

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91147
Folder ID Number: 91147-002

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [5]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	48	6	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Letter	President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to President Bush Re: [Non-Official Translation] (2 pp.)	1/31/91	(b)(1)	
02a. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Prime Minister Major from President Bush (1 pp.)	2/16/91	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Reply to Message from Prime Minister Major on Burdensharing (2 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	S
02c. Draft Message	President Bush to Prime Minister Major Re: Message for Prime Minister Major from President Bush (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02d. Cable	Re: Message to the President from the Prime Minister [311330Z Jan 91] (2 pp.)	1/31/91	(b)(1)	C
03a. Letter	President Bush to President Felipe Gonzalez (2 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	
03b. Letter	President Felipe Gonzalez Marquez to President Bush Re: [English] (3 pp.)	2/14/91	(b)(1)	
03c. Letter	President Felipe Gonzalez Marquez to President Bush Re: [Spanish] (4 pp.)	2/14/91	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files

Subseries: Chronological Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [5]

Pinksheet Number: cap1224

OA/ID Number: 91147-002

Date Closed: 7/2/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03d. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Reply to Letter from Spanish President Gonzalez on Bombing of Bunker in Baghdad (2 pp.)	2/18/91	(b)(1)	S
03e. Memo	Philip Zelikow/Adrian Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: Reply to Letter from Spanish President Gonzalez on the Bombing of the Bunker in Baghdad (1 pp.)	2/15/91	(b)(1)	S
04a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04b. Cable	Re: Letter from the King to the President [171300Z Feb 91] [FOIA restricitions redacted] (2 pp.)	2/17/91	(b)(1)	S
04c. Letter	Chancellor Kohl to President Bush Re: Annexe (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05. Cable	Re: Letter from the King to the President [171300Z Feb 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	2/17/91	(b)(1)	S
06. Memo	From Wendy Chamberlin to Brent Scowcroft, Re: The Terrorist War: Are We Winning? [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	2/22/91	(b)(1)	S
07a. Telcon	Re: Telcon with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey on February 19, 1991 (3 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S
07b. Memo	Nicholas Burns to William F. Sittmann Re: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (1 pp.)	2/22/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 4

Collection:	
Record Group:	Bush Presidential Records
Office:	Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:	Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:	Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:	
File Location:	Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [5]
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08a. Memo	R. Rand Beers to Brent Scowcroft Re: Post-Gulf War Counterterrorism Policy (2 pp.)	2/26/91	(b)(1)	S
08b. Memo	Robert M. Kimmitt to Distribution List Re: Post-Gulf War Counter-Terrorism Objectives (1 pp.)	2/14/91	(b)(1)	S
08c. Report	Re: Counter-Terrorism (CT) Objectives for the Post-Conflict Situation (2 pp.)	2/12/90	(b)(1)	S
09a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with Volker Ruehe, General Secretary, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) of Germany, February 27, 1991 (2 pp.)	2/26/91	(b)(1)	S
09b. Memo	David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft Re: Cracks in the European Pillar (3 pp.)	2/25/91	(b)(1)	S
10a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Douglas Hurd, UK Foreign Secretary (1 pp.)	2/27/91	(b)(1)	S
10b. Outline	Re: Meeting with Douglas Hurd, UK Foreign Secretary (2 pp.)	2/27/91	(b)(1)	S
10c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with UK Foreign Secretary Hurd (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10d. List	Re: Participants (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
10e. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	1/24/91	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:	
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WHORM Cat.:	
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Pinksheet Number:	cap1224
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Date Closed:	7/2/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:	2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10f. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd on Wednesday, February 27, at 1:30 pm (1 pp.)	2/26/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 4 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [5]

Pinksheet Number: cap1224
OA/ID Number: 91147-002
Date Closed: 7/2/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100882
RECEIVED: 04 FEB 91 20

TO: SITTMANN

CHRON FILE

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 15 FEB 91
SOURCE REF: 9102130

KEYWORDS: TUNISIA
IRAQ

HS
KUWAIT

PERSONS: BEN ALI, ZINE

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PRES BEN ALI RE SUPPORT FOR MAGHREBI INITIATIVE TO
END GULF WAR

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

DUE DATE: 07 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF: 9100836 9100854

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

030
CARON FILE

TRANSMITTAL FORM

9102130

S/S

Date February 15, 1991

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Bush
From: Tunisian President Ben Ali
Date: January 31, 1991
Subject: Letter Requesting Support for Maghrebi Initiative
to End Gulf War

WH Referral Dated: February 4, 1991
NSCS ID# (if any): 9100882

The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- ☐ A draft reply is attached.
☐ A draft reply will be forwarded.
☐ A translation is attached.
☐ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
☒ * We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
☐ The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
☐ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:

Per Bob Blake conversation with David Welch on
2/15, the White House and the Department do not
believe a response is necessary at this time.


Director
Secretariat Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9102130

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9100882

REFERRAL

DATE: 04 FEB 91

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: BEN ALI, ZINE

DATE: 31 JAN 91

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM PRES BEN ALI OF TUNISIA RE SUPPORT OF MAGHREBI
INITIATIVE TO END GULF WAR

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 07 FEB 91

COMMENT:

FOR

Walter E. Aving

GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/2/09

101 100-2-100-100
101 100-2-100-100
101 100-2-100-100

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



9102130

EMBASSY OF TUNISIA

1515 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005

NON-OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

CARTHAGE, JANUARY 31, 1991

MR. PRESIDENT,

OUR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS WELL AS OUR SATISFACTION TO SEE SIGNS OF INTERNATIONAL DETENTE AND PROMISING PROSPECTS AT THE END OF THE PREVIOUS DECADE, ALLOW US TO WRITE TO YOU ON THE GULF CRISIS.

THIS SITUATION CONSTITUTES AT PRESENT FOR US ALL A SOURCE OF GRAVE CONCERN AND URGES US TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND CONSULT ON THE MOST URGENT AND EFFICIENT MEANS TO RESTORE AND GUARANTEE STABILITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION AND THE REST OF THE WORLD.

THE WAR, WHICH IS TAKING PLACE TODAY IN THAT REGION WITH ITS PROCESSION OF DAMAGE AND DESTRUCTION DUE TO THE SOPHISTICATED MEANS WHICH ARE BEING USED AND MANY OTHERS WHOSE USE WE ARE ENTITLED TO FEAR, MAY HAVE THE MOST DESASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR ALL OF US.

PERSUADED THAT YOU SHARE OUR CONVICTION THAT THE CATASTROPHY IS NOT INEXORABLE AS WELL AS OUR ASPIRATION TO PUT AN END TO THIS TRAGEDY, WE ARE DETERMINED TO STRIVE, WHILE IT IS TIME TO DO SO, FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN ORDER TO AVOID FOR ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THIS CONFLICT FURTHER HUMAN AND MATERIAL LOSSES.

THE CALL FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN ORDER TO FURTHER EXPLORE THE CHANCES OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THIS CRISIS, INTENDS BY NO MEANS TO PREVENT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS NOR TO MODIFY ITS CONTENT AS LONG AS THE OBJECTIVE REMAINS THE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT AND THE RESTORATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THIS COUNTRY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY TO WHICH WE ARE ALL BOUND.

SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS CRISIS, WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN ALL EFFORTS IN ORDER TO FULFILL THIS OBJECTIVE, AND, BASED ON THESE SAME PRINCIPLES, WE PRESENTED OUR PROPOSALS TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN. WE FEEL THAT THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS FOR THESE INITIATIVES WOULD INCREASE WERE THEY SUPPORTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

TUNISIA, WHICH CONTINUES TO WORK IN COOPERATION WITH THE STATES OF THE ARAB MAGHREB UNION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THIS CONFLICT BY PEACEFUL MEANS, CALLS UPON YOUR COUNTRY, IN ITS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO SUPPORT THE MAGHREBI INITIATIVE SUBMITTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, CONTRIBUTING THUS TO THE FULFILLMENT OF THIS NOBLE OBJECTIVE.

AT THIS DIFFICULT JUNCTURE, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT, THANKS TO THE RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND CONSIDERATION EXISTING BETWEEN US, OUR APPEAL WILL RECEIVE YOUR EXCELLENCY'S INTEREST AND SUPPORT IN ORDER TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY, PRESERVE PEACE AND GUARANTEE SECURITY AND STABILITY.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, THE EXPRESSION OF OUR HIGHEST ESTEEM AND CONSIDERATION.

ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101071
RECEIVED: 11 FEB 91 17

TO: MAJOR, JOHN

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 15 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
IRAQ
JAPAN

DESERT STORM
KUWAIT
ECONOMICS

PERSONS: MAJOR, JOHN

POWELL, CHARLES

SUBJECT: PRES MSG TO PM MAJOR

ACTION: PRES APPROVED CABLE

DUE DATE: 14 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9101071

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SCOWCROFT
001
002

Z 91021319 FOR DECISION
X 91021907 SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM
X 91022014 PRES APPROVED CABLE

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/2/09

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101071
RECEIVED: 11 FEB 91 17

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: ZELIKOW
GOMPERT
DEAL

DOC DATE: 11 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
IRAQ
JAPAN

DESERT STORM
KUWAIT
ECONOMICS

PERSONS: MAJOR, JOHN

SUBJECT: REPLY TO MSG FM PM MAJOR OF UK RE BURDENSARING RE DESERT STORM

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 14 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 7/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9101071

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91021319 FOR DECISION
X 91021907 SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/2/09

~~SECRET~~

Reply to Mlog from PM Major on
National Security Council
The White House

Burdenhorning

PROOFED BY: WJ
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 1071
 SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 DOCLOG 40 AVO

WJ

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

91 FEB 13 17.30

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Sent

DISPATCH INSTR

Sten

~~EX-100~~

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE OUT PRES MSGS

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

1071
<OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 160223Z FEB 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

FEBRUARY 15, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

I TOTALLY AGREE WITH YOUR VIEW, IN YOUR JANUARY 31 MESSAGE,
THAT BRITIAN IS ALSO ENTITLED TO RECEIVE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
TO SUPPORT YOUR SPLENDID MILITARY EFFORT IN THE GULF. I AM
GLAD TO HEAR THAT YOU HAVE SOME SUCCESS WITH GERMANY AND THE
ARAB STATES.

WE WILL ENDORSE YOUR EFFORTS TO RECEIVE CONTRIBUTIONS BEYOND
THE SUMS ALREADY COMMITTED TO US. YOUR EIGHT PERCENT TARGET IS A
GOOD ONE, PROVIDED THE DONORS DO NOT REDUCE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE
U.S. BY THAT AMOUNT. WE WOULD WELCOME COORDINATION OF OUR
BIDS FOR FINANCIAL HELP. I UNDERSTAND THAT JIM BAKER HAS ALREADY
BEEN TALKING TO DOUGLAS HURD ABOUT HOW TO FRAME THE DISCUSSION
WITH JAPAN.

PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF YOU SEE PARTICULAR OPPORTUNITIES WHERE
WE NEED TO HELP, OR CHARLES CAN CONTACT BRENT.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR

#0054

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0054 <TOR> 910215225047 MSG000287967047

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0753-MR
6/6/2012 MM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1071

February 11, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT/TIM DEAL *DP*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Reply to Message from Prime Minister Major on
Burdensharing

On January 31 Charles Powell passed a message to you from Prime Minister Major pointing out that Britain was seeking financial assistance in meeting the defense costs associated with the war in the Gulf. The message suggested that the UK would ask donors to give them an amount equal to about 8% of what they gave to us, which is the approximate proportion of British military manpower in the Gulf in relation to our own. Major also asked that our two countries coordinate efforts, that we encourage donors also to give money to London, and that we assure the Japanese -- in particular -- that the US and UK were coordinating bids for assistance.

The British have now been able to obtain sizable pledges from Germany (about \$500 million), Kuwait (about \$660 million), the UAE (about \$500 million), and Saudi Arabia (still unspecified). There are some European countries, like Belgium and Norway, which we did not ask for Desert Storm aid but which the UK will approach. The British want another \$720 million from Japan. The Japanese have said this money must come out of the \$9 billion they have allocated for the coalition as a whole. We have taken the position that the Japanese commitment of \$9 billion is for the U.S., but will not press Tokyo in public if the Japanese say that some of the funds must go to allied forces. The Japanese no doubt realize that in giving the British \$700 million they also give us \$700 million less than the \$9 billion we requested.

Rather than allow the Japanese to get us to fight with the British over whether they get \$720 million of our \$9 billion, we should work to get the Japanese to satisfy both of us over time. One way to do this, which we understand Secretary Baker may have mentioned to Douglas Hurd, is to agree with the Japanese that the British should get \$720 million in some of the early Japanese disbursements but that, over time -- perhaps beyond the first three months of 1991, we would ultimately get what we need from Japan. Such a settlement with the British might, therefore,

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~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0894-MR
EJ 8/26/15

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2

~~SECRET~~

influence the size of our request from Japan for the second quarter or remainder of 1991.

The proposed reply to Major (Tab I) does not detail this idea, but is positive in tone, encouraging further coordination between Baker and Hurd to work out the Japanese problem.

Concurrences by: Richard *for* Haass, Karl *for* Jackson

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize transmission of the message from the President attached at Tab I to be sent through White House channels.

Approve *B*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Proposed Reply to Major
Tab II Incoming

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER MAJOR
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
VIA CABINET CHANNELS

Dear John:

I totally agree with your view, in your January 31 message, that Britain is also entitled to receive financial assistance to support your splendid military effort in the Gulf. I am glad to hear that you have had some success with Germany and the Arab states.

We will endorse your efforts to receive contributions beyond the sums already committed to us. Your 8% target is a good one, provided the donors do not reduce their support for the U.S. by that amount. We would welcome coordination of our bids for financial help. I understand that Jim Baker has already been talking to Douglas Hurd about how to frame the discussion with Japan.

Please let me know if you see particular opportunities where we need to help, or Charles can contact Brent.

Sincerely,

George

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~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0753-MR
6/6/2012 MM

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02d. Memo	To Distribution List Re: No Subject Found (2 pp.)	1/31/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [5]

Date Closed:	7/2/2009	OA/ID Number:	91147-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE


RECORD ID: 9101241
RECEIVED: 19 FEB 91 17

TO: GATES

CHRON FILE

FROM: LUNDSAGER

DOC DATE: 19 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: MEDIA
KUWAIT
SAUDI ARABIA

IRAQ
DESERT STORM

PERSONS: FITZWATER, M

SUBJECT: RELEASE OF DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM 1991 DATA

ACTION: OBE PER LUNDSAGER DUE DATE: 22 FEB 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LUNDSAGER

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NSC-CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSJEB

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9101241

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 GATES
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91021917 FOR INFORMATION
X 91022219 OBE PER LUNDSAGER

UNCLASSIFIED

Release of Desert Shield / Storm UFI Data

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: BDM

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG #

1241

SYSTEM

PRS

NSC INT

DOCLOG

AIO

Ken Hill

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

1

K

I

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3

OBE

JM 2/22

N

OBE

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc:

VP

Sununu

Other

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Return - NFA - OBE per
Meg hundersager 2/22/91
1759 RAN

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 19, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

FROM:

MEG LUNDSAGER *ML*

SUBJECT:

Release of Desert Shield/Desert Storm 1991 Data

As agreed at your steering group meeting, we are preparing for release the information on 1991 foreign commitments. Attached is a draft table and fact sheet. I am awaiting final clearance from DOD, OMB, and State. The issues are:

1. UAE is pledging another \$1 billion. State is checking overnight if we can make this public, which would increase UAE to \$3 billion.
2. DOD is uneasy about listing UAE at all, since we asked them for \$7.5 billion. DOD does not want it to appear that we are satisfied with \$2 or 3 billion.
3. How we present the Japanese commitment is also under discussion. State does not want it to appear that the entire \$9 billion is for the U.S. All other agencies would prefer that Japan be listed for the \$9 billion for the U.S. The tentative compromise is as you see it: the table and fact sheet do not say "for the United States."

If we receive interagency clearance overnight, we plan to ask Marlin Fitzwater to release these in the morning.

Attachments

Tab I Draft Table

Tab II Fact Sheet

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

JAN-MAR 1991 FOREIGN COMMITMENTS
(millions of U.S. dollars)

	Commitments
GCC STATES	29,000
Saudi Arabia	13,500
Kuwait	13,500
UAE	2,000 + host nation support
Germany	5,500
Japan	9,000
Korea	305
TOTAL	43,805

FACT SHEET

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

Jan-Mar 1991 Foreign Commitments

- o Several countries have voluntarily committed to the United States to make considerable financial and other contributions to help cover first quarter 1991 Desert Shield/Desert Storm costs. The pledges in this strong demonstration of responsibility sharing total almost \$44 billion, with initial disbursements of \$6.8 billion.
- o The Gulf states have made significant financial commitments:
 - o Saudi Arabia will contribute \$13.5 billion during the first quarter of this year in cash and host nation support, which includes food, fuel, facilities, water, and local transport. This is a large contribution for the Saudi government, especially as its own military expenditures are increasing rapidly.
 - o Kuwait will also contribute \$13.5 billion, in cash.
- o Japan has pledged \$9 billion to cover first quarter Desert Shield/Desert Storm costs.
- o Germany has pledged \$5.5 billion for the first quarter of this year, which will consist entirely of cash.
- o Several countries have begun making payments. This includes:
 - o \$3.65 billion from Saudi Arabia,
 - o \$2.16 billion from Germany, and
 - o \$1 billion from Kuwait.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Feb-1991 09:06 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robin A. Uhl

(UHL)

FROM:

Margrethe Lundsager
(LUNDSAGER)

SUBJECT:

package 1241

Re: Release of 1991 Desert Shield/Desert Storm Data (#1241)

Robin,

Please tell Mr. Gates that OMB has asked that we wait until tomorrow to release the 1991 Fact Sheet and table. Dick Darman wants to credit the Saudi disbursements listed in the table to their remaining 1990 commitments. OMB will pursue this with DoD - I expect DoD to not agree to this. I will keep you posted and bring over a new table and fact sheet when we complete it today or tomorrow morning.

Meg

CC: Timothy E. Deal

(DEAL)

CC: Mary Cooper

(COOPER)

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101177
RECEIVED: 15 FEB 91 10

TO: GONZALEZ, FELIPE

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 19 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SPAIN
DESERT STORM
KUWAIT

PERSIAN GULF
IRAQ
HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY TO LTR FM PRES GONZALEZ RE BOMBING OF BUNKER IN BAGHDAD

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 19 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF: 9101159

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BASORA
GOMPERT
HAASS
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 7/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: 24.

LOG # 1177

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 24. A/O _____

~~Ken Hill~~

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

4

✓

Review

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

91 FEB 19 P 1. 06

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2/19 AC

D/LDX

6

D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS Date 2/19/91 3

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 19, 1991

Dear Felipe:

I wanted to respond promptly to your letter. Following the initial publicity about the letter, I was pleased to note that you put the issues into their proper perspective during your February 15 news conference.

My military commanders and I share your emphasis on the need to minimize civilian casualties. There is no precedent in history for the efforts we have made to avoid such losses, efforts which increase the risk to our own pilots' lives. Saddam knows well how we try to avoid civilians. That is why he is now putting military equipment in residential neighborhoods and parking combat aircraft in front of archaeological treasures.

Your understanding for our actions is important to me. I would like to share privately with you some of the intelligence information that led our military commanders to target this particular site for attack. I have asked my staff to make this data available for your personal review.

We know that Saddam's concern for civilian well-being is a sham. That is why I feel that, in practice, the international investigation you suggest would simply be manipulated as part of his propaganda game. Iraq can conceal or remove the evidence of the bunker's military use; we, in turn, could not make public our intelligence data. Given Saddam's total control in Baghdad, the focus would end up being on the U.S. instead of on Iraq's policies and the suffering and brutality that goes on in Kuwait, hidden from the eyes of the world.

I am aware of the dangers regarding Arab public opinion. We are working hard to ensure a more balanced picture of our military operations. But the main point must be to keep attention on the central issue: Saddam is responsible for the war, including the inherent jeopardy to civilians, and it is Saddam who must take action to stop its tragic consequences.

While the war continues, we must do what is necessary to win it. We cannot turn Baghdad and other cities into sanctuaries for more effective direction and support of Iraqi forces in the field.

On the political front, I was disappointed that Saddam's latest proposal turned out to be such a cruel hoax. He did not promise a complete withdrawal, an immediate withdrawal, or an unconditional withdrawal. Indeed, he failed once again even to mention Kuwait. It is important to point out to our publics and to Arab opinion that he only said he would "deal with" UNSC Resolution 660, he explicitly rejected all 11 other UN resolutions, and he attached both old and new conditions. Saddam still seems intent only on using diplomacy to weaken the coalition, not to find an end to the war by withdrawing.

I look forward to receiving the thoughts on political considerations which you referred to in your letter. I would be particularly interested in your ideas about how Spain, and Europe, can help address the potential for unrest and instability in the Maghreb.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "George Bush", written in a cursive style.

His Excellency Felipe Gonzalez
President of the Government of Spain
Madrid

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT



THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES _____

FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN (Name) _____ (Phone Number) _____ (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION REPLY TO LTR FM SPANISH PRES GONZALEZ ON
BOMBING OF BUNKER IN BAGHDAD LOG # 1177

<u>TO</u> (Agency)	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>J. STAPLETON ROY</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	_____
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REMARKS FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING, SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

URGENT

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/2/09

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT

Madrid, February 14, 1991

Mr. George Bush
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear George:

The news regarding the death of hundreds of civilians during an allied attack in Baghdad prompts me to write to you, although I know well -from the telephone conversation that we held on Saturday- that you are undoubtedly as concerned as I am about these incidents.

It is obvious that during the course of the operations, we must maintain the principle of avoiding casualties -especially civilian ones- as much as possible. It would be naive to think that civilian casualties could be prevented during wartime but, as we have been discussing, the coalition must clearly inform the public of its will to maintain a civilized attitude when implementing the measures authorized by the United Nations' Security Council. Under no circumstances can we allow the public to start perceiving the erroneous and ominous idea that the allies are acting in a comparable manner to the Iraqi dictatorship when it launches missiles on Tel Aviv or Riyadh.

Therefore, I suggest for this incident to be thoroughly investigated so that we can establish the responsibilities, whether it was a military installation that was deceptively used by the Iraqi military or whether it was an error of appreciation on the part of the military information services. We might suggest holding an independent investigation mission, under the auspices of the United Nations or of the International Red Cross Committee. This would allow us to shed some light on the incident and it would also force Baghdad to facilitate the work of the international organizations in other aspects, such as the treatment of allied prisoners of war according to the Geneva Conventions.

Of course, the results of this investigation would have to be publicized so as to show the world's public opinion what the coalition's position is and what Saddam's position is.

On the other hand, we must be aware that the consequences of these incidents in the Arab world are incalculable. We are well situated to appreciate this given our proximity to the Magreb countries where, as I informed you on Saturday, the atmosphere among the people is particularly heated. I would like not to exaggerate my evaluations, but I feel that the course of events can change if we do not react quickly in the right direction.

According to the reports that I have been receiving from our military experts -who in turn receive them from yours- after almost one month of bombings the effects of the aerial attacks on Baghdad are progressively more irrelevant to the outcome of this war. On the other hand, it is possible to think that the military advantages that can be achieved with further bombings will more than make up for the political inconveniences of their unavoidable effects on civilian population, and the consequent effects on the Arab world and on the public opinion of our own countries.

All of this leads me to propose that you consider ceasing the aerial attacks on Baghdad and other Iraqi cities, so as to concentrate the allied effort essentially on the Operation's Theater of Kuwait. Such a decision, which can only be adequately weighed by you, would improve the public opinion by emphasizing the true intentions of the coalition regarding the enforcement of the Security Council's Resolutions and International Law.

Although I do not feel it is truly necessary, I want to stress that I am conveying these concerns and suggestions from the support and solidarity stand that we will maintain, as I have had the opportunity to tell you in our conversations.

I believe -as I stated on Saturday- that the contradiction between military and political interests is growing as time goes by. Undoubtedly, from a strictly military point of view -and I am not forgetting that this is above all a military operation- it would be convenient to wait (which is less detrimental, if the bombings over Baghdad stop). Nevertheless, from a political viewpoint, it seems necessary for this conflict to end soon if we want to maintain the coalition and not offer Saddam Hussein opportunities to divide or confuse public opinion, especially in the Arab world.

This contradiction applies as well to Saddam Hussein, but exactly in an opposite manner. He probably wanted to wage a

ground war as quickly as possible; but on the other hand, he would try to win political grounds with a prolonged battle.

After these urgent thoughts, I plan on sending you some political considerations regarding the present situation and its possible outcomes, keeping in mind the direction of our conversations.

Receive my warmest regards along with my esteem and friendship.

Felipe González Márquez
President of the Spanish Government

EL PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO

Madrid, 14 de febrero de 1991

Excmo. Sr. George Bush
Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América
WASHINGTON

Querido George:

La noticia de la muerte de centenares de personas civiles en un bombardeo aliado en Bagdad me incita a escribirte, aunque sé bien -por la conversación telefónica que mantuvimos el sábado pasado- que tú estarás sin duda tan preocupado como yo por estos acontecimientos.

Es evidente que en el curso de las operaciones debe mantenerse el principio de evitar víctimas, especialmente civiles, en toda la medida de lo posible. Sería ingenuo pensar que una guerra no va a provocar ninguna víctima civil, pero -como hemos venido hablando- la Coalición debe dejar claro ante la opinión pública su voluntad de mantener una actitud civilizada en la aplicación de las medidas autorizadas por el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. De ninguna manera podríamos permitir que se abriese paso en la percepción de la opinión pública la idea -equivocada y nefasta- de que los aliados se comportan de manera equiparable a la dictadura iraquí cuando lanza misiles sobre Tel Aviv o Riad.

Por eso, te sugiero que se investigue a fondo este suceso, de modo que se depuren las responsabilidades, tanto si se trataba de un objetivo militar utilizado engañosamente por las autoridades iraquíes como si ha sido un error de apreciación de los

EL PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO

2.

servicios de información militar. Se podría propiciar una misión de encuesta independiente, bajo los auspicios de las Naciones Unidas o del Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja. Ello nos permitiría avanzar en el esclarecimiento de los hechos y obligaría también a Bagdad a facilitar el trabajo de los organismos internacionales en otros aspectos, como el trato a los prisioneros aliados conforme a los Convenios de Ginebra.

Por supuesto, habría que hacer públicos los resultados de esa investigación, con el fin de mostrar a la opinión pública mundial cuál es la actitud de la Coalición y cuál la de Saddam Hussein.

Por otra parte, hemos de ser conscientes de que las consecuencias de estos acontecimientos en el mundo árabe son incalculables. Nosotros estamos en buena posición para apreciarlo, por nuestra vecindad respecto al Magreb, donde -como ya te señalé el sábado- los ánimos populares están particularmente caldeados. Me gustaría no exagerar en mis apreciaciones, pero pienso que puede variar el curso de los acontecimientos si no se reacciona rápidamente en la buena dirección.

Según las evaluaciones que recibo de nuestros expertos militares -que reciben a su vez información de los vuestros-, el efecto de los ataques aéreos sobre Bagdad, después de casi un mes de bombardeos, tiene cada vez menos relevancia para el curso de la contienda. Visto de otro modo, cabe pensar que las ventajas militares que se puedan conseguir con nuevos bombardeos se vean más que compensados con los inconvenientes políticos de sus inevitables efectos sobre la población civil y la consiguiente repercusión en el mundo árabe y en la opinión de nuestros propios países.

EL PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO

3.

Todo ello me lleva a proponerte que consideres la suspensión de esos ataques aéreos sobre Bagdad y otras ciudades iraquíes, a fin de concentrar el esfuerzo aliado fundamentalmente en el Teatro de Operaciones de Kuwait. Una decisión de este tipo, que sólo vosotros podéis valorar adecuadamente, sería sin duda un gran paso ante la opinión pública para poner de relieve las verdaderas intenciones de la Coalición en relación con el cumplimiento de las Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad y de las reglas del Derecho internacional.

Aunque no creo que fuese realmente necesario, quiero recalcar que te expreso estas preocupaciones y sugerencias desde una actitud de apoyo y solidaridad que vamos a mantener, como he tenido ocasión de expresarte en nuestras conversaciones.

Pienso -conforme te dije el sábado pasado- que la contradicción entre interés militar e interés político empieza a agudizarse con el paso del tiempo. Sin duda, desde el punto de vista estrictamente militar -y no olvido que se trata ante todo de una operación militar-, sería conveniente esperar (lo cual es menos perjudicial si cesan los bombardeos sobre Bagdad). Ahora bien, desde el punto de vista político, parece necesario que acabe pronto el conflicto, si queremos mantener la Coalición y no ofrecerle a Saddam Hussein oportunidades para dividir o confundir a la opinión pública, especialmente en el mundo árabe.

Esta contradicción opera también para Saddam Hussein, pero justamente en la dirección contraria. Probablemente, él quería una batalla terrestre cuanto antes; pero, por otro lado, pretendería ganar terreno político con la prolongación de la contienda.

EL PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO

4.

Tras estas reflexiones de urgencia, pienso mandarte algunas consideraciones políticas acerca de la situación actual y sus posibles desenlaces, atendiendo al sentido de nuestras conversaciones.

Con mi aprecio y mi amistad, te envío un cordial saludo,

Felipe González

Felipe González Márquez
Presidente del Gobierno de España

Research Memorandum

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of Research



February 11, 1991

PERCEPTION GROWING IN SPAIN THAT GULF WAR UNJUST

A non-USIA telephone poll of 784 adults (18 years of age or more) conducted nationwide in Spain by the firm DYM on January 24-25, and reported on February 4 in the weekly newsmagazine *Cambio 16* and a nationwide personal interview survey of 1000 adults conducted by Sigma Dos for the Madrid daily *El Mundo* on February 5 and reported February 8 indicate:

- **By four-to-one margins, both surveys show that the Gulf war is perceived to be "unjust"** (72%-18% in *Cambio 16* and 76%-17% in *El Mundo*). The *El Mundo* poll shows a 24 percent increase in this view since a January 17 poll (52%-39%). At the same time, a (43%-31%) plurality believes that the bombing of Iraq "exceeds the UN resolution." But half of the Spanish public (54%-36%), according to *Cambio 16*, say the war was inevitable.
- **Public support of Spanish government policy remains low.** Prevailing opinion does not approve of sending Spanish ships to the Gulf (52%-42% - *Cambio 16* poll), generally consistent with public opinion in Spain shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Moreover, by better than two-to-one (*El Mundo*, 65%-29%) Spaniards disagree with their government's policy of allowing the U.S. use of Spanish bases in order to bomb Iraq. There is public concern that U.S. utilization of the bases will affect Spain's relations with Arab nations of the Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Mauritania) (there will be an impact - 59%) and a belief (54%-29%) that Spanish citizens in the enclaves of North Africa (Ceuta and Melilla) are threatened by Spanish actions in the Gulf.
- **Lukewarm support of their government's policies are accompanied by considerable skepticism that the war will end up benefitting the anti-Iraq coalition.** Nearly as many say no one will benefit from the war (22%) as say the U.S. will (35%), and nearly one-in-four believe no one will win the war. When asked if they think nuclear weapons will be used in the war, less than half (46%) said they would not, and a surprisingly high one-quarter of Spaniards believe they may be used.

Prepared by: R/WE - Barbara Smela
Approved by: R - Ronald H. Hinckley
Director, Office of Research

619-5140

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Reply to Letter from Spanish President Gonzalez on Bombing of Bunker in Baghdad (2 pp.)	2/18/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files

Subseries: Chronological Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [5]

Document Partially Declassified

(Copy of Document Follows)

By ES On 7/21/22

Date Closed: 7/2/2009

OA/ID Number: 91147-002

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #: 2010-0894-MR (502.03)

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition: Released in Part

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date: 8/26/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

2/19/91

THE WHITE HOUSE

1177

WASHINGTON

91 FEB 18 PM 1:2

February 18, 1991

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT (B)

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Spanish President Gonzalez on Bombing of Bunker in Baghdad

Purpose

3.3(b)(6)

Background

Until this week, Felipe Gonzalez had defied opinion in his party and public (see Tab C) to support the coalition effort with surprising firmness, given past Spanish policy. We have had unlimited transit rights 3.3(b)(6)

Your

phone conversation with him on February 9 showed your appreciation for this support.

3.3(b)(6)

We are told that Gonzalez was angry that the substance of his letter was made public by his spokeswoman and he has personally tried to make amends. He held a special press conference on February 15 in order to declare his unconditional support for the coalition and readiness to help the U.S. enforce the UN resolutions. He downplayed his suggestions about the bombing, said the deaths of civilians were inevitable, and attacked Saddam for deliberately harming and endangering innocents.

We have prepared a letter which addresses Gonzalez' concerns, notes his supportive February 15 statements, 3.3(b)(6)

Instead the letter offers to share with Gonzalez some of the intelligence information that led us to conclude that

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0894-MR
28 8/21/15

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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2

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this installation was a legitimate target. Gonzalez is an important supporter, his February 15 comments were helpful, and we think he is worth this extra effort.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to President Felipe Gonzalez at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to President Gonzalez
Tab B	Letter from President Gonzalez on February 14
Tab C	USIA report on Spanish public opinion on Gulf war

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03e. Memo	Philip Zelikow/Adrian Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: Reply to Letter from Spanish President Gonzalez on the Bombing of the Bunker in Baghdad (1 pp.)	2/15/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [5]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By EL On 7/21/22

Date Closed: 7/2/2009	OA/ID Number: 91147-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0894-MR (502.04)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 8/26/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1177

February 15, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

DAVID GOMPERT/RICHARD HAASS *PN for*

FROM:

PHILIP ZELIKOW/ADRIAN BASORA *PHB*

SUBJECT:

Reply to Letter from Spanish President Gonzalez on the Bombing of the Bunker in Baghdad

SIGNED

3.3(b)(6)

We have heard that Gonzalez was upset, however, that the government's spokesperson publicized Spanish concerns in a way that implied criticism of the U.S. and coalition effort. To remedy that impression Gonzalez took the extraordinary step of scheduling a press conference today and announcing that he wished to clarify "misinterpretations" of the Spanish position. Gonzalez declared that Spanish support for coalition forces was "inalterable", that Spain would fully support U.S. military efforts until all UN resolutions were fulfilled. He added, "and I repeat this today."

As for the particular ideas in his letter, Gonzalez said "Spain was not establishing any conditions" but was merely suggesting ideas which could best be assessed by those actually fighting the war. He added that it is not for Spain to tell Allied combatants how best to prosecute their offensive. He concluded that civilian casualties were inevitable and attacked Saddam's deliberate policy of killing and endangering innocents.

Gonzalez' effort to walk back any impression of criticism of the U.S. (defying his pacifist public -- see the survey results at Tab C) has influenced the tone of our suggested reply, which is attached at Tab A. ^{3.3(b)(6)}

We have cleared our draft reply with the State Department.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to Gonzalez

Tab B Incoming

Tab C USIA report on Spanish public views of Gulf war

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E.O. 13526

2010-0894-MR

28 8/24/15

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101257
RECEIVED: 20 FEB 91 12

CHRON FILE



TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 21 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS
EL SALVADOR

JORDAN
GERMANY

PERSONS: HUSSEIN I
KOHL, HELMUT

CRISTIANI, ALFREDO

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY AS OF 16 FEB

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 23 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON

LOGREF: 9101168 9101222

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
VAN ERON

pls copy only:

Hussein 2/16

Kohl n.d.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1257

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

King Hussein I of Jordan - February 16, 1991
(Received February 19)

CB

Y King Hussein is deeply disappointed by the increasing difference between U.S. policy and "Arab and Muslim aspirations." However, he suggests a continuation of bilateral dialogue.

President Cristiani of El Salvador - January 3, 1991
(Received February 19)

President Cristiani acknowledges your letter regarding the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and the U.S.-Latin American free trade zone. He also appreciates your support since the recent FMLN terrorist offensive.

Chancellor Kohl of Germany - Not Dated
(Received February 14)

Chancellor Kohl assures you of his continued support as the second phase of Desert Storm approaches. So far Germany has assumed \$9.66 billion of the coalition military costs and has contributed another \$1.36 billion to help stabilize the economies of several countries affected by the Gulf Crisis.

At the same time, Germany includes European stability as a high priority. This depends largely on the consolidation of the economic situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Therefore, he warns, we must not fail to provide support to these reformist states. He writes this to demonstrate that Germany is reaching its economic limits in order to meet its international responsibilities. Consequently, he announces a German tax increase to ease the federal budget.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0895-MP

MM 12/1/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Cable	Re: Letter from the King to the President [171300Z Feb 91] [FOIA restricitons redacted] (2 pp.)	2/17/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [5]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By mm on 12/1/2022

Date Closed: 7/2/2009	OA/ID Number: 91147-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0895-MR(503.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/1/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

1222

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT BOOK GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN VANERON
SIT FILE HAASS CHARLES PAVITT ROSTOW WELCH WHSR IRAQ WORKING PRES MSGS
SIT SUM VAX BRANSCUM

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~ DTG 171300Z FEB 91

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9538

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 01789

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPDC, JO



SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE KING TO THE PRESIDENT

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM KING HUSSEIN TO
PRESIDENT BUSH IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S FEBRUARY
8 LETTER. COURT CHIEF SHERIF ZEID BIN SHAKER HANDED
IT TO ME AFTER A MEETING WITH CONGRESSMAN OWENS ON FEB
17.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0895-MA
MM 12/1/2016


IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



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4. COMMENT: THE KING'S EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR CONTINUED DIALOGUE IS REVERSAL OF THE POSITION HE TOOK WITH ME 10 DAYS AGO AND REPRESENTS THE GENUINE CONCERN FELT AMONG HIS CLOSEST ADVISORS THAT THE FEBRUARY 6 SPEECH HAS CREATED A SIGNIFICANT DANGER FOR THE FUTURE OF JORDAN-U. S. RELATIONS. THE CROWN PRINCE MENTIONED TO ME FEBRUARY 16 THAT HE HAS A PREPLANNED TRIP TO

CALIFORNIA FOR AN ENGAGEMENT ON MARCH 23. HE OBVIOUSLY HOPES THAT HE CAN USE THIS OCCASION TO RESTART THE HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE WHICH HAS NOW BEEN INTERRUPTED.

HARRISON

BT

#1789

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Letter	Chancellor Kohl to President Bush Re: Annexe (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [5]

Date Closed: 7/2/2009 FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S Re-review Case #: P-2/P-5 Review Case #: AR Case #: AR Disposition: AR Disposition Date:	OA/ID Number: 91147-002 Appeal Case #: Appeal Disposition: Disposition Date: MR Case #: MR Disposition: MR Disposition Date:
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101222
RECEIVED: 19 FEB 91 11

CHRON FILE

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 22 FEB 91
SOURCE REF: 9102945

KEYWORDS: JORDAN

HS

PERSONS: HUSSEIN I

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM KING HUSSEIN RE REQUEST FOR CONTINUED DIALOGUE

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE DUE DATE: 22 FEB 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE LOGREF: 9101155 9101168

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSLMS DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~



ORIGINAL FILE

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9102945

Date February 22, 1991

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Bush
From: King Hussein I
Date: February 16, 1991
Subject: Acknowledgment of President's February 8 letter
and request for continuation of dialogue

WH Referral Dated: February 19, 1991
NSCS ID# (if any): 9101222

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By cap NARA, Date 7/2/09

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- X We believe no response is necessary for the reason
 cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the
 proposed travel.
- Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:

Per conversation with David Welch (NSC) on February 21,
no response is required. Welch has communicated this to
Sittmann (NSC), who will ask State (S/S) to rescind this tasker.

Andrea Richhart
for: Director
Secretariat Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9101222

REFERRAL

DATE: 19 FEB 91

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: HUSSEIN I

DATE: 16 FEB 91

SUBJ: CABLE TO PRES FM KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN RE ACKNOWLEDGES 8 FEB LTR &
ASKS TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 21 FEB 91

COMMENT:

FOR

Lisa M. Salvetti
GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

CAF

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/2/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Cable	Re: Letter from the King to the President [171300Z Feb 91] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	2/17/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [5]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 11/3/2022

Date Closed:	7/2/2009	OA/ID Number:	91147-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-0895-MR(503.01)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	12/1/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
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 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

1222

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT BOOK GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN VANERON
SIT FILE HAASS CHARLES PAVITT ROSTOW WELCH WHSR IRAO WORKING PRES MSGS
SIT SUM VAX BRANSCUM

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~ DTG 171300Z FEB 91

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9538

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 01789

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPDC, JO

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE KING TO THE PRESIDENT

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM KING HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT BUSH IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S FEBRUARY 8 LETTER. COURT CHIEF SHERIF ZEID BIN SHAKER HANDED IT TO ME AFTER A MEETING WITH CONGRESSMAN OWENS ON FEB 17.
3. BEGIN TEXT:

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0895-MR
MM 12/1/2016


IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



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4. COMMENT: THE KING'S EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR CONTINUED DIALOGUE IS REVERSAL OF THE POSITION HE TOOK WITH ME 10 DAYS AGO AND REPRESENTS THE GENUINE CONCERN FELT AMONG HIS CLOSEST ADVISORS THAT THE FEBRUARY 6 SPEECH HAS CREATED A SIGNIFICANT DANGER FOR THE FUTURE OF JORDAN-U. S. RELATIONS. THE CROWN PRINCE MENTIONED TO ME FEBRUARY 16 THAT HE HAS A PREPLANNED TRIP TO

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CALIFORNIA FOR AN ENGAGEMENT ON MARCH 23. HE OBVIOUSLY HOPES THAT HE CAN USE THIS OCCASION TO RESTART THE HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE WHICH HAS NOW BEEN INTERRUPTED.

HARRISON

BT

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101312
RECEIVED: 22 FEB 91 10

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: CHAMBERLIN
BEERS

DOC DATE: 22 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM
IRAQ
DESERT STORM

COUNTERTERRORISM
SYRIA
PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS: HUSSEIN, SADDAM

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST WAR W/ RESPECT TO GULF CRISIS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 26 FEB 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHAMBERLIN

LOGREF: 9101370

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BEERS
CHAMBERLIN
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 7/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

Terrorist War - are we winning?

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WEA

LOG # 1312

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG AM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>sf</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>		
Bill Sittmann		APNSA Has Seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>24.4/29</u>	<u>J</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>YAM 4/29</u>	<u>NIR</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

91 FEB 22 10 39

See BS comment pg 3

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Memo	From Wendy Chamberlin to Brent Scowcroft, Re: The Terrorist War: Are We Winning? [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	2/22/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [5]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 11/3/2022

Date Closed: 7/2/2009	OA/ID Number: 91147-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0895-MR(505)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 12/1/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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1312

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 22, 1991



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: R. RAND BEERS *RB* ACTING

FROM: WENDY CHAMBERLIN *Windy*

SUBJECT: The Terrorist War: Are We Winning?

From the day Saddam Hussein rolled into Kuwait, he has threatened to unleash an army of terrorists in a bald attempt to intimidate the world into acquiescing to his aggression. It has not happened. As our analysts address the question of why we have not been hit by a major terrorist campaign, it becomes evident that in the answer lies the key to our post-war CT policy (addressed in a separate memo). This memo is a snapshot of our evolving thinking on why the alliance has escaped significant terrorist attacks.

The first point is that we have not shut-out a terrorist campaign. There have been 200 terrorist attacks since January 17 alone -- a fourfold increase over pre-hostilities periods. There is ample evidence of extensive terrorist movement, planning, and strikes. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Arab Liberation Front (ALF) are trying hard to hit us.

That said, the gross lot of terrorist acts have contributed little or nothing to Saddam's endeavors. Most actual strikes have been launched by radical national groups with their own agenda: marxist groups in Latin America, Germany's Red Guard, Greece's November 17, and Turkey's Dev Sol. Iraqi terrorists have made a bungle of it, as in Manila, Jakarta.

The remarkable fact, however, is that many of the professional Palestinian groups who received direct support from Saddam are not engaging. These terrorist groups have had ample opportunity to regroup and work around the disruptions to their established command and control ^{1.4(c); 1.4(d)}

The explanation that they are waiting in reserve for the start of the ground war does not meet the test either. Saddam needs a victory of any sort now; would like a major terrorist act; and has snarled that he is not being supported by the Palestinian terrorist groups he thought he had bought.

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0895-MR
MM 12/1/2016

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There are three possible explanations for why professional Palestinian terrorist groups are holding back, despite Saddam's call for jihad. The most compelling reason is self interest as they look to their own survival in a post war environment. Why back a loser? Saddam may not be around to promote the Palestinian cause.

Secondly, State sponsors are using their influence over client Palestinian terrorist groups to prevent attacks. Fearful that a strike by the ANO on the alliance may invite military retribution on Libya, Qadhafi is maintaining a tight leash on Abu Nidal. (He is also angry at Saddam's reported support for Libyan dissidents based in Chad.) ^{1,4(d)}

Likewise, Syria reportedly issued strict instructions to all Syrian-based Palestinian groups (specifically the PFLP-GC) not to engage in terrorism related to the Gulf crisis.

Thirdly, faced with tight security measures worldwide, professional terrorist groups do not want to risk capture and exposure of their mode of operation at a time of diminished political utility to their cause. One can speculate that the strong display of American political will and power, so long rued by Arab extremists, must also have a chilling effect on individual terrorists.

The tentative conclusions from these observations are:

1. Post war strategy should seek to build constructively on Syrian (and to a lesser extent Iranian) coalition cooperation and desire to play an expanded role. Our CT strategy should be phased so that it permits us to work with Damascus over the medium term, while leading ultimately to our goal of dismantling of terrorist groups in Syria. In short, we should shift from the hard talking point of demanding Syria expel terrorist groups to one of insisting that it prohibit groups under its control from committing international terrorist acts. The objective is that over time and with progress on other fronts, Syria recognizes that it is in its interest to dismantle terrorist groups. In the meanwhile, the groups exist but do not act.

2. Building a working relationship with Syria in the post war atmosphere also requires that we not permit history to become an obstacle. Our dialogue should not be a sharp exchange of "who did what" in the past. Rather we should expect Damascus to work with us and the world community to prevent terrorist acts and prosecute those that do occur forthwith.

3. Assuming a clear cut victory over Saddam, we must convince the newly "empowered" Gulf have-states that they have the

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Can we?

internal strength to resist the blackmail of professional terrorist groups. The cessation of these secret pay-offs will help to funnel terrorist groups to an ever narrow band of sponsors. In that event, our policy options will be clearer. A distinction must be clear between support for Palestinians and support for Palestinian terrorists.

Concurrences by: Jim Pavitt, David Welch

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: BURNS

DOC DATE: 22 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: TURKEY
IRAQ
TELCON

KUWAIT
DESERT STORM

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: OZAL, TURGUT

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES OZAL OF TURKEY ON 19 FEB RE GULF CRISIS

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 26 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS

NEIL

NSC CHRON

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DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 7/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Turgut Ozal of
Turkey on February 19, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Turgut Ozal
Nicholas Burns (notetaker)

DATE, TIME February 19, 1991, 5:03 - 5:16 p.m.
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Turgut. (U)

President Ozal: Hello, how are you? I was today at the Turkish-Iraqi border. (S)

The President: Oh. What did you see? (U)

President Ozal: I visited our army troops in that area. I saw the situation and I have some information for you. (U)

The President: Please. And I have some information for you on the Gorbachev initiative. (S)

President Ozal: The numbers of Iraqi army deserters have increased substantially last week. Every day 200 people are coming to our border and more than half of them are soldiers, perhaps 70 per cent. It seems to me that was a fake piece some time ago by the Revolutionary Command Council. The same day our people noticed that their troops on the other side were enjoying like crazy people. And I think when this ground offensive starts, most of the Iraqi armed forces will desert the army or will become POWs. (S)

The President: That's interesting. We are encountering the same thing on the Saudi-Iraqi border and the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. More people are coming across discouraged. (S)

President Ozal: I told our TV people today when they asked about the Russian initiative. I said I don't know, but I feel they don't want to see a big victory. And they want to protect Saddam. I don't know, but I feel they want to guarantee the regime of Iraq. (S)

The President: You made a good statement that Saddam ought to be out of there. (S)

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President Ozal: Yes. I also said that their Soviet equipment is no match for the U.S. equipment. They don't want to see that. When the ground war starts, they will see the other equipment is also not matched. (S)

The President: Let me tell you Turgut - very interesting. The Soviet proposal stops short of what we can accept. They did not mention POWs. They said cease-fire and then withdrawal. We can't stop and then withdraw. There's no time set for troop withdrawal -- we said 96 hours. There was no reference to reparations and last week they said we had to pay to reconstruct Iraq. They should be paying for damage to coalition partners and the oil spill and for Kuwait. There are several important points missing: If Saddam Hussein tells Gorbachev he accepts the plan, it would not be acceptable to us. And I am sure it would not be acceptable to Turkey. (S)

President Ozal: I think I would agree. I felt it was guaranteeing the regime of Iraq. I know Saddam. He wants to protect his head. The Iraqi people are at a stage where they want no more war. (S)

The other thing, Rafsanjani called me today. He says that we should go forward in order to reach a peace. I asked do you know the Russian plan. He said no. Did Tariq Aziz tell you about the plan? He had no concrete information. I told him I am going to speak to President Bush, and he had nothing to relay. (S)

The President: There's something strange between Iraq and Iran. Aziz goes and spends the night. On the wire right now is a message to you putting in more detail than what I've told you. Be sure to get it right away. It spells out in detail our concerns. Mitterrand shares our concerns. I have not talked to Major, but Mitterrand tells me that the British share our reservations on the plan. I just talked to the Prime Minister of Canada. They are changing their commitment to participate in the bombing to show solidarity. (S)

Everybody we've talked to including Mubarak, says be careful of tricks. We cannot just jump at this peace proposal. Please read the telegram carefully. (S)

President Ozal: I suggest you should not change your position. (S)

The President: I will stay on the road. We are getting close on when to commit ground forces. Our military people are confident with the planning. We will keep hitting hard. If he said today "I'm getting out" and he does so with his military intact, we would not have done anything. All want to see Iraq without a war machine. Although we have hit him hard, its still a big force. (S)

President Ozal: Yesterday at Incirlik, I saw your people, your generals. They have not lost any planes. They say this base at

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Incirlik is the biggest and most comfortable in Europe. (S)

The President: Wonderful. You have been magnificent. If you have any questions, please let me know. (S)

President Ozal: I'll let you know. I may be coming to the U.S. in March before the end of month if you want to talk to me in a relaxed atmosphere. (S)

The President: 22nd? 23rd? We will definitely do that. All the day? (S)

President Ozal: It could be when you want. (S)

The President: I want to talk for sure. The only problem is I have a big dinner on Saturday. Maybe we could do something relaxed on Friday. We could fly to Camp David. (S)

President Ozal: I may be coming on 21st and leaving on 22nd. (S)

The President: Think about coming by here on Friday at 4:00 on the 22nd. We will fly to Camp David. I have to be back by Saturday afternoon at around 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. I'll bring you back. (S)

President Ozal: I will be there in Washington Friday at 4 or 3. Whatever. We will come to the military airport at Andrews Air Base. (S)

The President: Keep it small. Just Barbara and me and maybe one or two others. (S)

President Ozal: Maybe my wife. I don't know if she is coming. (S)

The President: That's wonderful. Hope she does. (S)

President Ozal: Everything is arranged. Thank you. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1322

February 22, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Turgut
Ozal of Turkey

At Tab I is the memorandum of telephone conversation between the President and President Ozal on February 19, 1991.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab I be filed for the record.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/27/2013

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: JEB LOG # 1322
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>WED</i> Ken Hill	<u>X</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>		
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>WEA 2/23</u>	<u>R</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>N</u>

☒ A = Action
 ☐ I = Information
 ☐ D = Dispatch
 ☐ R = Retain
 ☐ N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101370
RECEIVED: 25 FEB 91 16

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: BEERS

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 25 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: COUNTERTERRORISM
PERSIAN GULF
KUWAIT

TERRORISM
IRAQ
SYRIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POST GULF WAR COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 28 FEB 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BEERS

LOGREF: 9101312

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BEERS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

Post-War Counterterrorism Policy

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: DA

LOG # 1370

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 4 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>Ken Hill</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	APNSA Has Seen	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>9/11 3/8</u>	<u>H</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N/R</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08a. Memo	R. Rand Beers to Brent Scowcroft Re: Post-Gulf War Counterterrorism Policy (2 pp.)	2/26/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [5]

Date Closed:	7/2/2009	OA/ID Number:	91147-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

United States Department of State

*Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs*

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 14, 1991

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT M. GATES
PAUL WOLFOWITZ
RICHARD J. KERR
ADMIRAL DAVID E. JEREMIAH
RICHARD N. HAASS

SUBJECT: Post-Gulf War Counter-Terrorism Objectives

Attached is a copy of a concept paper on counter-terrorism goals for the war termination and post-war situations in the Middle East. It would be useful to discuss the paper at an upcoming small group meeting.

The paper summarizes a longer study produced and coordinated by a restricted PCC on counter-terrorism.

R.M.K.
Robert M. Kimmitt

Attachment: As stated.

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(DECL: OADR)

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0895-MR
mm 12/1/2016

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08c. Report	Re: Counter-Terrorism (CT) Objectives for the Post-Conflict Situation (2 pp.)	2/12/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [5]

Date Closed: 7/2/2009	OA/ID Number: 91147-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101422
RECEIVED: 26 FEB 91 18

ORIGINAL FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HUTCHINGS
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 26 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY
NATO
PERSIAN GULF

EC
FRANCE
ANSA

PERSONS: RUEHE, VOLKER

SUBJECT: MTG W/ RUEHE OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION OF GERMANY ON 27 FEB RE
GULF & POST WAR ORDER IN MIDDLE EAST

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 01 MAR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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GOMPERT
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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 7/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSJEB

DOC 1 OF 1

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2

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RECORD ID: 9101422

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91022619 FOR INFORMATION
X 91022719 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 7/2/09

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: MeH
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 1422
 SYSTEM PR NSC INT
 DOCLOG PM A/O _____

WFO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>copy</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u> <u>AI</u>	<u>Seen</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>WFA 2/27</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____
 Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1422

February 26, 1991

*Adm Sec Advisor
has seen*

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT *DCG*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Volker Ruehe, General Secretary,
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) of Germany,
February 27, 1991

Ruehe's visit is of course Gulf-related, designed to shore up Germany's image here and discuss the post-war order in the Middle East. He will also explain Chancellor Kohl's position on future German participation in out-of-area peacekeeping.

Kohl apparently prefers a broadly written constitutional amendment, permitting participation in at least UN-sponsored and possibly non-UN multilateral forces. However, by the time he gets the FDP and SPD on board, the amendment could restrict Germany to "blue helmet" roles. While we will not want to try to head off an amendment, you should urge Ruehe to advise Kohl to propose and stick with the least restrictive amendment possible.

Given Ruehe's influence not only with Kohl (which has grown with the incapacitation of Schaeuble and Teltschik's departure) as well as within the CDU, it would be useful to engage him directly on the question of a future "European pillar." As David Gompert explained in his memo of February 25 (Tab I), the problem we have with the Germans is that they affirm their commitment to NATO and a strong U.S. presence but act in ways that undermine both. We recommend that you tell Ruehe plainly how we see the issue:

-- We understand that our European allies want to develop a stronger security identity. We welcome that.

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0896-MR
MM 8/24/2016

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2

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- We are concerned that the way the European pillar is now developing will weaken the Atlantic Alliance.
- We are concerned in particular about an arrangement that would lead to:
 - o direct subordination of the WEU to the EC;
 - o a WEU defense structure with missions in Europe that overlap NATO's;
 - o a weakening of NATO's command structure.
- However, we have made it clear that we would welcome a sensibly designed WEU-based European pillar, tied to NATO, with missions that complement NATO's.
- Germany's leadership will be crucial, particularly in your discussions with the French.

Concurrence by: Philip Zelikow *PZ*

Attachment

Tab I Memo on "Cracks in the European Pillar"

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1362

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508
February 25, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID C. GOMPERT 
SUBJECT: Cracks in the European Pillar

Overview

Even as our European allies are pulling with us in the Gulf, some of them are pushing for adoption of a European security institution separate from NATO but with overlapping and potentially competing responsibilities. At French initiative, but with German compliance and a touch of British ambivalence, the WEU is being positioned as the security arm of the EC, with prospective military missions in regions contiguous to the NATO Treaty area (e.g., Eastern Europe and the Med/Maghreb).

This drift threatens to deviate from our conception of the WEU as a complement to NATO, focused on meeting out-of-area security challenges through NATO-WEU coordination. After months of patiently cautioning the allies that the European pillar must be organically tied to the Alliance, we (NSC, State, DoD) concluded that a more pointed U.S. message was necessary lest they assume we were, as one European put it, "relaxed." This more assertive American stance, coupled with serious division in the WEU and in the EC, appears to have slowed the rush toward an EC-based European pillar, but evoked a sharply negative French reaction, including from Admiral Lanxade.

Continued Quest for European Political Union

Logic would suggest that the combination of Moscow's shift to the right and the display of American power in the Gulf would lead the allies to conclude: first, that NATO and the U.S. role in Europe have renewed importance; and second, that Europeans must build up their own capacity to protect vital interests in other regions. But the impulse to press on with European union -- strongly felt in Paris, Bonn, Rome, and elsewhere -- has produced an alternative "logic," especially among the Eurocrats:

- The spotty European performance in the Gulf crisis is cited by the "unionists" as proof that new steps are needed to institutionalize common European foreign and security policies. The difficulty of forging common policies in practice only fuels the urge to do so by declaration.

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2000-0233-F/3
3/14/2011 MM

- The earlier British-led proposal to strengthen the WEU's ties to NATO has been met by pressures to subordinate it to the EC.
- The earlier French willingness to concentrate the WEU on out-of-area roles -- thus usefully complementing NATO's mission -- has been blunted by Bonn's aversion to participate in such a role (except under a UN fiat).
- As a result, the WEU is groping for a distinctive mission. Since, as mentioned above, the out-of-area focus seems increasingly problematical, the French now raise the possibility of an independent WEU role in Eastern Europe. Unless we agree to confine NATO to the narrow role of insurance protection against a resurgent Soviet threat, such WEU responsibility in Europe will cut into, compete with, and confuse NATO's purposes.

Positions of the Key Allies

Having tantalized their allies with the possibility of re-joining NATO's military structure, the French of late have offered nothing more on this score and are now promoting: (a) the idea of a looser NATO structure; and (b) the option of a WEU command -- essentially accountable to the EC -- that might act instead of NATO to defend allied interests in or around Europe (e.g. in Eastern Europe or against threats from the Maghreb). It appears that the French have found the Germans and others so accommodating on the proposition of a European pillar separate from NATO that they no longer feel they need to offer their own re-integration into NATO as a quid pro quo.

The British have tried to anchor the WEU in NATO, but have shown too much flexibility in an effort to entice the French to return to NATO's military structure. We suspect them of being accommodating on this issue to offset their go-slow stance on the other major track of European integration: monetary union.

The Germans have been all too agreeable to French proposals out of a political motive to build European union upon a Franco-German foundation. Oddly, they seem to believe that by simply asserting their fidelity to NATO and their desire to keep us in Europe, they can agree to French positions on a separate European security entity without harming the Alliance. Whether the Germans will be equally malleable when the discussion turns to vital details is an open, and critical, question.

The U.S. Position and Next Steps

The British tell us that movement toward a European pillar is inexorable; all we can do is try to shape it. We fundamentally share this assessment.

We have told all the allies -- some of the small ones are least enamored with an EC security institution -- what we would not

welcome: direct subordination of the WEU to the EC; a WEU defense structure with missions that overlap with NATO's; and a weakening of NATO's command structure. At the same time, we have reiterated our support for a sensibly designed WEU-based European pillar with missions that complement NATO's.

Having applied the brakes, we need now to decide where and how to steer the debate. Despite our enhanced leverage because of developments in the USSR and the Gulf, we cannot quash European security cooperation; the process of European political integration, however bumpy, has an underlying momentum which the U.S. cannot and should not try to arrest. But we will have to decide how flexible, how insistent, and how prescriptive we should be.

Clearly, we must be more assertive with the Germans, whom we have allowed the French to seduce. At the end of the day, whatever Washington and Bonn can agree on will likely prevail. But the Germans must be persuaded to adopt a more hard-headed, less romantic view of the French and steel themselves against French threats to withdraw their forces from Germany if Bonn does not follow their lead.

As for the French, it is not yet time to surrender all hope that Mitterrand and Lanxade have the agility and the will to bring France back into NATO's military structure in conjunction with a new WEU and adaptations in the Alliance. Yet my own exchanges with Lanxade have left me increasingly pessimistic and the Quai openly favors maximizing independence from the U.S. of the European security institution. The President's meeting with Mitterrand in late March (or early April) will be decisive for gauging what is possible.

We will ask Bob to call together his European Strategy Steering Group in March to consider:

- An integrated U.S. view of how the European pillar can strengthen and complement the Alliance.
- A strategy for dealing with the main European actors (Bonn, London, Paris), including whether to try to coopt or to isolate the French.
- An operational consultative plan, e.g., interagency bilaterals with the principal allies, followed by reinforced Quad talks, culminating in NATO deliberations leading up to a June Ministerial and a Fall Summit on the future of the Alliance.

cc: Arnold Kantor 

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101421
RECEIVED: 26 FEB 91 18

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 27 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
DESERT STORM
KUWAIT

AP
IRAQ

PERSONS: HURD, DOUGLAS

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ UK FORN SEC HURD 27 FEB

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 01 MAR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO

GOMPERT

HAASS

NSC CHRON

ZELIKOW

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 7/2/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 2 OF 2

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: Wendy Aug
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 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

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 DOCLOG WED A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>WE</u> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>copy</u>	_____
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	_____
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>/</u>	<u>DAD</u>	<u>/</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

President's Mtg w/ UK For Sec Heard
Feb 27

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec's Office has dispatch

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 27, 1991

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

02 07 91

91 FEB 27 PM 12:31 1421

MEETING WITH
DOUGLAS HURD, UK FOREIGN SECRETARY

DATE: February 27, 1991

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 1:30 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

I. PURPOSE

To welcome Foreign Secretary Hurd to Washington, cement coalition solidarity on conditions for ending the war, and gain a brief overview of British postwar ideas.

II. BACKGROUND

Hurd was invited here by Secretary Baker to work on the details of the diplomacy to end the war. Like us, the British will want to buy time for sufficient coalition military action and fend off premature Soviet efforts to obtain a ceasefire in the UN Security Council.

The military situation remains fluid. Most Iraqi forces are in retreat; their lines of communication are being cut. There are likely to be heavier engagements with the Republican Guard on February 27. Pressure at the UN has eased for the moment, as the Perm Five have agreed on the need to await formal Iraqi acceptance of all 12 UN resolutions before considering any new resolutions. Our two countries agree on the need to develop an alternative UN resolution, to be tabled as needed, which properly states the conditions for a ceasefire.

In substance, the British views on war termination are practically identical to ours. They want to adapt the conditions you outlined on February 22 into a suitable UNSC resolution, including arrangements for speedy return of our POWs. (We also know the British want Iraq to allow Red Cross visits to POWs immediately, before a ceasefire comes into effect.)

Hurd has been publicly outlining London's views on postwar issues, including security arrangements for the region. You

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 27, 1991

1421

MEETING WITH
DOUGLAS HURD, UK FOREIGN SECRETARY

DATE: February 27, 1991

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 1:30 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

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To welcome Foreign Secretary Hurd to Washington, cement coalition solidarity on conditions for ending the war, and gain a brief overview of British postwar ideas.

II. BACKGROUND

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Chief of Staff

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might wish to hear a brief overview of some of his ideas. We are not far from the British, but we are not yet ready to exchange our own thinking in any detail on these topics. (Papers have been reviewed by Bob Gates' group but have not been approved at the cabinet level for your review.)

With a possible late-March visit by Mitterrand being planned, you might use this opportunity to let the British know you are eager to meet with Prime Minister Major as well. Since Major was at Camp David in December, one possibility would be a meeting with him on British territory in the Caribbean, sometime in April.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See List at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity followed by brief discussion.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biography

TAB A

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
MEETING WITH UK FOREIGN SECRETARY HURD

The War

- The war is going well. I understand your armored division has done a splendid job in destroying Iraqi armored forces. The coalition is holding together well, thanks in large part to your efforts, and those of Prime Minister Major.
- Although most of the Iraqi forces are retreating, they are not laying down their arms. Some of their units appear to be maneuvering for better positions. Others are standing fast and fighting. I think we both agree on the need to continue operations with no letup.
- We are not under much pressure at the moment in the Security Council since the Soviets agree Saddam must first accept all 12 UN resolutions. In any event, we need to delay any ceasefire until the military situation is right.
- I know you and Jim will be working on ways to delay premature action in the UN. I think our governments agree on the need to have a good resolution ready, adapting the conditions we worked out together last Friday.

Postwar Issues

- I understand your officials have been working with us on postwar issues, like security arrangements for Kuwait.
- How is your thinking shaping up on postwar security arrangements for the region?

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- Have you thought about some first steps to take advantage of any opportunities in the Arab-Israeli peace process?

Possible Major Visit

- We need to have a good discussion of postwar issues, and other topics too. Perhaps the Prime Minister could get together again in the spring, possibly in April.
- If it is convenient, we might even want to find a way to meet on British soil, outside of capitals. Maybe the Prime Minister might enjoy a visit to one of your islands in the Caribbean.

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TAB B

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PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and
Deputy for National Security Affairs
Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs
Philip Zelikow, Director for European Security Affairs
NSC Staff (Notetaker)

UK

Douglas Hurd, Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Sir Antony Acland, Ambassador to the U.S.
Patrick Fairweather, Deputy Under Secretary of State
Richard Gozney, Private Secretary (Notetaker)

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TAB C

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10e. Report	Re: Biography (2 pp.)	1/24/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [5]

Date Closed: 7/2/2009	OA/ID Number: 91147-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1421

February 26, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT/RICHARD HAASS *RW*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with UK Foreign Secretary
Douglas Hurd on Wednesday, February 27, at 1:30 pm

The President's meeting is scheduled to last only ten minutes. You would follow up for another twenty minutes, until your next appointment at 2:00 pm. Hurd will have an extended meeting with Secretary Baker later in the afternoon.

Baker invited Hurd to come to Washington. (Dumas will follow on Thursday; Genscher on Friday.) We understand that these discussions will focus on diplomacy to end the war, including a draft UN ceasefire resolution to be employed when the time is right. Our ideas on postwar security arrangements and the other papers tasked by Bob's small group are not yet ready for detailed discussion with our allies.

We have included in the memo to the President the suggestion that a meeting with John Major be planned for April, shortly after a late-March meeting with Mitterrand.

Concurrence by: Sandy Charles *PZ*

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants
Tab C Biography

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