

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91145
Folder ID Number: 91145-006

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (December 1990) II [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Gulf Coalition Ambassadors on Responsibility-Sharing (2 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	C
01b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Gulf Coalition Financial Contributors (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
01c. Table	Re: Gulf Crisis Financial Assistance 1990-91 Commitments and Disbursements (1 pp.)	12/13/90	(b)(1)	
01d. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting with Gulf Coalition Ambassadors on Responsibility-Sharing (1 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	C
02. Memo	David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft Re: NATO ACE Mobile Force Deployment to Turkey (2 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Adrian Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to President Mitterrand (1 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Mitterrand of France (2 pp.)	12/90	(b)(1)	S
03c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Mitterrand (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 5

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (December 1990) II [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1211
OA/ID Number: 91145-006
Date Closed: 6/17/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03d. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush [English] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03e. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush [English] (2 pp.)	12/15/90	(b)(1)	
03f. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush [French] (3 pp.)	12/15/90	(b)(1)	
03g. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush Re: Translation of December 17 letter from President Mitterrand (1 pp.)	12/17	(b)(1)	
03h. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush [French] (2 pp.)	12/17/90	(b)(1)	
03i. Cable	Re: Mitterrand Reviews France's Position on Gulf (3 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	✓
03j. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush Re: Translation of Mitterrand Letter dated December 19 (1 pp.)	12/19	(b)(1)	
03k. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush Re: Translation of Mitterrand Letter dated December 19 (1 pp.)	12/19	(b)(1)	
03l. Cable	Elysee France to White House Re: Letter from President Mitterrand to President Bush (2 pp.)	12/19/90	(b)(1)	TS

Page 2 of 5

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04a. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Robert M. Gates Re: Gulf Crisis Coordination (1 pp.)	12/21/90	(b)(1)	✓
04b. Table	Re: Desert Shield Costs Responsibility-Sharing for 1990 (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
04c. Table	Re: Filing the Gap of 1990-91 Economic Assistance for Frontline States (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
04d. Outline	Re: Follow-up Request for Front Line Assistance (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
04e. Table	Re: Crisis-Related Increased Oil Export Earnings Potential Donors (1 pp.)	12/19/90	(b)(1)	✓
05a. Cable	White House to Federal Chancellery Re: Message to Chancellor Kohl from the President (1 pp.)	12/21/90	(b)(1)	✓
05b. Message	Re: Message to Chancellor Kohl from President Bush (1 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	✓
05c. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Message to Kohl on ACE Mobile Force Deployment (1 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	✓
06a. Memo	George Van Eron to Brent Scowcroft Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary as of December 21 (1 pp.)	12/21/90	(b)(1)	✓
06b. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06c. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush Re: Translation of Mitterrand Letter dated December 19 (1 pp.)	12/19	(b)(1)	
07. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Status of NATO Deployment to Turkey and Proposed Next Steps (3 pp.)	12/21/90	(b)(1)	S
08a. Handwritten Note	From Tim [Timothy Deal] to Bob [Robert Gates] Re: It could... (1 pp.)	12/26	(b)(1)	
08b. Memo	Timothy E. Deal/Richard Haass to Robert M. Gates Re: Gulf Crisis: Meeting of Informal Steering Group, 3:00 p.m., December 26, White House Situation Room (2 pp.)	12/26/90	(b)(1)	S
09a. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France (2 pp.)	12/24/90	(b)(1)	S
09b. Memo	Adrian Basora to William F. Sittmann Re: Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of France on December 24, 1990 (1 pp.)	12/26/90	(b)(1)	S
10. Letter	King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (1 pp.)	12/15/90	(b)(1)	
11a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Call to President Ozal (2 pp.)	12/27/90	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
11b. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for Ozal (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
11c. Memo	David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Call to President Ozal (1 pp.)	12/27/90	(b)(1)	S
12a. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Call to Peter Hartmann on Turkey's ACE Mobile Force Deployment Request (1 pp.)	12/27/90	(b)(1)	C
12b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Call to Hartmann (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

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Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009873
RECEIVED: 18 DEC 90 16

TO: CICCONI, J

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 19 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
SAUDI ARABIA

KUWAIT
IRAQ

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR DEC 19 MTG W/ BUSINESS LEADERS

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 21 DEC 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

GANTT

HAASS

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY ed DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9873

December 19, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES CICCONI

FROM: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN 

SUBJECT: Talking Points for December 19
Meeting with Business Leaders

Attached are Talking Points prepared for the President's remarks to Business Leaders on December 19.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points
Tab B List of Attendees

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR REMARKS TO ASSOCIATION HEADS

- I AM GLAD TO HAVE THE CHANCE TO MEET WITH YOU ALL THIS MORNING.
- THE ASSOCIATIONS YOU REPRESENT IN TURN REPRESENT HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS.
- UNFORTUNATELY, NOT ALL ARE REPUBLICANS. BUT ANY AMERICAN, BE HE OR SHE A REPUBLICAN, DEMOCRAT OR INDEPENDENT, OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT OUR POLICY IN THE GULF. THIS IS THE MESSAGE I WOULD LIKE YOU ALL TO TAKE BACK WITH YOU TODAY.

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CARD 2 OF 5

- WHAT IS AT STAKE--THE SECURITY OF THE WORLD'S ENERGY SUPPLIES, THE ECONOMIC HEALTH OF THIS COUNTRY AND OUR KEY TRADING PARTNERS, COMMON DECENCY, THE NATURE OF THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD--ARE NOT ABSTRACTIONS. THEY AFFECT THE LIVES OF EACH AND EVERY ONE OF US.
- OUR POLICY IS TO BRING ABOUT IRAQ'S TOTAL AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. OUR PATIENCE MUST NECESSARILY BE LIMITED. WITH EACH DAY, SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SOLDIERS BRUTALIZE KUWAIT, HIS POLICIES RESULT IN HIGHER OIL PRICES THAT THREATEN THE HEALTH OF NEW DEMOCRACIES, HIS GENERALS AMASS EVER-GROWING FORCES ARMED WITH THE WEAPONS OF GREAT POTENTIAL DESTRUCTION.

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- WE ARE NOT ALONE IN FEELING THIS SENSE OF URGENCY AND DETERMINATION. WE HAVE THE BACKING OF THE UN AND NO LESS THAN 12 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. WE HAVE THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NO LESS THAN 28 OTHER COUNTRIES. AND STILL OTHER COUNTRIES ARE SUPPORTING US FINANCIALLY.
- NONE OF US HAS ANY DESIRE FOR WAR. WE'RE DOING ALL WE CAN TO PRESERVE THE PEACE. BUT WE MUST PRESERVE OUR PRINCIPLES TOO. WE EITHER STAND UP NOW FOR WHAT IS RIGHT, OR WE WILL HAVE TO FACE AN EVEN MORE COSTLY CHALLENGE IN THE FUTURE. AND IF WE HAVE TO FIGHT, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL DO SO DECISIVELY.

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UNCLASSIFIED

CARD 4 OF 5

- TO UNDERLINE OUR INTEREST IN PEACE, I PROPOSED TO IRAQ THAT WE MEET DIRECTLY. SHOULD THESE MEETINGS OCCUR, IT WILL BE OUR PURPOSE TO ENSURE THAT SADDAM UNDERSTANDS WHAT IS REQUIRED OF HIM--AND WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES ARE IF HE CONTINUES TO STAND OUTSIDE THE LAW. UNFORTUNATELY, SADDAM APPEARS TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN MANIPULATING WORLD OPINION THAN IN DIPLOMACY.
- THIS, THEN, IS MY BASIC MESSAGE. I CAN THINK OF NO BETTER WAY TO PRESERVE THE PEACE THAN TO SIGNAL SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE IRAQI PEOPLE THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE UNITED AND RESOLUTE THAT THIS AGGRESSION WILL NOT BE REWARDED.

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-- I HOPE I CAN COUNT ON ALL OF YOU TO GET THIS
WORD OUT TO YOUR MEMBERS AND TO ENCOURAGE
UNDERSTANDING FOR WHAT WE ARE DOING. IN CASE
THERE ARE QUESTIONS, I WILL DO MY BEST TO
ANSWER THEM.

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Themes for President's Remarks to Association Heads

- I am glad to have the chance to meet with you all this morning.
- The associations you represent in turn represent hundreds of thousands of Americans.
- Unfortunately, not all are Republicans. But any American, be he or she a Republican, Democrat or Independent, ought to be able to support our policy in the Gulf. This is the message I would like you all to take back with you today.
- What is at stake--the security of the world's energy supplies, the economic health of this country and our key trading partners, common decency, the nature of the post-Cold War world--are not abstractions. They affect the lives of each and every one of us.
- Our policy is to bring about Iraq's total and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Our patience must necessarily be limited. With each day, Saddam Hussein's soldiers brutalize Kuwait, his policies result in higher oil prices that threaten the health of new democracies, his generals amass ever-growing forces armed with the weapons of great potential destruction.
- We are not alone in feeling this sense of urgency and determination. We have the backing of the UN and no less than 12 Security Council Resolutions. We have the involvement of the armed forces of no less than 28 other countries. And still other countries are supporting us

financially.

- None of us has any desire for war. We're doing all we can to preserve the peace. But we must preserve our principles too. We either stand up now for what is right, or we will have to face an even more costly challenge in the future. And if we have to fight, I can assure you that we will do so decisively.
- To underline our interest in peace, I proposed to Iraq that we meet directly. Should these meetings occur, it will be our purpose to ensure that Saddam understands what is required of him--and what the consequences are if he continues to stand outside the law. Unfortunately, Saddam appears to be more interested in manipulating world opinion than in diplomacy.
- This, then, is my basic message. I can think of no better way to preserve the peace than to signal Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi people that the American people are united and resolute that this aggression will not be rewarded.
- I hope I can count on all of you to get this word out to your members and to encourage understanding for what we are doing. In case there are questions, I will do my best to answer them.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ATTENDEES FOR ASSOCIATION DESERT SHIELD MEETING
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1990; 10:00 A.M., THE ROOSEVELT ROOM

Abenante, Paul, President
American Bakers Assoc.
296-5800

Ball, William, President
National Soft Drink Assoc.
463-0356

Baly, Michael, President
American Gas Association
703-841-8612

Beatty, Bert, Exec. Vice President
Associated General Contractors
393-2040

Black, Judy, Vice President
International Council of Shopping Centers
703-549-7404

Block, John R., President
National Assoc. of Wholesale Grocers
703-532-9400

Cavaney, Red, President
American Paper Institute, Inc.
212-340-0676

Colton, Kent, Exec. Vice President
National Assoc. of Home Builders
822-0200

DeFries, Gene, President
Marine Engineers Beneficial Association
638-2405

Driesler, Steve, Senior Vice President
National Association of Realtors
383-1238

Fritts, Edward, President
National Assoc. of Broadcasters
429-5300

Fuqua, Don, President
Aerospace Industries Assoc.
371-8400

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Gable, Wayne, President
Citizens for a Sound Economy
488-8200

Galles, John, Executive Vice President
National Small Business United
293-8830

Gerard, Joe, President
American Furniture Manufacturers Assoc.
466-7362

Gorman, Mark, Senior Director, Gov't Affairs
National Restaurant Association
331-5900

Hawkins, Charlie, Vice President
Associated Builders and Contractors
637-8800

Jasinowski, Jerry, President
National Association of Manufacturers
637-3105

Leshner, Dick, President
Chamber of Commerce
463-5300

Sam Maury, Executive Director
The Business Roundtable
872-1260

McKevitt, James D., President
McKevitt Group
822-0604

Motley, John, Vice President
National Federation of Ind. Business
554-9000

O'Neill, Joe, President
National Retail Federation
783-7971

Parker, David, President
Aluminum Association
862-5196

Rogstad, Barry, President
American Business Conference
822-9300

Ruane, Peter, President
ARTBA
488-2722

Satagaj, John, President
Small Business Legislative Council
639-8500

Valis, Wayne, President
Valis Associates
833-5055

Van Dongen, Dirk, President
NAWD
872-0885

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9873

December 19, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS 


SUBJECT: Talking Points for December 19 Remarks
to Business Leaders

SIGNED

At Tab A are proposed Talking Points for the President's remarks to Business Leaders on December 19.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Sittmann to forward the proposed Talking Points to Jim Cicconi (Sittmann memo at Tab I).

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann Memo to Cicconi
Tab A Proposed Talking Points
Tab B List of Attendees

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: LMG LOG # 9873

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PR) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG LMG A/O _____

WED

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann	<u>4</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>12/19/00</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N</u>

90 DEC 18 P 6.43

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Evans' Office has dispatch

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009851
RECEIVED: 18 DEC 90 08

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 20 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
KUWAIT
SP

IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
AP



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MTG W/ GULF COALITION AMBS ON RESPONSIBILITY SHARING

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 21 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

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NSC CHRON
WELCH

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSMJT

DOC 4 OF 4

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9851 ADD ON

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

December 20, 1990

MEETING WITH
GULF COALITION AMBASSADORS ON RESPONSIBILITY-SHARING

DATE: Friday, December 21
LOCATION: The Map Room
TIME: 1:30 - 2:00 p.m.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

I. PURPOSE

To reaffirm the imperatives of large-scale, rapid economic assistance to sustain the common effort in the Gulf.

II. BACKGROUND

This meeting with economic supporters is the logical follow-on to the December 17 session with military contributors; indeed, there is some overlap, e.g., France, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Kingdom. Financial responsibility-sharing for Desert Shield and economic assistance to the front-line states (Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan) are essential to supporting and sustaining our Gulf strategy. We will also be asking the West Europeans and Japan to provide additional help for Eastern Europe.

However, we have run into problems. First, Desert Shield costs have escalated, so that the commitments of 1990 are looking proportionately smaller as time passes. Second, needs of the frontline states (especially Turkey and Jordan) are greater than commitments for both 1990 and 1991, and -- even worse -- actual disbursements are well behind commitments for 1990. The bottom line is depressingly clear: our friends and allies, particularly Japan and Germany, are not delivering their fair share. This perception is increasingly prevalent on the Hill and threatens our Gulf policy and our bilateral relationships with key countries. Our goal with this meeting is to kick off a fresh effort to meet these pressing requirements in the New Year.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab B.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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2010-0856-4R
MM 7/20/2016

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2

IV. PRESS PLAN

Press corps.

V. SEQUENCE

Photo op, followed by Presidential remarks and general discussion.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B List of Participants

Tab C Gulf Crisis Financial Assistance: Commitments
and Disbursements

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State

Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and
Deputy for National Security Affairs

Richard N. Haass, Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs

Tim Deal, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director,
International and Economic Affairs

Allied/Coalition Ambassadors (Economic)

Austria

Belgium

Canada

Denmark

Finland

France

Germany

Iceland

Ireland

Italy

Japan

Korea

Kuwait

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Norway

Portugal

Saudi Arabia

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

UAE

UK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
GULF COALITION FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS

- I very much appreciate your coming in at short notice for this discussion.
- On Monday, December 17, I met with representatives of those nations contributing troops to the effort to reverse Iraq's aggression. Some of you were in that group, and it's good to see you again.
- Today, we are together to demonstrate that the solidarity of the coalition against Iraq is also sustained by critical economic contributions. We have had a solid partnership from the beginning of the crisis, and I want to work with you and your leaders to continue this close consultation.
- We face some tough choices in the coming weeks. It would be tough for me to consult individually with each of you, but we do seek your ideas on how to meet the demands upon all of us.
- Every one of you represents a government that has committed tangible economic resources to supporting the decisions of the world community and sharing the responsibility for carrying them out. Some of you have given military and other logistical support, such as use of bases in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey.

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2010-0856-MR

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- Economic support is absolutely vital to offset the impact of the military effort, sanctions compliance, and higher energy prices.
- I will be honest: responsibility-sharing is also vital to generate and maintain political support, domestically and internationally, for the international coalition against Iraq.
- The United States must not be seen as bearing a disproportionate load, given the magnitude of our military effort.
- From the beginning, we urged those among you who for one reason or another are unable to make military contributions or who have the financial resources available to do more than your share in the economic area.
- Commitments in 1990-91 were good, but still are well short of estimated needs. Perhaps more important, disbursements have been discouragingly slow and represent barely one-fourth of what is needed. The impact of slow disbursements on some economies has been devastating and could undermine the resolve of those countries to carry out the sanctions effort.
- We need to do more to rectify this by accelerating the flow of funds to those needy nations.
- We also need to look ahead to 1991. Just as we did in September, the United States will take the lead in encouraging you, our partners, to do what is fair, necessary and in our mutual interest to support the Gulf effort.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Early in the New Year we will again be sending senior representatives to discuss and coordinate the next phase with you.
- We count on you to make responsible decisions. It is hard to exaggerate the importance of your help and its political impact.

GULF CRISIS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 1990-91 COMMITMENTS AND DISBURSEMENTS

	TOTAL		Egypt		Turkey		Jordan	
	Committ. to Date	Future Disb.	Committ. to Date	Future Disb.	Committ. to Date	Future Disb.	Committ. to Date	Future Disb.
GCC STATES 2/								
Saudi Arabia 3/	6348	2790	2663	2248	1810	475	1335	0
Kuwait	2848	1363	1688	1288	1160	75	1085	0
UAE 3/	2500	840	555	540	300	300	0	0
	1000	587	420	420	350	100	250	0
EC								
EC Budget	2164	489	871	172	191	86	105	234
Bilateral: 4/	760	78	16	16	2	2	0	10
Belgium	1403	411	855	156	189	84	105	224
Denmark	32	7	16	6	9	0	9	7
France 5/	30	4	20	0	0	0	0	0
Germany	200	0	30	0	30	0	30	0
Ireland	884	338	665	132	73	73	0	146
Italy 6/	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	150	4	75	0	49	0	49	27
Netherlands	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Spain	57	43	18	18	18	11	7	18
U.K.	35	9	11	0	11	0	11	5
	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER EUROPE								
Austria	202	32	12	0	5	0	5	13
Finland	11	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iceland	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Sweden	23	0	2	0	2	0	2	0
Switzerland	45	22	10	0	3	0	3	10
	109	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
JAPAN								
	2022	272	419	0	286	200	86	250
CANADA								
	66	17	22	0	4	0	4	23
KOREA								
	83	0	23	0	20	0	20	15
(a) TOTAL COMMITMENTS	10885	3600	4010	2420	2316	761	1555	534
(b) EST. EFFECT OF GULF CRISIS 7/	13580	13580	3375	3375	5910	5910	-	4295
DIFFERENCE (a minus b)	-2695	-9980	635	-955	-3594	-5149	-	-3761
								-4086

* Does not include contributions to the multinational force. Totals may not equal sum of components due to rounding. Based on data submitted to the Cc

1/ Unallocated among Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. Includes general humanitarian assistance. 2/ GCC financing for "Other States" is for Syria, Morocco

3/ Grant oil to Turkey: \$1160 million from Saudi Arabia and \$250 million from the UAE. 4/ Other countries will be added as their bilateral disbursement

6/ Italian aid to "Other States" is for Somalia. 7/ IMF/World Bank estimates (oil at \$31/barrel) circulated to Group shown for illustrative purposes. Not

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9851 ADD ON

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 20, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Meeting with Gulf Coalition Ambassadors on
Responsibility-Sharing

Attached is a meeting memo for the President's session Friday, December 21 with Ambassadors from those countries contributing financial and/or in-kind assistance to the sustainment of the coalition against Iraq.

Tim Deal, Karl Jackson, and David Gompert concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

ATTACHMENTS

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Talking Points

Tab B Participants

Tab C Gulf Crisis Financial Assistance: Commitments and
Disbursements

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0856-MR

mm 7/20/2016

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009919
RECEIVED: 20 DEC 90 10

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 20 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: NATO
AIR DEFENSE
KUWAIT

TURKEY
IRAQ
GERMANY

PERSONS: OZAL, TURGUT

SUBJECT: NATO ACE MOBIL FORCE DEPLOYMENT TO TURKEY

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 24 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOMPERT

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: ST LOG # 9919
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ST A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>pub</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>		<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>JHM 12/27</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N/R</u>

90 DEC 20 AM 11:26

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP _____ Sununu _____ Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9919

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 20, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID C. GOMPERT *NB*

SUBJECT: NATO ACE Mobile Force Deployment to Turkey

NOTED

I want to be sure that you and Bob are aware of the following development, which expands upon the understanding reached with Ozal in Paris and since then confirmed by the Turks:

- The Turkish General Staff has formally requested an immediate deployment of an air component of the ACE Mobile Force. The request has been approved by SACEUR and by the Military Committee. Significantly, this is not a request for an exercise, as Ozal suggested, but an actual deployment requested by a member of NATO in the face of a perceived threat.
- This force, according to the existing NATO contingency plan specifically selected by the Turks, would consist of German, Italian and Belgian units (total of 42 aircraft). We will address the question of whether to accompany this deployment with a new U.S. air deployment to Incirlik, as previously discussed with the Turks. The Dutch have also offered to add one of their squadrons of F-16s to the ACE Mobile Force deployment.
- The Germans and Belgians have shown some hesitation. This may be because of lack of advance warning; for obvious reasons, we have not discussed U.S.-Turkish plans with others. They may also not have remembered the significance of their previous force commitment to this contingency plan. NATO **SYG** Woerner is pressing hard for a prompt and fully **positive** response to the Turkish request. NATO's decision will **be** taken at a DPC meeting tomorrow.
- The German MOD is all for this, but there is hesitation in the MFA and Chancellor's office. Baker is being ask to call Genscher. I recommend that you call Peter Hartmann; if you cannot get to it, let me know and I will call him on your behalf.

Presumably, as been discussed with the Turks, this deployment will be accompanied by a further Turkish buildup on the Iraqi border, thus confronting Saddam with a substantial air and ground

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~~SECRET~~

capability on his northern front. It will have the added advantage of showing that NATO, including the Germans, are prepared to participate at least in support of Turkey.

There are no indications of political divisions within Turkey on these developments. It is reassuring to note that the request to NATO came not from government but from the TGS.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009914
RECEIVED: 20 DEC 90 08

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: BASORA
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 20 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
IRAQ
UN

PERSIAN GULF
KUWAIT
HS

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: PROPOSED TELEPHONE CALL TO MITTERRAND / 26 / 27 OR 28 DEC

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 24 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA

LOGREF: 9009927

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASORA
GANTT
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 2 OF 2

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Memo	Adrian Basora to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call to President Mitterrand (1 pp.)	12/20/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (December 1990) II [2]

Date Closed:	6/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91145-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Mitterrand of France (2 pp.)	12/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (December 1990) II [2]

Date Closed: 6/17/2009	OA/ID Number: 91145-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

GENERAL

-- First of all, I would like to wish you a very Merry Christmas. Barbara and I are enjoying our time here at Camp David with many of our children and grandchildren. I hope your holidays are equally happy.

GULF CRISIS

-- I read your recent letters, and your December 20 press statements, with great interest.

-- It seems clear that we continue to be in full agreement on the essential point in the Gulf crisis: that Saddam Hussein must pull his forces entirely out of Kuwait, and that he must do so promptly without prior negotiations.

-- As I told your Ambassador, I appreciated very much your strong statement last week that Saddam had to leave every meter of Kuwait, and that France would carry out its responsibilities in seeing that the UN resolutions were fully implemented. Your decision to reinforce your military contingent in Saudi Arabia was also very welcome.

-- As we get closer to January 15, and as Saddam's response to this deadline becomes clearer, we will of course need to have consultations among the Permanent Five either as a group or bilaterally. I expect the best timing and format will become clearer in January.

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mm 7/20/2016

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~~SECRET~~

- On the Palestinian issue, you and I are very close in our views on the main point: we must find an effective way of dealing with the problem soon -- not just for tactical and strategic reasons, but also for reasons of fairness and the rule of law.
- Judging from your letters, there have been a certain number of frictions and misunderstandings between our two foreign ministries in recent weeks. We must make sure that these do not get in the way of our cooperation on the essentials.
- As you know, I greatly welcome your counsel. I will continue to ponder the issues you have raised, and I will look forward to communicating with you again in January.

SOVIET UNION

- I would be very interested in your assessment of Shevardnadze's resignation.
- His comments on the internal political situation in the USSR are cause for concern.
- However, Gorbachev's reassurances are encouraging, particularly his assertion that there would be no change in Soviet foreign policy.
- What is your view?

VISIT OF JOHN MAJOR

(Points to be provided once a readout is available)

CHAD (If raised)

- We appreciated French help during the recent problems in Chad. Let's hope that Deby puts some distance between

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~~SECRET~~

himself and the Libyans. We hope to work with the new government.

- I take your point about the "Libyan National Army", and the ICRC. We are working to assure that they get full access to the exiled Libyans who are now in Zaire.
- You may want to make the point to Mobutu as well, since he has so far impeded ICRC access to the LNA.
- (If Mitterrand raises the issue of the French government not being informed:) I am told by my staff that the DGSE was briefed on the creation of the LNA. The DGSE Deputy Director was briefed in Paris on August 12, 1988, and the DGSE representative in Ndjamena was informed on August 18, 1988. My staff says that no objections were raised.

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~~SECRET~~

Mr. President, Dear George,

Your message of December 7, following the Security Council vote on Resolution 678, received my fullest attention.

I wish first of all to confirm to you, after my December 8 decision, that the French military presence in the Gulf will soon be substantially reinforced.

I am in agreement with you on the necessity of maintaining a united front with regard to Iraq, in order that the Iraqi President should not, in any instance, be able to use the weakness of some to resist the pressure of others. That is the purpose underlying the actions of France, on the military, political and diplomatic levels.

We were happy as to the conditions for voting on Resolution 678 and I am happy that the United States was able to accept the proposals for amendment made by France to safeguard all possible opportunities for peace.

It is in this spirit that we strive to bring the Iraqi President to reason.

You are concerned that demarches parallel to yours might give the impression of a lack of unity and determination. Even while understanding this point of view, I admit to being a little surprised by it. It was in fact on the initiative of France that the 5 ministers of permanent member countries of the Security Council met in New York on November 29, right after the vote, to coordinate their views and their demarches during the very sensitive period which lies between now and January 15. Roland Dumas had even proposed a joint demarche. Mr. James Baker preferred parallel and coordinated bilateral demarches. It was this that was agreed upon.

I wanted to interpret your initiative as reflecting this conclusion.

Also agreed upon was a new meeting of the 5, in mid-January, to maintain unity and assure that an identical message was being given to the Iraqi President. Roland Dumas wrote on this subject to Mr. Baker, as well as to his colleagues in the UK, USSR and China. The latter have replied and confirmed their agreement in principle. I would be pleased to know whether the United States also confirms this agreement.

With respect to a direct contact between France and Iraq, if there is occasion for it, I have not yet decided at what level and at what moment it will occur.

Naturally, I deem it indispensable that we maintain between us the closest possible coordination as to the approach to take towards Iraq. Everything must be done, in my opinion, to consolidate the possibilities for a peaceful outcome.

Sincerely,

Francois Mitterrand

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03e. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush [English] (2 pp.)	12/15/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (December 1990) II [2]

Date Closed: 6/17/2009	OA/ID Number: 91145-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03f. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush [French] (3 pp.)	12/15/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (December 1990) II [2]

Date Closed: 6/17/2009	OA/ID Number: 91145-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
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Translation of December 17 letter from President Mitterrand

Mr. President, Dear George,

I would like to bring to your attention a problem regarding Chad that concerns me. It has to do with the conditions of evacuation of the so-called Haftar group.

During the change of government in N'Djamena, the United States requested that France assist in the evacuation of the members of this group even though France had never been informed about the constitution of this force, either by the United States or by the Chadian authorities under President Hissene Habre. France agreed to provide technical assistance for the voluntary departure of the interested parties on a humanitarian basis.

We provided this assistance under two conditions: the formal agreement of the new N'Djamena authorities, which was given, and the involvement of the International Committee of the Red Cross under whose aegis the evacuation operation was to take place, which was agreed.

However, evacuation operations were not carried out in this fashion. Carried out under the direct responsibility of American representatives, they did not permit the ICRC the freedom of action that was required. The ICRC has told us that "it was unable to carry out its task of protection as it would have wished."

Even if one can attribute a certain haste to the need for urgency, it is nevertheless thoroughly regrettable that such activities could have occurred in violation of the Third Geneva Convention.

I strongly desire to see the ICRC enabled to accomplish its mission with regard to the interested parties in the country which has received them. I am making a demarche to this effect and I would be very pleased if you could do the same. It is, in my view, the only way of putting an end to a regrettable polemic.

Knowing that I can count on your cooperation, I ask that you accept, Mr. President and Dear George, the assurances of my very high esteem.

Very cordially yours,

Francois Mitterrand

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03h. Letter	President Mitterrand to President Bush [French] (2 pp.)	12/17/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (December 1990) II [2]

Date Closed: 6/17/2009	OA/ID Number: 91145-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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<DIST>SIT: BASORA RICE HUTCHINGS CHARLES MONTGOMERY ROSTOW WELCH WHSR_IRAQ
VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUFHFR<DTG> 201452Z DEC 90
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8955
INFO RUEHWW/GULF WAR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKK/EC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

<SUBJ> TFKU01: MITTERRAND REVIEWS FRANCE'S POSITION
ON GULF

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 37855
E.O. 12356: DECL:OARD
TAGS: PREL, IZ, KU, FR
SUBJECT: TFKU01: MITTERRAND REVIEWS FRANCE'S POSITION
ON GULF

REF: FBIS LONDON 192027Z DEC 90

(Q) 1. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE ON THE GULF DECEMBER 20. HE HELD FIRM ON THE CORE ISSUE: FRANCE WILL "NOT FAIL TO DO ITS HISTORIC DUTY" ON BEHALF OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN APPLYING UNSC 678 COME JANUARY 15. IRAQ MUST WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT; PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IS UNACCEPTABLE. HOWEVER, MITTERRAND STATED OVER AND OVER AGAIN THAT FRANCE WAS COMMITTED ONLY TO THE OBJECTIVES ESTABLISHED BY THE UN, I.E. THE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES AND THE WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. FRANCE WILL NOT ENGAGE IN CONTACTS WITH KUWAIT SO LONG AS THE U.S. AND IRAQ HAVE NOT REACHED AGREEMENT ON DATES (I.E. AT LEAST UNTIL JANUARY 3), ALTHOUGH FRANCE "ISN'T PROHIBITED FROM TAKING INITIATIVES."

MITTERRAND HIGHLIGHTED DIFFERENCES WITH THE USG POSITION. HE REFERRED REPEATEDLY TO HIS SEPTEMBER 24 UNGA SPEECH, AND SEEMED TO SAY THAT IF SADDAM HUSSEIN WERE TO ANNOUNCE BEFORE JAN. 15 A DECISION TO WITHDRAW, IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO PROVIDE HIM TIME TO IMPLEMENT SUCH A DECISION. MITTERRAND ALSO CRITICIZED U.S. ACTIONS IN NEW YORK WHICH HAVE LED TO POSTPONING PASSAGE OF A UN RESOLUTION REFERRING TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE ISRAEL/ARAB CONFLICT. COMMENT: THIS WAS A CLASSIC MITTERRAND PERFORMANCE, CONSISTENT WITH HIS HANDLING OF THE GULF CRISIS FROM THE OUTSET. HE SHOWED HIMSELF RESOLUTE ON THE KEY QUESTION -- WHERE FRANCE WILL BE IN THE EVENT OF WAR -- WHILE HIGHLIGHTING ALL POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES WITH THE U.S. ON THE CORE ISSUE MITTERRAND IS CLEAR, IF NOT EXPLICIT: FRANCE WILL TAKE PART IN ANY WAR WAGED AFTER JANUARY 15 IN IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RESOLUTION 678. (THIS IS THE POINT FROM THE NEWS CONFERENCE THAT HAS GRABBED HEADLINES HERE.) MITTERRAND ALSO PUT THE ONUS ON IRAQ, WHICH BEARS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR AVOIDING WAR. HOWEVER, MITTERRAND'S HAS ONCE AGAIN SHROUDED CLARITY ON THE FUNDAMENTALS WITH RHETORIC AND NUANCES THAT AMPLIFY FRANCE'S INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY. FINALLY, MITTERRAND REMAINS LOYAL TO HIS SEPT. 24 UNGA "PEACE PLAN," WHICH CONTAINS A POINT AT ODDS WITH THE U.S. POSITION (AND WITH ANY REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF UNSC RESOLUTION 678.) MITTERRAND, IN EFFECT, CALLS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0858MR
E8 7/7/15

FOR IRAQ TO DECLARE BEFORE JAN. 15 THAT IT WILL WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM KUWAIT; BY IMPLICATION, SUCH A (SUPERVISED) WITHDRAWAL COULD EXTEND BEYOND THE JAN. 15 DEADLINE.

END SUMMARY AND COMMENT

2. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOW.

-- FRANCE WILL CARRY OUT ITS "DUTY" IN THE APPLICATION OF UNSC 678 AND IN THE DEFENSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

ITS ROLE AS A GREAT POWER REQUIRES THAT FRANCE BE "PRESENT" AND THAT IT MEET ITS HISTORIC OBLIGATIONS (IMPLICITLY, IN THE EVENT OF WAR).

-- HOWEVER, FRANCE'S OBLIGATIONS EXTEND ONLY TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS. FOLLOWING THE HOSTAGE RELEASE, ONE OBJECTIVE REMAINS, VIZ. WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQ FROM KUWAIT. WHILE ALL OTHER ISSUES CAN BE ADDRESSED LATER, FRANCE'S ACTIONS (INCLUDING PARTICIPATION IN A WAR) ARE GUIDED EXCLUSIVELY BY UNSC OBJECTIVES.

-- FRANCE REFUSES TO ENGAGE IN SEPARATE CONTACTS WITH IRAQ AT THE PRESENT TIME: IF THE U.S. HAS NOT SUCCEEDED IN ARRANGING A MEETING WITH THE GOI, HOW COULD OTHER DISCUSSIONS (E.G. FRANCO-IRAQI) OCCUR WITHOUT CREATING THE WRONG IMPRESSION, ONE OF A BREAK IN THE COALITION?

-- HOWEVER, IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT A DIALOGUE WILL NEVERTHELESS TAKE PLACE, AND FRANCE RETAINS ITS FREEDOM OF ACTION. FRANCE WOULD ONLY ACT (PRESUMABLY AFTER JANUARY 3) IN CONSULTATION WITH ITS ALLIES.

-- THE BURDEN IS ON IRAQ, WHOSE INTRANSIGENCE ON DATES
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 37855
E.O. 12356: DECL:OARD

TAGS: PREL, IZ, KU, FR

SUBJECT: TFKU01: MITTERRAND REVIEWS FRANCE'S POSITION
ON GULF

"RISKS CREATING THE IRREPARABLE....THE LEADERS OF IRAQ, PARTICULARLY THE PRESIDENT, MUST HAVE A CLEAR AWARENESS OF THE RISKS THEY ARE RUNNING."

-- A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IS UNACCEPTABLE: THE UNSC REQUIRES COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL.

-- "IF KUWAIT WERE EVACUATED (BY IRAQI FORCES), IF THE ANNOUNCEMENT WERE MADE BEFORE JAN. 15 IN ANY CASE, IT WOULD BE NORMAL TO PROVIDE IRAQ GUARANTEES, SINCE IT WOULD HAVE AGREED TO WHAT WAS REQUESTED OF IT, AND SINCE THERE WOULD NOT BE A WAR. IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY THAT KUWAIT BE EVACUATED, THAT THIS BE ANNOUNCED BEFORE THE FATEFUL DATE," AND THAT THE WITHDRAWAL BE SUPERVISED, POSSIBLY BY THE UN.

-- FRANCE'S FORCES IN THE GULF ARE NOW AT THE DESIRABLE LEVEL; MAJOR REINFORCEMENTS ARE NOT FORESEEN.

-- THE U.S. IS HOLDING UP A UNSC RESOLUTION REFERRING TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE; THE DELAYS IN NEW YORK ARE "NOT REASONABLE."

-- INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES MUST DEAL WITH THREE ISSUES: THE GULF, THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT AND SECURITY/REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS IN THE REGION. THE LINK BETWEEN CONFERENCES AND THE SEQUENCE WAS NOT SPECIFIED.

-- WHAT HAPPENS IN THE GULF IS "OUTSIDE NATO'S GEOGRAPHIC ZONE, OUTSIDE ITS DEPARTMENT."

-- ALGERIAN PRESIDENT BENJEDID WILL MEET WITH MITTERRAND IN PARIS ON SATURDAY, DECEMBER 22.

CURLEY

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 7855<STOR> 901220101954 MSG000282997194
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN> 7855<STOR> 901220101912 MSG000282997152
<TOR>901220103659

Mr. President, Dear George,

- Translation of Mitterrand letter dated
- December 19.

Your message of December 7, following the Security Council vote on Resolution 678, received my fullest attention. #9914

I wish first of all to confirm to you, after my December 8 decision, that the French military presence in the Gulf will soon be substantially reinforced.

I am in agreement with the united front with the President should not weakness of some to purpose underlying political and diplomatic

From the desk of

George Bush

Bush

We were happy as to and I am happy that proposals for amendment opportunities for

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APNSA Has Seen

It is in this spirit to reason.

ident

You are concerned to have the impression of a lack of unity and determination. Even while understanding this point of view, I admit to being a little surprised by it. It was in fact on the initiative of France that the 5 ministers of permanent member countries of the Security Council met in New York on November 29, right after the vote, to coordinate their views and their demarches during the very sensitive period which lies between now and January 15. Roland Dumas had even proposed a joint demarche. Mr. James Baker preferred parallel and coordinated bilateral demarches. It was this that was agreed upon.

I wanted to interpret your initiative as reflecting this conclusion.

Also agreed upon was a new meeting of the 5, in mid-January, to maintain unity and assure that an identical message was being given to the Iraqi President. Roland Dumas wrote on this subject to Mr. Baker, as well as to his colleagues in the UK, USSR and China. The latter have replied and confirmed their agreement in principle. I would be pleased to know whether the United States also confirms this agreement.

With respect to a direct contact between France and Iraq, if there is occasion for it, I have not yet decided at what level and at what moment it will occur.

Naturally, I deem it indispensable that we maintain between us the closest possible coordination as to the approach to take towards Iraq. Everything must be done, in my opinion, to consolidate the possibilities for a peaceful outcome.

Sincerely,

Francois Mitterrand

Mr. President, Dear George,

December 19.

Your message of December 7, following the Security Council vote on Resolution 678, received my fullest attention. #9914

I wish first of all to confirm to you, after my December 8 decision, that the French military presence in the Gulf will soon be substantially reinforced.

I am in agreement with you on the necessity of maintaining a united front with regard to Iraq, in order that the Iraqi President should not, in any instance, be able to use the weakness of some to resist the pressure of others. That is the purpose underlying the actions of France, on the military, political and diplomatic levels.

We were happy as to the conditions for voting on Resolution 678 and I am happy that the United States was able to accept the proposals for amendment made by France to safeguard all possible opportunities for peace.

It is in this spirit that we strive to bring the Iraqi President to reason.

You are concerned that demarches parallel to yours might give the impression of a lack of unity and determination. Even while understanding this point of view, I admit to being a little surprised by it. It was in fact on the initiative of France that the 5 ministers of permanent member countries of the Security Council met in New York on November 29, right after the vote, to coordinate their views and their demarches during the very sensitive period which lies between now and January 15. Roland Dumas had even proposed a joint demarche. Mr. James Baker preferred parallel and coordinated bilateral demarches. It was this that was agreed upon.

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Sincerely,

Francois Mitterrand

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
031. Cable	Elysee France to White House Re: Letter from President Mitterrand to President Bush (2 pp.)	12/19/90	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (December 1990) II [2]

Date Closed: 6/17/2009	OA/ID Number: 91145-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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National Security Council
The White House

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LOG # 9914

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138

Ken Hill

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

9000021 P7. 57

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc:

VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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RECORD ID: 9009955
RECEIVED: 21 DEC 90 11

TO: GATES

FROM: DEAL

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 21 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
KUWAIT

IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: GULF CRISIS COORDINATION

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 25 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

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DEAL

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/17/09

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DOC 1 OF 1

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Chief of Staff Coordination
**National Security Council
The White House**

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Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>WS</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>BG</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
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West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>JHM 12/24</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>JHM 12/24</u>	<u>N/R</u>

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9955

December 21, 1990

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *li*
SUBJECT: Gulf Crisis Coordination

NOTED

Attached for your information are several tables (Tab I) concerning allied contributions to Desert Shield and the Front Line States. An additional table shows estimated increased earnings to oil producers.

Attachment
Tab I Tables

cc: Richard Haass
Karl Jackson
David Gompert
Virginia Lampley
Roman Popadiuk

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
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1/4/2000 MM

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AS AMENDED
1998-0099-F/S
2/24/2000 MM

DESERT SHIELD COSTS RESPONSIBILITY-SHARING FOR 1990

(as of 12/18/90)

DONOR	COMMITMENTS		DISBURSEMENTS (\$M)***	REMARKS/STATUS
	\$M	ALLOCATION		
SAUDI ARABIA	**	HOST NATION SUPPORT (HNS)	760 CASH 484 IN-KIND	HNS is fuel, food, water, facilities, local transport. \$760M cash is HNS reimbursement for US expenses thru Oct. Seeking \$1.051B for actual November and projected December en route transport expenses, with monthly payments thereafter.
KUWAIT	2500	ALL CASH	2500 CASH	Ten \$250M weekly transfers since 2 Oct.
UAE	1000	CASH AND HNS	250 CASH 85 IN-KIND	\$85M in-kind HNS is thru Oct. Project total CY 90 in-kind HNS of \$125M. Seeking \$625M remainder of commitment as cash (cable to UAE week 12/17).
JAPAN	2000	\$400M CASH FOR TRANSPORT \$350M IN-KIND MATERIAL \$80M IN-KIND LIFT \$120M MEDICAL TEAMS & OTHER MNF SUPPORT \$50M RESERVE FUND \$1B UNALLOCATED	428 CASH 62 IN-KIND 11 LIFT	GOJ working with CENTCOM on about \$700M of in-kind requirements: \$350M from first \$1B received or in pipeline. Diet has approved second \$1B, of which \$850M will be in-kind material and cash support for US forces. Likely allocation: \$400M in-kind, \$450M cash. \$11M lift is charters used through Nov.
FRG	1072	\$130M 60 NBC VEHICLES \$260M CASH \$660M IN-KIND MATERIAL \$22M EUCOM AIRLIFT	272 CASH 65 FUCHS	Fuchs NBC vehicles accepted, over half received. Over \$350M in-kind material in pipeline. \$22M airlift support is backfill for EUCOM lift assets now devoted to Desert Shield.
KOREA	95	\$50M CASH \$30M LIFT \$15M IN-KIND MNF SUPPORT	7 LIFT	\$7M lift is for charters used through 11/90. National Assembly has approved cash; disbursement expected by end of December.
TOTAL	6667	Commitment total does not include value of Saudi HNS.	4924	Disbursement total includes value of Saudi HNS received through 11/30.

*** Saudi Arabia's HNS is for US forces in Saudi Arabia and surrounding waters.
*** All in-kind receipts valued through November 30. Substantial additional in-kind material and lift in pipeline.

Classified by D/1337A (STR)
Declassify on OADP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILLING THE GAP OF
1990-91 ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR FRONTLINE STATES
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

	<u>TURKEY</u>	<u>JORDAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. <u>FINANCING GAP</u>	-3594	-3761	-7355
2. <u>FINANCING</u>			
A. <u>1990-91 UNDISBURSED</u>			
GCC States	1808	--	1808
EC Budget	--	682	682
EC Bilateral	--	114	114
Other Europe	--	141	141
Japan	--	1045	1045
Canada	--	--	--
Korea	--	<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>
Total	1808	2007	3815
B. <u>REMAINING GAP</u>	-1786	-1754	-3540
C. <u>1991 NEW COMMITMENTS</u>			
GCC States	1786	--	1786
EC/Europe	--	877	877
Japan	--	<u>877</u>	<u>877</u>
Total	<u>1786</u>	<u>1754</u>	<u>3540</u>
D. <u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	3594	3761	7355

12/19/90

FOLLOW-UP REQUEST FOR FRONT LINE ASSISTANCE

I. Current Status

- o Egypt's 1990-91 needs have already been fully covered.
- o Turkey's uncovered 1990-91 financing need is \$3.6 billion.
- o Jordan's uncovered 1990-91 financing need is \$3.8 billion.
- o Funds already committed in the GCFCG but not yet disbursed or specifically allocated total \$3.8 billion.
- o Thus, directing all available funds to Turkey and Jordan, would still leave a combined shortfall of \$3.5 billion.

II. Key Considerations

- o The Gulf States:
 - Unallocated GCFCG commitments to front line states now total \$1.8 billion.
 - Can be expected to maintain refusal to assist Jordan.
 - With Egypt already fully funded, suggests unallocated \$1.8 billion could be directed to Turkey.
 - Gulf States are also likely to be the principal focus of efforts to identify additional military financing.
- o Japan:
 - Now about \$1 billion in unallocated GCFCG commitments.
 - Has expressed appreciation for particular difficulties of Jordan.
 - Will also be considered prime target for additional military financing requests.
- o European Commission:
 - Bulk of GCFCG commitment still unallocated and undisbursed (\$682 million of \$760 million).
 - Assistance to Turkey has proven difficult given Greek resistance; providing assistance to Jordan may be easier.
 - Commission not a candidate for military assistance requests.

o European Countries:

- Bulk of EC member commitments already allocated, mainly to Egypt; unallocated and undisbursed only totals \$114 billion.
- Non-EC members represent \$141 in unallocated commitments.

III. Possible Approach

- o First, push for allocation/disbursement of committed funds.
- o Second, seek total of \$3.5 billion in new 1991 commitments.

Gulf States:

- o Essentially take full responsibility for filling remaining 1990-91 financing gap for Turkey.
- o Direct full amount of unallocated \$1.8 billion from existing GCFCG commitment to Turkey.
- o Pledge new monies to cover fully Turkey's remaining \$1.8 financing need in 1991.
- o Any new money for non-frontline countries would be additional to and separate from this amount.
- o New 1991 commitment of \$1.8 billion would be modest, leaving ample room for additional military burden sharing.

Japan/Europe:

- o Japanese, EC and members, and other Europeans collectively meet Jordan's \$3.8 billion uncovered financing need.
- o GCFCG commitments still unallocated by these countries total 2.00 ~~\$1.25~~ billion: Japan: \$1.045 billion; European Commission and EC members: \$796 million; other European: \$141 million.
- o Jordan's remaining, still uncovered need for \$1.75 billion would be met through additional targeted commitments from these countries, perhaps split 50:50.
- o New 1991 commitments from Japan and Germany would be modest enough to allow some additional military burden sharing.

Norway:

- o Should consider making special approach to Norway, either for military or economic assistance, or both.

- o Norway's incremental oil revenues (due to higher prices and volumes) will total about \$5.2 billion through end-1991.
- o Norwegian economic assistance amounts to \$23 million thus far; military participation is fairly minimal.

CRISIS-RELATED INCREASED OIL EXPORT EARNINGS
POTENTIAL DONORS
1990 & 1991
(U.S. Billion Dollars)

	1990 -----	1991 -----	1990-91 -----
OECD			
Norway	\$2.5	\$2.7	\$5.2
U.K.	\$0.7	\$0.8	\$1.5
Canada	\$0.5	\$0.6	\$1.1
GCC Total	<u>\$20.2</u>	<u>\$35.2</u>	<u>\$55.4</u>
Saudi Arabia	\$14.8	\$27.3	\$42.1
U.A.E.	\$3.7	\$5.9	\$9.6
Oman	\$1.1	\$1.3	\$2.4
Qatar	\$0.6	\$0.7	\$1.3
Other			
Brunei	\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.6

Note: Calculated by subtracting pre-crisis price and volume projections from current price and volume estimates and projections.

	1990 (5 months) -----	1991 (12 months) -----
Pre-crisis price	\$18.30/bbl	\$19.00/bbl
Current est./proj.	\$29.50/bbl	\$24.00/bbl

J Hurley/ICM
12/19/90

TO: KOHL, HELMUT

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 21 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: GERMANY
NATO DEFENSE
KUWAIT

TURKEY
IRAQ
TELCALL

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

WOERNER, MANFRED

SUBJECT: PRES MSG RE ACE MOBILE FORCE DEPLOYMENT

ACTION: PRES APPROVED CABLE DUE DATE: 24 DEC 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 1/7/09

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 3 OF 3

**National Security Council
The White House**

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	<u>1</u>	<u>12/20</u>	<u>D</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
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00 12/20 08.07

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

NSC/S
Cable sent via WHSR on
12/20
AR

DISPATCH INSTRUCTION

20 DEC 90

This Cable was processed
and transmitted this
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Situation Room

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PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 210219Z DEC 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO FEDERAL CHANCELLERY

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA SKIPPER CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KOHL FROM
THE PRESIDENT.

DECEMBER 20, 1990

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HELMUT,

I KNOW YOUR GOVERNMENT JUST CONSIDERED HOW TO RESPOND TO TURKEY'S
REQUEST FOR DEPLOYMENT OF PART OF NATO'S ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE
MOBILE FORCE UNDER AN EXISTING PLAN WHICH CURRENTLY INCLUDES A
GERMAN AIR UNIT. I KNOW AMBASSADOR WALTERS SPOKE TO YOU AND JIMBAKER TAL
K
ED TO MINISTER GENSCHER ABOUT THIS ISSUE EARLIER TODAY.
I WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THAT YOU INTEND TO JOIN OTHER ALLIES IN
AGREEING TO APPROVE TURKEY'S REQUEST FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THIS NATO
FORCE.

THE THREAT TO TURKEY IS REAL, AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NATO WILL
ACT COLLECTIVELY IN THIS INSTANCE TO HELP DEFEND AN ALLY. I WAS
PARTICULARLY STRUCK TO HEAR THAT THE GREEK REPRESENTATIVE NOT
ONLY AGREED TO THE TURKISH REQUEST, BUT PROMPTLY AND GRACIOUSLY
OFFERED RIGHTS OF TRANSIT THROUGH HIS COUNTRY FOR THE MOVE.

I KNOW THESE ARE NOT EASY DECISIONS, ESPECIALLY FOR YOUR COUNTRY.
THAT IS WHY I APPLAUD YOUR RESOLVE. YOUR ACTION DEMONSTRATES
THAT WE ARE ALL PREPARED TO STAND BEHIND THE NATO COMMITMENTS
THAT HAVE SERVED US SO WELL ALL THESE YEARS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR

#0059

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0059 <TOR> 901220212254 MSG000283036974

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0768-MR
2/25/13 MM

MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KOHL
VIA WHITE HOUSE CHANNELS
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH

December 20, 1990

Dear Helmut,

I know your government just considered how to respond to Turkey's request for deployment of part of NATO's Allied Command Europe Mobile Force under an existing plan which currently includes a German air unit. I know Ambassador Walters spoke to you and Jim Baker talked to Minister Genscher about this issue earlier today. I was pleased to hear that you intend to join other Allies in agreeing to approve Turkey's request for deployment of this NATO force.

The threat to Turkey is real, and it is important that NATO will act collectively in this instance to help defend an ally. I was particularly struck to hear that the Greek representative not only agreed to the Turkish request, but promptly and graciously offered rights of transit through his country for the move.

I know these are not easy decisions, especially for your country. That is why I applaud your resolve. Your action demonstrates that we are all prepared to stand behind the NATO commitments that have served us so well all these years.

Sincerely,

George Bush

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

9934 add-on

December 20, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT 

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW 

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Kohl on ACE Mobile Force
Deployment

General:
State has cleared
the text at Tab I.
(Seitz)

Pzelikow

Following up our earlier package discussing a possible call from the President to Kohl on this subject, Bob Gates has now talked to Secretary Baker. Baker talked to Genscher and believes the issue has been settled and that the Germans will agree to the deployment. Dave Gompert's earlier debrief from Bob Zoellick left the impression that the Germans might agree 'in principle' as they continue to evaluate the threat to Turkey.

Secretary Baker asked for a brief White House message to Kohl to help lock things up by congratulating him on his decision. We think this would be a good idea. One danger is that the Germans might agree to the move 'in principle' and alert their Alpha Jet squadron, in Germany, but not actually agree to deployment until they review the threat again some time in the indefinite future. To get the unit in place by early January, as the Turks asked, a deployment decision probably needs to be made now.

We have attached, at Tab I, a brief message to Kohl that indicates the President's pleasure with the German decision, implying that we understand Germany will accept the Turkish request for deployment of this part of the ACE Mobile Force. The message should go tonight, if possible, so that Kohl receives it on Friday morning, before the Friday afternoon DPC meeting at NATO.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize transmission of the message to Chancellor Kohl attached at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Message to Chancellor Kohl



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~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0859-MR

MM 11/9/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009927
RECEIVED: 20 DEC 90 13

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: SITTMANN
VAN ERON

CHRON FILE
DOC DATE: 21 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: HS

FRANCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY AS OF 21 DEC

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 24 DEC 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON LOGREF: 9009914

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
VAN ERON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 6/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: LMG LOG # 9927
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>WGA</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>RET 12/22</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>W/M 12/24</u>	<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

EX Secs Office has dispatch

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9927

December 21, 1990

President has seen
[Signature]

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN *KH for*
FROM: GEORGE VAN ERON *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Heads of State Correspondence Summary
as of December 21

Attached at Tab I is a summary of the Heads of State correspondence received by the Secretariat since Wednesday, December 19.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached summary to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Summary for the President
Tab A President Mitterrand - France

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/20/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTED

9927

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

**President Mitterrand of France - December 19, 1990
(Received December 20)**

President Mitterrand acknowledges your message concerning UN Resolution 678. He agrees that it is critical to maintain a united front against Iraq. To make this point, France will reinforce its troops in the Gulf.

He is surprised by your concern on parallel talks with Iraq. After the vote on Resolution 678, the permanent member countries decided to coordinate their views and demarches. He claims that France proposed a joint message, however, Secretary Baker preferred parallel and coordinated bilateral demarches. Although he has not decided at what level or at what time, direct talks with Iraq have not been ruled out.

The group also agreed to meet in mid-January to maintain unity and to coordinate messages to Iraq. Recently, Roland Dumas wrote to Secretary Baker on this subject, as well as his colleagues in the UK, USSR, and China.

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2010-0859-MR

MM 8/24/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. President, Dear George,

December 19.

Your message of December 7, following the Security Council vote on Resolution 678, received my fullest attention.

I wish first of all to confirm to you, after my December 8 decision, that the French military presence in the Gulf will soon be substantially reinforced.

I am in agreement with you on the necessity of maintaining a united front with regard to Iraq, in order that the Iraqi President should not, in any instance, be able to use the weakness of some to resist the pressure of others. That is the purpose underlying the actions of France, on the military, political and diplomatic levels.

We were happy as to the conditions for voting on Resolution 678 and I am happy that the United States was able to accept the proposals for amendment made by France to safeguard all possible opportunities for peace.

It is in this spirit that we strive to bring the Iraqi President to reason.

You are concerned that demarches parallel to yours might give the impression of a lack of unity and determination. Even while understanding this point of view, I admit to being a little surprised by it. It was in fact on the initiative of France that the 5 ministers of permanent member countries of the Security Council met in New York on November 29, right after the vote, to coordinate their views and their demarches during the very sensitive period which lies between now and January 15. Roland Dumas had even proposed a joint demarche. Mr. James Baker preferred parallel and coordinated bilateral demarches. It was this that was agreed upon.

I wanted to interpret your initiative as reflecting this conclusion.

Also agreed upon was a new meeting of the 5, in mid-January, to maintain unity and assure that an identical message was being given to the Iraqi President. Roland Dumas wrote on this subject to Mr. Baker, as well as to his colleagues in the UK, USSR and China. The latter have replied and confirmed their agreement in principle. I would be pleased to know whether the United States also confirms this agreement.

With respect to a direct contact between France and Iraq, if there is occasion for it, I have not yet decided at what level and at what moment it will occur.

Naturally, I deem it indispensable that we maintain between us the closest possible coordination as to the approach to take towards Iraq. Everything must be done, in my opinion, to consolidate the possibilities for a peaceful outcome.

Sincerely,

Francois Mitterrand

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

49914

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009965
RECEIVED: 21 DEC 90 14

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: ZELIKOW
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 21 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO DEFENSE
GERMANY
KUWAIT

TURKEY
IRAQ

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STATUS OF NATO DEPLOYMENT TO TURKEY & PROPOSED NEXT STEPS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 25 DEC 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

NATO membership to
National Security Council *Furley +*
The White House *Proposed*

PROOFED BY: WJA LOG # 9965
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG NS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>WJA</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>g</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>27.12/27</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N/R</u>

10.17.07
 90 12 21

A = Action	<u>I = Information</u>	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



9965

December 21, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW

SUBJECT: Status of NATO Deployment to Turkey and Proposed
Next Steps

Nat'l Sec. Council
Report
SR
D

2172

What Kohl Decided

Dick Walters got a copy earlier today of the instructions sent to the German mission at NATO in response to the Turkish request for deployment of the ACE Mobile Force. The central points were:

- The Federal Government will of course adhere to its treaty obligations.
- We are prepared to study immediately on-site the military prerequisites necessary to deploy a German squadron. For this purpose, we will dispatch an advance team.
- The Federal Government reserves its right to decide on the date of a deployment.
- Due to the constitutional situation, the employment of German armed forces in a military conflict can come only as the result of unambiguous aggression against the Alliance partner Turkey."

What Happened at the DPC Today, December 21

Will Taft phoned in a report to State which made it clear the Germans interpreted their instructions restrictively. They could not, in other words, agree to the NATO deployment even in principle, leaving open specifics on timing or participation. All other Allies were ready to support the move. The Italians had already agreed. The Belgians said they had alerted their forces and were prepared to deploy if NATO agreed. Privately the Belgians made it clear that they would only go if the Germans went.

The DPC agreed to put the best face on this non-decision with a press line as follows:

"The Turkish government has requested the deployment of the ACE Mobile Force. The ACE Mobile Force exists to demonstrate Allied

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0859-MR
MM 8/24/2016

solidarity and determination of the Alliance in the face of any potential threat to Allied territory, and thus contributes to deterrence and defense. A DPC meeting has taken place to consider the request and to set the process of decisionmaking in motion. The DPC welcomed the steps already being taken."

The German advance team to Turkey is to examine technical issues -- runway suitability, safety equipment, etc. The notional composition of the team appears to bear this out. Whatever the duties of the team itself, we believe its real mission is to give Germany, and Kohl, more time to decide what to do.

The DPC agreed to meet again to make a final decision on the Turkish request no later than January 4. The Turks would like to have the planes in Turkey before January 15, preferably by January 10. We have checked with the Pentagon and are told that the units involved can be in Turkey 48 hours after a deployment decision is made.

Proposed Next Steps

We believe it is essential for NATO to respond positively to this legitimate Turkish request for Allied support. To do this, we recommend a three-part strategy:

1. **With NATO:** Emphasize that it is essential that the next DPC meeting fully agree to the Turkish request. Try to hold the next DPC as soon as possible before January 4 to demonstrate the seriousness with which the Alliance approaches this request from an ally during a major crisis. Work for timely deployment of the ACE Mobile Force contingent before January 15.
2. **With Turkey:** Assure them of our complete support for their request and our determination to obtain a positive decision from NATO. Ask them not/not to withdraw their request (which, as jittery and exposed as they are, seems quite possible). Ask them to work with the Germans and offer our help in facilitating a smooth technical checkout for the Turkish installations.
3. **With Germany:** Establish their specific plans and timing for the advance team mission. Work with the Germans to facilitate a rapid evaluation that will permit a DPC decision at the earliest possible date. Offer to provide additional information on the Gulf situation and on the threat to Turkey. Press the Germans, at whatever level is necessary, to accept the Turkish request. The issue will probably be less one of German participation than of whether Germany can approve any NATO action at all. If the Germans agree to a NATO deployment, they will have conceded it is a legitimate NATO mission. Having conceded this they would have no basis for refusing to contribute their forces. However, if

the Germans privately tell us that they can go along with the NATO decision but not with their forces, we can work with them to find a substitute -- we know the Dutch would probably be willing. This would be a bad outcome for NATO and for Germany's standing here in the US, but not as bad as a failure by NATO to respond to Turkey's request.

If the Germans do agree to the NATO deployment with their forces, then we should treat Germany as a true coalition partner, and consider inviting Peter Hartmann to visit Washington for a meeting with you, followed by discussions with Haass, Gompert and officials from other agencies. State supports this idea.

If the Germans ask about our own military plans with Turkey, we should candidly describe our own deployments (which the FRG should know about already) and note that Turkey asked for these forces to serve defensive purposes. We should be prepared to indicate that these aircraft are not there to help initiate a conflict, but point out that Iraq plainly presents a major military threat to all her neighbors and that, if war breaks out, both Turkey, the US, and other Allies will need constantly to assess what the situation requires. If war did break out, we would undertake to consult with other affected members of the coalition before taking actions which would place their forces in jeopardy.

State will prepare a cable to go out in the next day or two which we hope will incorporate the main elements of this strategy, but not discussing our own military plans with Turkey.

Concurrence by: Nicholas Burns *for*

cc: Richard Haass

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9010011
RECEIVED: 26 DEC 90 09

TO: GATES

FROM: DEAL
HAASS

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 26 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
KUWAIT
JORDAN

IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
TURKEY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MTG OF INFORMAL STEERING GRP RE GULF CRISIS / COMMITMENTS &
DISBURSEMENTS OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE / 26 DEC

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 29 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF: 9009875 9010099

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL

HAASS

NSC CHRON

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSJEB

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9010011

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 GATES
001
001
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90122613 FOR INFORMATION
X 91020712 OBE. / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN
X 91040512 ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S
X 91040512 NOTED BY GATES

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 4/17/09

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Informal Steering Group Mtg
Dec 26

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: EA.
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 10011
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
DOCLOG 24 AIO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>		
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room	<u>3</u>	<u>EA. 4/5</u>	<u>N</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>		<u>N/R</u>
NSC Secretariat			

90 DEC 26 P 1.32

A = Action Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____
Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

European Steering Group Mtg
on Dec. 26 at 3:00 pm

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12/26

Bob:

It would have preferred to have a consolidated account of US and front line states needs / disbursements for this meeting. But State was late in providing inputs on Eastern Europe, and DOD insisted on a separate presentation, as for either bureaucracy or substantive reasons it declined to provide the data to Treasury. Such slippage near the holidays is perhaps understandable, but for the future we need a team effort -- and timely presentation of agency presentations / views, etc.

Tom

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

10011

December 26, 1990

INFORMATION

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL/RICHARD HAASS

SUBJECT: Gulf Crisis: Meeting of Informal Steering Group,
3:00 p.m., December 26, White House Situation Room

Attached at Tab I is Treasury's paper regarding commitments and disbursements of financial assistance to the front line states in connection with the Gulf crisis. At today's meeting DOD and State should also distribute papers on Desert Shield responsibility sharing and Eastern European needs, respectively.

We should use today's session to:

- Reach agreement on the resources needed from donor countries for both Desert Shield and the front line states, as well as priorities for both funding sources and recipients beyond these two categories.
- Consider a proposed strategy for approaching donors to ensure full funding of U.S. needs, speedier disbursement of previously unallocated and newly authorized assistance to the front line states, and equitable allocation of resources through earmarking of funds for Jordan and Turkey.
- Discuss the most effective means for confirming financial commitments and establishing disbursement timetables (e.g. through meetings of the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group and cabinet-level missions to donor countries).

The Treasury paper provides a current and complete inventory of commitments and disbursements to date. It also highlights several problems which have plagued the exercise from the outset:

- Disbursements continue to lag commitments. The Gulf states have provided the most in absolute terms, but even their disbursements for 1990 have fallen short of their commitments by \$3.5 billion. The data also tend to give credence to the public view of the EC and Japan as the principal laggards/deadbeats.
- Jordan and Turkey face the largest gap between commitments and needs. Jordan has received only 5% of estimated needs for 1990/91; Turkey, only 13%.

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Declassify on: OADR

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2010-0826012
Eg 10/6/15

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CONFIDENTIAL

2

- An additional \$3.5 billion in new financial commitments is needed in addition to full disbursement of all unallocated funds for 1990/91, which amount to \$3.8 billion.

Of course, we will need to add the costs of Desert Shield, and you should ask DOD and Treasury to consolidate their accounts before any approach to other governments. Getting timely data from DOD continues to prove difficult.

On the financial assistance side, the Treasury paper sets forth a strategy for overcoming the problems outlined above. In brief, the U.S. would seek to : (a) obtain the full disbursement of 1990 commitments by end-January 1991 and of 1991 commitments by end-March 1991; and (b) earmark unallocated funds for 1990-91 and new commitments to Jordan and Turkey, since Egypt is "oversubscribed".

To implement the strategy, Treasury proposes that the multinational Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group play the central role in speeding disbursements and nailing down new commitments. This group had tentative plans to meet in mid-January in any event. Treasury asserts that this group "should be used to lay the groundwork for a possible Cabinet-level trip". That statement reflects views at the sub-Cabinet and working levels in both State and Treasury to the effect that any new Baker/Brady missions concerning responsibility sharing should follow -- not precede -- the next meeting of the Financial Coordination Group.

We suggest the following scenario for today's meeting:

- DOD summarizes the needs for Desert Shield.
- Treasury describes the financial assistance picture.
- State addresses the special needs of Eastern Europe.

After that the Steering Group should discuss the implementation strategy and timing of possible approaches to other governments.

Bill Diefenderfer may raise the question of interagency coordination of any public statements regarding responsibility sharing (see Bob Howard's memorandum at Tab II). Boucher's comments to the press were not reviewed by other Departments, and the data are misleading. We have coordinated previous testimony, Q's and A's, etc. OMB is concerned -- with good reason -- that comments like Boucher's will fuel Congressional concern about the division of labor among the coalition partners.

Attachments

Tab I Treasury paper
Tab II Bob Howard's Memo

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
~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9010019
RECEIVED: 26 DEC 90 12

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: BASORA

DOC DATE: 26 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: FRANCE
IRAQ

TELCON
KUWAIT

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: TELCON OF 24 DEC PRES CALL TO MITTERRAND RE GULF CRISIS

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 29 DEC 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASORA
LORD
NEIL
NSC CHRON
O'LEARY

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY MEV DATE 12/26 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSBTM

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

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10019

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Francois Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mitterrand
Adrian Basora, NSC Staff, (notetaker)
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

DATE, TIME December 24, 1990, 2:08-2:15 p.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Francois, comment allez vous? I am just calling to wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year. I am with my family at Camp David and our spirits are good for the Christmas season, despite the difficult times. (U)

President Mitterrand: Thank you. Please give my warm regards to your family and my Christmas greetings. Is it cold there at Camp David? (U)

The President: Yes, and Barbara is out for one of her long walks in the cold. (U)

President Mitterrand: Is it a good cold? Are your children there? (U)

The President: Yes, it is a refreshing cold. The rest of my children and grandchildren arrive tonight, all except for two. Are you in Paris, or at your country home? (U)

President Mitterrand: I am in the country for a few days. (U)

The President: Listen, I don't want to talk business on Christmas Eve, but I would like to consider sending a very high-level emissary to visit you soon after the first of January to discuss the Gulf and a few other issues. (S)

President Mitterrand: I will be back in Paris on the morning of January 3. (U)

The President: I much appreciated your strong statement on the Gulf the other day. Would you be able to receive Brent Scowcroft, or someone else, soon after January 3? (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
8/21/2009 JMM

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~~SECRET~~
2

President Mitterrand: Yes, certainly. I will receive him as soon as he arrives. We will then be in a more difficult time frame. (S)

The President: Yes, we will. I don't see any sign of change by Saddam Hussein, nor any room for flexibility on our part. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, that is right, as long as things remain as they are. But I am not sure that Saddam Hussein will not show some movement before January 15. (S)

The President: Perhaps, peut-etre, peut-etre. (U)

President Mitterrand: I hope you will have a good Christmas Eve with your family. You know you can reach me at any time. (U)

The President: I hesitated to call during your private holiday, but I wanted to tell you how much I appreciate our personal relationship. (U)

President Mitterrand: This is the time of year when one likes to be in touch with one's friends. Have a happy 1991!

The President: Let's keep in touch. Have a Merry Christmas.

-- End of Conversation --

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

10019

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 26, 1990

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA *AHB*

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Francois Mitterrand of
France on December 24, 1990

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and President Francois Mitterrand of France
on December 24, 1990.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve *VW*

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By MM NARA, Date 11/20/2013

PROOFED BY: WST LOG # 10019
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WST A/O _____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Telcom - Mitterand

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:



10003

PRES NOTED SUMMARY



UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear President Bush:

I have received, with thanks and appreciation, your letter regarding the situation in the Gulf and the departure of American citizens from Kuwait and Iraq, and the withdrawal of the remaining American diplomats from Kuwait.

With regards to your reference that the upcoming talks with Iraq will be to confirm the original message of non-negotiation, it is felt that your views on this matter are wise and accurate. Without a doubt, the attempts by officials in Iraq to delay responding to the issue of the visit are, as you pointed out, designed to influence and weaken the international coalition. This is a matter which we feel will not occur due to the efforts which you have expended and which reflect the will of the international community.

The unity of this determination, as well as our joint efforts to reinforce it and to maintain the unity of the international position will, god willing, achieve our joint objective of implementing the resolutions of the Security Council in all aspects and weaken all attempts at compromise and delay.

Once again, I wish to express my thanks and appreciation. I shall remain in contact with you on issues of concern to our nations.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud
King of Saudi Arabia

Jeddah 28 Jumad Alawal 1411 H
15 December 1990

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NSC/S PROFILE


RECORD ID: 9010036
RECEIVED: 27 DEC 90 10

TO: PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 27 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: TURKEY
 PERSIAN GULF
 KUWAIT

NATO
IRAQ
TELCALL

PERSONS: OZAL, TURGUT

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR PRES TELCALL TO PRES PZAL 28 DECE GULF CRISIS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 31 DEC 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOMPERT

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON
O'LEARY

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 6/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

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DOC 2 OF 3

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: SA LOG # 10036
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>H</u>
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>2</u>	<u>APNSA</u>	<u>Has Seen</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>WEA 12/27</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
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_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Gen has signed but
there is a change*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

*in TP's - See
page 2*


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 28, 1990

MR. PRESIDENT:

Per NSC, Özal will be in
Ankara all weekend. The
time difference is eight
hours ahead.

Thank you.


James W. Cicconi

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10030

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 27, 1990

90 DEC 27 PM 4:47

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Call to President Ozal

NOTED

I had recommended a non-substantive call to share best wishes for 1991 with Ozal. Two recent developments suggest a more substantive conversation would be appropriate, in light of Turkey's crucial role in the Gulf crisis and the very trying times Ozal is facing:

- o NATO is still deliberating on Turkey's request for deployment of the "Ace Mobile Force," owing to Helmut Kohl's hesitation. We are pressing for a decision by New Year's Eve. A German advance team is en route to Ankara; its report should enable Kohl to confirm soon Germany's support for deployment before January 15. Nevertheless, the Turks have been shaken by German -- and therefore NATO's -- equivocation, which Ozal considers "grave, perplexing, and disappointing."
- o Ozal gave an interview on December 23 which was uncomplimentary toward us. While affirming his intention to maintain Turkey's current stance until the crisis is resolved, he reportedly said that Turkey's pro-US policies might cease after the crisis because we treat Turkey "like a stepchild." Ozal is complaining that we have not responded to Turkey's security assistance requirements, by continuing to adhere to the "incredible" 7:10 (Greece:Turkey) FMS credits ratio and by failing to finance future F-16 co-production. The Turkish Foreign Minister called in Ambassador Abramowitz on Christmas Day to present some of these same points, which he said came directly from President Ozal.

We are working to meet Turkish concerns on both of these issues. On the ACE Mobile Force, we are pushing NATO (and specifically Germany) very hard for a positive decision to deploy and will watch developments closely during the next few days. If we believe the Germans are considering a negative decision, we may ask you to call Kohl.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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PER E.O. 13526

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Declassify on: OADR

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We have also launched a senior-level interagency review of Turkey's military needs for the Gulf crisis (air defense) and for the longer term. We intend to get back to the Turks by the first week in January on their most urgent requests. Our aim is to have a concrete and realistic package of longer term assistance measures ready for your trip to Ankara in February.

The attached talking points, in addition to wishing Ozal well for the New Year, are meant to assure him that Turkey's position vis-a-vis Iraq will lead to greater U.S. support and allied recognition.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points

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TALKING POINTS FOR OZAL

- Mr. President, I wanted to wish you all the best for 1991. I am sure that it will be a good year for Turkey and for you.
- I hope that you have been able to get some rest and spend some time with your family.
- Your friendship has come to mean a great deal to me. No one has been stronger than you throughout this crisis. The multinational coalition could not have held without your leadership.
- Because of your decisiveness and vision, Turkey will emerge as a leading player, commanding wide respect and wielding great influence in both the West and the Middle East.
- I know that you have shown remarkable political courage and agility in Turkey. Together, we have chosen a course that will not maximize popularity -- but is right nevertheless.
- Do not be disheartened by NATO's deliberations concerning the ACE Mobile Force Deployment. If Kohl had not been surprised, the matter would be settled already.
- We are in touch with the Germans at the highest level. I am monitoring the situation in NATO and will intervene if need be to produce a positive decision within a few days.
- We are studying your military equipment requests, as well as your financing needs for the F-16s. We intend to share some initial thoughts with you by the first week in January. And I see these as priority issues for our next meeting.

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28 8/10/15

-- We need to stay in very close touch during the weeks ahead.

(If Ozal asks about your proposed visit to Turkey in February:

-- As we discussed, I am looking forward to visiting you in Ankara after my next summit meeting with Gorbachev.

-- We have tentatively worked out February 11-13 as the dates for my trip to Moscow.

-- We have told your Ambassador here that we would like to wait until early to mid-January before announcing publicly my visit to see you since there are a number of events which could possibly delay a trip to the USSR.

-- I will be back in touch as soon as we are able to make a firm decision.

(If Ozal asks that the U.S. support Turkish diplomat Turkmen for the post of director UNRWA--the UN agency supporting the Palestinian refugees:

-- I am very pleased to tell you that we strongly support Ambassador Turkmen for the Director of UNRWA, and have communicated our support directly to Secretary General Perez de Cuellar.

-- We understand that while the UNSYG has not yet made a final decision, it appears Ambassador Turkmen is in a very strong position.)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 27, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID C. GOMPERT 

SUBJECT: Presidential Call to President Ozal

In light of developments concerning Turkey's request that NATO dispatch the ACE Mobile Force, as well as a recent Ozal interview critical of us, I am suggesting a more substantive call from the President than the "holiday greeting" call previously recommended. Attached is a memorandum to the President explaining the situation and offering new talking points.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Talking Points

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9010050
RECEIVED: 27 DEC 90 13

CHRON FILE



TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HUTCHINGS
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 27 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: TURKEY
IRAQ
NATO

PERSIAN GULF
KUWAIT
UN

PERSONS: HARTMANN, PETER

SUBJECT: TELCALL TO HARTMANN RE TURKEY ACE MOBILE FORCE DEPLOYMENT REQUEST

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 31 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPERT
HUTCHINGS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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DOC 1 OF 1

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**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: SLM

LOG # 10050

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
<u>SL</u> Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>copy</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>lms 1/19</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N/A</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

90 DEC 27 P 2: 26

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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December 27, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT 

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS 

SUBJECT: Call to Peter Hartmann on Turkey's ACE Mobile Force Deployment Request

We think it important that Peter Hartmann hear from you how vital it is that the German decision on deploying ACE Mobile Force be prompt and positive. We recommend that you call him Friday, December 28, by which time the Chancellor's office may have received the German advance team's report on Turkey's request.

You should also use the occasion to invite Hartmann to visit Washington at an early opportunity shortly after NATO's DPC has made its recommendation. You will want to propose the visit in a way that does not give the Germans an excuse further to delay their decision on the ACE Mobile Force. This would be part of a coalition consultation strategy, as discussed with Richard Haass, and might obviate the need for a visit to Bonn by a Presidential emissary. State and Ambassador Walters agree on the desirability of an early visit here by Hartmann.

Following your phone call to Hartmann and Manfred Woerner's talk with Kohl on Saturday, we would then determine whether the President's intervention with Kohl is needed.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call Peter Hartmann on Friday, December 28, drawing on the talking points at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR CALL TO HARTMANN

- I am calling to see where you stand on Turkey's request for a deployment of ACE Mobile Force.
- The Turks, as you know, are nervous. Turkey is crucial in convincing Saddam Hussein to implement the UN resolution. Yet Ozal's policies may not survive if NATO fails to follow through quickly. The sooner we can act, the better.
- We are calling for a NATO decision by Monday if possible. If need be, we can wait until Wednesday, January 2, so long as the outcome is positive.
- Obviously, Germany's participation is extremely important. This is a test not only of the Gulf coalition but of NATO itself. Failure to respond swiftly and unequivocally to an Ally facing a threat would have grave ramifications.
- If you think there is any doubt about German participation, or if you think that the President and the Chancellor need to talk about this, please let me know.
- We can't afford any missed signals on this one, particularly since we want ACE deployed before the January 15 UN deadline.
- After NATO has reached a decision on this, I would like to invite you to come to Washington for a visit.

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2010-0860-MR
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2

- o In addition to discussing the Gulf, this would be good chance for the two of us to have a broad, general discussion about the whole range of issues ahead of us.
- o Would you be able to arrange a brief visit here the week of January 7?

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