Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91146
Folder ID Number: 91146-001

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	4

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Richard N. Haass/Virginia Lampley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Talking Points for January 3 Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meetings (1 pp.)	1/2/90	(b)(1)	C
01b. Memo	William F. Sittmann to John Gardner Re: Talking Points for January 3 Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meetings (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
01c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made in Oval Office with 4 Leaders (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
01d. Talking Points	Re: Points for Cabinet Room Meeting with Congressional Leaders (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02a. Letter	To Dick Thornburgh Re: steps being taken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (1 pp.)	1/2/91	(b)(1)	
02b. Report	Re: Threat Assessment - United States (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02c. Report	Re: Resources Being Applied/Contingency Plans (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02d. Report	Re: Chemical/Biological Counterterrorism Matters (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02e. Report	Re: FBI Needs/Requests (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1214
OA/ID Number: 91146-001
Date Closed: 6/22/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
02f. Report	Re: Threat Warning Systems (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	From Timothy E. Deal to Robert M. Gates, Re: Gulf Crisis: Checklist for Informal Steering Group Meeting on January 4, 5:15 p.m., Situation Room [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	1/3/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. List	Re: Informal Steering Group [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	1/4/91	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
04a. Memo	Eric Melby to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting on Energy Prepardness, January 4, 3:00 p.m., Situation Room (2 pp.)	1/3/90	(b)(1)	C
04b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04c. Briefing Paper	Re: Energy Implications of an Outbreak of Hostilities in Persian Gulf (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04d. Agenda	Re: Meeting on Gulf Crisis Energy Preparedness (1 pp.)	1/4/91	(b)(1)	C
05a. Outline	Re: Meeting with UN Secretary General (2 pp.)	1/5/91	(b)(1)	C
05b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05c. Background Report	Re: President Bush's Meeting with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar Camp David, January 5, 1991 (2 pp.)	1/5/91	(b)(1)	C
05d. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: President's Meeting with Perez De Cuellar (1 pp.)	1/4/91	(b)(1)	C
05e. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Your Meeting with Perez de Cuellar (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
06a. Letter	President Bush to President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak Re: Turkey is a valued and trusted ally of the United States… (1 pp.)	1/7/91	(b)(1)	
06b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Military Assistance Package for Turkey (2 pp.)	1/7/91	(b)(1)	S
06c. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memorandum to the President on Proposed Military Assistance Package for Turkey (4 pp.)	1/5/91	(b)(1)	S
07a. Memo	William F. Sittmann to J. Stapleton Roy Re: Presidential Messages to Kaifu, Kohl, and Major (1 pp.)	1/8/91	(b)(1)	C
07b. Cable	White House to The Federal Chancellory Re: Message to Chancellor Kohl from President Bush (3 pp.)	1/9/91	(b)(1)	C
07c. Draft Message	Re: Presidential Message to Kohl (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07d. Cable	White House to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Re: Message to Prime Minsiter Kaifu from President Bush (3 pp.)	1/9/91	(b)(1)	C
07e. Draft Message	Re: Presidential Message to Kaifu (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07f. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Prime Minister Major from President Bush (3 pp.)	1/9/91	(b)(1)	C
07g. Draft Message	Re: Presidential Message to Major (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07h. Cable	Re: Message to Ambassador Alan Larson from General Scowcroft [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	1/8/91	(b)(1)	C
07i. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Al Larson, Re: Message from Me to Helga Steeg [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07j. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Energy Preparedness and the Gulf Crisis (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
07k. Memo	Eric Melby to Brent Scowcroft Re: Energy Preparedness and the Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)	1/7/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

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Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100029
RECEIVED: 02 JAN 91 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: HAASS
LAMPLEY

DOC DATE: 02 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: CONGRESSIONAL
KUWAIT
SAUDI ARABIA
IRAQ
PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES TALKING POINTS FOR BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL MTGS / 3 JAN

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 05 JAN 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		GANTT
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CoQ NARA, Date 6/22/09

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OB2/OAR

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3029

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG LE A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill		✓	
Bill Sittmann	1		
Bob Gates	2 APNSA Has Seen		
Brent Scowcroft	3		FNBI
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	33	1.3/7	
NSC Secretariat	34		
			OB2/OAR

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: Gen Scowcroft to Pres 1/3/91

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

[redacted]
0029

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen

January 2, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS/VIRGINIA LAMPLEY

SUBJECT: Talking Points for January 3 Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meetings

At Tab A are proposed Talking Points for the President's use with the Bipartisan Congressional Leadership on January 3.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Sittmann to forward the proposed Talking Points to John Gardner (Sittmann memo at Tab I).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Sittmann Memo to Gardner
Tab A Proposed Talking Points

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/21/2013

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN GARDNER

FROM: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

SUBJECT: Talking Points for January 3 Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meetings

Attached are Talking Points prepared for the President's use at the Bipartisan Leadership meetings on January 3.

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points

cc: Fred McClure

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E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/21/2013

TAB A

Points to be made in Oval Office with 4 Leaders

-- In the larger group we thought it best to discuss where we are with the policy, but here with just you I wanted to raise the question of executive-legislative relations.

-- I know there are some real differences between us when it comes to timing and the use of force, but there exists an overriding national interest in ensuring that we do not allow these differences to undermine the goals we share.

-- The national interest is to be found in signalling Saddam that we are united and resolute. I am truly concerned that otherwise we risk encouraging the notion that we lack the will to confront him. Ironically, this will only encourage him to hang tough and to bring about the very war we all want to avoid.

-- I can think of no better way to signal American unity than by congress passing a resolution endorsing Security Council Resolution 678. But anything less than a decisive, positive vote would send precisely the opposite message and undermine the purpose. I would be interested in your current assessment of where things stand with the members.

-- With or without such a vote, and whether you decided to stay in session or not, I promise to be in touch with you all before sending U.S. forces into hostilities.

-- While we were here, I was hoping to clear up one housekeeping matter. It concerns members who want to go out to the Gulf and see the troops. I can appreciate why they want to, but both our ambassador and Norm Schwarzkopf are complaining with good reason that they are being swamped.

-- To be blunt, Norm and his people may have a war to fight before long and they cannot afford to be constantly diverted from their mission. Until the situation clears could we agree to limit codels to one each from the House and Senate, just members, no staffs and no spouses? This would be a great help.

Points for Cabinet Room Meeting with Congressional Leaders

-- Happy New Year to one and all. And let me start off by saying that I hope it turns out to be a peaceful one for us all.

-- By now I expect that you have heard the news that I have proposed that Jim Baker and his Iraqi counterpart meet in Geneva or some other neutral site. As was the case in my earlier offer, I did this not to negotiate or make concessions but to go the extra mile, to make sure Iraq knows what is expected of it and what consequences it will suffer if it continues to resist.

-- I want to use this meeting to hear most of all from you. I have found our consultations to date to be real consultations, and I hope this one turns out to be as well. I also want you all to hear directly from Jim Baker, who will soon be heading out to the region again, and from Dick Cheney, who is recently back.

-- Let me just say a few things. I think there is consensus in this room on the stakes and on the need for Saddam's aggression not to be rewarded in any way.

-- Where there is continuing disagreement is over timing. I must tell you that I feel a real sense of urgency. I am convinced that we cannot depend upon sanctions alone. Their ultimate effect remains uncertain and uneven.

-- Meanwhile, Saddam is using every day that passes to continue his brutal destruction of Kuwait; all of you should read Amnesty International's latest report. We also pay a high economic price for every day that passes. And Saddam is using time to upgrade his military forces and to develop unconventional weapons. Should war come, waiting could result in higher U.S. and allied casualties.

-- January 15 is not a date by which we must use force, but it is a deadline after which we have the full weight of the United Nations behind us. If we succeed and Saddam finally gets the message, it will be important to keep in mind that the challenge of Iraq's conventional and unconventional military forces will still be with us. There is no going back to the status quo ante.

-- I also want you to know that if we must use force it will be decisive. The parallels to Vietnam do not and will not bear scrutiny.

-- I know that many of you are concerned about the level of foreign participation. Let me just say that if we fight we will not be alone--there will be some 200,000 foreign troops alongside American men and women. Also, one purpose of Jim

Baker's mission is to gather financial support for what we are doing and to offset the effects of higher oil prices and sanctions.

-- Let me just close with a point that I made before to the leaders. I know we have our differences. Tension between President and Congress are nothing new. But it is truly vital that we stand together at the water's edge. The surest way to persuade Saddam that he has nothing to fear is American division; the best deterrent to war I know right now is American unity.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9101104
RECEIVED: 12 FEB 91 19

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: HOLIDAY, E

DOC DATE: 03 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM
IRAQ
KUWAIT
COUNTERTERRORISM
PERSIAN GULF
CBW

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FBI ANTI - TERRORISM MEASURES RESPONDING TO ANY IRAQI THREAT DUE TO GULF CRISIS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 15 FEB 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CHAMBERLIN
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON
		WORKING

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/22/09

COMMENTS: _____

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~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 3, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: EDE HOLIDAY

SUBJECT: The Attached Report on Anti-Terrorism

The Attorney General has asked me to convey to the President the attached report on anti-terrorism measures undertaken in response to the Iraq crisis. For most routine matters I send Cabinet correspondence directly to the President through the Staff Secretary, but I thought you may prefer to see this item first and convey it to the President through the NSC.

Attachment

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

TO: The President

Attached find an update on FBI anti-terrorism measures responding to any Iraqi threat.

R.L.T.

1/3/91

(SECRET material attached.)

Copies to: Hon. John Sununu
Hon. Edith Holiday

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20535

January 2, 1991

Honorable Dick Thornburgh
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The attached material reflects the steps being taken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to insure a proper level of readiness in connection with the current Iraqi crisis. The materials include threat assessment information as well as an assessment of the possible areas from which terrorist attacks may come. Also included is information on the pro-active steps being taken by the FBI to increase our ability to respond promptly to any situation.

If you require a briefing on this material, please do not hesitate to contact me at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

William S. Sessions
Director

Enclosure
1 - Honorable William P. Barr (Enclosure)
Deputy Attorney General

(SECRET Material Attached)

SECRET

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By Cap NARA, Date 6/22/09

(This cover sheet is unclassified.)

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704-101
NSN 7540-01-213-7902

STANDARD FORM 704 (8-85)
Prescribed by GSA/ISOO
32 CFR 2003

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Report	Re: Threat Assessment - United States (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ES On 7/21/22

Date Closed:	6/22/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91146-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0865-MR (201.01)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	8/3/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

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C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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501-01
2010-0865-MR
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THREAT ASSESSMENT - UNITED STATES:

FBI THREAT ASSESSMENT:

The FBI has not seen any specific planning for domestic terrorist operations from within the official diplomatic presence. Further, no specific planning has been seen within the Iraqi Ba'ath Party Organization or student/religious groups. No information of terrorist planning has come to our attention as the result of interviews currently being conducted within the Iraqi student community. This situation could change quickly in the event of war.

FBI technical, physical and human source coverage of traditional terrorist groups has not developed information relating to specific planning for domestic terrorist operations. However, intelligence information from abroad indicates that threats from such groups in Europe and South American countries have surfaced. These groups have well developed infrastructures within the United States which have the capability of planning and executing terrorist operations in the event of war.

Given the current situation in the Middle East, the resulting terrorist threat would be in three separate and distinct areas:

(1) IRAQI PRESENCE IN THE U.S.: Through official diplomatic presence at the Iraqi Embassy and the Iraqi United Nations Mission, Iraqi Ba'ath Party Organization, and other student/religious groups- intelligence gathering and possible planning for terrorist activity.

Since the beginning of this current crisis, the official Iraqi presence in the United States has been significantly reduced.

The Iraqi Embassy in Washington, D.C., has been reduced from a complement of 64 diplomats and administrative staff to a current complement of 19. Current plans under consideration by DOS would further reduce this complement to five (on or about January 12-14, 1991).

The Iraqi Mission to the United Nations has maintained the same complement of 21 diplomatic and administrative staff.

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2010-0865-MR
ES 8/13/15

1.4(c); 1.4(d)

(2) TRADITIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS WHICH MAY SUPPORT IRAQ:

o Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

1.4(c); 1.4(d)

o Hizballah

1.4(c); 1.4(d)

o Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

1.4(c); 1.4(d)

o Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)

1.4(c); 1.4(d)

o PRTP-EPB-Macheteros

- Approximately 80-100 members in U.S.
- (Domestic-Puerto Rican) - 1 FFI (Group)
- Predominantly located in Puerto Rico, possibly a small presence in New York

o Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP)

- Approximately 50 members in U.S.
- (Domestic-U.S.) - 1 FFI (Group)
- Largest concentration in Los Angeles, some in Chicago

(3) INDIVIDUAL ZEALOT (ACTING INDEPENDENTLY): Any individual with such conviction to commit an act without direction from Iraq. (**example:** 11/27/90 arrest of Jamal Warrayat in Newark for threatening U.S. officials and conspiring to attack U.S. military bases in the U.S. in support of the Iraqi cause.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

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02c. Report	Re: Resources Being Applied/Contingency Plans (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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WHORM Cat.:
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL COUNTERTERRORISM MATTERS:

- o The FBI has developed a Chemical/Biological Incident Response Plan which provides a graduated response to a chemical/biological-related incident which occurs within the U.S., utilizing Department of Defense and internal FBI resources, in conjunction with other Federal agencies. The plan is designed to enable FBIHQ to provide assistance to all FBI Field Divisions.

- o The implementation of the plan includes:

  - Assessment of the threat.
  - Provision of technical advice to the field.
  - Deployment of technical personnel and resources to the scene.
  - Marshalling of appropriate health and safety resources.

  - o The FBI has developed a relationship with personnel from various agencies specially trained in chemical/biological warfare agents, to assist the FBI in evaluating the credibility of a chemical/biological threat.

  - o This Chemical/Biological Credibility Assessment Team is coordinated by the FBI. The team assesses each threat on the basis of its operational, technical, and behavioral aspects.

  - o The behavioral assessment of a chemical/biological threat is addressed by the Special Operations and Research Unit, Training Division. This unit has established a network of contract psychologists and other specialists to assist in this endeavor.

  - o The operational and technical assessments are conducted by the following components, at the direction of the FBI: U.S. Medical Institute for Infectious Diseases; the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center; the Foreign Science Technology Center; the U.S. Army Chemical Research Development and Engineering Center; and the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) also provide assistance.

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2010-0865-MR
E8 8/13/15

- Operational assistance to the FBI is provided by the EPA, HHS, the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit and the U.S. Medical Institute for Infectious Diseases.

- The FBI provided a briefing to select members of the White House staff outlining the FBI's Chemical/Biological Incident Response Plan on 11/19/90.

- A conference was sponsored by the FBI on 12/17/90, at FBIHQ, during which available technical support and capabilities were reviewed. The purpose of this conference was to further develop and refine the incident response plan. Participants included the Department of Defense, HHS, EPA, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Secret Service.

- The relationship between law enforcement and consequence crisis management is both dynamic and evolving. Any lead agency designation for consequence management should demand proper coordination and communication among the various Federal agencies involved.

FBI Needs/Requests:

1. Availability of adequate (C-141) transportation for HRT deployment inside the United States.

2. Continued availability of DOD support for FBI's chemical/biological response program.

3. Continued discussion to ensure proper coordination between law enforcement and consequence management in a chemical/biological response plan.

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2010-0865-MR
ES 8/3/15

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02f. Report	Re: Threat Warning Systems (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ES On 7/21/22

Date Closed:	6/22/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91146-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0865-MR (501.05)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	8/3/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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501.05
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THREAT WARNING SYSTEM:


Since the onset of the Iraqi crisis, the following threat advisories have been disseminated:

DATE	SUMMARY
8/25/90	1.4(c); 1.4(d) [redacted]
9/26/90	Alert for U.S. Government buildings and compounds in Washington, D.C. Two instances of official Iraqi vehicles approaching entrances to secure U.S. compounds under pretext of being lost and needing directions.
10/30/90	Official U.S. Iraqi presence: 14 diplomats in Washington, D.C., 23 in New York City. 1.4(c); 1.4(d) [redacted] 1.4(c); 1.4(d) [redacted]
11/28/90	Conflicting information from Iraq to U.S.-based Iraqi diplomats resulting in some discontent. No uniform support for Hussein within the diplomatic corps. Jewish Defense League leader Meir Kahane assassinated in New York City 11/5/90 - no Iraqi connection, but illustration of potential for Muslim radicals to act independently.
12/20/90	Jamal Warrayat arrested in Newark 11/27/90 for threatening U.S. officials and conspiring to destroy/injure military bases allegedly on behalf of Iraq. While Warrayat had been in contact with Iraqi officials, it appears that he was acting on his own.

~~SECRET~~

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2010-0865-MR
ES 8/13/15

12/28/90



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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100055
RECEIVED: 03 JAN 91 15

CHRON FILE

TO: GATES

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 03 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
JORDAN
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
KUWAIT
EUROPE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CHECKLIST FOR INFORMAL STEERING GRP MTG ON 4 JAN RE GULF CRISIS

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES DUE DATE: 07 JAN 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DEAL
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CoQ NARA, Date 6/22/09

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSMJT CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 1 OF 1

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National Security Council
The White House

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LOG # 91 0055

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

DOCLOG WMS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	~~Copy~~	I
Bill Sittmann		~~Copy~~	
Bob Gates	2		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	57.415	N
NSC Secretariat	4		N/R

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Memo	From Timothy E. Deal to Robert M. Gates, Re: Gulf Crisis: Checklist for Informal Steering Group Meeting on January 4, 5:15 p.m., Situation Room [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	1/3/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 4/13/2023

Date Closed:	6/22/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91146-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0866-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	6/6/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0055

January 3, 1990

Deputy Natl Sec Advis has seen

[redacted]

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL

SUBJECT: Gulf Crisis: Checklist for Informal Steering Group Meeting on January 4, 5:15 p.m., Situation Room

This supplements my earlier memo (10099) for the Steering Group meeting now scheduled on January 4. Since Baker will leave shortly on his trip to Europe and the Gulf, this may be the last chance to: (a) resolve several outstanding policy issues; and (b) reach agreement on U.S. and other country needs and apportion donor country commitments.

The key policy issues are:

1. Desert Shield: Recognizing DOD reluctance to specify its needs before the outbreak of hostilities, Baker must, nonetheless, be in a position to present at least notional figures so that contributing countries have some idea of their share for both military and financial assistance. Follow-up teams can refine the figures, but, as you said, it would be political suicide for the USG to appear to be soliciting new funds for other states while ignoring our own substantial costs for Desert Shield.

2. Jordan: 1.4(d)

[redacted]

3. Eastern Europe: State has proposed asking the Gulf states for $2 billion for Eastern Europe. Larry Eagleburger has made clear Baker's desire to seek such assistance.

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Declassify on: OADR

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2010-0866-MR
mm 6/6/2016

4. European Contributions: Tables prepared by both Treasury and State refer to Europe as a funding source without identifying what we expect from individual countries and the EC. We need to disaggregate the overall figure and establish targets for Germany, Italy, the EC as an institution, and others, including non-EC members such as Norway.

5. Public Diplomacy: Congress and the media have attacked allied burdensharing efforts. This may be a no-win argument, but ally-bashing could weaken the anti-Iraq coalition and almost certainly undermine new collection efforts. We need to get out the full story before Congress starts railing again. 1.4(d)

[redacted]

After working through the agenda with those policy issues in mind, you may wish to summarize the conclusions to ensure that all agencies stick to a common line. Suggested conclusions follow:

-- Baker will present to the Gulf states and any European donors that he may visit on this trip a notional figure for their share of our military costs and a more specific request for the Front Line states. The request for financial assistance should demonstrate how we intend to cover anticipated needs through the distribution of currently unallocated funds and new commitments.

-- Regarding Jordan, we would seek commitments for necessary assistance from Europe and Japan. Depending on the Steering Group's views, we would continue current policy of linking disbursements to Jordanian compliance with UN sanctions.

-- Baker will make a request for financial support from the Gulf states for Eastern Europe. Depending on the reaction, we would attempt through follow-up missions or Presidential messages to nail down any commitments.

-- Presidential letters would be sent to other key donors making clear their expected contributions for both Desert Shield and/or financial assistance.

-- The Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group would meet later in January to confirm new commitments and accelerate disbursements of those still outstanding.

-- The State/Treasury working group will prepare tables for Baker's use, for Presidential communication, and for the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group meeting, showing on a donor by donor basis how we intend to close the financing gap for Turkey and Jordan.

-- NSC will coordinate with State, Treasury, DOD and OMB a public fact sheet explaining comprehensively all the support we are receiving both financial and in-kind. This will be designed to make the case that we are receiving strong support from the rest of the coalition.

Concurrences by: David Welch and David Compert

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03b. List	Re: Informal Steering Group [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	1/4/91	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [2]

Date Closed:	6/22/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91146-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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INFORMAL STEERING GROUP
FRIDAY, JANUARY 4, 1991
5:45PM - 6:45PM
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE
Robert Gates

NSC
Tim Deal
Richard Haass

STATE
Lawrence Eagleburger (passholder)
Eugene McAllister

(b)(6)

TREASURY
John Robson
Charles Dallara
David Mulford

DOD
Donald Atwood (passholder)
I. Lewis Libby

(b)(6)

CIA
Richard Kerr (Passholder)

(b)(3) [50 USC 403g, Sec. 6] (b)(6)

OMB
Robert Howard (passholder)

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RECORD ID: 9100062
RECEIVED: 03 JAN 91 17

CHRON FILE

2

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: MELBY
DEAL

DOC DATE: 03 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ENERGY
KUWAIT
IRAQ
ANSA

PERSONS: SUNUNU, J
BRADY, N
CHENEY, R
WATKINS, J

SUBJECT: SCOWCROFT MTG ON ENERGY PREPAREDNESS ON 4 JAN

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 07 JAN 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MELBY LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
DEAL
GANTT
MELBY
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CQ NARA, Date 6/22/09

COMMENTS: _____

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1		A
Bill Sittmann	2		
Bob Gates	3	APNSA Has Seen	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		NFA
NSC Secretariat	5		N

WED

01 JAN 3 P7.25

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Mtg 1/4 ~~3:00~~ 4:00 pm

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0062

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

January 3, 1990

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL

FROM: ERIC MELBY

SUBJECT: Meeting on Energy Preparedness, January 4, 3:00 p.m., Situation Room

You will chair a meeting with Governor Sununu, Secretaries Cheney, Brady, Watkins, Director Darman, General Powell and Deputy Secretary Eagleburger to review energy preparedness measures in the event of military conflict in the Gulf.

The key points in the DOE paper (Tab II) are that, in the event of hostilities:

-- There could be a temporary loss of up to 3 million barrels a day (mbd) of Saudi production as Saudi Aramco withdraws its personnel from fields close to Kuwait until the situation stabilizes. Other Saudi fields should not be affected by any hostilities.

-- Even without additional supply disruption, there is likely to be panic buying and hoarding of supplies resulting in substantial crude oil price increases.

-- Additional DOD fuel requirements of 450,000 b/d can be met from DOD stocks, Saudi refineries and other refineries outside the region. About 75% of the additional requirements would be for jet fuel.

DOE proposes that the President decide now to release 50 million barrels of SPR oil (1.5 mbd) in the event of hostilities. This would be coordinated with an equivalent draw of strategic stocks and demand restraint by International Energy Agency (IEA) partners. The net effect would be to make available to the market 3 mbd of oil. This would reduce supply uncertainty, have a positive effect on market psychology and lessen economic damage.

I do not know the views of principals from other agencies on the DOE proposal. State, DOD and OMB staff support the DOE recommendation.

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2010-0866-MR
MM 6/6/2016

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Both IEA Governing Board Chairman Geoffrey Chipperfield (U.K.) and IEA Executive Director Helga Steeg plan to convene a meeting of the IEA within 48 hours of the outbreak of hostilities. They want to get consensus on coordinated action, including stockdraw and demand restraint. Helga Steeg told us today that it would be damaging to the IEA were it unable to agree on quick, coordinated action (regardless of the actual supply/demand situation). On the other hand, Steeg does not favor a pre-hostility IEA decision to use stocks, believing it might be difficult to get everyone on board absent hostilities.

Were the SPR to be drawn down, we would need a blanket waiver of the Jones Act to allow non-U.S. ships to transport SPR oil. DOE analysis shows that there are insufficient U.S. bottoms to transport SPR oil to successful bidders. The Department of Transportation favors case-by-case waivers; other agencies would support a blanket waiver (which Treasury issues).

When the Defense Production Act lapsed, so did emergency authorities to allocate, among other items, petroleum in civilian markets to meet DOD fuel needs if necessary. A draft Executive Order has been prepared to provide these authorities temporarily, using powers under the Selective Service Act. The E.O. will be sent to the President soon.

DOE has also been working with State, DOD and NSC on a public affairs strategy. The assumption is that DOE, under White House guidance, would handle press inquiries on energy-related issues in the event of hostilities.

Talking points for your use are at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Talking Points
Tab II Energy Paper
Tab III Agenda

cc: Richard Haass

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POINTS TO BE MADE

-- The purpose of today's meeting is to see if we have looked at all the energy issues which may come up if hostilities break out in the Gulf.

-- It is important that we have a clear strategy to deal with the energy consequences -- and that each agency knows its responsibilities.

-- I know Jim Watkins has had several planning exercises involving DOD, State, CIA and NSC staff. As I see it, the key issues in the event of hostilities are:

  - o Have we taken care of military fuel needs?
  - o How do we minimize panic on the oil market?
  - o What do we do with our allies in the IEA to ensure adequate oil supplies?
  - o What should our public affairs strategy be?

-- Jim, why don't you start by laying out the contingency plans you have put in place?

-- If there are other areas we should be covering but have not yet, please point them out.

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2010-0866-MR
MM 6/6/2016

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BRIEFING PAPER

ENERGY IMPLICATIONS OF AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN PERSIAN GULF

Summary

Although oil market fundamentals of supply and demand have improved steadily since August, the Department of Energy (DOE) has concerns about the impact of hostilities on market psychology. Even if there were no further disruption to exports from the Persian Gulf region, panic buying and hoarding could drive crude oil prices substantially higher.

DOE believes that it can support the efficient functioning of the market by providing the marketplace with analyses and information which show that, based on market fundamentals, hostilities need not lead to sharp price increases. Commercial requirements are being met from increased crude oil production from Saudi Arabia and others which has more than made up for embargoed Iraqi and Kuwaiti exports. Increased military requirements are being met under current market conditions. In the event of war, military requirements can be met from Department of Defense (DOD) fuel stocks, as well as from Saudi refineries and other refineries outside the region. These additional requirements are estimated to be 450,000 barrels per day over current military consumption. About 75 percent of these additional requirements would be for jet fuel.

There is a possibility that at the outbreak of war, there would be a temporary loss of some oil production from particularly exposed oil fields in Northern Saudi Arabia. Saudi Aramco has indicated privately that it will evacuate oil field workers from the northern producing region until any threat to those fields has been removed. This could cause a loss of up to 3 million barrels per day.

While it is not known how much oil would be lost to the world market before production would resume, the possibility of an actual supply disruption, along with the potential that excessive stockbuilding could cause a supply shortage, provides sufficient grounds for a Presidential finding that a "severe energy supply interruption" is likely. Therefore, in order to reassure the market further, DOE is proposing as an element of its contingency plans a preemptive announcement of its intentions to offer for sale a large quantity (50 million barrels in the first month) of Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) oil (in conjunction with comparable actions (equivalent to 50 million barrels) by our International Energy Agency (IEA) partners) in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. This action would reduce supply uncertainty from the onset and have a substantial positive effect on market psychology.

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2010-0866-MR
MM 8/8/2016

Background

During recent weeks DOE conducted several exercises dealing with energy issues relating to the Iraqi invasion and contingency planning in the event of hostilities. These exercises were designed to strengthen the interagency coordination and communication process. Senior level participants were involved from the Department of Defense, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and several domestic agencies as well as outside experts. The simulations and the Secretary of Energy's recent visit to Saudi Arabia have been instrumental in developing the actions recommended in this paper.

Supply impacts

- With respect to Saudi oil facilities:

Saudi oil production should continue at substantial volumes even in a war scenario, since most Saudi facilities are protected from ground attacks by allied forces. However, terrorism or sabotage is always a possibility. There is potential for attacks against oil facilities in and outside of the Persian Gulf area.

Aramco has contingency plans to evacuate oil field workers in the northern producing region of Ras al Khafji and As Saffaniyah at the outbreak of war, which could result in losses of production that could reach up to 3 million barrels per day.

- With respect to Kuwaiti oil facilities:

Cannibalizing and looting has already occurred. Reports indicate that all movable equipment and spare parts have been taken to Iraq. In addition, Iraq has threatened to set the oil fields on fire. They have attached explosives to the wellheads. There is potential damage to oil gathering centers, pipelines, refineries, storage tanks, and export terminals.

If Iraq successfully carries out its threats, damage to the Kuwaiti oil fields could be severe. Kuwaiti officials anticipate that no systems will be operational. However, many analysts believe that at most only 20 percent of the wells are likely to catch fire. Even with that limited disaster, it could take approximately two years to control all the blowouts and fires. In anticipation of potential damage to Kuwait's oil production capacity, advance planning for oil field restoration is well underway. Kuwait has already contracted for services and equipment, which will be pre-positioned in the Gulf region for quick access after the crisis is over.

Main Concerns

o Our primary concern is the oil market's ability to cope with the uncertainties that arise during wartime. With worldwide crude oil production and refining capacity stretched to near maximum capability, there is limited flexibility in the event of disruptions.

o At the outbreak of a war, there is likely to be panic buying or hoarding as consumers build "safety stocks", causing sharp upward price pressure on available supplies.

o Without prompt action on the part of the IEA member countries, prices could spike more sharply and the price increases could last longer, due to uncertainty of the impact of the war and its duration, exacerbated by speculation.

Contingency Planning Activities

The following activities have already taken place:

o The exercises have enhanced interagency communication and strengthened coordination.

o DOE and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) staff are participating in increased oil futures market surveillance and have established close communication with the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX).

o New communication links are being established with Saudi Arabia to provide a "hotline" with the Saudi Oil Ministry; improved coordination among CENTCOM, Saudi Aramco, and the Saudi Oil Ministry is taking place; and a new real-time data reporting system between the U.S. Government and the Saudi Oil Ministry has been approved.

o IEA members have submitted plans to the IEA Secretariat for coordinated early response measures, including stockdraw, which are ready to be implemented quickly.

Responses

o A preemptive announcement of an SPR drawdown upon the outbreak of hostilities is proposed, while obtaining a similar commitment from our IEA partners. This would give some certainty to the market regarding government actions that would be taken early in the crisis, and would make extra supplies available to the world oil market, helping to dampen price speculation.

o DOE and the Maritime Administration (MARAD) would work closely with the Treasury Department to prepare a blanket Jones

Act waiver to facilitate SPR drawdown. Treasury would have the waiver ready for issuance. This may require the President to intervene. MARAD is likely to oppose a blanket Jones Act waiver in favor of a case-by-case waiver process, which DOE finds unacceptable because it provides no assurance of the availability of vessels to transport SPR oil.

o The DOD/DOE/NSC communications and public information plan is being readied for implementation, so that information about energy effects of hostilities would be well-coordinated among the key agencies for dissemination to the public.

o Should hostilities break out, market monitoring activities would be intensified by DOE and CFTC, working in conjunction with the New York Mercantile Exchange. CFTC and NYMEX have broad emergency powers to ensure a fair and orderly futures market. NYMEX has provided its comprehensive contingency plan to DOE.

o The Defense Production Act (DPA) lapsed without Congressional action on the Administration's legislative proposals. This leaves the Federal government with no authority to allocate petroleum in civilian markets if necessary and hampers our ability to obtain the best industry advice. The Policy Coordinating Committee on Emergency Preparedness and Mobilization Planning has proposed a two-part legislative strategy. One part would seek a one-year simple extension of the DPA which would restore lapsed allocation authorities. The second part is a longer-term legislative initiative which includes DOE-proposed amendments to provide adequate conflict of interest and other protections for petroleum industry participation.

Presidential Decisions and Actions

At the outbreak of war, the President would have to find that a "severe energy supply interruption" exists, or is likely to occur. This finding would allow the immediate publication of a notice of sale of SPR oil. At the same time, the President would call the German and Japanese political leaders to enlist their support for coordinated stockdraw. A blanket Jones Act waiver would be needed to assure enough vessels to transport SPR crude oil.

In order to act quickly upon the outbreak of hostilities, the President would need to:

- Make an advanced announcement of planned SPR drawdown

- Approve coordination of SPR drawdown announcement with IEA partners

- Decide whether Treasury will issue a blanket Jones Act waiver

- Execute the PCC-approved Executive Order to bridge the lapse of the DPA authorities

- Support the legislative proposals which extend and amend the DPA

- Designate DOE as the lead agency to inform public on energy impacts of outbreak of hostilities

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MEETING ON GULF CRISIS ENERGY PREPAREDNESS
DATE: January 4, 1991
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 p.m.

Agenda

I. Introduction . . . . . General Scowcroft

II. Energy Preparedness Measures . . . . . Admiral Watkins

- o DOE/State/DOD/NSC Coordination
- o SPR Use
- o IEA Coordination
- o Public Affairs Strategy

III. Discussion . . . . . All Participants

IV. Summary . . . . . General Scowcroft

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0866-MR
MM 6/6/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100094
RECEIVED: 04 JAN 91 16

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 05 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: UN
AP

PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS: PEREZ DE CUELLAR, JAVIER

SUBJECT: POINTS TO BE MADE / BACKGROUND PAPERS RE PRES MTG W/ SECGEN AT CAMP DAVID 5 JAN

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 08 JAN 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CHARLES
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON
		PRYCE

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/22/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 3 OF 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0094

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 5, 1991

MEETING WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL
DATE: January 5, 1991
LOCATION: Camp David
TIME: 10:30 - 1:00 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To reaffirm our commitment to the objectives of the twelve UN resolutions on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the upcoming Baker-Tariq Aziz meeting, and to discourage any other diplomatic initiatives for now to prevent the possibility of partial solutions or linkage of the Gulf crisis to other issues.

II. BACKGROUND

Prior to Iraq's acceptance of the Baker meeting in Geneva, the UN Secretary General had expressed his willingness to travel to Baghdad to find a peaceful solution to the Gulf crisis. Iraq's acceptance of the Baker-Tariq Aziz meeting next week preempts the need for such a meeting at this point. Whether we would support a UN Secretary General trip to Baghdad in the future will depend on the results of that meeting. Thus you should politely discourage the Secretary General's initiative for now.

In addition, the Secretary General also suggested convening a Security Council meeting prior to January 15, an initiative we, along with the UK, France and the Soviets, opposed earlier. (Mitterrand now may want one, and the Chinese would support anything that would allow them to temporize). We believe it would be pointless to have such a meeting prior to January 15 since the twelve UNSC resolutions (and 678 in particular) clearly speak for themselves on what Iraq must do before the 15th to avoid a military conflict. In addition, agreeing to hold a meeting now for the post-January 15 period would be premature until we know what the future looks like, and that clearly will depend on what happens.

The paper at Tab B includes information on some other issues that Mr. De Cuellar may raise.

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER #2021-02
By MM NARA, Date 4/13/2023

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Perez de Cuellar, U.N. Secretary General,

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer only

V. SEQUENCE

Meeting, followed by lunch.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Background Paper

TAB A

TAB A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
UN SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR

-- I appreciate your willingness to go to Baghdad to try to reason with Saddam Hussein to get him to withdraw peacefully from Kuwait. Frankly, Javier, I am not convinced that he is willing to do so because he does not believe the international coalition is serious about his leaving peacefully or we will use force.

-- We have tried diplomacy along with the sanctions as our preferred means to meet our objectives. Secretary Baker's meeting next week with Tariq Aziz will be our last attempt in that regard.

-- Time is running out on both diplomacy and sanctions for several reasons: his military digs in deeper every day that passes and that will make it more costly for the multinational forces to evict the Iraqi troops; his efforts to acquire and perfect his unconventional military capability continue apace; and Iraqi atrocities against the Kuwaiti people are relentless.

-- Let me assure you that the framework for Baker's discussions with Tariq Aziz is the twelve UN Security Council resolutions on this issue. We do not intend to compromise, negotiate or offer face saving devices. Iraq's aggression cannot and will not be rewarded. I would go so far as to say the future of the UN and the Security Council depends on it.

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0866-MR
MM 6/6/2016

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The unanimity of the international coalition on this is virtually unprecedented and strengthens our hand.

-- In our meeting we hope to impress upon Saddam, through Tariq Aziz, that Iraq must understand the entire world community regards his actions as abhorrent and intolerable, and that if he refuses to withdraw peacefully, we will use force to liberate Kuwait. I will have Jim Baker hand Aziz a letter for Saddam to make sure he does not dilute our message.

-- Saddam also must understand that the coalition is determined to stick together, and that he will not be able to play us off against one another.

-- I hope we succeed in getting our message across, but as I said before I am not optimistic. Until then, you may want to put your plans for Baghdad on hold until we see how the Baker-Aziz meeting goes. We will give you a read-out on the meeting as soon as we have one.

-- Similarly, I see no need for another Security Council session. UNSC resolutions take us through the 15th, and it is premature to call one to consider the post-crisis period.

-- We in fact, are already working hard on post-crisis regional security arrangements and would welcome your thoughts. We will want to consult closer with you and the Security Council Permanent representatives as we move closer to the time when these arrangements are needed.

-- I hope you will become personally involved in the negotiations between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government.

-- It is urgent that a cease force be reached before the March elections.

-- The Salvadoran goverment has made significant concessions while the FMLN seems to have adopted a delaying strategy.

-- We, the Soviet Union, and other Security Council members are prepared to back you fully if you press the FMLN and raise the profile of the negotiations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAB B

TAB B

President Bush's Meeting with
UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar
Camp David, January 5, 1991

Middle East

The Secretary General plans to send his envoy Jean Claude Aime to Israel and the occupied territories to investigate the conditions of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation. The Secretary General himself has accepted an invitation by President Herzog to visit Israel. No date has been set for either trip. We urge early visits. General Assembly President De Marcos (Malta) has just concluded a visit to Israel and the occupied territories.

While the international community has remained resolute on the issue of the Gulf, several European countries are active in encouraging parallel UN action in the Middle East, setting the stage for further resolutions and (prematurely) for an international conference on the Middle East.

The Council has passed three resolutions and a Council presidential statement on the situation in the occupied territories. We deplore the continuing violence, have conveyed our concern to the Israeli government, and urge restraint on both sides.

We continue to insist that the Council make no linkage between the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli disputes and thus play into Saddam's hands.

EL SALVADOR

We want Perez de Cuellar to become more directly involved in the El Salvador peace negotiations. It is crucial that the negotiations produce a ceasefire agreement by the end of January, before the campaign begins for the March legislative elections -- yet Perez de Cuellar's representative, Alvaro de Soto, has not set another round of talks until January 26. The GOES has made significant concessions on armed forces reform, yet de Soto has not pressed the FMLN sufficiently to stop their current offensive and to drop their demand for the dissolution of the Salvadoran Armed Forces. After downing a U.S. helicopter Wednesday, the FMLN may have murdered the crew.

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0866-MR
MM 6/6/2016

BUSH ELECTION INITIATIVE IN THE UN

The 1990 General Assembly adopted a resolution supporting our proposal for enhancing UN capability to respond to countries' requests for electoral assistance. This is a good start for what is rapidly becoming a growth industry for the UN. UN election assistance may be requested by Bangladesh, El Salvador, and several African states. UN election missions were helpful in Nicaragua and Haiti.

FUNDING

Our ability to provide full funding for 1990 assessments has improved U.S. credibility significantly. FY 1991 Congressional appropriations allow for an initial payment on arrearages; exact amounts and timing will be worked out shortly. While we expect to stay current on future assessed obligations, paying arrearages at the rate projected (20 per cent annually) may not be possible due to the rigidity of the Budget Enforcement Act and the decline in the value of the dollar. Funding requirements for possible new peacekeeping operations this year (Western Sahara, Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, El Salvador) will be difficult to meet.

UN PERSONNEL

USG supported the Secretary General's appointment of Mrs. Sadako Ogata (Japan) as the new UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

USG supported the Secretary General's appointment of Ilter Turkman (Turkey) as the new UN High Commissioner General for the Relief and Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA).

USG supported the Secretary General's appointment of Giorgio Giacomelli as the new coordinator for UN anti-drug efforts. (Giacomelli is the outgoing UNRWA High Commissioner General.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0094

January 4, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS RH

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES SLC

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Perez De Cuellar

Attached at Tab I is a memo to the President forwarding points to be made (Tab A) on the Gulf crisis for his meeting with the UN Secretary General on Saturday, January 5 at Camp David. In addition, State has provided a background paper (Tab B) on other issues the UN Secretary General may raise.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Background Paper

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/21/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

BRENT. I'm TOLD THAT SECRETARY BAKER HAS SIGNED THIS AND SENT IT OVER. WE HAVE ADDED A TALKING POINT CARD ON EL SALVADOR

BILL PRYCE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James A. Baker, III

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Perez de Cuellar

Since I won't be able to join you for your talk with Perez de Cuellar, I want to stress the importance of your raising the UN mediated negotiations about El Salvador with him. Frankly, we are quite disappointed that the UN has not pressed the FMLN very hard, has allowed deadlines to slip, and has failed to give a sense of urgency to the talks. The FMLN has taken advantage of this, and has essentially adopted a fight and talk strategy, with an emphasis lately on fighting.

It would be very helpful if you could impress upon the Secretary General the importance of his personal involvement in the negotiations and the urgency of reaching a cease fire before the March elections in El Salvador. The UN has refused to observe the elections unless there is a cease fire. You should also stress that both the United States and the Soviet Union, along with other Security Council members are prepared to back him up fully if he is willing to press the FMLN and raise the profile of the negotiations.

I know the Gulf will be the priority in this meeting, but I hope you will take the opportunity to press the SYG on El Salvador also.

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100103
RECEIVED: 04 JAN 91 19

TO: MUBARAK, HOSNI

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 07 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: TURKEY
EGYPT

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES MUBARAK RE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR TURKEY

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH DUE DATE: 08 JAN 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BURNS
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 6/22/09

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSGLM CLOSED BY: NSMEN DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9100103

REFERRAL

DATE: 07 JAN 91

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY / STATE DEPT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: MUBARAK, HOSNI

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 07 JAN 91

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES MUBARAK RE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR TURKEY

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUEDATE:

COMMENT:

FOR GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/22/09

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DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9100103
DATE 07 JAN 91

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES MUBARAK RE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR TURKEY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
ROY, J DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____

COPY: ORIGINAL

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC/S, OEOB ROOM 379

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEI

WHITE HOUSE

91 JAN 7 A9:57

SITUATION ROOM

'91 JAN -7 A9:27

1027

THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE / PRIORITY / ROUTINE

RELEASER: Oliver

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0023 **CLASSIFICATION** ~~SECRET~~ **PAGES** 1

FROM WILLIAM F. SITTMANN (Name) _____ (Phone Number) _____ (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION MILITARY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR TURKEY

LOG #: 0103

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	J. STAPLETON ROY	EXEC SEC	

REMARKS FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING, SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/22/09

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: SA LOG # 0103

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 27 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1		Review
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2		D
NSC Secretariat	3	NFN 1/7	D

91 JAN 7 A9:15 RECD

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS Date 1/7/91

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Anita -
Nic Burns is in our office & would like a copy of this letter (after it's dated)
don't fax
Thanks,
Brenda

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 7, 1991

Dear Hosni:

As you know, Turkey is a valued and trusted ally of the United States, and has played a pivotal role thus far in our common effort to resist Iraqi aggression in the Gulf. It has done so, as has Egypt, at significant economic cost and potential threat to its national security.

President Ozal has asked me to raise with you directly his interest in having Egypt purchase its next tranche of 40 F-16 aircraft from Turkey.

My government believes that Turkish-made F-16s meet all requirements and are equal in quality to those produced in the United States. I am certain that President Ozal is willing to work with your government to make the necessary arrangements to ensure that this program would meet your own essential requirements.

I am confident that this joint effort would also serve to cement the close security relationship among our three countries and would help to provide for long-term stability in your region. I strongly encourage you and your military advisors to accept the Turkish proposal.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Mohammad Hosni Mubarak
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Cairo

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0867-MR
MM 4/14/2016

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
0103

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 7, 1991

SIGNED

1-7

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Military Assistance Package for Turkey

As you know, President Ozal has been indispensable in supporting us in the Gulf. His action to cut off two major Iraqi oil pipelines and his support of sanctions have been of immense help to our policy.

To increase military pressure on Saddam Hussein, you asked Ozal to deploy forces to his border with Iraq and to allow us use of his airbases. In response, Turkey has moved 140,000 troops to the area and has indicated we would have access for additional U.S. aircraft, beyond the 48 currently there, if hostilities begin.

Ozal's support of the coalition has been politically difficult for him at home. His Foreign and Defense Ministers and Army Chief of Staff all resigned this autumn. Despite these problems, there is every indication that he will continue to support us diplomatically and militarily. But he needs help.

Ozal has asked us to aid his military forces, which lack modern air defense. You assured Ozal on December 28 that we would respond to him in early January.

State and Defense have prepared a package for Turkey which Jim Baker will present in Ankara this week. I wanted you to be aware of its contents now, since we will begin consultations with the Turks and NATO allies on Monday. Jim will send you a memo early in the week, which Dick Cheney has cleared, seeking your formal authorization to secure the necessary funds. Major elements of the package are:

1) NATO deployment of Patriot air defense batteries: Patriot is our most advanced air defense system. We will commit to deploy two U.S. batteries with crews within the next two weeks, and will ask the Germans and the Dutch each to do likewise. This deployment will defend Turkish bases against missiles and help Ozal politically.

   This could be a difficult issue for Helmut Kohl, on top of the ACE Mobile deployment. Jim will raise the issue with him in Bonn and I will discuss it with my German counterpart, who will be here on Monday.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2) U.S. and allied provision of other support: To pay for other air defense systems for Turkey, we will use $32 million in emergency funds and $50 million in unused funds from prior years.

This action will result in a de facto break in the 7:10 Greek: Turkish military aid ratio for FY-91. We will explain to key members of Congress and the Greek government that this step is necessitated by the Gulf crisis.

3) Financing Package for Major F-16 and Patriot Purchase: To help meet Turkey's long-term air and air defense requirements, we will present to Ozal the outlines of the package which call for significant U.S. funding and a $2 billion donation from the Gulf states.

This package will include an attempt to convince the Egyptians to purchase 40 F-16s, assembled in Turkey. Ozal raised this issue with you during your meeting in Paris, and you agreed to ask Mubarak. I recommend that you sign the attached letter to Mubarak requesting his support for an F-16 purchase from Turkey.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter to President Mubarak

Attachment
Tab A Letter to President Mubarak

January 5, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Proposed Military Assistance Package for Turkey

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President on our intention to offer Turkey a major military assistance package to meet its short-term Gulf and long range security requirements. Secretary Baker intends to send to the President shortly a memo describing the package and requesting his approval to seek the necessary funding to implement it. Secretary Cheney has cleared that memo. We thought it was important to summarize for you and the President the major elements of the overall package since Baker's memo is unlikely to be conveyed to the President before we begin consultations on the Patriot issue with the Turks, Germans, Dutch and Woerner on Monday, January 7.

As you remember, President Ozal requested several times in recent months that the U.S. consider supplying Turkey with a significant amount of military equipment and aid in return for his agreement to our request that Turkey move a large number of its troops to the Iraqi border area, and allow the U.S. access to its eastern air bases in the event of a conflict with Iraq.

There are currently 140,000 Turkish troops and several squadrons of Turkish aircraft in southeastern Turkey. The Turks have allowed us to deploy 48 of our own aircraft in Turkey, and have indicated they will probably permit additional U.S. aircraft to be deployed in the event of a conflict. We are working with the Turks to obtain their approval for unrestricted use of the bases, should that be necessary in a conflict.

The President assured Ozal in their December 28 phone conversation that we would be prepared to respond to their requests by early January. Ozal followed up this week by instructing his Ambassador to tell Secretary Baker that he attached the highest importance to a positive and immediate U.S. response, including provision of Patriot and other air defense equipment, munitions, and longer-range financing for a major F-16 buy--with U.S. assistance that would break 7:10 restraints.

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0867-MR
MA 4/14/2016

Secretary Baker's visit to Ankara this week provides an opportunity for us to advise Ozal personally of what we are prepared to do to help him. State, DoD and we believe that providing a major package to the Turks at this time is justified to assure continuation of Turkey's support for our objectives in the Gulf, and to provide a concrete demonstration of our commitment to Turkey's long-term defense requirements. We believe our assistance will help Ozal to convince his military and the Turkish Parliament of the benefits of Turkey's close relationship with the U.S. In addition, the promise to provide Patriot batteries will help to deter the threat of ballistic missile attacks on Turkey's eastern air bases and will heighten the morale of Turkish forces on the eve of a possible conflict in the Gulf. You should know, however, that installation of the Patriot units will probably not be complete before the end of January.

While the U.S. will provide a major portion of the defense equipment in this package, we will also request that NATO, specifically Germany and the Netherlands, shoulder a roughly equal share of the burden, as well. The major elements of the assistance package are as follows:

1) Deployment of Patriot Air Defense Batteries to Turkey

- The U.S. will inform the Turks on January 7 that it will deploy immediately to Turkey two Patriot batteries and crews, if NATO can coordinate provision of needed transportation from non-U.S. sources. We will privately ask the Germans and the Dutch also to deploy two batteries and crews each (an additional feature of this offer will be to leave at least one of the two U.S. units behind for the Turks after the conflict has ended. We would ask the Germans and Dutch to leave all of their Patriot units behind). NATO allies would also need to provide transportation for the German-Dutch deployment.

- Together, these Patriot units would provide air defense for Turkish bases in the southeast, U.S. aircraft at Incirlik, and NATO aircraft deployed to Erhac and Diyarbakir as part of the ACE Mobile Force.

- Since this will likely be a difficult decision for the Germans and perhaps the Dutch, we intend to choreograph the deployment decision carefully, as follows:

  -- We will advise the Turks not to make a formal request to NATO for the Patriot units until we have answers to our requests to the Germans and Dutch.

  -- The Turks would then make a formal request to which we and the others would respond positively, stressing that these are defensive deployments meant to demonstrate NATO solidarity with the Turks.

-- Should the Germans decide not to participate, we would go forward with a package of U.S. and Dutch systems.

2) Other Air Defense Equipment for Turkey

- U.S. would agree to transfer 200 AIM-9M Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to Turkey. We would urge the allies to provide portable SAMs such as Stingers, Rolands and Blowpipes.

- We would advise the Turks to make a formal request to NATO for these weapons at the time they make the request for the Patriots.

3) Military Assistance Financing

- The U.S. would offer to the Turks the following financing measures (none of these funds would be taken from any other country's FY-91 allocation):

FY-91 FMF: U.S. offer to move to all grant/no loan program (thereby saving Turks $83 million over long-term).

Deob/Reob: U.S. would seek $50 million in past year unused funds for obligation to Turkey in FY-91. This would necessitate a Presidential authorization to State under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act to consult with the Congress to provide the money to Turkey (resulting in a de facto break in the 7:10 ratio for FY-91). OMB has not yet cleared this financing package, but will do so before the President is asked to formally authorize the Deob/Reob funding.

Emergency Drawdown: State will recommend the President invoke Section 506 (a) (1) authority of the Foreign Assistance Act to provide for the drawdown of $32 million in defense equipment and services from DoD stocks.

FY-92 FMF: We would inform the Turks next week that the Administration intends to seek roughly $725 million in combined FMF and ESF funds. (The 1991 total is $550M.)

F-16 and Patriot Financing Package: Secretary Baker will propose to Ozal a U.S. financing package for Turkish purchase of 10 Patriot systems and 80 F-16s over the next eight years.

A buy of ten Patriot systems will cost roughly $1 billion over a number of years. We would seek long-term financing for the complete package from the Gulf countries.

An 80 F-16 buy for the Turks will cost $2 billion over eight years. We will propose the U.S. and Turkey each contribute $500 million and that we seek the second $1 billion from the Gulf countries, spread over the next eight years.

Therefore, we would ask the Arabs to contribute $2.0 billion, we would put in $500 million, and the Turks would put in $500 million--all over a multi-year period.

As part of this effort, State recommends, and we concur, that the President write to President Mubarak to urge Egypt to agree to purchase 40 Turkish co-produced F-16s in the 1990s which, with U.S. help in financing an 80 plane package for the Turks, would allow Turkey to keep its production line running at a profit. The Egyptian purchase would effectively permit the Turks to keep their F-16 production line open until the 80-plane order comes on line in a few years.

Secretary Baker may raise this request with the Saudis, Kuwaitis and the UAE on his trip to the Middle East next week, and we will factor it into our overall requests to the Arabs for financial support.

We have attached a proposed letter to Mubarak at Tab 2. Your memorandum to the President urges that he agree to send the letter this week in advance of Secretary Baker's meeting with Ozal in Ankara.

Concurrence by: David Welch, Tim Deal and Philip Zelikow

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Mubarak

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9100109
RECEIVED: 07 JAN 91 07

TO: ROY, J

CHRON FILE

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 07 JAN 91
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: ENERGY
PERSIAN GULF
KUWAIT
OIL
IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES MSG TO KAIFU / KOHL & MAJOR

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 10 JAN 91 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MELBY LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DEAL
		MELBY
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/22/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 3 OF 3

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann	1	W	
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	LMS 1/8	D
NSC Secretariat	3	LM 1/8	D M/R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0109
a/o1

January 8, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Messages to Kaifu, Kohl, and Major (U)

At Tab A are Presidential messages sent today through Cabinet channels to Prime Minister Kaifu, Chancellor Kohl, and Prime Minister Major. Copies of the messages should be sent to the Secretary and to Ambassadors Armacost, Walters, and Catto for their information. (C)

William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Copies of Presidential Messages

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0867-MR
MM 4/14/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRT: COMM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 090053Z JAN 91

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO THE FEDERAL CHANCELLORY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA SKIPPER CHANNELS
QQQQ
-
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KOHL FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.
-
BEGIN TEXT:
-
DEAR HELMUT:
-
-

WE ARE FAST APPROACHING THE U.N. DEADLINE FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO WITHDRAW TOTALLY FROM KUWAIT. WHILE WE FERVENTLY HOPE THAT IRAQ WILL MAKE THE USE OF FORCE UNNECESSARY BY COMPLYING FULLY WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DEMANDS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE IN PLACE ADEQUATE CONTINGENCY PLANS TO DEAL WITH ANY POSSIBLE INTERRUPTION IN OIL SUPPLIES.
-

IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE A STRONG REACTION IN OIL MARKETS, REINFORCED BY THE PROBABILITY OF TEMPORARY LOSS OF SOME OIL FROM THE GULF. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO BE PREPARED NOW RATHER THAN TO BE FORCED TO REACT UNDER PRESSURE LATER.
-

SINCE 1974 WE HAVE WORKED HARD TOGETHER IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA) TO ENSURE OUR ENERGY SECURITY. A DECISION BY THE IEA BEFORE JANUARY 15 TO TAKE COORDINATED ACTION IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES WOULD REASSURE MARKETS AS WELL AS SEND A CLEAR

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11/21/2013 MM
2/25

SIGNAL TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. IT WOULD ALSO LESSEN ECONOMIC DAMAGE TO US, THE EMERGING DEMOCRACIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES GENERALLY.

-

THEREFORE, I HAVE ASKED MY OFFICIALS TO WORK WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES IN OTHER IEA COUNTRIES TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A PROGRAM OF COORDINATED ACTION. SUCH A PROGRAM WOULD CALL ON IEA MEMBERS TO ENSURE AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF OIL TO MARKETS. FOR OUR PART, THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE UP TO 1.5 MILLION BARRELS A DAY OF OIL FOR ONE MONTH FROM THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE, IF IT PROVED NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THESE EMERGENCY MEASURES.

-

I REQUEST THAT GERMANY, AS A HOLDER OF SUBSTANTIAL STRATEGIC STOCKS, COMMIT TO MAKING AVAILABLE A PROPORTIONATE AMOUNT OF THIS OIL TO ENSURE COORDINATED ACTION. I AM MAKING A SIMILAR REQUEST OF TOSHIKI KAIFU. AS THE WORLD'S ECONOMIC LEADERS, OUR THREE COUNTRIES IN PARTICULAR MUST ACT DECISIVELY TO AVERT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DAMAGE.

-

MY REPRESENTATIVES TO THE IEA GOVERNING BOARD WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES. I URGE YOU TO DIRECT YOUR OFFICIALS TO CONCLUDE IEA PREPARATIONS BY THE END OF THIS WEEK.

-

THE MAJOR OIL PRODUCERS RESPONDED QUICKLY TO OUR REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL OIL PRODUCTION AFTER AUGUST 2. IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES, THEY HAVE STRESSED THE NEED FOR QUICK ACTION BY THE IEA COUNTRIES TO HELP CALM THE MARKET. I SHARE THESE CONCERNS AND AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU DO TOO.

-

I TRUST THAT WE CAN COUNT ON GERMANY TO DO ITS PART TO BOLSTER INTERNATIONAL ENERGY SECURITY AND WESTERN SOLIDARITY IN THE FACE OF IRAQ'S AGGRESSIVE AND UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE TO THE RULE OF LAW AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER.

-

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SINCERELY,

-

GEORGE BUSH

-

END TEXT:

-

DECL: OADR

#0115

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KOHL

Dear Helmut:

We are fast approaching the U.N. deadline for Saddam Hussein to withdraw totally from Kuwait. While we fervently hope that Iraq will make the use of force unnecessary by complying fully with the Security Council's demands, it is important that we have in place adequate contingency plans to deal with any possible interruption in oil supplies.

In the event of hostilities, there is likely to be a strong reaction in oil markets, reinforced by the probability of temporary loss of some oil from the Gulf. For this reason, it is essential to be prepared now rather than to be forced to react under pressure later.

Since 1974 we have worked hard together in the International Energy Agency (IEA) to ensure our energy security. A decision by the IEA before January 15 to take coordinated action in the event of hostilities would reassure markets as well as send a clear signal to Saddam Hussein. It would also lessen economic damage to us, the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin America and developing countries generally.

Therefore, I have asked my officials to work with their colleagues in other IEA countries to reach agreement on a program of coordinated action. Such a program would call on IEA members to ensure an adequate supply of oil to markets. For our part, the U.S. would be prepared to make available up to 1.5 million barrels a day of oil for one month from the Strategic Petroleum

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2/25/2013 MM

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Declassify on: OADR

Reserve, if it proved necessary to implement these emergency measures.

I request that Germany, as a holder of substantial strategic stocks, commit to making available a proportionate amount of this oil to ensure coordinated action. I am making a similar request of Toshiki Kaifu. As the world's economic leaders, our three countries in particular must act decisively to avert international economic damage.

My representatives to the IEA Governing Board will be in touch with your representatives. I urge you to direct your officials to conclude IEA preparations by the end of this week.

The major oil producers responded quickly to our requests for additional oil production after August 2. In the event of hostilities, they have stressed the need for quick action by the IEA countries to help calm the market. I share these concerns and am confident that you do too.

I trust that we can count on Germany to do its part to bolster international energy security and Western solidarity in the face of Iraq's aggressive and unprecedented challenge to the rule of law and the new world order.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: COMM

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FM WHITE HOUSE

TO MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA BATMAN CHANNELS
QQQQ
-
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER KAIFU
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.
-
BEGIN TEXT:
-
DEAR TOSHIKI:
-
-

WE ARE FAST APPROACHING THE U.N. DEADLINE FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO WITHDRAW TOTALLY FROM KUWAIT. AS PART OF OUR BROADER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRATEGY, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE IN PLACE ADEQUATE MEASURES TO DEAL WITH ANY POSSIBLE INTERRUPTION IN OIL SUPPLIES.

-

IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE A STRONG REACTION IN OIL MARKETS, REINFORCED BY THE PROBABILITY OF TEMPORARY LOSS OF SOME OIL FROM THE GULF. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS BETTER TO BE VISIBLY PREPARED NOW THAN TO BE FORCED TO REACT LATER.

-

SINCE 1974 WE HAVE WORKED HARD TOGETHER IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA) TO ENSURE OUR ENERGY SECURITY. A DECISION BY THE IEA BEFORE JANUARY 15 TO TAKE COORDINATED ACTION IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES WOULD REASSURE THE MARKETS AS WELL AS SEND A CLEAR MESSAGE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN.

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2009-0770-MR
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-

THEREFORE, I HAVE ASKED MY OFFICIALS TO WORK WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES IN OTHER IEA COUNTRIES TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A PROGRAM OF COORDINATED ACTION. SUCH A PROGRAM WOULD CALL ON IEA MEMBERS TO ENSURE AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF OIL TO MARKETS. FOR OUR PART, THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE UP TO 1.5 MILLION BARRELS A DAY OF OIL FOR ONE MONTH FROM THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE, IF IT PROVED NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THESE EMERGENCY MEASURES.

-

I REQUEST THAT JAPAN, AS A HOLDER OF SUBSTANTIAL STRATEGIC STOCKS, COMMIT TO MAKING AVAILABLE A PROPORTIONATE AMOUNT OF THIS OIL TO ENSURE COORDINATED ACTION. I AM MAKING A SIMILAR REQUEST OF HELMUT KOHL. AS THE WORLD'S ECONOMIC LEADERS, OUR THREE COUNTRIES IN PARTICULAR MUST BE SEEN AS READY TO BEAR OUR SHARE OF THE BURDEN OF AVOIDING ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC DAMAGE.

-

MY REPRESENTATIVES TO THE IEA GOVERNING BOARD WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES. I URGE YOU TO DIRECT YOUR OFFICIALS TO CONCLUDE IEA PREPARATIONS BY THE END OF THIS WEEK.

-

THE MAJOR OIL PRODUCERS RESPONDED QUICKLY TO OUR REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL OIL PRODUCTION AFTER AUGUST 2. IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES, THEY HAVE STRESSED THE NEED FOR QUICK ACTION BY THE IEA COUNTRIES TO HELP CALM THE MARKET.

-

I SHARE THESE CONCERNS AND AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU DO TOO. AN IEA-WIDE COORDINATED ACTION TO COUNTER A POTENTIAL SUPPLY DISRUPTION WILL COMPLEMENT OUR MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO ENSURE FULL IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. RESOLUTIONS.

-

I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN COUNT ON JAPAN TO DO ITS PART TO BOLSTER INTERNATIONAL ENERGY SECURITY AND WESTERN SOLIDARITY IN THE FACE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S AGGRESSIVE AND UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE TO THE RULE OF LAW AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER. AS THE TWO

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LARGEST ECONOMIES IN THE WORLD. JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES MUST JOIN TOGETHER, UNDER OUR GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP. TO TAKE THE PRUDENT STEPS OUTLINED ABOVE TO MINIMIZE POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO OUR OWN ECONOMIES AND TO THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM.

-

SINCERELY,

-

GEORGE BUSH

-

END TEXT:

-

DECL: OADR

#0114

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KAIFU

Dear Toshiki:

We are fast approaching the U.N. deadline for Saddam Hussein to withdraw totally from Kuwait. As part of our broader economic and political strategy, it is important that we have in place adequate measures to deal with any possible interruption in oil supplies.

In the event of hostilities, there is likely to be a strong reaction in oil markets, reinforced by the probability of temporary loss of some oil from the Gulf. For this reason, it is better to be visibly prepared now than to be forced to react later.

Since 1974 we have worked hard together in the International Energy Agency (IEA) to ensure our energy security. A decision by the IEA before January 15 to take coordinated action in the event of hostilities would reassure the markets as well as send a clear message to Saddam Hussein.

Therefore, I have asked my officials to work with their colleagues in other IEA countries to reach agreement on a program of coordinated action. Such a program would call on IEA members to ensure an adequate supply of oil to markets. For our part, the U.S. would be prepared to make available up to 1.5 million barrels a day of oil for one month from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, if it proved necessary to implement these emergency measures.

I request that Japan, as a holder of substantial strategic

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2009-0770-MR
11/26/2014 MM

stocks, commit to making available a proportionate amount of this oil to ensure coordinated action. I am making a similar request of Helmut Kohl. As the world's economic leaders, our three countries in particular must be seen as ready to bear our share of the burden of avoiding additional economic damage.

My representatives to the IEA Governing Board will be in touch with your representatives. I urge you to direct your officials to conclude IEA preparations by the end of this week.

The major oil producers responded quickly to our requests for additional oil production after August 2. In the event of hostilities, they have stressed the need for quick action by the IEA countries to help calm the market.

I share these concerns and am confident that you do too. An IEA-wide coordinated action to counter a potential supply disruption will complement our military and diplomatic efforts to ensure full Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions.

I am confident that we can count on Japan to do its part to bolster international energy security and Western solidarity in the face of Saddam Hussein's aggressive and unprecedented challenge to the rule of law and the new world order. As the two largest economies in the world, Japan and the United States must join together, under our global partnership, to take the prudent steps outlined above to minimize potential damage to our own economies and to the international economic system.

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FM WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
QQQQ
-
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.
-
BEGIN TEXT:
-
DEAR JOHN:
-

WE ARE FAST APPROACHING THE U.N. DEADLINE FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO WITHDRAW TOTALLY FROM KUWAIT. AS PART OF OUR BROADER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRATEGY, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE IN PLACE ADEQUATE MEASURES TO DEAL WITH ANY POSSIBLE INTERRUPTION IN OIL SUPPLIES.
-

IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE A STRONG REACTION IN OIL MARKETS, REINFORCED BY THE PROBABILITY OF TEMPORARY LOSS OF SOME OIL FROM THE GULF. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS BETTER TO BE VISIBLY PREPARED NOW THAN TO BE FORCED TO REACT LATER.
-

SINCE 1974 WE HAVE WORKED HARD TOGETHER IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA) TO ENSURE OUR ENERGY SECURITY. A DECISION BY THE IEA BEFORE JANUARY 15 TO TAKE COORDINATED ACTION IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES WOULD REASSURE MARKETS AS WELL AS SEND A CLEAR SIGNAL TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. IT WOULD ALSO LESSEN ECONOMIC DAMAGE TO US, THE EMERGING DEMOCRACIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN

AMERICA AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES GENERALLY.

-

THEREFORE, I HAVE ASKED MY OFFICIALS TO WORK WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES IN OTHER IEA COUNTRIES TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A PROGRAM OF COORDINATED ACTION. SUCH A PROGRAM WOULD CALL ON IEA MEMBERS TO ENSURE AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF OIL TO MARKETS. FOR OUR PART, THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE UP TO 1.5 MILLION BARRELS A DAY OF OIL FOR ONE MONTH FROM THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE, IF IT PROVED NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THESE EMERGENCY MEASURES.

-

I HAVE WRITTEN HELMUT KOHL AND TOSHIKI KAIFU REQUESTING THAT GERMANY AND JAPAN, AS HOLDERS OF SUBSTANTIAL STRATEGIC STOCKS, COMMIT TO MAKING AVAILABLE A PROPORTIONATE AMOUNT OF THIS OIL TO ENSURE COORDINATED ACTION. OTHER IEA COUNTRIES MUST TAKE COMPLEMENTARY ACTION.

-

THE UNITED KINGDOM, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE IEA GOVERNING BOARD, CAN PLAY A KEY ROLE IN ENSURING COORDINATED ACTION BY THE IEA. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ALL IEA COUNTRIES MAKE A COMMENSURATE

CONTRIBUTION, IN PARTICULAR HOLDERS OF STRATEGIC STOCKS. I URGE YOU TO DIRECT YOUR OFFICIALS TO JOIN US IN RAPIDLY IDENTIFYING A CONSENSUS AMONG KEY IEA COUNTRIES AND REACHING FORMAL AGREEMENT. PERHAPS YOU COULD PERSONALLY URGE HELMUT KOHL TO TAKE THIS DECISION.

-

THE MAJOR OIL PRODUCERS RESPONDED QUICKLY TO OUR REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL OIL PRODUCTION AFTER AUGUST 2. IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES, THEY HAVE STRESSED THE NEED FOR QUICK ACTION BY THE IEA COUNTRIES TO HELP CALM THE MARKET.

-

I SHARE THESE CONCERNS AND TRUST YOU DO TOO. COORDINATED ACTION TO COUNTER A POTENTIAL SUPPLY DISRUPTION WILL COMPLEMENT OUR MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO ENSURE FULL IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. RESOLUTIONS.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

-

SINCERELY,

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GEORGE BUSH

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-

END TEXT:

-

DECL: OADR

#0113

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO MAJOR

Dear John:

We are fast approaching the U.N. deadline for Saddam Hussein to withdraw totally from Kuwait. As part of our broader economic and political strategy, it is important that we have in place adequate measures to deal with any possible interruption in oil supplies.

In the event of hostilities, there is likely to be a strong reaction in oil markets, reinforced by the probability of temporary loss of some oil from the Gulf. For this reason, it is better to be visibly prepared now than to be forced to react later.

Since 1974 we have worked hard together in the International Energy Agency (IEA) to ensure our energy security. A decision by the IEA before January 15 to take coordinated action in the event of hostilities would reassure markets as well as send a clear signal to Saddam Hussein. It would also lessen economic damage to us, the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin America and developing countries generally.

Therefore, I have asked my officials to work with their colleagues in other IEA countries to reach agreement on a program of coordinated action. Such a program would call on IEA members to ensure an adequate supply of oil to markets. For our part, the U.S. would be prepared to make available up to 1.5 million barrels a day of oil for one month from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, if it proved necessary to implement these emergency

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2010-0868-MR
ES 1/31/13

measures.

I have written Helmut Kohl and Toshiki Kaifu requesting that Germany and Japan, as holders of substantial strategic stocks, commit to making available a proportionate amount of this oil to ensure coordinated action. Other IEA countries must take complementary action.

The United Kingdom, as chairman of the IEA Governing Board, can play a key role in ensuring coordinated action by the IEA. It is important that all IEA countries make a commensurate contribution, in particular holders of strategic stocks. I urge you to direct your officials to join us in rapidly identifying a consensus among key IEA countries and reaching formal agreement. Perhaps you could personally urge Helmut Kohl to take this decision.

The major oil producers responded quickly to our requests for additional oil production after August 2. In the event of hostilities, they have stressed the need for quick action by the IEA countries to help calm the market.

I share these concerns and trust you do too. Coordinated action to counter a potential supply disruption will complement our military and diplomatic efforts to ensure full Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07h. Cable	Re: Message to Ambassador Alan Larson from General Scowcroft [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	1/8/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 3/9/2016

Date Closed:	6/22/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91146-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0868-MR(500.01)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	2/4/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]


C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

1.4(c)



PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR ALAN LARSON, USOECD THROUGH AMEMBASSY PARIS FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

-

PLEASE DELIVER AT OOB TUESDAY, JANUARY 8 THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO IEA EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR HELGA STEEG:

-

-

BEGIN TEXT:

-

DEAR HELGA:

-

WHEN WE MET ON OCTOBER 12, WE DISCUSSED WAYS TO DEAL WITH THE ENERGY CONSEQUENCES RESULTING FROM IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT. WE AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ALL IEA COUNTRIES ACTING IN CONCERT, RECOGNIZING THAT HOLDERS OF STRATEGIC STOCKS HAVE A SPECIAL ROLE TO PLAY IN CONTRIBUTING TO THE STABILITY OF THE OIL MARKET.

-

WE ARE FAST APPROACHING THE U.N. DEADLINE FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT. THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES IT IMPORTANT THAT IEA COUNTRIES HAVE IN PLACE A COORDINATED PLAN TO MAKE AVAILABLE ADDITIONAL SUPPLIES, SHOULD HOSTILITIES DEVELOP. SUCH A PLAN WOULD, IF IMPLEMENTED, CALL ON IEA MEMBERS TO ENSURE AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF OIL TO MARKETS.

-

FOR OUR PART, THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE UP TO 1.5 MILLION BARRELS PER DAY OF OIL FOR A MONTH FROM OUR STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE, IF IT PROVED NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THESE MEASURES. WE WOULD EXPECT OTHER IEA COUNTRIES TO TAKE EQUIVALENT ACTION THROUGH THE USE OF OIL STOCKS (STRATEGIC AND COMMERCIAL) AND DEMAND RESTRAINT MEASURES.

-

IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO HAVE THE IEA GOVERNING BOARD MEET THIS WEEK TO FINALIZE PLANS. I AM CONCERNED THAT ANY DELAY PAST THE U.N. DEADLINE WOULD CALL INTO QUESTION THE ABILITY OF THE IEA TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

-

I HAVE ASKED AMBASSADOR LARSON AND OUR GOVERNING BOARD REPRESENTATIVES TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU ON THIS MATTER.

-

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

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2/4/2014 MM

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END OF TEXT.

1.4(c)



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07i. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador Al Larson, Re: Message from Me to Helga Steeg [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (January 1991) I [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 3/9/2016

Date Closed:	6/22/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91146-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0868-MR(500.01)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	2/4/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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500.02

1.4(c)

TO: AMBASSADOR AL LARSON, USOECD
through AMEMBASSY PARIS

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
White House

Please deliver at OOB Tuesday, January 8 the following message from me to Helga Steeg.

Dear Helga:

When we met on October 12, we discussed ways to deal with the energy consequences resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. We agreed on the importance of all IEA countries acting in concert, recognizing that holders of strategic stocks have a special role to play in contributing to the stability of the oil market.

We are fast approaching the U.N. deadline for Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. The President believes it important that IEA countries have in place a coordinated plan to make available additional supplies, should hostilities develop. Such a plan would, if implemented, call on IEA members to ensure an adequate supply of oil to markets.

For our part, the U.S. would be prepared to make available up to 1.5 million barrels per day of oil for month from our Strategic Petroleum Reserve, if it proved necessary to implement these measures. We would expect other IEA countries to take equivalent action through the use of oil stocks (strategic and commercial) and demand restraint measures.

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2/4/2014 MM

It would be very helpful to have the IEA Governing Board meet this week to finalize plans. I am concerned that any delay past the U.N. deadline would call into question the ability of the IEA to respond quickly and effectively.

I have asked Ambassador Larson and our Governing Board representatives to work closely with you on this matter.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0109

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0808-MR
ES 1/31/13

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Energy Preparedness and the Gulf Crisis

Purpose

To obtain the support of our partners in the International Energy Agency (IEA) for a contingency plan of coordinated action to confront possible oil supply interruptions in the event of hostilities in the Gulf.

Background

On January 4, Governor Sununu, Secretaries Cheney, Brady and Watkins, Director Darman, Chairman Boskin, General Powell, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger and I met to review energy preparedness measures in the event of military conflict in the Gulf.

The group acknowledged that, in the event of hostilities:

-- There could be a temporary loss of up to 3 million barrels a day (mbd) of Saudi production as Saudi Aramco withdraws its personnel from fields close to Kuwait until the situation stabilizes. Other Saudi fields should not be affected by hostilities.

-- Even without additional supply disruption, there is likely to be panic buying and hoarding of supplies resulting in substantial crude oil price increases -- this despite the fact there is sufficient oil around to meet foreseeable needs.

-- Additional DOD fuel requirements of 450,000 b/d can be met from DOD stocks, Saudi refineries and other refineries outside the region.

To deal with the energy uncertainties likely upon the outbreak of hostilities, the group agreed that the U.S. should institute contingency planning within the IEA on a program of coordinated action. Under such a program, the U.S. would be prepared to release up to 50 million barrels of SPR oil (1.5 mbd). We would expect our IEA partners to take equivalent action through the use of oil stocks (strategic and commercial) and demand restraint measures. The net effect would be to make available to the

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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market 3 mbd of oil. A coordinated approach would reduce supply uncertainty, have a positive effect on market psychology and lessen economic damage. It is possible that oil traders will not avail themselves of SPR oil if they see sufficient commercial stocks. IEA countries will nevertheless have provided a calming influence by making additional oil available to markets.

The group believes that it is important to have in place before January 15 an IEA-wide, coordinated plan of action which could be implemented upon the outbreak of hostilities. The key countries are Japan and Germany, the other main holders of strategic stocks, and the U.K., which chairs the IEA Governing Board.

From our informal consultations this weekend, we have learned that Prime Minister Kaifu agrees on the desirability of having a plan in place by January 15, and Japan is prepared to make stocks available. The British have assured us they will work to achieve an IEA consensus on this issue, although they stress we must get Germany to agree to make its strategic oil stocks available.

We believe it important that you approach Prime Minister Kaifu and Chancellor Kohl to urge coordinated action within the IEA, including the use of strategic stocks by our three countries. The draft messages at Tab A state that the U.S. would be prepared to make available up to 1.5 mbd of SPR oil as our contribution. The message to Prime Minister Major is designed to enlist the U.K.'s direct support as the U.K. chairs the IEA Governing Board. In addition to your messages, we plan to have our Ambassadors in OECD capitals make our pitch to senior government officials.

These IEA preparations are likely to become public, certainly by the time of the IEA meeting, if not earlier. The impact on oil markets is difficult to assess. Some may be reassured by the contingency planning; others may see this as another step closer to hostilities. This is a necessary risk if we are to have a program of coordinated action in place to implement upon the outbreak of any possible hostilities.

In addition, the group agreed on the need to:

-- issue a blanket Jones Act waiver to allow non-U.S. ships to transport SPR oil, given the insufficiency of U.S. bottoms, in the event of hostilities;

-- quickly issue an Executive Order to provide authority to allocate, among other items, petroleum in civilian markets to meet DOD fuel needs <u>if necessary</u>. These authorities lapsed with the expiration at the end of the last session of Congress of the Defense Production Act (DPA);

-- prepare legislative proposals to restore lapsed DPA authorities as well as other authorities the Administration believes desirable to provide effective management of energy emergencies.

We are working on each of these items.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve U.S. participation in contingency planning within the IEA for coordinated action in the event of hostilities.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

That you approve the messages at Tab A to be sent through Cabinet channels to Kaifu, Kohl and Major.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Messages to Kaifu, Kohl and Major

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

SIGNED

January 7, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL

FROM: ERIC MELBY

SUBJECT: Energy Preparedness and the Gulf Crisis

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President reporting on the January 4 meeting to discuss energy preparedness measures in the event of hostilities in the Gulf, as well as on discussions we and State have had this weekend with key IEA countries. It includes Presidential messages to Kaifu, Kohl and Major.

Should the President agree to the letters, it is important they go out as soon as possible. We propose they be sent through Cabinet channels. Senior energy officials in Japan, the U.K. and Germany are aware of our proposals for IEA action this week; they may need the political direction from their leaders to take the final steps toward coordinated action.

At Tab II is a proposed message from you to IEA Executive Director Helga Steeg. When she met with you October 12, she agreed to do what was necessary to achieve IEA consensus should the U.S. decide coordinated action was necessary. She values your views highly and your letter is meant to convey the White House's keen interest in a quick IEA agreement on an action plan. We propose it be sent through privacy channels to be delivered by Ambassador Larson, our Ambassador to the OECD.

Concurrences by: Richard Haass, David Gompert and Karl Jackson

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

That you approve the message to Helga Steeg at Tab II.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to President
Tab A Messages to Kohl, Kaifu, and Major
Tab II Message to Helga Steeg

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