

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91147
Folder ID Number: 91147-007

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (April - June 1991) [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	6	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to President Ozal of Turkey (1 pp.)	4/19/91	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Ozal of Turkey (1 pp.)	4/19/91	(b)(1)	S
01c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl, April 25, 1991, 9:15 a.m. (1 pp.)	4/24/91	(b)(1)	C
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02c. Letter	Re: Letter from Chancellor Dr. Helmut Kohl to the President of the United States (1 pp.)	4/24/91	(b)(1)	
02d. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call form Chancellor Kohl of Germany (1 pp.)	4/18/91	(b)(1)	C
02e. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl of Germany (1 pp.)	4/19/91	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (April - June 1991) [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1229
OA/ID Number: 91147-007
Date Closed: 7/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02f. Cable	Re: Message from President Bush to Chancellor Kohl (2 pp.)	4/17/91	(b)(1)	✓
03a. Letter	President Bush to President Chiam Herzog (2 pp.)	5/29/91	(b)(1)	
03b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Reply Letter to Chiam Herzog, President of Israel (1 pp.)	5/27/91	(b)(1)	✓
03c. Memo	c. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Draft Reply for President Bush to Chaim Herzog, President of Israel (1 pp.)	5/10/91	(b)(1)	✓
03d. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Draft Reply for President Bush (1 pp.)	4/5/91	(b)(1)	✓
03e. Draft Letter	Re: Department of State Draft Reply (President Bush to President Chaim Herzog) (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
03f. Letter	President Chiam Herzog to President Bush (2 pp.)	3/14/91	(b)(1)	✓
04. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush Re: [Unofficial Translation] (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05a. Letter	President Bush to Winston Churchill (1 pp.)	6/5/91	(b)(1)	
05b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter from Winston Churchill Regarding Kurdish Refugees (1 pp.)	6/3/91	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Subseries: Chronological Files
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File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (April - June 1991) [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1229
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Date Closed: 7/7/2009
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05c. Draft Letter	Re: State Department Draft Reply (President Bush to Winston Churchill) (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05d. Fax	Winston S. Churchill, M.P. to President George Bush (3 pp.)	4/4/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (April - June 1991) [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1229
OA/ID Number: 91147-007
Date Closed: 7/7/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102919
RECEIVED: 19 APR 91 14

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 19 APR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: TURKEY

TELCALL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKER FOR TELCALL W/ PRES OZAL OF TURKEY ON 20 APR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES PER WH STAFF SEC DUE DATE: 23 APR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS

GOMPERT

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/7/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSPMP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

EN Sec's Office has deskette

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 19, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Ozal of Turkey

We have attached a Telephone Call proposal as well as talking points for the President's call to President Ozal this weekend. Ozal will not be available to receive a call from the President from 6-8:00 a.m. on Saturday, April 20 as we had desired.

He will be available anytime after 9:00 a.m. April 20 and after 8:00 a.m. on April 21.

Richard Haass and Nancy Dyke concur. NBD

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call proposal at Tab I and approve the attached talking points for the President.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Talking Points

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 129581998-0099-F/1
1/18/2000 MM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2919

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 19, 1991

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Ozal of Turkey

DATE: April 20-21, 1991

PURPOSE: To review the assistance effort to the Kurdish refugees and other issues in U.S.-Turkish relations.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open line

INTERPRETER: None required

PHONE NUMBER: 90-3184-6558

CONTACT: Nicholas Burns/Adrian Basora

TIME DIFFERENCE: +7

SUGGESTED TIME: After 9:00 a.m. April 20 or after 8:00 a.m. April 21.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: Kurdish refugee situation; U.S.-Turkish relations

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0909-MR
28 6/1/15

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT TURGUT OZAL

KURDISH REFUGEE SITUATION

- Turgut, I wanted to get back to you to review the Kurdish refugee situation and our common effort to resolve the humanitarian crisis on your border.
- First let me say once again how important the cooperation between our two governments is as we deal with an extremely difficult problem.
- As you know, we view our decision to introduce our military forces to assist in construction of new camps in Iraq as the only way to resolve in the short term the terrible suffering of the refugees.
- Our conversations earlier this week were of great help to me in deciding how to proceed.
- Our deployment in Iraq is temporary. We have no interest in dismembering Iraq and will not take sides in the civil war.
- We want the UN to take over administration of the camps as quickly as possibly and would also like an international umbrella for the security arrangements.
- As Ambassador Abramowitz has told you, we are asking many governments from outside the region to consider contributing military contingents to buttress the US/UK/French forces.
- We hope this will hasten an internationalization of the security arrangements.

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1998-0099-F/1
5/19/2010 MM

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~~PER E.O. 13526~~

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~₂

- I still believe that it is best if the Turkish military not participate in this part of our effort.
- But I understand that we are working very closely with your civilian officials in construction of the camps and the supply train. We expect to benefit greatly from your capabilities.

RAFSANJANI VISIT

- You mentioned when we last talked that Rafsanjani will visit Turkey shortly.
- I would be very interested in hearing from you his views of the refugee problem on his border and anything he says on U.S.-Iran relations.

CYPRUS

- Jim Baker saw Mr. Denktash last week as you had requested.
- Our purpose in seeing Denktash was to produce progress.
- Frankly, he did not come with any new ideas to meet our common objective of making real progress on Cyprus.
- Where do you suggest we go from here?

(If Ozal asks how the Administration will react to a House subcommittee action this week that reduced our FY-92 FMS allocation to Turkey:

- I can assure you we want to achieve the full \$625 million in FY-92 FMS.
- We're not particularly troubled by this week's action, which was part of the authorization process, not appropriations.
- We will fight and win when the time comes.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102879
RECEIVED: 18 APR 91 11

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: HUTCHINGS
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 24 APR 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY
IRAQ

TELCALL
REFUGEES

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TELCALL TO CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 25 APR RE KURDISH REFUGEES

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 22 APR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/7/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSPMP

DOC 3 OF 3

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: UEA

LOG # 2879

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG UEA A/O 01

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>HAS COPY</u>	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	<u>Has copy</u>	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>24.4/25</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
_____	_____	_____	<u>Add to File</u>

01 APR 24 07.46

<u>A</u> = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

rephrase me - none - apr 25
National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: JEB LOG # 2879
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PRM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>WBY</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>4/19 AC</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>OBSE/DMR</u>

91 APR 18 P 6. 24

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

[]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2879
Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 24, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT *mg*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Chancellor Kohl, April 25, 1991, 9:15 a.m.

Attached are talking points for the President's use in his telephone conversation with Chancellor Kohl. This will be the promised readout of Kohl's call to Gorbachev regarding a stronger UN role in securing the return of Kurds to their homes in Iraq. The President's points also refer to Kohl's April 24 message on CFE (Tab II) and steel the Chancellor against a possible Soviet nyet to the President's proposal.

FYI: The German side asked that we initiate and make the connection promptly at the agreed time, because during the last call (April 18), Kohl was left cooling his heels on the line for fifteen minutes before the President picked up. Immediately afterwards, I asked Neil and Ralph to review procedures with the Signal operations. You may want to double-track this in the Oval so that this call goes off more smoothly.

Concurrences by: Richard Haass *RH for* Heather Wilson

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached talking points for the President's use in his telephone conversation with Kohl.

Approve *RD*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Kohl's Message on CFE

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2010-0909-MR

28 6/1/15

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL

KURDISH REFUGEES

- The relief effort is going reasonably well, considering the logistical problems and difficult terrain. We have delivered a tremendous amount of food, medicines, and other supplies and now have forces in place to build and protect refugee camps in northern Iraq.
- Germany's assistance to the Kurds in Iran has been of great importance. Your dispatch of helicopters to Iran and Turkey, and your plans to send military forces to the region, are strong demonstrations of German commitment. I am glad this has been a German-American joint effort.
- Germany's financial assistance has been superb. Anything you can do to stimulate more aid from other EC members would be very helpful.
- The Soviets seem to be with us on the relief effort. They have not opposed the introduction of U.S. forces and seem to accept our assurances that they are there temporarily, solely for humanitarian purposes, and that we ^{have} no intention of dismembering Iraq or getting involved in a civil war.
- I am interested to know the outcome of your telephone call to Mikhail Gorbachev on the question of a stronger UN role.

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2010-0909-MR
E8 6/11/15

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CFE

- Thank you for your message on CFE. We are in close agreement.
- We have offered the Soviets a comprehensive and face-saving way to meet their obligations under the Treaty. Much of it was drawn from Gorbachev's own proposal.
- Frankly, I am not sure we will get a positive response, and I am not sure that Gorbachev is as engaged as he will need to be to resolve the issue.
- If the Soviet reply is negative, we need to stick firmly to our position. There is nothing else we can offer, short of permitting the Soviets to renege on their obligation under the Treaty. And we cannot let Gorbachev think that would be acceptable to any of the CFE signatories.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Letter	Re: Letter from Chancellor Dr. Helmut Kohl to the President of the United States (1 pp.)	4/24/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (April - June 1991) [2]

Date Closed:	7/7/2009	OA/ID Number:	91147-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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2879

April 18, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT 

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS 

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl of Germany

In their April 16 telephone conversation, Kohl promised to call Gorbachev and then brief the President on Soviet receptivity to a strengthened UN role in providing security for Kurds returning to their homes in Iraq. Kohl proposes to call the President on April 25 between 10:30 a.m. and 12:00 noon our time.

We have attached a Telephone Call proposal as well as a copy of the President's message to Kohl briefing him on the steps we are taking to provide humanitarian aid and security for the Kurds. We will forward talking points the day before the call.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Message to Kohl

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2010-0909-MR
Eg 6/1/15

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2879

April 19, 1991

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS fw*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl of Germany

DATE: April 25, 1991

PURPOSE: To receive Kohl's debrief on his call to Gorbachev

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line

INTERPRETER: To be supplied by the State Department

PHONE NUMBER: WHCA Head of State circuit -- Bonn

CONTACT: Robert Hutchings

TIME DIFFERENCE: +6

SUGGESTED TIME: 10:30 a.m.-12:00 noon, April 25, 1991

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: Kurdish refugees; Kohl's telephone conversation with Gorbachev regarding a strengthened UN role in providing security for Kurds in Iraq.

Attachment

Tab A Your Message to Kohl on the Kurdish Situation

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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2010-0909-MR
Eg 6/11/15

<DIST>PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: BURNS FILE HAASS PRES_MSGS SIT SUM VAX BRANSCUM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUEHC<DTG> 170254Z APR 91
<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC
<TO>TO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 2940
INFO RUFHBG/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 9130

<SUBJ> MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHANCELLOR KOHL

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 124485 TOSEC 050001

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, GE

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHANCELLOR KOHL

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHANCELLOR KOHL IMMEDIATELY.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR HELMUT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR CALL TODAY. I WAS GLAD TO KNOW THAT GERMANY IS MOVING SO QUICKLY AND GENEROUSLY TO HELP THE KURDISH REFUGEES IN IRAN, ABOVE AND BEYOND THE ASSISTANCE YOU HAVE ALREADY GIVEN ON YOUR OWN AND WITHIN THE EC. AS I SAID I WOULD DO, LET ME OUTLINE BRIEFLY WHAT WE HAVE DONE TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FOR THE KURDS, AS WELL AS SOME IDEAS FOR ASSURING THE SAFETY OF KURDS RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES IN IRAQ.

OUR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATION FOR THE KURDS IN SOUTHERN TURKEY AND NORTHERN IRAQ IS GAINING STEAM EVERY DAY. SINCE THE OPERATION WE CALL PROVIDE COMFORT BEGAN ON APRIL 7, FIXED WING AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS OF THE US, UK, AND FRANCE HAVE DELIVERED 1348 TONS OF RELIEF SUPPLIES TO IRAQI REFUGEES. THIS INCLUDES FOOD, WATER, BLANKETS, TENTS, AND CLOTHING. MEDICINE IS THE NEXT ITEM ON THE FAST TRACK FOR THIS LARGEST RELIEF EFFORT SINCE THE BERLIN AIRLIFT. YOUR ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN ENORMOUSLY IMPORTANT.

OUR ORIGINAL CONCEPT WAS A LIMITED EMERGENCY AIR EFFORT FOR ABOUT TWO WEEKS UNTIL THE UNITED NATIONS COULD ESTABLISH GROUND OPERATIONS TO SUSTAIN THE REFUGEES. HOWEVER, WITH THE CHALLENGE OF RELIEF FOR OVER 700,000 DESPERATE REFUGEES, WE EXPANDED THE AIR OPERATION AND TOOK ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY GROUND LOGISTICS FOR ALL OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCES AND ORGANIZATIONS. THIS INFRASTRUCTURE WILL BE TURNED OVER TO THE UN. WE OFFERED TO CARE FOR THE REFUGEES FOR 30 DAYS, AND WE HAVE ONE SHIP IN A NEARBY HARBOR AND FIVE MORE ENROUTE, ALL LADEN WITH BULK FOOD, PLUS NUMEROUS C-5 AND OTHER CARGO AIRCRAFT BRINGING SUPPLIES DAILY INTO TURKEY FOR AIR AND GROUND DELIVERY.

AS YOU SAID IN OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TRAGEDY IS MULTIPLIED BY THE FEAR THESE REFUGEES STILL FEEL FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS FORCES. THIS FEAR KEEPS TENS OF THOUSANDS OF THE KURDS UP IN THE MOUNTAINS, WHERE RELIEF CANNOT EASILY REACH. MANY ARE DYING. THEY MUST COME DOWN TO FLATTER LAND FOR US TO HELP THEM EFFECTIVELY. JOHN MAJOR, FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, AND I HAVE DEVELOPED A PLAN IN CONSULTATION WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT PROVIDES AN INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION. US MILITARY FORCES IMMEDIATELY WILL BUILD SEVERAL TEMPORARY ENCAMPMENTS IN NORTHERN IRAQ AREAS WHERE REFUGEES WOULD RECEIVE CARE AND RELIEF SUPPLIES ON AN ORDERLY BASIS. THESE HUMANITARIAN CENTERS WILL BE PROTECTED BY MILITARY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0909-MR
E8 6/1/15

THIS HUMANITARIAN EFFORT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 688. AS I SAID IN MY PUBLIC STATEMENT, WE WOULD HOPE TO TRANSFER RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADMINISTERING AND PROTECTING THESE CENTERS TO THE UN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE FOR THESE PEOPLE, AND WE ARE MOVING. ANY ASSISTANCE YOU CAN LEND THIS EFFORT WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATED.

OUR EVENTUAL GOAL IS FOR THE IRAQI REFUGEES TO RETURN HOME TO LIVE IN PEACE, WITHOUT FEAR OF REPRESSION AND DEATH. FRANCOIS' IDEA ABOUT HUMANITARIAN WAY STATIONS TO HELP THE KURDS ALONG A PATH BACK TO THEIR HOMES IS A GOOD ONE. WE WILL NEED TO STAY IN TOUCH ON IT AND ON IDEAS FOR HEIGHTENING UN INVOLVEMENT. I WILL BE INTERESTED TO LEARN THE RESULTS OF YOUR TELEPHONE CALL TO MIKHAIL GORBACHEV.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT. KIMMITT

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 4485<STOR> 910417111708 MSG000293195827
<TOR>910417112955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102320
RECEIVED: 29 MAR 91 11

TO: HERZOG, CHAIM

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 29 MAY 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL
MIDDLE EAST

HS

PERSONS: HERZOG, CHAIM

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PRES HERZOG OF ISRAEL RE MIDDLE EAST ISSUES

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 02 APR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF: 9102273 9102274

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAASS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/7/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY MEM DATE 5/30 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 6 OF 6

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2320
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG VEA A/O _____

W62

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>6</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
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West Wing Desk	<u>7</u>	<u>5/30 AC</u>	<u>D/LPX</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>8</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
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91 MAY 29 10:37

A = Action	<u>I</u> = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP _____ Sununu _____ Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Date: 5/29/91 ?

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 29, 1991

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciate your letter of March 14 and welcome your views on the tasks that lie before us in the Middle East following the eviction of Iraq from Kuwait. We did not seek war against Iraq, but when it was forced upon us, we moved with determination and in concert with the international community. Working again with our friends and allies and through the United Nations, we now want to ensure that Iraq does not in the future resort to attacks against its neighbors, whether Israel, Arab states, or others.

I want to reiterate my admiration for the wise policy of restraint pursued by the Government of Israel in this crisis, with the strong backing of the Israeli people. The United States is determined to support Israel's security, and we remain fully committed to that. Israel's restraint, despite unprovoked Iraqi attacks, frustrated Saddam Hussein's attempts to widen the war and helped bring it to a speedy end.

You are right that the issues facing us now in the region are complex. We cannot afford any illusions about the difficulties; nor can we be mesmerized by them. That is why I recently dispatched Secretary Baker to explore with leaders of the Middle East four key challenges: shared security arrangements; control of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems; a comprehensive peace which resolves the Arab-Israeli struggle and provides security for Israel and legitimate Palestinian political rights; and economic development across the region. The results of his trips are encouraging. My optimism, however, is tempered

by knowing that a durable peace process cannot be accomplished quickly and will require compromises from all. I am determined to spare no effort in facing the challenges ahead.

Fortunately, there seems to be broad agreement among regional leaders that we have before us a unique opportunity for progress. We must build upon that broad agreement and bridge differences which in the past have been irreconcilable. Good will--and the determination to take advantage of this opportunity--are essential so that the twin goals of peace and security can finally be achieved.

Finally, I appreciate your message of welcome to Israel. A return visit is something I look forward to with anticipation.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Ezer Weizman', written in a cursive style.

His Excellency
Chaim Herzog
President of Israel

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
5/27/91
2320

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

91 MAY 28 AM 7:24

May 27, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*
SUBJECT: Reply Letter to Chaim Herzog, President of Israel

Purpose

To respond to President Herzog, thanking him for his letter and expressions of gratitude.

Background

President Herzog wrote to you (Tab B) commending your defense of the free world and ongoing efforts to establish peace and security in the entire Middle East. He agrees with your course of action to secure peace, but considers Islamic fundamentalism a greater threat to Middle East security than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jim Baker consulted with President Herzog in early April.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter of reply to President Herzog at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Chaim Herzog, President of Israel
Tab B Letter from Chaim Herzog, President of Israel

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0910-MR
MM 11/16/2015

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Declassify on: OADR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2320

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 10, 1991

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH 

SUBJECT: Draft Reply for President Bush to Chaim Herzog,
President of Israel

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President that forwards a revised State Department draft (Tab A) to a letter (Tab B) from the President of Israel, Chaim Herzog. The reply thanks President Herzog for his letter and points out that Jim Baker's missions are an effort to take advantage of the current opportunity to make progress in the Middle East peace process.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to the President
Tab A	Revised State draft reply
Tab B	Letter from Chaim Herzog, President of Israel

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2010-0910-MR
MM 11/16/2015

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Declassify on: OADR

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9105506

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 28, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

SUBJECT: Alerting NSCS on Presidential
Correspondence

Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Bush from Israeli President Chaim Herzog which is transmitted for your information.

This correspondence was received in the Information Resources Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on March 28, 1991. A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.

C. Holmes

Director, S/S-IRM
Information Resources Management Section
Executive Secretariat
647-2991



April 5, 1991

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MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Reply for President Bush

Attached is a draft reply for President Bush in response to a letter from the President of Israel, Chaim Herzog. President Herzog discusses his views on the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Fundamentalism.

J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- TAB 1: Proposed Response.
- TAB 2: Incoming Letter.

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2010-0910-MR
MM 11/16/2015

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DRAFT REPLY

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciate your letter of March 14 and welcome your views on the tasks which lie before us in the Middle East following the eviction of Iraq from Kuwait. We did not seek war against Iraq, but when it was forced upon us, we moved with determination and in concert with the international community. Working again with our friends and allies and through the United Nations, we now want to ensure that Iraq does not in the future resort to attacks against its neighbors, whether Israel, Arab states, or others.

I want to reiterate my admiration for the wise policy of restraint pursued by the Government of Israel in this crisis, with the strong backing of the Israeli people. The United States is determined to support Israel's security, and we remain fully committed to that. Israel's restraint, despite unprovoked Iraqi attacks, frustrated Saddam Hussein's attempts to widen the war and helped bring it to a speedy end.

His Excellency

Chaim Herzog,

President of Israel.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0108-MR
7/5/2013 MM

You are right that the issues facing us now in the region are complex. We can neither afford any illusions about the difficulties, nor be mesmerized by them. Thus I asked Secretary Baker to explore with leaders in the Middle East four key challenges: shared security arrangements; control of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems; a comprehensive peace which resolves the Arab-Israeli struggle and provides security for Israel and legitimate Palestinian political rights; and economic development across the region. Our post-war diplomatic contacts are in their initial stage, but I am determined that the United States will spare no effort in facing the challenges ahead.

Fortunately, there seems to be broad agreement among regional leaders that we have a unique opportunity for progress. We must build upon that broad agreement and bridge differences which in the past have been irreconcilable. Good will -- and the determination to take advantage of this opportunity -- are essential so that the twin goals of peace and security can finally be achieved.

Finally, I appreciate your message of welcome to Israel. A return visit is something I look forward to with anticipation.

With Best Wishes,

Sincerely,

George Bush

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



מדינת ישראל

دولة اسرائيل

STATE OF ISRAEL

رئيس الدولة

THE PRESIDENT

9105506

'91 MAR-28 3:23 PM

הנשיא

Jerusalem, 14th March, 1991
160/LL

The Honorable
George Bush
President
of the United States of America
The White House
Washington D.C.
U. S. A.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0108-MR
7/5/2013 MM

Dear Mr. President,

I took the occasion of Secretary Baker's visit to publicly acknowledge your historic role as leader of the free world, in the struggle to overcome the forces of evil in the Middle East, which constituted a grave danger to the countries of this area and, indeed, to the world in general.

You will go down in history for your firmness and steadfastness, for the historic decisions which you made, for the organization of the coalition and the outstanding execution of the mission to free Kuwait. I trust that the new winds now blowing will combine to overcome the atmosphere of fear and prejudice which has characterized much of the Middle East.

Secretary Baker's visit to the area and to Israel was of particular importance.

There are many issues to be faced because the complexity of the problems in the area is far greater than is generally appreciated. Given goodwill on the part of the Arab states, or part of them, I believe that a new atmosphere can be created, which will serve to inspire a feeling of confidence in the population of Israel. After all, people tend to forget that we alone in the area are a democracy, where public opinion, polls, and the views of an independent media count.

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I believe that the parallel approach to the Arab states, on the one hand, and to the Palestinians, on the other hand, has the best chance of success because if they show goodwill, it should be possible to develop a far better atmosphere with some of the Arab states.

The Palestinian issue must be tackled too, although it is far more complicated. A high percentage of the Palestinians in the territories administered by Israel now support Hamas, an extreme Islamic Fundamentalist organization which is not prepared to compromise. There is, in fact, a civil war going on among the Palestinians, with the number of Palestinians killed per month by other Palestinians averaging between 60%-80% per month, of all Palestinian casualties. But with the Palestinians too we must look for a period of confidence-building measures and a way to allow a moderate leadership, which does not live under the shadow of the gunman, to emerge.

However, Mr. President, the main problem facing the Middle East today is not our issue, however important it is. The main issue is the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism which is threatening every single regime in the Middle East today and which constitutes a major danger not only in our area, but in the Moslem Republics in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. After all, the Israeli-Arab conflict had nothing to do with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with the Iran-Iraq war, with the fall of the Shah and the rise of Khomeini and with the tragic developments in Lebanon since 1975.

Again, please accept on my behalf and on behalf of the people of Israel, our deep and sincere admiration and gratitude for your leadership and for all that you have done to eliminate a great danger and to defend the free world.

We were delighted to hear that you might be visiting us and I look forward, together with the people of Israel, to welcoming you in our midst.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Chaim Herzog". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush Re: [Unofficial Translation] (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (April - June 1991) [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 12/5/2013

Date Closed:	7/7/2009	OA/ID Number:	91147-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	1999-0304-F/1(106)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	3/3/2010	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.


PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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3133



Unofficial translation

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

Dear George,

I have received your letter of April 17 concerning measures to help the Iraqi refugees. These are extraordinarily busy days for me. This week will be marked, I think, by extremely important decisions that will make it possible to get on the path of stabilization and a steadier movement toward a new economy. For all that, and taking into account the importance of the problem that you raised, I decided to reply in writing.

We in the Soviet Union, too, are alarmed by the terrible situation in which the Kurds in northern Iraq have found themselves, feel sympathy for them, and anger toward the regime which is behaving with such cruelty. Elementary humanness requires that one help people in such plight, stop the dying, and alleviate their suffering.

I understand that it was the extreme severity of the situation that necessitated such an unusual step as dispatching US and some other countries' troops to the border areas of Iraq to set up temporary relief and protection camps.

At the same time it cannot be denied that the fact of the introduction of foreign troop contingents into the territory of another state without that state's request or consent, even with such a humane goal, can be perceived as a threat to its territorial integrity. In that sense resolution 688 of the UN Security Council does not change the meaning of the precedent. Some of the actions, like the demand that the Iraqi troops be pulled out of the towns in the border areas, point to a broad interpretation of that resolution itself.

His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
President of the United States
of America
Washington, D.C.

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PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
1999-0304-F/1
3/3/2010 MM

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I do trust the clarifications concerning the character of the operation that was undertaken, its objectives and the limited nature of the goals pursued, as well as the commitment to move the operation under the UN control as soon as possible. But within some quarters of our public and the Parliament there are doubts and suspicions. I cannot but reckon with this. And, generally, from every standpoint, including from the standpoint of the prospects and terms of the Middle East settlement, it is desirable to withdraw foreign troops from Iraq's northern areas as quickly as possible and to entrust the whole matter to UN representatives.

There is also such a delicate aspect as the revival of hopes for creating a Kurdish state, which I think has not escaped your attention. Yet this can only take place at the expense of the territories of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. It is not hard to imagine what kind of a new crisis can be generated by this demand, if it were to be pursued. Therefore, it seems to me that it is essential to maintain confidence in the world community that the US and its allies draw a clear distinction between humanitarian assistance to the refugees and whatever political goals.

In our contacts with the Iraqi leadership we are trying to convince it that the operation conducted by the US, Britain, and France has a purely humanitarian and time-limited nature. We have been assured that Iraq will not oppose this operation. The Iraqi troops have been instructed to exercise restraint and not to engage in provocative actions. It is extremely important that the foreign troops dispatched to help the refugees, be issued relevant strict instructions as well.

Dear George, I wish to take this opportunity to share with you my impressions from the recent visit to Japan and South Korea.

The visit was necessary. In a situation of profound changes in the world the frozenness of Soviet-Japanese relations stood out as a clear anachronism. I understood that I would not be able to satisfy the hopes of the Japanese, but it was my

~~SECRET~~

expectation that an open and frank dialogue with Mr. Kaifu, a "meeting with Japan" would make it possible to deepen mutual understanding and get the talks on the most painful issue closer to the present-day realities. Our conversation was not easy, but, on the whole, a substantive, frank, and friendly one.

As a result, we adopted a fundamentally important document, a joint statement, and concluded fifteen bilateral agreements on economic and other matters.

The peace treaty problem, including territorial delineation, took particularly much time and effort. As a result, the almost twelve hour-long intense work and eight negotiating sessions produced a formula which now makes it possible to search more confidently for a solution to the problem on the basis of the balance of interests and taking into account the existing realities, but, most importantly, creating a totally new nature of relations among states and peoples - through a many-sided and mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields.

I am satisfied with the results. I believe they meet the interests of both the Soviet Union and Japan without prejudicing their relations with third countries, and have laid a solid groundwork for moving Soviet-Japanese relations onto the track of complete normalization.

The meeting with President Roh Tae Woo was short, but very substantive and productive. As you recall, we had first met in San Francisco - not without your good offices. This follow-on saw fast progress. I greatly appreciate President Roh's courage and foresight. He did not wait to see what the outcome of perestroika was going to be, but, rather, aware of the international implications of its success or failure for his country as well, began to act.

The talks on the island made it possible to deepen mutual understanding concerning the Korean problem including South Korea's admission to the United Nations.

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(b) (1)

We also reiterated our position regarding the DPRK's nuclear facilities, our insistence before its leadership that they be placed under the IAEA control. Roh Tae Woo came out in favor of deepening their dialogue with the DPRK and searching for ways of peaceful unification, but without haste and bearing in mind, by analogy, some experience. We, for our part, advocated reducing tensions, preventing nuclear confrontation on the peninsula, and achieving a peaceful unification of Korea. This is in our interests and in the interests of all. Roh Tae Woo was understanding of our relations with the DPRK.

I wish you all the best,

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102553
RECEIVED: 08 APR 91 13

CHRON FILE

TO: CHURCHILL, WINSTON

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 07 JUN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
SAUDI ARABIA
PERSIAN GULF

IRAQ
KUWAIT
REFUGEES

PERSONS: CHURCHILL, W

SUBJECT: LTR TO CHURCHILL FM PRES RE KURDISH REFUGEES

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH DUE DATE: 11 APR 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
HUTCHINGS
~~NSC-CHRON~~

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY JS DATE 6/7 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 5 OF 5

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UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9102553

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 STATE
002 HUTCHINGS
003 SCOWCROFT
004 PRESIDENT
005
005 STATE

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91040813 FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY
Z 91051012 PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
Z 91053020 FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
Z 91060313 FOR SIGNATURE
X 91060720 PRES SGD LTR
X 91060720 FOR DISPATCH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102553
RECEIVED: 08 APR 91 13

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 09 MAY 91
SOURCE REF: 9106148

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
SAUDI ARABIA
PERSIAN GULF

IRAQ
KUWAIT
REFUGEES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DRAFT REPLY TO CHURCHILL LTR TO PRES RE CONCERN FOR KURDISH REFUGEES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 11 APR 91 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HUTCHINGS

FOR CONCURRENCE
CHARLES
DYKE
HAASS

FOR INFO
GOMPERT

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY:

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 2553

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

[Signature] Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
NSC Secretariat

SEQUENCE TO

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DISPOSITION

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<u>3</u>	<u>JB 6/2</u>	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

☒ A = Action
 ☐ I = Information
 ☐ D = Dispatch
 ☐ R = Retain
 ☐ N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Date 6/5/91 ?

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Letter from UK Parliament, Winston Churchill

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: JB

LOG # 2553

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SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 124 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>W</u> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>N</u>	
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>6/3 AC</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat			

91 MAY 30 P 8:18

APNSA Has Seen

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 2553

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>6/7 AC</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
<u>HUTCHINGS</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>RFA</u>

91 JUN 7 AIO. 09

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Redo Pres Green. Return
all originals to West Wing
Desk.*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT



THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES 1

FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN 202-456-2585 WHITE HOUSE
(Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION LTR FM PRESIDENT TO CHURCHILL REGARDING
KURDISH REFUGEES LOG # 2553

<u>TO</u> (Agency)	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>PEARSON, W</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	
_____	_____	_____	_____
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REMARKS ***FOR IMMEDIATE CABLE / ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW***

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/7/09

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9102553
DATE 07 JUN 91

SUBJECT: LTR TO CHURCHILL FM PRES RE KURDISH REFUGEES
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

PEARSON, W
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

COPY: 1

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9102553

REFERRAL

DATE: 07 JUN 91

MEMORANDUM FOR: PEARSON, W

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: CHURCHILL, WINSTON

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 07 JUN 91


SUBJ: LTR TO CHURCHILL FM PRES RE KURDISH REFUGEES

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 08 JUN 91

COMMENT:

FOR


GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/7/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 5, 1991

Dear Mr. Churchill:

Thank you for your letter, and my apologies for the delay in responding. I share your deep concern with the plight of the Kurdish and other Iraqi civilians who have fled to their borders and to neighboring countries in the wake of Saddam Hussein's brutality. You are aware of the steps taken by our governments and others to provide assistance to these refugees and displaced persons.

Our primary objective is to provide life-sustaining assistance to the refugees and displaced persons until the United Nations is prepared to take over the relief operation. The longer-term objective is to have the refugees and displaced persons return home voluntarily when conditions permit a safe return, so they may live in peace, free from repression. Today the refugees have left Turkey for the camps, way stations, or their own homes in Iraq. We intend to continue to help those in the camps until the UN can take over this life-saving effort.

Your ongoing efforts, and those of your countrymen, for the Kurdish refugees are very much appreciated. Best wishes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "G" and a stylized "Bush".

The Honorable Winston Churchill
Member of Parliament of the
United Kingdom

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
5/5/91

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2553

91 JUN -3 AM 10:26

June 3, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*
SUBJECT: Letter from Winston Churchill Regarding Kurdish
Refugees

Purpose

To respond to a letter from British MP Winston Churchill.

Background

Churchill wrote urging that you take measures to aid the Kurdish refugees and congratulating you on your leadership during Operation Desert Storm. Your reply updates measures we are taking, together with HMG.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Churchill at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab A Reply to Winston Churchill
Tab B Incoming

~~From the desk of~~

~~George Bush~~

Phil per POTUS

INCOMING 4/4

*Is the response
still relevant?
Pls. Check. r.?*

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2553

May 30, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH; DAVID C. GOMPERT 

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS 

SUBJECT: Letter from UK Member of Parliament
Winston Churchill

Attached is a memorandum to the President forwarding for his signature a reply to a letter from Winston Churchill concerning U.S. assistance to the Kurdish refugees.

Concurrence by: Nancy Bearg Dyke, Richard Haass

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Reply to Winston Churchill
Tab B Incoming



9106148
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

May 9, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter from Winston Churchill on Kurdish Refugees

Attached for signature by the President is a draft reply to a letter from Winston Churchill, Member of Parliament of the United Kingdom, regarding his concern that swift action is needed to help the Kurdish civilians.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Draft Reply

UNCLASSIFIED

STATE DEPARTMENT DRAFT
REPLY

Dear Mr. Churchill:

I share your deep concern with the plight of the Kurdish and other Iraqi civilians who have fled to ^{then borders and to} neighboring countries in the wake of Saddam Hussein's brutality. The U.S. government, ^{along with your government and others,} has been actively involved in moving as quickly as possible to provide assistance to these refugees and displaced persons. [and in working with the governments and organizations involved.]

Our primary objective is to provide life-sustaining assistance to the refugees and displaced persons [for 30-40 days or at least] until the United Nations has geared up to take over the relief operation. The ^{longer-} ~~long~~-term objective is to have the refugees and displaced persons return home voluntarily when conditions permit a safe return.

Operation Provide Comfort, the relief effort mounted for the Iraqis in Turkey and ~~massed~~ at the Turkish-Iraqi border, is the largest U.S. relief effort mounted in modern military history. ^{From an initial airdrop} ~~We are planning for a relief effort that will provide~~ ^{providing}

medical care, shelter, and food for the refugees, ^{Operation Provide Comfort has grown into} ~~an emergency~~ ^{emergency} a massive ~~of~~ program to bring the people down ^{from the mountains where} ~~But despite these efforts, hunger, malnutrition, disease and exposure are taking their grim toll. It is for this reason that~~ I announced on April 16 ^{this} a greatly expanded and more

The Honorable
Winston Churchill,
Member of Parliament
of the United Kingdom.

^{hunger, malnutrition, disease, + exposure were continuing to take a toll.}

ambitious relief effort, after consultations with Prime Minister Major, President Mitterand, President Ozal, and Secretary General Perez de Cuellar.

Consistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution 688, and working closely with the United Nations and other international relief organizations and our European partners, I directed the U.S. military to begin immediately to establish several encampments in northern Iraq, where relief supplies for these refugees ^{would} ~~will~~ be made available in large quantities and distributed in an orderly way.

~~I can well appreciate that many Kurds have good reason to fear for their safety if they return to Iraq, however, adequate~~
~~Security will be~~ ^{is being} provided at these temporary sites by U.S.,

British and French ground forces, again consistent with Resolution 688.

Today the majority of the refugees have come ^{down} to the camps or way stations or to their own homes. We continue
Our long-term objective remains the same: for Iraqi Kurds and for all Iraqi refugees to be able to return home and to live in peace, and free from repression. We are urging the United Nations to assume leadership in this area by establishing a presence in areas of Iraq from which the refugees fled, particularly in the north. We view the allied military presence as a temporary expedient to save lives, an

to help these in the ~~lands~~ mountain camps until the UN can take over this life-saving effort.

operation in which the British and American forces have distinguished themselves.

Your efforts, and those of your countrymen, for the Kurdish refugees are well appreciated.

Sincerely,

George Bush

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

REFERRAL

9/06/148
ID 9102553

DATE: 08 APR 91

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: CHURCHILL, WINSTON S

DATE: 04 APR 91

SUBJ: URGENT ACTION ON KURDISH REFUGEES

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 11 APR 91

COMMENT:

FOR

G. J. Mugridge
GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

*Received in SF-184/KW
4/8 at 2:44 PM (C75)*

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS

LONDON SW1A 0AA

01 - 219 3405

Date: 4 April 1991**Time: 1245 EST****FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION****TO: President George Bush
President of the United States****FAX NO: 202-456-2883****FROM: Winston S. Churchill, M.P.****Until 6 April in USA****Fax No: 208-622-2030****Tel No: 208-622-4111 Ext. 3154****After 7 April in UK****Fax No: 0959-62897****Tel No: 0959-62222****THERE FOLLOWS A 2 PAGE FAX TRANSMISSION**

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS

LONDON SW1A 0AA

071-219 3405

Personal and Urgent

Via Fax

4 April 1991

President George Bush
Office of the President
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President,

Urgent Action on Kurdish Refugees

I know you will be deeply concerned at reports that up to 3 million Kurdish civilians, who have fled or been driven from their homes by advancing Iraqi forces, are being denied entry into both Turkey and Iran. They are stranded in the mountains of Northern Iraq in sub-zero temperatures without shelter and with little food. Among them are many elderly and infirm, large numbers of small children and women in childbirth. Their plight is desperate.

I trust you will be able to take swift and decisive action to prevent a terrible human tragedy and would ask you to intervene to ensure:

1. The Turkish and Iranian Governments open their borders without delay to Kurdish refugees.
2. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees takes prompt action for their reception in both those countries.
3. All necessary emergency aid and finance is guaranteed by Coalition Governments to the UNHCR.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P.

226689



HOUSE OF COMMONS

LONDON SW1A 0AA

01 - 219 3405

2

As you may be aware it was my Grandfather, Winston Churchill who, as Colonial Secretary at the time of the Cairo Conference of 1921, was responsible for the creation of Iraq and placing Emir Feisal on the throne. It was also his wish to see an independent Kurdistan established but, against his better judgement, he allowed himself to be persuaded otherwise by the Colonial Office's Middle East expert of the day.

The consequences of that decision have been grievous for the Kurdish people, who have suffered more than any other in the region as a result. They have been persecuted to a degree by Turkey, seriously by Iran and monstrosly by Iraq. If any nation deserves a homeland of their own, it is the Kurds. The fact that they are perhaps the only such people not to have resorted to terrorism or violence to draw attention to their cause should definitely be held to account in their favor.

I hope that even now, seventy years on, it may not be too late to remedy a grave injustice and that, at least, we can assist a brave and tragic people in their hour of need, caused in part as a consequence of our own actions in Operation Desert Storm.

May I take this opportunity of offering you my warmest personal congratulations on your decisive leadership which led to the victorious outcome of Operation Desert Storm.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Winston S. Churchill

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 13, 1991

CHRON FILE

al
Dear Senator Gore:

Thank you for your letter to the President of April 3, 1991 about the situation inside Iraq, and for your kind words on the UN ceasefire resolution. We share your concern about the Iraqi government's brutal use of force against its political opponents, particularly the Kurdish and other innocent civilians.

Our decision to shoot down Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft was taken as a military precaution to protect coalition forces operating inside Iraq. Shooting down Iraqi helicopters might have marginally impeded Iraqi government operations to quash the rebellion, but would not have changed the ultimate outcome. Further military intervention by the coalition to support Iraq's political opposition risked embroiling us either in a protracted civil war or in long-term political administration of Iraq until a successor government could be chosen. This clearly was never an objective of the coalition. We do agree, however, that the Iraqi people would be better off under new leadership, and that this can best be achieved by keeping the pressure on the Iraqi government through the stringent imposition of sanctions.

The international relief effort assembled under the mandate of UNSC resolution 688 has successfully attended to the humanitarian and security needs of nearly 500,000 Kurds who fled Iraqi brutality. Operation Provide Comfort, the largest U.S. relief effort mounted in modern military history, has included a commitment of over \$200 million for these refugees and the deployment of nearly 12,000 U.S. military personnel to carry out the operation in conjunction with our coalition partners. The success of a major objective of this operation was realized this month when the last refugee camp in Turkey was vacated as the refugees voluntarily returned home.

These relief operations will soon be turned over to the United Nations and other international relief organizations who will assure the continued delivery of assistance to and the security of the Kurds who have now returned home from Turkey. The Administration will continue to provide material assistance through the UN. To deter Iraqi military action against these operations following coalition troop withdrawals, we intend to convey a strong warning to Iraq about the consequences of

interfering in these operations and violating the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding concluded in April by the Iraqi government and the UN Secretary General's Executive Delegate.

Thank you again for writing on this matter of mutual concern.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Brent", with a stylized flourish extending from the end.

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2878

Redo

April 25, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: ~~SANDRA~~ SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Gore on Iraq

SECRET

Attached at Tab I is a response to Senator Gore's letter to the President on the situation inside Iraq (Tab II).

Ginny Lampl  concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Gore at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Response to Senator Gore
Tab II Letter from Senator Gore

Enclosure

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 3, 1991

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Let me begin by congratulating you on the terms of the U.N. cease-fire resolution. It's tough and it represents a precedent of historical proportions for the United Nations and for the idea of collective security. Having said this, however, I want to urge you to change the course of American policy for dealing with the insurrection and its aftermath in Iraq. Our policy in the Gulf should not be mortgaged to the success of tyranny in Iraq, but we are coming painfully close to that position. Of course, if I thought there were no alternative but to become deeply engaged in Iraq's internal struggle and to protract our military stay in the region, I would support your approach. In my opinion, however, there are certain things we should do not only because they are right, but especially because they are also feasible.

Specifically:


1. We should enforce the cease-fire strictly. Permission to fly Iraqi helicopters was not granted for the purpose of suppressing a rebellion: it was granted explicitly for administrative necessity. Now that we understand Iraq's real intent, we should stop this abuse. Many lives can still be saved if Iraq is forbidden to use these powerful weapons against people completely unable to defend themselves.

2. We should support the French effort to focus the Security Council on the plight of Iraq's Kurdish and Shi'ite population, and we should also mobilize support to provide aid to refugees. I hope and trust also that the coalition already recognizes a responsibility not to forcibly repatriate any refugees who have fled into the portion of Iraq we now control.

3. In the longer term, we should be using such leverage as we have to advance the day not just when Saddam Hussein is out of power, but when there exists in Iraq a government that grants reasonable consideration to all its peoples and which no longer rules by terror. Until that time, I would hope it would be your explicit policy to inform Iraq that the US will be adamant about imposing sanctions in a very severe manner.

I believe that the approach outlined above would not impede our planned drawdown of forces in the region. On the contrary, it might well be part of the insurance that we want against ever having to bring them back again. Above all, it would keep our policy and our principles in alignment. You asked the country to accept that Iraq's conquest of Kuwait was not just an intra-Arab affair but a matter of global consequence. Saddam Hussein's external behavior is of a piece with the internal character of his regime. As you would not have the world repeat the mistake that was made at Munich, I ask you to change your policy so that we do not replicate other situations in which Great Powers ignored the fate of peoples who rose up for their freedom, especially at a juncture when we have immense leverage to influence the outcome.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Al Gore", written over the printed name.

Albert Gore, Jr.
United States Senator