

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91145
Folder ID Number: 91145-001

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Cable	American Embassy Sanaa to Secretary of State and White House Washington DC Re: Letter from President Saleh to President Bush (10 pp.)	11/13/90	(b)(1)	C
02a. Memo	William F. Sittmann to James Cicconi Re: Talking Points for November 14 Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meeting (1 pp.)	11/13/90	(b)(1)	C
02b. Talking Points	Re: Themes for November 14 Congressional Leadership Meeting (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02c. Talking Points	Re: Themes for November 14 Congressional Leadership Meeting (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02d. Talking Points	Re: Themes for November 14 Congressional Leadership Meeting (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02e. Memo	Richard N. Haass/Virginia Lampley to Brent Scowcroft Re: Talking Points for November 14 Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meeting (1 pp.)	11/13/90	(b)(1)	C
03. Memo	Nicholas Rostow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Pakistan and Desert Shield: The Use of U.S. or U.S. Origin Equipment (4 pp.)	11/15/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1206
OA/ID Number: 91145-001
Date Closed: 6/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04a. Memo	Bill Sittmann to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Meeting Memo for His Trip to Saudi Arabia and Egypt (1 pp.)	11/15/90	(b)(1)	S
04b. Outline	Re: Meeting with Kuwaiti Amir Jaber (3 pp.)	11/21/90	(b)(1)	S
04c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made with Amir Sheikh Jaber (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04d. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made with Amir Sheikh Jaber (5 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memo	Wendy Chamberlin to Robert M. Gates Re: Treatment of Released Iraqi Detainees/Hostages (2 pp.)	11/19/90	(b)(1)	S
05b. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Treatment of Released Iraqi Detainees/Hostages (1 pp.)	11/13/90	(b)(1)	S
05c. Report	Re: USG [United States Government] Assistance for Iraqi Hostages (3 pp.)	3	(b)(1)	S
06a. Scenesetter	Re: Meeting with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey Scenesetter (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
06b. Talking Points	Re: Meeting with President Turgut Ozal Points To Be Made (8 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
06c. Summary	Re: Summary of Main Elements of U.S. Support for Turkey (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1206
OA/ID Number: 91145-001
Date Closed: 6/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07a. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Assad (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
07b. Outline	Re: Meeting with President Assad of Syria (3 pp.)	11/23/90	(b)(1)	S
07c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with President Assad (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
08a. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	10/27/90	(b)(1)	S
08b. Memo	Richard N. Haass to William F. Sittmann Re: Memorandum of Telephone Call with President Mubarak of Egypt on October 27, 1990 (1 pp.)	11/23/90	(b)(1)	S
09a. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	11/20/90	(b)(1)	S
09b. Memo	C. David Welch to William F. Sittmann Re: Memorandum of Telephone Call with President Mubarak of Egypt of November 20, 1990 (1 pp.)	11/23/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1206
OA/ID Number: 91145-001
Date Closed: 6/16/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

9076

2

GE 01 OF 10

PRT: GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SIT SITTMANN VANERON
SIT: FILE HAASS CHARLES MONTGOMERY ROSTOW WELCH WHSR-IRAQ PRES-MSGS SIT
SUM VAX

PREC IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 131637Z NOV 90

FM AMEMBASSY SANAA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3011
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 SANAA 08358
EXDIS STARBURST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, YM, US

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT SALEH TO PRESIDENT
- BUSH

REF: A. SANAA 8131; B. STATE 373874

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

>BEGIN SUMMARY>

2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: ROY PRESIDENT SALEH'S
LENGTHY REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE NOTING
UNHAPPINESS AT YEMEN'S CHANGE OF VOTE ON UNSCR 674
JUSTIFIES THAT VOTE IN FAMILIAR TERMS. SALEH ALSO
REITERATES THE ROY'S CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ'S INVASION
AND ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT, ITS RESPECT FOR SANCTIONS,
ITS INTEREST IN AN ARAB SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT, AND
ITS OPPOSITION TO THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES ON
THE PENINSULA. HE CONDEMNS THE SAUDI DECISION TO
SEND 650,000 YEMENIS HOME AND NOTES THAT YEMEN STANDS
TO SUFFER GREATLY IF THERE IS A WAR IN THE GULF.
FINALLY, HE NOTES THE ROY'S INTEREST IN MAINTAINING
THE BEST POSSIBLE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

3. SALEH AND THE REST OF THE ROY LEADERSHIP WERE
CLEARLY STRUCK BY THE SOMBER TONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S
MESSAGE. HIS RESPONSE SEEMS DESIGNED TO EXPLAIN AND

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0841-MR
28 9/24/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

02 OF 10 —

TO PUT THE BEST POSSIBLE FACE ON THE ROY'S GULF-CRISIS POSITION. TO MAKE CLEAR WHY THAT POLICY IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE, AND TO TRY TO PRESERVE YEMEN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
>END SUMMARY>

4. ON NOVEMBER 11, ROY FOREIGN MINISTER AL-IRYANI SUMMONED ME AND GAVE ME A RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO ROY PRESIDENT SALEH NOTING UNHAPPINESS AT THE ROY'S DECISION TO CHANGE ITS VOTE ON UNSCR 674. AN EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF SALEH'S LETTER FOLLOWS; THE SIGNED ORIGINAL IS BEING POUCHED TO NEA/ARP:
BEGIN TEXT:

MY DEAR FRIEND PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
I RECEIVED WITH APPRECIATION YOUR LETTER DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1990, IN WHICH YOU CONFIRMED YOUR SERIOUS CONCERN FOR THE PLIGHT OF THE CIVILIANS, INCLUDING A NUMBER OF AMERICAN CITIZENS, DETAINED IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. THIS IS A CONCERN WE SHARE WITH YOU, AND WE CONDEMNED IRAQ'S INHUMANE ACTION WHEN WE VOTED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR RESOLUTION 664 AND 665, WHICH WERE ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. YOU

NONETHELESS EXPRESSED YOUR CONCERN AND DISCOMFORT AT THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN'S ABSTENTION IN THE VOTE ON RESOLUTION 674 WHICH CONDEMNED ANEW IRAQ'S VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHARGED IRAQ FOR THE FIRST TIME WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR PAYING FULL COMPENSATION TO STATES, INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS FOR WAR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM IRAQ'S OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THERE WAS A COMPARISON IN YOUR LETTER BETWEEN THE SITUATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT AND THE SITUATION OF OUR CITIZENS IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA. THIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE STEP TAKEN BY THE KINGDOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

03 OF 10 —

BEARS NO RELATION TO THE EVENTS OCCURING IN THE REGION. ACCORDING TO WHAT KING FAHD BIN ABDULAZIZ AFFIRMED TO US IN A LETTER WE RECEIVED FROM HIM ON SEPTEMBER 29 AND WHAT AN OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN IN THE KINGDOM CONFIRMED ON NOVEMBER 2. I WAS EAGER TO NOTE THIS BECAUSE IT PROVES THAT THE DECISION TAKEN BY SAUDI ARABIA ON SEPTEMBER 19 WAS MADE TO EXPLOIT THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING OTHER OBJECTIVES. THIS PRODUCED NO RESULT, AND MY WISH, DEAR FRIEND, IS TO DISPEL ANY MISIMPRESSION YOU MAY HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONCERNING THE POSITION OF YEMEN. PERMIT ME TO TAKE UP THE TOPICS ADDRESSED BY YOUR LETTER IN SOME DETAIL.

DEAR FRIEND:

IN LIGHT OF THE GOOD RELATIONS AND FRUITFUL COOPERATION WHICH BIND THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AND YOUR FRIENDLY COUNTRY, WE ARE INTENT ON PRESERVING AND DEVELOPING THESE RELATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN THE CURRENT TRYING AND DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS DESPITE THE TRAGEDY THROUGH WHICH THE GULF REGION AND ARABIAN PENINSULA ARE PASSING AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT YEMEN

BT

#8358

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 SANAA 08358

EXDIS STARBURST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, YM, US

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT SALEH TO PRESIDENT IS NOT A DIRECT PARTY TO WHAT HAPPENED OR WHAT IS HAPPENING. HOWEVER, WHAT IS HAPPENING IS SO CLOSE THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO BE ISOLATED FROM IT, AND WE CANNOT DEAL WITH IT BY IGNORING THE DAMAGE IT HAS IMPOSED ON US UP TO NOW AND THE MORE SERIOUS DAMAGE WHICH MAY RESULT FROM IT IN THE FUTURE ABSENT A BALANCED POSITION. I THUS REITERATE THE NECESSITY OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

04 OF 10 —

REMINING YOU OF THE BALANCED AND FIRM POSITION OF YEMEN ON THE CURRENT CRISIS. IT IS A POSITION WE HAVE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED TO ALL THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES IN KEEPING WITH YEMEN'S HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL LINKS TO THEM. THIS, AFTER THOSE COUNTRIES TOOK THEIR POSITION ON YEMEN WHICH CAN BE SUMMARIZED BY THE PRINCIPLE: "HE WHO IS NOT WITH US IS AGAINST US."

YEMEN'S FIRM POSITION ON THE CRISIS IS AS FOLLOWS:

FIRST:

THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN DID NOT AND WILL NOT APPROVE OR SUPPORT THE OCCUPATION BY IRAQ OF THE STATE OF

KUWAIT. A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS FROM YEMENI OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO THIS EFFECT, AND WE VOTED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHOUT HESITATION ON THE ILLEGALITY OF KUWAIT'S ANNEXATION BY IRAQ.

SECOND:

THE POSITION OF YEMEN SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE CRISIS HAS BEEN THAT THE ARAB STATES ARE MORE COMPETENT TO END THAT OCCUPATION. OUR POSITION IS SUMMRIZED AS THE NECESSITY OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQ FROM KUWAIT, BUT IT WOULD APPEAR THAT SOME OF THEM PREFERRED TO RELY UPON MULTINATIONAL FORCES TO ACHIEVE THE SAME GOALS. THEY WERE SUPPORTED BY A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ARAB LEAGUE WHOSE CHARTER STIPULATES CLEARLY THE NEED FOR TAKING SUCH A DECISION UNANIMOUSLY. THEREFORE YEMEN REFRAINED FROM SUPPORTING IT.

THIRD:

WE HAVE CONFIRMED TO MORE THAN ONE PARTY, BOTH ON THE ARAB AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL THAT YEMEN IS NOT LINKED TO IRAQ BY ANY FORM OF MILITARY OR POLITICAL ALLIANCE AIMED AT HELPING IT TO MAINTAIN ITS OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT. THE CONDITIONS IT FACES ARE ITS CHOICE AND ITS RESPONSIBILITY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

05 OF 10

FOURTH:

THIS POSITION, WHICH DOES NOT KEEP ANY OTHER PARTY WITH A POSITION DIFFERENT THAN OURS FROM ACHIEVING ITS PLANNED OBJECTIVES OF CONFRONTING IRAQ, DID NOT PREVENT STATES NEIGHBORING US FROM TAKING MEASURES AGAINST YEMEN DESPITE THEIR CLAIM THAT THESE WERE NOT RELATED TO THIS POSITION. THE RESULT OF THESE MEASURES WAS THE IMPOSITION OF ECONOMIC PENALTIES ON HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF OUR CITIZENS AND THE TAKING OF ACTIONS CONTRARY TO HUMAN RIGHTS AGAINST HUNDREDS OF THEM WHOSE SITUATION WAS AKIN TO THAT OF THE U.S. CITIZENS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT AND ALL OF WHOM WERE INNOCENT WITH NO CLOSE OR DISTANT RELATIONSHIP TO THE CURRENT CRISIS. DESPITE THIS, WE HAVE NOT UNTIL TODAY HEARD AN OFFICIAL CONDEMNATION OF THIS POSITION FROM ANY COUNTRY.

FIFTH

ALTHOUGH I GREATLY APPRECIATE THE EFFORTS YOU HAVE MADE TO DISSUADE THE KINGDOM FROM ITS DECISION, MORE THAN 650,000 YEMENI CITIZENS HAVE RETURNED DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS, AND THEIR EMIGRATION CONTINUES, ALTHOUGH IN LESSER NUMBERS THAN BEFORE. YOU SHOULD CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF SUCH AN ACT ON A DEVELOPING COUNTRY LIKE YEMEN.

DEAR FRIEND:

I HAVE STRIVEN TO SET FORTH THE POSITION OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN ON THE CURRENT CRISIS IN SOME DETAIL IN ORDER TO SHOW YOU THAT YEMEN LIVES IN THE

BT

#8358

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 SANAA 08358
EXDIS STARBURST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, YM, US

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT SALEH TO PRESIDENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

06 OF 10 —

HEART OF A CRISIS WHICH FRIGHTENS EVERY CITIZEN WHO

LIVES WITHIN ITS SCOPE. BECAUSE HIS FUTURE AND THAT OF HIS CHILDREN AND HIS GRANDSONS FOR MANY YEARS TO COME WILL BE GOVERNED BY ITS OUTCOME. I HOPE YOU APPRECIATE THAT WE IN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN CANNOT DEAL WITH THIS DESTRUCTIVE AND SERIOUS PROBLEM FROM AFAR FOR, WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, WE ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE AND AREA OF ITS FOCUS AND OF ITS PRESSURE. BASED ON THE FOREGOING, WE HAVE DEFINED OUR POSITION ON THE CRISIS ON THE BASES AND PRINCIPLES FROM WHICH WE DO NOT DEVIATE. HOWEVER, WE DEAL WITH ITS PARTICULARS ACCORDING TO WHAT IS DICTATED TO US BY THE SUPREME YEMENI INTEREST WHICH LEADS TO OUR INTENSE DESIRE TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP OUR RELATIONS WITH FRIENDLY COUNTRIES AND IN THEIR FOREFRONT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THIS, MY FRIEND, I WAS GREATLY SUPRISED TO LEARN FROM YOUR LETTER THAT YOU THOUGHT OUR ABSTENTION IN THE VOTE ON RESOLUTION 674 IGNORED OR MADE LIGHT OF THE VIOLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERPETRATED OR BEING PERPETRATED BY IRAQ. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE IN ANY POSITION WE TOOK IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. THE ABSENCE OF OUR DELEGATE DURING THE VOTING ON RESOLUTION 660 AND HIS ABSTENTION FROM SUPPORTING RESOLUTION 661 STEMMED FROM REASONS AND CONDITIONS WITH WHOSE EXPLANATION I DO NOT WANT TO DETAIN YOU. MORE IMPORTANT THAN ALL THAT IS THAT WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE NEED FOR IRAQ TO OBSERVE RESOLUTION 660 AS WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE APPLICATION OF RESOLUTION 661, IN LETTER AND IN SPIRIT. BEYOND THIS, WE SUPPORTED RESOLUTION 662 WHICH CONDEMNED THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ AND CONSIDERED KUWAIT'S ANNEXATION TO IRAQ NULL AND VOID. FURTHERMORE, WE SUPPORTED RESOLUTION 664 CONCERNING THE TAKING OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 07 OF 10 —

HOSTAGES AND RESOLUTION 667 CONCERNING THE SITUATION OF EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT. I WANT TO ADD, HOWEVER, THAT WE DO NOT SUPPORT THE WITHHOLDING OF FOOD AND MEDICINE FROM THE IRAQI AND KUWAITI PEOPLES.

FOR ALL THESE REASONS WE IN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN DO NOT FIND THAT WE ARE IN DISPUTE WITH ANY MEMBER STATE IN THE UNITED NATIONS AS REGARDS NOT ACCEDING TO THE OCCUPATION OF THE LANDS OF OTHERS BY FORCE, TO THE VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR TO COMPROMISING HUMAN RIGHTS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE PERPETRATOR IS IRAQ OR ANOTHER PARTY. WE WILL, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO OUR FIRM POSITION ON REACHING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THIS CRISIS, AND WE WILL LEND A HAND TO ANYONE WHO STRIVES TO REACH A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, SINCE THE ORDER OF MAGNITUDE OF THE CRISIS THE WORLD NOW CONFRONTS IS UNPRECEDENTED SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. WHETHER OR NOT THIS POSITION MERITS PRAISE, IT AT THE LEAST DOES NOT, IN MY OPINION, WARRANT THE PUNITIVE MEASURES WHICH WERE TAKEN AGAINST US BY THE COUNTRIES NEIGHBORING US.

FROM THIS STARTING POINT, WHICH IS OUR CONTINUING EFFORT TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, WE PRESENTED OUR INITIATIVE ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1990 CALLING UPON THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TO INVITE THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO GO TO THE

REGION IN AN EFFORT TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. THIS IS THE INITIATIVE WHICH MET WITH REJECTION BY THE STATES OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AND WHICH SOME MEMBER STATES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD NOT ADDRESS. IT FINALLY SUCCUMBED WHEN THE PERMANENT MEMBER COUNTRIES INSISTED ON TYING IT TO RESOLUTION 674 AND WHEN THE DELEGATE OF THE UNITED STATES INSISTED ON MAKING AMENDMENTS TO IT WHICH IN THE END LED THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 08 OF 10 —

NATIONS HIMSELF TO CONSIDER IT AS BEING WITHOUT MERIT. WHEN. PRIOR TO THE DEBATE OF RESOLUTION 674 AND UPON ITS PRESENTATION FOR CONSULTATION, WE INFORMED THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBER COUNTRIES THAT YEMEN WOULD ABSTAIN FROM VOTING ON IT, OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH YOUR DELEGATE AT THE UNITED NATIONS WERE BASED ON THE DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR THE PEACEFUL INITIATIVE WE HAD PRESENTED PRIOR TO THE PRESENTATION OF DRAFT

BT

#8358

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 SANAA 08358
EXDIS STARBURST

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, YM, US

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT SALEH TO PRESIDENT RESOLUTION 674, CONCERNING WHICH WE TOLD YOUR AMBASSADOR IN SANAA IMMEDIATELY AFTER ITS DISTRIBUTION TO THE MEMBER STATES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT A RESOLUTION CONCERNING WAR COMPENSATION SHOULD BE ISSUED FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NOT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THUS, WHEN WE FOUND THAT RESOLUTION 674 WAS NOTHING BUT A RESOLUTION FORCING IRAQ TO PAY COMPENSATION AND THAT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO TRACE OF THE PORTION DEALING WITH DIRECTING THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO GO TO THE REGION TO SEARCH FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS, WE DECIDED TO RETURN TO OUR ORIGINAL POSITION, WHICH WE HAD MENTIONED TO THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBER COUNTRIES BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF CONSULTATIVE MEASURES ON THE RESOLUTION ITSELF AND WHICH WAS ABSTENTION. WE WERE INTENT ON ASSURING ALL OF YOU THAT OUR ABSTENTION DID NOT MEAN OUR RETREAT FROM ANY PREVIOUS POSITION WE HAD COMMITTED OURSELVES TO.

ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING CLARIFICATION, I

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 09 OF 10 —

CONFIRM TO YOU THE ADHERENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN TO ALL THE BASES AND PRINCIPLES WHICH YOU WERE INTENT ON CONFIRMING IN YOUR LETTER. I HOPE THE DEPTH OF THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WHICH TIE ME TO YOU PERSONALLY WILL BE A HELPFUL FACTOR, GIVING EACH OF US THE UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATION OF THE HARD AND DIFFICULT POSITIONS EITHER OF US FACES IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SPEED US TOWARDS THE LIGHTING OF A HUGE FIRE AND TOWARDS TERRIBLE DESTRUCTION WHOSE LOCUS IS NOT FAR FROM OUR COUNTRY. THIS WILL BE DUE TO A DISASTER NOT RELATED TO US IN YEMEN SINCE, EXCEPT FOR WHAT WE HAVE LOST AND WHAT WE MAY LOSE, YEMEN HAD NO ROLE IN THE MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS WHICH LED TO THE OCCUPATION BY IRAQ OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT AND IS ALSO NOT A PARTY TO WHAT IS GOING ON IN

THE NORTH OF THE PENINSULA OR THE GULF. HOWEVER, WE REALLY FEAR THAT THERE ARE THOSE WHO HARBOR A GRUDGE AGAINST US EXPLOITING THE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES AND SERIOUS POSSIBILITIES THROUGH WHICH THE REGION IS PASSING, AND THIS PUTS ON OUR SHOULDERS IN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING THE SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF YEMEN, WHATEVER THE PRICE AND WHATEVER THE SACRIFICE. AS FOR YEMENI-AMERICAN RELATIONS, THEY WILL REMAIN AN AREA OF GREAT INTEREST AND SERIOUS CONSIDERATION ON OUR PART. WE WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO DEVELOP THEM APART FROM THE DISPUTES AND CONTROVERSIES, AND EVEN THE CONFLICTS, WHICH OCCUR BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION AND IN THE HOPE THAT THIS IS WHAT YOUR RESPECTED GOVERNMENT IS STRIVING FOR.

FINALLY, I PRESENT MY APOLOGIES FOR THE LENGTH OF THE RESPONSE TO YOUR SHORT LETTER, BUT MY INTEREST IN RELATIONS BASED ON GOODWILL AND FRIENDSHIP WHICH TIE ME TO YOU AND THE INTEREST OF EVERY RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL IN YEMEN FOR MAINTAINING AND EXPANDING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 10 OF 10 —

YEMENI-AMERICAN RELATIONS COMPELLED ME TO RESPOND AT
LENGTH. ALSO, THE SIGNS OF UNEASE AND CONCERN I
SENSED IN YOUR LETTER OBLIGED ME TO DO SO.
FINALLY, PLEASE ACCEPT, DEAR FRIEND, MY BEST WISHES
AND RESPECT. AND I PRAY TO THE LORD FOR HELP,
GUIDANCE AND SUCCESS FOR US ALL.

- LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALI ABDULLAH SALEH
- PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL
-
-
-
-

SANAA
-

RABI THANI 23, 1411, A.H.
NOVEMBER 11, 1990
END TEXT. DUNBAR
BT
#8358

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009008
RECEIVED: 13 NOV 90 16

TO: CICCONI, J

FROM: SITTMANN

DOC DATE: 13 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CONGRESSIONAL

PERSIAN GULF

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR NOV 14 BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MTG

ACTION: SITTMANN SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 16 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

HAASS

LAMPLEY

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY ed _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSAMM

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9008

November 13, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES CICCONI

FROM: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN 
SUBJECT: Talking Points for November 14 Bipartisan
Congressional Leadership Meeting

Attached are Talking Points prepared for the President's use at the Bipartisan Leadership meeting on November 14.

Attachment:
Tab A Talking Points

cc: Fred McClure

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/18/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 1 OF 11

THEMES FOR NOVEMBER 14 CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING

- THANK YOU ALL FOR COMING IN TODAY. AS USUAL, I DO NOT WANT TO TAKE UP TOO MUCH OF OUR TIME HERE BY TALKING. I WANT TO HEAR FROM YOU. I ALSO WANT YOU TO HEAR FROM JIM BAKER ON HIS RECENT TRIP AND FROM DICK CHENEY ON THE STATUS OF OUR DEPLOYMENT.
- I DO WANT TO SAY A FEW THINGS, THOUGH, AT THE OUTSET.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

CARD 2 OF 11

- IT IS NOW SOME 3 1/2 MONTHS SINCE IRAQ INVADED KUWAIT. IN LARGE PART BECAUSE OF AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS RESPONDED TO THIS ACT OF AGGRESSION WITH UNPRECEDENTED RESOLVE. THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS ON RECORD TEN TIMES OPPOSING IRAQ; SANCTIONS ARE IN PLACE; SO TOO ARE FORCES FROM MORE THAN 25 COUNTRIES TO BACK UP SANCTIONS, DEFEND SAUDI ARABIA AND DETER FURTHER IRAQI AGGRESSION.
- OUR AIMS ARE WELL-KNOWN: IRAQ'S IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT; THE RESTORATION OF KUWAIT'S LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT; THE RELEASE OF ALL HOSTAGES; THE REGION'S SECURITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0841-742
E8 9/24/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 3 OF 11

-- DESPITE MY MANY STATEMENTS ABOUT WHY WE ARE IN THE GULF, I KEEP SEEING STATEMENTS THAT I HAVEN'T EXPLAINED WHAT IT IS WE ARE DOING THERE. LET ME REPEAT.

-- THIS IS NOT SIMPLY A CASE OF PETTY AGGRESSION. WE ARE BEGINNING TO FASHION THE RULES WHICH WILL GOVERN THE NEW WORLD ORDER WHICH IS BEGINNING TO EMERGE. DO WE REALLY WANT THESE RULES TO BE THOSE BEING PRACTICED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN. IF WE DON'T STAND UP NOW FOR THE KIND OF WORLD WE AND OUR ALLIES WANT TO SEE, WE WILL HAVE REPEATED THE MISTAKES OF THE PAST AND FACE MORE SADDAM HUSSEINS. THE CIVILIZED WORLD IS SHOWING ABSOLUTELY UNPRECEDENTED UNANIMITY AGAINST THIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 4 OF 11

BARBARISM. WE MAY HAVE THE FUTURE IN OUR HANDS AND WE MUST NOT BLOW IT.

-- WE ALSO HAVE THE PROBLEM OF OUR EMBASSY IN KUWAIT AND THE HOSTAGES SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF EVERY NORM OF CIVILIZED CONDUCT. WE ARE UNFORTUNATELY POWERLESS AGAINST THOSE HELD IN IRAQ. BUT IN KUWAIT WE HAVE 28 PEOPLE IN OUR EMBASSY BEING DELIBERATELY STARVED OUT. ONLY SEVEN OF THEM ARE OFFICIAL AMERICANS. IF WE GIVE UP THERE, THE OTHERS ARE SUBJECT TO BEING MARCHED OFF TO FACE WHO KNOWS WHAT FATE. AND THEN THERE ARE THE MORE THAN 200 AMERICANS STILL IN HIDING IN KUWAIT, BEING SHELTERED BY BRAVE KUWAITIS. AS FOOD SUPPLIES RUN OUT, THESE PEOPLE WILL BE FORCED OUT OF HIDING TO FACE THE SAME

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 5 OF 11

BRUTALITIES BEING INFLICTED ON THE KUWAITIS -- OR WORSE.

-- AND THEN THERE IS ECONOMICS. CAN WE -- CAN THE WORLD -- AFFORD TO ALLOW SADDAM HUSSEIN A STRANGLE HOLD AROUND THE WORLD'S ECONOMIC LIFELINE? IF WE FAIL, THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT. EVEN NOW -- WITHOUT AN OIL SHORTAGE -- THE US ECONOMY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY ARE SUFFERING. THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES -- MANY STRUGGLING TO MAKE DEMOCRACY WORK -- ARE BEING DRIVEN TO THEIR KNEES BY OIL PRICES. EACH DAY THAT GOES BY BRINGS ECONOMIC DISASTER CLOSER FOR MANY COUNTRIES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE THIRD WORLD. SO THERE ARE SOME REAL REASONS, ALL COMPELLING, WHICH REQUIRE OUR PRESENCE TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES. FROM THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 6 OF 11

VERY BEGINNING I HAVE BEEN EMPHASIZING ALL OF THEM.

-- LAST WEEK'S DECISION TO AUGMENT OUR FORCES WAS NOT A DECISION TO USE MILITARY FORCE. WE HAVE NOT CROSSED ANY RUBICON OR POINT OF NO RETURN.

-- I MADE THE DECISION FOR SEVERAL REASONS. ALL ALONG I HAVE SAID THAT ALL OPTIONS ARE OPEN. IF THIS WAS TO BE MORE THAN JUST WORDS, I HAD TO ACT NOW. IN THE TIME SINCE I FIRST ORDERED TROOPS TO THE GULF, IRAQI TROOPS IN AND AROUND KUWAIT HAVE VIRTUALLY DOUBLED.

-- I ALSO CONCLUDED THAT SADDAM WAS NOT REALLY TAKING US SERIOUSLY. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SADDAM IS INTERESTED IN DIPLOMACY AS ANYTHING MORE THAN A TACTIC DESIGNED TO CREATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 7 OF 11

FISSURES IN THE COALITION NOW ARRAYED AGAINST HIM.

- UNLESS SADDAM BELIEVES THAT WAR IS A REAL POSSIBILITY AND THAT HE AND HIS COUNTRY WILL BE DECISIVELY DEFEATED, HE IS UNLIKELY TO PULL OUT. IRONICALLY, OUR BEST CHANCE FOR BRINGING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IS BY PREPARING FOR A MILITARY ONE.
- I KNOW THAT MANY OF YOU BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO GIVE SANCTIONS MORE TIME TO WORK. WE ARE. AGAIN, I WANT TO STRESS THAT WHAT WE'VE DONE ONLY GIVES US OPTIONS DOWN THE ROAD SHOULD WE DECIDE TO EXERCISE THEM.
- BUT I DO THINK WE ALSO NEED TO KEEP IN MIND THAT THE PASSAGE OF TIME BRINGS WITH IT COSTS FOR US AS WELL. I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 8 OF 11

COSTS OF THE CRISIS TO THE WORLD ECONOMY -- COSTS WHICH ARE MOUNTING DAILY.


- SADDAM IS ALSO USING TIME TO PREPARE HIS FORCES. AS I SAID, HE HAS USED THE PAST MONTHS TO MOVE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF TROOPS INTO THE IMMEDIATE THEATER. AND FOR SEVERAL WEEKS NOW IRAQI TROOPS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ AND KUWAIT HAVE USED TIME TO DIG IN. GETTING THEM OUT WILL BE THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT AND COSTLY.
- SIMILARLY, WE KNOW THAT IRAQ IS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE ITS CHEMICAL ARSENAL AND TO DEVELOP BIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ALLOWING TIME TO PASS RAISES THE RISK THAT HE WILL SUCCEED. IF HE DID, WE WOULD END UP PAYING A HORRENDOUSLY STEEP PRICE IN INCREASED CASUALTIES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 
- IN SHORT, WHILE WE ARE WAITING FOR SANCTIONS TO WORK, SADDAM IS NOT STANDING STILL. AND, OF COURSE, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE AS YET THAT SANCTIONS WILL WORK AS INTENDED.
 - LET ME MAKE A FEW FINAL POINTS, BEGINNING WITH CONSULTATIONS.
 - WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU. I BELIEVE I HAVE CONSULTED CLOSELY THUS FAR AND NOTE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT IS ONLY TWO WEEKS SINCE WE LAST MET HERE.
 - AND WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE CONSULTING CLOSELY IN THIS PERIOD BEFORE THE NEW CONGRESS CONVENES. MORE MEETINGS SUCH AS THIS OR WITH A LARGER GROUP OF MEMBERS IS A REAL OPTION.

CONFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIAL

CARD 10 OF 11

- 
- THIS PLACES RESPONSIBILITY ON ALL OF US. CONSULTATIONS ARE A TWO-WAY STREET. I THINK IT IS ONLY FAIR THAT I GET TO HEAR YOUR SPECIFIC IDEAS IN PRIVATE ABOUT THE TOUGH CHOICES WE FACE BEFORE YOU STAKE OUT PUBLIC STANCES.
 - I MUCH APPRECIATED HOW YOU DEALT WITH THE MEDIA AFTER OUR LAST MEETING. BUT PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUCH AS THOSE WE HAVE SEEN IN THE LAST FEW DAYS HAVE THE UNFORTUNATE SIDE EFFECT OF LEADING SADDAM TO CONCLUDE THAT WE ARE DIVIDED AND LACK STAYING POWER. THIS IN TURN ONLY WEAKENS THE PROSPECTS FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WE ALL WANT. I KNOW PUBLIC DEBATE
- 

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARD 11 OF 11

IS A MUST, BUT I ASK YOU NOT TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE IMPACT OF WHAT YOU SAY.

-- THAT'S ENOUGH FOR ME. WITH THAT I WILL CALL ON JIM TO GIVE US A READ-OUT OF HIS TRAVELS, THEN ON DICK TO GIVE US AN UPDATE ON OUR MILITARY PREPARATIONS, AND FINALLY ON JACK MURTHA, WHO I UNDERSTAND HAS JUST RETURNED FROM THE GULF. AND AFTER THAT, I REALLY WANT TO HEAR FROM YOU ALL ABOUT HOW YOU THINK WE OUGHT TO PROCEED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Corrected
Version

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THEMES FOR NOVEMBER 14 CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING

- Thank you all for coming in today. As usual, I do not want to take up too much of our time here by talking. I want to hear from you. I also want you to hear from Jim Baker on his recent trip and from Dick Cheney on the status of our deployment.
- I do want to say a few things, though, at the outset.
- It is now some 3 1/2 months since Iraq invaded Kuwait. In large part because of American leadership, the international community has responded to this act of aggression with unprecedented resolve. The Security Council is on record ten times opposing Iraq; sanctions are in place; so too are forces from more than 25 countries to back up sanctions, defend Saudi Arabia and deter further Iraqi aggression.
- Our aims are well-known: Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; the release of all hostages; the region's security.
- Despite my many statements about why we are in the Gulf, I keep seeing statements that I haven't explained what it is we are doing there. Let me repeat.
- This is nothing new. We have maintained a continuous military presence since 1949 and beginning with

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0841142
ES 9/24/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

2

President Carter the security of the Gulf has been a declared vital national interest of the United States.

-- This is not simply a case of petty aggression. We are beginning to fashion the rules which will govern the new world order which is beginning to emerge. Do we really want these rules to be those being practiced by Saddam Hussein? If we don't stand up now for the kind of world we and our allies want to see, we will have repeated the mistakes of the past and face more Saddam Husseins. The civilized world is showing absolutely unprecedented unanimity against this barbarism. We may have the future in our hands and we must not blow it.

-- We also have the problem of our Embassy in Kuwait and the hostages Saddam Hussein has seized in violation of every norm of civilized conduct. We are unfortunately unable to help those held in Iraq. But in Kuwait we have 28 people in our Embassy being deliberately starved out. Only seven of them are official Americans. If we give up there, the others are subject to being marched off to face who knows what fate. And then there are the more than 200 Americans still in hiding in Kuwait, being sheltered by brave Kuwaitis. As food supplies run out, these people will be forced out of hiding to face the same brutalities being inflicted on the Kuwaitis -- or worse.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

3

-- And then there is economics. Can we -- can the world -

-
afford to allow Saddam Hussein a strangle hold around the world's economic lifeline? If we fail, that is exactly what we are talking about. Even now -- without an oil shortage -- the US economy and the world economy are suffering.

Third World countries -- many struggling to make democracy work --are being driven to their knees by oil prices. Each day that goes by brings economic disaster closer for many countries in Eastern Europe and the Third World. So there are some real reasons, all compelling, which require our presence to achieve our objectives. From the very beginning I have been emphasizing all of them.

-- Last week's decision to augment our forces was not a decision to use military force. We have not crossed any rubicon or point of no return.

-- I made the decision for several reasons. All along I have said that all options are open. If this was to be more than just words, I had to act now. In the time since I first ordered troops to the Gulf, Iraqi troops in and around Kuwait have more than doubled.

-- I also concluded that Saddam was not really taking us seriously. There is no evidence that Saddam is interested in diplomacy as anything more than a tactic designed to create fissures in the coalition now arrayed against him.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

4

- Unless Saddam believes that war is a real possibility and that he and his country will be decisively defeated, he is unlikely to pull out. Ironically, our best chance for bringing about a peaceful solution is by preparing for a military one."
- I know that many of you believe that we should continue to give sanctions more time to work. We are. Again, I want to stress that what we've done only gives us options down the road should we decide to exercise them.
- But I do think we also need to keep in mind that the passage of time brings with it costs for us as well. I have already mentioned the costs of the crisis to the world economy -- costs which are mounting daily.
- Saddam is also using time to prepare his forces. As I said, he has used the past months to move hundreds of thousands of troops into the immediate theater. And for several weeks now Iraqi troops in southern Iraq and Kuwait have used time to dig in. Getting them out will be that much more difficult and costly.
- Similarly, we know that Iraq is doing everything possible to improve its chemical arsenal and to develop biological and nuclear weapons. Allowing time to pass raises the risk that he will succeed. If he did, we would end up paying a horrendously steep price in increased casualties.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

5

- In short, while we are waiting for sanctions to work, Saddam is not standing still. And, of course, it is not possible to conclude as yet that sanctions will work as intended.
- Let me make a few final points, beginning with consultations:
- We will make every effort to consult closely with you. I believe I have consulted closely thus far and note, for example, that it is only two weeks since we last met here.
- And we are prepared to continue consulting closely in this period before the new Congress convenes. More meetings such as this or with a larger group of members is a real option.
- This places responsibility on all of us. Consultations are a two-way street. I think it is only fair that I get to hear your specific ideas in private about the tough choices we face before you stake out public stances. One more word on consultation. We are facing an awesome responsibility. If you think I am going to go into this alone without insuring that you all stand up to be counted, think again.
- I much appreciated how you dealt with the media after our last meeting. But public statements such as those we have seen in the last few days have the unfortunate side effect of leading Saddam to conclude that we are divided and lack staying power. This in turn only weakens the prospects for the peaceful settlement we all want. I know public debate

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

6

is a must, but I ask you not to lose sight of the impact of what you say.

-- That's enough for me. With that I will call on Jim to give us a read-out of his travels, then on Dick to give us an update on our-military preparations, and finally on Jack Murtha, who I understand has just returned from the Gulf. And after that, I really want to hear from you all about how you think we ought to proceed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THEMES FOR NOVEMBER 14 CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING

- Thank you all for coming in today. As usual, I do not want to take up too much of our time here by talking. I want to hear from you. I also want you to hear from Jim Baker on his recent trip and from Dick Cheney on the status of our deployment.
- I do want to say a few things, though, at the outset.
- It is now some 3 1/2 months since Iraq invaded Kuwait. In large part because of American leadership, the international community has responded to this act of aggression with unprecedented resolve. The Security Council is on record ten times opposing Iraq; sanctions are in place; so too are forces from more than 25 countries to back up sanctions, defend Saudi Arabia and deter further Iraqi aggression.
- Our aims are well-known: Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; the release of all hostages; the region's security.
- Despite my many statements about why we are in the Gulf, I keep seeing statements that I haven't explained what it is we are doing there. Let me repeat.
- This is not simply a case of petty aggression. We are beginning to fashion the rules which will govern the

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0841-MR
EG 9/24/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

new world order which is beginning to emerge. Do we really want these rules to be those being practiced by Saddam Hussein. If we don't stand up now for the kind of world we and our allies want to see, we will have repeated the mistakes of the past and face more Saddam Husseins. The civilized world is showing absolutely unprecedented unanimity against this barbarism. We may have the future in our hands and we must not blow it.

-- We also have the problem of our Embassy in Kuwait and the hostages Saddam Hussein has seized in violation of every norm of civilized conduct. We are unfortunately powerless against those held in Iraq. But in Kuwait we have 28 people in our Embassy being deliberately starved out. Only seven of them are official Americans. If we give up there, the others are subject to being marched off to face who knows what fate. And then there are the more than 200 Americans still in hiding in Kuwait, being sheltered by brave Kuwaitis. As food supplies run out, these people will be forced out of hiding to face the same brutalities being inflicted on the Kuwaitis -- or worse.

-- And then there is economics. Can we -- can the world -- afford to allow Saddam Hussein a strangle hold around the world's economic lifeline? If we fail, that is exactly what we are talking about. Even now -- without an oil shortage -- the US economy and the world economy are suffering.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

Third World countries -- many struggling to make democracy work -- are being driven to their knees by oil prices. Each day that goes by brings economic disaster closer for many countries in Eastern Europe and the Third World. So there are some real reasons, all compelling, which require our presence to achieve our objectives. From the very beginning I have been emphasizing all of them.

- Last week's decision to augment our forces was not a decision to use military force. We have not crossed any rubicon or point of no return.
- I made the decision for several reasons. All along I have said that all options are open. If this was to be more than just words, I had to act now. In the time since I first ordered troops to the Gulf, Iraqi troops in and around Kuwait have virtually doubled.
- I also concluded that Saddam was not really taking us seriously. There is no evidence that Saddam is interested in diplomacy as anything more than a tactic designed to create fissures in the coalition now arrayed against him.
- Unless Saddam believes that war is a real possibility and that he and his country will be decisively defeated, he is unlikely to pull out. Ironically, our best chance for bringing about a peaceful solution is by preparing for a military one.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

4

- I know that many of you believe that we should continue to give sanctions more time to work. We are. Again, I want to stress that what we've done only gives us options down the road should we decide to exercise them.
- But I do think we also need to keep in mind that the passage of time brings with it costs for us as well. I have already mentioned the costs of the crisis to the world economy -- costs which are mounting daily.
- Saddam is also using time to prepare his forces. As I said, he has used the past months to move hundreds of thousands of troops into the immediate theater. And for several weeks now Iraqi troops in southern Iraq and Kuwait have used time to dig in. Getting them out will be that much more difficult and costly.
- Similarly, we know that Iraq is doing everything possible to improve its chemical arsenal and to develop biological and nuclear weapons. Allowing time to pass raises the risk that he will succeed. If he did, we would end up paying a horrendously steep price in increased casualties.
- In short, while we are waiting for sanctions to work, Saddam is not standing still. And, of course, it is not possible to conclude as yet that sanctions will work as intended.
- Let me make a few final points, beginning with consultations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5

- We will make every effort to consult closely with you. I believe I have consulted closely thus far and note, for example, that it is only two weeks since we last met here.
- And we are prepared to continue consulting closely in this period before the new Congress convenes. More meetings such as this or with a larger group of members is a real option.
- This places responsibility on all of us. Consultations are a two-way street. I think it is only fair that I get to hear your specific ideas in private about the tough choices we face before you stake out public stances.
- I much appreciated how you dealt with the media after our last meeting. But public statements such as those we have seen in the last few days have the unfortunate side effect of leading Saddam to conclude that we are divided and lack staying power. This in turn only weakens the prospects for the peaceful settlement we all want. I know public debate is a must, but I ask you not to lose sight of the impact of what you say.
- That's enough for me. With that I will call on Jim to give us a read-out of his travels, then on Dick to give us an update on our military preparations, and finally on Jack Murtha, who I understand has just returned from the Gulf. And after that, I really want to hear from you all about how you think we ought to proceed.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9008

November 13, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD W. HAASS/VIRGINIA LAMPLEY *sol*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for November 14 Bipartisan
Congressional Leadership Meeting

Nat Sec Advisor
has seen

SIGNED

At Tab A are proposed Talking Points for the President's use with the Bipartisan Congressional Leadership on November 14.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize William Sittmann to forward the proposed Talking Points to Jim Cicconi (Sittmann memo at Tab I).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Sittmann Memo to Cicconi

Tab A Proposed Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/8/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: [Signature]

LOG # 9008

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 115 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>km</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>Copy ✓</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>		
Brent Scowcroft	<u>✓</u>	<u>Per Florence</u>	<u>this is ready for Cicconio's ofc</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>11/14/90</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc. VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

TP's for Comm. Leadership
on Nov. Bill, 11/17/90

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Per Florence, she
has done new talking
points and new cards, and
this package has been
approved to go to Cicconio's
ofc.
nr
Robi

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009033
RECEIVED: 14 NOV 90 12

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: ROSTOW

DOC DATE: 15 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PAKISTAN
PERSIAN GULF

MILITARY ASSISTANCE
SAUDI ARABIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PAKISTAN & DESERT SHIELD / USE OF US OR US ORIGIN EQUIPMENT

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 17 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSTOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~NSC CHRON~~
ROSTOW

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/14/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSLMS

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 9033

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

This was closed
out Today.

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

ADD BS APPROVED
RECOM (BAR)
to last line on this
in computer.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Memo	Nicholas Rostow to Brent Scowcroft Re: Pakistan and Desert Shield: The Use of U.S. or U.S. Origin Equipment (4 pp.)	11/15/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [2]

Date Closed: 6/16/2009	OA/ID Number: 91145-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009089
RECEIVED: 15 NOV 90 17

CHRON FILE

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 15 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: KUWAIT
IRAQ
CONGRESSIONAL

EGYPT
JORDAN

PERSONS: SABAH, JABER

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ AMIR OF KUWAIT ON 21 NOV RE GULF CRISIS

ACTION: OBE / ORIGINALS RETURNED DUE DATE: 19 NOV 90 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: HAASS LOGREF: 9009087 9009088
FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAASS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 9089

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	<u>1</u>	<u>W</u>	_____
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	ABT/10/21/14 <u>DN</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>OBE/OWR</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

90 DEC 3 18:45

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____

NSC/S -

11/26

PLEASE NOTE - SEVERAL
DIFFERENT #'S HAVE BEEN
INCORPORATED INTO THIS BOOK.
CLOSE EACH ONE OUT.

THANKS -

LMS

Sgt

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENTS

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE 9089

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 15, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: BILL SITTMANN

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting Memos for His Trip
To ~~Saudi Arabia~~ and Egypt

Attached are the self-explanatory meeting memos for the events the President will be having while in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The package for his meeting with the Amir of Kuwait is at Tab I; the package for the meeting and dinner with King Fahd is at Tab II; and, the package for the meeting with President Mubarak is at Tab III.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memos to the President at Tabs I, II, and III.

Attachments
As Stated

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENTS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
20100841-MR
EJ 9/24/15

- 16 -

OPENING STATEMENT TO THE PRESS FOLLOWING
MEETING WITH AMIR OF KUWAIT

- I just had a very useful meeting with His Highness the Amir.
- I reiterated the total commitment of the United States to the objectives enshrined in ten UN Security Council Resolutions. As you all know, these objectives include Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and the release of all individuals held against their will.
- We agreed on the desirability that these objectives be realized peacefully. At the same time we also agreed that all options remained open and that steps needed to be taken now in order to make these options credible and effective.
- His Highness the Amir told me of the atrocities and acts of destruction being committed daily against the Kuwaiti people by the forces of Saddam Hussein. I come away from this conversation more committed than ever to seeing this cruel occupation come to an end and those responsible for this violence called to account.
- Let me just close by saying that this is my second meeting with His Highness the Amir since the tragic events of August 2, and as I told the Amir, I both hope and expect that our next meeting will take place in liberated Kuwait.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH
KUWAITI AMIR JABER

DATE: November 21, 1990

LOCATION: The al-Hamra Guest Palace

TIME: 8:30 p.m. - 9:15 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To provide a tangible signal of the U.S. commitment to restore the country and government of Kuwait, to reassure the Amir that we are in this for the long haul, to counsel patience as we escalate economic and military pressure on Saddam, and to seek additional GOK financial aid for 1991 in support of our efforts. ~~The Amir, while expressing his support and appreciation for U.S. actions thus far, will urge a quick decision to use military force to liberate his country as he did with Secretary Baker.~~

II. BACKGROUND

Sheikh Jaber met with you in Washington on September 28, at which time he pressed for an indication of how long we would wait for sanctions to work, while cataloguing Iraq's rape and pillage of Kuwait. While not ruling out the military option, you and Secretary Baker, who met with the Amir on November 5, demurred on specifying a deadline.

The Amir, who does not believe sanctions will work, is having some difficulty keeping up the morale of his people in view of Iraq's dismantling of his country and abuse of its people. He will expect your visit to provide a psychological boost to Kuwaiti citizens. Their most immediate concern will be to learn when we plan to rid Kuwait of its Iraqi invaders and restore his government. The Kuwaitis are concerned that with each passing day, Kuwait's existence is becoming history as its infrastructure is destroyed and its citizens brutalized. They also are concerned that Saddam Hussein is buying time in hopes that delayed action on our part will weaken allied and Arab resolve. Thus, they are extremely anxious.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262010-0841 MUR
EJ 9/24/15

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

current
members
of 2

be based upon

In responding to these concerns, you should reiterate our commitment to our stated objectives: complete, unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, restoration of

the legitimate government, security and stability of the Persian Gulf, and the safety and well-being of American citizens. While unable to give the Amir a specific timeframe for military action, they will somewhat mollified to hear that our next step is to pursue a UN resolution on use of any means necessary to achieve our objectives should sanctions fail. In this regard, you should seek the Amir's support for lobbying the ~~Chinese, Soviets and other governments represented on the Security Council~~. If this approach should fail, you should reassure him that we believe we have the authority to proceed within Article 51 and based on a request we would expect to receive from the GOK, as we did on naval interception. (+)

You need to underscore that the main objective of increasing U.S. forces and obtaining UN authorization to use force if necessary is to mount pressure on Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. You should also point out that this military pressure would be more effective if it were combined with political pressure from the rest of the Arabs, particularly Jordan, Yemen and Tunisia, to get Saddam to face reality of possible military action unless he withdraws peacefully. Therefore, we would like Kuwaiti assistance in working toward that end.

for 1990

On compensation, Kuwait has pledged \$2.5 billion for Desert Shield, and economic aid totalling \$3.3 billion (with a promise of more) for those countries adversely affected by sanctions. ~~They are well ahead of other donors in disbursing aid. While the GOK wants to continue such assistance, they will be constrained somewhat by lack of revenues except those from investments.~~ On aid for Jordan, the GOK bitterly resents King Hussein's pro-Iraqi position, and while recognizing the importance of Jordan's stability, they continue to refuse to send any aid to Jordan. You should note our own concern about King Hussein's support for Saddam, but stress that his compliance with sanctions has been the true test of Jordan's position on the invasion, and Jordan's continued compliance will require economic aid in order to be sustained.

The Kuwaiti government-in-exile also has started making preparations for its return to Kuwait. In this regard, State and Defense have begun preliminary work on a civic action program for the reconstruction of Kuwait. In addition, the Kuwaitis recognize a post-crisis environment will require some changes in the regional security structure, which may include U.S. military guarantees or a peacetime presence of sorts.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

We need to
push them
to commit
support
for 1991.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
3

While the GOK has made some progress on public relations, they still have not effectively promoted their story to

↪ counter Iraqi propaganda. The GOK should be encouraged to do more particularly to rebut Iraq's territorial claims, and to highlight the inhumane treatment of Kuwaiti and other citizens and other "war crimes" by the Iraqis to return international attention to Iraq's illegal aggression. The GOK also needs to project itself as a functioning government that has resumed the business and governmental responsibilities of Kuwait. (4)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

POINTS TO BE MADE WITH AMIR SHEIKH JABER

GULF CRISIS

- Your Highness, I am pleased to be here with you, and as I said in September, I am confident our next meeting will be held in Kuwait after you have been restored to your rightful place.
- Let me assure you from the outset that the liberation of your country continues to be our essential and nonnegotiable goal.
- * insert from p.3* -- I continue to be outraged and horrified by Iraqi actions to dismantle Kuwait and abuse your citizens. As you know, I also am concerned about the plight of Americans in hiding in your country and the fate of our diplomats there.
- I also want to express our deep gratitude to those Kuwaitis who have risked their own lives to shelter our people in hiding. I have heard from several hostages and their families that they would not be surviving survived without the help of the Kuwaiti people.
- You must be encouraged by the continued outpouring of global support your country has received, and the solidarity of the coalition against Iraq.
- I know we all prefer a peaceful outcome to the crisis as encompassed in the ten UN Security Council ^{resolutions thus far} ~~now~~ passed.

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0841-MR
28 9/24/15

Hopefully, the combination of tighter economic sanctions, coupled with an increased military presence and a UN resolution authorizing the use of force, will make Saddam come to his senses and avoid a bloody, costly war by choosing to withdraw completely and unconditionally from your country.

- We believe that Saddam is beginning to feel the combination of effective economic sanctions. Lost oil revenues are costing them \$2 billion a month or more, and their foreign exchange is dwindling. Iraq must continue to be completely isolated until it complies with the will of the UN.
- To achieve this end, the coalition must remain steadfast, particularly the Arab members. It is important that you work to close ranks, particularly by doing what you can to bring Jordan, Yemen and Tunisia into the fold if at all possible.

Jordan

- I know that we share disappointment with King Hussein's position on the crisis, but we believe that Jordan's security is still critical to Middle East stability.
- From our Ambassador in Amman, we understand that the King may have begun to accept that Saddam will not withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait and that an Arab solution cannot be achieved. Perhaps this would be a good time to try to reconcile your differences with him.

Move to
p 1 *

U.S. Congressional/Domestic Support

-- You may also be aware of recent press reports about growing congressional and public concerns about our policy in the Gulf. I believe domestic support for our basic policy and objectives is essentially strong.

-- ~~Where we have run into problems is with concern over moving from a policy of using sanctions to liberate Kuwait to one that advocates using force. With Congress, the matter also reflects political and legal concerns. After my meeting with congressional leaders last week, I am confident that they now understand why a credible military option is necessary to convince Saddam that we are serious. Congress will not constrain me from doing whatever needs to be done.~~

Next Steps

- I appreciate that Kuwait is undergoing an extremely difficult time, and your people untold hardship. But our strategy needs time to work effectively.
- To the extent possible, we need to give sanctions a chance to work.
- At the same time, and as you know, we are ^{urgently} taking steps that will allow us to exercise other options, including the use of force. We are also hoping that Saddam will alter his behavior when he sees the extent of our preparations.
- ~~After he left here, Secretary Baker met with the other Perm~~ ^{and I are continuing our} ~~Four governments, and has just completed consultations with~~

this month

members of the

~~other~~ Security Council and ~~NAM~~ foreign ministers on the
~~prospects for a~~ ^{new} UN resolution authorizing the use of force
if sanctions fail to remove Iraq from Kuwait by a specified time.

- Prospects for passing such a resolution look favorable. We intend to move forward on this right away. I'll let Secretary Baker brief you on our gameplan. As he mentioned to you before, your help with the Soviets, Chinese, and key ~~non-aligned~~ ^{non-aligned} NAM members of the Security Council will be important to our success. Have you had any discussions with these governments on this?
- If this effort fails however, we are still prepared to proceed without one, on the basis of Article 51 and a request from you, Your Highness, as we received on naval interception. But to do so will require your support and that of our coalition partners.

MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

- ~~Your government has led donor nations in rapidly disbursing funds to those countries most hurt by the economic embargo against Iraq.~~ I ~~also~~ appreciate your ^{helping to} support ~~the~~ the costs of our Desert Shield operations.
- You have recognized, as we do, that the visible willingness of other countries to share the financial burden will help ensure continued high levels of public and congressional support for our efforts in the Gulf, ~~particularly for continued compliance with sanctions.~~
- It seems certain our efforts will be continuing into 1991. I hope we can count on you as we did this year.

-- Similarly, your support for countries affected by sanctions has been most important.

~~As~~ Still, each day countries around the world continue to face serious economic consequences from the embargo against Iraq and higher oil prices. Many of these countries, like those in Eastern Europe, were facing economic hardship before the crisis began.

-- I know Secretary Baker discussed this issue with you, and about the need to consider an assistance contribution for ~~next year~~ 1991 since the economic effects of the crisis will continue to be felt for months to come even if a solution were found tomorrow.

-- Countries in Eastern Europe, Turkey, and those that have contributed troops to the multinational force should get immediate consideration. ~~I know he suggested some ideas concerning the IMF and World Bank.~~ I hope we can count on your help.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

-- As Saddam continues his propaganda campaign, we must keep up our public relations efforts. We must do more to rebut his allegations, particularly in the Arab world, so that the truth about his aggression is known.

-- Iraq's alleged historical claims should be challenged, and Iraq's inhumane treatment of Kuwaitis and other citizens should be highlighted. In addition, it ^{must help} ~~is important~~ for you to communicate your support for pluralism and "democratic" procedures to highlight the distinction between your government and Saddam's autocratic dictatorship in Iraq.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
6

-- We have been impressed with the pictures we see and stories we hear of tremendous Kuwaiti courage and determination in facing Iraq's brutal invasion. The selfless efforts of the Kuwaiti resistance in fighting this aggression, and the help they are providing expatriates in hiding for their lives and our own embassy personnel, are truly heroic. It is important that these people get the support they need to keep their morale high and activities effective. Judge Webster is prepared to discuss this further with you.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

POINTS TO BE MADE WITH AMIR SHEIKH JABER

GULF CRISIS

- Your Highness, I am pleased to be here with you, ~~and as I said in September,~~ I am confident our next meeting will be held in Kuwait after you have been restored to your rightful place.
- Let me assure you from the outset that the liberation of your country continues to be our essential and nonnegotiable goal.
- You may also be aware of recent press reports about growing congressional and public concerns about our policy in the Gulf. I ^{want to reassure you that} ~~believe~~ domestic support for our basic policy and objectives is essentially strong.
- I continue to be outraged and horrified by Iraqi actions to dismantle Kuwait and abuse your citizens. As you know, I also am concerned about the plight of Americans in hiding in your country and the fate of our diplomats there.
- I ~~also~~ want to express our deep gratitude to those Kuwaitis who have risked their own lives to shelter our people in hiding. I have heard from several hostages and their families that they would not be ^{alive} ~~surviving~~ without the help of the Kuwaiti people.
- ~~You must be encouraged by the continued outpouring of global support your country has received, and the solidarity of the coalition against Iraq.~~

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-09-15-14R

841
E8 9/24/15

- I know we all prefer a peaceful outcome to the crisis as encompassed in the ten UN Security Council resolutions thus far passed.
- We believe that Saddam is beginning to feel the ^{effect} ~~combination~~ of ~~effective~~ economic sanctions. Lost oil revenues are costing them \$2 billion a month or more, and their foreign exchange is dwindling. Iraq must continue to be completely isolated until it complies with the will of the UN.
- To achieve this end, the coalition must remain steadfast, particularly the Arab members. It is important that you work to close ranks, particularly by doing what you can to bring Jordan, Yemen and Tunisia into the fold if at all possible.

Next Steps

- I appreciate that Kuwait is undergoing an extremely difficult time, and your people untold hardship. But our strategy needs time to work effectively.
- To the extent possible, we need to give sanctions a chance to work.
- At the same time, and as you know, we are urgently taking steps that will allow us to exercise other options, including the use of force. We are also hoping that Saddam will alter his behavior when he sees the extent of our preparations.
- Secretary Baker and I are continuing our consultations with members of the Security Council on a new UN resolution

authorizing the use of force if sanctions fail to remove Iraq from Kuwait by a specified time.

- Prospects for passing such a resolution this month look favorable. We intend to move forward on this right away. ~~I'll let Secretary Baker brief you on our gameplan.~~ As he mentioned to you before, your help with the Soviets, Chinese, and key non-aligned members of the Security Council will be important to our success. Have you had any discussions with these governments on this?
- If this effort fails, ~~however~~, we are still prepared to proceed ~~without one~~, on the basis of Article 51 and a request from you, Your Highness, as we received on naval interception. But to do so will require your support and that of our coalition partners.

MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

- I appreciate your helping to support the costs of our Desert Shield operations.
- You have recognized, as we do, that the visible willingness of other countries to share the financial burden will help ensure continued high levels of public and congressional support for our efforts in the Gulf.
- It seems certain our efforts will be continuing into 1991. I hope we can count on you as we did this year.
- Similarly, your support for countries effected by sanctions has been most important. Still, each day countries around the world continue to face serious economic consequences from the embargo against Iraq and higher oil prices. Many

of these countries, like those in Eastern Europe, were facing economic hardship before the crisis began.

- I know Secretary Baker discussed this issue with you, and about the need to consider an assistance contribution for 1991 since the economic effects of the crisis will continue to be felt for months to come even if a solution were found tomorrow.

~~Countries in Eastern Europe, Turkey, and those that have contributed troops to the multinational force should get immediate consideration.~~ I ^{know} ~~hope~~ we can count on your help.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

- As Saddam continues his propaganda campaign, we must keep up our public relations efforts. We must do more to rebut his allegations, particularly in the Arab world, so that the truth about his aggression is known.
- Iraq's alleged historical claims should be challenged, and Iraq's inhumane treatment of Kuwaitis and other citizens should be highlighted. In addition, it might help for you to communicate your support for pluralism and "democratic" procedures to highlight the distinction between your government and Saddam's autocratic dictatorship in Iraq.
- We have been impressed with the pictures we see and stories we hear of tremendous Kuwaiti courage and determination in facing Iraq's brutal invasion. ~~The selfless efforts of the Kuwaiti resistance in fighting this aggression, and the help they are providing expatriates in hiding for their lives and our own embassy personnel, are truly heroic.~~ It is

important that these people get the support they need to keep their morale high and activities effective. It is also important that as many Kuwaitis as is possible be trained to participate in the multinational force.

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009013
RECEIVED: 13 NOV 90 17

TO: GATES

CHRON FILE

FROM: CHAMBERLIN
MILLER

DOC DATE: 19 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
KUWAIT

HOSTAGES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TREATMENT OF RELEASED IRAQI DETAINEES / HOSTAGES

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 16 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHAMBERLIN

LOGREF: 9009157

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CHAMBERLIN
HAASS
MILLER
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

Approve Changing of Committee
for handling returning hostages

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: AM

LOG # 9013

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 113 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>Ken</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>h</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>		
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>

90 NOV 20 P 6: 13

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9013

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 19, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: DAVID ~~WILLIS~~ MILLER, JR.

FROM: WENDY CHAMBERLIN

SUBJECT: Treatment of Released Iraqi Detainees/Hostages

*Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen*

Media stories of hardships endured by the families whose breadwinner is held hostage in Iraq/Kuwait are becoming more numerous and will put national pressure on the President. As you know, the FY 91 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act earmarked \$10 million for the USG to pay a hostage at the rate of a GS-9, if the hostage is not receiving salary payments. It also permits the Government to fund health and life insurance benefits for hostages not otherwise covered. The Congress designated OPM as the administrator of the funds but little else about the mechanism for providing assistance has been worked out. Lawyers at State and OPM are taking a look at the legislation. What is clear is that an interagency process for expeditiously administering these provisions is required.

The Department of State anticipates a number of agencies (Treasury, OPM, DOD, Justice, USAID, HHS, etc.) will be involved in this effort as well as in the repatriation of the hostages. State proposes an organized Government-sponsored effort to provide emergency medical treatment, physical and psychiatric evaluations, transportation back to the U.S., and appropriate handling for those Americans who die while in captivity. Our law enforcement and intelligence agencies will want an opportunity to debrief returning detainees as well. Conceding that the planning, resources, and implementation of such a coordinated policy is beyond the capabilities of the State Department, it asks that the NSC direct other agencies and departments to work with State, Tab I.

State is clearly the lead agency for overseas constituent affairs. In the past, it has taken the lead in coordinating aid for released hostages from Lebanon, a comparatively simple

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0915-MR

MM 3/17/2016

~~SECRET~~

2

operation. In this case, however, we believe it would be awkward for State to command authority in the initial stages because of the decidedly domestic focus of the operation. We propose instead, that an interagency agreed Terms of Reference covering issues of USG assistance to hostages and their families be coordinated by the CSG for Terrorism. Once established, the Terms of Reference could designate the Department of State as the coordinating agency. Should you agree, we would proceed by requesting agency comments on the draft TOR at Tab II.

Concurrences by: Richard Haass, Nicholas Rostow, Rand Beers

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve that the chairman of the CSG on Terrorism, David Miller, will work with relevant agencies to achieve an agreed Terms of Reference for providing aid to hostage/detainees and their families.


Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to Brent Scowcroft from State Dept.
Tab II	Proposed Terms of Reference

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



9013
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

9023580

November 13, 1990

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Treatment of Released Iraqi Detainees/Hostages

The Department of State has begun planning to provide coordinated treatment for all remaining U.S. citizen hostages, both USG employees and private individuals, in the event of their release or escape from Iraq or Kuwait.

The State Department believes that it would be appropriate to provide special assistance to U.S. citizen hostages, including non-U.S. government employees. In the past, we have provided special assistance for hostages released from Lebanon on an ad hoc basis.

Depending on the circumstances of the release, and the physical condition of the hostages, the U.S. government may be called upon to offer hostages emergency medical treatment, physical and psychiatric evaluations, and transportation back to the U.S. Arrangements would also be made for debriefings and, for those Americans who die while in captivity, repatriation of remains and autopsies.

We need a coordinated effort to develop a USG policy in response. Given the large number of U.S. citizens still being held in Iraq and Kuwait, the planning, resources, and implementation of this policy are beyond the capabilities of the State Department acting alone. We also need to address how to implement the newly-enacted provisions of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. We therefore ask the NSC to direct the Departments of Defense, Justice, Health and Human Services, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs, the intelligence community, the Agency for International Development, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Agency for International Development to work with the Department of State to identify what authorities and funds are available and to then establish coordinated policies and procedures which will make the best use of the facilities, personnel and funds of all concerned agencies.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0915-MR
MM 3/17/2016

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05c. Report	Re: USG [United States Government] Assistance for Iraqi Hostages (3 pp.)	3	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [2]

Date Closed:	6/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91145-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009503

RECEIVED: 04 DEC 90 10

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 20 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: TURKEY
IRAQ
PERSIAN GULF

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
IRAN

PERSONS: OZAL, TURGUT

HUSSEIN, SADDAM

SUBJECT: POINTS TO BE MADE & SCENESETTER RE PRES MTG W/ PRES OZAL 20 NOV ON
GULF SITUATION

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 07 DEC 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF: 9009256

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS
GOMPERT
HAASS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

General

9503

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0915-MR
MM 3/17/2016

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TURGUT OZAL OF TURKEY

SCENESETTER

OS
11-27

PURPOSE

To continue your close cooperation with Ozal on the Gulf crisis, encourage Turkish military measures to increase pressure on Saddam Hussein, and review U.S. military and economic assistance to Turkey.

BACKGROUND

Your primary objective in this meeting is to review the Gulf crisis with Ozal, with the aim of confirming his support for a new UN resolution permitting the use of force, and agreeing to measures Secretary Baker discussed with him last week to increase Turkish military pressure on Saddam Hussein from the north.

Secretary Baker asked Ozal to consider taking three specific steps to help us to tighten the vise on Saddam:

- 1) Increase Turkish troop presence and exercises in eastern Turkey near the Iraq border. Ozal agreed to do so but did not say by how much and when. 'How much' matters: the Turkish deployments should get Saddam's attention and oblige Baghdad to divert forces that might otherwise go to the Kuwait Theater of Operations.
- 2) Deploy some Turkish troops to join the multinational force in Saudi Arabia. This would bolster the Islamic character of the force, and position Turkey to reap the rewards of direct participation after the conflict is over. Ozal also agreed to do this but said he would need to be asked by the Saudis, and the Gulf states would have to provide financial support to pay for the move. The Saudis have now said they have invited the Turks.
- 3) Provide increased access for U.S. use of Turkey's eastern air bases for recovery and offensive operations. Ozal said he would have to think about this and get back to us, since it could be a domestic problem for him.

You will want to discuss each of these steps with Ozal to reinforce how important they are for our strategy of convincing Saddam to agree to the UN resolutions.

Ozal has apparently kept our proposals closely held since his discussion with Secretary Baker. We sent a high-level military team to Turkey after the meeting to follow up in more detail, but they were unable to arrange a discussion with the Turkish General Staff which said it lacked instructions from Ozal.

~~SECRET~~

We have since been informed that the Turks want to delay the military talks until after your meeting with Ozal. You should thus offer to send a military team directly following your meeting in Paris, and request that Ozal instruct his military to work with our people.

You will also want to review with Ozal what we are doing to help Turkey in return for their many contributions to the international effort against Iraq, starting with multinational aid. We made a real effort, for example, to get the \$1.1 billion oil grant from the Saudis and that has paid off -- the oil deliveries have begun. Our package also includes U.S. military and economic assistance, the new textile agreement, and support in NATO.

Finally, you will want to reconfirm your intention to visit Turkey in 1991, probably following a Summit in Moscow. We plan to issue a press statement after your meeting announcing your plans to visit Turkey in the first part of 1991.

~~SECRET~~

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TURGUT OZAL
POINTS TO BE MADE

OVERVIEW

- This crisis has brought our nations closer together. I want you to know that your advice and support have been indispensable.
- No one can doubt now how important Turkey is for NATO and for the countries of Europe more generally. I can assure you we will not forget your friendship when this crisis is over. And we will not let Europe forget.
- We have embarked on a new stage in U.S.-Turkish relations. I am eager to visit Turkey in order to demonstrate the strength and importance of our ties.
- As I told you on the phone, I plan to visit you in the first part of 1991, but still cannot confirm exactly when. I will be in touch as soon as I can.
- As I mentioned before, I will also plan to visit Greece and the USSR during the same trip.
- If you agree, we will issue a press statement after this meeting announcing my intention to visit Turkey.

GULF CRISIS

- Jim Baker has briefed me on his recent discussion with you on the Gulf. I would like to review the main points that Jim raised with you in Ankara.
- I know you agree that we must do everything we can to

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0915-MR
MM 3/17/2016

maintain the coalition and the effectiveness of the sanctions.

- After three months of no movement from Saddam, I felt it was essential to turn up the heat on him. That is why I have ordered an additional 150,000 American troops to the Gulf to join the 230,000 who are already there.
- We're going to add over 1200 tanks, as well as more ships and planes. Saddam will be faced by a daunting capability. He'll see this is no bluff.
- My hope is that he will see that the alternative to complete withdrawal is a complete defeat -- and that we have the means and will to achieve that.
- The next step will be to seek a UN resolution authorizing the use of force. Jim and Vice President Quayle told me you would support such a resolution. I appreciate that.
- We are currently seeking the votes for a resolution, and will introduce it in the UN when we are sure we have enough. I am confident we are going to get there.
- We intend to move quickly since we are in the UNSC chair this month.
- We must now put maximum pressure on Saddam Hussein if we are to have any chance of achieving our objectives without having to resort to force. I would like to review the specific steps Jim suggested to you that Turkey might take to add to this pressure, to add to our ability to resolve this crisis peacefully.
- First, he told me you had agreed to increase your troop presence and exercises in southeast Turkey.

- This is most important. If we can worry Saddam about his northern border, his military problem will look all the more futile.
- We understand you have moved a limited number of troops. How many more will you move and when? We are prepared to help you logistically, should that be necessary.
- We will also act promptly should hostilities occur to eliminate any Iraqi offensive threat to Turkey in response to your build-up.
- Second, Jim said you agreed to deploy some Turkish forces to Saudi Arabia. This too will strengthen the coalition significantly. I've been told that the Saudis have invited your presence. We're assuming the Saudis will cover the cost of the movement of your forces. We're ready to ask them to do that if need be. Will you need logistic help to move your forces?
- Third, Jim asked for increased U.S. access to your eastern air bases for operations and recovery. I understand you wanted to think about that. How are you feeling about it?
- If you concur, I would like to send to Turkey as soon as possible a senior military team to discuss these three steps in more detail with your General Staff.
- I would appreciate it if you would issue the necessary instructions. Who would be our contact for follow-up?
- Let me just say one final word on your efforts. We understand that the steps you have already taken have met some opposition in Turkey.
- Some in Turkey may feel that going any further would be too

risky, lest Turkey be left to face Iraq alone after the crisis.

- I can assure you that the United States will be behind you throughout this crisis and afterwards. We are committed to your security. That is a firm and irrevocable promise.
- We will prevail in this crisis, and Turkey's standing will be very high. If we prevail peacefully, we will contain Iraqi forces afterwards and work to erode Iraq's military machine.

ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT FOR TURKEY

- We are doing a number of things for you, in several areas. We have prepared a short paper summarizing the details, which General Scowcroft could summarize for you now, or we could just pass to you later.
- I am particularly pleased that the Saudi oil commitment is now being fulfilled.

(If Ozal asks to pursue discussion of an FTA with the U.S.):

- As we told you in September, we would be happy to discuss the possibility of negotiating an FTA with you.
- We would need to know, of course, what you have in mind, and how fast you would want to go.
- An FTA would take time to negotiate and would require the agreement of our Congress.)

CYPRUS AND TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS

- I am well aware of the sensitivity of these issues in your region. The last thing I want to do is create problems for you or Prime Minister Mitsotakis.
- Let me make one suggestion on Cyprus which could help free

our hand in assisting Turkey. As you know, I support the UN Secretary General's attempts to renew the intercommunal negotiations.

- Our special Cyprus coordinator, Nelson Ledsky, explored with the parties last month some confidence building measures as one way to improve prospects for eventual progress on the larger issues.
- Ledsky will visit the region again soon to continue this work.
- I would welcome your ideas on this effort.
- Finally, we support your dialogue with Mitsotakis. We like him very much, and are looking for ways to help him. He is a reformer, and has been helpful on the Gulf.
- I hope that you continue to meet him half way on the issues that divide you.

U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS

- Vice President Quayle briefed me on your conversation in Tokyo in which you described your recent meeting with Rafsanjani.
- I appreciate your staying in close touch with me on Iran.
- I was glad to hear that Rafsanjani supports the embargo and would not oppose use of force, if needed, against Iraq.
- It was also good to hear that he wants better relations with the U.S. Do you think he's prepared to take any steps in this regard? And how do you think he perceives us and our role in the Gulf at this point?
- Can we count on his view to prevail in Iran?

Personal summary for President Ozal of main elements of U.S. support for Turkey:

1) Multinational aid to Turkey

-We have actively encouraged other countries to increase their assistance and disburse it quickly to you.

-Some of the support promised by other countries has been slow to arrive. We are pushing them to make good on their promises. As you may know, we have actively encouraged other countries to increase their assistance and disburse it quickly to you.

-Jim Baker discussed with you Saudi Arabia's commitment to provide \$1.1 billion worth of oil to compensate for your closing the pipeline. We gather that's now working well.

-Germany is prepared to extend to you a new and significant amount of military equipment, including 165 combat tanks, anti-aircraft guns, chemical weapons protective gear and munitions.

-We have asked the Germans to expedite the delivery of this equipment this year.

-France, Italy and Sweden have agreed to extend significant economic help.

-We hope that this aid, and ours, will help in redeploying some of your armed forces to the Iraq border area.

-We are also actively reminding our allies that Turkey's security is indivisible from that of NATO. We think there's a new recognition in NATO of Turkey's importance to the Alliance.

2) U.S. Military Assistance to Turkey

- On Foreign Military assistance (FMS), the Congress obligated \$500 million for Turkey for fiscal year 1991. That is less than we had pushed for, but it does represent a significant commitment.
- We are now formulating our assistance levels for 1992. I can assure you that Turkey will be one of our very top priority countries.
- I know Secretary Cheney briefed you in September on our military equipment deliveries. Here is a review of where we stand now.
- We support your decision to acquire up to 160 additional F-16s.
 - I know that financing is a concern for you. If you agree, we are ready to talk to the Saudis, Kuwaitis, and the UAE about funding for the F-16s.
- Secretary Cheney will also be in touch about other ways to help you finance the planes.
- Concerning your wish to co-produce F-16s for sale to Egypt, we will not object if Egypt agrees. The first step will be for you to consult with the Egyptians.
- We have also reviewed the military equipment list you gave to us.
- As you know, we have already offered to give you 150 M60A-3 tanks.
- We are also moving rapidly on lease arrangements for four missile destroyers and on the transfer of five COBRA attack helicopters.

3) U.S. Economic Assistance

- I was very pleased that we reached a new textile accord.
- You will also be glad to know that we will grant Turkey roughly \$50 million in Economic support funds (ESF) for FY-91. That is a more than three-fold increase over the original plan.
- We also strongly support your application for EC membership.
- Finally, I have asked Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher to lead a Presidential Trade Mission to Turkey in 1991. He would bring with him some top executives in the hope of increasing American trade and investment with your country.

~~SECRET~~

Summary of Main Elements of U.S. Support for Turkey

1) Multinational aid to Turkey

- We have actively encouraged other countries to increase their assistance and disburse it quickly to you.
- Some of the support promised by other countries has been slow to arrive. We are pushing them to make good on their promises. As you may know, we have actively encouraged other countries to increase their assistance and disburse it quickly to you.
- Jim Baker discussed with you Saudi Arabia's commitment to provide \$1.1 billion worth of oil to compensate for your closing the pipeline. We gather that's now working well.
- Germany is prepared to extend to you a new and significant amount of military equipment, including 165 combat tanks, anti-aircraft guns, chemical weapons protective gear and munitions.
- We have asked the Germans to expedite the delivery of this equipment this year.
- France, Italy and Sweden have agreed to extend significant economic help.
- We are also actively reminding our allies that Turkey's security is indivisible from that of NATO. We think there's a new recognition in NATO of Turkey's importance to the Alliance.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0915-MR
MM 3/17/2016

~~SECRET~~

2) U.S. Military Assistance to Turkey

- On Foreign Military assistance (FMS), the Congress obligated \$500 million for Turkey for fiscal year 1991. That is less than we had pushed for, but it does represent a significant commitment.
- We are now formulating our assistance levels for 1992. I can assure you that Turkey will be one of our very top priority countries.
- I know Secretary Cheney briefed you in September on our military equipment deliveries. Here is a review of where we stand now.
- We support your decision to acquire up to 160 additional F-16s.
 - I know that financing is a concern for you. If you agree, we are ready to talk to the Saudis, Kuwaitis, and the UAE about funding for the F-16s.
- Secretary Cheney will also be in touch about other ways to help you finance the planes.
- Concerning your wish to co-produce F-16s for sale to Egypt, we will not object if Egypt agrees. The first step will be for you to consult with the Egyptians.
- We have also reviewed the military equipment list you gave to us.
- As you know, we have already offered to give you 150 M60A-3 tanks.
- We are also moving rapidly on lease arrangements for four missile destroyers and on the transfer of five COBRA attack helicopters.

3) U.S. Economic Assistance

- I was very pleased that we reached a new textile accord.
- You will also be glad to know that we will grant Turkey roughly \$50 million in Economic support funds (ESF) for FY-91. That is a more than three-fold increase over the original plan.
- We also strongly support your application for EC membership.
- Finally, I have asked Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher to lead a Presidential Trade Mission to Turkey in 1991. He would bring with him some top executives in the hope of increasing American trade and investment with your country.

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009221
RECEIVED: 21 NOV 90 15

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: WELCH

DOC DATE: 21 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SYRIA
LEBANON

IRAQ
TERRORISM

PERSONS: ASSAD, HAFIZ

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ PRES HUSSEIN OF SYRIA ON 23 NOV RE GULF CRISIS

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S DUE DATE: 24 NOV 90 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF: 9009087 9009088
FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cef NARA, Date 6/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~



**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 9207

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	<u>SA. 11/29</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>log FRP</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

1001 Card 1 of 10
8:45 out
9:15 out

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT ASSAD

U.S.-SYRIAN RELATIONS

Time -

- now full exchange of views*
- THANK YOU FOR AGREEING TO THIS MEETING. AS SEEN
I'VE TOLD YOU IN LETTERS AND ON THE PHONE, I
BELIEVE IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE
THIS DIALOGUE BETWEEN US.
 - IN MY FIRST LETTER TO YOU, I SAID THAT WE
COULD GO TOGETHER DOWN THE PATH TOWARD BETTER
RELATIONS, BUT ONLY RESULTS WOULD MOVE US
FORWARD.
 - IT'S IMPORTANT TO REVIEW WHERE WE ARE AND WHAT
WE CAN DO IN THE PERIOD AHEAD.

~~SECRET~~

9221

Card 1 of 12

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT ASSAD

U.S.-SYRIAN RELATIONS

now full exchange - private club

- THANK YOU FOR AGREEING TO THIS MEETING. AS
I'VE TOLD YOU IN LETTERS AND ON THE PHONE, I
BELIEVE IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE
THIS DIALOGUE BETWEEN US.
- I SEE THAT WE HAVE JUST OVER TWO HOURS
ALLOTTED FOR OUR MEETING. IF IT IS ALL
RIGHT WITH YOU, I WOULD PROPOSE THAT I
TAKE SOME TIME AT THE START TO LAY OUT
FOR YOU SOME OF MY PRINCIPAL CONCERNS. I
WOULD THEN VERY MUCH LIKE TO HEAR YOUR
THINKING ON ANYTHING I HAVE RAISED OR ON
ANYTHING ELSE. I WOULD ALSO HOPE THAT WE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0915-MR

mm 3/17/2016

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07b. Outline	Re: Meeting with President Assad of Syria (3 pp.)	11/23/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [2]

Date Closed:	6/16/2009	OA/ID Number:	91145-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT ASSAD

U.S.-SYRIAN RELATIONS

- Thank you for agreeing to this meeting. As I've told you in letters and on the phone, I believe it is extremely important that we have this dialogue between us.
- I see that we have just over two hours allotted for our meeting. If it is all right with you, I would propose that I take some time at the start to lay out for you some of my principal concerns. I would then very much like to hear your thinking on anything I have raised or on anything else. I would also hope that we could save a half hour at the end to meet alone.
- In my first letter to you, I said that we could go together down the path toward better relations, but only results would move us forward.
- It's important to review where we are and what we can do in the period ahead.
- Let us establish, right from the start, that we will deal from mutual respect and total frankness.
- I wish to assure you that we are not seeking to harm Syria's vital national interests and that we appreciate your security concerns.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0915-MR

MM 3/17/2016

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

- I therefore regret and see no reason for the anti-American media campaign of late October.

GULF

- I would like to begin with the Gulf situation before turning to other items on our agenda.
- The international response to Saddam's aggression could not be more clear: he must leave Kuwait unconditionally and in no way be rewarded. "Partial solutions" are no solution at all.
- Although the sanctions are in place and working fairly well, there is no evidence that Saddam is prepared to reverse course. Meanwhile, he is taking steps, including adding troops to what he already has in Kuwait and developing biological and nuclear weapons, that could prove to be costly to all who oppose him.
- It is for this reason that I feel a sense of urgency, and am taking steps that would give us a credible military option. I hope we will not have to use it, but we will if there is no other way.
- I also believe we are on the verge of obtaining a new Security Council resolution that would authorize the use of force if need be. This too is designed to signal Saddam; if he still refuses to withdraw, it will provide an added political basis to use force. I would hope this is something that you would support.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

- Thus far, in your decision to send forces to Saudi Arabia and in your Arab League votes, Syria has been an important member of this international coalition. This is something I very much value and respect.
- I would appreciate having the benefit of your views on the impact of sanctions on Saddam's future behavior.
- I would also like to hear your thinking about what could be done about Saddam's weaponry should he withdraw. I strongly believe a return to the previous status quo is not acceptable.
- Last, and perhaps most important, I believe it is essential that there be a capable, visible Arab contribution to the effort against Saddam. This means not only a military presence in Saudi Arabia--to be candid, the defense of Saudi Arabia is no longer a problem--but a willingness to participate in offensive combat operations against Iraqi forces in Kuwait and Iraq if need be. I would appreciate your giving me a better sense of what Syria is prepared to do in light of Assistant Secretary Kelly's recent meeting with Foreign Minister Shara.
- I realize that I have asked you a good many questions, i.e., on the upcoming Security Council role, the impact of sanctions, post-crisis regional security arrangements, and Syrian willingness to participate in

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

common military operations. If you prefer, we could hold off discussing any of these until we meet alone.

PEACE PROCESS

- We also remain committed to seeking a just and lasting comprehensive peace achieved through negotiations based on the principles of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. As we have stated before, UN Security Resolution 242 applies to the Golan.
- Indeed, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, we were preparing to seek a definitive answer from the Israelis as to whether they intended to honor their own peace plan in order to allow a dialogue to begin between Israelis and Palestinians.
- We believe that Syria and other key Arab states together with Israel can do much to encourage a negotiated settlement by taking steps to decrease any chance of conflict.
- As I said in my speech to the UNGA this autumn, I hope and believe that success in the effort against Iraq will create opportunities for moving ahead on the Arab-Israeli issue. I am firmly committed to moving ahead with the peace process. I know we agree on avoiding any linkage here, but I would appreciate hearing your thinking on how we might proceed once Saddam is out of Kuwait.

TERRORISM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5

- I appreciate your efforts to win the freedom of our hostages in Lebanon. That remains a top priority for me. Do you see any developments?
- I am pleased that our dialogue on terrorism has developed since you met with Secretary Baker. However, we still have significant differences to work out on the terrorism issue. This is something extremely important for both Secretary Baker and me; it is not simply a concern of bureaucrats.
- I have also heard your complaints that we are not appropriately responding to Syria's assurances on terrorism or its contribution to the Gulf effort.
- But I could not set aside past actions that harmed or endangered American citizens. Neither would the American people or Congress accept any such arrangements.
- We believe groups and individuals responsible for such terrorist attacks remain in Syria and Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon. We also believe that terrorists resident in Syria and Syrian-controlled Lebanon continue to plan new attacks on our interests.
- Foreign Minister Shara suggested that Syria is ready to continue our dialogue and consider ways to fight terrorism.
- I will ask Secretary Baker to get back to Foreign Minister Shara with a concrete proposal.

LEBANON

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6

- I think there are some real opportunities for progress in Lebanon.
- Taif continues to be the best bet. We need to move quickly on disarming all militias and redeploying foreign forces away from greater Beirut.
- I would think we all have an interest in the emergence of the Hrawi Government as truly sovereign.
- in one on one: One step that might help Lebanon make a clean break with the past would be for Aoun to be allowed to go to France. We need to get this chapter behind us.

HUMAN RIGHTS

- I want to express my continuing concern over the welfare of Syria's Jewish community.
- I want to acknowledge as well the progress that has taken place.
- We continue to favor unconditional freedom to emigrate.
- If you are not yet ready to sign on to this, we would at a minimum want to see families reunified.
- This issue is an important one: for me, for the Congress, and for many Americans.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009238
RECEIVED: 23 NOV 90 12

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 23 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT
 PERSIAN GULF

TELCON
USSR

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: MUBARAK, HOSNI

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES MUBARAK RE MTG W/ PRIMAKOV / OCT 27

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 27 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

HAASS

NEIL

NSC CHRON

O'LEARY

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cwp NARA, Date 6/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9238

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2000-0429-F
SS 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANT: The President
President Hosni Mubarak
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME: October 27, 1990; 2:24 - 2:31 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Mubarak initiated the call.

The President: Hosni, how are you? (U)

President Mubarak: Very well, George. I met with Primakov. (U)

The President: How did it go? (U)

President Mubarak: I will tell you all of it. I impressed on him our conclusion that the only way to avoid military action is for Iraq to accept to withdraw totally and unconditionally. The aggression should never be rewarded. I told him that the Soviet Union must avoid the impression of a wedge between it and the United States. There is no direct linkage, I said, between the Gulf and other Middle Eastern issues; otherwise, both would not be solved. Regarding the Palestinian problem, all he can say is that he will consult with the United States. (Ø)

The President: That is very encouraging. (U)

President Mubarak: I was very straight with him. You are an expert; you know these guys, I said. If you support them, then you will have a problem with all the Arabs. Primakov said Assad had proposed an Arab League summit, which would call for Iraq to withdraw. I said that we had done this before, so a summit is of no use. But if he accepts total withdrawal, then we will have a summit to ask for it as a facesaver. I told him to tell Saddam Hussein that the United States is hard as a wall and for military action. He agreed. He was to go to Baghdad at seven this morning, but Tariq Aziz called to say that as they were supporting the United States at the U.N., he shouldn't come. I also sent a message to Mitterrand today. He is seeing Gorbachev today. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2

The President: The EC met today. Their statement was important.
(Ø)

President Mubarak: He (Primakov) will hear the same thing from King Fahd. (Ø)

The President: I'm very grateful to you. All the coalition partners will be grateful. Jim Baker will talk to you about where we are and where we go. There are lots of ideas, in direct accord with what you say. Your talk with Primakov was very helpful. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I was very clear with him. He understood well. (Ø)

The President: He seems like a nice man, who thinks he knows the area well. What he heard, coming from you, was important. (Ø)

President Mubarak: He is going to Saudi Arabia tomorrow. I will inform King Fahd of what I said. (Ø)

The President: He made a good statement. (U)

President Mubarak: Yes, he did. (U)

The President: Well, I'm off to do some more campaigning. See you soon. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9238

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 23, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM:

RICHARD N. HAASS *rw*

SUBJECT:

Memorandum of Telephone Call with President
Mubarak of Egypt on October 27, 1990

Attached at Tab is the memorandum of conversation for the
President's telephone call from President Mubarak of Egypt on
October 27, 1990.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve

KD fa

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By *CB* NARA, Date *7/29/10*

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: LMS LOG # 9238
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOC AM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>		
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>AM/11/24</u>	<u>N/R</u>
NSC Secretariat			

90 NOV 23 P 4:20

(A) = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS 11-23-90 10:00

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9009246
RECEIVED: 23 NOV 90 15

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 23 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: EGYPT
KUWAIT
HS

SAUDI ARABIA
PERSIAN GULF
TELCON

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: MUBARAK, HOSNI

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W/ PRES MUBARAK OF EGYPT RE HUSSEIN / NOV 20

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 27 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
HAASS
NEIL
NSC CHRON
O'LEARY
WELCH

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 4/16/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT CLOSED BY: NSMEN DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9246

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2000-0429-F
SS 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Hosni Mubarak
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME November 20, 1990; 7:55 - 8:01 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: CSCE Conference Center, Paris

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hosni, how are you? I'm still in Paris, just wanted to touch base with you on an item or two. (U)

President Mubarak: Everything is going all right. (U)

The President: I think we are beginning to get Saddam Hussein's attention. I'm calling regarding President Assad and how important you believe it is to see him on this trip. I could see him in Geneva on the way back. Do you think that would be okay with him? (U)

President Mubarak: I will call him, George. That is a very good idea. It is extremely important to support him because he is with our line on this. We need to encourage him. He is with us against Saddam Hussein, George. He did not want to come here for a meeting; that way, some would have said that he came to Egypt just because George Bush wanted him to. But if you are offering a third place, that shows you have worked to meet his concerns. (U)

The President: We could do it at a British base in Cyprus, or in Geneva, whatever he thinks is best. (U)

President Mubarak: I will ask. (U)

The President: We have not checked with the Brits yet, but we could do an airport stop in Cyprus. It would be after we left you, either in Cyprus or in Geneva. (U)

President Mubarak: I will contact him. Maybe he will agree to both and then you can choose. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President: I was a little worried about his statement on his troops staying in Saudi Arabia. (Ø)

President Mubarak: This is for local consumption, George. We are not going to fight Iraq in Iraq -- we are going to Kuwait. (Ø)

The President: He's saying that they are going to stay in Saudi Arabia. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I know him -- when the action starts, he will go quickly with us. (Ø)

The President: Well, call me through Signal once you know his reaction. If I'm busy at the conference, then I hope you will speak to Brent Scowcroft. Or tell Wisner. Tell Assad I look forward to seeing him. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I will tell you or through Scowcroft or Frank. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9246

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 23, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *ml*

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH *mw*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Call with President
Mubarak of Egypt of November 20, 1990

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation for the President's telephone call to President Mubarak of Egypt on November 20, 1990.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *KJH/fu* Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By *01* NARA, Date *7/29/00*

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: MAJ LOG # 9246
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCL Stm A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>		
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>Stm 11/24</u>	<u>N/R</u>
NSC Secretariat			

RECEIVED
NOV 23 6:23

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: