

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):  
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:  
2009-0275-S

# FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an  
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential  
Library Staff.**

---

**Record Group/Collection:** George H.W. Bush Presidential Records  
**Collection/Office of Origin:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files

---

**OA/ID Number:** 91146  
**Folder ID Number:** 91146-002

---

**Folder Title:**  
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]

---

| Stack:   | Row:      | Section: | Shelf:   | Position: |
|----------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| <b>G</b> | <b>34</b> | <b>3</b> | <b>6</b> | <b>4</b>  |

---

## Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type | Subject/Title                                                                              | Date   | Restriction | Classification |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------|----------------|
| 01a. Memo       | Timothy E. Deal to Robert M. Gates<br>Re: Burdensharing in Gulf Crisis (3 pp.)             | 1/7/91 | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 01b. Letter     | To Dick Thornburgh<br>Re: steps being taken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (1 pp.) | 1/2/91 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 01c. Report     | Re: Threat Assessment - United States (3 pp.)                                              | n.d.   | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 01d. Report     | Re: Resources Being Applied/Contingency Plans: (2 pp.)                                     | n.d.   | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 01e. Report     | Re: Chemical/Biological Counterterrorism Matters (2 pp.)                                   | n.d.   | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 01f. Report     | Re: FBI Needs/Requests (1 pp.)                                                             | n.d.   | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 01g. Report     | Re: Threat Warning System (2 pp.)                                                          | n.d.   | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 02. Memo        | Timothy E. Deal to Robert M. Gates<br>Re: Burdensharing in Gulf Crisis (3 pp.)             | 1/7/91 | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 03a. Telcon     | Re: Telephone Cnversation with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir<br>(3 pp.)                    | 1/7/91 | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |

Page 1 of 3

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1215  
**OA/ID Number:** 91146-002  
**Date Closed:** 6/22/2009  
**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2009-0275-S  
**Re-review Case #:**  
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type            | Subject/Title                                                                                                                         | Date     | Restriction | Classification |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|----------------|
| 03b. Memo                  | Richard N. Haass to William F. Sittmann<br>Re: Memorandum of Telephone Call with Prime Minister Shamir,<br>January 7, 1991 (1 pp.)    | 1/7/91   | (b)(1)      | ✓              |
| 04a. Letter                | President Bush to Secretary General Manfred Woerner<br>Re: Thank you so much for your kind letter (1 pp.)                             | 1/8/91   | (b)(1)      |                |
| 04b. Memo                  | Brent Scowcroft to POTUS<br>Re: Letter from the President to NATO Secretary General<br>Woerner Regarding Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)          | 1/4/91   | (b)(1)      |                |
| 04c. Memo                  | Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Letter from the President to NATO Secretary General<br>Woerner Regarding Gulf Crisis (1 pp.) | 12/28/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 04d. Memo                  | J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Draft Reply to Letter from NATO Secretary General Woerner<br>to the President (1 pp.)      | 12/20/90 | (b)(1)      | ✓              |
| 04e. Memo                  | Charles Jackson to William Sittmann<br>Re: Alerting NSCS on Presidential Correspondence (1 pp.)                                       | 12/17/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 04f. Letter                | M. Worner to President Bush<br>Re: I regret... (1 pp.)                                                                                | n.d.     | (b)(1)      |                |
| 04g. Handwritten<br>Letter | M. Worner to President Bush<br>Re: I regret... (3 pp.)                                                                                | 12/4/90  | (b)(1)      |                |

Page 2 of 3

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1215  
**OA/ID Number:** 91146-002  
**Date Closed:** 6/22/2009  
**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2009-0275-S  
**Re-review Case #:**  
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type    | Subject/Title                                                                   | Date   | Restriction | Classification |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------|----------------|
| 05a. Profile Sheet | Scowcroft to Baker, J<br>Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)                       | 1/8/91 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 05b. Cable         | Re: Cable for Secretary Baker (2 pp.)                                           | n.d.   | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 05c. Cable         | Re: Message to Secretary of State James Baker from General<br>Scowcroft (2 pp.) | n.d.   | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1215  
**OA/ID Number:** 91146-002  
**Date Closed:** 6/22/2009  
**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2009-0275-S  
**Re-review Case #:**  
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100125  
RECEIVED: 07 JAN 91 12

CHRON FILE

TO: GATES

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 07 JAN 91  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE  
SAUDI ARABIA  
UAE

IRAQ  
KUWAIT  
JAPAN



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BURDENSARING IN GULF CRISIS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 10 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL

NSC CHRON

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/22/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY:                     

LOG # 0125

URGENT NOT PROOFED:                     

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK:                     

DOCLOG De A/O                     

|                     | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN              | DISPOSITION                 |
|---------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
| <del>Ken Hill</del> | <u>1</u>    | <u>Kn</u>             | <u>I</u>                    |
| Bill Sittmann       | <u>2</u>    | <u>W</u>              |                             |
| Bob Gates           | <u>3</u>    | <u>J</u>              |                             |
| Brent Scowcroft     | <u>4</u>    |                       |                             |
| Bill Sittmann       |             |                       |                             |
| Situation Room      |             |                       |                             |
| West Wing Desk      | <u>5</u>    | <u>APNSA/Has Seen</u> | <u>                    </u> |
| NSC Secretariat     | <u>6</u>    |                       | <u>W/R</u>                  |
|                     |             |                       |                             |
|                     |             |                       |                             |

91 JAN 7 12 38

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc:    VP    Sununu    Other                     

Should be seen by:                       
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0125

January 7, 1991

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL

SUBJECT: Burdensharing in Gulf Crisis

This supplements my comments to you by phone Saturday regarding allied burdensharing in the Gulf Crisis.

As I said then, I believe Secretary Brady's data on foreign contributions to Desert Shield are incomplete and somewhat misleading. The problem is getting accurate data from DOD, which has been reluctant to share information on this subject with other agencies.

Here is the latest data that we have from DOD and Treasury on Desert Shield and financial assistance to the Front Line states:

Desert Shield: Contributions by Allies in CY 1990  
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)

|              | Total<br>Commitments | Total<br>Disbursements |
|--------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| Saudi Arabia | 1.8                  | 1.2                    |
| Kuwait       | 2.5                  | 2.5                    |
| UAE          | 1.0                  | 0.6                    |
| Japan        | 2.0 <sup>1</sup>     | 0.5                    |
| Germany      | 1.1                  | 0.3                    |
| Korea        | 0.1                  | ---                    |
| Total        | 8.5 <sup>2</sup>     | 5.2                    |

Eliminating the Japanese contributions to other forces in the Gulf, the correct figures for Desert Shield for CY 1990 are: Commitments, \$8.2 billion; disbursements to date, \$5.2 billion.

Disbursements for Saudi Arabia, Japan and Germany have lagged commitments for the following reasons:

<sup>1</sup>Includes \$267 million for other multinational forces

<sup>2</sup>Includes Japan's contribution of \$267 million for other multinational forces

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-08-10 MR  
E 10/5/15

-- Saudi Arabia: The \$1.2 billion in disbursements does not include host nation support for December, which DOD must yet evaluate. Also, Secretary Baker and Wolfowitz allegedly obtained a commitment from the Saudis for \$1.05 billion for en route travel expenses in connection with the second deployment. For some reason, State has been sitting on an instructions cable to Riyadh requesting these funds. When obtained, they will be added either to the CY 1990 or CY 1991 contributions.

-- Germany and Japan: Both have committed large amount of in-kind and lift support which are either in the pipeline or subject to further negotiations (what Germany has offered in the way of in-kind material reportedly is of questionable utility, and cash payments may be sought instead).

The data on commitments and disbursements for assistance to the Front Line states are more clear cut:

Financial Assistance to Front Line States and Others in FY 1990-91  
(Billions in U.S. Dollars)

|             | <u>Estimated Needs</u> | <u>Commitments</u> | <u>Disbursements</u> |
|-------------|------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| Egypt       | 3.4                    | 4.0                | 2.4                  |
| Turkey      | 5.9                    | 2.3                | 0.8                  |
| Jordan      | 4.3                    | 0.5                | 0.2                  |
| Others      | ---                    | 4.0                | 0.2                  |
| East Europe | 1.0                    | ---                | ---                  |
| Total       | 14.6                   | 10.9               | 3.6                  |

On the question of the Saudi windfall from higher oil prices, Treasury has estimated a \$14.8 billion gain in 1990, which is in the mid-range of Embassy Riyadh projections. The Embassy has, however, estimated that the Saudis have made major outlays for their defense and for aid and that actual expenditures far exceed any windfall profits. The Embassy's figures are as follows:

Saudi Expenditure Commitments in Connection with  
Gulf Crisis through November 1990  
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)

|                                                                       |             |      |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------|
| Defense                                                               | 18.3        |      |
| Saudi Mobilization and Support                                        |             | 1.8  |
| Third Country Military Support                                        |             | 2.9  |
| New Arms and Equipment Contracts                                      |             | 13.6 |
| Aid                                                                   | 6.0         |      |
| Increased Oil Production (incremental<br>operating and capital costs) | 1.7         |      |
| Refugees                                                              | 0.6         |      |
| Civil Defense                                                         | 0.3         |      |
| Other                                                                 | 3.0         |      |
| Total                                                                 | <u>29.9</u> |      |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

As directed by the Informal Steering Group, we are preparing a press statement with data about allied contributions for Desert Shield and the Front Line states.

cc: Richard Haass  
David Gompert  
Karl Jackson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE ATTORNEY GENERAL



TO: The President

Attached find an update  
on FBI anti-terrorism  
measures responding to any  
Iraqi threat.

R.L.T.

1/3/91

(SECRET material attached.)

Copies to: Hon. John Sununu  
Hon. Edith Holiday

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 3, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

EDE HOLIDAY 

SUBJECT:

The Attached Report on Anti-Terrorism

The Attorney General has asked me to convey to the President the attached report on anti-terrorism measures undertaken in response to the Iraq crisis. For most routine matters I send Cabinet correspondence directly to the President through the Staff Secretary, but I thought you may prefer to see this item first and convey it to the President through the NSC.

Attachment



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20535

January 2, 1991


Honorable Dick Thornburgh  
The Attorney General  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The attached material reflects the steps being taken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to insure a proper level of readiness in connection with the current Iraqi crisis. The materials include threat assessment information as well as an assessment of the possible areas from which terrorist attacks may come. Also included is information on the pro-active steps being taken by the FBI to increase our ability to respond promptly to any situation.

If you require a briefing on this material, please do not hesitate to contact me at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

  
William S. Sessions  
Director

Enclosure

1 - Honorable William P. Barr (Enclosure)  
Deputy Attorney General

(SECRET Material Attached)



# ~~SECRET~~

THIS IS A COVER SHEET

FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

ALL INDIVIDUALS HANDLING THIS INFORMATION ARE REQUIRED TO PROTECT IT FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE EXECUTIVE ORDER(S), STATUTE(S) AND AGENCY IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By \_\_\_\_\_ NARA, Date \_\_\_\_\_

(This cover sheet is unclassified.)

# ~~SECRET~~



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                     | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 01c. Report              | Re: Threat Assessment - United States (3 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files

**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files

**Subseries:** Chronological Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]

Document Partially Declassified

(Copy of Document Follows)

By ES On 7/21/22

|                                     |                                         |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/22/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91146-002          |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>                   |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>              |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>                |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b> 2010-0869-MR (500.02) |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 8/3/2015    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]



SECRET



THREAT ASSESSMENT - UNITED STATES:

FBI THREAT ASSESSMENT:

The FBI has not seen any specific planning for domestic terrorist operations from within the official diplomatic presence. Further, no specific planning has been seen within the Iraqi Ba'ath Party Organization or student/religious groups. No information of terrorist planning has come to our attention as the result of interviews currently being conducted within the Iraqi student community. This situation could change quickly in the event of war.

FBI technical, physical and human source coverage of traditional terrorist groups has not developed information relating to specific planning for domestic terrorist operations. However, intelligence information from abroad indicates that threats from such groups in Europe and South American countries have surfaced. These groups have well developed infrastructures within the United States which have the capability of planning and executing terrorist operations in the event of war.

Given the current situation in the Middle East, the resulting terrorist threat would be in three separate and distinct areas:

- (1) IRAQI PRESENCE IN THE U.S.: Through official diplomatic presence at the Iraqi Embassy and the Iraqi United Nations Mission, Iraqi Ba'ath Party Organization, and other student/religious groups-intelligence gathering and possible planning for terrorist activity.

Since the beginning of this current crisis, the official Iraqi presence in the United States has been significantly reduced.

The Iraqi Embassy in Washington, D.C., has been reduced from a complement of 64 diplomats and administrative staff to a current complement of 19. Current plans under consideration by DOS would further reduce this complement to five (on or about January 12-14, 1991).

The Iraqi Mission to the United Nations has maintained the same complement of 21 diplomatic and administrative staff.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART


PER E.O. 13526

2010-08-05-ml  
Eg 8/31/15

SECRET

~~SECRET~~


1.4(c); 1.4(d)



(2) TRADITIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS WHICH MAY  
SUPPORT IRAQ:

o Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

1.4(c); 1.4(d)




o Hizballah

1.4(c); 1.4(d)




o Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

1.4(c); 1.4(d)



o Democratic Front for the Liberation of  
Palestine (DFLP)

1.4(c); 1.4(d)



o PRTP-EPB-Macheteros

- Approximately 80-100 members in U.S.
- (Domestic-Puerto Rican) - 1 FFI (Group)
- Predominantly located in Puerto Rico, possibly  
a small presence in New York

o Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP)

- Approximately 50 members in U.S.
- (Domestic-U.S.) - 1 FFI (Group)
- Largest concentration in Los Angeles, some in  
Chicago

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- (3) INDIVIDUAL ZEALOT (ACTING INDEPENDENTLY): Any individual with such conviction to commit an act without direction from Iraq. (example: 11/27/90 arrest of Jamal Warrayat in Newark for threatening U.S. officials and conspiring to attack U.S. military bases in the U.S. in support of the Iraqi cause.

SECRET



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                              | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 01d. Report              | Re: Resources Being Applied/Contingency Plans: (2 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/22/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91146-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



~~SECRET~~

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL COUNTERTERRORISM MATTERS:

- o The FBI has developed a Chemical/Biological Incident Response Plan which provides a graduated response to a chemical/biological-related incident which occurs within the U.S., utilizing Department of Defense and internal FBI resources, in conjunction with other Federal agencies. The plan is designed to enable FBIHQ to provide assistance to all FBI Field Divisions.
- o The implementation of the plan includes:
  - Assessment of the threat.
  - Provision of technical advice to the field.
  - Deployment of technical personnel and resources to the scene.
  - Marshalling of appropriate health and safety resources.
- o The FBI has developed a relationship with personnel from various agencies specially trained in chemical/biological warfare agents, to assist the FBI in evaluating the credibility of a chemical/biological threat.
- o This Chemical/Biological Credibility Assessment Team is coordinated by the FBI. The team assesses each threat on the basis of its operational, technical, and behavioral aspects.
- o The behavioral assessment of a chemical/biological threat is addressed by the Special Operations and Research Unit, Training Division. This unit has established a network of contract psychologists and other specialists to assist in this endeavor.
- o The operational and technical assessments are conducted by the following components, at the direction of the FBI: U.S. Medical Institute for Infectious Diseases; the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center; the Foreign Science Technology Center; the U.S. Army Chemical Research Development and Engineering Center; and the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) also provide assistance.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0865-MR  
E8 8/3/15

~~SECRET~~

- o Operational assistance to the FBI is provided by the EPA, HHS, the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit and the U.S. Medical Institute for Infectious Diseases.
- o The FBI provided a briefing to select members of the White House staff outlining the FBI's Chemical/Biological Incident Response Plan on 11/19/90.
- o A conference was sponsored by the FBI on 12/17/90, at FBIHQ, during which available technical support and capabilities were reviewed. The purpose of this conference was to further develop and refine the incident response plan. Participants included the Department of Defense, HHS, EPA, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Secret Service.
- o The relationship between law enforcement and consequence crisis management is both dynamic and evolving. Any lead agency designation for consequence management should demand proper coordination and communication among the various Federal agencies involved.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI Needs/Requests:

1. Availability of adequate (C-141) transportation for HRT deployment inside the United States.
2. Continued availability of DOD support for FBI's chemical/biological response program.
3. Continued discussion to ensure proper coordination between law enforcement and consequence management in a chemical/biological response plan.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0805 MR  
Eg 8/31/15

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document         | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 01g. Report              | Re: Threat Warning System (2 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]

Document Partially Declassified  
 (Copy of Document Follows)  
 By EL On 7/21/22

|                                     |                                         |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/22/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91146-002          |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>                   |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>              |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>                |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b> 2010-0869-MR (500.06) |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 8/3/2015    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

**Deed of Gift Restrictions**


C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information  
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information  
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]  
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]



SECRET



THREAT WARNING SYSTEM:

Since the onset of the Iraqi crisis, the following threat advisories have been disseminated:

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>SUMMARY</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 8/25/90     | <div>1.4(c); 1.4(d)</div> <div></div>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| 9/26/90     | Alert for U.S. Government buildings and compounds in Washington, D.C. Two instances of official Iraqi vehicles approaching entrances to secure U.S. compounds under pretext of being lost and needing directions.                                                                                                                       |
| 10/30/90    | Official U.S. Iraqi presence: 14 diplomats in Washington, D.C., 23 in New York City. <div>1.4(c); 1.4(d)</div> <div></div>                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| 11/28/90    | Conflicting information from Iraq to U.S.-based Iraqi diplomats resulting in some discontent. No uniform support for Hussein within the diplomatic corps. Jewish Defense League leader Meir Kahane assassinated in New York City 11/5/90 - no Iraqi connection, but illustration of potential for Muslim radicals to act independently. |
| 12/20/90    | Jamal Warrayat arrested in Newark 11/27/90 for threatening U.S. officials and conspiring to destroy/injure military bases allegedly on behalf of Iraq. While Warrayat had been in contact with Iraqi officials, it appears that he was acting on his own.                                                                               |


SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-08-19 MR  
E8 8/3/15

~~SECRET~~

12/28/90

1.4(c); 1.4(d)



~~SECRET~~

~~CLASSIFIED MATERIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cup NARA, Date 6/22/09

~~CLASSIFIED MATERIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100125  
RECEIVED: 07 JAN 91 12

TO: GATES

**CHRON FILE**

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 07 JAN 91  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE  
SAUDI ARABIA  
UAE

IRAQ  
KUWAIT  
JAPAN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BURDENSARING IN GULF CRISIS

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 10 JAN 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL

NSC CHRON

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 12/22/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 0125

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN      | DISPOSITION    |
|-----------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|
| Ken Hill        | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Bob Gates       | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Brent Scowcroft | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Situation Room  | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| West Wing Desk  | _____       | <u>24.2/7</u> | _____          |
| NSC Secretariat | <u>1</u>    | _____         | <u>OBE/OWR</u> |
| _____           | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| _____           | _____       | _____         | _____          |

91 FEB 7 AM 11:57

|            |                 |              |            |                       |
|------------|-----------------|--------------|------------|-----------------------|
| A = Action | I = Information | D = Dispatch | R = Retain | N = No further Action |
|------------|-----------------|--------------|------------|-----------------------|

cc: VP Sununu Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

**COMMENTS**

**DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

0125

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 7, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TE*  
SUBJECT: Burdensharing in Gulf Crisis

This supplements my comments to you by phone Saturday regarding allied burdensharing in the Gulf Crisis.

As I said then, I believe Secretary Brady's data on foreign contributions to Desert Shield are incomplete and somewhat misleading. The problem is getting accurate data from DOD, which has been reluctant to share information on this subject with other agencies.

Here is the latest data that we have from DOD and Treasury on Desert Shield and financial assistance to the Front Line states:

Desert Shield: Contributions by Allies in CY 1990  
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)

|              | Total<br>Commitments | Total<br>Disbursements |
|--------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| Saudi Arabia | 1.8                  | 1.2                    |
| Kuwait       | 2.5                  | 2.5                    |
| UAE          | 1.0                  | 0.6                    |
| Japan        | 2.0 <sup>1</sup>     | 0.5                    |
| Germany      | 1.1                  | 0.3                    |
| Korea        | 0.1                  | ---                    |
| Total        | 8.5 <sup>2</sup>     | 5.2                    |

Eliminating the Japanese contributions to other forces in the Gulf, the correct figures for Desert Shield for CY 1990 are: Commitments, \$8.2 billion; disbursements to date, \$5.2 billion.

Disbursements for Saudi Arabia, Japan and Germany have lagged commitments for the following reasons:

---

<sup>1</sup>Includes \$267 million for other multinational forces

<sup>2</sup>Includes Japan's contribution of \$267 million for other multinational forces

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

20100869-142  
Eg 10/5/15

-- Saudi Arabia: The \$1.2 billion in disbursements does not include host nation support for December, which DOD must yet evaluate. Also, Secretary Baker and Wolfowitz allegedly obtained a commitment from the Saudis for \$1.05 billion for en route travel expenses in connection with the second deployment. For some reason, State has been sitting on an instructions cable to Riyadh requesting these funds. When obtained, they will be added either to the CY 1990 or CY 1991 contributions.

-- Germany and Japan: Both have committed large amount of in-kind and lift support which are either in the pipeline or subject to further negotiations (what Germany has offered in the way of in-kind material reportedly is of questionable utility, and cash payments may be sought instead).

The data on commitments and disbursements for assistance to the Front Line states are more clear cut:

Financial Assistance to Front Line States and Others in FY 1990-91  
(Billions in U.S. Dollars)

|             | <u>Estimated Needs</u> | <u>Commitments</u> | <u>Disbursements</u> |
|-------------|------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| Egypt       | 3.4                    | 4.0                | 2.4                  |
| Turkey      | 5.9                    | 2.3                | 0.8                  |
| Jordan      | 4.3                    | 0.5                | 0.2                  |
| Others      | ---                    | 4.0                | 0.2                  |
| East Europe | 1.0                    | ---                | ---                  |
| Total       | 14.6                   | 10.9               | 3.6                  |

On the question of the Saudi windfall from higher oil prices, Treasury has estimated a \$14.8 billion gain in 1990, which is in the mid-range of Embassy Riyadh projections. The Embassy has, however, estimated that the Saudis have made major outlays for their defense and for aid and that actual expenditures far exceed any windfall profits. The Embassy's figures are as follows:

Saudi Expenditure Commitments in Connection with  
Gulf Crisis through November 1990  
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)

|                                                                       |      |      |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|------|------|
| Defense                                                               | 18.3 |      |
| Saudi Mobilization and Support                                        |      | 1.8  |
| Third Country Military Support                                        |      | 2.9  |
| New Arms and Equipment Contracts                                      |      | 13.6 |
| Aid                                                                   | 6.0  |      |
| Increased Oil Production (incremental<br>operating and capital costs) | 1.7  |      |
| Refugees                                                              | 0.6  |      |
| Civil Defense                                                         | 0.3  |      |
| Other                                                                 | 3.0  |      |
| Total                                                                 | 29.9 |      |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

As directed by the Informal Steering Group, we are preparing a press statement with data about allied contributions for Desert Shield and the Front Line states.

cc: Richard Haass  
David Gompert  
Karl Jackson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100126  
RECEIVED: 07 JAN 91 12

**CHRON FILE**

TO: WINSTON, C

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 07 JAN 91  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ  
KUWAIT  
WH REFERRAL

SAUDI ARABIA  
PUBLIC STATEMENTS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: VIDEO ADDRESS TO COMMUNITY OF NATIONS AGAINST IRAQI AGGRESSION

ACTION: GATES SGD WH REFERRAL DUE DATE: 10 JAN 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GANTT  
HAASS  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEF

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED



Value -

22

0126

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

DOCLOG 27. A/O           

## DISPOSITION

---

Ken

4

2

W

---

3

✓

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

\_\_\_\_\_

---

---

4

204

*[Handwritten signature]*

5

AM 17

N

**N = No further Action**

Other \_\_\_\_\_

**(Date/Time)**

COMMENTS  
WH Referral - due ASAP

**DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:**

## DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS

CLOSE HOLD

Document No. 0126

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 1/7/90

ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 4:00 TODAY

VIDEO ADDRESS TO THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS UNITED AGAINST  
IRAQI AGGRESSION

SUBJECT:

|                | ACTION FYI                          |                                     |            | ACTION FYI                          |                                     |
|----------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| VICE PRESIDENT | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | MCCLURE    | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| SUNUNU         | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | NEWMAN     | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| SCOWCROFT      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | PORTER     | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| DARMAN         | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | ROGICH     | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| CARD           | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | UNTERMAYER | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| CICCONI        | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | ROGERS     | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| DEMAREST       | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            | WINSTON    | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| FITZWATER      | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| GRAY           | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| HAGIN          | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| HOLIDAY        | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |            | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/>            |

REMARKS:

Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122, x2930, no later than 4:00 TODAY, with a copy to my office. Sorry for the short turnaround. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

January 7, 1991

Memo to Chriss Winston

The NSC concurs with changes as indicated.

Brent Scowcroft

James W. Cicconi  
Assistant to the President  
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff  
Ext. 2702

CLOSE HOLD

91 JAN -7 PM 12:02

McGroarty/Dooley  
January 7, 1991  
11:30 a.m.  
[COALITION]

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: VIDEO ADDRESS TO THE COMMUNITY OF  
NATIONS UNITED AGAINST IRAQI AGGRESSION

More than five months ago, in the early morning hours of August 2nd, Iraqi forces rolled south, and the rape of Kuwait began. That <sup>unprovoked</sup> invasion was more than an attack on Kuwait -- more than the <sup>brutal</sup> ~~unprovoked~~ occupation of a tiny nation that posed no threat to its large and powerful neighbor. It was an assault on the very notion of international order. //

My purpose in speaking to you -- the people of <sup>countries</sup> ~~nations~~ united against this assault -- is to share with you my view of the aims and objectives that must guide us in the challenging days ahead. //

From the center of the crisis in the Middle East, to people and <sup>countries</sup> ~~nations~~ on every continent -- to the families with loved ones held hostage, to the many millions sure to suffer at the hands of one man with a stranglehold on the world's economic lifeline -- Iraq's aggression has caused untold suffering, hardship and uncertainty. //

In <sup>more than</sup> the five months since August 2nd, Iraqi troops have carried out a systematic campaign of terror on the people of Kuwait. Unspeakable atrocities <sup>against men and women</sup> -- and among the maimed and murdered, even innocent children. //

In <sup>more than</sup> the five months since August 2nd, Iraq's action has imposed economic strains on nations large and small -- among



them, some of the world's newest democracies at the very moment they are most vulnerable.

And yet, Iraq's aggression did not go unchallenged. //

In the five months since August 2nd, the world has witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented coalition against aggression.

In the United Nations, Iraq's outlaw act has met a chorus of condemnation in 12 Resolutions with the overwhelming support of the Security Council. At this moment, forces from 28 nations -- rich and poor, Arab and Muslim, European, Asian, ~~and~~ African <sup>and American</sup> -- stand side by side in the Gulf, determined that Saddam's aggression will not stand. //

We are now entering the most critical period of this crisis. For the past five months, Saddam has held the world and the norms of civilized conduct in contempt. In the next five days, Iraq arrives at a deadline that spells the limit of the civilized world's patience. //

Let me be clear about the upcoming deadline. January 15 is not a date certain for the onset of armed conflict -- it is a deadline for Saddam Hussein ~~to choose~~ <sup>to choose peace over war.</sup>

The purpose of declaring this deadline was to give Saddam fair warning: withdraw from Kuwait, without condition and without delay, or face -- any time on or after that date -- a coalition ready and willing to employ "all means necessary" to enforce the will of the United Nations. //

Every one of us, each day of this crisis, has held out hope for a peaceful solution. Even now, as the deadline draws near, we continue to seek a way to end this crisis without further

conflict. That is why, back on November 30, I offered to have Secretary Baker travel to Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein. / That is why, even after Saddam failed to respond -- failed to find time to meet on any of the 15 days we put forward -- I invited Iraq's foreign minister to meet with Secretary Baker in Geneva <sup>on Wednesday, January 9,</sup> ~~just a few days from now.~~ //

In Geneva, we will be guided by the will of the world community -- expressed in those 12 UN resolutions I mentioned a moment ago. // I didn't send Secretary Baker to Geneva to compromise -- or to offer concessions. This meeting offers Saddam Hussein ~~one final chance~~ <sup>one last opportunity to find a final chance --</sup> before the UN deadline to resolve by peaceful means the crisis he has created. //

Saddam may seek to split the coalition -- to exploit our sincere desire for peace to secure for himself the spoils of war.

I know that pressures are now building to provide Saddam some means of saving face -- or to accept a withdrawal that is less than unconditional. The danger in this course should be clear to all. The price of peace now on Saddam's terms will be paid many times over <sup>in the future.</sup> in greater sacrifice and suffering.

Saddam's power will only grow -- along with his appetite for more conquest. The next conflict will find him stronger still -- perhaps in possession even of nuclear weapons -- and far more difficult to defeat.

That is why we simply cannot accept anything less than full compliance with the UN dictates: Iraq's complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. //

He will fail just as he has failed for most the five months

I began by saying that Iraq's action was more than an attack on one nation -- it is an assault on <sup>us all, on</sup> the international order. We who have witnessed in this past year an end to the long years of Cold War and conflict -- we who have seen so much positive change -- stand now at a critical moment, one that will shape the world we live in for years, even decades, to come.

The key now in meeting this challenge is for this remarkable coalition to remain steadfast and strong. If we remain in the days ahead nations united against aggression, we will turn back not only the actions of an ambitious dictator -- we will as partners step forward toward a world of peace. //

Thank you, and may God bless all of you.

# # #

we all share.



CLOSE HOLD

URGENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TIME STAMP

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 0126

ACTION OFFICER: [Redacted]

DUE: 3:00 1/7/90 Today

☐ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates

☐ Appropriate Action

☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi

☐ Prepare Memo for Sittmann

☒ Prepare Memo Scowcroft

to Winston w/cc: Cicconi?

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\*

PHONE\* to action officer at ext. 6900

Concur FYI

☐ Barth  
☐ Basora  
☐ Beers  
☐ Broome  
☐ Burns  
☒ Canas  
☒ Charles  
☐ Coulson  
☐ Davis  
☐ Deal  
☐ Dorminey  
☐ Dyke  
☐ Frasure  
☐ Fry  
☐ Gordon  
☐ Gompert  
☐ Haass  
☐ Hayden

Concur FYI

☐ Hutchings  
☐ Jackson  
☐ Johnson  
☐ Kanter  
☐ Kitchen  
☐ Kuehne  
☐ Lampley  
☐ Lundsager  
☐ Melby  
☐ Menan  
☐ Merchant  
☐ Miller  
☐ Needles  
☐ O'Leary  
☐ Paal  
☐ Pacelli  
☐ Pavitt  
☐ Pilling

Concur FYI

☐ Poneman  
☐ Popadiuk  
☐ Pryce  
☐ Rademaker  
☐ Rice  
☐ Rostow  
☐ Tilley  
☐ Tobey  
☐ Van Eron  
☐ Watson  
☐ Welch  
☐ Whitley  
☐ Wilson  
☐ Working  
☐ Zelikow

INFORMATION

☒ Sittmann

☒ Hill

☒ Exec Sec Desk

☒ Scowcroft (advance)

☒ Gates (advance)

☒ Secretariat

COMMENTS

URGENT

CLOSE HOLD

Logged By SA

Return to Secretariat  
379 OEGB



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100140  
RECEIVED: 07 JAN 91 18

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 07 JAN 91  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL  
IRAQ  
PERSIAN GULF

TELCON  
KUWAIT

**CHRON FILE**

PERSONS: SHAMIR, YITZHAK

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PM SHAMIR RE PERSIAN GULF SITUATION / JAN 7

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 10 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

**D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N**

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC  
HAASS  
LORD, C  
NEIL  
NSC CHRON  
O'LEARY

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

**E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006**

By Cop NARA, Date 4/22/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0140

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister Shamir  
Notetaker: John Montgomery

DATE, TIME January 7, 1991, 1500 - 1510 EDT  
AND PLACE: the White House

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, How are you?

PM Shamir: I am fine and happy to hear your voice.

The President: I thought our meeting in December was quite good and I want to keep up the communication. There are a couple things about the Gulf Crisis that I would like to raise with you.

First, when Jim Baker sees Tariq Aziz in Geneva, he will be very straight. Everything is exactly as we have made public: Iraq must leave Kuwait, or face catastrophe. There will be no behind the scenes negotiations, no deals, no face-saving, and no linkage. That is the underline or main spring of our policy. There is no hidden agenda, no secret emissaries. I also said publicly that we do not plan any follow-up meeting in Baghdad with Saddam himself. We are also being very direct with our European partners. We are cautioning them against diplomacy that could encourage Saddam to believe there are splits in the coalition. What the EC said officially is quite good. We don't want any appearances of splits in a diverse coalition. As this moves down the track, many are looking or hope for a peaceful solution. I think what [Luxembourg Foreign Minister] Poos said is very good.

I also would like to ask your agreement to receive Larry Eagleburger on a very quiet mission to talk to you about where I see things going. Larry is very close to me. He was at my house last night and that is what we talked about. His points will be specific and from me. This would be a continuation of the private conversation you and I had during your visit. If it is agreeable to you, I will ask Ambassador Brown to set up this very important meeting.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 12958,  
AS AMENDED  
2000-0429-F  
8/12/2009 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

PM Shamir: Thank you. I know him. If he has your confidence, I will be very happy to receive him and talk with him.

The President: Yes he does. He will reflect my personal views; I consider this a confidence building mission. He is a very good man to do it. Please consider him a personal emissary.

PM Shamir: Will you be sending him soon? In the next few days?

The President: Yes, before the weekend.

PM Shamir: I will receive him at any moment and be happy to listen and to understand your views better.

The President: Wonderful, we also want to hear your views, anything you say will be important. [Deputy Secretary] Eagleburger will be in contact with me before he comes.

PM Shamir: Will Larry Eagleburger's visit be made public?

The President: I hope not, but it is up to you. It would be better if it were kept quiet. It should be a private meeting, but if word gets out, at least the subject matter should be kept confidential. The visit is not a secret mission, but would be better if it were kept a quiet mission.

PM Shamir: Good. I may have something else to convey to you.

The President: Okay. Ambassador Brown will know about the visit.

PM Shamir: OK. Very good. Thank you.

The President: As I said to you before, Israel has conducted itself with great restraint and that has helped to hold together a disparate coalition.

PM Shamir: We are maintaining a steady course.

The President: I respect that. [Deputy Secretary] Eagleburger will talk with [Ambassador] Brown who will be in touch with your appointment people to set up the meeting.

PM Shamir: I want to wish you a happy new year.

The President: Thank you and I hope you had happy holidays.

PM Shamir: I admire your strong positions in these hard times.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

The President: Don't be diverted by what's going on in Congress, there is strong support throughout the country for our position. Thank you for receiving [Deputy Secretary] Eagleburger.

PM Shamir: Thank you for the phone call.

The President: Thank you and good bye.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0140

January 7, 1991

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN


FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS 

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Call with Prime Minister Shamir, January 7, 1991

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation for the President's telephone call to Prime Minister Shamir January 7, 1991.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve 

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab I

Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006  
By MM NARA, Date 11/23/2013

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: *[Signature]*

LOG # 0140

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCL *[Signature]* A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                             | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN                  | DISPOSITION |
|-----------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|
| <i>[Signature]</i> Ken Hill | <u>1</u>    | <u><i>[Signature]</i></u> | <u>A</u>    |
| Bill Sittmann               | <u>2</u>    | <u><i>[Signature]</i></u> |             |
| Bob Gates                   |             |                           |             |
| Brent Scowcroft             |             |                           |             |
| Bill Sittmann               |             |                           |             |
| Situation Room              |             |                           |             |
| West Wing Desk              | <u>3</u>    |                           | <u>✓</u>    |
| NSC Secretariat             | <u>4</u>    |                           | <u>N</u>    |
|                             |             |                           |             |
|                             |             |                           |             |

91 JAN 7 P 7.10

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc:    VP    Sununu    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Telecon - PH Shanier*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009842  
RECEIVED: 17 DEC 90 18

TO: WOERNER MANFRED

**CHRON FILE**

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 08 JAN 91  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO  
IRAQ

PERSIAN GULF  
KUWAIT



PERSONS: WOERNER, MANFRED

SUBJECT: LTR FM PRES TO WOERNER RE GULF CRISIS

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 04 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION  
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
GOMPERT  
NSC CHRON  
ZELIKOW

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/22/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 6 OF 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council  
The White House**

DOCLOG AK A/O       

### o further Action

**DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:**



Pres Ht to Wbarnes re Study

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: MEN

LOG # 9842

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PR5 NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG 24 A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                    | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN      | DISPOSITION |
|--------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| <i>sf</i> Ken Hill | <u>1</u>    | <u>K</u>      | <u>A</u>    |
| Bill Sittmann      | <u>2</u>    | <u>W</u>      |             |
| Bob Gates          | <u>3</u>    | <u>8</u>      |             |
| Brent Scowcroft    |             |               |             |
| Bill Sittmann      |             |               |             |
| Situation Room     |             |               |             |
| West Wing Desk     | <u>4</u>    | <u>24.114</u> | <u>P</u>    |
| NSC Secretariat    | <u>5</u>    |               |             |
|                    |             |               |             |
|                    |             |               |             |
|                    |             |               |             |

91 JAN 3 PM 2:34  
RECORDED

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc:    VP    Sununu    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 8, 1991

Dear Manfred:

Thank you so much for your kind letter.

This past year has been a triumphant one for the Alliance. Much of this success is directly attributable to your superb leadership: in strategy, in tactics, and in articulating our goals and achievements.

As we enter the New Year, we will face difficult decisions about peace and war. I want to assure you personally of my deep desire to resolve the Gulf crisis without bloodshed, but also of my deep commitment that Iraq's aggression cannot stand. I particularly appreciated your recent leadership in securing approval for the ACE Mobile Force deployment to Turkey.

I hope you found time to rest and enjoy the holiday season. Barbara joins me in sending you and your family best wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "G. Bush", written in a cursive style.

The Honorable  
Dr. Manfred Woerner  
Secretary General of the North Atlantic  
Treaty Organization  
Brussels

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 4, 1991

ACTION

## MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *Bg for*  
SUBJECT: Letter from the President to NATO Secretary  
General Woerner Regarding Gulf Crisis

Purpose

To reply to a letter from NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner.

Background

On December 4, 1990, Secretary General Woerner sent you a handwritten letter expressing the feeling that, although you had not had the chance to meet for several months, you were constantly in his thoughts. He also sent you his best wishes for the New Year both for you and for your family.

Your letter to Woerner personally assures him of your commitment that Iraq's aggression cannot stand and praises his recent leadership in securing NATO approval of the ACE Mobile Force deployment to Turkey. Woerner was especially helpful with Kohl. Since Woerner penned his letter to you, and he is such a good friend, you might want to consider a handwritten reply drawing on the proposed text at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send a letter to Secretary General Woerner as attached at Tab A.

## Attachment

Tab A Draft reply to Woerner  
Tab B Letter from Woerner

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 28, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW SUBJECT: Letter from the President to NATO Secretary  
General Woerner Regarding Gulf Crisis

On December 4, 1990, Secretary General Woerner wrote to the President regarding the Gulf Crisis. Attached at Tab A is a proposed response. Your memorandum to the President transmitting the letter is at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President which is at Tab I.

## Attachments

Tab I Letter to the President  
Tab A Letter to Woerner  
Tab B Letter from Woerner





United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

9842


December 20, 1990

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Reply to Letter from NATO Secretary General  
Woerner to the President

The attached draft is a response to NATO Secretary General  
Manfred Woerner's personal letter to the President.

  
J. Stapleton Roy  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

- Tab 1 - Draft Presidential Response to NATO Secretary  
General Woerner
- Tab 2 - Incoming Correspondence from Secretary General  
Woerner

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0870-NR  
82 71715



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 17, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann  
Executive Secretary  
National Security Council Staff  
The White House

SUBJECT: Alerting NSCS on Presidential  
Correspondence

Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Bush from SYG Worner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which is transmitted for your information.

This correspondence was received in the Information Resources Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on Dec. 17, 1990. A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Charles G. Jackson Jr. for".

Director, S/S-IRM  
Information Resources Management Section  
Executive Secretariat  
647-2991

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                              | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 04f. Letter              | M. Worner to President Bush<br>Re: I regret... (1 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1)      |        |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]

|                               |             |                             |           |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 6/22/2009   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 91146-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |           |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |           |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |           |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |           |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |           |

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type   | Subject/Title of Document                              | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 04g. Handwritten<br>Letter | M. Worner to President Bush<br>Re: I regret... (3 pp.) | 12/4/90 | (b)(1)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [3]

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/22/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91146-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100179  
RECEIVED: 08 JAN 91 19

TO: FOLEY, THOMAS S  
ET AL

**CHRON FILE**

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 08 JAN 91  
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF  
IRAQ  
UN

CO  
KUWAIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES LTRS TO CONGRESSMEN FOLEY / MITCHELL / DOLE & MICHEL RE GULF  
CRISIS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 11 JAN 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 0179

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN      | DISPOSITION    |
|-----------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|
| Ken Hill        | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Bob Gates       | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Brent Scowcroft | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Situation Room  | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>1</u>    | <u>4/18</u>   | <u>AN</u>      |
| NSC Secretariat | <u>2</u>    | <u>11/1/8</u> | <u>Log FRP</u> |
| _____           | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| _____           | _____       | _____         | _____          |

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc: VP \_\_\_\_\_ Sununu \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

**COMMENTS**

WWO/Secretariat

Pls put in system for record purposes if not

**DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:** there already

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 8, 1991

Dear Mr. Speaker:

The current situation in the Persian Gulf, brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait, threatens vital U.S. interests. The situation also threatens the peace. It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position adopted by the UN Security Council on twelve separate occasions. Such an action would underline that the United States stands with the international community and on the side of law and decency; it also would help dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's leaders that the United States lacks the necessary unity to act decisively in response to Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.

Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's Foreign Minister on January 9. It would have been most constructive if he could have presented the Iraqi government a Resolution passed by both houses of Congress supporting the UN position and in particular Security Council Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently stated my desire for such a Resolution. Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for peace and safeguard this country's vital interests.

I therefore request that the House of Representatives and the Senate adopt a Resolution stating that Congress supports the use of all necessary means to implement UN

Security Council Resolution 678. Such action would send the clearest possible message to Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less would only encourage Iraqi intransigence; anything else would risk detracting from the international coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression.

Mr. Speaker, I am determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America's security. I ask Congress to join with me in this task. I can think of no better way than for Congress to express its support for the President at this critical time. This truly is the last best chance for peace.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Tom Foley', written in a cursive style.

The Honorable Thomas S. Foley  
Speaker of the House  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 8, 1991

Dear Senator Mitchell:

The current situation in the Persian Gulf, brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait, threatens vital U.S. interests. The situation also threatens the peace. It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position adopted by the UN Security Council on twelve separate occasions. Such an action would underline that the United States stands with the international community and on the side of law and decency; it also would help dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's leaders that the United States lacks the necessary unity to act decisively in response to Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.


Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's Foreign Minister on January 9. It would have been most constructive if he could have presented the Iraqi government a Resolution passed by both houses of Congress supporting the UN position and in particular Security Council Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently stated my desire for such a Resolution. Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for peace and safeguard this country's vital interests.

I therefore request that the House of Representatives and the Senate adopt a Resolution stating that Congress supports the use of all necessary means to implement UN

Security Council Resolution 678. Such action would send the clearest possible message to Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less would only encourage Iraqi intransigence; anything else would risk detracting from the international coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression.

I am determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America's security. I ask Congress to join with me in this task. I can think of no better way than for Congress to express its support for the President at this critical time. This truly is the last best chance for peace.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. Mitchell", written in a cursive style.

Senator George Mitchell  
Senate Majority Leader  
S221 Capitol  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 8, 1991

Dear Senator Dole:

The current situation in the Persian Gulf, brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait, threatens vital U.S. interests. The situation also threatens the peace. It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position adopted by the UN Security Council on twelve separate occasions. Such an action would underline that the United States stands with the international community and on the side of law and decency; it also would help dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's leaders that the United States lacks the necessary unity to act decisively in response to Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.

Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's Foreign Minister on January 9. It would have been most constructive if he could have presented the Iraqi government a Resolution passed by both houses of Congress supporting the UN position and in particular Security Council Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently stated my desire for such a Resolution. Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for peace and safeguard this country's vital interests.

I therefore request that the House of Representatives and the Senate adopt a Resolution stating that Congress supports the use of all necessary means to implement UN

Security Council Resolution 678. Such action would send the clearest possible message to Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less would only encourage Iraqi intransigence; anything else would risk detracting from the international coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression.

I am determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America's security. I ask Congress to join with me in this task. I can think of no better way than for Congress to express its support for the President at this critical time. This truly is the last best chance for peace.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. Dole", written in a cursive style.

Senator Robert Dole  
Senate Republican Leader  
S230 Capitol  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 8, 1991

Dear Congressman Michel:

The current situation in the Persian Gulf, brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait, threatens vital U.S. interests. The situation also threatens the peace. It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position adopted by the UN Security Council on twelve separate occasions. Such an action would underline that the United States stands with the international community and on the side of law and decency; it also would help dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's leaders that the United States lacks the necessary unity to act decisively in response to Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.


Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's Foreign Minister on January 9. It would have been most constructive if he could have presented the Iraqi government a Resolution passed by both houses of Congress supporting the UN position and in particular Security Council Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently stated my desire for such a Resolution. Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for peace and safeguard this country's vital interests.

I therefore request that the House of Representatives and the Senate adopt a Resolution stating that Congress supports the use of all necessary means to implement UN

Security Council Resolution 678. Such action would send the clearest possible message to Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less would only encourage Iraqi intransigence; anything else would risk detracting from the international coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression.

I am determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America's security. I ask Congress to join with me in this task. I can think of no better way than for Congress to express its support for the President at this critical time. This truly is the last best chance for peace.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. Michel", written in a cursive style.

Representative Robert Michel  
House Republican Leader  
H232 Capitol  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100155  
RECEIVED: 08 JAN 91 13

TO: BAKER, J

**CHRON FILE**

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 08 JAN 91  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: TURKEY  
NETHERLANDS

GERMANY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CABLE RE PATRIOTS FOR TURKEY

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 11 JAN 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
GOMPERT  
NSC CHRON  
ZELIKOW

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0870 MR  
Eg 71715

National Security Council  
The White House

**CHRON FILE**

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 0155

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG 24 A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN      | DISPOSITION    |
|-----------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|
| Ken Hill        | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Bob Gates       | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Brent Scowcroft | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| Situation Room  | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| West Wing Desk  | _____       | <u>27.1/8</u> | _____          |
| NSC Secretariat | <u>1</u>    | _____         | <u>Log FRP</u> |
| _____           | _____       | _____         | _____          |
| _____           | _____       | _____         | _____          |

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc: VP PIK Sununu Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Cable sit via  
Wh Situation Room  
1/2/90  
LMH

Fm: Philip Zelikow  
TO: Secretary Baker  
Priority Out message  
West Wing  
Copy

No cover sheet enclosed

SDO MALICK  
7 JAN 91 2200



CABLE FOR SECRETARY BAKER, VIA WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS

SUBJECT: Patriots for Turkey (S)

1. In parallel with your letter to Genscher on this subject, I previewed with ~~the~~ Kohl's national security advisor, Peter Hartmann, our proposal to respond to Turkey's request for Patriot with two American, two Dutch, and two German batteries, all with crews. While Hartmann appreciated the prior consultations on this matter, which were lacking in the case of the ACE mobile force, he predicted that this would be an even more difficult decision for Germany. His reasoning was that the German crews could be exposed to hostilities once deployed without any subsequent opportunity for Germany to take a decision to engage them, as provided for by Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. Logically and politically, this would probably require the government to seek Bundestag approval for the Patriot deployment. He predicted difficulty with Genscher and strong opposition from the SPD and elements of the press. (S)
2. Hartmann understood the reasons for the Turkish request and acknowledged that somehow the U.S. and its allies had to give a favorable response. He asked about the possibility of Germany providing units to the United States which we in turn would deploy with our crews to Turkey. We pointed out that it would be hard to explain why American and Dutch crews should go but German crews should not. (S)
3. It is important that we decide with the Germans very soon how to handle this so that we can guide the Turks. I would hope that you can resolve it directly with the Chancellor. In deciding how hard we wish to press the Germans on this, we should bear some other factors in mind. First, the deeper we involve the Germans militarily the greater the pressures -- largely self-generated -- for Germany to pursue or encourage further diplomatic initiatives toward Iraq. Second, as you know, we are about to ask Kohl also to agree to ~~make Germany's~~ strategic petroleum reserve available in the event of hostilities. Third, there are a number of other requests (e.g. for financial contributions, transportation for Patriot, and other air defense systems) which are going to be presented to Germany. (S)
4. If ~~after pressing Kohl~~ you determine that the only way to get a positive and prompt German decision is by accepting German units without German crews, I would support this as a fallback. It would need to be understood that the units would be turned over first to us and eventually be turned over to the Turks at no cost. Because the Germans evidently

have modified their units, manning them with Americans would cause a delay in deployment of about two weeks while the Germans trained our people on their systems. Nevertheless, this course of action strikes me as preferable to a strictly U.S./Dutch response. (S)

5. We have ~~not~~ discussed this with DOD <sup>and</sup> You may wish to get reaction from Steve Hadley and Howard Graves in your party. (S)

Brent Scowcroft



WHITE HOUSE

CABINET OFFICE LONDON

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES  
BAKER FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

SUBJECT: PATRIOTS FOR TURKEY (S)

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0870 MR  
E8 717115

1. IN PARALLEL WITH YOUR LETTER TO GENSCHER ON THIS SUBJECT, I  
PREVIEWED WITH KOHL'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, PETER HARTMANN,  
OUR PROPOSAL TO RESPOND TO TURKEY'S REQUEST FOR PATRIOT WITH TWO  
AMERICAN, TWO DUTCH, AND TWO GERMAN BATTERIES, ALL WITH CREWS.  
WHILE HARTMANN APPRECIATED THE PRIOR CONSULTATIONS ON THIS MATTER,  
WHICH WERE LACKING IN THE CASE OF THE ACE MOBILE FORCE, HE  
PREDICTED THAT THIS WOULD BE AN EVEN MORE DIFFICULT  
DECISION FOR GERMANY. HIS REASONING WAS THAT THE GERMAN CREWS  
COULD BE EXPOSED TO HOSTILITIES ONCE DEPLOYED WITHOUT ANY  
SUBSEQUENT OPPORTUNITY FOR GERMANY TO TAKE A DECISION TO ENGAGE  
THEM, AS PROVIDED FOR BY ARTICLE V OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.  
LOGICALLY AND POLITICALLY, THIS WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE THE  
GOVERNMENT TO SEEK BUNDESTAG APPROVAL FOR THE PATRIOT DEPLOYMENT.  
HE PREDICTED DIFFICULTY WITH GENSCHER AND STRONG OPPOSITION  
FROM THE SPD AND ELEMENTS OF THE PRESS. (S)

2. HARTMANN UNDERSTOOD THE REASONS FOR THE TURKISH REQUEST AND  
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOMEHOW THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES HAD TO GIVE A  
FAVORABLE RESPONSE. HE ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF GERMANY  
PROVIDING UNITS TO THE UNITED STATES WHICH WE IN TURN WOULD DEPLOY  
WITH OUR CREWS TO TURKEY. WE POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE HARD TO  
EXPLAIN WHY AMERICAN AND DUTCH CREWS SHOULD GO BUT GERMAN CREWS  
SHOULD NOT. (S)

3. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE DECIDE WITH THE GERMANS VERY SOON HOW  
TO HANDLE THIS SO THAT WE CAN GUIDE THE TURKS. I WOULD HOPE THAT  
YOU CAN RESOLVE IT DIRECTLY WITH THE CHANCELLOR. IN DECIDING HOW  
HARD WE WISH TO PRESS THE GERMANS ON THIS, WE SHOULD BEAR SOME  
OTHER FACTORS IN MIND. FIRST, THE DEEPER WE INVOLVE THE GERMANS  
MILITARILY THE GREATER THE PRESSURES -- LARGELY SELF-GENERATED --  
FOR GERMANY TO PURSUE OR ENCOURAGE FURTHER DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES  
TOWARD IRAQ. SECOND, AS YOU MAY KNOW, WE ARE ABOUT TO ASK KOHL  
ALSO TO AGREE TO MAKE GERMANY'S STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE  
AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES. THIRD, THERE ARE A NUMBER  
OF OTHER REQUESTS (E.G. FOR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS, TRANSPORTATION  
FOR PATRIOT, AND OTHER AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS WHICH ARE GOING TO BE  
PRESENTED TO GERMANY. (S)

4. IF YOU DETERMINE THAT THE ONLY WAY TO GET A POSITIVE AND PROMPT  
GERMAN DECISION IS BY ACCEPTING GERMAN UNITS WITHOUT GERMAN CREWS,  
I WOULD SUPPORT THIS AS A FALLBACK. IT WOULD NEED TO BE UNDERSTOOD  
THAT THE UNITS WOULD BE TURNED OVER FIRST TO US AND EVENTUALLY BE  
TURNED OVER TO THE TURKS AT NO COST. BECAUSE THE GERMANS EVIDENTLY  
HAVE MODIFIED THEIR UNITS, MANNING THEM WITH AMERICANS WOULD CAUSE  
A DELAY IN DEPLOYMENT OF ABOUT TWO WEEKS WHILE THE GERMANS TRAINED

OUR PEOPLE ON THEIR SYSTEMS. NEVERTHELESS, THIS COURSE OF ACTION  
STRIKES ME AS PREFERABLE TO A STRICTLY U.S./DUTCH RESPONSE. (S)

5. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH DOD AND YOU MAY WISH TO GET  
REACTION FROM STEVE HADLEY AND HOWARD GRAVES IN YOUR PARTY. (S)

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT.

DECLAS: OADR

#0000