

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:	Chronological Files

OA/ID Number:	91146
Folder ID Number:	91146-009

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [3]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	4

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	C
01b. Letter	President Collor to President Bush Re: [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	2/6/91	(b)(1)	
01c. Memo	George Van Eron to Brent Scowcroft Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary of February 8 (1 pp.)	2/8/91	(b)(1)	C
02. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Timing of NATO Summit Slipping to Autumn (1 pp.)	2/8/91	(b)(1)	C
03a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Prospects for Completing the START Treaty (3 pp.)	2/18/91	(b)(1)	S
03b. Memo	Arnold Kanter to Brent Scowcroft Re: Prospects for Completing the START Treaty (1 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	S
04a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens (2 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	S
04b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Arens (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04c. List	Re: Participants (1 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1222
OA/ID Number: 91146-009
Date Closed: 7/1/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04d. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Reply to Prime Minister Shamir (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04e. Letter	President Bush to Prime Minister Shamir (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04f. Letter	Prime Minister Shamir to President Bush RE: Personal (2 pp.)	2/4/91	(b)(1)	S
04g. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: The President's Meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens (1 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	Meg Lundsager to Robert Gates Re: Informal Steering Group Meeting on Desert Storm Data -- 1:00 p.m., Monday, February 11, 1991, White House Situation Room (2 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	C
05b. Agenda	Re: Informal Steering Group Meeting (1 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	C
05c. Table	Re: Desert Shield Military Assistance CY 1990 Commitments (1 pp.)	2/7/91	(b)(1)	
05d. Table	Re: Desert Shield/Storm Military Assistance Calendar Year 1991 Commitments (1 pp.)	2/4/91	(b)(1)	
05e. Table	Re: Gulf Crisis Financial Assistance (3 pp.)	2/5/91	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Date Closed: 7/1/2009
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05f. Table	Re: Gulf Crisis Financial Assistance 1990-91 Commitments and Disbursements (1 pp.)	2/5/91	(b)(1)	
05g. Report	Re: Sharing of Responsibility for the Coalition Effort in the Persian Gulf (5 pp.)	2/8	(b)(1)	
05h. Report	Re: Major Military and Economic Assistance Commitments (5 pp.)	2/5/91	(b)(1)	
05i. Agenda	Re: Informal Steering Group Meeting (1 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	C
06. Memo	Sandra Charles to Robert M. Gates Re: Law and Order in Post-Crisis Kuwait (2 pp.)	2/12/91	(b)(1)	S
07a. Letter	President Bush to King Hassan II (1 pp.)	2/13/91	(b)(1)	
07b. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Eagleburger Mission to Morocco (1 pp.)	2/12/91	(b)(1)	C
07c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Eagleburger Mission to Morocco (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07d. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with King Hassan (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Page 3 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1222
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Date Closed: 7/1/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101001
RECEIVED: 08 FEB 91 13

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 11 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS

BRAZIL

PERSONS: COLLOR DE MELLO, FERNANDO

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY AS OF 5 FEB

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 12 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON

LOGREF: 9100949

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
VAN ERON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CB NARA, Date 7/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 1001
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	<u>24.7/11</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>NIR</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____
 Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
2-11-91

1001

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

**President Collor de Mello of Brazil - February 5, 1991
(Received February 6)**

✓
President Collor de Mello acknowledges your January 28 letter concerning the Gulf Crisis. He supports the objectives of the UNSC resolutions and praises the UN's renewed role in world events. He condemns Iraq's treatment of allied POWs and Iraq's total disrespect for the Geneva Conventions. After the war has ended, he offers Brazil's support and assistance in the peace process.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0889-MR

MM 10/26/2015

(Unofficial translation)

FERNANDO COLLOR

PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL

TO HIS EXCELLENCY

GEORGE BUSH

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr. President, dear friend,

I have received your letter of last January 28, regarding the Gulf crisis. Our Governments thoroughly agree on the objectives to be pursued in the face of the situation established by Iraq's invasion of the sovereign State of Kuwait and its subsequent illegal annexation. The complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces and the restoration of the country's previous status, according to the resolutions approved by the Security Council, are the shortest way to ending the suffering and anguish nurtured by the current state of war.

2. Brazil supported from the first moment said resolutions and scrupulously abided by them, as a loyal member of the United Nations. My Government gives full value to the renewed rôle that the Organization has been called upon to play, a timely return to the spirit and text of the Charter of San Francisco, which leaves behind approximately four decades of multilateral deadlocks and

unilateral actions. The system of collective security created under the trauma of World War II, albeit always likely to be perfected, is the only alternative for order available at the international level and it is incumbent upon us to preserve it in an effort which, unfortunately, our predecessors did not demonstrate towards the League of Nations.

3. Respect towards the Charter of the United Nations as well as to international conventions, even in a situation of armed conflict, lead me to sincerely deplore the non-observance of the Geneva Conventions on prisoners-of-war, which adds new dimensions of tension and pain to the war tragedy. Would you please, Mr. President, convey to the prisoners' families, who are at this moment going through this anguish, my personal solidarity.

4. Brazil and the United States have fought side by side in other past conflicts, against the threat of universal tyranny and in support of democracy and peace. I am sure that shortly a rôle will be reserved for my Country to play in the current international crisis, when the necessary forces are called upon for the consolidation of a peace that I hope will soon be recovered.

I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Fernando Collor)

Palácio do Planalto, Brasília, 5th February, 1991

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1001

February 8, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: GEORGE VAN ERON *Van Eron*

SUBJECT: Heads of State Correspondence Summary
as of February 8

Attached at Tab I is a summary of the Heads of State
correspondence received by the Secretariat since Wednesday,
February 6.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached summary to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Summary for the President

Tab A President Collor de Mello - Brazil

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/26/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101017
RECEIVED: 08 FEB 91 16

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: ZELIKOW
GOMPERT
GORDON

DOC DATE: 08 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: NATO SUMMIT
USSR
EC

GREAT BRITAIN
MIDDLE EAST

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TIMING OF NATO SUMMIT SLIPPING TO AUTUMN

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 12 FEB 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPERT
GORDON
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 7/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Timing of Nat Summit -
Autumn

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WEA
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 1017
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
DOCLOG 4/11 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>WEA</u> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann		<u>COB</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
<u>APNSA Has Seen</u>			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHRON FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1017

February 8, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT/JOHN GORDON (Acting)

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Timing of NATO Summit Slipping to Autumn

*Nat Sec Advisor
has seen*

The NATO strategy review and other followup to the London Summit is proceeding. We and NATO have been assuming that this work would be capped by a NATO Summit in late spring or early summer. David observed however, during his talks at NATO, the growing conviction that it is not feasible to conclude this review with a NATO Summit before the fall. This is mainly due to the unsettled situation in both the Soviet Union and the Middle East. The EC is also unlikely to articulate necessary conceptions for its common foreign and security policy before the end of the year.

The British have now told State that they would prefer an autumn NATO summit. We agree. We would like to get the review done soon, to maintain momentum for change in NATO and take advantage of the general disillusionment with Moscow. But the need to mesh the Summit outcome with developments in the USSR, the Middle East, and the EC is compelling.

Concurrence by: Heather Wilson *H*

*arent these
contradictory?*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0889-MR
mm 10/26/2015

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101056
RECEIVED: 11 FEB 91 13

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 18 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL
USSR

START
TREATIES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR COMPLETING START TREATY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 14 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KANTER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KANTER

NSC-CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cep NARA, Date 7/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY: _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSJEB

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9101056

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SCOWCROFT
001
002 PRESIDENT
002

Z 91021118 FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
X 91040117 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
Z 91021810 FOR INFORMATION
X 91040117 NOTED BY PRES

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cep NARA, Date 7/1/09

~~SECRET~~

Prospects for Completing the START Treaty
National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: W-1 LOG # 1056
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>W-1</i> Ken Hill	<i>1</i>		<i>A</i>
Bill Sittmann	<i>1</i>	<i>W</i>	
Bob Gates	<i>2</i>	<i>8</i>	
Brent Scowcroft	<i>3</i>	<i>✓</i>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<i>4</i>	<i>2/18 AC</i>	<i>D</i>
NSC Secretariat	<i>5</i>		<i>N/R</i>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP *✓* Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

APNSA Has Seen

1056

~~SECRET~~

February 18, 1991

91 FEB 18 AM 10:39

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Prospects for Completing the START Treaty

Reg Bartholomew led an interagency team to Geneva last week to meet with their Soviet counterparts. The objective was to engage senior officials from Moscow along with their Geneva negotiating team in a major effort to complete START by the end of February. The effort was unsuccessful. The talks made virtually no progress in resolving the remaining issues. As a result, it is a near certainty that we will not reach the goal of finishing START by the end of the month.

Indeed, barring a dramatic change in Moscow's approach to START or our acceptance of Soviet positions on the outstanding issues, the prospects for completing START any time over the next few months are poor. All of the signs coming out of Moscow indicate that, if anything, Soviet START positions will harden. Acceptance by the U.S. of Soviet positions would, in many cases, modify important substantive and verification provisions in ways that could seriously undermine the security value of the START treaty and add substantially to the problems of getting it ratified.

Paradoxically, the Soviets seem eager -- even desperate -- to sign START, if only to mitigate the strains that arms control problems have put on the bilateral relationship and to open the way for your summit meeting with Gorbachev. But they are unwilling -- and their internal politics may make them unable -- to show any movement on the hard issues that remain.

You are aware of the harsh Soviet military and conservative criticism of Shevardnadze (and increasingly Gorbachev) for making arms control concessions that undermine Soviet security and superpower status. That backlash is a major reason for the unacceptable Soviet reinterpretation of their CFE obligations you addressed in your recent letter to Gorbachev, and for their inability to implement the chemical weapons destruction agreement

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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2010-0889-MR

MM 10/26/2015

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you and Gorbachev signed at last year's Washington summit. That same backlash would account for the complaints the Soviets are now making about the remaining START issues:

- Requirements for information exchange that are needed to verify START, but that the Soviet military resent and resist.
- Provisions that require the elimination of strategic weapons such as submarines and ICBMs that the hard-pressed Soviet military-industrial complex may not be able to replace in the future.
- Provisions that constrain ballistic missiles in ways that make already vulnerable Soviet leaders worry about how they will be exploited by their internal political opponents.

None of these substantive issues is new. In fact, in many ways they are what START is all about: achieving substantial reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides, concentrating reductions on ballistic missiles because they are more destabilizing, and ensuring that the treaty's provisions are verifiable. Thus, START would require both sides to provide information for verification that each would just as soon keep secret, and to destroy weapons that would be expensive or impossible to replace. These are the price of enhancing strategic stability and international security. Moreover, we have accepted extensive, even onerous, constraints on our bombers in an effort to persuade the Soviets to accept analogous limits on ballistic missiles.

What has changed is the political line-up in Moscow, symbolized by Shevardnadze's resignation and the increasingly explicit and harsh criticism of policies -- including START -- with which he has been associated. Many of those who did not and do not want a START treaty on any terms except their own are growing in influence. Many who had previously argued for Soviet flexibility in order to reach agreement no longer are willing to speak out or are being overruled.

It is possible, but not likely, that last week's stalemate in Geneva will send enough of a shock through the senior Soviet leadership to get the Soviets back to meaningful negotiations. Much more likely is a situation in which the START talks simply

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3

continue without conclusion over the next several weeks and months. During that time, Moscow's willingness and ability to reach closure will become clearer, and we will be able to work on substantive approaches that may help overcome the impasse on the remaining issues.

For now, we will need to manage the disappointed expectations that will result from the likely failure to achieve the goal of completing START by the end of February. We will want to convey a sense of disappointment, combined with a message that we have not given up and will continue to work toward a successful conclusion. We also will want to avoid announcing any new near-term goal or deadline by which we expect START to be finished.

The following elements might be part of that political strategy:

- Take a matter-of-fact approach that avoids creating a sense of "failure," or an impression that we are returning to the Cold War.
- Emphasize that the remaining START issues are enormously difficult, and that we will work as hard as possible but take as much time as necessary to resolve them.
- Propose to the Soviets a low-key joint announcement that the START negotiations in Geneva will be taking a routine recess in late February-early March (which would allow our people to take a richly deserved break), and will resume on some specific date (e.g., April 15).
- De-emphasize the linkage between signing START and holding a U.S.-Soviet summit, so that whenever a meeting with Gorbachev is appropriate, it is not held hostage to wrapping up START.

We can refine this approach between now and the end of the month, taking account of any developments that occur over the next two weeks.

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1056

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 11, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

SUBJECT: Prospects for Completing the START Treaty

The attached memorandum to the President reports on the status of, and gloomy near-term prospects for, the START negotiations in the wake of the Bartholomew-Obukov meetings in Geneva last week. It also sketches a political strategy for how to proceed on START in the likely event that the treaty is not completed by the end of February.

Rid Rich Davis, *g* John Gordon, *AK* Art Kuehne, and *AK* Condi Rice concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to the President

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0889-MR

MM 10/26/2015

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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101068
RECEIVED: 11 FEB 91 16

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROSTOW

DOC DATE: 11 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
DESERT STORM
UN

KUWAIT
USSR

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: GULF WAR / GORBACHEV STATEMENT ON EXCEEDING UN MANDATE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 14 FEB 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSTOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
ROSTOW

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

*The Gulf War: Gorbachev
Statement on Exceeding UN Mandate*
**National Security Council
The White House**



PROOFED BY: WEA LOG # 1068
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PRN A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>P</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>SA 2/13</u>	<u>N/R</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>APNSA Has Seen</u>	<u>N/R</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1068

Nat'l Sec Advisor
has seen

February 11, 1991

T. Accurbs
*B*INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: NICHOLAS ROSTOW *N*

SUBJECT: The Gulf War: Gorbachev Statement on Exceeding
the U.N. Mandate

On February 9, 1991, TASS issued a statement in President Gorbachev's name to the effect that, among other things, "the logic of military operations and the nature of military actions are threatening to exceed the mandate which is defined in these [U.N. Security Council] Resolutions" (Tab I). As the following memorandum argues, this warning seems misplaced as a matter of international law.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 speaks in two ways to the issue of permitted military operations. First, it authorizes the use of "all necessary means" -- i.e., armed force -- to achieve the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. What may constitute necessary force is left to the judgment of the states cooperating with Kuwait. Second, by recalling and reaffirming Resolution 661, which affirmed "the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the [U.N.] Charter," Resolution 678 says that military action in collective defense of Kuwait must conform to the law governing defensive uses of force.

The relevant rules developed in customary law prior to the adoption of the U.N. Charter, and the Charter's characterization of the right of self-defense as "inherent" generally has been viewed as reaffirming the validity of that law. The law requires that defensive uses of force be necessary and proportional. The necessity of military action was demonstrated by the failure of peaceful efforts to resolve the conflict, a fact recognized by the authorization to use force in Resolution 678. Proportionality of force is best defined as "what is reasonably necessary promptly to secure the permissible objectives of self-defense." (M. McDougal & F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 242 (1961)) In the Gulf context, the permissible objectives of self-defense have been defined authoritatively by

the Security Council as Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of regional peace and stability. The Council's definition is binding on all states and gives Coalition members flexibility in choosing the military means reasonably calculated to achieve these goals. Historical examples of the use of defensive force provide the best guide to what is proportional in the abstract and, indeed, in the Gulf war, because the law on this subject reflects the historical practice of states.

Iraq's use of massive force against Kuwait and in defense of the occupation of Kuwait legally justifies massive defensive attacks against that force. The objects of military force therefore may legally include those elements of Iraq's infrastructure that support and sustain the occupation of Kuwait.

The Security Council's authorization to use force to restore regional peace and security should be read in context; it is part of the goal of upholding and implementing all relevant resolutions related to Iraq's armed attack on Kuwait. Thus understood, driving Iraq out of Kuwait may be accomplished in a fashion, consistent with the Council's resolutions, that prevents Iraq from committing future military aggression against Kuwait and other regional states. The practical consequence is that the use of force in defense of Kuwait also legally may have the effect of bringing Iraq's military establishment to a level consistent with the restoration of regional peace and security.

Accordingly, a strong argument exists that, as a matter of international law, destroying Iraq's ability to sustain its occupation of Kuwait and capability for mounting other armed attacks against regional states is entirely consistent with the law governing the use of force in self-defense and the U.N. Security Council's mandate for Desert Storm. President Gorbachev's warning thus lacks legal foundation.

Attachment
Tab I Gorbachev Statement

cc: David Gompert
Richard N. Haass
Condoleezza Rice

<DIST>SIT: BURNS CHARLES HAASS RICE SANNER WELCH
<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 910209115601

<TEXT>FBIS 102
UNCLAS 3E

USSR: GORBACHEV STATEMENT ON GULF WAR (TAKE 1 OF 2)

LD0902163491 MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1538
GMT 9 FEB 91

[TEXT] MOSCOW, 9 FEB (TASS) -- A STATEMENT BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, THE USSR PRESIDENT, WAS CIRCULATED HERE TODAY. IT SAYS THE FOLLOWING:

EVENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION ARE TAKING AN INCREASINGLY ALARMING AND DRAMATIC TURN. THE FLYWHEEL OF ONE OF THE MAJOR WARS OF RECENT DECADES, IS SPINNING FREE. THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, INCLUDING THOSE AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, IS INCREASING. THE MILITARY ACTIVITY HAS ALREADY CAUSED ENORMOUS MATERIAL DAMAGE. WHOLE COUNTRIES -- FIRST KUWAIT AND NOW IRAQ AND LATER, POSSIBLY, OTHERS -- ARE UNDER THE THREAT OF CATASTROPHIC DESTRUCTION. THE DISCHARGE OF A GIGANTIC AMOUNT OF OIL INTO THE PERSIAN GULF MAY TURN INTO THE GRAVEST ECOLOGICAL DISASTER.

THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ONCE AGAIN CONFIRMS ITS PRINCIPLED LOYALTY TO THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH REFLECT THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES AND THE HOPES PEOPLE ARE PINNING UPON A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, WHICH EXCLUDES AGGRESSION AND ENCROACHMENT ON FOREIGN TERRITORIES AND NATURAL RESOURCES.

HOWEVER, THE LOGIC OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE NATURE OF THE MILITARY ACTIONS ARE THREATENING TO EXCEED THE MANDATE WHICH IS DEFINED IN THESE RESOLUTIONS.

THE PROVOCATIVE ATTEMPTS TO EXTEND THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WAR, TO DRAW ISRAEL AND OTHER STATES INTO IT, THEREBY IMPARTING YET ANOTHER DESTRUCTIVE DIMENSION, AN ARAB-ISRAEL ONE, TO THE ARMED CONFLICT, ARE ALSO EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

JUDGING BY STATEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE ON A POLITICAL LEVEL AND BY THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF INFLUENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE MASS MEDIA, THEY WANT TO ACCUSTOM PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CONFLICT TO THE IDEA THAT THE USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IS POSSIBLE AND PERMISSIBLE. IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN, THE WHOLE OF WORLD POLITICS, THE ENTIRE WORLD COMMUNITY WOULD BE SHAKEN TO ITS FOUNDATIONS.

(MORE)

09 FEB 1654Z CW

NNNN

<DIST>SIT: BURNS CHARLES HAASS RICE SANNER WELCH
<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 910209121623

<TEXT>FBIS 105
UNCLAS 3E

USSR: GORBACHEV STATEMENT ON GULF WAR (TAKE 2 OF 2--102FEB09)

LD0902164891

[TEXT] THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS WAR IS CAUSING GREAT CONCERN IN SOVIET SOCIETY AND IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, ESPECIALLY AS THE WAR IS RAGING ALONGSIDE THE BORDERS OF THE SOVIET UNION.

HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY, COMMON SENSE, AND HUMANITY DICTATE ONE CONCLUSION -- THE ACTIVATION OF ALL LEVERS OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION.

AT THE CRITICAL MOMENT I PUBLICLY TURN TO THE PRESIDENT OF IRAQ WITH AN INSISTENT APPEAL ONCE MORE TO CONSIDER EVERYTHING THAT IS AT STAKE FOR HIS COUNTRY, AND TO SHOW A REALISM WHICH WOULD ALLOW A WAY OUT ONTO THE PATH TO A RELIABLE AND JUST PEACE SETTLEMENT. I WILL IMMEDIATELY SEND A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO BAGHDAD FOR A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HUSAYN.

BY ACTING IN THIS WAY, WE WISH, TOGETHER WITH AND ALONGSIDE THE ARAB AND OTHER MUSLIM STATES, WITH THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND ASIA, AND ABOVE ALL WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WITH ALL THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, NOT ONLY TO HELP BRING ABOUT THE QUICKEST POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE SITUATION OF WAR BUT ALSO TO SET ABOUT PREPARING A STABLE AND EQUAL SYSTEM OF SECURITY IN A REGION THAT IS OF SUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE WHOLE WORLD -- A SYSTEM WHICH WILL, OF COURSE, INCLUDE A SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB- ISRAELI CONFLICT AND OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. A DECISIVE PART WILL BE PLAYED IN THIS PROCESS ABOVE ALL BY THE STATES SITUATED THERE. A WORTHY PLACE IN THE POST-WAR ARRANGEMENTS MUST ALSO BELONG TO IRAQ, THE PUBLIC OF WHICH CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT HAS HAPPENED, AND DESERVE SYMPATHY, COMPASSION, AND SUPPORT.

I REPEAT: IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH TOWARD PEACE IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, WE MUST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE EXTINGUISH THE CONFLAGRATION OF WAR IN THE GULF. THAT IS NOW THE MAIN THING.

(ENDALL)

09 FEB 1715Z CW

NNNN

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101037
RECEIVED: 11 FEB 91 09

CHRON FILE



TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 11 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL
IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA

AP
KUWAIT

PERSONS: SHAMIR, YITZHAK

ARENS, MOSHE

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS / PARTICIPANTS LIST / SHAMIR LTR RE PRES MTG
W/ DEFMIN ARENS 11 FEB

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 14 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF: 9100836 9100854

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS

~~NSC CHRON~~

WELCH

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 7/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSJEB

DOC 3 OF 3

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~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9101037

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

002 SCOWCROFT
003 PRESIDENT
003

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91021112 FOR SIGNATURE
Z 91021112 FOR INFORMATION
X 91021115 NOTED BY PRES

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 7/1/09

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 1037

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	<u>24.4.11</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REF ID: A66082
 91 FEB 11 02.34


A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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National Security Council
The White House

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LOG # 1037

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			

APNSA Has Seen

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Pres mtg w/ Arns at 11:30am
today*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec ofc has diskette

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens (2 pp.)	2/11/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [3]

Date Closed:	7/1/2009	OA/ID Number:	91146-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS

- I appreciate the Prime Minister's phone call yesterday and his letter of February 4.
- As he has often said, trust and mutual confidence are essential, and I think we have shown those qualities in our dialogue.
- When Prime Minister Shamir was here in December, we spoke in this office about contingencies that are now real.
- I have delivered on my word. Iraq as a strategic threat to Israel is being smashed.
- Israel's strategic position -- militarily and politically -- is much better today. Because you have not responded to Saddam's provocations, international opinion has sided with you and against him. Saddam's attempt to broaden the war has been frustrated.
- Any injury to any innocent Israeli hurts all of us greatly, but mercifully, the damage in Israel to people and property has been relatively modest. The military effort, to defend by the Patriots and to prevent by attacking the SCUD launching points, has been very successful.
- We will continue to devote extraordinary military and intelligence assets to this threat until it is totally eradicated. It will remain a top priority even after a

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Declassify on: OADR

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mm 10/26/2022

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2

ground campaign is launched.

- Greater casualties or even unconventional weapons are still possibilities. I note the Prime Minister's position from his letter.
- Please remind him that we would expect to be consulted promptly on the appropriate response. We have not come this far in our strategic cooperation only to see it fail.
- We have made extraordinary efforts, as Dick Cheney will tell you, to help in the defense and intelligence area. All that we have done is proof that you do not stand alone.
- We know you have paid high costs in defense expenditures and economic losses. We will continue to take your needs into account and to press others to do so as well.
- Bear in mind that our legislation requires us to leave the Desert Storm supplemental unencumbered. We will, however, review carefully any specific requests you pass on to security Cheney.
- I would like to add a word about post-crisis arrangements.
- It is not enough to win the war; we must also win the peace. We want to work with you and your government from an early point to build together an approach that will take advantage of the opportunities before us in the region.

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3

-- The essential element is a viable peace process that can attract and hold Israeli, Arab and Palestinian support. We welcome any ideas you have.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
2-11-91

WP

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for
National Security Affairs
Richard N. Haass, Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs

ISRAEL

Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0889-MR
mm 10/26/2015

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~~SECRET~~

0931

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Reply to Prime Minister Shamir

Purpose

To respond to Yitzhak Shamir's February 4 letter concerning Israel's posture in the Gulf crisis.

Background

Shamir's letter (Tab B), which was promptly leaked to the Israeli press, would appear to have two purposes: to restate Israel's position on retaliation for Iraqi attacks; and to press Israel's case for additional economic assistance.

Since Shamir stated that any Iraqi attack that was costly in human terms or that involved unconventional weapons would "necessitate immediate response," the reply State has prepared also restates our position for the record. Specifically, the reply makes it clear that we (1) expect Israel to consult with us on the appropriate response and (2) that Israel should not play into Saddam's game.

On the economic front, the response notes extraordinary U.S. assistance (e.g., Patriots), as well as our encouragement of Allied help.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Shamir at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Prime Minister Shamir
Tab B Letter from Prime Minister Shamir

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on:

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0889-MR
mm 10/26/2015

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I appreciate your letter of February 4 and our continuing close communications in these difficult times.

We continue to make every effort to eliminate Iraq's capability to launch SCUD missiles against Israel. For this reason, a significant portion of our air sorties are being directed at western Iraq. The whole world understands by now that Iraq's unprovoked attacks against Israel have no military value or purpose, but are instead a miscalculated attempt to widen the conflict caused by Iraq's aggression against Kuwait in order to undermine the anti-Iraq coalition.

Iraq's intentions have been confounded by the extraordinary restraint which the people and government of Israel have demonstrated in the face of repeated attacks against Israel's civilian population. We are thankful that the number of lives lost has been mercifully few. However, should Saddam inflict an attack on Israel that uses non-conventional weapons or causes substantial human casualties, I want you to know that we would expect to consult with you promptly on the appropriate response. Indeed, I would hope you would call me personally on such a matter.

I fully appreciate the weight of decisions you might be called upon to make for Israel if this dreaded contingency arises. At the same time, all that we have done and will continue to do against Saddam's forces is proof that Israel does not stand alone in this hour of crisis. I continue to believe -- and I know you concur --

that it is essential that everything possible be done to avoid playing into Saddam's hands by involving Israel militarily in this crisis. A great deal has already been done to diminish the strategic threat posed by Iraq to the region; it would be short-sighted to do anything that would jeopardize this accomplishment.

Mr. Prime Minister, let me assure you that I do understand Israel's unique position in this crisis, and that you are paying high costs both in defense expenditures and in economic losses. On the defense side, I authorized the unprecedented and rapid deployment of U.S. Patriot units to defend against Iraqi SCUD attacks. We are working closely with the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands to coordinate the transfer of additional Patriot units to Israel. We are also working to speed up additional defense assistance to Israel that had already been planned.

I have spoken with Chancellor Kohl to encourage him to provide urgent economic assistance to Israel, and we have been in touch with all of the EC governments to make clear our view that it is important for them to contribute support to Israel at this time. I am pleased that the EC decided recently to grant Israel this emergency assistance. It goes without saying that the United States, Israel's strongest friend, will continue to take Israel's needs into account as we manage the conclusion of this crisis in order to build a better and more stable future.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister of Israel

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04f. Letter	Prime Minister Shamir to President Bush RE: Personal (2 pp.)	2/4/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [3]

Date Closed: 7/1/2009	OA/ID Number: 91146-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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1037

February 11, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *RNH*
FROM: C. DAVID WELCH *C.W.O.*
SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Israeli Defense
Minister Moshe Arens

A memorandum to the President for his meeting with Israeli
Defense Minister Moshe Arens is at Tab I for your signature.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached memorandum to the
President.

Attachment

Tab I Meeting Memorandum to the President
Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Shamir Letter

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E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *MM* NARA, Date *11/26/2013*

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101040
RECEIVED: 11 FEB 91 10

TO: GATES

CHRON FILE

FROM: LUNDSAGER
DEAL

DOC DATE: 11 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DESERT STORM

ECONOMICS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STEERING GRP MTG RE DESERT STORM ON 11 FEB

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 14 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LUNDSAGER

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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LUNDSAGER
NSC CHRON

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By Cop NARA, Date 7/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9101040

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 GATES
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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91021111 FOR INFORMATION
X 91040512 NOTED BY GATES

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By Cee NARA, Date 7/1/09

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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LOG # 24-1040
 SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 DOCLOG 24 - A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>2</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>2</u>
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91 FEB 11 AM 11:31

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____
 Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS
Informal Steering Grp at 1:00pm today (2/11)

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1040

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/4/24

February 11, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *D*

FROM: MEG LUNDSAGER *MZ*

SUBJECT: Informal Steering Group Meeting on Desert Storm
Data -- 1:00 p.m., Monday, February 11, 1991,
White House Situation Room

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

You are meeting today at 1:00 with Defense, State, Treasury, and OMB to discuss the handling of military costs and receipts arising out of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The agenda is at Tab I. Each deputy will bring his legislative affairs official, as well as his working group representative. The driving force for this meeting is the House bill H.R. 586, which contains onerous reporting requirements, including very detailed breakdowns of costs and types of in-kind receipts. As a secondary issue, handling of public/press inquiries on costs should be agreed upon as well.

We suggest you begin the meeting by clarifying the handling of specific country contributions for 1991 first quarter costs (Tab II):

- o How should we portray the Japanese \$9 billion?
- o The UAE pledge is presently \$2 billion, should we press publicly for more (we asked for \$7.5 billion)?

The material that was released by State to Hill committees on Friday is also at Tab II. The table on 1990 foreign commitments and status of receipts for military costs could easily be expanded to cover 1991, once cash versus in-kind contributions become clarified. You should press Defense and OMB for specificity on their ability to provide up-to-date reporting that would enable regular release of data in this format. You might also ask Treasury for a brief report on disbursements to front-line states (Tabs II and III). The frequency for updating that information could be discussed as well.

This could lead into a discussion of H.R. 586 (summary at Tab IV), with its very burdensome requirements for data on U.S. and foreign costs and disbursements. Many of these requirements would be impossible to meet, but with some legislation likely to pass, we need to decide how much can be provided regularly.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Legislative officers will need a coordinated strategy for negotiating this bill into something more manageable.

The matter of a more narrative paper for public release, i.e. a revised version of the "White Paper," should be decided. At Tab V is the paper NSC drafted and released in January as well as a State-prepared list of all types of commitments by source. One format and one preparation point should be agreed upon.

Concurrence by: Virginia Lampley and David Welch

M L for

h L for

Attachments

Tab I	Agenda
Tab II	Package Released by State on Friday: 1990 costs and receipts, 1991 Commitments, Front-line States
Tab III	Detailed Status of Front-line States (not released)
Tab IV	Summary of H.R. 586
Tab V	NSC "White Paper," State paper

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMAL STEERING GROUP MEETING

FEBRUARY 11, 1991

AGENDA

- I. Introduction
- II. Status of 1991 Commitments
- III. Front-line States - Commitments and Receipts
- IV. Data Availability - H.R. 586
- V. Re-release of "White Paper"

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 44 NARA, Date 11/26/2013

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DESERT SHIELD MILITARY ASSISTANCE

CY 1990 COMMITMENTS 1/

(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

02/07/91

	Commitments	Receipts		Future Receipts
		Cash 2/	In-kind	
GCC STATES	6,845	4,136	971	1,738
SAUDI ARABIA	3,339	766	854	1,719 3/
KUWAIT	2,506	2,500	6	0
UAE	1,000	870	111	19 3/
GERMANY	1,072	272	568	232 4/
JAPAN	1,740 5/	866	206	668 4/
KOREA	80 6/	50	11	19 4/
OTHERS	3	0	3	0
SUBTOTAL	9,740	5,324	1,759	2,657
U.S.	1,354		1,354	0
GRAND TOTAL	11,094	5,324	3,113	2,657

1/ Data compiled by OMB. Sources of data: Commitments for August - December 31 - Defense, State, Treasury; Cash received - Treasury; Receipts and value of in-kind assistance - Defense; Total cost for August - December 31 - Defense.

2/ \$1 billion has been released from the Defense Cooperation Account to Defense in accordance with the FY '91 Appropriations Act.

3/ Reimbursement from Saudi Arabia and UAE awaiting bill from Defense. Saudi reimbursement includes enroute transportation through December for the second deployment and in-theater expenses for food, building materials, fuel, and support.

4/ In-kind assistance from Germany, Japan, and Korea. Orders made and receipt of goods expected soon.

5/ Japan pledged \$260 million to other coalition forces for total contributions of \$2 billion.

6/ Korea pledged \$15 million to other coalition forces for total contributions of \$95 million.

**Desert Shield/Storm Military Assistance
Calendar Year 1991 Commitments**

	(\$ millions)
Saudi Arabia	13,500
Kuwait	13,500
Japan	9,000
Germany	5,500
Korea	280
TOTAL	41,780

Information as of February 4, 1991.

TABLE A**GULF CRISIS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE ***

(\$ Billions - as of 2/5/91)

Donor/Creditor	Commitments
GULF STATES	9.5
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY	2.3
JAPAN	2.1
OTHER	0.4
TOTAL	14.3

* Includes all commitments to date for extraordinary economic assistance in 1990 and 1991.
Does not include contributions to the multinational force, existing bilateral assistance, or funds made available by the IMF and World Bank.

TABLE B

GULF CRISIS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE * (\$ Billions - as of 2/5/91)

Donor/Creditor	Total Commitments	1990-91 Commitments	
		Egypt/Turkey/Jordan	Unallocated**
GULF STATES	9.5	6.1	0.3
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY	2.3	2.0	0.2
JAPAN	2.1	2.0	0.1
OTHER	0.4	0.2	0.1
TOTAL	14.3	10.3	0.7
			3.3

* Includes all commitments to date for extraordinary economic assistance in 1990 and 1991.

Does not include contributions to the multinational force, existing bilateral assistance, or funds made available by the IMF and World Bank.

** Includes both unallocated commitments and multilateral humanitarian assistance.

TABLE C

GULF CRISIS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE *

(\$ Billions - as of 2/5/91)

Donor/Creditor	Commitments	Disbursements
GULF STATES	9.5	5.6
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY	2.3	0.6
JAPAN	2.1	0.4
OTHER	0.4	0.1
TOTAL	14.3	6.7

* Includes all commitments to date for extraordinary economic assistance in 1990 and 1991.
Does not include contributions to the multinational force, existing bilateral assistance, or funds made available by the IMF and World Bank.

**GULF CRISIS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE *
1990-91 COMMITMENTS AND DISBURSEMENTS**

(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

	TOTAL		EGYPT		TURKEY		JORDAN		UNALLOCATED 1/		Other States		GRAND TOTAL	
	Committ.	Future Disb.	Committ.	to Date	Future Disb.	Committ.	to Date	Future Disb.	Committ.	to Date	Future Disb.	Committ.	to Date	Future Disb.
GCC STATES 2/	6348	3230	3123	2383	760	2995	800	2195	0	0	0	230	67	163
Saudi Arabia 3/	2848	1768	1686	1368	300	1180	400	780	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kuwait	2500	855	1015	555	460	1485	300	1185	0	0	0	0	0	0
UAE 3/	1000	587	413	420	0	360	100	250	0	0	0	230	67	163
EC	2228	557	1671	208	917	434	90	344	455	194	261	215	66	149
EC Budget	805	78	726	16	239	240	2	239	214	10	204	96	51	45
Bilateral:	1424	479	945	192	679	194	86	106	240	184	56	119	15	104
Belgium	33	7	26	6	10	7	0	7	10	1	1	0	0	0
Denmark	30	14	16	4	16	3	3	0	3	3	0	4	4	0
France 4/	200	0	200	0	50	30	0	30	20	0	20	100	0	100
Germany	895	362	533	154	519	74	74	0	148	134	14	0	0	0
Ireland	6	0	6	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy 5/	150	37	114	75	10	49	0	49	27	27	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	4	1	3	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0
Netherlands	63	45	18	18	0	18	11	7	18	11	7	9	5	4
Portugal	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	36	9	27	12	0	11	0	11	14	9	5	0	0	0
U.K.	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	0
OTHER EUROPE/AUSTRALIA	234	49	186	13	2	9	2	7	37	18	19	175	27	148
Australia	14	3	11	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	3	10
Austria	11	1	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	15	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	1	10
Iceland	3	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	0	15
Norway	32	14	18	2	2	5	2	3	2	2	0	1	1	0
Sweden	52	21	31	10	0	4	0	4	26	16	10	12	6	15
Switzerland	109	9	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	109	9	100
JAPAN 6/	2120	445	1675	624	0	720	216	502	716	187	849	60	60	0
CANADA	66	17	49	22	0	4	0	4	23	0	23	17	17	0
KOREA	83	5	78	23	0	20	5	15	15	2	15	25	0	25
(a) TOTAL COMMITMENTS	11060	4304	6776	4931	2358	4182	1115	3087	1246	379	867	721	237	484
(b) EST. EFFECT OF GULF CRISIS 7/	13580	13580	-	3375	3375	5910	5910	-	4295	4295	-	-	-	-
DIFFERENCE (a minus b)	-2500	-9276	-	1558	-802	-1728	-4795	-	-3049	-3016	-	-	-	-

* Does not include contributions to the multinational forces. Totals may not equal sum of components due to rounding. Based on data submitted to the Coordinating Group. 1/ Unallocated among Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. Includes general humanitarian assistance. 2/ GCC financing for "Other States" is for Syria, Morocco, Lebanon, Somalia, and Djibouti. 3/ Grant oil to Turkey: \$1160 million from Saudi Arabia and \$250 million from the UAE. 4/ Protocols for \$130 million of grand total were signed by end November. Aid to "Other States" is for Morocco. 5/ Italian aid to "Other States" is for Somalia. 6/ All GCI procedures for \$322 million to Egypt completed, awaiting parliamentary approval in Egypt. 7/ IMF/World Bank estimates (not at \$11/trillion) circulated in Group shows for illustrative purposes. Not intended to represent precise figure of impact.

February 8, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: VIRGINIA LAMPLEY

FROM: BRET COULSON

SUBJECT: Analysis of H.R. 586

This bill (H.R. 586) contains two separate reporting requirements: 1, a report (Section 1) by the Secretary of Defense on the costs of the war; and 2, a report (Section 2) by the Secretary of State on foreign contributions to the war.

Section 1:

Requires the Secretary of Defense to provide an initial report (covering the period August 1 - December 31, 1990) within 14 days of enactment of the act, with subsequent reports due on the 15th of each month (beginning the first month after the enactment of the act) until 1 year after the end of the conflict.

This report will consist of two parts:

I. The first part will cover the month before the preceding month (ie, the May report will cover March)*, and will provide (for that month):

1. The costs incurred by the U.S.;
2. The total of such costs by fiscal year to date;
3. Nonrecurring costs;
4. Specific costs (within the following categories: airlift, sealift, personnel, personnel support, operations & maintenance, fuel, special operations, procurement, and military construction).

Only costs associated with the war are to be included in the report -- no costs that would be incurred under normal operations will be included.

II. The second part of the report will cover the preceding month#, and will contain the amount each foreign country is contributing to the U.S. to defray the costs of the war.

The contributions will be categorized as follows:

1. Cash payments pledged;
2. Cash payments received;
3. Description and value of in-kind contributions pledged;
4. Description and value of in-kind contributions received.

The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Secretary of State in preparing this portion of the report.

* except for the first regular monthly report which will cover January 1991.

except for the first regular monthly report which will cover January and February 1991.

Section 2

Requires the Secretary of State to provide an initial report (covering the period August 1 - December 31, 1990) within 30 days of enactment of the act, with a second report due by April 15, 1991 (or 30 days after enactment of the act, whichever is later), and subsequent reports due on the 15th day after the end of each calendar quarter (July 15, October 15, January 15, ad naseum). The quarterly reports will provide the appropriate information for the preceding quarter.

This report will provide the following information:

1. All of the data provided in part 2 of the Secretary of Defense's report (see Section 1 above) for the quarter;
2. The aggregate costs incurred by each foreign country whose armed forces are participating in the war;
3. The value and description of assistance pledged and received by "directly affected countries" (Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Israel, and any other country the President determines is significantly affected economically by the war);
4. The value and description of assistance pledged and received by any other third countries;
5. The value and nature of assistance pledged and received by:
 - a. Any United Nations organization
 - b. The International Committee of the Red Cross
 - c. Any other appropriate international or non-governmental organization;
6. The total value of the contributions listed above from 1-5 pledged and received;
7. A description of any other form of non-financial contribution to the U.S. by a foreign country, with a description to the extent possible of the value of such support.

Cumulative totals to all of the above information (1-7) shall also be included in the report. This informations shall be provided in an unclassified report, with a classified annex if necessary. The Secretary of State shall consult with the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury (and any other appropriate Government official) in preparing this report.

N.S.C.

Sharing of Responsibility for
the Coalition Effort in the Persian Gulf
(Feb 8 update)

Many other countries are doing their part to support the coalition effort in the Persian Gulf. Our partners in the coalition have contributed in three ways:

- First, 27 other countries have their own combat forces contributing to the coalition against Iraq. They have now committed more than 270,000 troops, 66 warships, over 750 combat aircraft, and more than 1100 tanks in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and the Persian Gulf. Pilots from eight other allied nations have flown more than 8000 sorties in the air campaign. Coalition forces have engaged in ground combat alongside our forces and, like us, they have suffered casualties. Turkey has allowed air operations against Iraq from its territory and has significantly enhanced its defense capabilities opposite Iraq.
- Second, other countries have given money and other assistance to us to pay most of the cost of both Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. Our incremental costs for Desert Shield were roughly \$11 billion in calendar year 1990. Assuming Congress enacts the necessary appropriation, we expect our coalition partners to pay about \$9.7 billion, or nearly 90% of those incremental expenses. Now, for calendar year 1991, we have received commitments of about \$42 billion to cover the financial costs for Desert Storm in the first three months of this year. We are confident our friends and allies will continue to bear the bulk of the financial burden in this struggle.
- Third, other countries have taken on the responsibility for assisting those nations which have suffered the most from enforcement of the international economic sanctions against Iraq. The Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group established by President Bush has received pledges of \$14.3 billion in exceptional economic assistance for these hard-hit states, of which nearly half, \$6.7 billion, has already been disbursed.

Other Countries' Military Forces in the Gulf. Thirty-four countries, including the U.S., have joined forces in responding to the crisis in the Gulf. 27 other states have contributed combat units to the coalition; six more have provided support or medical units. In general, given their limited capabilities to support large-scale force deployments, other states have contributed what they can and what we have asked.

Public opinion in key allied countries, led by firm statements from their heads of government, is overwhelmingly supportive of the coalition military action in the Gulf. For example, 84% of the British people, 76% of the French, 64% of the Germans, and

61% of Italians have supported the use of force against Iraq in recent polls. Similar majorities endorse their own countries actions and President Bush's personal performance in the crisis.

The contributions from our coalition partners are militarily significant. Our allies have already flown more than 8,000 sorties in the air campaign. For example, Kuwaiti A-4 aircraft successfully struck Iraqi infantry and artillery positions and other military installations in their occupied homeland. The British used their GR-1 Tornados and Jaguars to strike bridges, radar, communication, as well as ammunition and petroleum storage sites, and joined in strikes against airfields in southern Iraq and Kuwait. Saudi F-5s attacked command posts and artillery sites in Kuwait and airfields in western Iraq, while Saudi Tornados teamed with our F-111 aircraft to hit key airfields and Saudi F-15s shot down Iraqi planes. French Jaguars attacked the Republican Guards and military installations in western Iraq, while other French aircraft provided aerial refueling and fighter protection. Canadian CF-18 aircraft provided escort and air cover along with help in cutting off Iraqi military supplies. Qatar's Mirage F-1s flew in combined attacks on SCUD sites. Bahraini F-5s hit radar and missile sites in southern Kuwait. Italian Tornados struck Iraqi forces in and around occupied Kuwait.

On the ground, Saudi and Qatari units led the counterattack which expelled Iraqi forces from Khafji, taking hundreds of prisoners. Syrian forces have exchanged artillery fire with Iraqi forward positions in Kuwait.

Our allies are also paying the price for their support. Ten coalition aircraft have been lost in action; British, Italian, and Kuwaiti airmen are missing in action or being held as prisoners of war. Saudi and Qatari soldiers have been killed and wounded in ground action.

Some other military contributions include:

- The Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have deployed their ground forces to Saudi Arabia.
- Egypt has sent a mechanized corps, including an armored division, a mechanized division, and a Ranger regiment -- hundreds of armored vehicles and more than 30,000 troops. A Syrian division and forces from other Muslim states are also deployed against Iraq.
- Britain has deployed a heavy armored division and has sent more than 70 combat aircraft, a total of over 30,000 soldiers and airmen. A French light armored division is in place too, along with over 130 combat aircraft.

- Canada and Italy have sent combat aircraft to the Gulf; Czechoslovakia has deployed a chemical decontamination unit. Poland, Hungary, New Zealand, Korea, and Singapore have sent medical teams to help.
- Turkey has supported the UN effort, allowing strikes against Iraq from its territory, and has substantially strengthened its defenses opposite Iraq. NATO approved the unprecedented dispatch of its rapid deployment units -- German, Belgian, and Italian planes -- to help this Alliance member. The Netherlands has also deployed Patriot batteries and Hawk air defense systems to shield Turkey from attack; Germany is also deploying air defense units from its Bundeswehr to Turkey.

Fourteen navies also have fighting vessels patrolling the Persian Gulf and nearby waters. Our coalition partners have stopped and boarded over three hundred ships to help enforce the UN's economic sanctions.

Assistance For Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are providing substantial cash and host nation support. They are covering more than 60% of the costs of Operation Desert Shield in 1990, and have agreed to bear a major part of the financial costs for Desert Storm. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have committed \$27 billion to cover costs for the first three months of 1991. Pledged support has been disbursed promptly. Their host nation support includes food, fuel, water, facilities, and local transport for US forces.

Japan is contributing over \$1.7 billion to Desert Shield in 1990 (and \$260 million to other coalition partners). More than half of the assistance to us was in cash and the remainder came or is coming through in-kind support, including support for transport costs and purchases of U.S.-made computers, vehicles and construction equipment. The Japanese government recently pledged an additional \$9 billion for Operation Desert Storm. German support in 1990 exceeded a billion dollars, including in-kind support such as heavy equipment transporters and other valuable equipment from existing stocks like modern chemical detection vehicles. Germany has made a firm commitment to provide \$5.5 billion in cash for Operation Desert Storm expenses for the first quarter of 1991. Germany has also provided extensive support for the movement of US forces from Europe to the Gulf and aid to Britain (over \$500 million for 91), Turkey (over \$1 billion in military assistance) and Israel (over \$100 million). Korea has provided cash and lift support from the beginning and has recently pledged an additional \$280 million for Desert Storm.

Exceptional Economic Assistance. With our own resources concentrated on the military effort against Iraq, we organized

the international effort to allow other countries to provide financial assistance to the nations most hard-hit by the crisis and sanctions. Our partners in this effort have made commitments amounting to \$14.3 billion for assistance to front-line states and other countries. About \$6.7 billion of this total has already been disbursed. Our Arab partners, Germany, Japan, and the European Community have been leading contributors and we look to them and other countries to accelerate the disbursement of funds already committed and make additional commitments. Also, Japan has pledged to take the lead in evacuating refugees from the area of conflict. Additionally, in response to President Bush's proposals and with strong support from other creditor countries, the IMF and World Bank moved swiftly to adapt their lending procedures to enable them to alleviate more effectively the economic effects of the crisis on a wide range of countries.

More Needs to be Done. The contributions in 1990 were substantial and, increasingly, countries are pledging what we have asked them to pledge. We are working now to:

- Ensure prompt disbursement of the new commitments to cover incremental costs for Operation Desert Storm; and
- For the front line states, accelerate disbursements of previous commitments of economic assistance, particularly for Turkey, and obtain new commitments for the front line states and for Eastern Europe to help cover the continuing economic costs of the sanctions.

Annex: Countries Involved in Responsibility-Sharing

Providing Combat Forces

ARGENTINA (naval)
 AUSTRALIA (naval)
 BAHRAIN (ground, air)
 BANGLADESH (ground)
 BELGIUM (air in Turkey, naval)
 CANADA (air, naval)
 DENMARK (naval)
 EGYPT (ground)
 FRANCE (ground, air, naval)
 GERMANY (air and ground in Turkey, naval)
 GREECE (naval)
 ITALY (air, naval)
 KUWAIT (ground, air, naval)
 MOROCCO (ground)
 NETHERLANDS (ground in Turkey, naval)
 NIGER (ground)
 NORWAY (naval)
 OMAN (ground, air)
 PAKISTAN (ground, naval)
 QATAR (ground, air)
 SAUDI ARABIA (ground, air, naval)
 SENEGAL (ground)
 SPAIN (naval)
 SYRIA (ground)
 TURKEY (home defense)
 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (ground, air)
 UNITED KINGDOM (ground, air, naval)

Providing Combat Support and Combat Service Support Forces

CZECHOSLOVAKIA (CW decontamination)
 HUNGARY (medical)
 REPUBLIC OF KOREA (transport, medical)
 NEW ZEALAND (transport, medical)
 POLAND (medical)
 SINGAPORE (medical)

Assistance to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

GERMANY
 JAPAN
 REPUBLIC OF KOREA
 KUWAIT
 SAUDI ARABIA
 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
 (plus aid in the deployment of our forces from others, including
 DENMARK, FRANCE, GREECE, ITALY, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL, SPAIN,

State
February 5, 1991

MAJOR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS
(Provisional figures awaiting clearance; not for distribution)

KEY:

Ships: Unless otherwise stated, denotes contributions to multilateral force in the Gulf area. Includes combatants, support vessels and/or minesweepers. All promised ships have arrived.

Aircraft: All promised aircraft have arrived

Lift: Unless otherwise stated, denotes sealift for U.S. forces. Chart specifies whether lift was provided in kind or whether money to pay for it was offered instead. "For charter" indicates that ships will be released, but at cost to the U.S.

Transits/Base Rights:

Not listed here because all NATO countries have provided unlimited clearance. The bulk of equipment for the Gulf transited the FRG and Spain.

Frontline States: Egypt, Turkey and Jordan

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>MILITARY ASSISTANCE</u>	<u>ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE</u>
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Gulf States:

SAUDI ARABIA	CY1990: \$3.3 bn. commitment in host nation support and other assistance: --\$854 mn in food, fuel, water, facilities and transport for U.S. forces (rec'd) --\$760 mn cash (rec'd) --\$1.7 bn. for HNS and transport (in process) Saudi armed forces (95,000) Q1/1991: \$13.5 bn. commitment	Frontline-\$2.8 bn
KUWAIT	CY1990: \$2.5 bn cash (rec'd) Surviving ground and air forces Q1/1991: \$13.5 bn. commitment	Frontline-\$2.5 bn

UAE armed forces

(the Gulf states have also pledged \$3.2 bn to other affected states)

1

GERMANY	CY 1990:	
	\$1072 mn. commitment to U.S.:	
--	\$272 mn in cash (rec'd),	Frontline-\$888 mn
--	\$66 mn. in-kind (rec'd)	Refugees -\$ 7 mn
--	\$734 mn in kind (in process)	Other states - \$69 mn
	\$1.5 bn. to Turkey and U.K.	

Q1/1991:
\$5.5 bn commitment to U.S.
\$533 mn to U.K.

ITALY	4 ships, 8 Tornados	Frontline-\$146 mn
	1 aircraft detachment to	Refugees-\$4 mn
	Turkey.	Other states-\$9 mn
	Lift: \$ 4 mn	

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LUXEM- BOURG	Transits \$2 mn for WEU -of planned \$6 mn for naval ops cost	Frontline-\$ 3 mn Refugees -\$ 1 mn
NETHER- LANDS	2 ships 50,000 CBW suits for Turkey	Frontline- \$ 60 mn Refugees - \$ 3 mn
NORWAY	1 ship (Gulf) 3 ships (Atlantic) 1 tanker: \$14 mn worth of JP-5 aviation fuel for U.S. (150,000 barrels)	Frontline-\$32 mn Other states-\$21 mn
PORTUGAL	1 ship to assist UK Lift: 2 ships offered for charter	
SPAIN	3 ships Airlifted U.S. forces to Turkey Full assistance to U.S. airlift Providing basing for U.S. aircraft	Frontline-\$26 mn Refugees - \$9 mn
TURKEY	Shut off pipeline Increased troop alert posture Providing basing for US aircraft	None
U.K.	40,000 troops 12 ships 54 fighters, plus other aircraft Lift: 2 ships offered, free Providing basing for U.S. aircraft	Refugees - \$5 mn

Other European:

EC Commis.	None	Frontline-\$682 mn Refugees- \$122 mn
IRELAND	None	Frontline -\$ 6 mn
AUSTRIA	Overflights	Frontline- \$21 mn Refugees - \$1 mn
BULGARIA	Offered CBW unit Offered transport	

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CYPRUS	Transits Aircraft beddown	None
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA	Deployed anti-CW medical unit, CW detection equipment (for sale to U.S. and Gulf states)	None
FINLAND	None	Frontline -\$ 6 mn Refugees-\$ 9 mn
HUNGARY	None	
POLAND	Deployed 2 ships (1 hospital and 1 support); and 1 field hospital.	None
ROMANIA	Offered medical aid water, oil refining, R&R for U.S. troops	None
SWEDEN	None	Frontline-\$23 mn Refugees- \$28 mn
SWITZER- LAND	None	Frontline-\$100 mn Refugees- \$ 9 mn
USSR	None	None
YUGO- SLAVIA	None	None

Asia:

JAPAN	<u>CY1990:</u> \$2 bn. commitment: \$1740 mn to U.S.: --\$866 mn. in cash (rec'd) --\$206 mn. in-kind (rec'd) --\$668 mn. in-kind (in process) \$260 mn to other coalition forces <u>Q1/1991:</u> \$9 bn commitment	Frontline-\$2 billion Refugees-\$22 mn
KOREA	<u>CY1990</u> \$95 mn. commitment: \$80 mn. to U.S.: --\$50 mn cash (rec'd) --\$11 mn in-kind (rec'd) --\$19 mn in-kind (in process) \$15 mn to other coalition forces Military medical team deployed to Saudi Arabia. <u>Q1/1991:</u> \$280 mn commitment	Frontline-\$83 mn. Other states-\$17 mn

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AUSTRALIA	3 ships, 2 medical teams	Frontline-\$11 mn. Refugees-\$ 3 mn.
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NEW ZEALAND	Deployed 2 C-130s to support British forces
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Other Arab/Islamic:

BAHRAIN	250 ground troops to Saudi Arabia. Providing access to ports, bases, and logistic facilities.	None
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BANGLA- DESH	2,000 ground troops	None
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EGYPT	30,000 ground troops deployed.	None
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MOROCCO	2,000 ground troops	None
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NIGER	500 ground troops	None
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OMAN	1,000 ground troops to Saudi Arabia. Providing access to ports, bases, and logistic facilities.	None
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PAKISTAN	10,000 ground troops	None
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QATAR	1,000 ground troops to Saudi Arabia. Providing access to ports, bases, and logistic facilities.	None
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SENEGAL	500 ground troops	None
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SYRIA	Currently completing deployment of 18,000 ground troops.	None
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Other:

ARGENTINA	2 ships	None
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INFORMAL STEERING GROUP MEETING

FEBRUARY 11, 1991

AGENDA

- I. Introduction
- II. Status of 1991 Commitments
- III. Front-line States - Commitments and Receipts
- IV. Data Availability - H.R. 586
- V. Re-release of "White Paper"

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/26/2013

INFORMAL STEERING GROUP
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1991
1:00PM - 2:00PM
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE

Andy Card (Invited)
Robert Gates

OVP

Carnes Lord

NSC

Tim Deal
Ginny Lampley
David Welch

STATE

Robert Kimmitt
Eugene McAllister
Janet Mullins

TREASURY

John Robson
David Mulford
Mary Sophos

DOD

Donald Atwood
I. Lewis Libby
Patricia Howe

OMB

William Diefenderfer
Robert Howard

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE


RECORD ID: 9101085
RECEIVED: 12 FEB 91 13

TO: GATES

CHRON FILE

FROM: CHARLES
HAASS

DOC DATE: 12 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: KUWAIT

IRAQ

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LAW & ORDER IN POST - CRISIS KUWAIT

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 15 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 7/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

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DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9101085

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 GATES
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91021218 FOR INFORMATION
X 91021413 NOTED BY GATES

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By SP NARA, Date 7/1/09

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Law and Order in Post-Crisis Kuwait

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: SLM

LOG # 1085

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG SM A/O _____

REF

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>SA 9:14</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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1085

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 12, 1991

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: ~~SANDRA~~ CHARLES

SUBJECT: Law and Order in Post-Crisis Kuwait

For several months, it has become evident that there will be some friction in post-war Kuwait between the Kuwaitis and the Palestinians and Iraqis, as well as between the returning citizens and the Kuwaiti resistance. The government-in-exile (GOK) is grappling with the issue of how to include elements of the Resistance as well as the political opposition into a political structure in the post-war period. To preclude a recurrence of the security problem created by too many expatriates, the GOK apparently has decided to restrict the number of third country nationals, particularly Jordanians, Palestinians and Yemenis, allowed to live in liberated Kuwait.

We have already laid down a marker with the GOK on its responsibility after the liberation of Kuwait for the protection of civilians and displaced persons, including Palestinians and Iraqis. We have advised them that U.S. forces liberating Kuwait will protect all noncombatants in their area of control. We obviously would want to avoid a situation where U.S. forces had to fire on Kuwaitis in order to protect such noncombatants, or to referee battles between groups holding different views on Kuwait's future.

GOK has already begun to think about his issue and has assured us its policy would be grounded in respect for international law and protection of all elements of the populations. Still, the real worry GOK officials have is whether they will be able to control all their citizens, no matter what the official policy is.

The GOK has issued orders to the Kuwaiti Security Forces who will restore law and order in Kuwait as follows:

- a) government policy is full protection for all nationalities in accordance with international law;
- b) police are instructed to take action against violators of this policy;

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- c) police are instructed to protect all elements of the population.

The GOK currently plans for 800 policemen to enter Kuwait attached to each Army brigade to help quickly establish law and order. There is concern of possible retribution by aggrieved Kuwaitis when there is no authority present, particularly as Iraqi forces retreat and before Coalition and Kuwait forces have reestablished some authority. There will have to be close coordination between the GOK and Allied forces to ensure that the transition from military to civil police authority is smooth and effective. The GOK is considering a public affairs initiative to educate its people to the human rights and international law aspects of this issue, and to describe correct mechanisms for bringing people to justice and redressing grievances.

Consistent with our concerns, Bandar told Ambassador Freeman that the Saudis and Kuwaitis have worked out an arrangement on dealing with Palestinian collaborators to preclude the possibility of Kuwaiti retribution against them once Kuwait is liberated. Per Bandar, once urban areas in Kuwait are liberated and controlled by Arab forces, every Kuwaiti soldier on patrol would be teamed with one Saudi and one Egyptian soldier to assure that the Palestinians would not be unnecessarily harassed or harmed. Joint Arab forces would seek Kuwaiti Resistance members' help in contacting Palestinians active in the Resistance who would be asked to identify Palestinians who had collaborated with Iraq. They would then be gathered together in an orderly manner and ultimately expelled to Iraq.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101080
RECEIVED: 12 FEB 91 09

TO: HASSAN II

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 13 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MOROCCO
PERSIAN GULF
IRAQ

TELCALL
ALGERIA
KUWAIT

PERSONS: HASSAN II
EAGLEBURGER, L

BEN ALI, ZINE

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO KING HASSAN RE EAGLEBURGER MISSION

ACTION: FOR DELIVERY

DUE DATE: 15 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
EAGLEBURGER, L

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAASS
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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 7/1/09

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DOC 2 OF 2

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 13, 1991

Your Majesty:

At this critical time in world affairs, I want you to know how very much I value U.S.-Moroccan friendship and how much I appreciate your personal support and advice. Our telephone conversation was particularly timely; I found your views very insightful, and I hope we can continue the dialogue.

Your contribution to the defense of Saudi Arabia has been an act of courage and wisdom that has won worldwide respect. I am acutely aware of the serious challenges presented by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, with its many ramifications throughout the world. I know too of the pressures on Morocco that have resulted from your principled decision to help your Arab brethren in their hour of need.

I appreciate your receiving Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger. In addition to bringing my personal greetings and respects, I have given him the mission of reviewing with you where we are in the war to liberate Kuwait and where we will go in the days and weeks ahead. He has my absolute trust and confidence.

I look forward to speaking with you again soon and sharing views on these and other important issues.

With personal regards,

Sincerely,

His Majesty
Hassan II
King of Morocco
Rabat

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letter "G" being large and prominent. The "B" is also large and loops around. The rest of the name "ush" is written in a more compact, cursive style.

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1080

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 12, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS
FROM: C. DAVID WELCH
SUBJECT: Eagleburger Mission to Morocco

Brent: ① President is free to
phone from 2¹⁵-4⁰⁰
today

② Larry is reviewing
text of letter

(RCH)

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President proposing a telephone call and a letter to King Hassan. The call is to ask that he receive Larry Eagleburger as an emissary from the President; talking points are attached at Tab A. The letter is to add a personal note to the Eagleburger mission.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Letter to King Hassan

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*
SUBJECT: Eagleburger Mission to Morocco

Purpose

To call King Hassan to ask him to receive Larry Eagleburger as your emissary, and to sign a letter that Eagleburger can deliver.

Background

The Gulf war has brought domestic tensions to the surface in Morocco, a coalition partner, as well as in the rest of the Maghreb. Some of our Allies (especially the French, but also the Egyptians and Saudis) have worried about Moroccan staying power in the coalition and even about the stability of the monarchy.

Sending Larry Eagleburger to Rabat as your emissary would underline our policy interests and demonstrate close bilateral relations. The Eagleburger mission would correct a period of benign neglect of Hassan, who has felt slighted that he was not given more attention earlier. State has recommended, and I agree, that Eagleburger not go to Algeria and Tunisia at this time because it would possibly create the mistaken impression of U.S. willingness to explore Gulf diplomacy with Algeria and/or tolerate Ben Ali's pro-Iraqi position. A stop in either place would detract from the centrality of the Morocco mission.

A telephone call to ask that Eagleburger be received is appropriate, given the history of close U.S.-Moroccan friendship. Similarly, a personal letter of introduction would also be welcomed by Hassan, with whom you have not corresponded in some time.

RECOMMENDATION

That you phone King Hassan, using the points at Tab A, and that you sign the letter at Tab B.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Letter to King Hassan

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING HASSAN

- Your Majesty, it's good to hear your voice.
- I thought I would call to express my appreciation for your friendship and support in the international effort to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.
- Your troops are making an excellent contribution in Saudi Arabia; the others in the multinational coalition are very grateful, as I am, for Morocco's role.
- I know that this is not an easy time for you or for your people.
- I was thinking that it might be valuable if we could have a serious exchange of views so that you could understand how I see the situation in the Gulf and where I believe we are headed.
- In this regard, if you think it would be useful, I would be pleased to send Larry Eagleburger, our Deputy Secretary of State, to meet with you. He is very close personally to me and is a man whose advice and judgment I value greatly.
- What I have in mind is a private, unpublicized and quick visit in the next several days, so that views can be exchanged in confidence, out of the public eye.
- It goes without saying, Your Majesty, that he would carry back to me directly your concerns and views.
- If you find this idea attractive, I will have our Ambassador get in touch.

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