

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91146
Folder ID Number: 91146-005

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) III [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	4

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Re: Comparison of the Arabic and English Correspondence to the President from the Amir of Kuwaiti [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	12/19/90	(b)(3)	
01b. Letter	Amir of Kuwait Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	12/15/90	(b)(1)	
01c. Letter	Amir of Kuwait Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah to President Bush [Arabic] (2 pp.)	12/15/90	(b)(1)	
02. Cable	Re: The Pope Sends Message to the President on the Gulf; Public Comments Condemn Iraq's Violation of International Law (2 pp.)	1/12/91	(b)(1)	✓
03a. Cable	Re: 1990 GCC DOHA Summit, Report No. 31: Text of Amir's Letter to President Bush (2 pp.)	1/2/91	(b)(1)	✓
03b. Letter	To President Bush [Arabic] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04a. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
04b. Letter	Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to President Bush (2 pp.)	1/11/91	(b)(1)	
05. Note	James A. Baker, III to Brent Scowcroft Re: Foreign Minister Meguid (1 pp.)	1/25/91	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 2

Collection:	
Record Group:	Bush Presidential Records
Office:	Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:	Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:	Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:	
File Location:	Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) III [1]
Pinksheet Number:	cap1218
OA/ID Number:	91146-005
Date Closed:	6/30/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:	2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Hans Van Den Broek, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	1/28/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C
06b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van Den Broek (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
06c. Report	Re: Government report (2 pp.)	1/27/91	(b)(1)	S
06d. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek of the Netherlands (1 pp.)	1/28/91	(b)(1)	C
07a. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Iraqi Aircraft and Iran's Obligations Under International Law (4 pp.)	1/29/91	(b)(1)	C
07b. Memo	From Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Responding to Iraqi CW Use [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	1/29/91	(b)(1)	TS

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) III [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1218
OA/ID Number: 91146-005
Date Closed: 6/30/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009835
RECEIVED: 17 DEC 90 16

TO: SITTMANN

CHRON FILE

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 24 JAN 91
SOURCE REF: 9026353

KEYWORDS: KUWAIT
HOSTAGES
HS

PERSIAN GULF
IRAQ

PERSONS: SABAH, JABER

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM AMIR RE US POLICY TWD IRAQ

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE DUE DATE: 20 DEC 90 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: STATE LOGREF: 9009826 9009827
FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAASS
NSC CHRON
SALVETTI, L

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM CLOSED BY: NSDAI DOC 3 OF 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(DECLASS: OADR)

9835

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9026353

Date January 24, 1991

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: The President

From: The Amir of Kuwait

Date: December 15, 1990

Subject: U.S. Policy toward Iraq

WH Referral Dated: December 17, 1990
NSCS ID# (if any): 9009835

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State

ACTION TAKEN:

 A draft reply is attached.

 A draft reply will be forwarded.

 A translation is attached.


 An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

 X We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.

 The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.

 Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: The letter raises hypothetical questions about U.S.
reactions in the event of Iraqi withdrawal pursuant to U.N.
resolutions. The questions are no longer relevant and no reply
will be expected.


Director
Secretariat Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(DECLASS: OADR)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Memo	Re: Comparison of the Arabic and English Correspondence to the President from the Amir of Kuwaiti [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] (1 pp.)	12/19/90	(b)(3)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) III [1]

Date Closed: 6/30/2009	OA/ID Number: 91146-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

memorandum

DATE: December 19, 1990

LS No. 133901

REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

SUBJECT:

Comparison of the Arabic and English Correspondence
to the President from the Amir of Kuwaiti

TO:

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

The English and Arabic texts of the above-mentioned correspondence have been compared by a responsible language officer of this Division and have been found to have the same meaning in all substantive respects.

(b)(3) [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6]

Bush Library Photocopy

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 1-80)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-114

* U.S. GPO: 1988-201-760



S/S 9026304

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 17, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

SUBJECT: Alerting NSCS on Presidential
Correspondence

Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Bush from Amir of Kuwait Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah which is transmitted for your information.

This correspondence was received in the Information Resources Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on Dec. 17, 1990. A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.

Charles G. Jackson Jr.

Director, S/S-IRM
Information Resources Management Section
Executive Secretariat
647-2991

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9009835
DATE 15 DEC 90

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM AMIR OF KUWAIT RE GULF CRISIS
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

12/17/90

2217

[Signature]

COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9009835
DATE 15 DEC 90

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM AMIR OF KUWAIT RE GULF CRISIS
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

ROY, J

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE

2201 C STREET, NW

WASHINGTON, DC 20520

12/17/90 2230 J. Roy

COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/30/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9009835

REFERRAL

DATE: 17 DEC 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: SABAH, JABER

DATE: 15 DEC 90

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM AMIR OF KUWAIT RE GULF CRISIS

9026353

90 DEC-17 10:31 PM

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 20 DEC 90

COMMENT:

M. Metz
(FOR)

GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EMBASSY OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT
WASHINGTON, D. C.



9835
PRES NOTED SUMMARY
سفارة دولة الكويت
وشحن

December 15, 1990

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

The Honorable
George Herbert Walker Bush
President of the United States of America

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your message which you have sent to me yesterday, Thursday the 13th of December 1990, and in which you enlightened me of your stand in the Gulf.

I wish to thank you for your continuous endeavor to provide me with a clear picture of the latest developments of events, specially after the departure of the American hostages in both Kuwait and Iraq, and the withdrawal of the remaining diplomats, leaving the Embassy officially opened until the return of the legitimate authority to the country, and normality is resumed.

Besides conveying my congratulations to these hostages, who have shared hard times with the Kuwaiti people on their release, I would like also to congratulate Your Excellency on the achievement that has been realized by your steadfast stances, built on a far righted policy, and correct understanding of the dictatorship mentality of Saddam, which responds to nothing except firmness and force.

This achievement that forms part of the realization of your full and declared objectives is but a clear indication of your correct assessment of these objectives.

In response to your stated wish in your message to hear our opinion, and your call to us to stand firmly together, I thought it opportune to share with you my thoughts at present.

Mr. President:

I was, as I still am, always highly appreciative of your relentless efforts to reach the final stage with firm, and well calculated steps in a logical sequence until the hour of reckoning became near, be it peaceful or otherwise. But there are thoughts that has started to occupy my mind, and that is the European countries endeavor to guarantee that Iraq will not be attacked during or after its withdrawal from all of Kuwait in case of response to The Security Council resolution. This is a matter which we have no objection to in principal, for we are with every peaceful solution that (does not reward the aggressor), quoting Your Excellency's repeated statements. But what if the Iraqi regime goes ahead with his threats deliberately destroying Kuwait oil installations and its wells before, during, or after his withdrawal? and what will be the reaction in this case?

This is what I liked to put before Your Excellency, knowing for certain that these thoughts must have passed through your mind, and I firmly believe, therefore, that you have taken it into account. It is just a reminder.

With my best wishes and highest consideration.

Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah
Amir of Kuwait



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



صاحب الفخامة الرئيس بوش
رئيس الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية
البيت الأبيض - واشنطن

عزيزي السيد الرئيس ،

بلغتني رسالتكم التي بعثتم بها مساء أمس الخميس ١٣ ديسمبر ١٩٩٠م والتي تطلعوني بها على الموقف الآن بالنسبة لأزمة الخليج .
واني إذ أشكركم على مواظبتكم إعطائي صورة واضحة من تطورات الأحداث وعلى الأخص بعد مفادرة الرهائن الأمريكيين في كل من الكويت والعراق وسحب ما تبقى من الدبلوماسيين في الكويت مع ترك السفارة مفتوحة رسمياً لحين عودة الملطة الشرعية الى البلاد كما كانت في سابق عيدها .
كما أود بجانب تقديمي التهنئة لهؤلاء الرهائن الذين شاركوا شعب الكويت هراهم بملك أسرهم ، أن أهنيء فخامتكم أيضاً بهذا الإنجاز الذي حققته مواقفكم الشابتة والمبنية على سياسة بعيدة النظر وتغلب مائب لعقلية صدام الدكتاتورية التي لا تستجيب الى أي شيء سوى الحزم والقوة .
ان هذا الإنجاز يشكل جزءاً من تحقيق الأهداف الشاملة والمعلنة لتلك السياسة يهتبر مؤشراً واضحاً على صواب تصوركم لها .
واستجابة لرغبتكم التي وردتموها في تلك الرسالة بسماع رأينا ودعوتكم لنا الى الوقوف بحزم مع بعض ، رأيت من المناسب أن أهشكم الأفكار التي تراودني حالياً .

السيد الرئيس ،

لقد كنت ولا أزال أقدر في النهاية عظيم التقدير ما بذلتم من جهود حثيثة للوصول الى مرحلة النهاية بخطوات ثابتة ومدروسة النتائج حتى بات أمر الحسم قريباً من مواعده ويتسلسل منطقي سواء كان سلماً أم حرباً .

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- ٢ -

ولكن هناك أفكارا بدأت تخالجي وتتردد في نفسي وهو تعهد الدول الأوروبية بالسعي لضمان عدم مهاجمة العراق أثناء انسحابه أو بعده وذلك في حالة تنفيذه لقرار مجلس الأمن بالانسحاب الكامل من الكويت ، وهذا أمر لا اعتراض لنا عليه من ناحية المبدأ ، فنحن نقول نعم لكل حل سلمي لا يكافئ المعتدي ، كما أعلنتم أنتم ذلك مرارا ، ولكن ماذا لو أقدم النظام العراقي على تدمير متعمد لمنشآت الكويت النفطية وتفجير آبارها قبل أو أثناء أو بعد انسحابه ؟ وماذا سيكون رد الفعل في تلك الحالة ؟ هذا ما أحببت أن أطرده على فخامتكم وأعتقد جازما أن هذه الأفكار لابد وأنهما قد راودتكم ووقعتم حسابا لها ، وإنما أحببت أنذكر .

مع خالص التقدير وأطيب التمنيات

جابر الأحمد الجابر الصباح

أمير الكويت

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100318
RECEIVED: 14 JAN 91 15

CHRON FILE

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 24 JAN 91
SOURCE REF: 9100807

KEYWORDS: VATICAN
IRAQ

HS
PERSIAN GULF

2

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CABLE RE MSG FM POPE JOHN PAUL II TO PRES / IRAQI VIOLATION OF INTL
LAW

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

DUE DATE: 17 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF: 9100217 9100291

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0518

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CHRON FILE

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 91008 24,

Date January 24, 1991

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: The President

From: John Paul II

Date: January 12, 1991

Subject: Cable re msg from Pope John Paul II to

President re Iraqi Violation of International Law

WH Referral Dated: 1/16/91

NSCS ID# (if any): 9100318

The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION TAKEN:

Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1993
By Cap NARA, Date 6/30/69

A draft reply is attached.

A draft reply will be forwarded.

A translation is attached.

An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

☒ We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.

The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.

Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:

Subsequent public exchange of letters between Pope John Paul II and
President Bush addressed this subject in full.

Rebecca Kuhl
Director
Secretariat Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9100318

REFERRAL

DATE: 14 JAN 91

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

9100307

91 JAN-14 11:34 PM

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: JOHN PAUL II

DATE: 12 JAN 91

SUBJ: CABLE RE MSG FM POPE JOHN PAUL II TO PRES RE IRAQI VIOLATION OF INTL
LAW

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 17 JAN 90

COMMENT:


FOR GEORGE VAN ERON
DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/30/09

by Albany, NY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

0318

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT. GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN SUNUNU VANERON
SIT. FILE HUTCHINGS MONTGOMERY ROSTOW WELCH WHSR-IRAQ PRES-MSGs SIT SUM
VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 121713Z JAN 91

FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8191
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHWW/GULF WAR COLLECTIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ROME 00797

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

FROM EMBASSY VATICAN/MESSAGE NO. 0040/91

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ZP, VT

SUBJECT: THE POPE SENDS MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT

-- ON THE GULF; PUBLIC COMMENTS CONDEMN IRAQ'S
-- VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. ~~101~~ AFTER THE POPE'S ANNUAL ADDRESS TO THE
DIPLOMATIC CORPS TODAY, HE SPOKE BRIEFLY WITH ME ALONE
AND ASKED THAT I PASS A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. THE
POPE SAID THAT HE WAS "THINKING OF PRESIDENT BUSH," AND
UNDERSTOOD THE PRESIDENT HAD A DIFFICULT DECISION TO
MAKE. THE POPE INDICATED HE WAS CONFIDENT THE
PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE THE RIGHT DECISION, WHICH WOULD
AFFECT THE ENTIRE WORLD. THE POPE SAID HE WAS PRAYING
FOR THE PRESIDENT.

2. (U) IN THE POPE'S TOUR D'HORIZON REMARKS TO THE
DIPLOMATIC CORPS, HE REFERRED TO THE GULF REGION AS
BEING IN A STATE OF SEIGE. HE NOTED THAT "ONE COUNTRY
VIOLATES THE MOST ELEMENTARY RULES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW." "ONE CANNOT ACCEPT THAT THE LAW OF THE STRONGER
CAN BE BRUTALLY IMPOSED ON THE WEAKER." HE ONCE AGAIN
PRAISED THE UN'S REACTION TO IRAQ'S AGGRESSION. THE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0716-WR
mm 9/28/2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

POPE REFERRED TO A MESSAGE HE HAD SENT UN SYG PEREZ DE
CUELLAR THE PREVIOUS DAY WHICH REAFFIRMED THE
"UNACCEPTABLE FACTS" OF IRAQ'S "BRUTAL VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW." THE POPE THEN CALLED FOR
EXHAUSTING ALL PEACEFUL MEANS TO FIND A JUST SOLUTION.

MELADY

BT

#0797

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100148
RECEIVED: 08 JAN 91 09

TO: SITTMANN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FILE

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 25 JAN 91
SOURCE REF: 9100299

KEYWORDS: QATAR
PERSIAN GULF
KUWAIT

HS
IRAQ

PERSONS: THANI, KHALIFA

SUBJECT: LTR OF APPRECIATION TO PRES FM AMIR THANI RE GULF CRISIS

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE DUE DATE: 14 JAN 91 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: STATE LOGREF: 9009237 9009412
FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAASS
NSC CHRON
SALVETTI, L

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Co NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI CLOSED BY: NSDAI DOC 3 OF 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

0148

S/S 9100299

Date January 25, 1991

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By Co NARA, Date 6/30/09

Reference:

To: President Bush

From: Chairman GCC

Date: 30 December 90

Subject: Appreciation of GCC Leaders for USG's Stance
during the Gulf Crisis

WH Referral Dated:) _____
NSCS ID# (if any): _____

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State

Action Taken:

- _____ A draft reply is attached.
- _____ A draft reply will be forwarded.
- _____ A translation is attached.
- _____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- X We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- _____ The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- _____ Other (see remarks).

Remarks: The Amir was replying formally and publicly to President Bush's letter to the GCC summit leaders. The letter contains well known sentiments, from leaders with whom we are in close touch. The GCC summit did not expect a "thank you" to its "thank you."


Director
Secretariat Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

SUBJECT: Alerting NSCS on Presidential
Correspondence

Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Bush from Khalifa bin Hamad al Thani, Amir of Qatar which is transmitted for your information.

This correspondence was received in the Information Resources Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on January 7, 1991. A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "S. McElhann", followed by a flourish.

Director, S/S-IRM
Information Resources Management Section
Executive Secretariat
647-2991

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRE-INDEXED SUMMARY

INCOMING

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ARA/NEA REARCS

Q Incl - GCC Summit

PAGE 01 OF 02 DOHA 00006 00 OF 02 020942Z 021883 0051291
ACTION: QA (01)

DOHA 00006 00 OF 02 020942Z 021883 0051291

INFO: ARPD (01) NEA (02) RA (01) MRA (01) BA (01) IR (01) IZ (01)
KU (01) MU (01) SA (01) TC (01) MIL (01)
----- 02/1048Z A3 HS (TOTAL COPIES: 014)

ACTION NEA-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 EUR-00 INRE-00 INR-05
IO-19 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-02
SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 /037W
-----306A2A 021045Z /21 61O 020939Z JAN 91
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1900
INFO RUEHWW/GULF WAR COLLECTIVE
NSC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
SECDEF WASHDC
USIA WASHDC 5744
USCINCCENT
USCENTAF FWD HQS ELEMENT
USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AF
COMUSNAVCENT
DIA WASHDC
TRSYDEPT WASHDC
USDOE WASHDCDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0877-MR

M4 4/7/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DOHA 00006

NSC FOR MR. NAAS OR MS. CHARLES

USUM FOR URBANCIC; LONDON FOR MILLIKAN; PARIS FOR
ROSENBLATT; USCINCCENT ALSO FOR POLAD; USIA FOR NEA; AMB.
RUGH; DOD FOR OSD/ISA; DOE FOR IE/CCPAKEN/BRODMANE.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, OPDC, MOPS, PINR, GCC, XF, QA
SUBJECT: 1990 GCC DOHA SUMMIT, REPORT NO. 31:
- TEXT OF AMIR'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSHREF: (A) 90 STATE 417279
- (B) 90 DOHA 3312 DTG 200712Z DEC 90
- (C) 90 DOHA 3385 DTG 310916Z DEC 90
- (D) 90 DOHA 3384 DTG 310910Z DEC 90

1. ~~1st~~ COMMENT: PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER TO THE AMIR (REF A), IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE GCC FOR 1991, WAS WARMLY RECEIVED IN QATAR AND ACCORDED UNUSUALLY EXTENSIVE PRESS COVERAGE (REF B). AS REPORTED IN REFS C AND D, THE AMIR'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT WAS GIVEN EQUALLY WIDE PUBLICITY, EVEN FOR A COUNTRY WHERE THE MOST TRIVIAL EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES BETWEEN CHIEFS OF STATE IS ROUTINELY REPORTED ON THE FRONT PAGE. FOLLOWING IN PARA TWO IS THE OFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE AMIR'S DECEMBER 30 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. AS NOTED IN REFS C AND D, THE LETTER CONVEYS IN VERY WARM TERMS THE "APPRECIATION" AND "GRATITUDE" OF THE SIX GULF LEADERS FOR THE "HONORABLE" STANCE TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THE GULF CRISIS. THE TEXT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF BUT IS ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY FOR THE CONGENIALITY OF THE TONE WHICH IS EXCEPTIONAL COMING AS IT DOES FROM A COUNTRY WHOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S., PRIOR TO THE EVENTS OF LAST AUGUST, WAS ALL TOO OFTEN STRAINED AND SOMEWHAT DISTANT. END COMMENT.

2. (U) FOLLOWING IS THE OFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE

AMIR'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT DATED 30 DECEMBER 1990:

BEGIN TEXT:

H.E. PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

0148

I HAVE RECEIVED WITH PROFOUND THANKS AND APPRECIATION YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 18, 1990, WHICH EXPRESSED THE STRONG FRIENDSHIP THAT IS BINDING US AND IS GAINING SPECIAL IMPORTANCE AT THIS CRITICAL STAGE OF THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD AND PARTICULARLY THE HISTORY OF THE GULF REGION.

HAVE BRIEFED THEIR MAJESTIES AND HIGHNESSES THE LEADERS OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL ON YOUR LETTER AND YOUR DETERMINATION TO CONFRONT THE IRAQI AGGRESSION, LIBERATE KUWAIT AND RESTORE LEGITIMACY THERE.

THE LEADERS OF THE COUNCIL HAVE ASKED ME, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE ELEVENTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL, TO WRITE TO YOU ON THEIR BEHALF TO CONVEY APPRECIATION AND GRATITUDE TO YOU AND YOUR GREAT COUNTRY, WHICH, FROM THE VERY FIRST DAY OF THE TREACHEROUS IRAQI INVASION OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT, THE AGGRESSION AGAINST ITS NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE REPRESSION OF ITS PEOPLE, HAS TAKEN A FIRM STAND IN BRINGING ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON THE NECESSITY OF ENDING THE AGGRESSION IMMEDIATELY AS EMBODIED IN THE SUCCESSIVE UNITED NATIONS' SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WHICH CLIMAXED IN RESOLUTION 678. THIS RESOLUTION HAS SET A TIMETABLE FOR IRAQI WITHDRAWAL

FROM KUWAIT IN CONFIRMATION OF THE DETERMINED WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO LIBERATE KUWAIT BY PEACEFUL MEANS, OR RESORT TO ALL OTHER OPTIONS TO REACH THIS GOAL SHOULD PEACEFUL MEANS FAIL.

THE UNITED STATES HONOURABLE STANCE IN THIS REGARD IS BUT A CONTINUATION OF THE PATH IT HAS TAKEN THROUGH ITS HISTORY OF PLACING PRINCIPLES, VALUES AND COMMON WORLD INTERESTS ABOVE ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. IT FOUGHT INJUSTICE IN WORLD WAR I, AND VEHEMENTLY STOOD UP TO DESPOTISM, ANNEXATION AND HEGEMONY IN WORLD WAR II.

YOUR POSITION TODAY IS BUT A CONTINUATION OF THE UNITED STATES HERITAGE OF SEEKING THE SUPREMACY OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE AND DEFEATING AGGRESSION.

RELATIONS OF THE COUNCIL'S MEMBER STATES WITH THE UNITED STATES ARE PASSING THROUGH A HISTORIC PHASE, THANKS TO YOUR STANDING ALONG WITH THE BRAVE AMERICAN PEOPLE WITH US IN OUR CONFRONTATION WITH THE EVIL AND OUR RESOLVE TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE, LIBERATE KUWAIT AND RESTORE LEGITIMACY THERE. OUR DETERMINATION TO WORK TOGETHER TO REALIZE THE LOFTY OBJECTIVES OF MEN IN PEACE AND SECURITY IS ROOTED IN CLOSE INTERESTS, UNITED GOALS AND COMMITMENT TO PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS' CHARTER, AND THE CONVICTION THAT THE WORLD OF TOMORROW MUST BE ONE OF PROSPERITY, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT, BASED ON INTERDEPENDENCE AND SOLVING PROBLEMS NOT BY CONFRONTATION BUT BY DIALOGUE.

IN EXPRESSING DEEP THANKS AND APPRECIATION FOR YOUR NOBLE SENTIMENTS AND STRONG DETERMINATION TO DEFEAT THE AGGRESSION, I AGREE WITH YOU MY DEAR FRIEND, ON THE NECESSITY THAT THE NEW WORLD ORDER SHOULD BE FOUNDED ON COOPERATION AND RECONCILIATION AND NOT HEGEMONY AND DESPOTISM. THESE PRINCIPLES WERE EMBODIED IN BOTH THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL'S ELEVENTH SUMMIT AND THE DECLARATION OF DOHA WHICH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ARA/NEA REARCS

PAGE 02 OF 02 DOHA 00006 00 OF 02 020942Z 021003 S05125:
DEFINED THE PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH OUR REGIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ARE BUILT.

I TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND TO YOU ON MY BEHALF AND
IN THE NAME OF THE LEADERS OF THE COUNCIL THE ASSURANCES
OF OUR HIGHEST ESTEEM AND CONSIDERATION.

KHALIFA BIN HAMAD AL THANI
AMIR OF THE STATE OF QATAR

END TEXT.
HAMBLEY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



PRES NOTED SUMMARY

فخامة الرئيس جورج بوش

رئيس الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية .

تلقيت ببالغ الشكر والتقدير كتابكم المؤرخ ١٨ ديسمبر ١٩٩٠
المعبر عن الصداقة الوطيدة التي تربط بيننا والتي تكتسب أهمية خاصة
في هذه المرحلة الدقيقة من تاريخ العالم عامة وتاريخ منطقة الخليج
خاصة .

ولقد اطلعت إخواني أصحاب الجلالة والسمو قادة دول مجلس
التعاون على رسالتكم وما أكدته من تصميمكم على مواجهة العدوان
العراقي وتحرير الكويت وعودة الشرعية إليها .

وقد كلفني إخواني قادة دول المجلس أن أكتب لكم نيابة
عنهم - بصفتي رئيساً للدورة الحادية عشرة للمجلس الأعلى لمجلس
التعاون لدول الخليج العربية - لكي أنقل اليكم مشاعر التقدير
والامتنان لكم ولبلدكم العظيم الذي اتخذ منذ اليوم الأول من الغزو
العراقي الغادر على دولة الكويت والاعتداء على سيادتها الوطنية
والتنكيل بشعبها ، موقفاً حازماً في تحقيق الاجماع الدولي على وجوب
الانهاء الفوري للعدوان ، عبر القرارات المتتالية لمجلس الأمن الدولي
التي توجت بالقرار رقم ٦٧٨ الذي وضع اطاراً زمنياً للانسحاب العراقي

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



-٢-

من الكويت تأكيداً لإرادة المجتمع الدولي في الاصرار على تحريرها
بالوسائل السلمية ، أو باللجوء إلى كافة الخيارات الأخرى اذا لم تفلح
الوسائل السلمية في تحقيق هذه الغاية .

ان موقف الولايات المتحدة المشرف في هذا الصدد ليس إلا
استمراراً للنهج الذي اتبعته عبر تاريخها والمتمثل في وضع المبادئ
والقيم والمصالح العالمية الجماعية فوق كل اعتبار ، فقد حاربت الولايات
المتحدة الظلم في الحرب العالمية الأولى ، وتصدت بقوة للاستبداد والضم
والهيمنة في الحرب العالمية الثانية . وموقفكم اليوم هو استمرار لتراث
الولايات المتحدة في العمل على سيادة المبادئ واعلاء كلمة الحق ودحر
العدوان .

ان علاقات دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي بالولايات المتحدة تمر
بفترة تاريخية من خلال وقوفكم والشعب الأمريكي الشجاع معنا في
تصدينا للباطل واصرارنا على احقاق الحق وتحرير الكويت وعودة
الشرعية اليها . كما ان تصميمنا على العمل معاً لتحقيق الأهداف
السامية للانسانية في السلام والاستقرار يجد أساسه في تقارب المصالح
 واتحاد الاهداف والالتزام بمبادئ القانون الدولي وميثاق الأمم المتحدة
والاقتناع بأن عالم الغد يجب أن يكون عالم رخاء واطمئنان وتركيز على

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



-٣-

التنمية يقوم على الاعتماد المتبادل ، وحل المشاكل بالحوار بدلاً من
المواجهة .

وانني أيتها الصديق العزيز إذ أعرب لكم عن فائق الشكر
والتقدير على نبل مشاعركم وقوة تصميمكم على دحر العدوان ، اتفق
معكم على ضرورة ان يكون النظام العالمي الجديد مبنياً على الوفاق
والتعاون، لا الهيمنة والاستبداد ، وقد عبر عن هذه المبادئ البيان
الختامي الذي صدر عن أعمال الدورة الحادية عشرة للمجلس الأعلى ،
كما تضمنها اعلان الدوحة الذي حدد المبادئ التي تقوم عليها علاقاتنا
الاقليمية والدولية .

وانتهز هذه المناسبة لاجدد لكم باسمي وباسم اخواني قادة دول
المجلس ، الاعراب عن اسمى الاعتبار وفائق التقدير .

خليفة بن حمد

خليفة بن حمد آل ثاني

أمير دولة قطر

الديوان الأميري في : ١٣/٦/١٤١١هـ

الموافق : ٣٠/١٢/١٩٩٠م

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100627
RECEIVED: 25 JAN 91 14

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 29 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS
GABON

GREAT BRITAIN



PERSONS: THATCHER, MARGAERT

BONGO, OMAR

SUBJECT: HS CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 29 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON

LOGREF: 9100584 9100600

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
NSC CHRON
VAN ERON

*Please copy only:
Thatcher 1/11*

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Heads of State Summary - Jan 25

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: LMS LOG # 0627
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>sf</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>APNSA Has Seen</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>To Pres</u>	<u>1/29</u>
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>JA 1/29</u>	<u>[scribble]</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

RECEIVED
 JAN 25 P 4: 47

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP _____ Sununu _____ Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Heads of State Correspondence
Summary*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec See office has diskette

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
0627

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

**Former Prime Minister Thatcher of the UK - January 11, 1991
(Received January 24)**

✓ Former PM Thatcher plans to make a semi-private visit to the U.S. for President Reagan's 80th birthday celebration. Although she would like to visit Washington, she realizes your time is occupied by the war. She does not plan to make a major speech in California, however if questioned by reporters, she will be as supportive as ever.

✓ She admired your interview with David Frost and was particularly impressed by the way that you told people the truth about the atrocities that Saddam Hussein has committed in Kuwait. As one Anglican Bishop said, "the sanction of force could not be left only to those who have no moral scruples about its use."

**President Bongo of Gabon - December 27, 1990
(Received January 24)**

✓ President Bongo appreciates your message concerning the political changes in Gabon. Soon his government will complete a new constitution, demonstrating the Gabonese commitment to democracy.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0877-MR
MM 4/7/2016

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

11th January 1991

Dear Mr. President.

I thought I would let you know that I am planning to attend President Reagan's 80th birthday celebration in California. Like so many others, I want to pay my tribute to what he has done for the United States and for freedom in the wider world.

Although I should like to come to Washington, I feel that the timing would not be appropriate because every day for you will be dominated by the Gulf and the anxious decisions it will require. Also, thanks to your immense kindness, I hope to see you and be able to talk with you at a time of your choosing when the Freedom Medal is presented. This visit therefore will be to the West Coast and will be semi-private.

I shall not be making a major speech but may be tackled by TV interviewers. My comments will be as firm, direct and supportive as ever. May I say how greatly I admired your interview with David Frost. I was particularly pleased that you really told people the truth about the terrible tortures that have been perpetrated by Saddam Hussein in Kuwait. One of our

Bishops put the whole Kuwait issue very clearly when he said that the sanction of force could not be left only to those who have no moral scruples about its use.

You and Barbara are constantly in our thoughts and hearts especially in these difficult weeks. Denis and I will hope to see you before long.

Warm regards,

Yours very
sincerely
Barbara

The President of the United States of America

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101246
RECEIVED: 20 FEB 91 07

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: BAKER, J

DOC DATE: 25 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT

IMF

PERSONS: MUBARAK, HOSNI

MEGUID, AHMED ESMAT ABDEL

SUBJECT: BAKER MTG W/ FOMIN MEGUID OF EGYPT / MEMO ON EGYPTIAN IMF
NEGOTIATIONS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 23 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: PLEASE NOTE THIS IS EYES ONLY

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

1-25
CHIEF OF FILE

January 25, 1991

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *J.A. Baker*

Foreign Minister Meguid is coming next week to see me, Brady, and, I presume, the President.

President Mubarak is concerned about Egypt's negotiations with the IMF. I really think with the sniping that Mubarak is beginning to receive from his opposition at home, and considering the importance of concluding an IMF stand-by agreement to public opinion in Egypt, that we should do everything we can to assist him with the IMF.

I think a gentle hint to that effect from the President (or the White House) to Treasury might be helpful.

EYES ONLY



THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE **IMMEDIATE**
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: JA

DTG: 26056Z

MESSAGE NO. 99 CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS PAGES 1

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
(Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____

TO (Agency) CAMP DAVID DELIVER TO: FLO GANTT FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT DEPT/ROOM NO. EYES ONLY PHONE NUMBER _____

REMARKS DELIVER UPON RECEIPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100687
RECEIVED: 28 JAN 91 19

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: HUTCHINGS
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 28 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NETHERLANDS
IRAQ
USSR

DESERT STORM
KUWAIT
AP

PERSONS: VAN DEN BROEK, HANS

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ DUTCH FOMIN VAN DEN BROEK ON 29 JAN RE GULF WAR & SOVIET
SITUATION

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 31 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GANTT
GOMPERT
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 0687

URGENT NOT PROOFED: [Signature]

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG [Signature] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>copy</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature] 7/28</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N/R</u>

A = Action **I = Information** **D = Dispatch** **R = Retain** **N = No further Action**

cc:

VP

91 JAN 28 02 PM '91

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

EN Secis Office has dispatch

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Hans Van Den Broek, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	1/28/91	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) III [1]

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**
By MM on 4/13/2023

Date Closed: 6/30/2009	OA/ID Number: 91146-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0877-MR(505)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/7/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0637

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 28, 1991

MEETING WITH HANS VAN DEN BROEK,
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE NETHERLANDS

DATE: January 29, 1991


LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 2:45 - 2:50 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

2:45 p.m.

MEETING WITH HANS
VAN DEN BROEK
FOREIGN MINISTER
OF THE NETHERLANDS
(Oval)



Rg fm

I. PURPOSE

To express your support for the strong position the Dutch, and van den Broek personally, have taken on the Gulf.

II. BACKGROUND

Van den Broek has consistently led the Dutch government and public opinion in strong political and material support for the Gulf effort. As Dutch public opinion has been supportive but not robust, van den Broek's leadership has been both instrumental and politically courageous.

In addition to their direct military contribution in the Gulf -- including the deployment of three ships and provision of weaponry and logistical support for the deployment of U.S. forces -- the Dutch stepped up quickly to deploy two Patriot units to southeastern Turkey and have offered 18 F-16s for stationing in the region. After the first Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel, Prime Minister Lubbers suggested that the Dutch might also offer Patriot units for Israel's defense -- an offer which was declined in favor of deploying further, immediately operational U.S. units.

Your meeting will help demonstrate Allied solidarity and give a boost to van den Broek, whose position on the Gulf will continue to be important in leading Dutch and broader European opinion.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity and brief meeting

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List

1.4(c); (b)(3)

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0877-MR

MM 4/7/2016

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER HANS VAN DEN BROEK

- Thank you for the strong, courageous support you and your government have given us in our effort to liberate Kuwait.
- Your direct support in the Gulf, as well as your provision of Patriots for Turkey, have been invaluable.
- We have appreciated the many other offers of aid you have made, especially of armed forces prepared to participate in the fighting.
- We will continue to look for ways in which the Dutch military can contribute to the multinational coalition.
- We are encouraged by results of the coalition military efforts thus far in the war against Iraqi aggression.
- We have deliberately planned operations so as to minimize damage to civilians.
- We will not agree to a "pause" in hostilities. We have seen no indications of any flexibility in Iraqi positions. Throughout the crisis, Iraq has attempted to exploit diplomatic initiatives to play for time. It would react to a "pause" in the same manner.
- We are more determined than ever to see the operation through. Saddam must know that we will continue military operations until Iraq complies fully and unconditionally with all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions.
- We appreciate your strong statements of support. Your leadership has been extremely important in solidifying European support for our common effort in the Gulf.

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TAB B

PARTICIPANTS

The President

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs

Howard Wilkins, Ambassador to the Netherlands

David C. Gompert, Special Assistant to the President
for European and Soviet Affairs

Hans van den Broek, Foreign Minister

Hans Meesman, Ambassador to the U.S.

TAB C

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06c. Report	Re: Government report (2 pp.)	1/27/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) III [1]

Date Closed: 6/30/2009	OA/ID Number: 91146-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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0687

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 28, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT *MG*FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*SUBJECT: Meeting with Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek
of the Netherlands

Attached at Tab I is the President's briefing package for his photo op with van den Broek.

In your office meeting, van den Broek will doubtless want to get your sense of the conduct of the war. The Dutch government, and van den Broek personally, are exposed politically on their offers to deploy first F-16s, and then Patriots, to the Middle East. They have a Patriot unit now in Turkey, but we just declined their offer to join in providing additional Patriots to Israel. You should reiterate our readiness to find ways for the Dutch to help the coalition. We are also likely to seek further Dutch military assistance for Turkey, but are not yet in a position to make specific requests, pending review by the Pentagon.

Van den Broek will also want to compare notes with you on the Soviet situation. As the Dutch are now reconsidering Soviet aid following the approval in November of a \$600 million export credit guarantee program, it would be useful to reiterate the importance of linking Western assistance to economic and political reform, and the danger of siphoning off Western support for central Europe. The Dutch have spoken out strongly against Soviet intimidation in the Baltic states, though the Netherlands is among the few European countries that recognize their incorporation into the USSR.

If time permits, you may also want to review with van den Broek your views on reconciling a stronger European security voice with a continuing vital Atlantic Alliance. On these issues as on the Uruguay Round, Dutch positions are sound but need to be translated into more effective advocacy in the EC and at NATO.

Concurrences by: *CR* Condoleezza Rice, Philip Zelipow *PZ*RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum for the President
Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biography

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PER E.O. 13526*200-0878-MR*
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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100727
RECEIVED: 29 JAN 91 19

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: ROSTOW

DOC DATE: 29 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
KUWAIT
DESERT STORM

IRAN
PERSIAN GULF
UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: IRAQI AIRCRAFT & IRAN OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTL LAW

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 01 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSTOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
ROSTOW

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSMJT

DOC 1 OF 1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0727

January 29, 1991

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: NICHOLAS ROSTOW *NR*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Aircraft and Iran's Obligations Under
International Law

Summary

The landing of Iraqi aircraft in Iran raises important questions about the legal rights and duties of all states not participating militarily in the enforcement of the U.N. Security Council's decisions and recommendations with respect to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Arguably, Iran may not claim to be a neutral in the traditional sense of unbiased non-participant in international armed conflict. If it may claim to be neutral, or if it is determined there is no effective way to prevent such a claim, Iran must conform its behavior to the strict legal rules governing neutrality.

A. Is Neutrality in the Gulf War Possible?

A strong argument exists, which the State Department Legal Adviser's Office and most scholars endorse, that no U.N. member may claim to be neutral in the Gulf war. As a matter of international law, the Gulf war is an enforcement action of U.N. Security Council decisions, binding on all U.N. members. Therefore, neutrality legally is not permissible.

This conclusion follows from the actions taken by the U.N. Security Council. Resolution 660 condemned the invasion and demanded that Iraq immediately and unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait. Resolution 661 affirmed the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense against Iraq's armed attack on Kuwait and codified the Council's decision "that all states shall prevent" economic intercourse with Iraq, "except payments for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs." By Resolution 670, the Council further decided that, notwithstanding any international agreements to the contrary, all States "shall deny permission to

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31 4/28/11

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any aircraft to take off from their territory if the aircraft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait other than food in humanitarian circumstances" and shall deny overflight rights to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait. Acting under Chapter VII ("Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression"), the Security Council approved Resolution 678, authorizing U.N. members cooperating with the government of Kuwait to "use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660" and "request[ed] all States to provide appropriate support for" actions taken pursuant to this authorization.

Article 25 of the U.N. Charter provides that "[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." In addition, Article 2(5) of the Charter states that "[a]ll Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action." Given that the Security Council's resolutions constitute action and decisions within Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and thus make the coalitions military operations a U.N. enforcement action, the right of neutrality arguably does not exist for U.N. members with respect to the Gulf war.

Whether or not a state participates in the coalition undertaking military action against Iraq, all states are obliged to prevent economic intercourse, except permitted humanitarian economic transactions, with Iraq. In addition, all states are barred from permitting aircraft to take off from their territory carrying any cargo for Iraq or Kuwait. To comply with these binding Security Council decisions and fulfill the obligation set forth in Article 2(5) of the U.N. Charter, Iran ought not to permit Iraq's aircraft to return to Iraq or Kuwait or otherwise engage in activity assisting Iraq. Further, Iran should not treat coalition aircraft within its territory like Iraqi aircraft; as a non-neutral to the conflict, it is under no obligation to treat both sides equally.

B. Obligations of Neutrals Under International Law

Assuming for purposes of argument that Iran is legally permitted to claim neutrality in the Persian Gulf conflict, its rights and obligations as a neutral are defined by customary international law. Under customary international law, neutral states are obliged to prevent the use of their territory as a base of belligerent operations. This duty includes an obligation to prevent the armies, warships, or military aircraft of belligerent

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states from, among other things, taking refuge in, or launching hostile expeditions from, their territory.

These rules do not mean that neutral territory need be off limits entirely to belligerent forces. For example, neutrals may permit belligerent warships to call at their ports to take on food and fuel, provided that such calls do not amount to refuge or staging operations for hostile expeditions. If a neutral permits such visits, it is obligated to afford the same privilege to belligerents on both sides of the conflict. Further, neutrals must ensure that such visits not extend beyond a reasonable period, thereby amounting to refuge. During the period of U.S. neutrality in World War II, such visits were limited to 24 hours, except in circumstances where weather or the need for essential repairs required a longer stay. A neutral is required to intern a belligerent warship and its crew for the duration of the war if the ship either enters a neutral port in violation of a prohibition by the neutral on such visits, or, in situations where the neutral permits belligerent port calls, the ship remains in the neutral port beyond a reasonable period of time. The duty to intern includes a requirement that the neutral take adequate measures to ensure that the belligerent ship cannot leave.

The same rules apply with respect to belligerent military aircraft. Indeed, the rules regarding aircraft are somewhat stricter than those regarding ships. In the past, neutrals have taken measures to exclude military aircraft from their air space except in cases of navigational error or distress. This practice reflects the fact that military aircraft do not typically make "port calls" unrelated to combat operations and the difficulty of controlling belligerent aircraft more generally. If a neutral disregards its duty to prevent use of its territory as a base of belligerent operations, contending forces are entitled to attack belligerent warships and aircraft present within the neutral's territory.

C. Search and Rescue Operations in "Neutral" Countries

Under traditional rules governing neutrality, belligerents' armed forces are forbidden to enter neutrals' territory and neutrals are obliged to intern belligerent armed forces on their territory until the end of the war. As noted above, I should argue that neutrality is not an option for U.N. member states, and, accordingly, states not participating in military action against Iraq arguably should assist in the recovery of military personnel participating in action against Iraq and the return of such personnel to the coalition.

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Any coalition effort to engage in a rescue in a neutral state would constitute a violation of territorial integrity, which international law generally prohibits. An exception exists for necessary actions in exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense or to carry out mandatory decisions of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Should Iran, for example, assert that it will undertake search and rescue operations on its territory, any argument for the necessity of coalition self-help in this connection would be severely weakened. The coalition's assertion of a right of rescue would be strengthened if Iran gives no assurances or clearly is unable to provide for the safety and prompt recovery of coalition personnel. In such an event, the coalition argument would be based in large part on the Security Council's actions with respect to Iraq. While all the coalition's arguments would not be available to Iraq were it to undertake rescue operations in non-belligerent territory, nonetheless we could expect any coalition rescue without the consent of a non-belligerent to be used by Iraq to justify similar action.

cc: Richard Haass

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07b. Memo	From Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Responding to Iraqi CW Use [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	1/29/91	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 4/7/2023

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) III [1]

Date Closed:	6/30/2009	OA/ID Number:	91146-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-0878-MR(501.01)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/18/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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LIMITED ACCESS

January 29, 1991

INFORMATION


MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS 
SUBJECT: Responding to Iraqi CW use



Iraqi CW use, be it on SCUDs, aircraft or artillery, is a growing possibility as the war goes badly for Saddam. Although we have done some preliminary thinking about how we would respond to Iraqi use of unconventional weapons and chemical weapons in particular, we need to make our planning more concrete. We also need to think about the criteria for determining any response on our part, including such factors as the extent of Iraqi use, casualties, and military impact. In principle, the severity of our response should run parallel to the scale of the Iraqi use and its effect. We need to think about 3 scenarios, and about what we would be prepared to say and do in each:

1.4(a); 1.4(d)



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1.4(a); 1.4(d)