

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91145
Folder ID Number: 91145-002

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [3]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (4 pp.)	9/30/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to William F. Sittmann Re: President's Meeting with Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain (1 pp.)	11/23/90	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Karl D. Jackson to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to the President from former Prime Minister Nakasone (1 pp.)	11/24/90	(b)(1)	C
02b. Letter	Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone to President Bush (9 pp.)	11/15/90	(b)(1)	
03a. Memo	C. David Welch to Robert M. Gates Re: Unblocking Iraqi Assests for the Benefit of Jordan (1 pp.)	11/27/90	(b)(1)	C
03b. Memo	John E. Robson to Robert Gates Re: Unblocking Iraqi Assets for the benefit of the Central Bank of Jordan (1 pp.)	11/20/90	(b)(1)	C
03c. Letter	Ambassador Hussein Hammami to R. Richard Newcomb Re: Unblocking funds (2 pp.)	10/24/90	(b)(1)	
04a. Cable	Re: Presidential Letter to Yang Shangkun (3 pp.)	11/26/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1207
OA/ID Number: 91145-002
Date Closed: 6/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04b. Coversheet	Doug Paal to Florence Gantt for General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS
04c. Memo	Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Crosshatch of Presidential Letter to Beijing (1 pp.)	11/26/90	(b)(1)	TS
04d. Cable	Re: Presidential Letter to Yang Shangkun (3 pp.)	11/26/90	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Brent Scowcroft Re: B-C-S Breakfast Meeting, Wednesday, November 28, 1990, 7:15 a.m. (1 pp.)	11/27/90	(b)(1)	S
05b. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: November 28 Breakfast: Turkish Support for Desert Shield (2 pp.)	11/27/90	(b)(1)	S
06. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Strengthening Allied Responsibility-Sharing Toward the Gulf (3 pp.)	11/28/90	(b)(1)	S
07a. Memo	William F. Sittmann to James Cicconi Re: Talking Points for November 30 Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meeting (1 pp.)	11/30/90	(b)(1)	Ø
07b. Talking Points	Re: 11/30 Leadership Meeting (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	Ø

Page 2 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1207
OA/ID Number: 91145-002
Date Closed: 6/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07c. Memo	Richard N. Haass/Virginia Lampley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Talking Points for November 30 Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meeting (1 pp.)	11/30/90	(b)(1)	✓

Page 3 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1207
OA/ID Number: 91145-002
Date Closed: 6/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007887
RECEIVED: 03 OCT 90 15

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: HUTCHINGS

DOC DATE: 23 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: UNGA
POLAND
ITALY

MEMCON
BELGIUM
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

PERSONS: AL-HUSS, SALIM
MAZOWIECKI, TADEUSZ

MULRONEY, BRIAN
BAUDOUIN I

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PM GONZALEZ OF SPAIN ON 30 SEP

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 06 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
HUTCHINGS
NEIL
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 2 OF 2

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~~SECRET~~

7887

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Stephanie von Riegersberg, Interpreter

Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain
Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, Foreign Minister
Jaime de Ojeda, Ambassador to the U.S.
Fernando Perpina-Robert, Secretary of State
Juan Antonio Yanez, Chief of Staff
Interpreter

DATE, TIME: September 30, 1990, 6:40-7:00 p.m.
AND PLACE: Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York

The President: I am delighted to see you. I am sorry our time is so short. I have one or two points to raise with you but I am much more interested in your views. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: On the Gulf, I think we are in agreement. We look to see if there is some way out. The embargo is having an effect. International unanimity is having an effect. The embargo cannot go on forever, but if we have some tenacity it can succeed. (U)

The President: I agree. We don't know how effective it has been. What worries me, my friend, is the unpredictability of Saddam Hussein. We want a peaceful solution. I don't know if you saw the report of the Emir of Kuwait. It was horrible,

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

1999-0467-F/A
3/6/2003 MM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

sickening. There may not be a Kuwait in a few months. But, again, I am pleased at the solidarity of so many countries. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I think it is working quite well. You are right. He is unpredictable. But there are some signs of weakening in his position. The problem for the regional balance is to decrease his capacity to wage war, not just for him to withdraw from Kuwait. I think this can be done by maintaining the arms embargo. He buys at the supermarket. Iraq doesn't produce these weapons itself. I am told he doesn't even have lubricant. In addition to the global consequences of the embargo, the effect on his military apparatus will be very severe. My impression is that he won't have the nerve to engage in a provocation. He thinks he will break international solidarity. (C)

The President: I don't like his flirting with terrorism. This conference in Jordan, according to our intelligence, had some of the worst terrorists. I don't think world opinion would tolerate such terrorist acts. We sent a warning to him, but they reacted by denying these links. It is a worry. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: It is impossible to predict. Even if the conflict is resolved, we should be prepared for an increase in terrorism. The condition in the region is such that it is ripe for an increase in terrorism. The situation is like that in Lebanon some years back -- a really uncontrollable situation. I have one other subject -- Central America. (C)

The President: Yes. There is something I want to say. Everyone I talk to in Central and South America has great respect for you and Spain. Can you use your authority with the FMLN? I mentioned it to Carlos Andres Perez. There might be a way to get him involved. Anything you can do would be helpful. You are probably unique with your standing in the region. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: We accepted the idea of the UN Secretary General's role and accepted the group with Carlos, Menem, and Salinas. I think it can work by pressuring both sides. I am relatively optimistic. I don't think the FMLN is preparing for an offensive like last year, nor do I think they will walk away from negotiations. They paid a high price for that. We have to help Cristiani get some maneuvering room. Another element is to avoid a fight among political parties now that the March elections are coming up. Having the UNGA in the negotiation process will avoid a fight. (C)

There are two elements I would like to raise, Mr. President. First, perhaps it is the right time for the U.S. administration to open some channel to the FMLN, because they will now be

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sensitive to your views. See what you think. (S)

The President: Wouldn't it look like we were undermining Cristiani? (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: No, you would do it with his agreement. (S)

The President: Let me ask the Secretary of State for his views. (S)

Secretary Baker: We think they are not negotiating in good faith, because they are waiting to see how Congress goes on aid to Cristiani. We will know in two weeks. I am pretty sure we can prevail in a veto. We could restrict some aid in return for restrictions on the FMLN if they didn't bargain in good faith. That would free up aid to the Cristiani government. I think this question will be behind us in a couple of weeks. We should work through the UN Secretary General's good offices and the Friends of the Secretary General. I think we would be mistaken to have a dialogue with a group that hasn't condemned armed conflict. But if we get serious negotiations going -- maybe a cease fire -- then there would be possibility. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I understand the difficulty. I will leave the idea for you to think about. De facto we are recognizing Cristiani. We never talked about making the two equal, but this is a reality. We must strengthen the negotiating position of the governing party. Those who can take the decisions have to sit down together. At some point in the future, the direct pressure of the U.S. on the FMLN will be crucial. Of course the other factor is Cuba. We have had some difficulty with the Cubans ourselves, but it is important to try to see if they are in a constructive mood. (S)

Secretary Baker: What would be Cristiani's view if we had a dialogue with the FMLN and a cease fire? (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I can't say, but I think he would approve if you sat down at the table. (S)

The President: Let me raise one other point -- the Uruguay Round. I have been telling everyone to please get a successful Uruguay Round. We can't get success without agricultural reform. At Houston we issued a good statement, but we are not moving forward. It is very important to the world economy and to the Third World. I know it is difficult, but I ask you to do what you can. I want to encourage that approach to finish up, but it won't be done without agriculture. (S)

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4

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I discussed this with the Secretary of Commerce. He knows our position and analysis. I also explained the difficulties we see. I have been defending the idea of that for the Americans. I think the evolution of opinion is very positive. It has always been difficult in getting agreement with the U.S. because restrictions are not federal but at the state level. (S)

The President: It is not clear what that is. There shouldn't be protectionist policies at the state level. We do have state interests on issues like textiles, but there are no state barriers to international trade. That is the responsibility of the federal government. But I am glad that we are somewhat together. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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7887

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

November 23, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Prime Minister Gonzalez
of Spain

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation for the President's meeting with Prime Minister Gonzalez during the UNGA.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *RZH* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation with Prime Minister
Felipe Gonzalez of Spain

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *AM* NARA, Date *11/18/2013*

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: lms

LOG # 7887

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>Ken Hill</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>6M1421</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
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☒ Action
 ☐ Information
 ☐ Dispatch
 ☐ Retain
 ☐ No further Action

cc. VP

Sununu

Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009281
RECEIVED: 26 NOV 90 12

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: JACKSON

DOC DATE: 24 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JAPAN
PERSIAN GULF

IRAQ
KUWAIT

PERSONS: NAKASONE, YASUHIRO

HUSSEIN, SADDAM

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM FORMER PM NAKASONE RE MTG W/ HUSSEIN OF IRAQ

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 29 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JACKSON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
JACKSON
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 3

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9281
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>(needs #)</u>	<u>R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

90 DEC 18 P12:39

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____
Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS
NSC/S
LOG FRP

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9281

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

November 24, 1990

*Natl Sec Advisor
has seen*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: KARL D. JACKSON *KDJ*

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from former Prime Minister Nakasone.

Attached is a letter from Nakasone to the President. Given our unhappiness with Nakasone and other travelers to Baghdad, my inclination is to have State work up a reply, thereby showing our displeasure by the slowness of our reply.

To my eye, the only interesting matter Nakasone's read on Saddam Hussein as "desperately seeking a way to step back and find a way to a peaceful resolution. --- a leader in real despair, trying to extricate himself from the current situation ---" (pp. 6-7). Perhaps Richard Haass can find something more of interest. I am forwarding the letter to him as well as to State EAP.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you tell the President we have received Nakasone's letter and will be providing a reply in due course.

Approve

Disapprove

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0843-MR

mm 3/9/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



EMBASSY OF JAPAN
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 19, 1990

Dear General Scowcroft:

I have the honor to transmit to you, enclosed herewith, a photocopy of a letter from Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone, former Prime Minister of Japan, addressed to President Bush. I would appreciate it very much if you could forward it to the President. The original will follow as soon as I receive it from Japan.

Allow me to extend my warmest regards.

Sincerely yours,

Ryohei Murata
Ambassador of Japan

General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

November 15, 1990

Dear Mr. President,

Allow me to express my deepest appreciation and respect for the constant and strenuous efforts you continue to exert in the cause of world peace and prosperity.

I am sure you have been informed of my visit to Baghdad from 3rd to 7th of November at the invitation of the Organization of Friendship, Peace and Solidarity in Iraq.

The main purpose for the trip was to ascertain directly from President Saddam Hussein, who persists in his aggressive behavior, his real motives and possible reactions to future developments. As a political leader, I felt that this trip would bring me great satisfaction if I could make some positive contribution to the measures that our alliance is taking to resolve the Gulf Crisis.

During my stay in Iraq, I had three lengthy meetings with President Hussein, for a total of approximately four and a half hours. Initially the President was tense and simply advocated his own opinions. In the latter half of

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
U. S. A.

our series of discussions, however, he began to be more receptive to what I had to say and increasingly frank in his own responses.

In my meetings with other leading figures of the Iraqi Government, including First Deputy Prime Minister Ramadhan, I emphasized the following three objectives and requested that they be fulfilled in the most expeditious way possible:

1. to fully respect and obey the resolutions adopted by the United Nation's Security Council;
2. to exert the utmost effort to avoid armed conflict and to resolve the present crisis by peaceful means; and,
3. to immediately and unconditionally release all foreign hostages.

At first, President Hussein's reply remained totally cool and official, and he explained at length the historical background of what he called the Kuwait problem. He said, and I quote, "Only a few days after our advancement to Kuwait on August 2nd, I considered holding a mini summit of the Arab nations on 5 August to be attended by Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. In fact, we had agreed to hold this meeting in Saudi Arabia. Hopes for this proposed mini Arab summit vanished, however, following U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney's

visit to Saudi Arabia and the ensuing deployment of foreign troops in that country. Had this meeting been convened, the situation in the Gulf today would have probably been much different. I cannot but think that U.S. intervention has made the situation extremely complicated and has caused the international community as well as the Arab nations to lose an invaluable opportunity to settle the problem. Because of the strong military pressure that has been exerted by the United States, I was compelled to declare the annexation of Kuwait and bolster the morale of our soldiers by encouraging them, so that they are aware that defending Kuwait is in essence a struggle that must be endured to defend their own country."

President Hussein also said, and I also quote, "I understand the concern with which the world views the current Middle East situation. I also understand how important the security of our region is to global security."

At the same time, however, he continued to bluster, saying, "We never wanted war. But if we are forced into hostilities, our only recourse is to fight. We adamantly refuse to bow to the will of other countries as expressed by way of military threat or warning. In addition, a double standard should not be used by the countries of the world, nor by the United Nations, to resolve the problems

of the international community. Why do those who have condemned the problem of Kuwait never condemn or try to resolve the earlier problems relating to Palestine or Lebanon? The Kuwait problem must be resolved comprehensively, along with those of Palestine and Lebanon."

To counter his statement, I fully explained the necessity of resolving the current problem in a peaceful manner, stressing that this crisis is only exacerbating the difficulties of the developing countries and countries of Eastern Europe. I explained as follows: "The time has now come for action, rather than words. It is my opinion, and that of most of the world, that the situation is becoming critical as the U.S. now faces a decision on whether or not to use force. I am sure you understand this. The U.S. will strongly push for U.N. Security Council approval of military action, and the Soviet Union, anxious for outside assistance to alleviate its domestic economic crisis, will eventually agree to the use of force. It is also highly likely that China, which continues to try to improve relations with the West in the aftermath of Tiananmen, will in the end give quiet assent to military action. There is only a month left until December, after which the opportunity for American military action will emerge. In Japan, we are acutely

aware of the misery to be caused by war, and so I would like to remind you that there will be neither winners nor losers if it comes to war. On the contrary, it will be a defeat for all mankind if we fail to avoid armed conflicts because the entire world will suffer severe consequences. The misery of wars will ruin the political and economic achievements that we have accomplished, and will take us back to the glacial age."

It was after this statement that the tone of President Hussein changed, and he seemed more willing to consider concessions if they were a way to peace. He repeated his assertion that Iraq did not want wars, and I suggested that we look at some of the concrete proposals for peaceful resolution of the problem. As an example I asked his opinion on the Primakov proposal.

His reply was, and I again quote, "The Primakov proposal is, in short, a pax deal, a comprehensive exchange of views for the sake of peace. Under this proposal, there will be an opportunity for all the countries concerned to have frank exchanges of views without any preconditions. We do not deny the existence of various opinions on any given problem. This proposal suggests one approach." In response to a variety of other questions that I posed, the President made the following remarks:

"1. We would like to be free to resolve the current problem among the Arab ourselves without external influence."

"2. Iraq does not have the slightest intention of attacking Saudi Arabia. We have already provided assurances to Saudi Arabia on this. We have no such intentions, because Saudi Arabia has never been a part of Iraq and vice versa."

"3. If Saudi Arabia declares it will host Arab forces instead of a foreign military, then Iraq will accept this."

In response, I asked his opinion on the possibility of U.N. participation in a settlement based on an Arab agreement such as he called for, in other words, a U.N. umbrella on an Arab settlement. He replied, "I would prefer to reach a settlement among the Arab countries. However, I would not refuse a U.N. blessing on such an agreement."

I had the impression, after a series of long discussions with President Hussein, that he had fully realized Iraqi would suffer a total defeat and the country would be ruined if war began. This is the reason, in my opinion, that the President is desperately seeking a way to step back and find a way to a peaceful resolution.

Today, Saddam Hussein seems more like a leader in real despair, trying his best to extricate himself from the current situation, than the dictator who had overestimated himself.

I felt compelled as a political leader to inform you of my assessment of the situation. I am deeply convinced that there must be continuous efforts to avoid the use of force until the point where no other option exists, while exerting as much military pressure on Iraq as possible. The initiative to a peaceful settlement may come wherever possible, from the Arab countries, the United Nations, or elsewhere. There is still a possibility that these efforts will bear some positive results, and we should not abandon hope.

In closing, allow me to assume the privilege of making three suggestions.

First, it is necessary to allow the economic sanctions against Iraq to take effect and to enforce their impact, by consolidating unity among all of the countries concerned under the United Nations and by further strengthening the already massive military pressure. At the same time, it may be necessary to give Saddam Hussein a face-saving exit, acceptable to all the countries with the explicit precondition of an Iraqi

withdrawal from Kuwait and the release of all hostages. In the old days, whenever people in Asia was about to attack their adversary's castles, they prepared an escape route for their opponents which was also utilized to rescue hostages. After achieving these objectives, we should coordinate our measures against Iraq to gradually render that country harmless within the international community.

Second, in creating a face-saving exit for Saddam Hussein to resolve the current crisis, we have to bear in mind the importance of achieving compromises and agreements within the Arab world. To this end, it is desirable that such leading figures of the region as King Hussein of Jordan, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, King Hassan of Morocco, and the President Mubarak of Egypt take the initiative.

Third, even when worse comes to worse and there is no other options but the use of force, you must communicate directly with the President Hussein before military action is taken. It is necessary for the U.S. to show the world that it has exhausted all possible efforts for a peaceful resolution, including such measures as arranging meetings between respective foreign ministers and dispatching a special envoy to Iraq at the last stage, in order to win the support from the world.

- 9 -

I have written this letter as one who wishes to further enhance Japan-U.S. relations and to make a positive contribution to world peace, and sincerely hope that you appreciate both my intention and my concern.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading 'Yasuhiro Nakasone' in a cursive style.

Yasuhiro Nakasone
The Former Prime Minister
of Japan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009249
RECEIVED: 23 NOV 90 16

CHRON FILE

TO: GATES

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 27 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JORDAN
INTL FINANCE

IRAQ

PERSONS: NEWCOMB, RICHARD

HAMAMI, HUSSEIN

SUBJECT: UNBLOCKING IRAQI ASSETS FOR BENEFIT OF JORDAN

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 27 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS

NSC CHRON

WELCH

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSPMP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council The White House

PROOFED BY: ARM

LOG # 9249

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 37 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ker Hill	<u>3</u>		
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>AM 11:30</u>	<u>1</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

CC: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ORIGIN FILE

9249

November 27, 1990

Secy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THRU: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Unblocking Iraqi Assets for the Benefit of Jordan

At Tab I is a memo from John Robson informing you that Treasury intends to unblock certain frozen Iraqi assets held by the United States. State has concurred in this decision.

These funds (approximately \$9.4 million) were the final payment by Iraq to Jordan for a \$20 million loan. The funds were transferred on August 2 and seized as of that day in a Chase Manhattan account. Arguing that the funds were a late payment and only for Jordan's use, the Jordanians have pressed for Treasury to license their release.

We see no reason to contest this decision by Treasury.

Attachment

Tab I John Robson Memorandum of
November 20, 1990

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0843-MR
MM 3/9/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9249



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

FROM: JOHN E. ROBSON *JER*
SUBJECT: Unblocking Iraqi Assets for the benefit of the
Central Bank of Jordan

On October 23, 1990, the Jordanian Ambassador and the Governor of the Central Bank of Jordan met with the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("FAC") to discuss unblocking certain frozen Iraqi assets held under the jurisdiction of the United States. This was followed by a written request to unblock these funds from the Jordanian Ambassador (copy attached).

The Jordanian Ambassador requested FAC to issue a specific license to unblock \$9,402,534.00 in Iraqi funds presently frozen in The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., New York, for the benefit of the Central Bank of Jordan. These funds represent the second and final payment due under a \$20 million loan repayment program from Iraq to Jordan. These Jordanian officials assert that these funds will only be used to support Jordanian financial projects and will not assist, or be diverted to the benefit of, Iraq or Kuwait or any interest thereof.

FAC has obtained State's concurrence in issuing this license. Accordingly, FAC intends to grant the Ambassador's request for a license to authorize The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., New York to unblock and transfer the requested funds to the Central Bank of Jordan. As you are aware, a specific license is required pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 12722 and 12724 which blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Iraq, its agencies, instrumentalities and controlled entities, including the Central Bank of Iraq, that were or hereafter came under the jurisdiction of the United States.

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT IS REMOVED

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0843-MR
8/22/2014 MA


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE H. K. OF JORDAN
INTERNATIONAL DRIVE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008



سفارة
المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية
واشنطن

October 24, 1990



Mr. R. Richard Newcomb
Director
Office of Foreign Assets Control
15th and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Annex 2233
Washington, D.C. 20220

Dear Mr. Newcomb:

Thank you for meeting with Dr. Marto and myself yesterday. We appreciate the time you took out of your busy schedule to see us.

As discussed yesterday, we would like to officially request a license for unblocking funds presently held by Chase Manhattan Bank in New York which belong to the Central Bank of Jordan.

In the way of background, I have enclosed supporting correspondence from the Central Bank of Jordan, Chase Bank and from the Central Bank of Iraq.

As Dr. Marto ^{GOVERNOR} explained yesterday, the Central Bank of Jordan received a telex from the Central Bank of Iraq on July 30, 1990 advising that two loan payments were going to be credited to their account. The first payment for \$11,820,000 was credited to the Central Bank of Jordan's account value July 31, 1990 and represented the payment of a loan installment due June 15, 1990. The second payment of \$9,402,534 value dated August 2, 1990 represents a loan installment due July 15, 1990 was not credited to Central Bank of Jordan's account. Correspondence received from Chase Bank in New York indicated that the payment was not paid because they were understood to be assets of Iraq frozen by the President's Executive Order of August 2, 1990.

We ask that this payment of \$9,402,534 be released to the Central Bank of Jordan because the payment instructions were made prior to the Executive Order and the payment relates to loan installments due July 15, 1990 and that these assets should be considered Jordanian rather than Iraqi assets.

We ask for your prompt attention to this matter and will be pleased to furnish any additional information you may require.

As you are no doubt aware, Jordan's economy has been badly hurt by the events occurring after August 2, 1990 and its sources of foreign



Mr. R. Richard Newcomb
October 24, 1990
Page 2

exchange from traditional export markets have been impaired. These funds, once they are released to us, would be used to import badly needed supplies and meet debt obligations of our government. We assure you that they would not be used to assist the government of Iraq.

The Central Bank of Jordan is a serious and professional institution of long standing in Jordan and the international community. It would never allow itself to be used as a conduit for funds belonging to Iraq. To this date, it has fully complied with the requirements of the United Nations' SCR 661 and it intends to fully comply with all the U.N. SCRs in the future.

Furthermore, the Central Bank of Jordan has informed all its correspondent banks that it will not accept in its accounts any amounts to be credited to any Iraqi party, requesting these correspondents to act accordingly. Moreover, only sovereign government transfers to their embassies in Iraq which have received prior written approval from the United States Embassy in Jordan will be credited.

Jordan has taken the sanctions seriously by expanding its normal customs, border, and military controls to comply with their requirements even though Jordan's financial and manpower resources are being stretched. Any violations brought to Jordan's attention are being investigated promptly. We feel our controls are complete.

Again, we ask your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Hussein Hammami'.

Hussein Hammami
Ambassador of Jordan

Enc.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009220
RECEIVED: 21 NOV 90 15

CHRON FILE

TO: SOLARZ, STEPHEN J

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 31 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: POLAND
ECONOMICS

IMF
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO SOLAREZ RE POLISH DEBT REDUCTION

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 24 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BENKO

GOMPERT

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED



BS - Rep Solary - no Polish Debt

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: LMS

LOG # 9220

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG MEA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>Web</u> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>9/11 12/31</u>	<u>DA</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>B</u>

50 000 19 P 8. 42

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

APNSA Has Seen

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1990



Dear Congressman Solarz:

Thank you for your letter to the President concerning debt reduction for Poland. I fully agree with you that the Polish debt situation is serious and needs attention.

The Administration believes that official debt reduction is necessary for Poland in order to instill the confidence necessary to promote investment and growth. The President indicated to then-Prime Minister Mazowiecki in November that the United States is willing to reduce Polish debt and debt service obligations to the United States, provided that it could be done in an agreed multilateral context. To that end, we are consulting with our allies urging them to support such assistance.

The Polish debt question is an assistance priority for this Administration, and we are working to bring about an equitable relief package. Thank you again for your views.

Sincerely,



Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Stephen J. Solarz
United State House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

9220

December 18, 1990

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT *DCG*

FROM: STEPHEN E. BENKO *SEB*

SUBJECT: Letter to Representative Solarz re: Polish Debt
Reduction

At Tab I is a letter from you to Representative Solarz who wrote the President a letter, cosigned by eleven of his colleagues, urging the U.S. to take active measures to reduce Poland's external debt. The response at Tab I notes that we support debt reduction for the Poles, have so indicated to the Poles, and are working with our allies on it.

Concurrences by: Virginia Lampley *VL*, Robert Hutchings *RH*, Tim Deal *TD*

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Solarz
Tab II Incoming

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ
13TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEES:

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC

WASHINGTON OFFICE:

1536 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-2361

DISTRICT OFFICES:

532 NEPTUNE AVENUE
BROOKLYN, NY 11224
(718) 372-8600

619 LORIMER STREET
BROOKLYN, NY 11211
(718) 706-6603

356 COURT STREET
BROOKLYN, NY 11231
(718) 802-1400

9220

November 7, 1990

The Honorable George Bush
Office of the President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In recent months, you have made major proposals for debt relief initiatives with respect to Egypt and Latin America. We are writing to urge that you undertake a similar initiative with respect to Poland, as we believe an international program of debt reduction for Poland would serve U.S. interests in promoting economic stability and peaceful political change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

As you know, the Polish Government has remained remarkably firm in its commitment to economic reform, implementing an unprecedented IMF program that envisions the rapid transformation from a state-controlled to a market economy. The Government has virtually eliminated enterprise subsidies, has done away with almost all price controls, and has enacted a landmark privatization bill that will transform Polish industry over the next few years.

Through strict adherence to the IMF program, the Polish Government has reduced inflation from over 50% per month about a year ago to between 4% and 5% today, and has begun to create conditions of economic stability that will permit long-term economic growth and development.

The success of the Polish economic reform program, however, is by no means assured, as the economic transition has imposed major sacrifices upon the Polish people. Industrial production is about 20% below last year's level, and unemployment -- virtually unknown prior to implementation of the economic reform program -- is expected to reach one million before the end of the year. In recent months, Soviet failure to provide agreed-upon levels of oil deliveries has imposed additional strains on the economy. And Polish compliance with the United Nations embargo has meant that oil deliveries that had been expected from Iraq have not been delivered.

In addition to these economic problems and the threats to social stability that they pose, the Polish Government confronts debts of


more than \$40 billion, which may be the Communist Party's most enduring legacy in Poland. And despite decisions within the Paris Club to reschedule official debt, the continued failure of the international community to make serious efforts at debt reduction encourages economic uncertainty in Poland, complicates financial planning within government and private industry, serves to discourage new sources of capital, and signals a lack of western commitment to the kinds of reform measures that the Polish Government has so boldly undertaken.

To ensure the success of the Polish experiment in economic reform, we believe it essential that an international program of Polish debt reduction be implemented. As you know, officials in the Soviet Union have closely watched the political and economic transition underway in Poland, and the success of the Polish effort will be crucial in strengthening those within the Soviet Government who are committed to fundamental economic reforms.

We are aware that the U.S. Government holds only about \$3.1 billion of the more than \$40 billion in Polish debt, and for this reason we urge that you undertake vigorous efforts to encourage both Paris and London Club agreements on debt reduction. We also believe, however, that unilateral U.S. action might serve as an incentive for other creditors to respond on this issue. For this reason, we encourage your efforts to obtain substantial and significant reductions in Polish debt obligations to the United States in advance of an international debt reduction agreement, especially if you were to characterize your action as part of an effort to encourage other creditors to authorize and implement debt reduction.

In conclusion, we note that there is considerable congressional support for the kind of measure we advocate, as reflected in the two provisions on Polish debt reduction contained in the recently enacted Foreign Aid Appropriations Conference Report. We are eager to work closely with the Administration on this important issue, and look forward to hearing from you.


Cordially,



STEPHEN J. SOLARZ
Member of Congress





DAN ROSTENKOWSKI
Member of Congress


JOHN D. DINGELL
Member of Congress


LEE H. HAMILTON
Member of Congress


FRANK ANNUNZIO
Member of Congress



MATTHEW F. MCHUGH
Member of Congress


HENRY J. NOVAK
Member of Congress


DENNIS M. HERTEL
Member of Congress


RONALD V. DELLUMS
Member of Congress


MARTIN FROST
Member of Congress


JOHN EDWARD PORTER
Member of Congress


WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI
Member of Congress

November 19, 1990

Dear //:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President, cosigned by 11 of your colleagues, expressing your support for debt relief for Poland.

We appreciate being apprised of your views on the progress the Polish Government has made in the area of economic reform and receiving your recommendation regarding Polish debt. I have shared your comments with the President. Additionally, I have taken the liberty of providing your remarks to several of the President's foreign policy advisors so that they, too, are aware of your recommendation.

Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable ///////////////
////////////////////////////////////
Washington, D.C. 2051////////

FDM:SLM:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for appropriate action
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of the Treasury - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to OMB - FYI

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

ID# 190247

INCOMING

CD 126

DATE RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 13, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE STEPHEN J. SOLARZ

SUBJECT: URGES AN INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM OF POLISH DEBT
REDUCTION BE IMPLEMENTED TO ENSURE THE
SUCCESS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN POLAND

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE		ORG	90/11/13	FM	A 90/11/19 W
NSC	REFERRAL NOTE:	A	90/11/20 W		/ /
99DOS	REFERRAL NOTE:	I	90/11/23 W	C	/ /
99Trea	REFERRAL NOTE:	I	90/11/23 W	C	/ /
99OMB	REFERRAL NOTE:	I	90/11/23 W	C	/ /

COMMENTS: *Letter sent to all signers*

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 11 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240 1230

MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	*CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	*OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		*OUTGOING	*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY			*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE			*
*X-INTERIM REPLY			*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

~~TOP SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009383
RECEIVED: 28 NOV 90 19

2

TO: YANG SHANGKUN

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 26 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

4

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

PERSONS: YANG SHANGKUN
ZHU QIZHEN

JIANG ZEMIN
LI PENG

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PRES YANG

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 01 DEC 90 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF:
FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 6/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 2 OF 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Cable	Re: Presidential Letter to Yang Shangkun (3 pp.)	11/26/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [3]

Date Closed:	6/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91145-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Coversheet	Doug Paal to Florence Gantt for General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [3]

Date Closed:	6/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91145-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Memo	Douglas Paal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Crosshatch of Presidential Letter to Beijing (1 pp.)	11/26/90	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [3]

Date Closed: 6/16/2009	OA/ID Number: 91145-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IN REPLY TO

NOV 23



S. 08

MESSAGE NO. 059209 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 3
 FROM: BOB PEARSON S/S 5302 7224
 (Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO BEIJING: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO YANG SHANGKUN

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSCS</u>	<u>WILLIAM SITTMANN</u>	<u>456-6534</u>	<u>WHSITRM</u>
<u>NSCS</u>	<u>KENNETH HILL</u>		
<u>NSCS</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>		
	<u>PAAL</u>		
	<u>JACKSON</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: 11/26 MUST GO TONIGHT. THANKS

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines
 E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By Cap NARA, Date 6/14/09

S/S Officer:

BP

BOB PEARSON

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04d. Cable	Re: Presidential Letter to Yang Shangkun (3 pp.)	11/26/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [3]

Date Closed: 6/16/2009	OA/ID Number: 91145-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009342
RECEIVED: 27 NOV 90 17



TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 27 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: TURKEY
IRAQ

PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: B-C-S BREAKFAST 28 NOV RE TURKISH SUPPORT FOR DESERT SHIELD

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 30 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SITTMANN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS

GANTT

GOMPERT

HAASS

NSC CHRON

SITTMANN

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 4/6/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDGL

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 1 OF 2

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National Security Council
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PROOFED BY: _____
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 9342
SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT
DOCLOG By LAO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
<i>Bill Sittmann</i>	<u>1</u>	<u>h</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>		
Brent Scowcroft		<u>✓</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

B-C-S Breakfast on Nov. 28
at 7:15 am

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Memo	William F. Sittmann to Brent Scowcroft Re: B-C-S Breakfast Meeting, Wednesday, November 28, 1990, 7:15 a.m. (1 pp.)	11/27/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [3]

Date Closed: 6/16/2009	OA/ID Number: 91145-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: November 28 Breakfast: Turkish Support for Desert Shield (2 pp.)	11/27/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [3]

Date Closed:	6/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91145-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009368
RECEIVED: 28 NOV 90 15

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: ZELIKOW
GOMPERT
HAASS

DOC DATE: 28 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY
IRAQ

PERSIAN GULF

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STRENGTHENING ALLIED RESPONSIBILITY SHARING TWD GULF CRISIS

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 01 DEC 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
HAASS
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 11/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Strengthening Allied Responsibility-Sharing Toward the Gulf (3 pp.)	11/28/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [3]

Date Closed:	6/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91145-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

HLed Responsibility
 Toward Gulf

National Security Council
 The White House

PROOFED BY: NJT

LOG # 9368

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 104 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>Ken Hill</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>		
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>		
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>8</u>	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		
NSC Secretariat			

90 NOV 28 P 8: 55

☒ A = Action
 ☐ I = Information
 ☐ D = Dispatch
 ☐ R = Retain
 ☐ N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009428
RECEIVED: 30 NOV 90 09

CHRON FILE

TO: CICCONI, J

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 30 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CONGRESSIONAL
SAUDI ARABIA

PERSIAN GULF
KUWAIT

PERSONS: HUSSEIN, SADDAM

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR NOV 7 BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MTG

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 04 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

HAASS

LAMPLEY

NSC CHRON

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSMJT

DOC 2 OF 2

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE 9428

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November 30, 1990

90 NOV 30 PM 2:48

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES CICCONI

FROM: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN *W*
SUBJECT: Talking Points for November 30 Bipartisan
Congressional Leadership Meeting

Attached are Talking Points prepared for the President's use at the Bipartisan Leadership meeting on November 30.

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points

cc: Fred McClure

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/8/2013

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11/30 Leadership Meeting

- Glad to once more have the opportunity to meet. Despite what differences do exist, I think these meetings are very helpful to all of us at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.
- Yesterday's vote in the Security Council was a real milestone, both for the UN, which increasingly is coming to resemble what its founders imagined, and for the world's efforts to force Saddam out of Kuwait. If we succeed, we will teach him and those who might be tempted to emulate him a valuable lesson.
- As you know, the resolution gives the anti-Saddam coalition the added authority to use all necessary means to bring about Iraqi compliance with all previous Security Council resolutions.
- In my view, this resolution increases the chances that the coalition will not have to use force to achieve its goals. It is one more powerful signal to Saddam that his aggression will not be tolerated or rewarded.
- This resolution also complements efforts underway to provide the coalition with a credible military option. Again, we are ratcheting up the pressure not because we want to go to war, but because we don't. At the same time, I firmly

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By SS NARA, Date 3/14/24

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believe the stakes are such that we cannot afford to compromise or fail.

- Based on my recent trip and the efforts of Jim Baker, I am confident that both these tracks, the political and the military, enjoy widespread international support. I think you will all increasingly be seeing the evidence that others are doing their fair share, economically and militarily.
- I also know that while most everyone in this room shares our objectives and to a large extent our sense of the stakes, there is more than a little difference of opinion over means, and in particular over whether we ought to simply stick with sanctions.
- The truth is, while the sanctions seem to be having some impact, there is no evidence that they are changing Iraq's behavior. Nor can anybody predict when or even if they will.
- Meanwhile, we pay a price for waiting. Iraq is using every day to introduce more forces into the theater and to reinforce those already there. Saddam is producing more chemical and biological weapons too. What this does is raise the casualties and costs to us and our allies if war does come about down the road.
- Saddam is also on a crash program to develop nuclear weapons. The recent IAEA inspection should not allay

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anyone's concerns. He has fissile material that could be tapped at short notice once the rest of his unsafeguarded program is ready. Estimates of when Iraq could have a crude device run from months to several years; prudence requires we factor this into our thinking.

- We are all paying a price in higher energy costs. This is having an impact not simply here but in Eastern and Central Europe and throughout the developing world.
- And of course all this is taking place against a backdrop of the destruction of Kuwait, the pressure on our embassy, and the continued holding of hostages.
- To all of the above I would only add the argument that we cannot assume our coalition can hold indefinitely. Domestic upheavals, economic needs, or the strains caused by the Arab-Israeli issue could all take their toll.
- Any of these reasons could justify a sense of urgency; collectively, they make what I believe is a compelling case for us to increase the pressure on Saddam now.
- Most of our coalition partners agree. This explains the support in the Security Council for the resolution and for signalling Saddam that our patience has its limits.
- Again, I want to make it clear that the best way to get a peaceful settlement is to make clear to Saddam that the

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alternative is much more threatening to him. Indeed, the time between now and January 15 provides a real chance for diplomacy, so long as it is consistent with UN resolutions on the books.

- It was to underline my commitment to peace that I offered this morning to meet with Tariq Aziz here and to send Jim Baker to meet in Baghdad with Saddam.
- Let me just bring my comments to an end by saying that we continue to want to consult with you. I value your advice and counsel. We will also continue to discuss with you on how best to provide the Congress an opportunity to get its position on the record in the aftermath of the UN action.
- Why don't I leave it there, and ask the Secretary of State to say a few things about the Security Council action before turning to the Speaker and the Majority Leader.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9428

November 30, 1990

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS/VIRGINIA LAMPLEY

SUBJECT: Talking Points for November 30 Bipartisan
Congressional Leadership Meeting

At Tab A are proposed Talking Points for the President's use with the Bipartisan Congressional Leadership on November 30.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Sittmann to forward the proposed Talking Points to Jim Cicconi (Sittmann memo at Tab I).

Approve *RD* Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann Memo to Cicconi
Tab A Proposed Talking Points

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Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/18/2013

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