

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91146
Folder ID Number: 91146-003

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) II [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	4

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Ede Holiday Re: Talking Points for the President's Use at the Cabinet Meeting, Wednesday, January 9, 2:00 p.m. (1 pp.)	1/9/90	(b)(1)	✓
01b. Talking Points	Re: President's Opening Remarks at 1/9 Cabinet Meeting (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
01c. Talking Points	Re: President's Opening Remarks at 1/9 Cabinet Meeting (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
01d. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Talking Points for Cabinet Meeting on Persian Gulf, January 9, 2:00 p.m. (1 pp.)	1/8/90	(b)(1)	✓
02. Letter	Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to President Bush (2 pp.)	12/22/90	(b)(1)	
03a. Memo	Karl D. Jackson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama (1 pp.)	1/12/91	(b)(1)	✓
03b. Outline	Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Nakayama (2 pp.)	1/14/91	(b)(1)	✓
03c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Foreign Minister Nakayama (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
03d. Report	Re: Taro Nakayama [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	1/17/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Page 1 of 3

Collection:	
Record Group:	Bush Presidential Records
Office:	Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:	Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:	Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:	
File Location:	Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) II [1]
Pinksheet Number:	cap1216
OA/ID Number:	91146-003
Date Closed:	6/30/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:	2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03e. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	1/30/90	(b)(1)	C
03f. Report	Re: Ryohei Murata [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C
04a. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush [English Translation] (2 pp.)	1/4/91	(b)(1)	
04b. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush [German] (2 pp.)	1/4/91	(b)(1)	
05a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Message to Chancellor Kohl (1 pp.)	1/15/91	(b)(1)	C
05b. Message	Re: Message from the President to Chancellor Kohl of Germany (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
05c. Speech	Re: Speech by Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the Bundstag in Bonn on 14 January (5 pp.)	1/14	(b)(1)	
05d. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush [English Translation] (2 pp.)	1/4/91	(b)(1)	
06a. Letter	President Bush to President Vaclav Havel (1 pp.)	1/15/91	(b)(1)	
06b. Letter	President Bush to President Lech Walesa (1 pp.)	1/15/91	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) II [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1216
OA/ID Number: 91146-003
Date Closed: 6/30/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letters to President Lech Walesa of Poland and President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia (2 pp.)	1/15/91	(b)(1)	C
06d. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letters to President Lech Walesa of Poland and President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia (1 pp.)	1/12/91	(b)(1)	C
06e. Talking Points	Re: Background Material on Walesa and Havel Messages (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
06f. Message	From Warsaw Re: Dear Mr. President, (1 pp.)	1/11/91	(b)(1)	C
06g. Message	President Bush to President Lech Walesa (1 pp.)	1/8/91	(b)(1)	C

Page 3 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) II [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1216
OA/ID Number: 91146-003
Date Closed: 6/30/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100174
RECEIVED: 08 JAN 91 18

TO: HOLIDAY, E

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 09 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
KUWAIT

IRAQ

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES TALKING POINTS FOR CABINET MTG RE GULF CRISIS / 9 JAN

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 11 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: Wenc

LOG # 0174

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG WEJAO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>copy</u>	_____
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	_____
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>1/9 DC</u>	<u>S</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>MM 1/9</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Jan 9 2:00pm Cabinet mtg
changed to 2:45

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec's Office has deshe lls

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORON FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0174

January 9, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR EDE HOLIDAY

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Talking Points for the President's Use at the
Cabinet Meeting, Wednesday, January 9, 2:00 p.m.

Attached are the Talking Points for the President's use in the
Cabinet meeting on January 9th at 2:45 p.m.

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points

cc: John Gardner

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/22/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President's Opening Remarks at 1/9 Cabinet Meeting

- With Jim Baker's meeting today in Geneva with Tariq Aziz, it seems appropriate to start with the Gulf situation.
- [read-out of the Baker meeting]
- Otherwise, Jim has just completed consultations with the European allies, and is about to meet with our coalition partners in the Middle East and the Gulf. Despite Saddam's efforts to split this coalition, it is in good shape. Larry Eagleburger can fill us in on this.
- Similarly, and despite some of the voices raised to the contrary, the domestic coalition is also in good shape. Polls indicate strong popular support for what we are doing. And just yesterday I wrote the congressional leaders asking for the House and Senate to go on record supporting UN Security Council Resolution 678 and the use of all necessary means to bring about Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. We will be working hard to get an endorsement and to avoid something that seeks to tie our hands.
- Quite candidly, I do not know if Saddam Hussein will pull out of Kuwait. We are now less than a week away from January 15, and time is running out. What I can say is that there will be no compromise on our part. There will be no negotiations or deals or linkage to other issues.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0871-MR
E8 9124115

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- Dick Cheney can speak to the question of our military preparations and our readiness. All I will say on this point is that I have not given up on diplomacy, that I prefer a peaceful solution, but that if we must use force, it will be in a manner designed to be decisive.
- Why don't I stop there, and ask Dick, Larry and Brent if they have anything to add.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 1 OF 3

PRESIDENT'S OPENING REMARKS AT 1/9 CABINET MEETING

- WITH JIM BAKER'S MEETING TODAY IN GENEVA WITH TARIQ AZIZ, IT SEEMS APPROPRIATE TO START WITH THE GULF SITUATION.
- [READ-OUT OF THE BAKER MEETING]
- OTHERWISE, JIM HAS JUST COMPLETED CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN ALLIES, AND IS ABOUT TO MEET WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF. DESPITE SADDAM'S EFFORTS TO SPLIT THIS COALITION, IT IS IN GOOD SHAPE. LARRY EAGLEBURGER CAN FILL US IN ON THIS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 2 OF 3

- SIMILARLY, AND DESPITE SOME OF THE VOICES RAISED TO THE CONTRARY, THE DOMESTIC COALITION IS ALSO IN GOOD SHAPE. POLLS INDICATE STRONG POPULAR SUPPORT FOR WHAT WE ARE DOING. AND JUST YESTERDAY I WROTE THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ASKING FOR THE HOUSE AND SENATE TO GO ON RECORD SUPPORTING UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 678 AND THE USE OF ALL NECESSARY MEANS TO BRING ABOUT IRAQ'S UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. WE WILL BE WORKING HARD TO GET AN ENDORSEMENT AND TO AVOID SOMETHING THAT SEEKS TO TIE OUR HANDS.
- QUITE CANDIDLY, I DO NOT KNOW IF SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL PULL OUT OF KUWAIT. WE ARE NOW LESS THAN A WEEK AWAY FROM JANUARY 15, AND TIME IS RUNNING OUT. WHAT I CAN SAY IS THAT THERE WILL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0871-MR
88 9/24/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 3 OF 3

BE NO COMPROMISE ON OUR PART. THERE WILL BE NO NEGOTIATIONS OR DEALS OR LINKAGE TO OTHER ISSUES.

- DICK CHENEY CAN SPEAK TO THE QUESTION OF OUR MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND OUR READINESS. ALL I WILL SAY ON THIS POINT IS THAT I HAVE NOT GIVEN UP ON DIPLOMACY, THAT I PREFER A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, BUT THAT IF WE MUST USE FORCE, IT WILL BE IN A MANNER DESIGNED TO BE DECISIVE.
- WHY DON'T I STOP THERE, AND ASK DICK, LARRY AND BRENT IF THEY HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0174

January 8, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS 
SUBJECT: Talking Points for Cabinet Meeting
on Persian Gulf, January 9, 2:00 p.m.

SIGNED

Attached are Talking Points prepared for the President's use at the Cabinet meeting on the Persian Gulf, January 9.

Attachment
Tab I Memo to the Ede Holiday
Tab A Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/27/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9010059
RECEIVED: 27 DEC 90 17

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: ROY, J

CHRON FILE
DOC DATE: 09 JAN 91
SOURCE REF: 9026944

KEYWORDS: SINGAPORE
KUWAIT

IRAQ

PERSONS: GOH CHOK TONG
LEE KUAN YEW

HUSSEIN, SADDAM

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM FORMER PM LEE KUAN YEW RE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE DUE DATE: 31 DEC 90 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: STATE LOGREF: 9010062 9010063
FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS
JACKSON
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9010059

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 STATE
001
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90122717 FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY
X 91010216 PRES NOTED SUMMARY OF LTR
X 91011008 NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9010059
RECEIVED: 27 DEC 90 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LEE KUAN YEW

DOC DATE: 22 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SINGAPORE
KUWAIT

IRAQ

PERSONS: GOH CHOK TONG

HUSSEIN, SADDAM

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM FORMER PM OF SINGAPORE ON 22 DEC RE PERSIAN GULF
CRISIS

ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 31 DEC 90

STATUS: D

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CHARLES
HAASS
HAYDEN
HILL
JACKSON
SALVETTI, L
WATSON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: * TREAT AS HS LETTER PER WATSON*

DISPATCHED BY 1-11T DATE 12/27 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

10059

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9026944

Date January 9, 1991

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Bush

From: Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew - Singapore

Date: December 22, 1990

Subject: Persian Gulf Crisis

WH Referral Dated: December 27, 1990

NSCS ID# (if any): 9010059

XX The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

 A draft reply is attached.

 A draft reply will be forwarded.

 A translation is attached.

 An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

XX We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.

 The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.

 Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: The letter received is in response to the hand-delivered
letter from President Bush to PM Lee through
Vice President Quayle's meeting in Tokyo.

for Freddie Suleis
Director
Secretariat Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9010059
DATE 22 DEC 90

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM FORMER PM OF SINGAPORE YEW ON 22 DEC RE PERSIAN GULF
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

12/28/90

9:15

P. Soudan

COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9010059
DATE 22 DEC 90

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM FORMER PM OF SINGAPORE YEW ON 22 DEC RE PERSIAN GULF
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE

12/28/90

TIME

9:06 AM

SIGNATURE

Anthony Tangle

COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By *Cap* NARA, Date *6/30/09*

~~DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEGB~~

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9010059

REFERRAL

DATE: 27 DEC 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

9026944

SOURCE: LEE KUAN YEW '90 DEC-28 11:00 AM

DATE: 22 DEC 90

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM FORMER PM OF SINGAPORE ON 22 DEC RE PERSIAN GULF
CRISIS

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 03 JAN 90

COMMENT:

(FOR)

George Van Eron

GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

90-10059-106
88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

*Senior Minister
Singapore*

22 December 1990

Dear President Suh

Thank you for your letter dated November 8 which Vice-President Dan Quayle handed to me in Tokyo personally on November 12, and thank you again for your hand-written card of November 28. I am honoured that you found the time to give your personal touch to our friendship.

Goh Chok Tong took over from me as Prime Minister under nearly ideal conditions. You were kind enough to meet him last April. Singapore will continue to do well under him and his team. The ASEAN countries, with the exception of the Philippines, are all doing well and will become newly industrialised economies in this or the next decade. But Saddam Hussein's invasion, occupation and brutal despoliation of Kuwait, his cynical manipulation of the hostages, and his chemical and incipient nuclear weapons, they all bode ill for the future of all of us - unless the U.S., on behalf of the world community, asserts and enforces the rule of law.

This is a heavy task. The world is already in your debt for your initiatives in bringing together in Saudi Arabia, forces from so many nations, and getting them supported by UN Security Council resolutions.

The U.S. is not in the Gulf as a big power out on its own to teach a regional bully a lesson, but as the world's sheriff. And the sheriff's authority has been validated by UN Security Council resolutions to bring an international outlaw to book. The sheriff should therefore bring overwhelming forces to bear so that losses incurred in subduing the outlaw can be minimised.

A Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, the Clausewitz of his time, in 500 B.C., said, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill".¹ Such an

1

Sun Tsu - Art of War - Edition by Samuel Griffith p.77

outcome is not impossible, provided maximum forces and other disincentives are brought to bear. If Saddam Hussein withdraws, then the UN can deal with other problems like his chemical and incipient nuclear weapons and restitution to Kuwait, through further UN Security Council resolutions.

But Sun Tzu also said, "If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust strength."² Therefore if he does not totally withdraw from Kuwait in compliance with UNSC resolutions by January 15, 1991, the sheriff and his posse are empowered to use all the force necessary to get him out. Otherwise world order will be undermined, and moderate Arab governments like Egypt and Saudi Arabia will, in due course, be destroyed.

The shape of the post-Cold War world depends upon how the U.S. responds and resolves this act of international banditry. If there is to be world order, there can be no compromise with Saddam Hussein and no reward for aggression. The world cannot afford to have you fail.

My daughter, Ling, wife, Choo, and I wish your wife, family and you a Happy Christmas and a successful New Year.

Yours Sincerely
Lehman

His Excellency Mr George Bush
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington D.C.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100212
RECEIVED: 09 JAN 91 18

UNKNOWN FILE

TO: AGENCIES

FROM: GATES

DOC DATE: 10 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CONGRESSIONAL
IRAQ

KUWAIT
MEDIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ADMIN PUBLIC POSITION ON SHARING OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR COALITION
EFFORT IN PERSIAN GULF

ACTION: GATES SGD MEMO TO AGENCIES

DUE DATE: 12 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GANTT
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

JSB

DATE

1/10

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSW

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED



**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 0212

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>ASAP</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>QEB 1/10</u>	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
------------	-----------------	--------------	------------	-----------------------

cc: VP _____ Sununu _____ Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0212

January 10, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION
AGENCY

SUBJECT: Administration Public Position on Sharing of
Responsibility for the Coalition Effort in the
Persian Gulf

Having received agency comments, we have prepared the paper, attached at Tab A, describing the Administration's public position on what other countries have done to share the responsibility for the coalition effort in the Gulf. This guidance should form a common base within the USG for discussions of this issue with the public, the press, and with the Congress. You should feel free to deploy this material immediately in whatever way you feel will be most effective.


Brent Scowcroft

Attachment

Tab A "Sharing of Responsibility for the Coalition Effort in
the Persian Gulf"

Sharing of Responsibility for
the Coalition Effort in the Persian Gulf:

Many other countries are doing their part to support the coalition effort in the Persian Gulf. Looking only at what has been accomplished so far, in calendar year 1990, our partners in the coalition have contributed in three ways:

- First, 28 other countries have their own military forces in the Persian Gulf, in Saudi Arabia, and in the Gulf states. They have now committed more than 245,000 troops, 64 warships, over 650 combat aircraft, and more than 950 tanks to the multinational coalition facing Iraq. Turkey has also significantly enhanced its defense capabilities opposite Iraq.
- Second, they have given money and other assistance to us for our Operation Desert Shield expenses. Our incremental costs for the operation were roughly \$10 billion in calendar year 1990. We have already received \$6 billion in cash and in-kind support from our allies to defray these costs. We expect to soon receive an additional \$2 billion more that has already been pledged to meet these 1990 costs. With these sums, and assuming Congress enacts the necessary appropriation, our coalition partners will have covered some 80% of our incremental expenses through December 31, 1990.
- Third, they have taken on the responsibility for assisting those nations which have suffered the most from the effects of the international economic sanctions against Iraq. The Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group established by President Bush has received pledges of \$13.5 billion for exceptional economic assistance for these hard-hit states, of which nearly \$6 billion has already been disbursed.

These are the figures for last year. As costs for CY 1991 occur, we will look to our allies to shoulder their fair share of our military expenses and exceptional economic assistance efforts.

Other Countries' Military Forces in the Gulf. Twenty-nine countries, including the U.S., have joined forces in responding to the crisis in the Gulf. In general, given their limited capabilities to support large-scale force deployments, other states have contributed what they can and what we have asked.

- Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other GCC states have deployed their armed forces.
- Egypt has sent an armored division, a mechanized division, and a Ranger regiment -- hundreds of armored vehicles and more than 25,000 troops, with thousands more en route. Syria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco, and other Muslim states also have put tens of thousands of soldiers in the field.

- Britain is deploying a heavy armored division and has sent more than 70 combat aircraft, a total of over 30,000 soldiers and airmen. Eight French regiments are in place too, along with over 130 combat aircraft.
- Canada and Italy have sent combat aircraft to the Gulf; Czechoslovakia has deployed a chemical decontamination unit.
- Turkey has substantially strengthened its defenses opposite Iraq and NATO approved the unprecedented dispatch of its rapid deployment units -- German, Belgian, and Italian planes -- to help this Alliance member.

Fourteen navies now have fighting vessels patrolling the waters of the Gulf. Our coalition partners have stopped and boarded hundreds of ships to enforce the UN's economic sanctions.

Help For Operation Desert Shield. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are providing substantial cash and host nation support. Host nation support includes food, fuel, water, facilities, and local transport for US forces. In addition, Saudi Arabia is committed to funding transportation for our forces in Europe and the U.S. to the Gulf from the start of the second deployment in October.

Japan has contributed substantial cash and in-kind support, including support for transport costs and purchases of U.S.-made computers, vehicles and construction equipment. The Japanese Diet recently appropriated the second \$1 billion allotment of Japan's promised \$2 billion contribution to the multinational defense effort. Germany has provided cash and in-kind support, including heavy equipment transporters and other valuable equipment from existing stocks, such as 60 modern chemical detection vehicles. Germany has also provided extensive support for the movement of US forces from Europe to the Gulf. Korea has provided cash and lift support since the earliest days of the operation.

Exceptional Economic Assistance. With our own resources concentrated on the military effort against Iraq, we organized the international effort to provide financial assistance to those nations most hard-hit by the crisis and sanctions. Our partners in this effort have made commitments amounting to \$13.5 billion for assistance to front-line states and other countries. Nearly six billion dollars of this total has already been disbursed. Our Arab partners, Germany, Japan, and the European Community have been leading contributors and we look to them and other countries to accelerate the disbursement of funds already committed and make additional commitments. Additionally, in response to President Bush's proposals and with strong support from other creditor countries, the IMF and World Bank moved

swiftly to adapt their lending procedures to enable them to alleviate more effectively the economic effects of the crisis on a wide range of countries.

The Facts on Windfall Profits. Reports of windfall profiteering made against our coalition partners from the Arab Gulf are misleading. For example, Saudi Arabia's increased revenue so far due to the increase in oil prices comes to about \$13-15 billion. Saudi Arabia's Gulf crisis-related expenditures are estimated to be running ahead of their increased revenues. Saudi crisis-related expenditures include host nation support to coalition forces, aid to front line and other affected nations, increased Saudi military expenditures and arms purchases, and investment to expand oil production capacity.

More Needs to be Done. The contributions in 1990 were substantial and, in most cases, countries committed what we requested. We are working now to:

- Ensure, in Desert Shield, prompt disbursement of remaining funds and secure new commitments to cover incremental costs in 1991; and
- For the front line states, accelerate disbursements of previous commitments of economic assistance, particularly for Turkey, and obtain new commitments for the front line states and for Eastern Europe to help cover the emerging economic costs of the sanctions.

Annex: Countries Involved in Responsibility-Sharing

Providing Military Forces

ARGENTINA (naval)
 AUSTRALIA (naval)
 BAHRAIN (ground, air)
 BANGLADESH (ground)
 BELGIUM (air - in Turkey, naval)
 CANADA (air, naval)
 CZECHOSLOVAKIA (ground)
 DENMARK (naval)
 EGYPT (ground)
 FRANCE (ground, air, naval)
 GERMANY (air - in Turkey, naval)
 GREECE (naval)
 ITALY (air, naval)
 KUWAIT (ground, air, naval)
 MOROCCO (ground)
 NETHERLANDS (naval)
 NEW ZEALAND (air)
 NIGER (ground)
 NORWAY (naval)
 OMAN (ground, air)
 PAKISTAN (ground, naval)
 QATAR (ground, air)
 SAUDI ARABIA (ground, air, naval)
 SENEGAL (ground)
 SPAIN (naval)
 SYRIA (ground)
 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (ground, air)
 UNITED KINGDOM (ground, air, naval)

Assistance to Operation Desert Shield

GERMANY
 JAPAN
 REPUBLIC OF KOREA
 KUWAIT
 SAUDI ARABIA
 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
 (plus transit rights from numerous states and aid in moving forces from others, including DENMARK, GREECE, ITALY, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, UNITED KINGDOM, POLAND, and TURKEY)

Exceptional Economic Assistance for Front-Line States

AUSTRIA
 BELGIUM
 CANADA
 DENMARK

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (for the EC)

FINLAND

FRANCE

GERMANY

ICELAND

IRELAND

ITALY

JAPAN

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

KUWAIT

LUXEMBOURG

NETHERLANDS

NORWAY

SAUDI ARABIA

SPAIN

SWEDEN

SWITZERLAND

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

UNITED KINGDOM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D C 20506

0212

January 10, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIM ~~DEAL~~/DAVID GOMPERT *[Signature]*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Administration Public Guidance on Responsibility-Sharing

SIGNED

You have seen the statement commissioned by Bob's Gulf crisis informal Steering Group to characterize the responsibility-sharing efforts of our coalition partners. We need to get this story out quickly, to help as much as possible with this aspect of the ongoing public and Congressional debate.

We understand you would prefer not to have this statement formally released to the press and would instead like it to be utilized as the Administration's 'bible' for public and Congressional discussion of this issue. We have therefore attached, at Tab I, a memo to your counterparts providing this statement as Administration guidance for public handling of responsibility-sharing.

We have worked the text of this statement with State, Defense, JCS, Treasury, and CIA. *(and others)*

Treasury prefers not to not say anything about the important windfall profits issue (page 3 of Tab A) since Treasury believes Bandar's efforts to explain why they are not making a profit are full of holes. Yet, by Treasury's own numbers, the general assertion in page 3 ("running billions ahead") is still quite defensible. We would like to keep the language on page 3, which was suggested by State and cleared by Defense.

Concurrence by: Richard Haass *RH for, in draft*
cc: Roman Popadiuk

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Agency Counterparts
Tab A "Sharing of Responsibility for the Coalition Effort in the Persian Gulf"

Memo signed/approved with change by RG for BS.

1/10/91

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101042
RECEIVED: 11 FEB 91 10

CHRON FILE

TO: POPADIUK

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 11 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: OIL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: OIL EMERGENCY PLANNING

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 14 FEB 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # _____

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	2	54.2/11	N
NSC Secretariat	3	_____	Log FRP
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
------------	-----------------	--------------	------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 11, 1991

1042
Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR ROMAN POPADIUK

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL 
SUBJECT: Oil Emergency Planning 

The International Energy Agency (IEA) adopted today an energy emergency response contingency plan for implementation in the event of a temporary shortfall in oil supplies arising from the outbreak of any hostilities in the Gulf. The IEA Executive Director will make public at 9:00 a.m. EST the Governing Board conclusions attached at Tab A. Three brief Q's and A's are at Tab B.

It will be important to emphasize in any response to the press that this is a contingency plan, that the U.S. would contribute to it through use of our Strategic Petroleum Reserve, but that the President has made no decision yet actually to draw down our oil stocks. He would take such a decision only when required.

Attachments

Tab A IEA Governing Board Conclusions
Tab B Q's and A's

cc:


Robert Gates
Virginia Lampley
David Gompert
Karl Jackson

IEA/PRESS(91)1
11 January 1991

GOVERNING BOARD CONCLUSIONS ON THE GULF SITUATION

11th January 1991

THE GOVERNING BOARD

- Convened on 11th January, 1991, to assess the oil market situation and the state of emergency preparedness of IEA Member countries in view of the approaching 15th January deadline set in United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait;
- Expressed the hope that a peaceful solution would be found to the crisis in the Gulf;
- Noted that OECD crude oil and product stocks at the beginning of 1991 were about 470 million tons (3 600 million barrels), some 16 million tons higher than one year earlier and close to the previous peak reached in 1981;
- Agreed that despite the ample availability of oil to the market, the outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf could lead to heightened uncertainty and volatility in the market as a result of the possible temporary shortfall of some Gulf supplies;
- Agreed that it would be prudent at this time to complete preparations for a rapid, effective and concerted energy emergency response in the event of hostilities in the Gulf.

THE GOVERNING BOARD HAS THEREFORE:

- (a) Adopted a coordinated energy emergency response contingency plan for use in anticipation of any possible temporary shortfall in oil supplies in the event of hostilities in the Gulf which, through a combination of stockdraw, demand restraint, and other measures, would make available to the market 2.5 million barrels of oil per day;
- (b) Welcomed the participation of Finland, France, and Iceland in the contingency plan;

- (c) Agreed that upon notification by the Executive Director, after prompt and wide-ranging consultations with Member governments, of the need to activate the contingency plan, each IEA Member country, as well as Finland, France, and Iceland, would begin implementation of their commitments under paragraph (a) above;
- (d) Agreed that the stockdraw, demand restraint, and other measures would be implemented so as to take effect, in terms of additional availability of oil to the market and reduced demand for oil, beginning within 15 days after notification by the Executive Director;
- (e) Decided that the Governing Board would convene within 10 days of the notification by the Executive Director to assess the energy implications and to decide upon any modifications which may be required in the contingency plan;
- (f) Recommended that oil companies continue to draw on their commercial stocks, that governments and consumers maintain and intensify their conservation efforts, and that oil companies and consumers exercise restraint in purchases, in order to reduce uncertainty and volatility in the world oil market; and
- (g) Requested that the Secretariat, the Standing Group on the Oil Market, and the Standing Group on Emergency Questions continue to monitor closely the oil market situation and, if activated, the implementation of the contingency plan.

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY ENERGY CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Q: What is the significance of the decision taken today by the International Energy Agency (IEA) to adopt an energy emergency response plan?

A: The plan is designed to address possible temporary shortfalls in oil supplies in the event of hostilities.

If implemented, IEA member countries (and France, Finland, and Iceland, which are not members of the IEA) would make available to markets 2.5 million barrels of oil per day (mbd) through a combination of stock drawdowns and measures to restrain oil consumption.

The U.S. welcomes this prompt, decisive action on the part of the IEA. This unanimous action of the 24 industrialized countries demonstrates a strong commitment to reduce any uncertainty and volatility in world oil markets that might arise in the event of hostilities.

Q: What is your reaction to the IEA agreement?

A: We are very pleased with the agreement.

We stand ready to fully support it along with our partners in the IEA.

Q: What is the U.S. contribution to the 2.5 mbd supply availability?

A: The U.S. contribution will be announced immediately upon activation of the contingency plan. We have said consistently since August 2, 1990 that the U.S. is prepared to use its Strategic Petroleum Reserve when necessary. Our commitment remains firm.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100129
RECEIVED: 07 JAN 91 13

TO: DEMAREST, D

CHRON FILE

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 12 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA
VOA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES STATEMENT TO BE READ IN ARABIC ON VOA

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 10 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DYKE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DYKE

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

DATE

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSAMM

DOC

4 OF

4

UNCLASSIFIED

Pres. msg to Iraqi People
National Security Council
The White House

CHRON FILE

PROOFED BY: WEA

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 0129 A/6

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

DOCLOG WEA A/O 2

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>✓</u> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>Tab I only</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>5</u>	<u>DD 1/2</u>	<u>D - Jax</u>
Situation Room	<u>6</u>		<u>D I + A only</u>
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			

91 JAN 10 PM 5.17

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 12, 1991

CHRON FILE 0129

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID F. DEMAREST, JR.

FROM: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement to Be Read in Arabic on VOA

Attached at Tab A is the text of a Presidential statement to the Iraqi people to be read in Arabic over the Voice of America (VOA) by a VOA broadcaster. After your action on it, will you please call Nancy Bearg Dyke (extension 5694), who will transmit it immediately to VOA for translation and broadcast.

Attachment

Tab A Presidential Statement

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT TO BE BROADCAST ON VOA IN ARABIC

Announcer: And now, a special message from President George Bush to the Iraqi people.

Voice: As you, the people of Iraq, know better than anyone else, Saddam Hussein has plunged the world into crisis by invading and brutalizing your Arab neighbor, Kuwait. Time to resolve this crisis by peaceful means is running out. I believe I have done everything in my power to find a peaceful solution, and others have tried repeatedly. I regret especially the failure of talks this week between the U.S. Secretary of State and Iraqi Foreign Minister in Geneva. The Iraqi position was one of complete intransigence and miscalculation of world opinion and determination.

If a peaceful solution can be found, Iraq will be spared the sufferings of war. But the world cannot -- and will not -- wait while Saddam Hussein brutalizes hundreds of thousands of Arabs in Kuwait. Since August 2, a helpless Kuwait has been occupied by cruel force, and its men, women, and children have been terrorized, tortured, and killed. One shameful example is the shooting of children in front of their parents. These actions taken against innocent Arab citizens have been beyond human decency. It is hard to see that this kind of behavior has helped to advance peace in the region and in particular the cause of the Palestinian people.

Saddam Hussein must heed the will of the United Nations. He must withdraw fully, immediately, and without precondition from Kuwait. He must abandon his desire to dominate the Gulf. The peoples of the world know this. And I believe that you, the people of Iraq, know it, too.

The world knows that you, the people of Iraq, are not free to speak your minds, and that Saddam Hussein will not tell you the truth about what is happening in the rest of the world. That is why I believe the work of the Voice of America and other free-world radio broadcasters is so important. Because you, the people of Iraq, must know the truth -- the truth about Saddam Hussein -- the truth about the world's determination to stop his aggression.

A strong international coalition of 29 nations, including Arab countries, has committed military

Murray

forces now numbering about a half million to ensure that Saddam Hussein's aggression does not stand. As brave as the people of Iraq may be, they should not be misguided by their leadership that they can match the capabilities of the forces arrayed against them. Also, more than 50 other countries are contributing financially to the coalition.

Saddam Hussein is alone. He is isolated in the world community. And once again the people of Iraq are being made to suffer -- as they did in the eight-year war with Iran that cost Iraq so much and gained it nothing but suffering and privation.

The United States and the rest of the world have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. Our quarrel -- the world's quarrel -- is with Saddam Hussein. His aggression will not stand.

The United Nations has authorized its member states to use military force to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, but its aim is to bring this about by peaceful means. It has authorized the use of force, if necessary, if Iraq refuses to withdraw from Kuwait by January 15. Time is running out.

Whether force must be used or not depends solely on one individual -- Saddam Hussein. He can choose peace by complying with the will of the international community. If he does not, Iraq will suffer the terrible consequences of his decision.

I can assure you that the American people and the Congress are absolutely united in their determination that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait. In our society, unlike the one Saddam Hussein runs, we have an open debate which should not be misunderstood. There is a harmony of purpose from which we will not flinch: Saddam Hussein's aggression must be reversed.

The world will not rest until Iraqi forces have withdrawn from Kuwait and the legitimate government is restored. Once our objectives are realized, US military forces will not remain one day longer than they are required.

We and our coalition partners firmly want a peaceful resolution of this crisis. However, we stand ready to do what is necessary to end it. The choice for peace is up to Saddam Hussein.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0129 Add-on 2

January 10, 1991

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD HAASS *not for*
R. RAND BEERS, ACTING

FROM: NANCY BEARG DYKE *NBD*

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Iraqi People

*Brent
I think the message is a good one,
even if I don't
it will help.
(RH)*

Following the Baker-Aziz meeting and in these last few days before January 15, we should continue efforts to reach Saddam Hussein and key populations in Iraq with our message. It is appropriate for President Bush to address the Iraqi people -- who are denied straight information by their government -- over the Voice of America to clearly lay out the choice Saddam Hussein faces and to convey that the world's quarrel is not with the Iraqi people. The message would be read in Arabic by a VOA announcer, so it will not take any of the President's time. Doing this message would not dilute the focus on our Congressional effort.

I recommend that the Presidential statement at Tab A be approved, broadcast by VOA, and released by the White House.

The interagency public diplomacy committees strongly back this initiative, and I understand that David Demarest supports it.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the statement at Tab A and authorize Bill Sittmann to send the text to David Demarest with the memo at Tab I.

Approve *(S)*

Disapprove _____

That you authorize Bill Sittmann to send the press release at Tab A to John Gardner with the memo at Tab II.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann Memo to David Demarest
Tab A Proposed Presidential Message
Tab II Sittmann Memo to John Gardner
Tab A Proposed White House Press Release

cc: Roman Popadiuk

*Have been
checked for
meaning in
Arabic?*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0129 Add-on

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN S. GARDNER

FROM: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

SUBJECT: Proposed Press Release on the President's
Message to the Iraqi people

Attached at Tab A is a proposed press release giving the text of
the President's message to the Iraqi people.

Attachment
Tab A Proposed Press Release

cc: Marlin Fitzwater

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

A statement by President Bush to the Iraqi people was read in Arabic over the Voice of America today. The purpose of the statement is to communicate directly to the Iraqi people, with whom we and the rest of the world have no quarrel, that the Persian Gulf crisis can be resolved peacefully if Saddam Hussein withdraws fully, immediately, and without precondition from Kuwait. At the same time, the statement underscores our determination to uphold and implement the United Nations Security Council resolutions. The full statement follows.

"As you, the people of Iraq, know better than anyone else, Saddam Hussein has plunged the world into crisis by invading and brutalizing your Arab neighbor, Kuwait. Time to resolve this crisis by peaceful means is running out. I believe I have done everything in my power to find a peaceful solution, and others have tried repeatedly. I regret especially the failure of talks this week between the U.S. Secretary of State and Iraqi Foreign Minister in Geneva. The Iraqi position was one of complete intransigence and miscalculation of world opinion and determination.

If a peaceful solution can be found, Iraq will be spared the sufferings of war. But the world cannot -- and will not -- wait while Saddam Hussein brutalizes hundreds of thousands of Arabs in Kuwait. Since August 2, a helpless Kuwait has been occupied by cruel force, and its men, women, and children have been terrorized, tortured, and killed. One shameful example is the shooting of children in front of their parents. These actions taken against innocent Arab citizens have been beyond human decency. It is hard to see that this kind of behavior has helped to advance peace in the region and in particular the cause of the Palestinian people.

Saddam Hussein must heed the will of the United Nations. He must withdraw fully, immediately, and without precondition from Kuwait. He must abandon his desire to dominate the Gulf. The peoples of the world know this. And I believe that you, the people of Iraq, know it, too.

The world knows that you, the people of Iraq, are not free to speak your minds, and that Saddam Hussein will not tell

you the truth about what is happening in the rest of the world. That is why I believe the work of the Voice of America and other free-world radio broadcasters is so important. Because you, the people of Iraq, must know the truth -- the truth about Saddam Hussein -- the truth about the world's determination to stop his aggression.

A strong international coalition of 29 nations, including Arab countries, has committed military forces now numbering about a half million to ensure that Saddam Hussein's aggression does not stand. As brave as the people of Iraq may be, they should not be misguided by their leadership that they can match the capabilities of the forces arrayed against them. Also, more than 50 other countries are contributing financially to the coalition.

Saddam Hussein is alone. He is isolated in the world community. And once again the people of Iraq are being made to suffer -- as they did in the eight-year war with Iran that cost Iraq so much and gained it nothing but suffering and privation.

The United States and the rest of the world have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. Our quarrel -- the world's quarrel -- is with Saddam Hussein. His aggression will not stand.

The United Nations has authorized its member states to use military force to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, but its aim is to bring this about by peaceful means. It has authorized the use of force, if necessary, if Iraq refuses to withdraw from Kuwait by January 15. Time is running out.


Whether force must be used or not depends solely on one individual -- Saddam Hussein. He can choose peace by complying with the will of the international community. If he does not, Iraq will suffer the terrible consequences of his decision.

I can assure you that the American people and the Congress are absolutely united in their determination that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait. In our society, unlike the one Saddam Hussein runs, we have an open debate which should not be misunderstood. There is a harmony of purpose from which we will not flinch: Saddam Hussein's aggression must be reversed.

The world will not rest until Iraqi forces have withdrawn from Kuwait and the legitimate government is restored. Once our objectives are realized, US military forces will not remain one day longer than they are required.

We and our coalition partners firmly want a peaceful resolution of this crisis. However, we stand ready to do what is necessary to end it. The choice for peace is up to Saddam Hussein."

#



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0254
Redo

January 12, 1991



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: KARL D. JACKSON *KDJ*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama

Attached for your signature is the meeting memorandum for the Nakayama meeting. I have abbreviated the talking points because the time should be used to provide the fullest possible briefing on expected developments in the Gulf crisis.

I have included a reference to Prime Minister Kaifu's January 11 conversation with the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to the President
Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biographies

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0871-MR
E8 9124115

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0254
Redo

MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER NAKAYAMA

DATE: January 14, 1991

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 1:30 - 1:50 pm

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To consult on the Gulf crisis, to prepare the Japanese for further contributions, and to emphasize the importance of a successful Uruguay Round.

II. BACKGROUND

Taro Nakayama was retained as Foreign Minister because of his close personal relationship with Prime Minister Kaifu.

This meeting is an opportunity to reemphasize the importance of the Gulf crisis, and to elicit further Japanese contributions by expressing your appreciation for the contributions provided thus far by Japan.

Japanese leaders have felt neglected in the consultation process over the Gulf. Secretary Baker has naturally spent more time consulting with troop-contributing European and Middle Eastern allies and coalition partners. Actually, the Japanese have been consulted through your phone calls as well as the visits to Japan by Secretary Brady and the Vice President. However, one of the functions of your meeting with Nakayama will be to overcome the impression that they are only consulted when we need financial contributions.

After your meeting, Foreign Minister Nakayama will engage in detailed consultations with Secretary Baker before returning to Tokyo on January 15.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See attached list.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0871 MR
28 9/24/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

2

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Brief meeting in the Oval Office.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biography

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER NAKAYAMA

Persian Gulf

- Japan's diplomatic and financial support for the multinational effort in the Gulf is very important.
- In my conversation last Friday with Prime Minister Kaifu, I was impressed with the leadership he had exercised in his discussions with four ASEAN leaders (Mahathir, Goh, Aquino, and Chatchai). They agreed with Prime Minister Kaifu that the UN Resolutions must be respected, and that our coalition must remain united to enforce these vital principles of international behavior.
- In the difficult days and weeks ahead we must strive to maintain our common stand against aggression.
- Depending on the evolution of the crisis, we will be approaching our allies and partners for further support, and I am confident that Japan will continue to shoulder its share of the burden of the Gulf operation.
- If hostilities break out in the Gulf, I hope that Japan will volunteer to take an even greater share of the burdens of the West.
- At each stage, as events unfold, Secretary Baker and I will continue to consult fully with you on the Gulf crisis.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
20100871-MR
E8 9/24/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Uruguay Round

- I continue to be deeply concerned about the deadlock of the Uruguay Round, especially over agricultural issues.
- I believe that if Japan and the U.S. worked together, we could break the deadlock and insure the continued health of the international trading system.
- I urge you to announce Japan's willingness to negotiate on agriculture as soon as possible.

Visit to Japan

- In my New Year's Eve phone call with Prime Minister Kaifu, we discussed my visit to Japan. I am committed to making the trip, but in light of the Gulf crisis, the actual dates have not been set. I will have my staff work out the dates as soon as possible.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

List of Participants

U.S.

The President

The Vice President

James A. Baker, The Secretary of State

Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of Treasury

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs

Karl D. Jackson, Senior Director for Asian Affairs

Japan

Taro Nakayama, Foreign Minister

Ryohei Murata, Ambassador to the U.S.

Koichiro Matsuura, Director General, North American Affairs Bureau, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. Report	Re: Taro Nakayama [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	1/17/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) II [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/10/2016

Date Closed:	6/30/2009	OA/ID Number:	91146-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-0871-MR(502.03)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	7/31/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Taro NAKAYAMA
(Phonetic: nahkahyahma)

JAPAN

Minister of Foreign Affairs
(since August 1989)

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

Taro Nakayama has impressed 1.4(c); 1.4(d) Japanese officials with his performance and enthusiasm as Minister of Foreign Affairs. In addition to managing the US-Japanese relationship, he has also focused on improving relations with South Korea and strengthening Japan's role in the peace processes and reconstruction efforts in Cambodia, Iran, and Iraq. Nakayama has been particularly interested in examining the impact of events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on the closed societies of North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Burma and in strengthening relations with Southeast Asian countries. 1.4(c); 1.4(d)



©

he holds little clout in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). He comes from the LDP faction led by former LDP Secretary General Shintaro Abe. (b)(3)

Nakayama—whose Ministry is the primary caretaker of US-Japan relations—1.4(c); 1.4(d) 1.4(c); 1.4(d)

He has stated that Japan will fulfill the commitments it made during the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks and has pledged to work with the United States on agricultural issues during GATT talks this fall. He has stated that Tokyo cannot extend economic aid to Moscow while the Northern Territories dispute remains unsolved. Nakayama—a longtime activist for the return of the Kurile Islands occupied by the Soviet Union—originally established Northern Territories Day, a day each year when the Japanese protest the occupation. (b)(3)

Elected in 1955 to the Osaka Prefectural Assembly, Nakayama served there for 13 years before winning a seat in the Diet. He served three terms in the upper house before his election in 1986 to the lower house, where he is in his second term. He was a parliamentary vice minister for labor in 1971, chairman of the upper house Steering Committee in 1980, and director general of the Prime Minister's Office during 1980-81. He has chaired the International Bureau of the LDP and has also been Director General of the Management and Coordination Agency. Nakayama is a strong proponent of nuclear energy development; in his book *Scientific Strategy for the Post-Petroleum Era*, he commented favorably on the US nuclear program. (b)(3)

Nakayama was born on 27 August 1924 into a prominent political family (his mother, Fukuzo Nakayama, was Japan's first female Cabinet minister). He graduated from the Osaka Medical College in 1952 and received an M.D. degree in 1960. He is a trained pediatrician, is knowledgeable in organ transplants and brain death, and is an acknowledged expert in science and technology. He speaks English fairly well but prefers to use an interpreter for official business. He was the first member of the Diet to hire a US citizen as his secretary. He has traveled to the United States several times. He enjoys music, movies, and painting and also likes to fish, swim, and play golf. Married, he and his wife, Hanako, live in the Okura Hotel and have two grown sons. Extremely wealthy, he owns a pharmaceutical company, and his wife runs a successful florist chain. Nakayama's younger brother, Masaaki Nakayama, is a seven-term member of the lower house. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

LDA M 90-14397
17 July 1990



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0871-MA
7/31/2014 MA

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03e. Report	Re: Biography (1 pp.)	1/30/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) II [1]

Date Closed: 6/30/2009	OA/ID Number: 91146-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03f. Report	Re: Ryohei Murata [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) II [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/10/2016

Date Closed: 6/30/2009	OA/ID Number: 91146-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0872-MR(502.05)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 9/17/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Ryohei MURATA
(Phonetic: moorahtah)


JAPAN

Ambassador to the United States
(since 20 December 1989)

Addressed as: Mr. Ambassador

Ryohei Murata is one of Japan's most influential and respected foreign policy makers and is likely to pursue his job as Ambassador to the United States with vigorous activism and candor.

1.4(c); 1.4(d)



In his previous position as administrative vice minister (1987 – August 1989), Murata was the Foreign Ministry's highest ranking career officer. 1.4(c)

he was the principal architect of Takeshita's foreign policy agenda. Murata has pledged to develop relationships with members of Congress and state governments in an effort to foster better US understanding of contentious Japanese trade and security policies. (b)(3)

Murata, 1.4(c); 1.4(d) has worked to enhance Tokyo's credentials as a world leader and an intermediary in regional conflicts. He has been behind Japan's cautious warming toward Israel—as part of an effort to strengthen ties to all players in the Middle East peace process—and he orchestrated the first visit by a Japanese foreign minister to that country in June 1988. He has also promoted high-level dialogue with Western Europe—one of his areas of expertise—in an attempt to prepare for the 1992 EC integration as well as to maximize Tokyo's leverage with Washington by coordinating more closely with Europe on issues where European and Japanese interests converge. For example, he has called on Europe to engage in multilateral discussions on burdensharing—in particular, on how to respond to US requests for increased shouldering of defense responsibilities. Murata has suggested that Japan is already doing its fair share of supporting US base costs and has urged Washington to take into account Japan's large and growing foreign aid to regions of strategic importance to the United States. (b)(3)

From 1980 until 1982, Murata was director general of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau. A widely acknowledged expert on the issues of the Middle East and Africa, 1.4(c); 1.4(d)

He arranged for PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat to visit Japan in the fall of 1981. In early 1989 Murata told a visiting PLO envoy that Japan would continue to expand assistance to Palestinians through various UN organizations. (b)(3)

(cont.)

LDA M 89-16725

1.4(c); (b)(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0872-MR

9/17/2014 MM

Murata served as director general of the Economic Affairs Bureau during 1982-84. The Japanese press speculated that he was selected because his superiors thought that the respect he commanded within the bureaucracy would assist him in improving communication between the bureau and other government agencies. (b)(3)

Early Life and Career

Murata was born on 2 November 1929. A 1952 graduate of the Law Faculty of Kyoto University, he served in Bonn during 1953-56 and in Vienna during 1960-64. He was posted to Washington from 1970 until 1974. Between 1974 and 1978 he was a division director and later deputy director general of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau; he subsequently held the position of deputy director general of the Treaties Bureau. He also served briefly as counselor for inspection in the Minister's Secretariat in 1984. After serving as Ambassador to Austria (1986-87), where he gained experience in dealing with East-West issues, he served as deputy minister for six months in 1987. (b)(3)

Personal Data

Murata speaks excellent English. He is the coauthor (with colleagues Hiroshi Kitamura and Hisahiko Okazaki) of *Between Friends*, a book that examines the US-Japanese relationship. His wife, Reiko, is the daughter of a former Governor of Osaka Prefecture. (b)(3)

(b)(3) The Muratas do not have children. (b)(3)

20 December 1989

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100145
RECEIVED: 08 JAN 91 08

TO: SITTMANN

CHRON FILE

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 14 JAN 91
SOURCE REF: 9100386

KEYWORDS: GERMANY
 PERSIAN GULF
 IRAQ

HS
KUWAIT
TURKEY

PERSONS: BAKER, J

AZIZ, TARIQ

SUBJECT: LTR OF THANKS TO PRES FM CHANCELLOR KOHL RE UPDATE ON GULF CRISIS

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

DUE DATE: 14 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPERT
HUTCHINGS
SALVETTI, L

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

C145

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9100386

Date January 14, 1991

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Bush
From: Helmut Kohl
Date: January 4, 1991
Subject: Letter of thanks re. update on the Gulf Crisis.

WH Referral Dated: January 8, 1991
NSCS ID# (if any): 9100145

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By Coq NARA, Date 6/30/09

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- ✓ We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- X Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: Kohl's response to the President raises no new
substantive issues, and the President and Kohl have
communicated numerous times on this topic since the
letter was written.

Lynn Sweeney
Director
Secretariat Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9100145
DATE 04 JAN 91

SUBJECT: LTR OF THANKS RE UPDATE INFO ON SITUATION IN GULF
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9100145

REFERRAL

DATE: 08 JAN 91

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE

9100386

STATE SECRETARIAT-08 11:57 AM

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: KOHL, HELMUT

DATE: 04 JAN 91


SUBJ: LTR OF THANKS RE UPDATE INFO ON SITUATION IN GULF

REQUIRED ACTION: COMMENTS/CONCURRENCE

DUE DATE: 10 JAN 91

COMMENT:

FOR


GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Received in 5/5-18 at 1.00
1/8 at 11:55 AM (CZ)*

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush [English Translation] (2 pp.)	1/4/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) II [1]

Date Closed: 6/30/2009	OA/ID Number: 91146-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush [German] (2 pp.)	1/4/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) II [1]

Date Closed:	6/30/2009	OA/ID Number:	91146-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100306
RECEIVED: 14 JAN 91 11

TO: GARDNER, J

CHRON FILE

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 14 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CONGRESSIONAL
PERSIAN GULF
KUWAIT

SPEECHES
IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR 14 JAN BIPARTISAN CONG LEADERSHIP MTGS

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 17 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

HAASS

LAMPLEY

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSJEB

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED



**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: men
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 0306
 SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 DOCLOG AE A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>Perk</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>copy</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>		
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>1/14/8</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

91 JAN 14 P 1:00

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VB Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Pres Meeting 1/14, 4:00 PM

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Epc Sec has Kishette

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0306

January 14, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN GARDNER

FROM: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN 

SUBJECT: Talking Points for January 14 Bipartisan
Congressional Leadership Meetings

Attached are Talking Points prepared for the President's use at the Bipartisan Leadership meetings on January 14.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points

cc: Fred McClure

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0306

January 14, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS/VIRGINIA LAMPLEY

SUBJECT: Talking Points for January 14 Bipartisan
Congressional Leadership Meetings

At Tab A are proposed Talking Points for the President's use with the Bipartisan Congressional Leadership on January 14.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Sittmann to forward the proposed Talking Points to John Gardner (Sittmann memo at Tab I).

Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann Memo to Gardner
Tab A Proposed Talking Points

Points for President's Jan 14 Leadership Meeting

- Once again, I want to thank you all for making it here on such short notice.
- Before we turn to the Gulf, let me say a few things about what is going on in the Baltics and Lithuania in particular.
- I spoke to President Gorbachev on Friday, and told him how concerned I was by the direction of developments.
- On the South Lawn yesterday, I condemned the inexcusable use of force in Lithuania, said its continuation would definitely affect our relationship with the USSR, and called on the Soviet leadership to denounce violence and return to negotiations and dialogue with the democratically elected governments of the Baltic peoples.
- We understand now that the situation is calmer today in Vilnius and that there has been no further use of force.
- I can assure you we will continue to make our views clear to the Soviets and will consider all options should force be used again.
- Above all, I want to express my appreciation for Saturday's vote on H.J. Res 77. I continue to think it sends the best possible signal to Saddam that he faces a united foe.
- The vote also sends a reassuring signal to our coalition partners and to the troops in the field.
- Let me also say how impressed and proud I felt watching and reading about the debate. It was Congress at its best, and proved to be a valuable civics lesson for the country.

- I know that the debate and the choices were far from easy for anyone. But now is the time to put it behind us.
- As I said, one of the important aspects of the Congressional action was to persuade Saddam that peace is his only rational course of action. I truly believed that your affirmative note was the last, best hope for peace. Unfortunately, I have nothing to report that suggests he has absorbed that message.
- My good friend, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, travelled to Baghdad to make one more appeal. He was insulted at the outset by being made to cool his heels while others were received and, in the end, he was thoroughly rebuffed.
- I gather that the EC has decided not to go ahead with a diplomatic initiative at this time. Whether anything else will happen is not clear at this moment. I must in all candor state to you that there are absolutely no indications that Saddam Hussein has paid attention to any of the diplomatic messengers trying to tell him what he faces.
- With that, why don't I just turn to Jim and Dick, after which I look forward to hearing from you all on either of the subjects I've raised.

POINTS FOR PRESIDENT'S
JANUARY 14 LEADERSHIP MEETING

- ONCE AGAIN, I WANT TO THANK YOU ALL FOR MAKING IT HERE ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE.
- ABOVE ALL, I WANT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR SATURDAY'S VOTE ON H.J. RES 77. I CONTINUE TO THINK IT SENDS THE BEST POSSIBLE SIGNAL TO SADDAM THAT HE FACES A UNITED FOE.
- THE VOTE ALSO SENDS A REASSURING SIGNAL TO OUR COALITION PARTNERS AND TO THE TROOPS IN THE FIELD.
- LET ME ALSO SAY HOW IMPRESSED AND PROUD I FELT WATCHING AND READING ABOUT THE DEBATE. IT WAS

CARD 2 OF 5

CONGRESS AT ITS BEST, AND PROVED TO BE A VALUABLE CIVICS LESSON FOR THE COUNTRY.

- I KNOW THAT THE DEBATE AND THE CHOICES WERE FAR FROM EASY FOR ANYONE. BUT NOW IS THE TIME TO PUT IT BEHIND US. IF WE DO GO TO WAR--AND LET ME NOTE THAT NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO DO SO--IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT WE GO INTO IT TOGETHER.
- AS I SAID, ONE REASON I SOUGHT YOUR SUPPORT WAS TO PERSUADE SADDAM THAT PEACE IS HIS ONLY RATIONAL COURSE OF ACTION. UNFORTUNATELY, I HAVE NOTHING TO REPORT THAT SUGGESTS HE HAS COME TO THAT CONCLUSION.

- MY GOOD FRIEND, UN SECRETARY GENERAL JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, ONCE MORE TRAVELLED TO BAGHDAD ONLY TO BE INSULTED AND IN THE END REBUFFED.
- I GATHER THAT THE EC HAS DECIDED NOT TO GO AHEAD WITH A DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE AT THIS TIME. WHETHER ANYONE ELSE WILL, SUCH AS ALGERIA, REMAINS OPEN, ALTHOUGH I WILL TELL YOU THAT WE DO NOT WANT TO SEE THE JANUARY 15 DEADLINE IN EFFECT POSTPONED OR OTHER ISSUES LIKE THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE DRAGGED IN.
- MEANWHILE, WE CONTINUE TO PREPARE OURSELVES BOTH MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY. DICK CHENEY AND JIM BAKER, JUST BACK FROM HIS TRIP, CAN FILL YOU IN ON THE DETAILS.

- I ALSO WANT TO SAY A FEW THINGS ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE BALTICS AND LITHUANIA IN PARTICULAR.
- I SPOKE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV ON FRIDAY, AND TOLD HIM I WAS VERY CONCERNED BY DEVELOPMENTS.
- ON THE SOUTH LAWN YESTERDAY, I CONDEMNED THE INEXCUSABLE USE OF FORCE IN LITHUANIA, SAID ITS CONTINUATION WOULD AFFECT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR, AND CALLED ON THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS AND DIALOGUE WITH THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENTS OF THE BALTIC PEOPLES.

- WE UNDERSTAND NOW THAT THE SITUATION IS CALMER TODAY IN VILNIUS AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO FURTHER USE OF FORCE.
- I CAN ASSURE YOU WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE OUR VIEWS CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS AND WILL CONSIDER ALL OPTIONS SHOULD FORCE BE USED AGAIN.
- WITH THAT, WHY DON'T I JUST TURN TO JIM AND DICK, AFTER WHICH I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU ALL ON EITHER OF THE SUBJECTS I'VE RAISED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100349
RECEIVED: 15 JAN 91 15

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: HUTCHINGS
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 15 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY

HS

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: MSG TO GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL

ACTION: OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

DUE DATE: 18 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSMJT

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0349

January 15, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT *[Signature]*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *R218*
SUBJECT: Message to Chancellor Kohl

We recommend that the President send a brief message (Tab I) praising Chancellor Kohl for his very strong speech on the Gulf, delivered to the Bundestag on January 14 (Tab II). While Germany has not been as forthcoming as we would have liked on many of our Gulf-related requests, Kohl's very helpful speech, delivered straight into the anti-war winds now blowing in the Federal Republic, is an example of positive leadership that ought to be encouraged. The President's message also acknowledges the Chancellor's January 4 message (Tab III).

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Tab I message to Kohl, for delivery via White House privacy channels.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

*NOT NECESSARY
TO SEND PER
BRENT
SCOWCROFT*

Attachments

Tab I Message for Kohl
Tab II Kohl's January 14 Bundestag Speech
Tab III Letter from Kohl dated January 4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0872-MR
mm 11/9/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY
VIA SKIPPER CHANNELS

Dear Helmut,

I am writing to thank you for your letter of January 4 and to congratulate you on your speech to the Bundestag on January 14. I have read the speech carefully. It is a powerful statement of our common resolve in the Gulf and of united Germany's role in the world. During this difficult period, when our publics will need to be reminded that peace cannot be achieved by rewarding aggression, your strong leadership is immensely reassuring.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

George Bush

[SPEECH BY CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL AT THE BUNDESTAG IN BONN ON 14 JANUARY -- LIVE]

[TEXT] MADAME PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN; OUT OF GREAT CONCERN FOR PEACE AND OUT OF GREAT CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WE HAVE GATHERED HERE TODAY. MILITARY FORCE WAS APPLIED IN LITHUANIA OVER THE WEEKEND [12-13 JANUARY], FORCE THAT CAUSED A GREAT NUMBER OF DEATHS AND INJURIES. THE DEADLINE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS SET FOR IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT WILL EXPIRE TOMORROW. ALL ATTEMPTS THAT HAVE SO FAR BEEN MADE TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT BY PEACEFUL MEANS HAVE FAILED BECAUSE OF THE REFUSAL OF THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP TO GO BACK ON THE FORCEFUL ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT. THE MEETING BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTERS IN GENEVA HAS SO FAR NOT SUCCEEDED IN CHANGING THE IRAQI POSITION EITHER, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE U.S. MADE CLEAR THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION.

WE HAVE ALSO SEEN THAT THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S PEACE MISSION WHICH WAS EMPHATICALLY SUPPORTED BY THE FRG GOVERNMENT, ITS PARTNERS IN THE EC, AND, ABOVE ALL, THE UNITED STATES, HAS UNFORTUNATELY REMAINED WITHOUT TANGIBLE RESULTS.

THIS IS ALL THE MORE DISAPPOINTING BECAUSE THE IDEAS PRESENTED TO THE IRAQI LEADER IN BAGHDAD BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL INCLUDED AN EXPLICIT NONAGGRESSION GUARANTEE IN THE EVENT OF AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT, AS WELL AS THE DEPLOYMENT OF A UN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN KUWAIT. AT THIS POINT A MILITARY CONFRONTATION CAN STILL BE AVERTED. IT IS UP TO THE IRAQI PRESIDENT NOW TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR THIS. THE PRECONDITIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ARE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL. IRAQ MUST WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT. KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY MUST BE RESTORED. THIS IS AND CONTINUES TO BE THE DEMAND BY THE COMMUNITY OF STATES ADDRESSED TO THE IRAQI PRESIDENT.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, A REVIEW MAKES CLEAR THE EXTENT OF THE AGGRESSION. PEACE IS NOT ENDANGERED JUST AT THIS POINT. IT WAS BROKEN ON 2 AUGUST 1990 -- BY IRAQ. IRAQ OCCUPIED AND ANNEXED KUWAIT WITH POOR EXCUSES, EXPELLED MANY INHABITANTS OR FORCED THOSE WHO STAYED -- AGAINST THEIR WILL -- TO ACCEPT IRAQI CITIZENSHIP. ABSENCE OF LAW AND DESPOTISM, FEAR, HUNGER, AND MISERY HAVE SINCE THEN DETERMINED THE EVERYDAY LIFE OF THE KUWAITI POPULATION.

KUWAIT, A SOVEREIGN STATE, IS TO BE EXTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO IRAQ'S WILL AND SHOULD DISAPPEAR FROM THE MAP. IN THIS WAY, IRAQ HAS VIOLATED BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ORDER THAT ARE VITAL FOR COEXISTENCE AMONG PEOPLE. THE COMMUNITY OF STATES WAS NOT ALLOWED TO AND COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS BREACH OF LAW. TO ACCEPT THIS WOULD HAVE ENCOURAGED FURTHER ATTACKS.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, EVERYBODY MUST BE AWARE THAT ONCE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ALLOWS THE FORCEFUL EXTINCTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF ONE OF ITS MEMBERS AS A STATE, THIS WILL HAVE UNFORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. I BELIEVE THAT WE GERMANS IN PARTICULAR SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE IN THIS CONNECTION. FOR THIS REASON, IT WAS AND STILL IS NECESSARY TO NIP THINGS IN THE BUD, AND TO PUT UP RESOLUTE RESISTANCE TO THE IRAQI BEHAVIOR. TH AND DETERMINATION THIS ACT OF VIOLENCE AND THE ACTUAL DISREGARD FOR THE RESOLUTIONS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL AGAINST IRAQ. THE TWELVE RESOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE 2 AUGUST 1990 TO RESTORE THE RULE OF LAW ARE AN EXPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY THAT HERETOFORE WERE UNKNOWN IN THIS FORUM.

[TEXT] TO A GREAT EXTENT IT IS THIS SOLIDARITY THAT SHOULD BE THANKED FOR THE FACT THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT [WORD INDISTINCT] RELEASED THE FOREIGN HOSTAGES -- INCLUDING GERMAN CITIZENS -- WHOM IT HELD IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

AT THE SAME TIME, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE DEMAND OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FOR IRAQ'S COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT IS THE BINDING WILL OF THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY OF STATES. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF UN MEMBER KUWAIT MUST BE COMPLETELY RESTORED. ON 29 NOVEMBER 1990 THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, WITH ITS RESOLUTION 678, AUTHORIZED THE UN MEMBER STATES TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS IF IRAQ DOES NOT COMPLETELY FULFILL THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS ON THE GULF CRISIS BY THE END OF TOMORROW.

THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES IN THE GULF ARE THUS THERE WITH THE EXPRESS APPROVAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. IF THEY ARE USED, THIS WOULD BE DONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN RESOLUTIONS. RESOLUTION 678 IS A LAST WARNING FROM THE WORLD ORGANIZATION TO IRAQ.

AT THE SAME TIME -- AND I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THIS -- IT KEEPS THE DOOR OPEN FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE LAST MOMENT.

HERE I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESSLY PAY TRIBUTE TO THE ACTIVE ROLE PLAYED BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SECRETARY GENERAL IN THE EFFORTS TO COME TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE GULF CONFLICT.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IT IS GRATIFYING THAT THE UNITED NATIONS' ABILITY TO ACT HAS CLEARLY INCREASED TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE ALL HAVE STEPPED OUT OF THE SHADOW OF THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT. THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN THUS FULLY FULFILL ITS INTENDED ROLE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS OPENED UP NEW POSSIBILITIES TO SUBJECT REGIONAL CONFLICTS TO THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND, IF NECESSARY, TO ENFORCE THIS JUDGMENT. THIS GIVES HOPE FOR THE FUTURE.

WE WILL DO EVERYTHING TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS THE GUARDIANS OF LAW AND PEACE. THE FRG GOVERNMENT HAS SUPPORTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AT EVERY STAGE OF THE GULF WAR [AS HEARD]. WE HAVE DONE THIS WITH THE CONVICTION THAT JUSTICE MUST NEVER GIVE WAY TO INJUSTICE, THAT OUR OWN HISTORY TEACHES US THAT AGGRESSORS MUST BE COUNTERED IN TIME, THAT THE PRESERVATION OF LAW AND PEACE IN EVERY SINGLE REGION OF THE WORLD IS A MATTER FOR ALL OF US, FOR THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

IN THIS CRITICAL SITUATION WE HAVE BEEN STANDING CLOSELY SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE EC AND, ABOVE ALL, ALSO IN THE ALLIANCE. THIS APPLIES, NOT LEAST, TO OUR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. WE KNOW THAT OUR AMERICAN, BRITISH, AND FRENCH ALLIES CARRY THE MAIN BURDEN IN THE DEFENSE OF LAW AND FREEDOM IN THIS CONFLICT, AND THEY DESERVE OUR SOLIDARITY.

WE HAVE SHOWN SOLIDARITY ALSO IN THOSE CASES WHERE THE FRIENDLY COUNTRIES, WHICH ARE PARTICULARLY AFFECTED BY THE GULF CRISIS -- HERE I MENTION EGYPT, JORDAN, AND TURKEY -- NEEDED OUR HELP. AS LONG AS THE GULF TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESPONSIBLE WAY IN THE INTERNATIONAL BURDEN SHARING. EVERYONE MUST KNOW THAT THIS CREATES FINANCIAL BURDENS FOR THE FRG ALSO.

[TEXT] HOWEVER, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE ALSO EXPECT THE OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES IN THE GULF, WHOSE FINANCIAL CAPABILITIES HAVE CONSIDERABLY INCREASED AS A RESULT OF THE HIGHER OIL PRICES, TO SUBSTANTIALLY SHARE IN THE BURDENS.

AT TURKEY'S REQUEST, NATO ACTIVATED THE AIR FORCE OF THE MOBILE DEPLOYMENT FORCE FOR THE COMMAND AREA EUROPE EARLY IN JANUARY. [SEVERAL WORDS INDISTINCT] FOR THE AREA OF TURKEY, OUR BELGIAN AND ITALIAN PARTNERS ARE INVOLVED, IN ADDITION TO US. IN AGREEING TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNITS IN TURKEY, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS GUIDED BY THE IDEA THAT THIS IS A SIGNAL OF SOLIDARITY AND WILL HELP DETER AN ATTACK AGAINST TURKEY AND PRESERVE PEACE.

MADAME PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: FOLLOWING THE INVASION AND ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ, THERE HAVE BEEN MANY DIFFERENT INITIATIVES TO SETTLE THIS CONFLICT PEACEFULLY. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS, OF COURSE, DONE EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO CONTRIBUTE TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. WE HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED OUR ACTIVITIES IN RECENT DAYS AND WEEKS. THEY COMPRISE CONSTANT CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR PARTNERS AND ALLIES, INTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS OF THE ARAB WORLD AND THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT. TO MENTION JUST A FEW, I PERSONALLY DISCUSSED THE GULF CRISIS IN DETAIL IN RECENT DAYS WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY, PRESIDENT OZAL, AND KING HUSAYN. IN THIS CONTEXT, I ALSO REFER TO THE GREAT PERSONAL WORK OF FEDERAL FOREIGN MINISTER HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: IN ITS EFFORTS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS ABOVE ALL BEEN GUIDED BY TWO CONSIDERATIONS. WE, THE GERMANS, KNOW ALL TOO WELL WHAT WAR MEANS. THEREFORE, WE ARE PASSIONATELY TRYING TO PREVENT A MILITARY CONFLICT IF POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE ARE ALSO AWARE OF THE FATAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN APPEASEMENT POLICY WHICH PUTS UP WITH THE VIOLATION OF LAWS AND THUS ENCOURAGES FURTHER AGGRESSION.

THE IRAQI SIDE IS TRYING TO LINK THE KUWAIT ISSUE WITH OTHER PROBLEMS OF THE REGION, IN PARTICULAR THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. WE HAVE REJECTED THIS TOGETHER WITH OUR PARTNERS. THE PROBLEMS MUST BE RESOLVED SEPARATELY. HOWEVER, I ADD THAT THEY MUST BE RESOLVED. THAT MEANS THAT WE ARE ALSO IN AGREEMENT WITH OUR PARTNERS THAT ONCE THE GULF CONFLICT IS SETTLED, WE MUST TACKLE THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION IMMEDIATELY, WITH GREAT EMPHASIS, AND WITH MORE EFFORT THAN WE HAVE EXERTED HERETOFORE.

THIS WAS ALSO CLEARLY STATED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AT ITS MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG EARLIER THIS MONTH. NEW, CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS ARE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE A LASTING PEACE ORDER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO HARMONIZE THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION WITH THE RIGHT OF EXISTENCE AND SECURITY OF ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, INCLUDING ISRAEL. ALL PARTIES INVOLVED MUST RECOGNIZE THAT SETTling THIS ISSUE CANNOT BE DELAYED ANYLONGER. COMPROMISE ARE CALLED FOR. IT MUST ALSO BE POSSIBLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO OVERCOME DIFFERENCES AND TO DEVELOP LASTING, MEANING STABLE, SECURITY STRUCTURES. [APPLAUSE]

HERE, THE

THAT INCLUDES ACCORDS ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMED FORCES AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS, AND THE TOTAL RENUNCIATION OF THE PRODUCTION AND POSSESSION OF MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: THIS, TOO, FORMS PART OF SUCH STRUCTURES. TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN THE REGION, MUCH LARGER EFFORTS FOR THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOR OVERCOMING SOCIAL DIFFERENCES ARE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. WE COULD VERY WELL IMAGINE -- AND I HAVE REPEATEDLY PROPOSED THIS IDEA IN RECENT MONTHS -- THAT THIS GOAL COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST. THIS REQUIRES, OF COURSE, THE COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION OF ALL POLITICAL PROBLEMS.

THE FRG IS READY TO CONTRIBUTE ITS SHARE TO SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. HOWEVER, I ADD THAT IN THIS RESPECT, TOO, THOSE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION WHICH BECAUSE OF THEIR ECONOMIC RESOURCES ARE ABLE TO DO MORE

[TEXT] ALL THESE, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, ARE IMPORTANT TASKS FOR THE FUTURE WHICH NO ONE SHOULD LOSE SIGHT OF. TODAY, HOWEVER, IN THESE HOURS, IT IS, ABOVE ALL, NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE THE RIGHT TO EXIST OF KUWAIT, ONE OF MANY SMALL STATES OF THE REGION, AND TO SEIZE ANY CONCEIVABLE CHANCE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. IF REASON DOES NOT PREVAIL IN BAGHDAD -- AND WE ALL CAN ONLY HOPE THAT IT DOES -- WE HAVE TO EXPECT ONE OF THE MOST SEVERE MILITARY CONFLICTS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II. IN VIEW OF THE MILITARY POTENTIAL EXISTING IN THE GULF, WHICH, AS IS KNOWN, INCLUDES WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, THIS CANNOT BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY ENOUGH.

THE ONES TO SUFFER FROM SUCH A CONFLICT WOULD BE, ABOVE ALL, THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN THIS REGION. WE MUST NOT FORGET THIS AT ANY TIME. THE ENTIRE REGION WOULD HAVE TO SUFFER FROM THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A CONFLICT. BILATERALLY AND TOGETHER WITH OUR PARTNERS, IN PARTICULAR IN THE EC, WE HAVE DONE EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO PREVENT THIS LAST CONSEQUENCE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE THE RESTORATION OF LAW BY PEACEFUL MEANS, AS LONG AS THERE IS ANY CHANCE FOR IT.

I MYSELF HAVE REPEATEDLY SENT CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES TO THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP, TELLING THEM THIS AND URGENTLY WARNING AGAINST THE CONSEQUENCES IF THIS DATE OF 15 JANUARY PASSES. AS FAR AS WE CAN SEE AT THE MOMENT, THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP HAS NOT HEEDED THESE WARNINGS. AS FAR AS WE KNOW, IT IS NOT WILLING TO DEVIATE FROM ITS VIOLATION OF LAW AND TO WITHDRAW. HOWEVER, IT IS STILL NOT TOO LATE, EVEN TODAY.

PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN HOLDS THE KEY TO WAR AND PEACE IN HIS HANDS. THEREFORE, I TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAL TO HIM FROM THIS PLACE HERE: DECIDE NOW TO WITHDRAW YOUR TROOPS FROM KUWAIT. SPARE YOUR PEOPLE AND THE ENTIRE REGION A WAR.

WE GERMANS -- IN PARTICULAR THE GENERATIONS WHO GREW UP AFTER WORLD WAR II -- HAVE HAD THE GOOD FORTUNE OF BEING PERMITTED TO LIVE IN PEACE FOR ALMOST HALF A CENTURY. WE ARE NOT IN THE SAME EXPOSED SITUATION AS OUR ALLIES, WHOSE SOLDIERS ARE DEPLOYED IN THE GULF.

HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT FORGET AT ANY MOMENT THAT THERE, TOGETHER WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES, THEY ARE DEFENDING LAW AND JUSTICE. LAW AND JUSTICE ARE THE PRECONDITIONS AND BASES OF PEACE. OUR POLICY -- ABOVE ALL, OVER THE PAST YEARS -- HAS CONTRIBUTED TO PUTTING PEACE IN EUROPE ON A STABLE BASIS. WHAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED IN EUROPE -- AND IF I SAY WE, I EXPRESSLY INCLUDE ALL FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS SINCE THE FOUNDING OF THE FRG -- MUST BECOME THE MODEL OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. ABOVE ALL, THIS IS OUR DESIRE FOR THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, A REGION OF THE WORLD IN WHICH THREE WORLD RELIGIONS HAVE THEIR ORIGIN AND THEIR SOURCE.

PEACE, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, CAN FLOURISH LASTINGLY AND RELIABLY ONLY ON THE SOIL OF LAW AND JUSTICE. OUR COMMITMENT TO PEACE, OUR COMMITMENT TO FORCE APPLIES TO ALL THE WORLD. THEREFORE, OUR UNANIMOUS AND UNAMBIGUOUS ATTITUDE IN VIEW OF THE MILITARY MEASURES OF FORCE WHICH HAVE BEEN IMPOSED IN LITHUANIA OVER THE WEEKEND IS CALLED FOR. WE DEPLORE THE MANY DEAD AND INJURED, AND OUR PROFOUND SYMPATHY GOES TO THEIR RELATIVES. [APPLAUSE]

[TEXT] WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM, OF THE REFORMS, AND OF THE POLICY OF THE NEW THINKING IN THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH EARNED THE COUNTRY SUCH HIGH INTERNATIONAL RESPECT IN THE PAST FEW YEARS AND WHICH OPENED UP PROMISING NEW PROSPECTS OF COOPERATION. FOR THIS REASON, I ADDRESSED ANOTHER MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SOVIET UNION, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, AND APPEALED TO THE CSCE PRINCIPLES ON THE BASIS OF THE CHARTER OF PARIS FOR A NEW EUROPE WHICH WE CONFIRMED JOINTLY IN PARIS. THIS MEANS THAT ANY FURTHER USE OF FORCE MUST BE STOPPED, THAT THE PATH OF DIALOGUE AND UNDERSTANDING MUST BE RESUMED, AND THAT IT MUST BE ENSURED THAT THE FREE CHOICE MADE IN LITHUANIA AND OTHER REPUBLICS OF THE UNION IS RESPECTED.

AS RECENTLY AS LAST WEEK, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CONFIRMED THAT FORCE WILL NOT BE USED IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS. YESTERDAY PRESIDENT GORBACHEV INFORMED THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE ORDER FOR THE ATTACK DURING THE WEEKEND [12-13 JANUARY] WAS NOT ISSUED BY HIM PERSONALLY AND THAT HE STRONGLY HOPES THAT A SOLUTION CAN BE ACHIEVED POLITICALLY. THIS MORNING RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW AGAIN STRESSED THAT THE ORDER FOR THE ATTACK -- I QUOTE -- HAVE NOT BEEN ISSUED BY THE CENTER. I TRUST THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WILL BE ABLE TO CLARIFY THIS ISSUE. THE USSR FEDERATION COUNCIL DECIDED AT HIS INITIATIVE TO SEND A HIGH-RANKING DELEGATION TO VILNIUS WHICH ARRIVED THERE YESTERDAY AND HAS STARTED TALKS.

I STRONGLY HOPE THAT IN THIS WAY IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO RESTORE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND VILNIUS THAT IS CHARACTERIZED BY A WILLINGNESS FOR UNDERSTANDING. ABOVE ALL -- I HOPE THAT THIS WILL BE SUPPORTED BY THE ENTIRE PARLIAMENT -- THE NORMAL WORK OF THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LITHUANIAN PEOPLE MUST BE ENSURED. [APPLAUSE]

MADAME PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, OUR GREAT GOAL CONTINUES TO BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN STATE OF PEACE FROM WHICH ALL COUNTRIES AND ALL PEOPLES ON OUR CONTINENT WILL PROFIT. WE ARE DEEPLY CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN IMPORTANT EXPERIENCE OF GERMAN HISTORY PARTICULARLY IN THIS CENTURY THAT THE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND BASIC FREEDOMS ARE ESSENTIAL PRECONDITIONS FOR PROGRESS CONCERNING THE CREATION OF THIS STATE OF PEACE. THE EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE IN VILNIUS -- WE ALL FEEL THIS -- WERE A SERIOUS SETBACK ON THIS PATH. WE ALL HOPE THAT THE PEACEFUL AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT WILL BE CONTINUED IN THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE DEEPLY CONVINCED THAT ONLY DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW ARE THE GREAT IDEALS TO WHICH THE FUTURE BELONGS. ABOVE ALL, THEY ARE THE BASIS FOR A PERMANENT AND JUST STATE OF PEACE IN EUROPE. I BELIEVE THAT WE WANT TO MAKE OUR JOINT CONTRIBUTION TO THIS GOAL. [APPLAUSE]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05d. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush [English Translation] (2 pp.)	1/4/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) II [1]

Date Closed: 6/30/2009	OA/ID Number: 91146-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100242
RECEIVED: 10 JAN 91 16

CHRON FILE

TO: HAVEL, VACLEV
WALESA, LECH

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 15 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CZECHOSLOVAKIA
KUWAIT
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

POLAND
IRAQ
ACCOUNT 150

PERSONS: HAVEL, VACLEV

WALESA, LECH

SUBJECT: LTRS TO PRES HAVEL & WALESA RE THANKS FOR SUPPORT IN GULF CRISIS

ACTION: PRES SGD LTRS

DUE DATE: 14 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GANTT
GOMPERT
HUTCHINGS
NSC-CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 4 OF 4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: *[Signature]*

LOG # 0242

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG CAO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>Lab</i> Ken Hill	<u>6</u>	<u><i>km</i></u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>7</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>8</u>	<u>MM/15</u>	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

91 JAN 15 02.29

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
------------	-----------------	--------------	------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DATE: JAN 15 '91

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 15, 1991

Dear Mr. President:


Thank you for your very kind note and for your message delivered to General Scowcroft by Mr. Zantovsky. I greatly appreciate your words of support for our common policy in the Persian Gulf. Czechoslovakia's steadfastness, its direct military contribution to the Gulf effort, and your unflinching personal resolve are immensely reassuring during these difficult times.

As I mentioned in my last letter, I strongly believe that Czechoslovakia's solidarity, maintained at a high economic cost, should be reciprocated by the international community. In that regard, I want you to know that we have called special attention to your needs with the oil-producing Gulf states at very high levels. I am also pleased that the IMF, responding to our initiative, approved financing for Czechoslovakia of nearly \$1.6 billion, or as much as \$1.8 billion in the event oil prices go still higher in the coming year.

May I say again how deeply I appreciate your words of support on the Gulf. The spirit of friendship and cooperation that we have developed in our several meetings is emblematic of the larger friendship that now flourishes between our two countries.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. H. W. Bush", written in a cursive style.

His Excellency
Vaclav Havel
President of the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic
Prague

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 15, 1991

Dear Mr. President:

I greatly appreciate your letter of January 8 and your expression of support for our common policy in the Persian Gulf. Poland's steadfastness, its direct contribution to the effort in the Gulf, and your personal resolve are immensely reassuring during these difficult times. I was also glad to receive your letter of January 11 on the vital issue of Polish debt reduction, which, as you know, the United States has taken the lead in addressing.

May I also express my admiration for your decisive leadership at home in taking early steps to build a national consensus around Poland's trail-blazing economic reform program. As Poland prepares for elections later this year, the Polish people need to know that the sacrifices they are making will lead them to a more prosperous future. In that regard, I want to assure you that the United States is redoubling its efforts, in the Paris Club and bilaterally, to achieve a significant reduction of Poland's official debt. As Poland resumes its strong IMF program under your leadership, I am hopeful that this effort will succeed.

I look forward to greeting you in Washington on an official visit in March, for what I hope will be an important step in developing a strong and enduring partnership between our two countries.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. Bush", written in a cursive style.

His Excellency
Lech Walesa
President of the Republic of Poland
Warsaw



B 98
1602

THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: *R. S. L.*

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0104 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN
(Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION LETTERS TO PRES LECH WALESZA OF POLAND AND
PRES VACLAV HAVEL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA LOG #: 0242

<u>TO (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>J. STAPLETON ROY</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING, SIGNED ORIGINALS TO FOLLOW.

URGENT

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/30/09



THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN (Name) _____ (Phone Number) _____ (Room No.) _____

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION LETTERS TO PRES LECH WALESA OF POLAND AND
PRES VACLAV HAVEL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

LOG #: 0242

<u>TO</u> (Agency)	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>PHONE NUMBER</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>J. STAPLETON ROY</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING, SIGNED ORIGINALS TO FOLLOW.

URGENT

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 6/30/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0242

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 15, 1991

THE PRESIDENT

91 JAN 15 PM 8:25

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SIGNED

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*
SUBJECT: Letters to President Lech Walesa of Poland and
President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia

Purpose

To reply to messages from Walesa and Havel.

Background

Walesa and Havel have been strong and consistent supporters of the international effort against Iraq, despite the severe economic costs to their countries. They deserve replies to their recent messages of support. The letters at Tabs A and B express your great appreciation for their solidarity and also address what we are doing to help them economically. Your letter to Walesa also responds to a second incoming, sent to leaders of all the G-7 countries, on the question of Polish debt.

As you heard from Havel in Prague, the Czechoslovak economy is suffering from the combined shocks of the collapse of East German and Soviet markets, cutbacks in Soviet energy deliveries, the loss of Iraqi oil supplies and markets, and higher world oil prices. Mazowiecki told you much the same story in Paris, shortly before his defeat by Walesa in the presidential election. Despite public pressures to retreat from austerity measures, however, both Havel and Walesa have given their strong backing to radical economic reforms.

The next year will be pivotal for Eastern Europe. If Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary get through 1991 with economic reforms intact and political leaderships secure, they will be on the road -- albeit a rough one -- to economic recovery. If not, these democratic experiments could fail, and we could see instead the rise of the authoritarian, ultranationalistic elements Havel spoke to you about. These new democracies will need substantially greater Western assistance to succeed, and the collapse of perestroika in the USSR makes it all the more crucial that they do.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-0312-MR
mm 1/20/2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Our strategy for Eastern Europe is to use U.S. assistance as a multiplier to leverage substantially more from our West European partners. As it now stands, however, our aid level is too small to be a credible lever. Given the immediacy of Eastern Europe's needs, we and State have agreed in the FY 1992 budget request to add as much as possible to last year's level of \$370 million. We would then call on others in the G-24 to follow our lead and increase their bilateral aid programs proportionally and be more forthcoming on related issues like Polish debt and East European energy financing. So long as our new commitment is more than token, we can hope in this way to leverage billions in total new assistance for the region, since our G-24 contributions to date have yielded over ten times as much from other donors.

In generating that higher level of U.S. assistance, we run up against a limited foreign assistance budget that is constrained by longstanding earmarks for Israel, Egypt, and others. We will therefore be exploring a possible shift of funds within the foreign assistance account and seeing what other flexibility we have within the constraints of the budget compromise.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the messages to Walesa and Havel at Tabs A and B.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to Walesa
Tab B	Letter to Havel
Tab C	Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0242
REDO

January 12, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS

SUBJECT: Letters to President Lech Walesa of Poland
and President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0873-MR
JL 5/4/11

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President attaching letters to Walesa and Havel, thanking them for their words of support on the Gulf. The texts have been cleared with State and Treasury.

We also think that these messages should be given some immediate publicity as the Gulf situation reaches its denouement. At Tab II are suggested points for you or Bob Gates to use in backgrounding the press or talking with key Members of Congress.

The proposed Presidential letters to Walesa and Havel also allude to steps we are taking to address their economic needs. The memo to the President describes the acute economic problems facing the east Europeans and what we intend to do for them in 1991.

Concerning FY 1992 bilateral aid, Larry Eagleburger has agreed to allow David Gompert informally to go to his office and look at the breakdown for the 150 account but would not agree to sharing the document with the NSC. You may want to call Larry about this position. If the effort to get more for Eastern Europe from the FY 1992 foreign assistance account fails, we will be exploring -- within the constraints of the budget compromise -- the possibility of transferring funds from elsewhere in the budget. We will return to you with a recommendation once we understand all our options.

Concurrences by: Adrian Basora and Tim Deal

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Letter to Walesa

Tab B Letter to Havel

Tab C Incoming Correspondence

Tab II Background Material on Walesa and Havel Messages

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON WALESA AND HAVEL MESSAGES

- Polish President Lech Walesa and Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel have both sent messages to the President expressing their full support for the international effort in the Gulf and for the President's policies.
- Walesa wrote the President on January 8. Let me read you one sentence: "Poland fully supports -- and not only in words -- the U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the return of independence to Kuwait, profoundly acknowledges the efforts of the United States Government and yourself aimed at a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and expresses its deep hope that these efforts will be crowned with success."
- Walesa noted that he was writing not only as President of Poland but also as a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate.
- President Havel delivered his message orally through his Press Spokesman, who was visiting Washington January 8. Havel wanted the President to know that he supported the President's stance in the Gulf "100 percent."
- Czechoslovakia has been hit particularly hard by the loss of Iraqi oil supplies and higher world oil prices. Yet, when he was asked about this in a press conference during the President's visit to Prague in November, Havel said: "No price is too high where aggression is concerned."
- The President has written letters to Walesa and to Havel thanking them warmly for their messages of support.

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/4/24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06f. Message	From Warsaw Re: Dear Mr. President, (1 pp.)	1/11/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) II [1]

Date Closed:	6/30/2009	OA/ID Number:	91146-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06g. Message	President Bush to President Lech Walesa (1 pp.)	1/8/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) II [1]

Date Closed: 6/30/2009	OA/ID Number: 91146-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information