

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91145
Folder ID Number: 91145-005

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (December 1990) II [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Letter	President Bush to Sultan Qaboos bin Said (2 pp.)	12/14/90	(b)(1)	
01b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to the sultan of Oman (1 pp.)	12/13/90	(b)(1)	S
01c. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Letter to the Sultan of Qaboos (1 pp.)	12/11/90	(b)(1)	S
01d. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Letter for Sultan Qaboos (1 pp.)	12/8/90	(b)(1)	S
01e. Draft Letter	President Bush to Sultan Qaboos bin Said (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Gulf Coalition Ambassadors (1 pp.)	12/15/90	(b)(1)	✓
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Coalition Ambassadors (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
02c. List	Re: Allied/Coalition Forces of Desert Shield (1 pp.)	12/14/90	(b)(1)	✓
02d. Memo	Richard Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting with Gulf Coalition Ambassadors (1 pp.)	12/14/90	(b)(1)	✓

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (December 1990) II [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1210
OA/ID Number: 91145-005
Date Closed: 6/17/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03. Memo	Wendy Chamberlin to Brent Scowcroft Re: Preparedness for Chemical/Biological Terrorist Attack within the United States (2 pp.)	12/17/90	(b)(1)	TS
04a. Letter	Re: Unofficial Translation of the Letter from T.H. Giulio Andreotti, President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Italy, to T.H. George Bush, President of the United States of America (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04b. Message	Re: Text of the Message Addressed to the President of the United States of America from the President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Italy (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04c. Declaration	From Italian Embassy Re: Declaration on the Gulf Crisis (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04d. Declaration	From Italian Embassy Re: Declaration on the Middle East (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04e. Declaration	From Italian Embassy Re: Declaration on Lebanon (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04f. Declaration	From Italian Embassy Re: Declaration on South Africa (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04g. Cable	Re: Egypt: Message from President Mubarak to President Bush (2 pp.)	12/13/90	(b)(1)	TS

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05. Letter	Prime Minister Major to President Bush Re: Text of a Message Dated 11 December 1990 from the Prime Minister to President Bush (3 pp.)	12/11/90	(b)(1)	S
06a. Memo	Willaim F. Sittmann to James Cicconi Re: Talking Points for December 20 Meeting with Senators who just returned from the Gulf (1 pp.)	12/19/90	(b)(1)	✓
06b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Senators Just Back from the Gulf (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
06c. Talking Points	Re: President's Remarks to the Senators just back from Gulf (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
06d. Memo	Richard N. Haass/Virginia Lampley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Talking Points for December 20 Meeting with Senators who just returned from the Gulf (1 pp.)	12/19/90	(b)(1)	✓
07a. Memo	William F. Sittmann to James Cicconi Re: Talking Points fro December 20 Meeting with House Intelligence Committee (1 pp.)	12/19/90	(b)(1)	✓
07b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with the House Intelligence Committee (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
07c. Talking Points	Re: Presidents Remarks to the House Intelligence Committee (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓

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07d. Memo	Richard N. Haass/Virginia Lampley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Talking Points for December 20 Meeting with the House Intelligence Committee (1 pp.)	12/19/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 4 of 4

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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008977
RECEIVED: 13 NOV 90 11

TO: FOLEY, THOMAS S

FROM: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE
DOC DATE: 06 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
CO

WAR POWERS



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SCOWCROFT REPLY TO REP FOLEY RE CONGRESS ROLE IN THE EVENT OF WAR
IN PERSIAN GULF

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 16 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES

HAASS

LAMPLEY

NSC CHRON

ROSTOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRCB

CLOSED BY: NSJWD

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 6, 1990

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter on behalf of eighty-one Members of Congress to the President.

Since Iraq's unlawful, unprovoked aggression against Kuwait at the beginning of August, the President and other members of this Administration have consulted closely with Congress as events have unfolded and the international community has responded to the Persian Gulf crisis. This close consultation reflects our firm belief that by acting together we best can serve the interests of our Nation. Our policy and the possibility of a peaceful resolution of this crisis have been immeasurably strengthened by repeated expressions of congressional support.

In the days ahead, the Administration will continue to consult closely with Congress, so that the basic identity of views thus far achieved may be strengthened even more and so that we may continue to benefit from your counsel. We also want to work to minimize any differences regarding how best to achieve the goals we share. The stakes are high and our vital national interests are at issue. We can and will succeed. This situation demands the kind of consultation we have enjoyed so far, and it shall continue.

Thank you again for writing.

Sincerely,


Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 13, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS 

FROM: ~~SANDRA~~ SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Response to Congressman Foley

Attached at Tab I is a response to Congressman Foley's letter of October 25, 1990 to the President (Tab II) expressing his concern about Congress' role in the event of war in the Persian Gulf.

Nick Row  and Ginny  concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to Congressman Foley at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Response to Congressman Foley
Tab II Letter from Congressman Foley



The Speaker
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

October 30, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

The attached statement was recently presented to me in a meeting with a number of its co-signers. At their request, I agreed to provide it to you.

These Members stated their concern that any Congressional leadership consultative group with which you may meet not be viewed as a surrogate for the Congress as a whole. They asked that you select Members from among their number as well as from the leadership when consulting on developments in the Persian Gulf. I ask that you give this request all due consideration.

With warm regards, I am,
believe me,

Yours faithfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Thomas S. Foley".

Thomas S. Foley
The Speaker

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Attachment

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

STATEMENT OF CONCERN

October 26, 1990

We, as Members of Congress, express our grave concern about the possibility of war in the Middle East.

Recent reports and briefings indicate that the United States has shifted from a defensive to an offensive posture and that war may be imminent. We believe that the consequences would be catastrophic -- resulting in the massive loss of lives, including 10,000 to 50,000 Americans. This would not be a "low intensity conflict." This could only be described as war. Under the U.S. Constitution, only the Congress can declare war.

We are emphatically opposed to any offensive military action. We believe the U.N.-sponsored embargo must be given every opportunity to work and that all multinational, non-military means of resolving the situation must be pursued. If, after all peaceful means to resolve the conflict are exhausted, and the President believes that military action is warranted, then under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, he must seek a declaration of war from the Congress.


Given that Congress is about to adjourn, possibly until next year, we are gravely concerned that the Administration may attempt an end-run around the Constitution. We understand a mechanism is being established by which a few Members of Congress will be monitoring the situation. This group should not be seen as a surrogate for the entire body of Congress. We firmly believe that consulting with this group in no way replaces the President's Constitutional obligation to seek a declaration of war before undertaking any offensive military action. We demand that the Administration not undertake any offensive military action without the full deliberation and declaration required by the Constitution.


1 Les AuCoin
2 Jim Bates
3 Anthony C. Beilenson
4 Charles E. Bennett
5 David E. Bonior
6 Barbara Boxer
7 Albert G. Bustamante
8 William Clay
9 Ronald D. Coleman
10 Cardiss Collins
11 John Conyers, Jr.
12 George W. Crockett
13 Peter DeFazio
14 Ronald V. Dellums
15 Julian C. Dixon
16 Byron L. Dorgan
17 Richard J. Durbin
18 Mervyn M. Dymally
19 Don Edwards
20 Mike Espy
21 Lane Evans
22 Walter E. Fauntroy
23 Vic Fazio
24 Floyd H. Flake
25 Thomas M. Foglietta
26 Harold E. Ford
27 William D. Ford
28 Barney Frank
29 Henry B. Gonzalez
30 William H. Gray
31 Augustus F. Hawkins
32 Charles A. Hayes
33 Dennis Hertel
34 George J. Hochbrueckner
35 Jim Jontz
36 Marcy Kaptur
37 Robert W. Kastenmeier
38 Barbara B. Kennelly
39 Gerald Kleczka
40 John J. LaFalce
41 John Lewis
42 Thomas A. Luken
43 Jim McDermott


44 Thomas J. Manton
45 Kweisi Mfume
46 George Miller
47 Norman Y. Mineta
48 John Joseph Moakely
49 Jim Moody
50 Bruce A. Morrison
51 David Nagle
52 James L. Oberstar
53 Major R. Owens
54 Wayne Owens
55 Leon E. Panetta
56 Donald M. Payne
57 Donald J. Pease
58 Nancy Pelosi
59 Carl C. Perkins
60 Nick Joe Rahall, II
61 Charles B. Rangel
62 Edward R. Roybal
63 Gus Savage
64 Thomas C. Sawyer
65 Patricia Schroeder
66 Jose' Serrano
67 Louise McIntosh Slaughter
68 Fortney Pete Stark
69 Louis Stokes
70 Gerry Studds
71 Edolphus Towns
72 James A. Traficant, Jr.
73 Bob Traxler
74 Jolene Unsoeld
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76 Doug Walgren
77 Craig A. Washington
78 Ted Weiss
79 Alan Wheat
80 Pat Williams
81 Howard Wolpe


Ronald V. Dellums, M.C.



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

Albert Bustamante, M.C.


Lane Evans, M.C.


Edward R. Roybal, M.C.



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

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

David Nagle, M.C.


Dennis Hertel, M.C.


Pat Williams, M.C.



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

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

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

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
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
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
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
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John Joseph Moakley, M.C.




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Major R. Owens, M.C.



John Lewis, M.C.



George W. Crockett, M.C.



Barbara Boxer, M.C.




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
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
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
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
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
Mervyn M. Dymally, M.C.




Gus Savage, M.C.




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
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
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
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
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Louise Slaughter, M.C.





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



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Thomas M. Foglietta, M.C.



Walter E. Fauntroy, M.C.



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

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

Robert W. Kastenmeier, M.C.



Augustus F. Hawkins, M.C.



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

Byron Dorgan, M.C.


James A. Traficant, Jr., M.C.



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

Richard J. Durbin, M.C.



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

George J. Hochbrueckner, M.C.


William D. Ford, M.C.


John J. LaFalce, M.C.


Carl C. Perkins, M.C.


Don Pease, M.C.


Howard Wolpe, M.C.

8911
THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

ID# 187954

ND 016

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 02, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE THOMAS S. FOLEY

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES AN OCT 26 90 "STATEMENT OF CONCERN"
URGING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION NOT UNDERTAKE
ANY OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTION WITHOUT THE
FULL DELIBERATION AND DECLARATION REQUIRED BY

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE		ORG	90/11/02	FM A 90/11/02 DJ	
REFERRAL NOTE: NSSCO		R	90/11/09		
REFERRAL NOTE: 99000		I	90/11/13		
REFERRAL NOTE: 99000		I	90/11/13		
REFERRAL NOTE: CUGRAY		I	90/11/09 DJ		

COMMENTS: THE STATEMENT OF CONCERN IS SIGNED BY 81
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
INCOMING REC'D FROM HENRY PLASTER, NOV 2 90,
FOR TRACKING

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230
MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

```

*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                      *                      *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL  *          OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED          *          CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED          *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *          OUTGOING  *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                      *
*****

```

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

November 6, 1990

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President enclosing a copy of the statement you received from a number of Democratic House Members expressing their support for the President's continued consultation with Congress concerning the situation in the Persian Gulf.

We appreciate being apprised of their perspective on this important matter. I have shared your letter and their comments with a number of the President's advisors in this matter for their prompt consideration.

Thank you again for writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

FDM:HGP:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for Direct
Response

bcc: w/ copy of inc to DoD - FYI

bcc: w/ copy of inc to State - FYI

bcc: w/ copy of inc to Boyden Gray - FYI

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009640
RECEIVED: 10 DEC 90 09

CHRON FILE

TO: QABOOS

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 14 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: OMAN
PERSIAN GULF

HS
IRAQ

2

PERSONS: QABOOS

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO SULTAN QABOOS OF OMAN RE US / OMAN ACCESS AGREEMENT

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 13 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CHARLES
GANTT
HAASS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY MT DATE 12/14 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSMJT

DOC 4 OF 4

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9009640
DATE 14 DEC 90

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO SULTAN QABOOS OF OMAN RE US / OMAN ACCESS AGREEMENT
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

COPY: 0

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 6/17/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9009640

REFERRAL

DATE: 14 DEC 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: QABOOS

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 14 DEC 90

SUBJ: PRES LTR TO SULTAN QABOOS OF OMAN RE US / OMAN ACCESS AGREEMENT

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE:

COMMENT:

FOR


GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

CB

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. 1729 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2
 FROM WILLIAM P. SITTHAM (NAME) _____ (EXTENSION) _____ (ROOM NUMBER) _____

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION LTR TO SULTAN OF OMAN

LOG # 9640

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
STATE	MR J STAPLETON ROY	EXEC SEC	

REMARKS ***FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING*SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW***

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/17/09

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1990

Your Majesty:

I would like to express my deep satisfaction with our extraordinary cooperation in deterring Iraqi aggression. The foundation of that cooperation is the U.S.-Oman Access Agreement which our two governments renewed on December 1. Nothing could be a more concrete example of Your Majesty's vision. The Agreement has been instrumental in implementing our military strategy in the present crisis as well as during the Iran-Iraq conflict.

We share a strong interest in preserving the security of Oman and other friendly governments in the area and in ensuring freedom of navigation between the states of the area and their trading partners. Since its inception, the Access Agreement has contributed to these goals, and I am confident it will continue to do so. Its renewal further strengthens our relations while signaling to our friends and foes alike our determination to protect our mutual interests in the region.


My administration has firmly demonstrated the commitment of the United States to help the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council deter external threats in the Gulf and, if deterrence fails, to consider appropriate steps, including the use of military force, in accordance with our constitutional processes. In this regard, any threat to the independence and territorial integrity of the Sultanate would be regarded by the United States with grave concern. Were this to occur, we would expect to consult closely with your government on an appropriate coordinated response. Furthermore, we intend to maintain a U.S. military presence in the Gulf

region, commensurate with the threat to our mutual interests. We also plan to ensure we have the flexibility and the capability to respond quickly to future contingencies in an appropriate manner should the need arise, as we have done in the current Gulf crisis.

Let me add that, as Vice President and as President, I have watched with great respect as you developed a new and important role for your country in maintaining security in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Your Majesty, it is clear your leadership and vision have guided the Sultanate to its special position in the region and inspired the steadfast professionalism with which Omani military forces conduct their mission. In closing, let me express how pleased I am that U.S. forces are cooperating so well with yours in responding to the current threat from Iraq to our mutual interests in the region. Let me assure you, Your Majesty, that U.S. resolve will not be diminished until this challenge to regional peace and stability has been successfully met.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "G. Bush", written in a cursive style.

His Majesty
Sultan Qaboos bin Said
Sultan of Oman
Muscat

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to the sultan of Oman (1 pp.)	12/13/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (December 1990) II [1]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By ES On 7/21/22

Date Closed: 6/17/2009	OA/ID Number: 91145-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0854-MR (500.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 11/12/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9640

" PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
12-14-90

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

90 DEC 13 PM 8:10

December 13, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *RG for*
SUBJECT: Letter to the Sultan of Oman



Purpose

To reaffirm to Sultan Qaboos of Oman^{1.4(d)} the U.S.-Oman Access Agreement renewed on December 1, 1990.

Background

As part of the formalities of the initial signing and five year review of the U.S.-Oman Access Agreement, Presidents Carter and Reagan confirmed in letters to Sultan Qaboos^{1.4(d)}

The U.S.-Oman Access Agreement was renewed on December 1. We have prepared a letter (Tab A) similar to those of your predecessors to show the high degree of importance we attach to the renewal of this agreement, particularly at this critical time. The letter also expresses our strong appreciation for the support we have received thus far from the Sultan for U.S. forces sent to Oman in response to the current crisis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to the Sultan of Oman at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Letter to the Sultan of Oman

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0854-MR
EJ 111215

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Letter to the Sultan of Qaboos (1 pp.)	12/11/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)

By EG On 7/21/22

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (December 1990) II [1]

Date Closed: 6/17/2009	OA/ID Number: 91145-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0854-MR (500.02)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 11/12/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9640

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



December 11, 1990



Fix
Letter

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: ~~SANDRA~~ CHARLES

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to the Sultan of Qaboos

Attached at Tab I is a memo to the President asking him to sign a letter to the Sultan of Oman (Tab A) ^{1.4(d)}

consistent with the U.S.-Oman Access Agreement. The Agreement was officially renewed on December 1. After its initiation and after the five-year mandated review, Presidents Carter and Reagan sent the Sultan similar letters.

A proposed response, which has been coordinated in substance with Defense, was provided by State (Tab B).

Nick Rostow *NR* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Letter to the Sultan of Oman
Tab II Memo from Roy

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0854-MR
Eg 11/12/15

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01d. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Letter for Sultan Qaboos (1 pp.)	12/8/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (December 1990) II [1]

Date Closed: 6/17/2009	OA/ID Number: 91145-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0854-MR (500.03)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Denied in Full
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 11/12/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Your Majesty:

I would like to express my deep satisfaction with our extraordinary cooperation in deterring Iraqi aggression. The foundation of that cooperation is the U.S.-Oman Access Agreement which our two governments renewed on December 1. Nothing could be a more concrete example of your Majesty's vision. The Agreement has been instrumental in implementing our military strategy in the present crisis as well as during the Iran-Iraq conflict.

We share a strong interest in preserving the security of Oman and other friendly governments in the area and in ensuring freedom of navigation between the states of the area and their trading partners. Since its inception, the Access Agreement has contributed to these goals, and I am confident it will continue to do so. Its renewal further strengthens our relations while signaling to our friends and foes alike our determination to protect our mutual interests in the region.

Administration
My admiration has firmly demonstrated the commitment of the United States to help the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council deter external threats in the Gulf and, if deterrence fails, to consider appropriate steps, including the use of military force, in accordance with our constitutional processes. In this regard, any threat to the independence and territorial integrity of the Sultanate would be regarded by the United States with grave concern. Were this to occur, we would expect to consult closely with your government on an appropriate coordinated response. Furthermore, we intend to maintain a U.S. military presence in the Gulf

region, commensurate with the threat to our mutual interests. We also plan to ensure we have the flexibility and the capability to respond quickly to future contingencies in an appropriate manner should the need arise, as we have done in the current Gulf crisis.

Let me add that, as Vice President and as President, I have watched with great respect as you developed a new and important role for your country in maintaining security in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Your Majesty, it is clear your leadership and vision have guided the Sultanate to its special position in the region and inspired the steadfast professionalism with which Omani military forces conduct their mission. In closing, let me express how pleased I am that U.S. forces are cooperating so well with yours in responding to the current threat from Iraq to our mutual interests in the region. Let me assure you, Your Majesty, that U.S. resolve will not be diminished until this challenge to regional peace and stability has been successfully met.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

His Majesty
Sultan Qaboos bin Said
Sultan of Oman
Muscat

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009791
RECEIVED: 14 DEC 90 15

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 15 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
KUWAIT

IRAQ
AP

PERSONS: NYIRABU, CHARLES

SUBJECT: POINTS TO BE MADE & PARTICIPANTS LIST RE PRES MTG W/ GULF COALITION
AMBS 17 DEC

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 18 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTAS

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mon, Dec 17 - P/Mtg with
GULF COALITION Ambassador

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WE [signature]

LOG # 9791

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: copy

DOCLOG WEATO

WE

Ken Hill

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Bill Sittmann

1

-1W

Bob Gates

2

APNSA Has Seen

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

3

DDO 12/15

/

NSC Secretariat

4

N/R

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec's Office has dispatched

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

9791

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

90 DEC 15 PM 2:02

December 15, 1990

MEETING WITH GULF COALITION AMBASSADORS

DATE: December 17, 1990

LOCATION: Roosevelt Room

TIME: 1:45 - 2:15 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

I. PURPOSE

To explain U.S. policy toward the Gulf crisis to our coalition partners and to elicit greater political, military and economic support for our policy.

II. BACKGROUND

This meeting provides an opportunity to ensure that those countries participating in any aspect of the Gulf military effort understand our policy as we begin to near January 15. The meeting also sends a useful signal to Saddam that the coalition against him remains strong; simultaneously, the meeting lets the Congress and the American people know that we are not alone. In so doing, the meeting provides a perfect "filler" to the time that was to have been devoted to the meeting with Tariq Aziz.

III. PARTICIPANTS

To be provided.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Press Corps

V. SEQUENCE

Photo Op, followed by Presidential remarks and general discussion.

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B List of Participants

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
COALITION AMBASSADORS

- I very much appreciate you all coming in here at such short notice.
- Every one of you represents a government making a direct contribution to the effort to reverse Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. I am pleased and proud to be meeting with you today.
- We are at a key juncture in our Gulf effort. What we have accomplished is nothing less than historic: 12 Security Council resolutions, comprehensive economic sanctions, and the creation of a powerful military force that can defend against further Iraqi aggression and force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait if need be.
- I need not remind you of the stakes. We are talking about the bulk of the world's energy resources, the world economy, morality, and world order itself.
- We must succeed in achieving all our goals, including Iraq's complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. Not surprisingly, Saddam will take every opportunity to test us, to probe for weaknesses in our solidarity and our commitment. We must be sure he continues to fail.
- Let me add here the fact that Saddam's release of the hostages in no way lessens our determination to achieve

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these other goals. To the contrary, it encourages us: pressure works.

- It will not have escaped your notice that I asked you to come in today, December 17. This was to have been the occasion of my meeting here with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.
- Unfortunately, it was not possible to hold the meeting, as we had made clear all along to the Iraqi government that our acceptance of the 17th was contingent upon their agreeing to host Secretary Baker some time between December 20 and January 3. We gave the Iraqis a choice of no less than 15 dates, yet Saddam, a man who never travels and who has time to meet with all sorts of would-be peacemakers, is unable to accommodate the Secretary.
- We reached the only possible conclusion, that Saddam is not interested in the meetings but only in using diplomacy to manipulate the coalition arrayed against him and to subvert the intent of UN Security Council Resolution 678 and its demand that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait by January 15 or face the consequences.
- We continue to hope that these meetings can be arranged. I continue to think it is useful to tell him directly that his choice is clear: unconditional withdrawal or military catastrophe. Let me assure you that is all that would happen at these meetings -- no negotiations and no departure from the 12 resolutions thus far passed by the Security Council.

- There will be no concessions, no rewards for aggression, no attempts at face-savers of any sort.
- It is difficult to exaggerate how strongly I feel about this. The stories of rape and violence are sickening. None of us would be safe if we accepted such aggression. Saddam's appetite would only be wetted for more; others would draw the lesson that aggression can pay. We would have wasted our opportunity to build a better world, a new world order, in the wake of the Cold War.
- I am saying all this so that you and your governments will know exactly where we stand. We are determined to succeed, to prevail. And we will.
- Even if we succeed, our challenge will be far from over. We must take steps to ensure that Iraq can never again threaten the security and stability of the region. Going back to the status quo ante is not an option. We are developing our own thinking on how best to accomplish this, and will be in touch with you.
- If force must be used, I want you to know that our intent is to act decisively. It is vital that we do everything possible to minimize the casualties that the armed forces of our countries would have to suffer. I am confident that we can deliver a decisive blow.

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4

- I am confident that the bulk of the American people agree with me. Increasingly, people understand just why we do not have the luxury of waiting for sanctions alone to force Saddam out. The bottom line is that I will have the support of this country to do what needs to be done to implement Security Council Resolution 678.
- As you know from your contacts with the Congress and the public, it is essential that the United States not be perceived to be acting alone. Similarly, it is essential that Saddam and the Iraqi people realize that it is not simply the United States, but the entire world, that opposes Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.
- I therefore hope each of you will urge your government to do what it can to contribute to our common efforts: by contributing to our military strength, by helping to bolster the economies of those countries most affected by higher energy prices and the effects of sanctions, and above all by holding firm to the principle that there can be no partial solutions and no reward of aggression.
- That is what I wanted to say. Thank you for hearing me out. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have about our policy.

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PARTICIPANTS

The President

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State

Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense

Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for
National Security Affairs

Richard N. Haass, Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALLIED/COALITION FORCES OF DESERT SHIELD

DOI: 14 DEC 90

These force figures represent combat ready and combat service forces only. The Gulf states armed forces are much larger but not all are committed to DESERT SHIELD.

	GROUND	AIR	NAVAL	TOTAL
ARGENTINA			300	300
AUSTRALIA			550	550
BAHRAIN	200	500		700
BANGLADESH	2,300			2,300
BELGIUM			350	350
CANADA		500	700	1,200
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	180 (in place 15 Dec)			180
DENMARK			100	100
EGYPT	17,000			17,000
FRANCE	5,000	1,200	2,500	8,700
GREECE			200	200
ITALY		200	750	950
KUWAIT	3,300	150		3,450
MOROCCO	1,300			1,300
NETHERLANDS			400	400
NIGER	500			500
NORWAY			100	100
OMAN	1,000	7,000		8,000
PAKISTAN	2,000 (not on front line)			2,000
QATAR	2,000	800		2,800
SAUDI ARABIA	47,000	16,000	1,300	64,300
SENEGAL	500			500
SPAIN			450	450
SYRIA	10,500			10,500
UAE	1,000	7,000		8,000
UK	10,000	1,000	2,000	13,000
TOTAL	103,780	34,350	9,700	147,830
US	188,000	34,000	41,000	263,000
GRAND TOTAL	291,780	68,350	50,700	410,830

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2010-0854-M2

28 10/26/15

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CONFIDENTIAL

9791

December 14, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD HAASS *RH*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Gulf Coalition Ambassadors

Attached is the meeting memo to the President for the Monday, December 17 session in the Roosevelt Room with the Ambassadors from those countries contributing one way or another to the military effort in the Gulf.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

ATTACHMENTS

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Lists of Participants
Tab C List of Coalition Force Contributions

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2010-0854-MR
E8 10/26/15

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~~TOP SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009834
RECEIVED: 17 DEC 90 16

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: CHAMBERLIN
MILLER

DOC DATE: 17 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM
CRISIS MANAGEMENT

CHEMICAL WARFARE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PREPAREDNESS FOR CHEMICAL / BIOLOGICAL TERRORIST ATTACK IN US

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 20 DEC 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHAMBERLIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CHAMBERLIN
MILLER
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cep NARA, Date 6/17/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

F4I C2W/BW Terrorist Attack within the US

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WCA LOG # 9834
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG LMG/AIO

Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft

SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
1	K	I
2	W	
3	8	
4	APNSA Has Seen	

Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
NSC Secretariat

SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
5	INT/18	R
6	1/18	N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

QBE

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~~TOP SECRET~~

9834

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 17, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. MILLER, JR.

FROM: WENDY CHAMBERLIN *Wendy*

SUBJECT: Preparedness for Chemical/Biological Terrorist
Attack within the United States

*Brent - live should
discuss
OK*

During his October 18 meeting with you, Dr. Joshua Lederberg expressed his concern that the USG was not well organized in the event of a chemical/biological (C/B) terrorist attack within the U.S. You noted that domestic coordination was out of the purview of the NSC but offered your support and asked me to monitor developments. We have generated some efforts to assure improved coordination in such a scenario, but serious domestic weaknesses remain.

The Office of Science and Technology chaired an interagency meeting November 11 to review coordination. DOD, HHS, FEMA, EPA and the FBI made presentations. In conclusion, it was clear that the FBI had a handle on crisis management in the event of a C/B terrorist incident, but that no agency was prepared or could assert leadership of consequence management following the incident.

I. Crisis Management: Since the November 11 meeting, the FBI, has taken a number of additional steps to improve its readiness. It updated its C/B Incident Response Plan and hosted an interagency all-day conference to better coordinate alert procedures, asset deployment, and planning for law enforcement during a domestic attack. In addition, the Department of State conducted a field training exercise at Fort McClellan November 5-8 based on a scenario of a CW terrorist threat to US/NATO forces in Turkey. It trained our Emergency Support Team to work together with the Army Technical Support Unit in detection and decontamination practices with the use of "live" toxic nerve agents. In principle, coordination procedures and equipment developed to handle terrorist incidents abroad would be applicable for domestic attacks as well. Finally, the CSG on

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Counterterrorism is conducting a table top exercise December 18 in which one of the scenarios is terrorist use of biological warfare at a midwestern water plant.

II. Consequence Management: Also since the November 11 meeting, the FBI acknowledged that its capability and mandate to act as "lead agency" in a C/B terrorist incident does not extend to management of the social, public health and public safety consequences of an attack. There is great need but no obvious candidate for a single lead agency. As Dr. Lederberg pointed out to you, the right experts must be called upon to make an early determination as to the nature of the attack. For example, EPA might be best equipped to detect and lead consequence management efforts following a CW incident. Health and Human Resources working with the Center for Disease Control would be best suited for working with local governments in the event of a biological incident. Neither agency is adapted for leadership in both scenarios. Logically FEMA should assume consequence management responsibility for all generic catastrophes, yet a disturbing consensus gives voice to FEMA's managerial inadequacies. Officials on the President's Domestic Policy Council are seized with this key failing and reportedly will bring the issue to Governor Sununu's attention. Stand by.

Concurrences by: Don Pilling, R. ^{EB}and Beers, David ^{NK}Kitchen

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009815
RECEIVED: 17 DEC 90 10

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 17 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
KUWAIT

PERSIAN GULF
PUBLIC STATEMENTS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR PRES COMMENTS IN ROSE GARDEN RE GULF CRISIS
FOLLOWING MTG W/ CAOLITION AMB ON 17 DEC

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 20 DEC 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAASS
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council
The White House**

LOG # 9815

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

DOCLOG 1 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>
Bill Sittmann		<i>[Signature]</i>	
Bob Gates	2		
Brent Scowcroft	3		<i>Table F</i>
Bill Sittmann	<i>B</i>		<i>FAB</i>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	12/17AC	D
NSC Secretariat	5		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:


Eper Sec Ofc has Kiskadee

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SIGNED

9815

December 17, 1990



*Natl Sec Advisor
has seen*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS 

SUBJECT: Talking Points for President's comments in the
Rose Garden

At Tab A are proposed Talking Points for the President's comments in the Rose garden following his meeting with the Coalition Ambassadors.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Sittmann to forward the proposed Talking Points to Jim Cicconi (Sittmann memo at Tab I).

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann Memo to Cicconi
Tab A Proposed Talking Points

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

9815

December 17, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES CICCONI

FROM: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

SUBJECT: Talking Points for the President's Comments in the
Rose Garden

Attached are Talking Points prepared for the President's comments
in the Rose Garden following his meeting with Coalition
Ambassadors.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points

Rose Garden Remarks by the President
Following Meeting with Coalition Ambassadors

- What you see is living proof that the international coalition arrayed against Saddam's aggression remains both deep and wide.
- Every country represented agrees that the 12 Security Council Resolutions on the books make clear what is required: Iraq's complete, immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.
- These same countries--and there are more than two dozen represented here--are contributing over 200,000 individuals to the military effort against Iraq. Tens of thousands more are on their way. As has been the case from August 2nd, it is not simply the United States against Iraq; it is Iraq against the world.
- Again, none of us wants a war. But none of us is prepared to accept a partial solution. It is for this reason that we all welcome Security Council Resolution 678 and its authorization that all necessary means be used after January 15 to bring about Iraq's full compliance with all that the UN has demanded.
- Let me just add that I also used this occasion to brief our coalition partners on our efforts to meet directly with Iraqi officials. Thus far, Iraq's behavior underscores its lack of interest in a peaceful settlement of the crisis.
- For our part, we remain open to having these meetings if mutually acceptable dates can be agreed upon. If meetings

are held, I want to reiterate publicly what I said inside, namely, that what we want to do is to impress upon Iraq the consequences of its aggression and the need for all Iraqi forces to leave every square inch of Kuwait. There can and will be no negotiations, no concessions, and no rewards for aggression.

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CARD 1 OF 3

POINTS TO BE MADE BY PRESIDENT
FOLLOWING MEETING WITH COALITION AMBASSADORS

- WHAT YOU SEE IS LIVING PROOF THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION ARRAYED AGAINST SADDAM'S AGGRESSION REMAINS BOTH DEEP AND WIDE.
- EVERY COUNTRY REPRESENTED AGREES THAT THE 12 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON THE BOOKS MAKE CLEAR WHAT IS REQUIRED: IRAQ'S COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT.

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CARD 2 OF 3

- THESE SAME COUNTRIES--AND THERE ARE MORE THAN TWO DOZEN REPRESENTED HERE--ARE CONTRIBUTING OVER 200,000 INDIVIDUALS TO THE MILITARY EFFORT AGAINST IRAQ. TENS OF THOUSANDS MORE ARE ON THEIR WAY. AS HAS BEEN THE CASE FROM AUGUST 2ND, IT IS NOT SIMPLY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST IRAQ; IT IS IRAQ AGAINST THE WORLD.
- AGAIN, NONE OF US WANTS A WAR. BUT NONE OF US IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A PARTIAL SOLUTION. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE ALL WELCOME SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 678 AND ITS AUTHORIZATION THAT ALL NECESSARY MEANS BE USED AFTER JANUARY 15 TO BRING ABOUT IRAQ'S FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ALL THAT THE UN HAS DEMANDED.

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CARD 3 OF 3

- LET ME JUST ADD THAT I ALSO USED THIS OCCASION TO BRIEF OUR COALITION PARTNERS ON OUR EFFORTS TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH IRAQI OFFICIALS. THUS FAR, IRAQ'S BEHAVIOR UNDERSCORES ITS LACK OF INTEREST IN A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CRISIS.
- FOR OUR PART, WE REMAIN OPEN TO HAVING THESE MEETINGS IF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DATES CAN BE AGREED UPON. IF MEETINGS ARE HELD, I WANT TO REITERATE PUBLICLY WHAT I SAID INSIDE, NAMELY, THAT WHAT WE WANT TO DO IS TO IMPRESS UPON IRAQ THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS AGGRESSION AND THE NEED FOR ALL IRAQI FORCES TO LEAVE EVERY SQUARE INCH OF KUWAIT. THERE CAN AND WILL BE NO NEGOTIATIONS, NO CONCESSIONS, AND NO REWARDS FOR AGGRESSION.

UNCLASSIFIED

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

9857

*Ambasciata d'Italia
Washington*



UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE LETTER FROM T.H. GIULIO ANDREOTTI,
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY,
TO T.H. GEORGE BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

"Dear George,

Thank you for your letter of December 12th in which you shared
with me your impressions on the current situation in the Gulf.

As you will see, the recently concluded European Council
formulated a declaration that, going back to your concerns in
regard, reiterates its firm commitment to the full application of
the UN Security Council Resolutions, with particular reference to
Resolution 678.

In transmitting the conclusions of the Council and the
political Declarations approved, I would like to draw your
attention to the reference made to the GATT negotiations, where the
Commission is invited, inter alia, to step up its contacts with all
the participants in order to conclude a balanced accord in all
sectors as quickly as possible.

As regards the USSR, it was decided to make available up to
750 million ECU in emergency food assistance and to draw up a
series of medium- and long-term support and cooperation measures
for the Soviet Union's economic recovery.

I believe the conclusions of the European Council can be
considered very satisfactory as understandings were reached on all
the issues raised, including those regarding political union and
economic and monetary union which are the focus of two
intergovernmental conferences that I convened as the Council was
concluding.

We shall continue to keep in close contact, and in the
meantime, I take this occasion to wish you and your family a joyous
holiday season.

Giulio Andreotti"

PRES NOTE ~~BY MAP~~ *Imbasciata d'Italia*
Washington

TEXT OF THE MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ITALY

"Caro George,

ti ringrazio per la lettera che mi hai inviato il 12 dicembre per rendermi partecipe delle tue impressioni sulla situazione attuale del Golfo.

Come vedrai, il Consiglio Europeo che si è appena concluso ha formulato una dichiarazione che, nel riprendere le tue preoccupazioni in proposito, ribadisce il fermo impegno alla piena applicazione delle risoluzioni del Consiglio di Sicurezza dell'ONU con particolare riferimento alla risoluzione 678.

Nel trasmetterti le conclusioni del Consiglio e le Dichiarazioni politiche approvate, vorrei attirare la tua attenzione sul riferimento ai negoziati Gatt, dove si esprime tra l'altro l'invito alla Commissione ad intensificare i suoi contatti con tutti i partecipanti al fine di concludere un accordo equilibrato su tutti i settori nei tempi più brevi.

Per quanto riguarda l'Urss, si è deciso di mettere a disposizione un aiuto alimentare urgente fino ad un importo di 750 milioni di Ecu e di predisporre una serie di misure di sostegno e di cooperazione a medio e lungo termine per contribuire alla ripresa dell'economia sovietica.

Penso che le conclusioni del Consiglio Europeo possano ritenersi molto soddisfacenti per l'intesa raggiunta su tutti i problemi affrontati anche per quanto riguarda i temi dell'Unione Politica e dell'Unione Economica e Monetaria che sono stati oggetto di due Conferenze Intergovernative che ho inaugurato proprio al termine del Consiglio.

Continueremo a mantenerci in stretto contatto e colgo l'occasione delle prossime festività per rivolgere a te e alla tua famiglia i miei auguri più fervidi.

Giulio Andreotti"

*Ambasciata d'Italia
Washington*

DECLARATION ON THE GULF CRISIS

1. The European Community and its member States remain firmly committed to full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions. Complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty and of its legitimate government remain the absolute conditions for a peaceful solution of the crisis.
2. Security Council Resolution 678 sends the clearest possible signal to Iraq that the international community is determined to ensure full restoration of international legality. The responsibility lies on the Iraqi government to ensure peace for its people by complying fully with the demands of the UN Security Council, in particular by a complete withdrawal from Kuwait by 15 January.
3. The European Community and its member States earnestly hope that implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions can be peacefully secured. To this end, they support a dialogue of the sort President Bush has offered. They also favour action by the UN Secretary General and hope that the UN Security Council's Permanent Members will remain actively involved as well. They wish Arab countries to continue to play an important role in the efforts for a peaceful solution. The European Community and its member States underline the value of a contact between the Presidency and the Foreign Minister of Iraq, aimed at securing, in coordination with other members of the international community, full compliance with UN Security Council resolutions.

4. The European Council expresses relief at Iraq's decision to release all foreign hostages, but underlines its deep concern at Iraq's failure to withdraw , at its oppressive and inhuman occupation of Kuwait and its attempt to destroy the fabric of the country.

*Ambasciata d'Italia
Washington*

DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. The European Council expresses its dismay at the continuing lack of clear prospects for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the Palestinian problem, and at the renewed acts of terrorism and violence. It expresses its deep concern at the rising incomprehension and tension in the Occupied Territories. It renews its call to the parties concerned to refrain from violence that can only engender new violence. It expresses its concern about the Israeli practises of collective reprisals, such as the destruction of houses or restrictions on freedom of movement, and deplores the recent decision to place moderate Palestinians under administrative arrest.

The European Council calls once again on Israel to comply with Resolutions 672 and 673 of the UN Security Council, to act in conformity with its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of the Civilian Population, and to cooperate with the United Nations. It welcomes the recommendations by the UN Secretary General in this regard and fully supports every effort of the UN Security Council to achieve a better protection of the Palestinian population and to promote peace in the area. It reaffirms the determination of the European Community and its member States to further assist the Palestinian population in its serious plight.

2. The European Council reiterates its long-standing commitment to a just and lasting solution to these problems, in conformity with the relevant Resolutions of the UN Security Council and with the principles expressed by the European Community in its previous

Declarations. To this end, the European Council reaffirms its support for the principle of convening, at an appropriate time, an international peace conference under the auspices of the UN.

3. The serious deterioration in the economic situation in the Occupied Territories is a source of great concern to the Community. In this connection the European Council reaffirms its commitment to the economic and social development of Palestinian people and considers that, in the new circumstances, the doubling of Community aid to the Occupied Territories decided by the Strasbourg European Council appears particularly appropriate and timely.

The European Council also considers it vital for all efforts to be made to create the conditions for facilitating and increasing trade between the Occupied Territories and the Community.

4. As expressed in its Declaration of 28 October 1990, the European Council remains convinced that relations of mutual confidence and cooperation must be encouraged among the countries of the region, with a view to establishing a situation of stability, security, economic and social well-being, and respect of civil and political rights, to forestalling the recurrence of crises, and to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The European Community and its member States remain ready actively to cooperate with the concerned countries to achieve these goals and to contribute to the success of the task entrusted by relevant resolutions to the UN Secretary General to examine measures to enhance security and stability in the region. In this connection, the European Council reaffirms the importance of a meaningful and constructive Euro-Arab Dialogue.

*Ambasciata d'Italia
Washington*

DECLARATION ON LEBANON

The European Council expresses its satisfaction at the implementation of the security plan in greater Beirut following the withdrawal of all militias from the Lebanese capital. It expresses the hope that the recent developments can foster the process of national reconciliation and lead to the full implementation of the Taif agreements, thus bringing about the restoration of the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of a Lebanon free of all foreign troops and enabling the Lebanese people to express their will through free elections.

It appeals to the parties concerned to release all remaining hostages.

The European Community and its member States reaffirm their commitment to help provide Lebanon with the assistance needed to build its future and view favourably the participation of the Community in the pledging conference for the creation of a Lebanon Assistance Fund.

*Embasciata d'Italia
Washington*

DECLARATION ON SOUTH AFRICA

The Community and its member States have consistently followed developments in South Africa with the greatest attention and had given a favourable reception to the initiatives which have been taken to bring about the abolition of apartheid and the establishment of a united, non-racial, and democratic South Africa. They have already expressed approval of the results of the talks between the Government and the ANC, in particular those of the Pretoria meeting in August which opened the way to the negotiation of a new Constitution.

They deplore the phase of serious violence through which South Africa is passing which may endanger these developments. They welcome, however, further indications serving to confirm that the process of change already begun is going ahead in the direction advocated by the Strasbourg European Council. They have decided to continue to encourage this process.

Against this background, the European Council has decided that as soon as legislative action is taken by the South African government to repeal the Group Areas Act and the Land Acts, the Community and its member States will proceed to an easing of the set of measures adopted in 1986.

As of now, so as to contribute to combatting unemployment and improving the economic and social situation in South Africa, and to encourage the movement underway aimed at the complete abolition of apartheid, the European Council has decided to lift the ban on new investments.

At the same time, the Community and its member States, with the objective of sending a clear signal of political support to the victims of apartheid, and intending to contribute to a new economic and social balance in South Africa, have agreed to strengthen the programme of positive measures and to adapt it to the requirements of the new situation, including requirements related to the return and resettlement of the exiles.

The Community and its member States hope in this way to be able to contribute to the speeding up of the process underway through sending to all the parties involved in negotiation a concrete sign of support for the establishment of a new South Africa, united, non-racial, and democratic, and capable of resuming the place which it deserves in the international community.

Please note that the text of the Conclusions of the European Council will follow as soon as it becomes available.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9827

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

AGE 01 OF 02

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

PRT GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN VANERON
SIT FILE HAASS PRES MSGS SIT SUM WELCH

PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 131451Z DEC 90

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5776

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CAIRO 25239

EXDIS STARBURST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PDIP, PREL, EG, US

SUBJECT: EGYPT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO
PRESIDENT BUSH

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON DECEMBER 13 PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR MOSTAFA EL-FEKI DICTATED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO PRESIDENT BUSH. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS MESSAGE IS IN RESPONSE TO A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH RECEIVED EARLIER IN THE DAY.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR GEORGE: THANK YOU FOR YOUR MOST RECENT MESSAGE. I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS AND WISH TO CONFIRM THAT I UNDERSTAND YOUR VIEWS ON ALL THE POINTS RAISED.

I WOULD NOTE THAT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS I HAVE RECEIVED MANY INQUIRIES FROM THE GULF AND THOSE IN OTHER AREAS RAISING QUESTIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE RAISED BY CONGRESSMAN OWENS. IN RESPONSE, I HAVE CONFIRMED FORCEFULLY THAT THE U.S. STAND IS FAIR AND FIRM AND THAT THERE ARE NO CHANGES IN YOUR POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL AND THE RETURN OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT. I RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1998-0099-F/3
7/28/2003 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

AGE 02 OF 02

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UAE TODAY TO WHOM I
EMPHASIZED IDENTICAL VIEWS TO THOSE IN YOUR MESSAGE
WITH RESPECT TO THE CRISIS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO STAYING IN TOUCH ON THESE ISSUES
AND SEND YOU MY BEST REGARDS. SINCERELY. HOSNI.
END TEXT.

4. EMBASSY EXPECTS THERE WILL BE NO/NO SIGNED
ORIGINAL.

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WISNER

BT

#5239

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009735
RECEIVED: 12 DEC 90 17

TO: SITTMANN

CHRON FILE

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 18 DEC 90
SOURCE REF: 9026045



KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
PERSIAN GULF

IRAQ
HS

PERSONS: HUSSEIN, SADDAM

BAKER, J

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM MAJOR RE MTG W/ IRAQ

ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE

DUE DATE: 15 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GOMPERT

HAASS

SALVETTI, L

ZELIKOW

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/17/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9735

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9026045
Date December 18, 1990

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1991
By cap NARA, Date 6/17/09

REFERENCE:

To: The President
From: British Prime Minister Major
Date: December 11, 1990
Subject: Meetings with Iraq

WH Referral Dated: December 12, 1990
NSCS ID# (if any): 9009735

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- _____ A draft reply is attached.
- _____ A draft reply will be forwarded.
- _____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- XXX We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- _____ The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- _____ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS: No response is necessary because, as Major states at
the end of his letter, he plans to discuss the issues raised
directly with the President at Camp David on December 21-22.

for Rodia Salter
Director
Secretariat Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9009735

REFERRAL

DATE: 12 DEC 90

9026045

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

90 DEC-13 11:11 AM

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: MAJOR, JOHN

DATE: 11 DEC 90

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM PM MAJOR RE LTR OF 3 DEC / MEETING W/ IRAQ

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 15 DEC 90

COMMENT:

FOR

Lisa M. Salvetti

GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 4/17/09

~~SECRET~~

31 JAN 1991

[Handwritten signature]



BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

The Honorable
Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Room 1/WW
The White House
Washington DC 20500

11 December 1990

Dear Brent,

I should be grateful for your assistance in passing
/ to the President the enclosed text of a message from
The Rt Hon John Major MP.

Sincerely
Antony

Antony Acland

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Letter	Prime Minister Major to President Bush Re: Text of a Message Dated 11 December 1990 from the Prime Minister to President Bush (3 pp.)	12/11/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (December 1990) II [1]

Date Closed:	6/17/2009	OA/ID Number:	91145-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9009735
DATE 11 DEC 90

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM MAJOR RE LTR OF 3 DEC / MEETING W/ IRAQ
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

12/13/90

11:10 AM

Charles E. Felt

COPY: 1

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cep NARA, Date 6/17/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9009735
DATE 11 DEC 90

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM MAJOR RE LTR OF 3 DEC / MEETING W/ IRAQ
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

12/13/90

9:50

Anthony T. Taylor

COPY: 1

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 6/17/09

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOP

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009898
RECEIVED: 19 DEC 90 14

TO: CICCONI, J

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 19 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KUWAIT
PERSIAN GULF

SAUDI ARABIA
IRAQ

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR DEC 20 MTG W/ SENATORS RETURNING FM THE GULF

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 22 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

GANTT

HAASS

LAMPLEY

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/1/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY sel DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9898

December 19, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES CICCONI

FROM: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

SUBJECT: Talking Points for December 20 Meeting
with Senators who just returned from the Gulf

Attached are Talking Points prepared for the President's use in his December 20 meeting with the Senators who just returned from the Gulf.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points

cc: Fred McClure

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/19/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 1 OF 5

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
SENATORS JUST BACK FROM GULF

- I WANT TO THANK YOU ALL FOR COMING IN HERE TODAY. I EXPECT YOU ARE ALL SUFFERING FROM MORE THAN A LITTLE JET-LAG.
- AND I WANT TO THANK YOU AS WELL FOR TAKING THE TIME AND MAKING THE EFFORT TO GO TO THE AREA ITSELF. I KNOW IT IS NOT EASY OR ENJOYABLE, BUT I DO THINK IT PROVIDES A PERSPECTIVE AND A BETTER FEEL FOR WHAT IS TAKING PLACE.
- I VERY MUCH WANT TO SAVE MOST OF OUR TIME FOR HEARING YOUR INSIGHTS AND SUGGESTIONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CARD 2 OF 5

- FOR MY PART, I CONTINUE TO HAVE A SENSE OF URGENCY. WE CANNOT COUNT ON SANCTIONS ALONE TO SOLVE THIS FOR US. NOT ONLY IS THEIR ULTIMATE EFFECT UNCERTAIN, BUT SADDAM IS USING TIME TO CONTINUE HIS BRUTAL DESTRUCTION OF KUWAIT, TO UPGRADE HIS MILITARY FORCES, AND TO DEVELOP UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. WAITING COULD RESULT IN HIGHER U.S. AND ALLIED CASUALTIES SHOULD WAR COME, AND WE ALREADY PAY AN ECONOMIC PRICE FOR EVERY DAY THAT PASSES.
- I WANT TO JUST HIGHLIGHT ONE ITEM I JUST MENTIONED, THE BRUTALITY AGAINST THE KUWAITI PEOPLE. EVERYONE HERE SHOULD TAKE THE TIME TO READ THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT THAT JUST CAME OUT. IT IS GRAPHIC; IT IS SICKENING; AND WORSE, IT IS STILL GOING ON.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0855-MR
mm 6/14/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 3 OF 5

- NOTHING WE HAVE SEEN LEADS US TO CHANGE OUR VIEW THAT SADDAM RESPONDS BEST TO PRESSURE. AS A RESULT, AND AS YOU COULD SEE FOR YOUR SELVES, OUR MILITARY PREPARATIONS ARE ON TRACK.
- AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE THE ADDED AUTHORITY FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS TO ACHIEVE UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL IF IRAQ IS NOT FULLY OUT OF KUWAIT BY JANUARY 15.
- WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO GO TO WAR, BUT ANYTHING LESS THAN FULL IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH ALL 12 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WOULD ONLY SET A TERRIBLE PRECEDENT AND SET THE STAGE FOR MORE COSTLY AND FREQUENT CHALLENGES TO ORDER IN THE GULF AND ELSEWHERE IN THE FUTURE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CARD 4 OF 5

- IF WE SUCCEED WITHOUT A WAR, WE WILL STILL FACE THE CHALLENGE OF DEALING WITH IRAQ. BUT THERE CAN BE NO RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. AND IF WE MUST FIGHT, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I WOULD ACT IN A MANNER DESIGNED TO KEEP U.S. AND ALLIED CASUALTIES TO A MINIMUM.
- TO MAKE SURE THAT NO OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE WAS BEING MISSED, I PROPOSED DIRECT MEETINGS WITH THE IRAQIS--NOT TO NEGOTIATE OR TO MAKE CONCESSIONS, BUT TO ENSURE THEY UNDERSTOOD THE CHOICES BEFORE THEM AND THE CONSEQUENCES. UNFORTUNATELY, SADDAM THUS FAR APPEARS MORE INTERESTED IN PUBLIC RELATIONS THAN IN DIPLOMACY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CARD 3 OF 3

- WHAT IS KEY RIGHT NOW IS THAT ALL OF US, REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRAT, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, APPEAR AS ONE. SADDAM IS MUCH MORE LIKELY TO COMPLY WITH THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IF HE SENSES WE ARE STRONG AND RESOLUTE.
- AS A RESULT, I HAVE SOUGHT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FROM THE OUTSET. WITH THIS SAID, I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR FROM YOU ABOUT YOUR TRIP AND YOUR THINKING.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President's Remarks to the Senators just back from Gulf

- I want to thank you all for coming in here today. I expect you are all suffering from more than a little jet-lag.
- And I want to thank you as well for taking the time and making the effort to go to the area itself. I know it is not easy or enjoyable, but I do think it provides a perspective and a better feel for what is taking place.
- I very much want to save most of our time for hearing your insights and suggestions.
- For my part, I continue to have a sense of urgency. We cannot count on sanctions alone to solve this for us. Not only is their ultimate effect uncertain, but Saddam is using time to continue his brutal destruction of Kuwait, to upgrade his military forces, and to develop unconventional weapons. Waiting could result in higher U.S. and allied casualties should war come, and we and other countries everywhere already pay an economic price for every day that passes.
- I want to just highlight one item I just mentioned, the brutality against the Kuwaiti people. Everyone here should take the time to read the Amnesty International report that just came out. It is graphic; it is sickening; and worse, it is still going on.
- Nothing we have seen leads us to change our view that Saddam responds best to pressure. As a result, and as you could see for yourselves, our military preparations are on track.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0855-MR

MM 6/14/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- At the same time, we have the added authority from the Security Council to use all necessary means to achieve unconditional Iraqi withdrawal if Iraq is not fully out of Kuwait by January 15.
- We have no desire to go to war, but anything less than full Iraqi compliance with all 12 Security Council Resolutions would only set a terrible precedent and set the stage for more costly and frequent challenges to order in the Gulf and elsewhere in the future.
- If we succeed without a war, we will still face the challenge of dealing with Iraq. But there can be no return to the status quo ante. And if we must fight, I want you to know that I would act in a manner designed to keep U.S. and allied casualties to a minimum.
- To make sure that no opportunity for peace was being missed, I proposed direct meetings with the Iraqis--not to negotiate or to make concessions, but to ensure they understood the choices before them and the consequences. Unfortunately, Saddam thus far appears more interested in public relations than in diplomacy.
- What is key right now is that all of us, Republican and Democrat, President and Congress, appear as one. Saddam is much more likely to comply with the will of the international community if he senses we are strong and resolute.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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3

-- As a result, I have sought to consult closely with you and your colleagues from the outset. With this said, I would like to hear from you about your trip and your thinking.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9898

December 19, 1990

SIGNED

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS/VIRGINIA LAMPLEY 
SUBJECT: Talking Points for December 20 Meeting with
Senators who just returned from the Gulf

At Tab A are proposed Talking Points for the President's use in his December 20 meeting with the Senators who just returned from the Gulf.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Sittmann to forward the proposed Talking Points to Jim Cicconi (Sittmann memo at Tab I).

Approve  _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann Memo to Cicconi
Tab A Proposed Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/19/2013

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CC:

Sununu

Other

Should be seen by:

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

EX Secs Office has deslotted

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009897
RECEIVED: 19 DEC 90 14

TO: CICCONI, J

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 19 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KUWAIT
IRAQ

SAUDI ARABIA
PERSIAN GULF

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR DEC 20 MTG W/ HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COM

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 22 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

GANTT

HAASS

LAMPLEY

NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/17/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY ed DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D C 20506

9897

December 19, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES CICCONI

FROM: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN ✓

SUBJECT: Talking Points for December 20 Meeting
with House Intelligence Committee

Attached are Talking Points prepared for the President's use in his meeting with the House Intelligence Committee on December 20.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points

cc: Fred McClure

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/19/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 1 OF 5

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

- I WANT TO THANK YOU ALL FOR COMING IN HERE TODAY. I EXPECT YOU ARE ALL SUFFERING FROM MORE THAN A LITTLE JET-LAG.
- AND I WANT TO THANK YOU AS WELL FOR TAKING THE TIME AND MAKING THE EFFORT TO GO TO THE AREA ITSELF. I KNOW IT IS NOT EASY OR ENJOYABLE, BUT I DO THINK IT PROVIDES A PERSPECTIVE AND A BETTER FEEL FOR WHAT IS TAKING PLACE.
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 2 OF 5

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0857-MR
mm 1/19/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 3 OF 5

- 
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 4 OF 5

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 5 OF 5

- 
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- AS A RESULT, I HAVE SOUGHT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FROM THE OUTSET. WITH THIS SAID, I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR FROM YOU ABOUT YOUR TRIP AND YOUR THINKING.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Presidents Remarks to the House Intelligence Committee

- I want to thank you all for coming in here today. I expect you are all suffering from more than a little jet-lag.
- And I want to thank you as well for taking the time and making the effort to go to the area itself. I know it is not easy or enjoyable, but I do think it provides a perspective and a better feel for what is taking place.
- I very much want to save most of our time for hearing your insights and suggestions.
- For my part, I continue to have a sense of urgency. We cannot count on sanctions alone to solve this for us. Not only is their ultimate effect uncertain, but Saddam is using time to continue his brutal destruction of Kuwait, to upgrade his military forces, and to develop unconventional weapons. Waiting could result in higher U.S. and allied casualties should war come, and we already pay an economic price for every day that passes.
- I want to just highlight one item I just mentioned, the brutality against the Kuwaiti people. Everyone here should take the time to read the amnesty international report that just came out. It is graphic; it is sickening; and worse, it is still going on.
- Nothing we have seen leads us to change our view that Saddam responds best to pressure. As a result, and as you could see for your selves, our military preparations are on track.

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0857-MR
MM 1/19/2016

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2

- At the same time, we have the added authority from the Security Council to use all necessary means to achieve unconditional Iraqi withdrawal if Iraq is not fully out of Kuwait by January 15.
- We have no desire to go to war, but anything less than full Iraqi compliance with all 12 Security Council Resolutions would only set a terrible precedent and set the stage for more costly and frequent challenges to order in the Gulf and elsewhere in the future.
- If we succeed without a way, we will still face the challenge of dealing with Iraq. But there can be no return to the status quo ante. And if we must fight, I want you to know that I would act in a manner designed to keep U.S. and allied casualties to a minimum.
- To make sure that no opportunity for peace was being missed, I proposed direct meetings with the Iraqis--not to negotiate or to make concessions, but to ensure they understood the choices before them and the consequences. Unfortunately, Saddam thus far appears more interested in public relations than in diplomacy.
- What is key right now is that all of us, Republican and Democrat, President and Congress, appear as one. Saddam is much more likely to comply with the will of the international community if he senses we are strong and resolute.

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3

-- As a result, I have sought to consult closely with you and your colleagues from the outset. With this said, I would like to hear from you about your trip and your thinking.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9897

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 19, 1990

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

RICHARD N. HAASS/VIRGINIA LAMPLEY

SUBJECT:


Talking Points for December 20 Meeting with
The House Intelligence Committee

At Tab A are proposed Talking Points for the President's use in
his meeting with House Intelligence Committee on December 20.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Sittmann to forward the proposed
Talking Points to Jim Cicconi (Sittmann memo at Tab I).

Approve



Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann Memo to Cicconi

Tab A Proposed Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/19/2013

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: NEA LOG # 9897
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG NEA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>NEA</u> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>copy</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann		<u>W</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>12/20/82</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc. VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Ex Sec's Office has dispatch

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009884
RECEIVED: 19 DEC 90 08

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROSTOW

DOC DATE: 19 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: MEDIA
KUWAIT

IRAQ
AP

PERSONS: HUSSEIN, SADDAM

SUBJECT: POINTS FOR PRES INTERVIEW BY CNN 19 DEC

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 22 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSTOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
ROSTOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: N/A
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 9884
SYSTEM PBS NSC INT
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>WED</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	_____
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	<u>✓</u>	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	APNSA Has	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
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A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*The interview
was 12/19*

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

EN Sec's Office has dishele

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 19, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: NICHOLAS ROSTOW *N.R.*
SUBJECT: Points for Interview by CNN

Attached at Tab I are points for your use in preparing for your interview by CNN.

Concurrence by: ^{N/A} Randy Beers, Nancy Dyke, Robert Frasure, David
{ Gompert, Richard Haass, Karl Jackson, Arnold Kanter, Virginia A. } *By N.R.*
Lampley, William Pryce, Condoleezza Rice, William W. Working

RECOMMENDATION

That you make the attached points in the CNN interview.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE
CNN INTERVIEW

The Persian Gulf

- The President's goals are well-known and clear. They are the world community's goals as embodied in 12 mandatory U.N. Security Council resolutions:
 - o immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
 - o the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;
 - o the hostages having been freed, the free functioning of all embassies; and
 - o the security and stability of the Gulf region.
- This is not simply the U.S. versus Iraq; it is the world community opposing aggression: 27 countries are contributing armed forces and 50 countries are contributing financially to Desert Shield.
- Why does Kuwait merit this kind of attention and the real risk of war? The reason is simple and goes beyond who controls the region's oil resources on which so much of the world economy depends: if Kuwait can be devoured and destroyed as an independent country, who is next? This is why Iraq's action is of world-wide concern. Peace depends on countries feeling secure from attack.
- Why not give sanctions more time?
 - o On a human, moral level, with every passing day, Iraq destroys more of the very fabric of Kuwait.
 - o Iraq is continually strengthening its forces in Kuwait

and producing ever more biological and chemical weapons.

- o Iraq edges closer to a nuclear capability. Saddam Hussein has used every weapon he has possessed.
 - o The fledgling democracies of East Europe and developing countries everywhere are being severely damaged by the economic effects of Iraq's actions.
 - o Our own economy slows as a result of higher oil prices.
 - o Finally, while sanctions are being felt in Iraq, they have had no perceptible impact on Iraq's policies.
- The world community wants a peaceful resolution of the crisis; the way to get one is to make clear to Saddam Hussein that the alternative he faces is much worse.
- We remain hopeful that Saddam Hussein will agree to the President's overture and agree to see Secretary Baker. But there isn't much time.
- If January 15 arrives without Iraq's complying with the U.N. Resolutions, will the President ask Congress for a declaration of war or a joint resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq? The Korean War and other historical examples demonstrate that there is no legal requirement that we obtain authorization from Congress before using force against Iraq under current circumstances. However, this President and this Administration have consulted closely with the congressional leadership throughout the crisis. The consultations will continue and probably intensify as

January 15 approaches. We have had Congress' full backing for the steps we have taken up until now, and we expect to continue to have that backing for steps we may take after the 15th. At the same time, we cannot let Saddam Hussein doubt the President's determination to exercise the full constitutional powers of his office to defend America's vital interests.

Europe

- The last two years have been dominated by remarkable changes. In Europe: the Revolution of '89 brought freedom to half that continent, the unification of Germany, and an end to the Cold War.
- The Soviet Union is confronting the failure of its political and economic system:
 - o The President's economic package for the Soviet Union is designed to address both the short- and long-term needs of the Soviet Union.
 - o The international community needs to worry not only about getting the Soviet Union through the winter, but also about encouraging fundamental structural reform.
 - o The waiver of Jackson-Vanik allows the Soviets to buy food on credit backed by government guarantees.
 - o We are also focusing a technical assistance project on the problem of Soviet food distribution.
 - o The President has also announced that he will support special associate status for the Soviet Union with the

IMF and the World Bank.

- o Finally, you will note the President's call for continued democratization and political reform in the Soviet Union.
- Of course, Eastern Europe confronts enormous problems. Decades of misrule have left the region's economies in a shambles. To renew those economies requires enormous effort by governments and private capital alike. The need for productive public-private cooperation is no less great than it was following World War II with respect to Western Europe. Recognizing this fact, the President's approach, fully supported in Congress, has been to create institutions designed to foster this cooperation.
- New structures are developing to ensure a peaceful future for Europe. The CSCE process, involving 34 nations including the United States and the Soviet Union, offers great promise for regional cooperation both to resolve enduring problems between countries and as a framework for prosperity and peace.
- One area where we have fostered significant change is in export controls. Reflecting the changed strategic balance, we have nearly halved our export control requirements, thereby allowing freer trade and benefiting economic development, particularly in Eastern Europe.
- At the Houston Economic Summit, we set in motion an IMF/WB study of the Soviet economy. This should lead to closer

integration of the Soviet Union into the world economy.

Asia

- Beyond Europe, our most important bilateral relationship is with Japan. Since the March 1990 Palm Springs Summit, the U.S.-Japan relationship has been strengthened through: resolution of numerous economic disputes, an improving bilateral trade balance, and global partnership with Japan on everything from the Gulf to Eastern Europe to the war on drugs. (N.B.: the trade imbalance with Japan decreased by 19% in 1990, with the U.S. deficit down to \$40 billion compared to the peak of \$59 billion in 1987.)
- In Asia, and in our own hemisphere, democracy is blooming. The fledgling democracies confront great problems: narcotics traffickers and terrorists in Central and South America; persistent social problems. But the governments are tackling them, and we are helping.

Africa

- In South Africa, we have the beginning of a difficult dialogue in search of non-racial democracy. We are actively in touch with both sides. Elsewhere in Africa, the festering wars of the last two decades are winding down. Angola is a case in point. We are actively involved in this process.

South America

- The President just returned from an extremely successful trip to South America. Our relations with our neighbors in

this hemisphere reflect unprecedented cordiality and understanding. The President's June 27 initiative on trade, investment and debt has been warmly welcomed. The President's strong support for democracy, particularly when democratic government was threatened in Argentina, is widely applauded in this hemisphere.

- We are also committed to negotiating a free-trade agreement with Mexico. Talks with Canada suggest that we can make this into a trilateral free-trade accord.

Refugees

- The United States has successfully managed a generous refugee program, ensuring resettlement in the United States for 50,000 refugees and about 20,000 non-refugees from the Soviet Union (primarily Jews and Pentecostals) annually.
- The United States has worked with the international community to maintain a stable system of first asylum for Vietnamese boat people, including resettlement for refugees (primarily in the United States), protection for non-refugees, and ensuring no forcible repatriation to Vietnam under the current conditions there.

New World Order

- The unity shown against Iraq and the transformation of U.S.-Soviet relations toward true cooperation means that gridlock in the U.N. no longer is inevitable. The U.N. system established in 1945 thus can truly be used to address pressing problems.

- A true rule of law may be achieved.
- The prospect for making law the guide to international relations is the core of the President's hope that the developments of the last year and a half mean we are building a new world order.
- The President has spoken of "a new era -- freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace." To make it happen requires persistence and patience.
- The spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as missiles and other high-tech weapons and delivery systems pose increasing dangers to peace. Without a U.S. commitment to lead the work for peace, the hopes of the present may be dashed.

Defense Capabilities

- Words alone will not suffice. As the Gulf crisis shows, we must have adequate military capabilities. With a much diminished Soviet threat -- although I note that the Soviets continue to modernize their strategic weapons -- we need to restructure our forces in a rational fashion. Too often in the past we have dismantled our defenses only to discover they were still needed. We should not repeat these costly follies.
- Although we can do with smaller forces overall, they must be very ready and very competent and able to operate in austere environments, independent of the infrastructure we have

prepared in Europe. We need sea- and air-lift capabilities adequate to potential deployment needs. We need the capability to reconstitute larger forces in case of need.

- An orderly restructuring will take time. But with such a program, we will be able to preserve what we still need and not unfairly burden the men and women who have made today's successes possible.

Conclusion

- Opportunities abound to make the world a safer place. Dangers continue to exist. Therefore, we must remain strong and engaged. The days when we could safely retreat behind the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are long gone.