

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:	Chronological Files

OA/ID Number:	91146
Folder ID Number:	91146-007

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	4

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Cable	Re: Bahraini Amir's Warm Message to President Bush (3 pp.)	2/1/91	(b)(1)	C
02a. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with King Fahd (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02b. Telcon	Re: President's Call to the King of Saudi Arabia (3 pp.)	2/2/91	(b)(1)	S
02c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with King Fahd (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02d. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with King Fahd (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02e. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Qatari Amir Khalifa (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02f. Telcon	Re: President's Call to the Amir of Qatar (3 pp.)	2/2/91	(b)(1)	S
02g. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02h. Telcon	Re: President's Call to the Egyptian President (3 pp.)	2/2/91	(b)(1)	S
02i. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (February 1991) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1220
OA/ID Number: 91146-007
Date Closed: 6/30/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02j. Telcon	Re: Presidential Call to the Prime Minister of Pakistan (4 pp.)	2/2/91	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Eric Melby to Brent Scowcroft Re: SPR Bids (1 pp.)	2/4/91	(b)(1)	C
03b. Memo	James D. Watkins to John H. Sununu, Brent Scowcroft, Nicholas Brady Re: Strategic Petroleum Reserve Drawdown (1 pp.)	1/29/91	(b)(1)	C
03c. Memo	James D. Watkins to POTUS Re: Strategic Petroleum Reserve Drawdown (2 pp.)	1/29/91	(b)(1)	
03d. Message	Re: Presidential Message to Kaifu (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03e. Message	Re: Presidential Message to Kohl (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03f. Message	Re: Presidential Message to Kaifu (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03g. Message	Re: Presidential Message to Kohl (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04a. Coversheet	Sittmann to Roy, J and Dubia, J Re: Classified Subject (1 pp.)	1/9/91	(b)(1)	S
04b. Distribution List	Re: National Security Council The White House (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 3

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04c. Distribution Receipt	Log 9100206 (1 pp.)	2/4/91	(b)(1)	C
04d. Memo	William F. Sittmann to J. Stapleton Roy and Colonel John A. Dubia Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)	2/4/91	(b)(1)	C
04e. Memo	Don Piling to Brent Scowcroft Re: [Classified Subject] (2 pp.)	1/10/91	(b)(1)	S
04f. Memo	James D. Watkins to Brent Scowcroft Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)	1/9/91	(b)(1)	C

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FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100836
RECEIVED: 01 FEB 91 16

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: KHALIFA

DOC DATE: 01 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BAHRAIN
IRAQ
DESERT STORM

HS
KUWAIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CABLE TO PRES FM AMIR OF BAHRAIN KHALIFA RE SUPPORT FOR DESERT STORM

ACTION: OBE PER CHARLES

DUE DATE: 01 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF: 9100854 9100864

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: *** URGENT - PRES REPLY DUE COB TONIGHT ***
*** CY HAS BEEN WASHFAXED TO STATE ***

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

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IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0836

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

CHRON FILE

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

PRT BOOK

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (DTG) 011133Z FEB 91

FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4330
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MANAMA 00518

DEPARTMENT FOR AS KELLY AND NEA/ARP

USIA FOR AMBASSADOR RUGH

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, BA, US, IZ

SUBJECT: TFKU01: BAHRAINI AMIR'S WARM MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT BUSH

REF: MANAMA 380

1. (U) THE AMIR OF BAHRAIN, HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA BIN SULMAN AL-KHALIFA, ARRIVED BACK IN BAHRAIN ON JANUARY 29, AFTER A THREE-MONTH ABSENCE, MOSTLY IN THE CLEVELAND CLINIC WHERE HE UNDERWENT HEART SURGERY AND REHABILITATION.
2. (U) IN ORDER NOT TO PLACE UNDUE STRAIN ON THE AMIR, SINCE HIS RETURN HIS DOCTORS HAVE NOT PERMITTED HIM TO RESUME HIS REGULAR OPEN MAJILIS. THUS, THIS FRIDAY (1 FEBRUARY), TO THE DISAPPOINTMENT OF MANY OF HIS SUBJECTS, THE MAJILIS WAS NOT HELD (AND APPARENTLY WILL NOT TAKE PLACE FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS), THOUGH HUNDREDS GATHERED AT HIS PALACE IN RIFAA IN THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD.
3. (U) HOWEVER, THE AMIR MET PRIVATELY WITH THE AMBASSADOR THIS FRIDAY MORNING, AND WARMLY ASKED THAT A PERSONAL MESSAGE BE SENT TO PRESIDENT BUSH. "CHARLES", HE SAID, "I WANT YOU TO EXPRESS DIRECTLY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

MY VERY WARMEST PERSONAL THANKS AND RESPECTS TO
PRESIDENT BUSH FOR

A. HIS GREAT COURAGE AND LEADERSHIP OF THIS
COALITION IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE TYRANT SADDAM.
AND FOR THE FINE BRAVE U.S. FORCES THAT ARE HELPING
US HERE"

B. THE EXTENDED AND WARM TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE
PRESIDENT TO THE AMIR DURING THE LATTER'S STAY IN
THE USA:

C. "THE FINE, ABLE U.S. DOCTORS IN CLEVELAND, THE
EXCELLENT SECURITY PROVIDED, THE MANY COURTESIES
EXTENDED BY EVERYONE. IT WAS PERFECT."; AND,

D. "HIS SENDING YOU HERE AS U.S. AMBASSADOR. YOUR
PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN OUTSTANDING, AS REFLECTED IN
YOUR SENSITIVE FEELINGS FOR OUR NEEDS AND PROBLEMS.
YOUR ABLE DEVOTION TO YOUR DUTIES ON BEHALF OF THE
U.S., BAHRAIN AND OUR ALLIES HAS BEEN PERFECT--AND
REFLECTED IN ALL FIELDS: MILITARY, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL. AS I'VE TOLD YOU BEFORE, I WANT TO
KEEP YOU HERE ALWAYS."

4. (U) I LEAVE IT TO THE DEPARTMENT TO DETERMINE
HOW AND IN WHAT FORM THIS WARM AND SINCERELY-FELT
MESSAGE SHOULD BE RELAYED TO PRESIDENT BUSH, AND
OTHERWISE UTILIZED. CERTAINLY THE CONTENT IS
HEARTFELT. THE AMIR, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE PEOPLE
OF BAHRAIN (A SMALL BUT VERY STRATEGICALLY PLACED
FRIEND AND ALLY OF THE U.S.) ARE TRULY APPRECIATIVE
AND THANKFUL FOR PRESIDENT BUSH'S GREAT LEADERSHIP
AND HIS PERSONAL FEELINGS FOR BAHRAIN.

5. (U) I WOULD ADD THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF
THE UNION MESSAGE HAS EVOKED MANY SPONTANEOUS
ACCOLADES FROM BAHRAINIS, FOREIGN AMBASSADORS AND
BUSINESS/INDUSTRIAL LEADERS. OUR STOCK HERE IN
BAHRAIN MAY NEVER HAVE BEEN HIGHER THAN IT IS TODAY.

6. (2) MAY I AGAIN SUGGEST THAT WE NOT LET THIS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

AUSPICIOUS MOMENT PASS AS WE LOOK TO "FUTURE
ARRANGEMENTS" (SEE MANAMA 380 AND REFS CITED
THEREIN) FOR THIS STRATEGICALLY VITAL CORNER OF THE
GLOBE

HOSTLER

BT

#0518

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100864
RECEIVED: 04 FEB 91 11

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 02 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT
PAKISTAN
TELCALL

QATAR
SAUDI ARABIA
TELCON

PERSONS: MUBARAK, HOSNI
SHARIF, NAWAZ

KHALIFA
FAHD

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS & DRAFTS OF TELCONS RE PRES MUBARAK / AMIR KHALIFA /
PM SHARIF / KING FAHD ON 2 FEB

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 07 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES
NEIL
O'LEARY

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: ORIGINAL COVER MEMO TO PRES WAS SHREDDED BY SIT ROOM

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0864
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>R</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

WEST WING DESK:

2/2/91

Attached package sent to the President at Camp David -- Talking Points for Phone Calls to PM of Pakistan; Amir of Qatar; President Mubarak of Egypt; King Fahd of Saudi Arabia.

Cover note to President signed by General Scowcroft was shredded (in error) by Sit Rm after transmission of document.

Wilma

attached for files.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2/2/91

APNSA Has Seen

Brent,

Attached are 4 rough
drafts of the telephone
call memcons, a message
(w/ a ^{note} _{from me}) from King Hussien
to the ~~King~~ President,
and a proposed draft
message to the Pak
PM as we discussed.

Cheers!

Sandy

SECRET

CHRON FILE

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING FAHD

- I wanted to call to congratulate you on the outstanding success of your forces in retaking Khafji, and recovering some of our marines who were trapped there. I know how proud you must be of your ground forces. I also have called/will be calling the Amir of Qatar.
- Things are still going quite well and are right on schedule. This attempt by Saddam to try to start the ground war early failed miserably. I guess he didn't believe us when we said we would dictate the timing and the tempo of the war -- in all its phases.
- I am beginning to think he is growing more desperate -- with these oil slicks, setting oilwells on fire. And now he is even hitting the Palestinians -- the people he is supposed to be championing -- with SCUD missiles.
- The real tragedy, your Majesty, is the harm he is continuing to inflict on the Iraqi people by refusing to withdraw from Kuwait. We are treating his POWs so well, I understand they don't want to go back!
- I also wanted to mention that I appreciated your and President Mubarak's understanding of the joint statement we and the Soviets issued here on the conditions for an

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2010-0882-114
ES 8/18/15

Iraqi withdrawal. The wording of the statement led to speculation here of a change of our position. There was absolutely no change in our conditions for Iraqi withdrawal and I think that is absolutely clear now. There can be no daylight in our position. The coalition must remain solid.

-- I wanted to mention to you my concern about the situation in Pakistan. I have called/will call Prime Minister Nawaz to tell him how pleased we are with his steadfast support and troop contributions to DESERT STORM despite tough opposition at home. But we are concerned about statements by General Beg and some of the Afghan Resistance leaders opposing the coalition's position on Iraq. This hasn't helped his political position, and is creating some security problems for our people in Pakistan.

-- As you know, our aid programs to Pakistan have been cut off because of problems with this year's nuclear certification. But we are working with them to try to get things back on track as soon as we can. I know you and Pakistan have had longstanding ties. How do you view things there?

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Call to the King of Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Sandra Charles
Shukran Kamal, interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 2, 1991; 3:05-3:35, Camp David

The President: Hello, your Majesty. How are you?

King Fahd: How are you? I am glad to speak to you.

The President: Well, it's nice to talk to you. I just wanted to call to congratulate you on the outstanding success in retaking Khafji and thank your forces for helping to recover some of the marines who were trapped there. We are really grateful.

Things are still going quite well and are right on schedule. This attempt by Saddam to try to start the ground war early failed miserably. I also placed a call to thank the Amir of Qatar. His forces were involved too. They are performing quite well.

Another point, I know you understood but on the Baker/Bessmerytnykh communique, there is no change in our position. I wanted to tell you that personally. We are not interested in a ceasefire or to give him a chance to regroup. There won't be any concessions to Saddam. After what he has done to our POWs, launching SCUDs at your people and those in Israel, and now environmental terrorism he must pay for that under resolution 674. There can be no compromise and there is no interest in a ceasefire that will make a concession to him. But I am anxious to know how you think things are going.

King Fahd: First of all, thank you for your call and I want to congratulate you for the success in retaking Khafji. I also want to thank you Mr. President for what the US Marines did and the services rendered to Saudi and Qatari forces. The way we see it we don't think there are varied armies on the front -- we have one united army.

The President: Good, that's right.

King Fahd: I heard a statement you made Mr President that there will be no hesitation in the US position, and no cessation of the action until this matter is resolved -- and

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that means when Kuwait is restored to its preaggression state and Saddam has returned where he is supposed to be. I would like to affirm my belief the army on the front has arranged its operations in a proper manner so that Saddam cannot take any action. Actually, I believe what happened will make this area quiet over the next one hundred years.

The President: I hope so. It is our ambition for the Gulf area too. Your Majesty, what are you hearing inside Iraq?

King Fahd: The news we are receiving from inside Iraq is that the people are unhappy, the army is dissatisfied. But no one talks to Saddam. The only solution if there is dissatisfaction expressed to him is to be killed. This is what was told to us by the Iraqi officers captured with the soldiers. They told us they don't want to be in the fighting, but they told us the troops behind us keeping pushing us so we would fight.

I believe that the end of the revolutionary guard is staring to happen as a result of the bombing. This is an important factor for demoralizing the rest of the army and making them surrender.

The President: I agree with that.

King Fahd: At the same time I also am pleased Mr President that prime targets are being hit by bombs from Jordan to Kuwait borders and destroyed. We know this is the places where missiles are being launched and where binary gases are made.

The President: The Air Forces are doing a good job -- that's air forces plural. Could I raise one last question? I called Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan. It was the first time I talked to him. I thanked him for his steadfast support despite tough opposition at home. But we are concerned about statements by General Bega and statements by some of the Afghan Resistance who oppose your and our position on Iraq. Beg's statements that inflame the opposition concern me because we worry about the safety of American citizens in Pakistan. The Prime Minister was quite reassuring about managing the dissent and staying with us. I was just wondering if the situation worries you or if it is under control.

King Fahd: I spoke at length with the Prime Minister when he was here three days ago. We discussed this matter clearly. I asked him that there be no opposition to our position and to the United States. He promised he would take the necessary measures to make sure that happens. He asked me to send an envoy and he will go tomorrow. We also will extend an invitation to Beg to visit here in Saudi Arabia.

The President: That is all very encouraging. I must say he sounded confident he could weather the criticism and stay with us.

King Fahd: This is what the Prime Minister told me also. He told me he was able to overcome this unexpected problem and stay the course. I have known him a long time and he is a strong man. I am willing to help him in a variety of ways and we are.

The President: Thank you, unless there was something else. I wanted to call to congratulate you on the heroism of your troops. I wish you well.

King Fahd: Thank you. God willing, you will be hearing good news about Pakistan next week.

The President: Well, that's good. Call me if you have any problems, but I think things are going well.

King Fahd: Thank you Mr. President for this call. It is much appreciated.

The President: Good-bye and my respects.

SECRET

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING FAHD

- I wanted to call to congratulate you on the outstanding success of your forces in retaking Khafji, and recovering some of our marines who were trapped there. I know how proud you must be of your ground forces. I also have called/will be calling the Amir of Qatar.
- Things are still going quite well and are right on schedule. This attempt by Saddam to try to start the ground war early failed miserably. I guess he didn't believe us when we said we would dictate the timing and the tempo of the war -- in all its phases.
- I am beginning to think he is growing more desperate -- with these oil slicks, setting oilwells on fire. And now he is even hitting the Palestinians -- the people he is supposed to be championing -- with SCUD missiles.
- The real tragedy, your Majesty, is the harm he is continuing to inflict on the Iraqi people by refusing to withdraw from Kuwait. We are treating his POWs so well, I understand they don't want to go back!
- I also wanted to mention that I appreciated your and President Mubarak's understanding of the joint statement we and the Soviets issued here on the conditions for an

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2010-0882-MR
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Iraqi withdrawal. The wording of the statement led to speculation here of a change of our position. There was absolutely no change in our conditions for Iraqi withdrawal and I think that is absolutely clear now. There can be no daylight in our position. The coalition must remain solid.

-- I wanted to mention to you my concern about the situation in Pakistan. I have called/will call Prime Minister Nawaz to tell him how pleased we are with his steadfast support and troop contributions to DESERT STORM despite tough opposition at home. But we are concerned about statements by General Beg and some of the Afghan Resistance leaders opposing the coalition's position on Iraq. This hasn't helped his political position, and is creating some security problems for our people in Pakistan.

-- As you know, our aid programs to Pakistan have been cut off because of problems with this year's nuclear certification. But we are working with them to try to get things back on track as soon as we can. I know you and Pakistan have had longstanding ties. How do you view things there?

SECRET

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING FAHD

- I wanted to call to congratulate you on the outstanding success of your forces in retaking Khafji, and recovering some of our marines who were trapped there. I know how proud you must be of your ground forces. I also have called/will be calling the Amir of Qatar.
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- I am beginning to think he is growing more desperate -- with these oil slicks, setting oilwells on fire. And now he is even hitting the Palestinians -- the people he is supposed to be championing -- with SCUD missiles.
- The real tragedy, your Majesty, is the harm he is continuing to inflict on the Iraqi people by refusing to withdraw from Kuwait. We are treating his POWs so well, I understand they don't want to go back!
- I also wanted to mention that I appreciated your and President Mubarak's ~~statement~~ *understanding* ~~echoing~~ the joint statement we and the Soviets issued here on the conditions for an

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

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2010-0802-MR
Eg 8/18/15

The wording of the statement led to speculation here of a change of our position. There was absolutely no change in our conditions for Iraqi withdrawal.
Iraqi withdrawal. [^] There can be no daylight in our position. *and I think that is absolutely clear now*
The coalition must remain solid.

- I wanted to mention to you my concern about the situation in Pakistan. I have called/will call Prime Minister Nawaz to tell him how pleased we are with his steadfast support and troop contributions to DESERT STORM despite tough opposition at home. But we are concerned about statements by General Beg and some of the Afghan Resistance leaders opposing the coalition's position on Iraq. This hasn't helped his political position, and is creating some security problems for our people in Pakistan.
- As you know, our aid programs to Pakistan have been cut off because of problems with this year's nuclear certification. But we are working with them to try to get things back on track as soon as we can. I know you and Pakistan have had longstanding ties. How do you view things there?

SECRET

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
QATARI AMIR KHALIFA

- I am calling to congratulate you on the outstanding success of your forces in helping to retake Khafji, and in recovering some of our marines who were trapped there. I know how proud you must be of your ground forces, as well as your pilots. I also have called/am calling King Fahd.
- Things are going very well, in fact a lot better than we initially thought. We are particularly pleased that the casualties have been so low, even in this ground attack. We are starting to get better bomb damage assessments and it looks like we are achieving our objectives as planned.
- This attempt by Saddam to try to start the ground war early has failed miserably. I guess he didn't believe us when we said we would dictate the timing and the tempo of the war -- in all its phases.
- I am beginning to think he is getting more desperate -- creating these oil slicks, setting the oil wells on fire, parading POWs, and firing SCUDS at Israel and Saudi Arabia. And now he is even hitting the Palestinians -- the people he is supposed to be championing -- with SCUD missiles.
- The real tragedy, your Highness, is the harm he is continuing to inflict on the Iraqi people by refusing to

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0882-MR
EJ 8/18/15

SECRET

2

withdraw from Kuwait. We are treating his POWs so well, I understand they don't want to go back!

- Our objectives have not changed. As we and the Soviets just declared in a joint statement during their Foreign Minister's visit, we want an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from all of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq. So long as the coalition stays together, I believe we won't be long in achieving our goals. I would appreciate your assessment on Saddam's staying power, your Highness.

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AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
8/21/2009 MM

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Call to the Amir of Qatar

PARTICIPANTS: the President
Amir Khalifa
Sandra Charles, NSC Notetaker
Shukran Kamal, interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 2, 1991; 2:00-2:20 pm; Camp David

The President: Hello, how are you sir?

Amir Khalifa: Well, thank God.

The President: I am calling first to congratulate you on the wonderful success of your forces in helping to retake Khafji, and in helping to save some of our marines who were trapped there. I know you must be very proud of your ground forces, as well as your pilots. I also am going to call King Fahd and congratulate him too. I haven't talked to him yet.

That was one purpose for calling. I think things are going very well, but I am anxious to get your judgement on that.

Amir Khalifa: First of all Mr President, I appreciate your call, and I appreciate the position the US has taken on the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. Regarding what the Qatari Air Force did, Qatar adheres firmly to the UN resolutions, those for defending Saudi territory and those for the liberation of Kuwait.

The President: We were smart to not permit Saddam to tell us when to start the ground war. He was thinking he could draw us in early and get us to start when we weren't ready. I am confident when if necessary a ground offensive is required our allied forces will do very, very well. And I don't think it will take long. I must admit, Your Majesty, I have trouble understanding Saddam and anyone doing what he is doing to the POWs, and innocent civilians with SCUD missiles, and environmental terrorism. He is hard to predict. But it is all bad.

Your Majesty, what is your view on things in Iraq and what do you think Saddam will try to do next?

Amir Khalifa: Actually Mr. President, the US position from the beginning of the crisis, the US position has been wise and smart. But my own evaluation on the character of Saddam is that he doesn't know he is a human, because a human being would know how to act. He doesn't. He always said what was

important was the survival of the Ba'ath party even at the expense of all of Iraq.

The latest information I received -- I got it today from Syria and I am not certain of its accuracy -- is that the situation in Iraq is critical. Saddam doesn't trust anyone. His son is guarding him. When he moves, he is surrounded by 4-5 people who look like him to deceive bystanders and observers. Actually all the news from inside Baghdad is very bad. We also believe his relations with some religious factions are poor. There was a disagreement between them based on his request that his picture be hung in the mosques, and when they refused, some of them were executed.

The President: He is a bad man. Your Majesty, I think the thing for us to do is not to compromise or agree to a ceasefire, hoping he will do what he should have done long ago. We should stay with our gameplan. We don't seek the destruction of Iraq. But there should be no concessions, no compromises in any way. I am confident we will win the war. I am confident he will be made to comply with every resolution including the one on reparations, 674. He must be held responsible for the environmental damage and to the other claims against him.

Amir Khalifa: Actually, Mr President, Saddam is worse than just a bad man. That is why any compromise would not only hurt this area of the Gulf but would hurt the whole world if he stays in power. On allied actions targetting civilians, I understand that civilians are not being targetted. They can be spared what they are going through if their President would stop the bombing.

The President: That is a true and wise statement. We will keep our course. I am proud we are shoulder to shoulder with your country and your warriors, ground and air. I hope you will congratulate your commanders for me.

My last point, there has been some confusion about the statement by Secretary Baker and Bessmerytnykh of the Soviet Union. I want to tell you there is nothing new in that. Some have intepreted this as our interest in a ceasefire or pause. No -- we will not do that and certainly not without discussion with our coalition partners. There is no interest on my part to stop to make concessions, to stop to see if Saddam is ready to do what he should have long ago.

Amir Khalifa: Mr. President, I have no doubt about US policy, and no doubt about its serious intent. Not stopping Saddam Hussein would have serious repercussions for the whole world.

The President: Thank you again, and again thanks to your young men. I am pround we are together to overcome this evil

in the Gulf. Thank you again.

Amir Khalifa: I wish to thank you for your gracious remarks and sentiments toward our young men. I hope your next call will come after the liberation of Kuwait, and I hope it will come soon.

The President: I hope so too. It was good to talk to you.

Amir Khalifa: Thank you. I was pleased to talk with you. God bless you and your troops. Good-bye.

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT MUBARAK

- Hosni, I wanted to call to touch base and share some thoughts with my close friend.
- I've just spent Friday going around to several of our military bases visiting the families of our troops in the Gulf.
- Morale here is very, very strong. America continues to be united and determined. I must say, I was truly touched and impressed by what I saw and heard from the families of our soldiers.
- I had a good chat with Esmat Abd el-Meguid. As he has probably told you, he and Jim Baker are doing some good work on the issue of an IMF agreement.
- The military effort is going very well, all according to plan. The air campaign will go on as long as necessary. We will not agree to any pauses. The only way Saddam can stop the fighting is to leave Kuwait and do so rapidly, massively, and convincingly.
- Meguid reported that things are holding up in Egypt. How is public opinion?
- Andreotti and Mitterrand are very worried about the Maghreb; so am I. Is there anything you believe we could or should do that we are not doing?

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0882-MR
28 8/18/15

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Declassify on: OADR

- What do you hear from Syria? I know there is some concern there about how Israel fits into the whole picture, and I hope you are giving the Syrians a dose of your usual realism. Let me know if there is something you think I should do there.
 - I know there is concern at the popular level about the destruction of Iraq as a nation and the targetting of civilians, but I have been saying again and again here that we are not trying to dismember or destroy the country. We are also not targetting civilians.
 - Nor are we hitting the religious sites, and I can prove that. In fact, I may send you some interesting snapshots, along with someone to give you a comprehensive update, if you like.
-

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
8/12/2009 MM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Call to the Egyptian President

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Sandra Charles, NSC Notetaker

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 2, 1991; 2:35-2:45 pm; Camp David

The President: Hosni, how are you?

President Mubarak: How are you, George?

The President: I thought I'd call to touch base at the end of the week and compare thoughts. I just spent yesterday going around to several of our military bases visiting with some of the families of our troops in the Gulf. I was very impressed. Morale is very strong here. And support in the country is strong. I was touched and impressed by what I heard from the families. They have no doubt about what their husbands and fathers are doing.

I also had a good talk with Esmat Meguid. He and Jim are doing some good work on the IMF agreement. I'm interested in helping on that. From our end, the military effort is going well. We will not let Saddam decide the timing of any ground action. The air campaign will go on as long as necessary.

Another point I wanted to make is to be sure there is no misunderstanding about the Baker/Bessmerytknkyk statement. There is no change. We have no interest in a ceasefire, concessions or a pause, hoping Saddam will do in the future what he should have done before.

President Mubarak: I saw your tour yesterday on TV. I saw your reception. It was very warm. I saw it on TV here.

The President: How do you see things?

President Mubarak: Things are going well, very well. I am touch with our forces every day. Everything is going well.

The President: He made a mistake trying to get us into ground combat early. Instead he got his equipment and personnel captured and killed. We will set the timetable and not be drawn in until we are ready.

President Mubarak: I have sent a message to our people, to General Schwarzkopf that we should not slip into a ground war until we are ready.

The President: When we do I am ready to go all out. It won't take long unlike what the press says. And it will not be costly in life despite what the press says. We will convince Saddam he will not get a stalemate so he can claim victory like he did with Iran. He will be beat bad.

President Mubarak: I agree. I have the same conception.

The President: That's good because you know the area. We are on the same wavelength. Apparently, there was some misunderstanding by some countries about the Baker/Bessmerytnkyh communique. Jim insists there was nothing new in it. I want our coalition partners to know we are not deviating from our agreed path. If he is alive after the war, maybe his own people will take care of him.

President Mubarak: We didn't misunderstand at all. In Saudi Arabia we issued a statement saying the same thing as yours. Besides he won't agree on withdrawal.

The President: You told me before he wouldn't after withdrawing from Iran.

President Mubarak: I think things are going well.

The President: I wish his people would throw him out. That would make it perfect.

President Mubarak: Inshallah.

The President: Well, I thought we should talk once a week to see if there are any problems to see how things are going. One other thing, I am worried about the Maghreb and what to do there if there is anything. There have been more demonstrations in Tunis and Morocco. So I worry, but I don't know what we should do.

President Mubarak: In Tunis things will slow down on their own.

The President: Good, so we'll leave it. I understand there was a meeting of religious leaders in Egypt or Saudi Arabia and they called for a jihad against Saddam. If there was a meeting, there was nothing in the paper on it.

President Mubarak: Yes, it was held in Saudi Arabia. The meetings here and all the conferences are against that. In Parliament there was a tough speech against Saddam. That will be good for public opinion here.

The President: Is public opinion in good shape?

President Mubarak: Yes.

The President: Good, well I was just checking in to say hello. I appreciate our staying in close touch. I am going to call King Fahd, and I talked with the Amir of Qatar already, remembering your advice to stay in touch. I am glad we are together on this.

President Mubarak: If anything arises, I will contact you.

The President: Okay, good-bye.

SECRET

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRIME MINISTER NAWAZ SHARIF

- I am calling to tell you how much we appreciate your courageous and firm support for the coalition's efforts to liberate Kuwait, and particularly for the contribution of Pakistani forces standing side by side with those of 27 other countries in Operation Desert Storm.
- I know it has not been easy for you to maintain this position, and I just wanted you to know how grateful we are that you understand the vital principles our forces are defending.
- Let me assure you that our goal remains the complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from all of Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's government, as stated in the UN Security Council resolutions. We do not want Iraq destroyed or any harm to come to the Iraqi people. This was stated clearly in the joint statement we and the Soviets issued here following their Foreign Minister's visit this week.
- That is why we are making every effort to minimize civilian casualties and to safeguard religious and cultural sites in Iraq sometimes at great risk to allied pilots.

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

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ES 4/18/15

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- Iraqi propaganda has tried to turn this conflict into a war between Islam and the West; but as you know, this is patently false, and like Iraq's scud attacks on civilians, it is an act of desperation.
- I also wanted to express my sympathy to you and to the families of the victims of the earthquake. There are enough natural tragedies in this world that it is truly unfortunate when man has to create another by going to war.
- I also was pleased with the recent exchange of formal instruments of ratification between you and India on your agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. We are ready to help you both further improve your bilateral relations, including with help on confidence building measures, if you think that would be useful.

SECRET

2000-0429-F
8/21/2009 MM

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Call to the Prime Minister of Pakistan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
Notetaker: Sandra Charles, NSC

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 2, 1991; 1030-1050; Camp David

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, hello. How are you?

PM Nawaz: Good Morning. How are you?

The President: Just fine. I am calling, actually this is a call I should have made sooner, to tell you how much we appreciate your courageous and firm support for the coalition's efforts to liberate Kuwait. I know this has not been easy for you. I have been following with some degree of thoroughness the situation in Pakistan. But with Pakistani forces shoulder-to-shoulder with those of 27 other countries, well, that's a wonderful thing, and I just wanted to tell you how grateful we are -- something I have neglected doing before and should have done sooner. (C)

PM Nawaz: I have made a commitment and am convinced we are doing the right thing. It is based on principle and we stand with you and the coalition. (C)

The President: I hope you know when we say we want our people out as soon as this is over, we mean it. And we don't want Iraq destroyed or harm to come to the people of Iraq. I keep saying this even though Saddam Hussein is saying something else. We are not trying to wipe out Iraq. We made this clear in our joint statement with the Soviets when their new Foreign Minister was here. We are trying to keep down civilian casualties and to safeguard religious and cultural shrines. But we are concerned about his disinformation. I wouldn't be surprised if he damaged them himself and then blamed the coalition. He has tried to make this a war between Islam and the West. We are doing what we can to resist this. I just wanted to tell you this personally. (S)

PM Nawaz: I trust you and believe you. I believe we are taking the right approach. It is my understanding from the Soviet President that you want Iraq to withdraw and then you could agree to a ceasefire. (C)

The President: If they clearly withdraw. What we don't

want is a ceasefire and then he rebuilds his forces. We want full implementation of the resolutions. If he stops, with his armor, and gets out of Kuwait, then we don't intend to bomb him and continue the war. But that is what comes first -- he must get out of Kuwait. They won't be under attack when he does. But I am not saying that there will be a ceasefire if he says he will withdraw. Then we would start all over again with the same propaganda as before. The Soviets understand this, and have clarified it. (S)

PM Nawaz: Mr. President, then you would not accept a ceasefire if he says yes he will withdraw and lays down a timeframe for you to consider, and then this would be the basis of a ceasefire. (S)

The President: We can't stop this until we know he is substantially on his way out of Kuwait. He has to cross many bridges getting out. His statements show he is not interested in getting out. So if he says we want one, just talking about withdrawal is not good enough. It would be unacceptable to the coalition. If a withdrawal is going forward, and it is thorough, and we are monitoring it to insure it is happening and we can go into liberate Kuwait, and the Kuwaitis can go back, then that is a different game, a different formula. But just talking without leaving is not good enough. The coalition and others don't trust a word he says. (S)

PM Nawaz: We have been working on peace efforts. (C)

The President: Are you encouraged? (U)

PM Nawaz: There are people in his camp and the message from them is they would like to propose to be accepted a simultaneous withdrawal, which we know is not acceptable to us or the allies. (C)

The President: No, not at all. There need to be security provisions, and reparations as called for by UN resolution 674. He is not in a position to try to go out to declare victory. If he were, we'd face this aggression some other place at some other time. If he said he was fully complying, and not just talk about it -- and that would be clear soon -- but he is not in a position to make conditions. As I said, our goal is not the destruction of Iraq, but full compliance with the UN resolutions without conditions. Anything else is not good enough. And we don't want US forces there one more day than they have to be. I mean that. I don't like the prospect of leaving US troops there. That would be bad. I will be interested if there is more in your talks with them, but we don't intend to accept any conditions. (S)

PM Nawaz: We will keep you posted on developments. (C)

The President: I know there is some opposition in your country. We have some in ours but support is strong. But watching TV on the demonstrations it is hard to believe. So Saddam feels the US won't support the president in what he is doing. He hoped it would have a backlash, but it has not materialized. He shouldn't get too much comfort from CNN watching these demonstrations. The polls show there is overwhelming support for us and the coalition. Saddam is misreading US public opinion. (C)

PM Nawaz: There is a problem with a section of people here. They have been demonstrating. I admit Saddam's public relations are very good and effective. I mentioned this to King Fahd and he said we must also organize an effective campaign to counter him. His envoy is coming here tomorrow. I also plan to take a trip abroad to press Saddam through the OIC. But I am not impressed by these demonstrations. Governments must take tough positions to defend just positions based on principle. I am not feeling pressure from many quarters. Most have taken a position that is supportive of our principles. (S)

The President: I saw something saying that Egyptian and Saudi Muslim leaders had declared a jihad against Saddam, but there have been no reports of that in any of the newspapers. (U)

PM Nawaz: I also consider it a jihad. He has no conception for what he is doing to Iraq. He has to be punished. He is responsible for the destruction of the Iraqi nation. I wanted to clarify one thing, if he accepts and agrees to withdraw and you accept a ceasefire with assurances -- if materially he has said yes, there could be a ceasefire. Otherwise, no one would stop fighting. (S)

The President: That is what everyone tried before January 15. There has been no indication since then that he is willing to leave Kuwait. If fact yesterday, I think it was yesterday, he made another statement to that effect. Therefore, it would be difficult to accept a withdrawal with conditions. He must be punished, not given face or a way out. He has done something bad and the only way to compensate is for him to fully comply -- not say I'll do this and this and you do that. We don't have to accept any conditions. We are opposed to accepting conditions. With these goals, he will be punished by the results.

He needs to comply with the resolutions. We don't want to blow him back to the dark ages. That is not what the coalition military actions are trying to do. We are trying to get him to fully comply with the resolutions. It gets complicated but if we stay with no conditions then we'd

look at it and if Kuwait's leaders go back, and if the 674 sanctions thing gets set up. If he is serious, he might even leave his armor and go. Through full implementation of resolutions and sanctions, there can be a ceasefire. But it concerns me that if we talk about being willing to discuss one, it will be linked to other problems and that will be unacceptable. That is linkage. (S)

Prime Minister Nawaz: If we come across anything worthwhile, then we will let you know. (C)

The President: I just wanted to say how grateful and delighted we are with you and to thank you. (C)

Prime Minister Nawaz: We were elected with a popular mandate. We have more than a two-thirds majority in Parliament. We were going ahead with economic development with good speed. This has had a little bit of an adverse effect but it is only temporary. I have one question, how long do you think this will take to accomplish? (C)

The President: Not long, although I have deliberately not commented on that. Everyone is debating when the next phase on the ground will be. I don't see it taking too long even if the ground phase is necessary. I don't see a protracted war, even though he thinks it will be so. But we won't move before our officers are ready. We will do this on our timetable, not his. I wish to clarify that I have been careful not to say how long it will take. But General Schwarzkopf has a high degree of confidence that it won't be too long. (C)

Prime Minister Nawaz: It is a noble cause, and I appreciate it. We are with you. (C)

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, one more thing -- I understand from my staff that it might be better if we didn't say anything publicly about this call. I appreciate it if you want to keep this confidential. (C)

Prime Minister Nawaz: Thank you. We will keep you posted on any progress. (C)

The President: If in time for some reason, you decide you want to publish it, that's fine. But General Scowcroft mentioned that your staff said you wanted to keep it confidential for now. I just wanted you to know that's fine with me. (C)

Prime Minister Nawaz: Thank you. (U)

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100914
RECEIVED: 06 FEB 91 08

TO: SCOWCROFT
SUNUNU, J

CHRON FILE

FROM: AMEND, D
DEMAREST, D

DOC DATE: 03 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF

DESERT STORM

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: COMM FOR PEACE & SECURITY IN GULF

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 09 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

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CODES:

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DOC 1 OF 1

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>R</u>
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

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DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

APNSA Has Seen

FEBRUARY 3, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
GENERAL SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID DEMAREST

FROM: DEB AMEND

RE: COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF

Attached is a press release distributed Friday by a highly energized Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf. The feedback on the President's reception with this group has been tremendous.

Among other things, the committee board is meeting this week to review future events, fundraising for full page ads and an op/ed schedule.

As you may know, the committee was created "on paper" as signatories to statements in support the President's policies. The only times they have actually met as a group have been at the President's invitation before Christmas and last week. According to the Committee staff, the President deserves all the credit for taking a diverse group of "signatories" and turning them into members of a working committee with objectives larger than originally anticipated.

09114
1. General
747 FILE

2. House

COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF
SUITE 600
2300 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037
202 293-1525 PHONE
202 293-8965 FAX

P R E S S R E L E A S E

For Immediate Release
February 1, 1991

Contact: Meg Molyneaux
(202) 293-1525

**PRESIDENT BUSH MEETS WITH THE BIPARTISAN
COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF:
SIGNATORIES SUPPORTIVE OF PERSIAN GULF WAR**

On Wednesday, January 30, 1991, President George Bush and members of his cabinet met with 37 signatories of the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf.

Over cocktails in the White House residence, President Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft thanked the Committee for its bipartisan support and provided an update on U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf War. The briefing stressed that the administration's strategy of continuing the bombing campaign and keeping casualties to an absolute minimum will not be jeopardized by Saddam Hussein's attempt to lure allied forces into premature ground action.

On behalf of the Committee, Congressman Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY) praised the President's leadership during this time of national crisis and reiterated the necessity for all Americans to remain steadfast in their support for our troops in the Persian Gulf. Congressman Solarz also outlined the Committee's future plans, which include a second national newspaper advertisement of its position. After the briefing, President Bush took his guests on a personally guided tour of the White House residence.

Wednesday night's event was the second time the President met with the Committee. The group also met with him for an informal briefing on December 14, 1990, soon after the inauguration of the Committee.

The list of attendees is as follows:

COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF

**SUITE 600
2300 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037
202 293-1525 PHONE
202 293-8965 FAX**

**WHITE HOUSE RECEPTION ATTENDEES
January 30, 1991**

Honorable Richard V. Allen	Former National Security Adviser to President Reagan
Professor Graham Allison	Douglas Dillon Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Honorable Richard Armitage	Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr.	Former U.S. Senator (R-TN) and former White House Chief of Staff
Honorable Herbert H. Bateman	U.S. House of Representatives (R-VA)
Honorable Thad Cochran	U.S. Senate (R-MS)
Honorable C. Christopher Cox	U.S. House of Representatives (R-CA)
Honorable Stuart E. Eizenstat	Former Assistant to President Carter for Domestic Affairs and Policy
Douglas J. Feith	Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Mark B. Feldman	Former Deputy Legal Adviser and Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State
Honorable Richard N. Gardner	Former U.S. Ambassador to Italy
Robert A. Georgine	President, Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO
John T. Joyce	President, International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen
Ambassador Max Kampelman	Former Head of U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union
Honorable Bob Lagomarsino	U.S. House of Representatives (R-CA)
Honorable Tom Lantos	U.S. House of Representatives (D-CA)

COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF

Professor Robert J. Lieber	Chairman, Department of Government, Georgetown University and former Coordinator of Middle East issues for the 1988 Dukakis Presidential Campaign
Honorable Richard G. Lugar	U.S. Senate (R-IN)
Honorable Connie Mack	U.S. Senate (R-FL)
Honorable John McCain	U.S. Senate (R-AZ)
Honorable Dave McCurdy	U.S. House of Representatives (D-OK)
General Jack N. Merritt	Former U.S. Representative to the NATO Military Committee and former Director, Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Honorable John P. Murtha	U.S. House of Representatives (D-PA)
Honorable Michael G. Oxley	U.S. House of Representatives (R-OH)
Honorable Peter W. Rodman	Former Deputy Assistant to President Reagan for National Security Affairs
Peter R. Rosenblatt	President, Coalition for a Democratic Majority and former Personal Representative of President Carter to the Micronesian Status Negotiations
Honorable Alan K. Simpson	U.S. Senate (R-WY)
Dr. Joseph J. Sisco	Former UnderSecretary of State for Political Affairs
Ambassador Michael B. Smith	Former Deputy U.S. Trade Representative and former U.S. Ambassador to the GATT
Honorable Stephen J. Solarz	U.S. House of Representatives (D-NY)
Maurice Sonnenberg	Chairman, Executive Committee, Democratic House and Senate Council
Maurice Tempelsman	Senior Partner, Leon Tempelsman & Son
General John W. Vogt	Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, European Air Forces and former Director, Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Leon Wieseltier	Literary Editor, <u>The New Republic</u>
Dr. Dov S. Zakheim	Former Deputy UnderSecretary of Defense for Planning and Resources
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt	Former Chief of Naval Operations

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100730
RECEIVED: 30 JAN 91 08

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: MELBY
DEAL

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 04 FEB 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: OIL
STOCKPILES
UN

OIL VULNERABILITY
CM
PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS: KAIFU, TOSHIKI
HUSSEIN, SADDAM

KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: SPR BIDS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 02 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MELBY

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

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MELBY

NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

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CLOSED BY: NSJEB

DOC 2 OF 2

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9100730

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 MELBY
002 SCOWCROFT
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91013008 PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
Z 91020410 FOR INFORMATION
X 91042913 NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100730
RECEIVED: 30 JAN 91 08

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: WATKINS, J

DOC DATE: 29 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: OIL
STOCKPILES
UN

OIL VULNERABILITY
CM
PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS: KAIFU, TOSHIKI
HUSSEIN, SADDAM

KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE DRAWDOWN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 02 FEB 91

STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: MELBY

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
MELBY

FOR CONCURRENCE
GORDON
PILLING

FOR INFO
HILL
SITTMANN

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 1 OF 1

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SOR Bids

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
 Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	APNSA Has Seen	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>St. 4/29</u>	<u>St</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>NIR</u>

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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0730

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 4, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *td*

FROM: ERIC MELBY *em*

SUBJECT: SPR Bids

At Tab I is a memorandum from Secretary Watkins enclosing his memorandum to Governor Sununu on SPR bids. After Watkins' discussion with you at Tuesday's Cabinet meeting, he requested copies of the letters sent to Kaifu and Kohl on this issue. I inadvertently gave him an early version of the letters. The correct letters are at Tab II.

Attachment

Tab I Watkins Memo

Tab II Kaifu/Kohl Letters

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0730

The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

January 29, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN H. SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS BRADY
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE DRAWDOWN

TS sent:

After our discussion today, I further revised our procedures and approved what I consider the best arrangement, all things considered. Your copy of my memorandum notifying the President of actions taken is attached.

From my standpoint, the U.S. policy to conduct an automatic coordinated stockdraw in the event of hostilities was clearly articulated in the President's cable to Prime Minister Kaifu and Chancellor Kohl on January 8. These letters were prepared following our January 4 NSC meeting. Transmittal of this cable served as guidance to our Governors to the key January 11 IEA meeting as well. I have attached what I am informed, is an exact copy of the actual cable.


James D. Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Attachments

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The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

January 29, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE DRAWDOWN

As you recall, on January 11, the IEA nations adopted a plan to make 2.5 million barrels of oil available automatically at the onset of hostilities. This action was in consonance with your requests to both Prime Minister Kaifu and Chancellor Kohl on January 8.

According to most experts, the allied military successes, buttressed by the IEA action, have calmed the oil markets and removed the "war premium" which was keeping prices high.

As planned, the IEA Governing Board met again yesterday and reaffirmed the Agency's commitment to proceed with the January 11 plan, but allowed for "flexibility" in implementation. This memorandum informs you how we are proceeding in the execution of our final U.S. drawdown plans.

The IEA plan allocated about 1.1 million barrels per day to the United States. Following normal U.S. bidding practices, this offered for sale a total of 33.75 million barrels over the next 30-day contract period. In response to our offer of sale, we received bids for 25 percent more SPR oil than we offered, but with a heavy preference (2:1) for sweet crude. We are now ready to act on bids received.

Taking into account the actual worldwide surplus crude situation; remaining sensitive to expected taxpayer interests in selling at the best price possible; anticipating that the "flexibility" concept will result in achieving somewhere between 50-75 percent of goal by IEA nations against initially planned objectives; and satisfying American crude oil buyers that we are reliable suppliers, I have made a decision that the best approach would be to set a policy of acceptance of only the highest priced bids.

As a consequence of the aforementioned, by setting a policy of selecting only those bids that are above 97.5 percent of benchmark value for SPR crude oils, we will achieve sales that actually yield 99 percent of the benchmark value. As a result, the total amount sold would be approximately 51 percent of the 33.75 million barrels of crude oil originally offered for sale, or 17.3 million barrels. This action will satisfy the full U.S. commitment to the IEA plan. Unless unforeseen disruption to oil supplies occur, we have no intention of executing further draws.

Our informal contacts with members of the IEA, oil industry leaders, and key Hill members indicate that the approach we have taken is prudent and will be viewed as balanced under the circumstances. We intend to notify successful offerors early Wednesday morning, January 30, so that contract awards can take place as scheduled, and expected, by 6 February. Deliveries will commence any time thereafter as the successful offeror desires.

It may be useful to note that, were the SPR oil to be delivered under current market conditions, the average sale price would be about \$20. This could be compared with the five-year average purchase price of SPR oil from 1986 to 1991 (includes 100 million barrels) which was \$17.54 per barrel. From SPR opening in 1977, the total average purchase price of oil, on the other hand, is \$27.17 per barrel.


James D. Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

cc: The Honorable John H. Sununu
The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
The Honorable Nicholas Brady



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PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KAIFU

Dear Toshiki:

We are fast approaching the U.N. deadline for Saddam Hussein to withdraw totally from Kuwait. As part of our broader economic and political strategy, it is important that we have in place adequate measures to deal with any possible interruption in oil supplies.

In the event of hostilities, there is likely to be a strong reaction in oil markets, reinforced by the probability of temporary loss of some oil from the Gulf. For this reason, it is better to be visibly prepared now than to be forced to react later.

Since 1974 we have worked hard together in the International Energy Agency (IEA) to ensure our energy security. A decision by the IEA before January 15 to authorize an automatic coordinated stockdraw in the event of hostilities would reassure the markets as well as sending a clear message to Saddam Hussein.

I have asked my officials to work with their colleagues in other IEA countries to reach immediate IEA agreement on coordinated action. For our part, I will make available, in the event of hostilities, up to 1.5 million barrels a day of oil for one month from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. I am requesting that Japan, as a holder of substantial strategic stocks, make available a proportionate amount of this oil to ensure coordinated action. I am making a similar request to Helmut Kohl. As the world's economic leaders, our three countries in

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particular must be seen to be carrying our share of the burden of avoiding additional economic damage.

My representatives to the IEA Governing Board will be in touch with your representatives. I urge you to direct your officials to conclude IEA preparations by the end of this week.

The major oil producers responded quickly to our requests for additional oil production after August 2. In the event of hostilities, they have stressed the need for quick action by the IEA countries to help calm the market.

I share these concerns and am confident that you do too. An IEA-wide coordinated action to counter a potential supply disruption will complement our military and diplomatic efforts to ensure full Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions.

I am confident that we can count on Japan to do its part to bolster international energy security and Western solidarity in the face of Saddam Hussein's aggressive and unprecedented challenge to the rule of law and the new world order. As the two largest economies in the world, Japan and the United States must join together, under our global partnership, to take the prudent steps outlined above to minimize potential damage to our own economies and to the international economic system.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KOHL

Dear Helmut:

We are fast approaching the U.N. deadline for Saddam Hussein to withdraw totally from Kuwait. While we fervently hope that Iraq will make the use of force unnecessary by complying fully with the Security Council's demands, it is important that we have in place adequate contingency plans to deal with any possible interruption in oil supplies.

In the event of hostilities, there is likely to be a strong reaction in oil markets, reinforced by the probability of temporary loss of some oil from the Gulf. For this reason, it is essential to be prepared now rather than to be forced to react under pressure later.

Since 1974 we have worked hard together in the International Energy Agency (IEA) to ensure our energy security. A decision by the IEA before January 15 to an automatic coordinated stockdraw in the event of hostilities would provide a margin of comfort. It would also lessen economic damage to us, the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin America and developing countries generally.

I have asked my officials to work with their colleagues in other IEA countries to reach immediate IEA agreement on coordinated action. For our part, I will make available, in the event of hostilities, up to 1.5 million barrels a day of oil for one month from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. I am requesting that Germany, as a holder of substantial strategic stocks, make

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MM 3/17/2016

available a proportionate amount of this oil to ensure coordinated action. I am making a similar request of Toshiki Kaifu. As the world's economic leaders, our three countries in particular must act decisively to avert international economic damage.

My representatives to the IEA Governing Board will be in touch with your representatives. I urge you to direct your officials to conclude IEA preparations by the end of this week.

The major oil producers responded quickly to our requests for additional oil production after August 2. In the event of hostilities, they have stressed the need for quick action by the IEA countries to help calm the market. I share these concerns and am confident that you do too.

I trust that we can count on Germany to do its part to bolster international energy security and Western solidarity in the face of Iraq's aggressive and unprecedented challenge to the rule of law and the new world order.

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PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KAIFU

Dear Toshiki:

We are fast approaching the U.N. deadline for Saddam Hussein to withdraw totally from Kuwait. As part of our broader economic and political strategy, it is important that we have in place adequate measures to deal with any possible interruption in oil supplies.

In the event of hostilities, there is likely to be a strong reaction in oil markets, reinforced by the probability of temporary loss of some oil from the Gulf. For this reason, it is better to be visibly prepared now than to be forced to react later.

Since 1974 we have worked hard together in the International Energy Agency (IEA) to ensure our energy security. A decision by the IEA before January 15 to take coordinated action in the event of hostilities would reassure the markets as well as send a clear message to Saddam Hussein.

Therefore, I have asked my officials to work with their colleagues in other IEA countries to reach agreement on a program of coordinated action. Such a program would call on IEA members to ensure an adequate supply of oil to markets. For our part, the U.S. would be prepared to make available up to 1.5 million barrels a day of oil for one month from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, if it proved necessary to implement these emergency measures.

I request that Japan, as a holder of substantial strategic

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stocks, commit to making available a proportionate amount of this oil to ensure coordinated action. I am making a similar request of Helmut Kohl. As the world's economic leaders, our three countries in particular must be seen as ready to bear our share of the burden of avoiding additional economic damage.

My representatives to the IEA Governing Board will be in touch with your representatives. I urge you to direct your officials to conclude IEA preparations by the end of this week.

The major oil producers responded quickly to our requests for additional oil production after August 2. In the event of hostilities, they have stressed the need for quick action by the IEA countries to help calm the market.

I share these concerns and am confident that you do too. An IEA-wide coordinated action to counter a potential supply disruption will complement our military and diplomatic efforts to ensure full Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions.

I am confident that we can count on Japan to do its part to bolster international energy security and Western solidarity in the face of Saddam Hussein's aggressive and unprecedented challenge to the rule of law and the new world order. As the two largest economies in the world, Japan and the United States must join together, under our global partnership, to take the prudent steps outlined above to minimize potential damage to our own economies and to the international economic system.

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PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KOHL

Dear Helmut:

We are fast approaching the U.N. deadline for Saddam Hussein to withdraw totally from Kuwait. While we fervently hope that Iraq will make the use of force unnecessary by complying fully with the Security Council's demands, it is important that we have in place adequate contingency plans to deal with any possible interruption in oil supplies.

In the event of hostilities, there is likely to be a strong reaction in oil markets, reinforced by the probability of temporary loss of some oil from the Gulf. For this reason, it is essential to be prepared now rather than to be forced to react under pressure later.

✓ Since 1974 we have worked hard together in the International Energy Agency (IEA) to ensure our energy security. A decision by ✓ the IEA before January 15 to take coordinated action in the event of hostilities would reassure markets as well as send a clear signal to Saddam Hussein. It would also lessen economic damage to us, the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin America and developing countries generally.

Therefore, I have asked my officials to work with their colleagues in other IEA countries to reach agreement on a program of coordinated action. Such a program would call on IEA members to ensure an adequate supply of oil to markets. For our part, the U.S. would be prepared to make available up to 1.5 million barrels a day of oil for one month from the Strategic Petroleum

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Reserve, if it proved necessary to implement these emergency measures.

I request that Germany, as a holder of substantial strategic stocks, commit to making available a proportionate amount of this oil to ensure coordinated action. I am making a similar request of Toshiki Kaifu. As the world's economic leaders, our three countries in particular must act decisively to avert international economic damage.

My representatives to the IEA Governing Board will be in touch with your representatives. I urge you to direct your officials to conclude IEA preparations by the end of this week.

The major oil producers responded quickly to our requests for additional oil production after August 2. In the event of hostilities, they have stressed the need for quick action by the IEA countries to help calm the market. I share these concerns and am confident that you do too.

I trust that we can count on Germany to do its part to bolster international energy security and Western solidarity in the face of Iraq's aggressive and unprecedented challenge to the rule of law and the new world order.

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TO: DUBIA, J
ROY, J

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 04 FEB 91
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KEYWORDS: MILITARY OPERATIONS
IRAQ
KUWAIT

OIL
SAUDI ARABIA
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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: IRAQI USE OF OIL AS MILITARY WEAPON

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO

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Energy By on Iraqi Use of Air as
a Military Weapon

National Security Council
The White House

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Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>		
Bill Sittmann	<u>5</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>APNSA Has Seen</u> <u>TAB I</u>
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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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0206

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 4, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL JOHN A. DUBIA
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Iraqi Use of Oil as a Military
Weapon (Ø)

The Department of Energy has recently concluded a study on the subject. There are some effects analyzed in the study which might be of interest to our military allies in Desert Shield. State and Defense should develop a plan to inform those allies, as appropriate, of the results of the DoE study so that they can take necessary precautions. The NSC point of contact is Don Pilling, 202-395-6923. (Ø)



William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

cc: Ms. Ann Lavin
Executive Secretary
Department of Energy

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0206

January 10, 1991

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: DON PILLING

SUBJECT: Energy Brief on Iraqi Use of Oil as a Military
Weapon

At Tab II is a briefing book and a cover memorandum from Admiral Watkins in which he writes that "it is essential that you receive the briefing at the earliest opportunity so that you can decide on the most appropriate means to pass the information to both the Departments of Defense and State." We attended the briefing when it was presented to OSTP staff members on January 9, 1991. We believe that there is no need for you to be briefed, but you should be aware of its essential points and of the plans to disseminate the information.

The Iraqis have placed detonating charges on many Kuwaiti oil wells, constructed oil-filled trenches along the Saudi border, and laid oil pipelines into the Persian Gulf in the vicinity of Kuwait City. The Energy study examined the potential effects if the Iraqis decide to exercise the use of oil as a weapon. There are two effects which could have significant consequences for Desert Shield forces:

- The smoke from oil well and oil-filled trench fires would seriously impact electro-optical equipment. The region of maximum visibility degradation, i.e., less than 1 kilometer of visible range, will most likely be 5 kilometers or more downwind of the combustion sources and will extend for tens of kilometers. High winds would dramatically reduce the optical effects. For your information, an unreplenished trench fire would burn itself out in about a day, whereas oil well fires could go for years if not capped.
- The Iraqis could generate a twenty-million barrel oil spill which could compromise freshwater supplies and electrical power provided by desalination plants in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar as the slick moves down the coast with the counter-clockwise current in the Gulf. This could threaten the sustainment of Desert Shield forces, all of which rely on host-nation fresh water.

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The brief is to be presented to Defense/JCS today and at CENTCOM on January 11, 1991, so that appropriate counter-measures and plans can be made. The briefing tends to be alarmist and doesn't adequately address possible counters. For example, the extensive trench system is fed by only two pipelines which could be targeted early in a conflict. Further, plans could be made to attempt to prevent an oil spill by targeting the pipelines constructed for that purpose, and if prevention is unsuccessful, igniting the spilled oil before it spreads and becomes so thin it will not sustain combustion.

We believe that the only action NSC staff should take is to ensure that State and Defense work together to inform our military allies, as appropriate, of the results of the DOE study so that they can take necessary precautions. At Tab I is a memorandum for Bill Sittmann's signature initiating this action. If you concur, we will ensure that Admiral Watkins is informed of the action, unless you want to call him.

Concurrences by: Richard Haass and Tim Deal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That we inform Admiral Watkins through his staff of the action.

Approve *B*

Disapprove

That you request Bill Sittmann sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab II Briefing Book with Cover Memorandum

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The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

January 9, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: IRAQI USE OF OIL AS A MILITARY WEAPON

Brent:

Per our telephone conversation, I am attaching the book that accompanies the briefing by Sandia National Laboratory on the potential ramifications of the Iraqi use of oil as a military weapon. The book is divided into the following three sections:

- A. Latest Intelligence Situation
- B. Sandia's Study on the Potential Impacts of Iraqi Use of Oil as a Defensive Weapon
- C. Response Options (Very Preliminary)

I believe the information contained in this briefing is of extreme significance to the current military situation in the Gulf. Accordingly, I feel that it essential that you receive the briefing at the earliest possible opportunity so that you can decide on the most appropriate means to pass the information to both the Departments of Defense and State.

Representatives of DOE and Sandia National Laboratory stand ready to brief you at any time.

Jim
James D. Watkins
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)

Attachment

P.S. Briefings already scheduled as follows:
(1) Bromley - 1/9 @ 2:00 pm
(2) Interagency Group (incl. DoD/JCS) - 1/10 @ 2:00 pm
(3) CENTCOM at McDill AFB - 1/11

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