutions 660
(1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664
(1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), and 667
(1990);*

*Condemning Iraq's continued
occupation of Kuwait, its failure to
rescind its actions and end its pur-
ported annexation and its holding of
third State nationals against their will,
in flagrant violation of resolutions 660
(1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990) and 667
(1990) and of international humanitar-
ian law;*

*Condemning further the treatment
by Iraqi forces of Kuwaiti nationals,
including measures to force them to
leave their own country and mistreat-
ment of persons and property in
Kuwait in violation of international law;*

*Noting with grave concern the
persistent attempts to evade the
measures laid down in resolution 661
(1990);*

*Further noting that a number of
States have limited the number of Iraqi
diplomatic and consular officials in their
countries and that others are planning
to do so;*

*Determined to ensure by all
necessary means the strict and com-
plete application of the measures laid
down in resolution 661 (1990);*

*Determined to ensure respect for
its decisions and the provisions of
Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter of the
United Nations;*

*Affirming that any acts of the
Government of Iraq which are contrary
to the above-mentioned resolutions or
to Articles 25 or 48 of the Charter of
the United Nations, such as Decree No.
377 of the Revolution Command
Council of Iraq of 16 September 1990,
are null and void;*

*Reaffirming its determination to
ensure compliance with Security
Council resolutions by maximum use of
political and diplomatic means;*

*Welcoming the Secretary-General's
use of his good offices to advance a
peaceful solution based on the relevant
Security Council resolutions and noting
with appreciation his continuing efforts
to this end;*

*Underlining to the Government of
Iraq that its continued failure to
comply with the terms of resolutions
660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664
(1990), 666 (1990) and 667 (1990) could
lead to further serious action by the
Council under the Charter of the
United Nations, including under
Chapter VII;*

*Recalling the provisions of Article
103 of the Charter of the United
Nations;*

*Acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations:*

1. *Calls upon* all States to carry out
their obligations to ensure strict and
complete compliance with resolution
661 (1990) and in particular paragraphs
3, 4 and 5 thereof;

2. *Confirms* that resolution 661
(1990) applies to all means of transport,
including aircraft;

3. *Decides* that all States, notwith-
standing the existence of any rights or
obligations conferred or imposed by
any international agreement or any
contract entered into or any licence or
permit granted before the date of the
present resolution, shall deny permis-
sion to any aircraft to take off from
their territory if the aircraft would

carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait other than food in humanitarian circumstances, subject to authorization by the Council or the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) and in accordance with resolution 666 (1990), or supplies intended strictly for medical purposes or solely for UNIIMOG;

4. *Decides further* that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait, whatever its State of registration, to overfly its territory unless:

(a) The aircraft lands at an airfield designated by that State outside Iraq or Kuwait in order to permit its inspection to ensure that there is no cargo on board in violation of resolution 661 (1990) or the present resolution, and for this purpose the aircraft may be detained for as long as necessary; or

(b) The particular flight has been approved by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990); or

(c) The flight is certified by the United Nations as solely for the purposes of UNIIMOG;

5. *Decides* that each State shall take all necessary measures to ensure that any aircraft registered in its territory or operated by an operator who has his principal place of business or permanent residence in its territory complies with the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) and the present resolution;

6. *Decides further* that all States shall notify in a timely fashion the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) of any flight between its territory and Iraq or Kuwait to which the requirement to land in paragraph 4 above does not apply, and the purpose for such a flight;

7. *Calls upon* all States to cooperate in taking such measures as may be necessary, consistent with international law, including the Chicago Convention, to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) or the present resolution;

8. *Calls upon* all States to detain any ships of Iraqi registry which enter their ports and which are being or have been used in violation of resolution 661 (1990), or to deny such ships entrance to their ports except in circumstances recognized under international law as necessary to safeguard human life;

9. *Reminds* all States of their obligations under resolution 661 (1990) with regard to the freezing of Iraqi assets, and the protection of the assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies, located within their territory and to report to the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) regarding those assets;

10. *Calls upon* all States to provide to the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) information regarding the action taken by them to implement the provisions laid down in the present resolution;

11. *Affirms* that the United Nations Organization, the specialized agencies and other international organizations in the United Nations system are required to take such measures as may be necessary to give effect to the terms of resolution 661 (1990) and this resolution;

12. *Decides* to consider, in the event of evasion of the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) or of the present resolution by a State or its nationals or through its territory, measures directed at the State in question to prevent such evasion;

13. *Reaffirms* that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and that as a High Contracting Party to the Convention Iraq is bound to comply fully with all its terms and in particular is liable under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches committed by it, as are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches.

VOTE: 14 for, 1 against (Cuba) ■

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Resolution 674 (27 Oct 90)

--RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990) AND 670 (1990),

--STRESSING THE URGENT NEED FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT, FOR THE RESTORATION OF KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND OF THE AUTHORITY OF ITS LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT,

--CONDEMNING THE ACTIONS BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES AND OCCUPYING FORCES TO TAKE THIRD STATE NATIONALS HOSTAGE AND TO MISTREAT AND OPPRESS KUWAITI AND THIRD STATE NATIONALS, AND THE OTHER ACTIONS REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL SUCH AS THE DESTRUCTION OF KUWAITI DEMOGRAPHIC RECORDS, FORCED DEPARTURE OF KUWAITIS, AND RELOCATION OF POPULATION IN KUWAIT AND THE UNLAWFUL DESTRUCTION AND SEIZURE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY IN KUWAIT INCLUDING HOSPITAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT, IN VIOLATION OF THE DECISIONS OF THIS COUNCIL, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,

--EXPRESSING GRAVE ALARM OVER THE SITUATION OF NATIONALS OF THIRD STATES IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ, INCLUDING THE PERSONNEL OF THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS OF SUCH STATES,

--REAFFIRMING THAT THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION APPLIES TO KUWAIT AND THAT AS A HIGH CONTRACTING PARTY TO THE CONVENTION IRAQ IS BOUND TO COMPLY FULLY WITH ALL ITS TERMS AND IN PARTICULAR IS LIABLE UNDER THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE GRAVE BREACHES COMMITTED BY IT, AS ARE INDIVIDUALS WHO COMMIT OR ORDER THE COMMISSION OF GRAVE BREACHES,

--RECALLING THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF THIRD STATE NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT,

--DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE ECONOMIC COST, AND AT THE LOSS AND SUFFERING CAUSED TO INDIVIDUALS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ AS A RESULT OF THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ,

--ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER,
(ASTERISKS)

REAFFIRMING THE GOAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY BY SEEKING TO RESOLVE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND CONFLICTS THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS;

--RECALLING ALSO THE IMPORTANT ROLE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SECRETARY-GENERAL HAVE PLAYED IN THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF DISPUTES AND CONFLICTS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER,

--ALARMED BY THE DANGERS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS CAUSED BY THE IRAQI INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT, DIRECTLY THREATENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, AND SEEKING TO AVOID ANY FURTHER WORSENING OF THE SITUATION,

--CALLING UPON IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IN PARTICULAR RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 662 (1990) AND 664 (1990),

--REAFFIRMING ITS DETERMINATION TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY IRAQ WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BY MAXIMUM USE OF POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC MEANS,

A

--1. DEMANDS THAT THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES AND OCCUPYING FORCES IMMEDIATELY CEASE AND DESIST FROM TAKING THIRD STATE NATIONALS HOSTAGE, AND MISTREATING AND OPPRESSING KUWAITI AND THIRD STATE NATIONALS, AND FROM ANY OTHER ACTIONS SUCH AS THOSE REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL AND DESCRIBED ABOVE, VIOLATING THE DECISIONS OF THIS COUNCIL, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW;

--2. INVITES STATES TO COLLECT SUBSTANTIATED INFORMATION IN THEIR POSSESSION OR SUBMITTED TO THEM ON THE GRAVE BREACHES BY IRAQ AS PER PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE AND TO MAKE THIS INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE COUNCIL;

--3. REAFFIRMS ITS DEMAND THAT IRAQ IMMEDIATELY FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS TO THIRD STATE NATIONALS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ, INCLUDING THE PERSONNEL OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS, UNDER THE CHARTER, THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE COUNCIL;

--4. REAFFIRMS FURTHER ITS DEMAND THAT IRAQ PERMIT AND FACILITATE THE IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE FROM KUWAIT AND IRAQ OF THOSE THIRD STATE NATIONALS, INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL, WHO WISH TO LEAVE;

--5. DEMANDS THAT IRAQ ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO FOOD, WATER AND BASIC SERVICES NECESSARY TO THE PROTECTION AND WELL BEING OF KUWAITI NATIONALS AND OF NATIONALS OF THIRD STATES IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ, INCLUDING THE PERSONNEL OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN KUWAIT;

--6. REAFFIRMS ITS DEMAND THAT IRAQ IMMEDIATELY PROTECT THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL AND PREMISES IN KUWAIT AND IN IRAQ, TAKE NO ACTION TO HINDER THESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR FUNCTIONS, INCLUDING ACCESS TO THEIR NATIONALS AND THE PROTECTION OF THEIR PERSON AND INTERESTS AND RESCIND ITS ORDERS FOR THE CLOSURE OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN KUWAIT AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IMMUNITY OF THEIR PERSONNEL;

--7. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONTINUED EXERCISE OF HIS GOOD OFFICES CONCERNING THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF THIRD STATE NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT, TO SEEK TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES OF PARAGRAPHS 4, 5 AND 6 AND IN PARTICULAR THE PROVISION OF FOOD, WATER AND BASIC SERVICES TO KUWAITI NATIONALS AND TO THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN KUWAIT AND THE EVACUATION OF THIRD STATE NATIONALS;

--8. REMINDS IRAQ THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW IT IS LIABLE FOR ANY LOSS, DAMAGE OR INJURY ARISING IN REGARD TO KUWAIT AND THIRD STATES, AND THEIR NATIONALS AND CORPORATIONS, AS A RESULT OF THE INVASION AND ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ;

--9. INVITES STATES TO COLLECT RELEVANT INFORMATION REGARDING THEIR CLAIMS, AND THOSE OF THEIR NATIONALS AND CORPORATIONS, FOR RESTITUTION OR FINANCIAL COMPENSATION BY IRAQ WITH A VIEW TO SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AS MAY BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW;

--10. REQUIRES THAT IRAQ COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AND ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS, FAILING WHICH THE COUNCIL WILL NEED TO TAKE FURTHER MEASURES UNDER THE CHARTER;

--11. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY AND PERMANENTLY SEIZED OF THE MATTER UNTIL KUWAIT HAS REGAINED ITS INDEPENDENCE AND PEACE HAS BEEN RESTORED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

B

--12. REPOSES ITS TRUST IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE AVAILABLE HIS GOOD OFFICES AND, AS HE CONSIDERS APPROPRIATE, TO PURSUE THEM AND UNDERTAKE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN ORDER TO REACH A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS CAUSED BY THE IRAQI INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 662 (1990), AND 664 (1990), AND CALLS ON ALL STATES, BOTH THOSE IN THE REGION AND OTHERS, TO PURSUE ON THIS BASIS THEIR EFFORTS TO THIS END, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTER, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION AND RESTORE PEACE, SECURITY, AND STABILITY;

--13. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF HIS GOOD OFFICES AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.

END TEXT.

3. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION ON KUWAITI 677 (28 NOV)
DEMOGRAPHICS.

- THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

- RECALLING RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990) OF 2 AUGUST 1990, 662 (1990) OF 9 AUGUST 1990 AND 674 (1990) OF 29 OCTOBER 1990,

- REITERATING ITS CONCERN FOR THE SUFFERING CAUSED TO INDIVIDUALS IN KUWAIT AS A RESULT OF THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF KUWAITI BY IRAQ,

- GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE ONGOING ATTEMPT BY IRAQ TO ALTER THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF KUWAIT AND TO DESTROY THE CIVIL RECORDS MAINTAINED BY THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT,

- ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

--1. CONDEMNS THE ATTEMPTS BY IRAQ TO ALTER THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF KUWAIT AND TO DESTROY THE CIVIL RECORDS MAINTAINED BY THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT;

--2. MANDATES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TAKE CUSTODY OF A COPY OF THE POPULATION REGISTER OF KUWAIT THE AUTHENTICITY OF WHICH HAS BEEN CERTIFIED BY THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT WHICH COVERS THE POPULATION REGISTRATION UP TO 1 AUGUST 1990;

--3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ESTABLISH, IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT, AN ORDER OF RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING ACCESS AND USE OF THE SAID COPY OF THE POPULATION REGISTER.

- END TEXT.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF SC RESOLUTION ~~678~~ (28 NOV)

- CANADA, FRANCE, ROMANIA, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:-

- THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

- RECALLING AND REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990) AND 674 (1990),

- ~~677 (1990)~~
--NOTING THAT, DESPITE ALL EFFORTS BY THE UNITED NATIONS, IRAQ REFUSES TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 660 (1990) AND THE ABOVE SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, IN FLAGRANT CONTEMPT OF THE COUNCIL,

--MINDFUL OF ITS DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND PRESERVATION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

--DETERMINED TO SECURE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ITS DECISIONS,

--ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

--1. DEMANDS THAT IRAQ COMPLY FULLY WITH RESOLUTION 660 (1990) AND ALL SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS AND DECIDES, WHILE MAINTAINING ALL ITS DECISIONS, TO ALLOW IRAQ ONE FINAL OPPORTUNITY, AS A PAUSE OF GOOD WILL, TO DO SO;

--2. AUTHORIZES MEMBER STATES CO-OPERATING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT, UNLESS IRAQ ON OR BEFORE 15 JANUARY 1991 FULLY IMPLEMENTS, AS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE, THE FOREGOING RESOLUTIONS, TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS TO UPHOLD AND IMPLEMENT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 660 (1990) AND ALL SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS AND TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA;

--3. REQUESTS ALL STATES TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SUPPORT FOR THE ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF THIS RESOLUTION;

--4. REQUESTS THE STATES CONCERNED TO KEEP THE COUNCIL REGULARLY INFORMED ON THE PROGRESS OF ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF THIS RESOLUTION;

--5. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 03846

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS ALLDIP; NICOSIA FOR BSO; LONDON FOR MILLIKAN; PARIS FOR ROSENBLATT; GENEVA FOR PATTERSON; JCS FOR CHAIRMAN, DIRECTOR, DIRECTOR J5

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IR, KU, XF, UNSC

SUBJECT: SC ADOPTS RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING USE OF FORCE