Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:	Chronological Files
OA/ID Number:	91144
Folder ID Number:	91144-008

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Re: Iraqi Troop Qualities [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	11/1/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
01b. Report	Syria: Assessing Asad's Regional Policies [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)	10/25/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S
02a. Memo	William F. Sittmann to J. Stapleton Roy Re: Transmittal of Presidential Correspondence (1 pp.)	11/5/90	(b)(1)	C
02b. Letter	President Bush to President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak Re: I am writing with some good news (1 pp.)	11/5/90	(b)(1)	
02c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to President Mubarak (1 pp.)	11/5/90	(b)(1)	C
02d. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to President Mubarak (1 pp.)	11/5/90	(b)(1)	C
03a. Memo	John Gordon/Dan Poneman to Robert M. Gates Re: Teller Letter on Iraqi Nuclear Capabilities (2 pp.)	11/5/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Letter	Edward Teller to Admiral D. Watkins (1 pp.)	10/8/90	(b)(1)	S
03c. Letter	Edward Teller to Dr. Carnes Lord [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	10/12/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1205
OA/ID Number: 91144-008
Date Closed: 6/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04a. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Summary of President's Gorbachev's Letter to the President (1 pp.)	11/7/90	(b)(1)	S
04b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the President (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04c. Letter	President Gorbachev to President Bush [Unofficial Translation] (5 pp.)	11/6/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1205
OA/ID Number: 91144-008
Date Closed: 6/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008869
RECEIVED: 07 NOV 90 18

TO: MEMO

CHRON FILE

FROM: WARD, S

DOC DATE: 01 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
PERSIAN GULF
SAUDI ARABIA
SYRIA

2

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: IRAQI TROOP QUALITIES

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 10 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 6/15/09

COMMENTS: ***FM CIA***

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OPENED BY: NSGLM CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 1 OF 1

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	11/7	R
NSC Secretariat	3	11/7	D/R

90 NOV 7 AM 7:53

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Memo	Re: Iraqi Troop Qualities [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	11/1/90	~~(b)(1)~~, (b)(3)	

Collection:

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
By MM (NLGB) on 9/14/2015

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [1]

Date Closed:	6/15/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0914-MR(500)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	7/31/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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~~SECRET~~ (b)(3)

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

1 November 1990

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Iraqi Troop Qualities

1. The Iraqi Army is primarily a conscript force, and the quality of its units varies because of differing training and equipment standards and combat experience. Most officers and non-commissioned officers are volunteers who incur lengthy service commitments. Since 2 August, some reservists and retirees probably have been called back to duty. (b)(3)

2. The Army takes in about 100,000 men per year. Since 1980, however, most soldiers have served well beyond the mandated two-year tour, with some being released only after serving the entire eight-year war with Iran. Following induction, conscripts receive basic training that involves some live fire experience. Once assigned to units, they receive both individual and small-unit training.

--Republican Guard soldiers are recruited from among the more highly skilled conscripts, most of whom volunteer because of the additional benefits given the Guard.

--Many older or non-qualified men of military age (15-55 in Iraq) go into the Popular Army militia and perform rear-area security duties. (b)(3)

3. Most Army units and currently serving soldiers experienced combat during the war with Iran. Iraq did not fully demobilize after the war ended in August 1988, and at least 750,000 veterans probably remain on active service. (b)(3)

4. Reports from Iraqi deserters and evacuees from Kuwait indicate the occupation has hurt military morale. Front-line infantry forces and those occupying Kuwait city suffer from shortages of basic necessities, health problems, an apparent ambivalence about their mission, and a fear of fighting the multinational forces. These problems have resulted in desertions, unauthorized absences, and poor discipline.

--The result, we believe, is a diminished will to fight among the less capable infantry units, although all Iraqi units are likely to defend themselves initially. (b)(3)

This memorandum was prepared by (b)(3) of the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. He can be reached on (b)(3)

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2010-0914-MR
7/21/2014 MM

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Report	Syria: Assessing Asad's Regional Policies [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)	10/25/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 9/14/2015

Date Closed:	6/15/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0914-MR(500.01)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	7/31/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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(b)(3)

25 October 1990

Syria: Assessing Asad's Regional Policies

Two schools of thought exist on Syria's view of itself in the Arab world and in its immediate neighborhood of the Levant: one holds that Damascus has ambitions to exercise great influence over other Arabs by becoming the dominant Arab power amongst its immediate neighbors and the foremost bulwark against Israel; the other credits Damascus, and particularly President Asad, with more modest objectives of protecting Syria from its militarily superior archenemies and neighbors--Iraq and Israel--and of managing its regional relationships to reduce Syrian instability and the high susceptibility of Syrian society to radical ideologies such as Islamic fundamentalism and Palestinian nationalism. The former school puts continuing stock in the persistence of Greater Syrianism in the outlook of the Asad regime; the latter gives greater place to the defensive character of the regime domestically and regionally. Both views exist in the academic and foreign policy worlds and in the intelligence community. (b)(3)

There is general agreement among intelligence analysts, however, that Syria's policy objectives over the past few years have been:

-- Installing a pliant government in Lebanon that can restore stability there;

-- Avoiding both a war with Israel and a peace process that would yield less than full return of the Golan Heights and preserve Israel's military superiority over its erstwhile Arab enemies;

-- Checkmating and controlling Palestinians, who are regarded as a destabilizing force in the region and potentially one inside Syria;

-- Gaining maximum financial help from the Gulf states and maximum military and diplomatic support from the Soviet Union;

-- Minimizing Iran's ability to foster Islamic fundamentalists, particularly the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and Hizballah, while encouraging Tehran to hurt Saddam Husayn first through war and now through Iranian participation in international sanctions. (b)(3)

Asad's record in achieving these objectives is mixed, but he has proved to virtually all observers that he is a master at exploiting tactical opportunities to enhance his position and that he can be ruthless, unforgiving, and loyal only to his and Syria's interests.

-- Throughout a fifteen year stay in Lebanon that has been costly, internationally and domestically unpopular, and sometimes strategically dangerous, Asad has crafted just enough support to

(b)(3)
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2010-0914-MR
7/31/2014 MM

pursue his policies to thwart challenges from all quarters except Israel and more peripherally the United States. In his handling of Lebanese players, he has proved a popular characterization of him that "he never helps his friends so much that they don't need him nor hurts his enemies so badly that they cannot one day be allies."

-- Asad and the Israelis understand and "work" one another as only longtime, committed enemies can. Syria has poked and challenged the Israelis in Lebanon and essentially bested them there, but Asad has scrupulously honored his agreements with Tel Aviv on the Golan and worked at parallel purposes with Israeli hardliners to thwart peace negotiations that risk for both sides dreaded and potentially destabilizing territorial concessions. Asad has manipulated, threatened and tried to control Jordan and the Palestinians in pursuing these ends.

-- The cornerstone of Syrian policies throughout the last decade has been Soviet support and particularly the perception that Syria is a deeply valued Soviet client. For years, Asad successfully extracted most of what he wanted from the Soviets without giving much in return--in fact, defying Moscow repeatedly over Syria's Lebanon policy, his feuds with Arafat and Iraq, and occasional Syrian cooperation with the United States. (b)(3)

Asad was one of the first Soviet clients to sense the impending changes that Gorbachev and "new thinking" would bring to the Middle East. Syria began to adjust its policies some years ago by testing the prospects for improving relations with Egypt and the United States, the only combination of relationships that could maintain Syrian credibility with Israel and Iraq in the wake of Soviet retrenchment. In our judgment, the Gulf crisis allowed Asad to speed up his new policy approach; it also provided sufficient distraction internationally for Syria to undertake the controversial tasks of removing the recalcitrant Christian leader, General Awn, and moving on with taming Lebanon. The crisis and the United States and international response also provides Asad with his best hope yet of vanquishing his nemesis, Saddam Husayn. (b)(3)

Does this increased Syrian interest in cooperation with the United States have strong foundations? Are warnings appropriate that too close an embrace of Syria by Washington could be dangerous? There are not many shared goals and values between Syria and the United States and thus the relationship will probably remain tactical rather than strategic. Asad and most Syrians will act in self-protective and self-interested ways and will resort with no qualms to instruments such as terrorism. Asad is a much more judicious man than Saddam, however, and probably much smarter; Asad is also a less passionate and more predictable player. Some would also argue that Asad has fewer ambitions, resources, and options and thus is a safer bet in forging closer US-Arab ties. The United States can probably count on continuing Syrian support in the Gulf crisis as long as:

-- US efforts continue to harm and/or constrain Iraq;

-- Israel does not become directly involved in the crisis;

-- Asad is able to control domestic discontent fomented by Iraqi sympathizers, dissident fundamentalists, and other regime detractors who will exploit Syria's support for the United States and Arab conservatives. (b)(3)

Syria's Lebanon Policy

Syria's entry into Beirut's Christian sector last week to remove renegade General Michel Awn is consistent with its long-term efforts to establish a dominant presence in central and northern Lebanon and to foster a government susceptible to pressure from Damascus. Since Syrian troops first entered Lebanon in 1976--ironically to aid the besieged Christian forces--President Asad has faced a costly, uphill battle against serious national security threats. He has sought to:

-- Prevent any one group--whether Palestinian, Christian, or leftist Lebanese--from becoming strong enough to challenge Syrian authority;

-- Quash repeated Iraqi efforts to destabilize his regime through support of various Lebanese surrogates;

-- Head off Iranian-backed efforts by Hizballah to transform Lebanon into another radical, fundamentalist Islamic republic;

-- Counterbalance Israel's longstanding hegemony in southern Lebanon and strong ties to various Maronite Christian factions in Beirut and central Lebanon. (b)(3)

Damascus backs the National Accords document--signed by Lebanese legislators in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia in October 1989 and supported by the Arab League--because it effectively legitimizes Syria's continuing influence over Lebanese politics and its military presence.

1.4(c)

It is too soon to say that Syria will succeed in fashioning a compliant Lebanon, however.

-- Political divisions in Lebanon remain wide, only partly because of Syrian policies, and the prospects for sectarian reconciliation remain remote.

-- The defeat of Awn, moreover, does not mean the capitulation of the large Maronite Christian community. Some 400,000 remain in the Christian enclave, where the Lebanese Forces (LF) militia operates. The LF is Lebanon's largest remaining Christian militia, numbering some 5-7,000 men, and Syria's most outspoken surviving Christian opponent.

-- Israel's military presence in Southern Lebanon will remain a check against any possible ambitions by Asad to move beyond Beirut into the south. Tel Aviv will be watching Syrian behavior carefully and, 1.4(c) would probably respond militarily to challenges by Syria or its proxies to Israel's self-designated security zone. (b)(3)

The Terrorism Card

Syria continues to maintain close ties to radical Palestinian organizations. Damascus's support--which includes providing training facilities, weapons, documentation, safehaven, and operational guidance--is unlikely to end.

-- Support for these groups allows Syria to pressure rival neighboring states; maintain dominance in Lebanon; sabotage any Middle East peace process that excludes Syria; and exert control over the Palestinian movement.

-- Syria recognizes the heavy international costs of his policy and has restrained its clients from mounting spectacular operations when these costs rise, as was the case following heavy international criticism of its longtime ally, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), following the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988.

3.3(b)(1)



3.3(b)(1)

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008156
RECEIVED: 12 OCT 90 16

CHRON FILE

TO: FASCELL, DANTE B

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 02 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: IRAQ KUWAIT
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO CONGRESSMAN FASCELL LTR TO PRES RE US POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 28 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CHARLES
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY MJT DATE 11/2/90 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD CLOSED BY: NSMJT DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 2, 1990

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter to the President of October 2, 1990 concerning U.S. policy toward Iraq. We too are keenly aware of the historic import of the events both preceding and during the current crisis, and consistent with both the law and our practice, are maintaining records that document the events and policy decisions. Once the crisis is behind us, we will be in a better position to determine the extent of any policy review that might be undertaken.

Again, I appreciate your suggestion and interest on this issue of serious importance to our national security.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Dante B. Fascell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 23, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Response to Congressman Fascell

Attached at Tab I is a response to Congressman Fascell's letter to the President (Tab II) concerning the need to review past actions related to U.S. policy toward Iraq that led to the current crisis, and prepare a report and recommendations for the Congress. Your response reassures him our record-keeping but makes no promises on a post-crisis "white paper."

Ginny Lampley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to Congressman Fascell at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Response to Congressman Fascell
Tab II Letter from Congressman Fascell

October 10, 1990

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President expressing your thoughts on the importance of a timely review of U.S. actions prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

I have shared your comments with the President and he appreciates your counsel. I have also provided copies of your letter to General Scowcroft and a number of other administration officials for their prompt review and consideration. You should receive a more detailed response in the near future.

Thank you again for writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Dante B. Fascell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

FDM:HGP:
bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for DIRECT response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept of State - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of Defense - FYI

Congress of the United States

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

October 2, 1990

Mr. Nicholas Calio
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Calio:

Chairman Fascell asked that I send the enclosed letter to the President through you.

If you wish to contact me, I may be reached at (202) 225-5021.

Sincerely,

R. Michael Finley
Deputy Chief of Staff

RMF:dmh
enclosure

8156

DANTE B. FASCELL, FLORIDA
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JOHN J. BRADY, JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF

One Hundred First Congress

Congress of the United States

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

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PORTER J. GOSS, FLORIDA
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, FLORIDA

JOHN R. SINCLAIR
MINORITY CHIEF OF STAFF

October 2, 1990

The Honorable George H.W. Bush
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Full responsibility for the invasion of Kuwait rests with the government of Iraq. There is not and cannot be any other conclusion regarding culpability for the Persian Gulf crisis.

Legitimate questions have arisen, however, within Congress and amongst the American people as to whether the United States did all it could have done to discourage Iraq's aggressive action. Now is not the time for a public debate on what might have been done. Retrospection makes experts of us all, unfortunately after the fact.

But it is important that we review past actions to assure that our future policies have the benefit of experience gained. In this particular instance I believe that it is extremely important that a determination be made about what actually happened and what was done right or wrong in our relations with Iraq since you became President. To assure the necessary objectivity for such a review I believe it should be conducted by persons not now employed by the government who have not had direct involvement in the issues involved. A report and accompanying recommendations should be shared with the Congress after the Persian Gulf Crisis has been resolved.

Whether or not you choose to take steps now to review US policy toward Iraq I urge you to take appropriate steps now to assure that all documents which might relate to our policy be preserved and that, while memories are fresh, historical statements be taken from those who had any part to play.

Mr. President, in making this suggestion, I in no way wish to suggest any diminution whatsoever in my support or that of the Congress for the strong and effective steps you are taking in response to Iraq's totally unjustified actions.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

Dante B. Fascell
Chairman

DBF:RMFdmh

CHRON FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008771
RECEIVED: 05 NOV 90 11

TO: ROY, J

FROM: HILL

DOC DATE: 05 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: EGYPT
FMS

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF PRES LTR TO MUBARAK RE EGYPT FMS DEBT FORGIVENESS

ACTION: HILL SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 08 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF: 9005044 9005106

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		EXECSEC
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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 6/15/09

COMMENTS:

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8771

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	6	K	REVIEW
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	7	LMS 4/5	LDX
NSC Secretariat	8	MEA 11/6	D

RECEIVED 00 NOV 5 P 6:33

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS DATE? Nov 5
KA

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MEN LOG # 8771

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG R A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	K	A
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates	2		
Brent Scowcroft			
~~Bill Sittmann~~	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	WMS 4/5	D
NSC Secretariat	5		ADD TO FILE

90 NOV 5 P12:10 RECEIVED

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS 90 NOV 2 PM 4:28

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Please notify David Welch when signed.

X3950

Contacted Sec on 11/6/98 was cabled on the 5th of Nov.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

[redacted]

90 NOV -5 PM 5:35

Jim -

Per Florence Gantt, Mr. Gates has shown the attached Presidential letter to the President and has received his approval.

Secretary Baker would like to deliver this, via cable, to President Mubarak on Tuesday, November 6.

K.H.

Ken Hill

11/5
5:55pm
OK to do per Jim -
will send him a copy

[redacted]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8771
a/o 1

November 5, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Presidential Correspondence

Request the attached Presidential letter to President Mubarak be cabled NIACT IMMEDIATE to Secretary Baker for presentation to President Mubarak on Tuesday. Signed original will be sent via State Department pouch.

Kenneth J. Duffey

for William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By SS NARA, Date 3/4/24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Letter	President Bush to President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak Re: I am writing with some good news (1 pp.)	11/5/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [1]

Date Closed:	6/15/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 5, 1990

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter to President Mubarak

Purpose

To inform President Mubarak of your success in obtaining Congressional approval of Egyptian FMS debt cancellation.

Background

We have drafted a letter to Hosni Mubarak (Tab A) informing him of the good news about Congressional passage of the Egyptian FMS debt cancellation and reminding him that this was not an easy chore for us. If you approve the letter, we can cable it to Cairo so that Jim Baker can deliver it personally to Mubarak tomorrow, November 6.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Letter to President Mubarak

cc: Vice Presidnet
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/4/24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8771

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 5, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Letter to President Mubarak

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President, covering a letter for his approval to President Mubarak. If we can get approval of the letter ASAP, then we could cable it quickly to Cairo so that Jim Baker could deliver it there tomorrow. (Baker arrives at 1200 Cairo time and goes directly to his meetings).

Ginny Lampley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to the President, forwarding a suggested letter to President Mubarak.

Attachments
Tab I Memo for the President
Tab A Letter to President Mubarak of Egypt

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/4/24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008477
RECEIVED: 24 OCT 90 16

TO: GATES

CHRON FILE

FROM: GORDON
PONEMAN
KANTER

DOC DATE: 05 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR MATTERS IRAQ

PERSONS: HUSSEIN, SADDAM

SUBJECT: TELLER LTR ON IRAQI NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES DUE DATE: 27 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GORDON
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 5/16/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEF CLOSED BY: NSDAI DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Memo	John Gordon/Dan Poneman to Robert M. Gates Re: Teller Letter on Iraqi Nuclear Capabilities (2 pp.)	11/5/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [1]

Date Closed:	6/15/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

→ Staff
w/ copy back

The Under Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

October 24, 1990

Mr. Robert Gates
Assistant to the President
and Deputy National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Bob:

I am forwarding the enclosed for your information.

Sincerely,

John C. Tuck

John C. Tuck

Enclosure

The document transmitted herewith contains RESTRICTED DATA.

When separated from enclosures, handle this document as UNCLASSIFIED
(insert proper classification)

~~SECRET~~

P. O. Box 808, L-0
Livermore, CA 94550
October 8, 1990

Admiral James D. Watkins
Secretary
U. S. Department of Energy
Forrestal Building
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20585

Dear Admiral Watkins:

As you probably know, John Nuckolls, Siegfried Hecker and I saw Carnes Lord three weeks ago. Enclosed you will find a copy of a follow-up letter which is to supplement a carefully-formulated joint statement by the Laboratories.

Sincerely,

Edward Teller

Edward Teller

ET:js

Enclosure

The document transmitted herewith
contains **Restricted Data.**

WHEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURES, HANDLE
THIS DOCUMENT AS Unclassified
(INSERT PROPER CLASSIFICATION)

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1998-0099-F/6
08/26/2002 MM

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Letter	Edward Teller to Dr. Carnes Lord [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (2 pp.)	10/12/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (November 1990) [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 9/14/2015

Date Closed:	6/15/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0914-MR(11.04)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	6/23/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
502.02

October 12, 1990

Dr. Carnes Lord
National Security Advisor
to the Vice President
Office of the Vice President
292 Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0914-MR
6/23/2014 MM

Dear Dr. Lord:

6.2(a) [redacted] I supplemented these calculations by looking into designs where the Iraqis may go one state beyond the simplest possible use of fissionable material in an implosion.

This would be to use tritium for the production of additional neutrons which is called the boosting technology. Tritium is not strictly controlled.

6.2(a) [redacted] Obviously, higher technology is needed to produce these explosives. The boosting technology in itself is not difficult. The initiation of the explosives would be a little more difficult. As a pure guess, I would say that the availability of this technology in Iraq is as low as 10% or 20%.

One point seems really important. If Saddam Hussein stays in power for another five years without a very thorough method of inspection to inhibit the development of nuclear explosives, it must be assumed with high probability that in such a time frame, he will have the boosted devices described above. It is also probable that through isotope separation using the centrifuge method, ample enriched material will be on hand. Thus, his supply of nuclear explosive would become ample.

WNINTEL
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NOFORN
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

~~SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
This document contains Restricted Data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Unauthorized disclosure subject to Administrative and Criminal Sanctions.

NOCONTRACT
Not Releasable to Contractors/Consultant

ORCON
Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator

I hope that the report on the calculations and the guesses as to the advanced technologies will be of some use in Washington.

Sincerely,

Edward Teller

Distribution:

1/A - Dr. Carnes Lord
2/A - Secretary James Watkins
3/A - Secretary Richard Cheney
4/A - Judge William Webster
5/A - File

TIME STAMP

~~SECRET~~ RECEIVED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: [redacted]

90 OCT 24 P4 : 18

ACTION OFFICER: [redacted] DUE: 26 OCT 90

- [X] Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates
- [ ] Prepare Memo For Cicconi
- [ ] Prepare Memo _____ to _____
- [ ] Appropriate Action
- [ ] Prepare Memo for Sittmann

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

*PHONE** to action officer at ext. _____

FYI		FYI		FYI	
☐	☐ Barth	☐	☐ Johnson	☐	☐ Pryce
☐	☐ Basora	☐	☐ Kaeuper	☐	☐ Rademaker
☐	☐ Beers	☒	☐ Kanter	☐	☐ Rice
☐	☐ Blackwill	☐	☐ Kitchen	☐	☐ Rodman
☐	☐ Broome	☐	☐ LaMagna	☐	☐ Rostow
☐	☐ Burns	☐	☐ Lampley	☐	☐ Salvetti
☐	☐ Chamberlin	☐	☐ Levin	☐	☐ Tilley
☐	☐ Charles	☐	☐ Lundsager	☐	☐ Tobey
☐	☐ Coulson	☐	☐ Mandel	☐	☐ Van Eron
☐	☐ Davis	☐	☐ Melby	☐	☐ Watson
☐	☐ Deal	☐	☐ Menan	☐	☐ Welch
☐	☐ Dorminey	☐	☐ Merchant	☐	☐ Whitley
☐	☐ Dyke	☐	☐ Miller	☐	☐ Wilson
☐	☐ Fry	☐	☐ Needels	☐	☒ Working
☐	☐ Gaughan	☐	☐ O'Leary	☐	☐ Zelikow
☐	☐ Gordon	☐	☐ Ordway	☐	☐ _____
☒	☐ Haass	☐	☐ Paal	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Hayden	☐	☐ Pacelli	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Hutchings	☐	☐ Pilling	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Jackson	☐	☐ Popadiuk	☐	☐ _____

INFORMATION

- [X] Sittmann
- [X] Scowcroft (advance)
- [X] Deputy Exec. Sec.
- [X] Gates (advance)
- [ ] Exec. Sec. Desk
- [X] Secretariat

COMMENTS

CRW#:

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/15/09

Logged By JA.

Return to Secretariat

Gates FYI — Talking Ltr on Iraqi Nuclear Capabilities

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MEN — LOG # 8477

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ — SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ — DOCLOG AR — A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1		I
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates	2	8	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	24. 11/8	
NSC Secretariat	4		N/R

90 NOV 7 A10:16 RECEIVED

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008569
RECEIVED: 29 OCT 90 11

CHRON FILE

TO: FOLEY, THOMAS S

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 06 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: LEGAL ISSUES
PERSIAN GULF

CONGRESSIONAL

2

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO HOUSE SPEAKER FOLEY RE PERSIAN GULF SITUATION

ACTION: PRES SGD LTR DUE DATE: 01 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: RADEMAKER LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
RADEMAKER

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE 11/6 BY HAND W/ATTCH

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UNCLASSIFIED

CHRON FILE

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8569

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	Ken	REVIEW
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	Smith	W
NSC Secretariat	3		D

RECEIVED 90 NOV 6 P5:54

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DATE? 11-6-90

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Response Concerning Consultations on the Persian Gulf

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MEN
LOG # 8569
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____
DOCLOG A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	KH	A
Bill Sittmann	2 3	W	
Bob Gates	3	8	
Brent Scowcroft	4	✓	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	WA 11/5	R
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

1. See fwd on letter — copy sent 11/2 done 11/4
2. ~~If~~ addl' letter on same subject come in from ~~Foley~~ Mitchell done 11/2 (Dgl)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 6, 1990

CHRON FILE

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I have read your letter of October 17, and want to assure you that I believe close consultation between Congress and the Executive branch is essential as we implement our Nation's response to aggression in the Persian Gulf. As you know, we have consulted closely with Congressional leaders since the current crisis began, and we intend to continue doing so now that the 101st Congress has adjourned. I value your advice on this and other matters, and you should feel free to pass along any thoughts you have at any time.

Sincerely,

George Bush

The Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
11-6-90 8569

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

90 NOV -5 PM 3:52

November 5, 1990

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Response to Speaker Foley Concerning Consultations on the Persian Gulf

Purpose

To reply to Speaker Foley's letter concerning consultation with Congress over the Persian Gulf situation.

Background

Speaker Foley wrote you on October 17 to stress the importance of continued consultation with Congress over the Persian Gulf situation after the 101st Congress adjourns (Tab B). He mentioned that Congress will make arrangements in its adjournment resolution for reconvening if necessary, and that a consultative group of congressional leaders may be formed to facilitate consultations after adjournment.

Your proposed response (Tab A) states that we have consulted with Congress since the crisis began, and that we will continue to consult now that Congress has adjourned. Inasmuch as we do not favor either the proposed consultative group or arrangements for Congress to attempt to reconvene itself, your response does not comment on these ideas.

The proposed response has been reviewed and approved by Boyden Gray and Fred McClure.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to Speaker Foley at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Letter to Speaker Foley
Tab B Letter from Speaker Foley dated October 17, 1990

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

The Speaker's Rooms
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

October 17, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

As the 101st Congress approaches adjournment, consideration is being given in both Houses to provide in the adjournment resolution for the possibility of reconvening to consider developments in the Persian Gulf. I will support making appropriate arrangements toward this end.

Suggestions have also been advanced to create a consultative group with which it is hoped you will maintain communication and consultation on matters involving national security and foreign affairs, particularly as they may involve events in the Gulf region. I believe that there is a need for ongoing consultation. I also believe that you would find it both useful and appropriate in the coming months to consult with the joint bipartisan leadership of both Houses as well as of those House and Senate committees with responsibility for defense, intelligence and foreign affairs.

With warm regards, I am,
believe me,

Yours faithfully,

Thomas S. Foley
The Speaker

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8569

October 29, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: NICHOLAS ROSTOW SR for

FROM: STEPHEN RADEMAKER SR

SUBJECT: Response to Speaker Foley Concerning Consultations on the Persian Gulf

Speaker Foley wrote the President on October 17, to stress the importance of continued consultation with Congress over the Persian Gulf situation after the 101st Congress adjourns (Tab B). We have prepared a response for signature by the President (Tab A) in coordination with White House Legislative Affairs and the Office of Counsel to the President.

Concurrence by: Richard Haass and Ginny Kampley

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I transmitting the proposed response to the President for his signature.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Speaker Foley
Tab B Letter from Speaker Foley dated Oct. 17, 1990

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008851
RECEIVED: 07 NOV 90 10

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: BURNS
RICE

DOC DATE: 07 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
IRAQ
PERSIAN GULF
HS

PERSONS: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
HUSSEIN, SADDAM

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF GORBACHEV LTR TO PRES ON 6 NOV

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 10 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BURNS
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cof NARA, Date 6/15/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT CLOSED BY: NSMJT DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE 8851

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

November 7, 1990

[redacted]

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the President

Attached, per your request, is a summary of Gorbachev's November 6, 1990, letter to the President. We have also highlighted the most important passages on a copy of the letter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Summary of Gorbachev letter
Tab A Gorbachev letter to the President

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0845-MR
ES 5/23/13

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Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8851

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0840-MR
SCS 5/31/12

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Summary of President Gorbachev's Letter to the President

Gorbachev's November 6 letter responds to your October 20 letter on the Primakov trip to the U.S. and the situation in the Gulf.

Gorbachev begins by describing his recent visits to Spain and France. He was impressed in Spain by that country's transition from dictatorship to democracy, implying that it held lessons for the USSR. In France, he had a productive meeting with Mitterrand, highlighted by signing of a treaty on concord and cooperation. Gorbachev says he was particularly satisfied by his talks on economic relations with both countries.

Gorbachev's thinking on the Gulf crisis dominates the remainder of the letter. He reviews the basis for Primakov's recent trip by stating the Soviets "wanted to take advantage of even the smallest chance in Baghdad." He specifies that he remains committed to the agreements reached at Helsinki, and that the USSR will continue to hold firmly to the position that Iraq's aggression must be reversed, and that we should abide by the UNSC decisions. Gorbachev claims that his statement on the "unacceptability" of military force was mistranslated. The Russian word, he says, is "undesirable."

Reviewing the Primakov trip, Gorbachev states that Saddam appears to be more aware of the gravity of his situation, although it is too early to tell if he will act accordingly. He says that Primakov told Saddam that if he didn't leave Kuwait, a military strike might be inevitable. Gorbachev suggests the utility of involving the Arab countries more closely to make it easier for Saddam to agree to a potential solution.

Gorbachev closes with two suggestions. The first is that we maintain pressure on Iraq to free the hostages. The second is for the U.S. and USSR to let the Arab world know that while we could not directly link the Gulf crisis to the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, we could address those issues after the conflict has been resolved.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

In sum, it appears that the purpose of this letter is to reassure you of Gorbachev's commitment to full compliance with the UN resolutions. He clearly wishes to dispel your discomfort with his recent statements concerning the "unacceptability" of the military option and the need for an Arab solution.

Attachment
Tab A Gorbachev letter

SOVIET ARMS DESTRUCTION
HAND DELIVERED
NOV 6, 1990 — 4:00 pm

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I wish to share with you my thoughts prompted by your frank and friendly letter of October 20, and not by that letter alone. Let me tell you that the difficult problems outlined in your message constantly preoccupy myself, too. In this context, please accept my sincere thanks for the confidentiality with which you related your impressions from your discussions with my special representative. Let me tell you very frankly that it was precisely this kind of reaction - consistent with the new nature of our relationship, both personal and on the state level - that I was counting on.

This is why, in the same spirit of trust and desire to fully understand one's partner that has developed between ourselves, I would like to convey to you my assessments dealing with the two major recent events in the Soviet and, actually, the world politics. I am referring to my state visits to Spain and France.

It is quite possible that someone may have pondered this question: How did Gorbachev manage to carve out some time for talks abroad when there is such a mountain heap of problems inside the country, at such a point critical for perestroika? Indeed, it was not an easy thing to do, but you, like perhaps no other leader in the world, understand the special responsibility of our countries for what is happening in the world, and hence, the enduring need to weigh and to coherently balance the internal and external factors. I couldn't really postpone those talks that were long overdue, particularly on the eve of the truly historic pan-European meeting in Paris.

His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

First, about Spain. I will not burden you with recounting the official results - you no doubt know them.

Perhaps, at first neither I, nor the Spanish leaders expected such a condensed and super-substantive conversation. But for me the experience of Spain and its people who found the strength to overcome the consequences of a protracted dictatorship in an orderly and peaceful fashion and to break into the open field of free democratic development and take a worthy place in the international community, was very important.

All of us were most favorably impressed by the royal couple who played such an important role in the critical period of Spain's transition to democracy.

As a result of our talks - and those were facilitated by the substance of our conversations, the very spirit of the new dialogue, and the nature of the documents agreed upon - our relations with Spain have been given a well-assured prospect.

Now about my visit to Paris where we shall all soon see each other. Every meeting with President Mitterand adds something new, both to our politics and French ones. Essentially, this is an interaction - extremely important for both our countries and Europe - based on trust, which was reflected in a unique treaty on concord and cooperation. This is a new word in contemporary diplomacy. This is also a symbol of the viability of the "two-tier approach" where one track, which is the Helsinki multilateral process, goes parallel with and complements the other, which is the development of the bilateral relations. And I cannot fail to point out here once again that I trace back the beginning of a new stage in the European and world politics to the agreement that you and I reached - not to consider each other as enemies.

A major place in the talks in both capitals was given to reviewing the economic ties which are particularly essential to us at present. In this regard, I am quite satisfied with the results. We found understanding and a sincere desire to help.

In Paris, as in Madrid, despite the shortage of time, we were able to touch upon all the main European and world problems. And, of course, a great deal of attention was devoted to the situation in the Middle East, and above all, to the Persian Gulf crisis.

The mission of my special representative, E.M.Primakov, continued, and the Security Council discussions went on during the same days. As you know, we wanted to take advantage of even the smallest chance in Bagdad, and this is why we asked you and other Security Council members to postpone a little bit the vote on the resolution which has now been adopted.

Let me tell you the main thing from the outset: in Bagdad, as in other capitals, we are proceeding strictly from the positions that you and I agreed to in Helsinki. We have maintained this posture and shall continue to do so firmly. Our unanimity is key to restoring justice in that region. I have said it publicly, and will tell you again: the aggression must be reversed and the aggressor himself cannot expect a reward. In my private conversation with President Mitterand I stressed once again: all of us opposing the aggression "in our broad mutual understanding should strictly, consistently and firmly abide by the decisions adopted collectively by the UN Security Council".

At the news conference in Paris I said: we cannot allow, we must not give any excuse to Iraq, to President Hussein's regime to imagine or hope for some kind of altercation between us, between all those who oppose his aggression. Not a single crack, not even the smallest fissure. You and I - and we had complete understanding on it in Helsinki - are committed to a political solution, for a new war in the Middle East would have incalculable consequences. And for the sake of a peaceful settlement we shall, if need be, intensify efforts in all areas - political, economic, and moral pressure on the aggressor. I even told Mitterand, guided by our discussions in Helsinki, that it is my deep conviction that "even the presence of the

US troops and those of other countries pursues the objective of achieving a political solution and restoring justice".

Our ministers have already exchanged their impressions about E.M.Primakov's trips to Bagdad. Let me give you my personal view: thanks to the toughening of the sanctions Saddam Hussein appears to have begun to ponder the dangerous impasse he has gotten himself into. We relayed to Saddam Hussein our arguments and conclusions based on the serious situation in which Iraq has found itself. Hussein was told that if he did not pull out his troops from Kuwait, a military strike might become inevitable. Some shifts seem to begin to lurk at this time, but it is certainly too early to speak about serious results. In a few days we shall discuss this in more detail here with Mr. Baker. Contacts with Saddam Hussein must not be broken off, while there is still a chance to prevent bloodshed. After all, if a war should break out taking thousands of human lives, this would also be a blow on the process geared toward a new world order. This, too, if you will, would be a "reward", albeit terrible, for the aggressor. It was with this in mind that I said at the news conference in Paris that such a path is unacceptable to all. (Incidentally, used in this context in some media this term was translated as "inadmissible", "unfeasible". This gave rise to misunderstandings even at the diplomatic level. The Russian meaning of this word is "undesirable".)

In Paris I stressed the need for an active use of the Arab factor. The inner logic of this idea is to prevent the "let-somebody-else-do-it" tendency among the Arabs who sort of shift all the responsibility on the Security Council and you, the United States. They should be tied more firmly to the real process of defusing the crisis. Let them think and offer their suggestions demonstrating their active involvement in the international efforts. It would be easier for Saddam Hussein to backtrack if the Security Council resolutions (without any substantive digression) were draped in an Arab-Moslem mantle.

There is one more priority aspect in our peaceful diplomatic efforts (as in yours, for that matter) - the lives of our citizens in Iraq. As the USSR President, I am simply duty-bound to do all in my power so as to prevent loss of life among them. You understand that given our present situation at home, this is of particular importance. After the meetings with my representative Saddam Hussein knows what importance I attach to this. I don't want to delude myself, but the Iraqi leadership's agreement to the gradual departure of the Soviet specialists and the softening of Bagdad's position with respect to the hostages from some other countries make me hope that some sprouts of realism may yet germinate in Bagdad. The rejection of a barbaric tactic of hostage-taking, displayed by the world community, is yielding some results. Pressure should be intensified in this area as well.

In dealing with the immediate task of rebuffing Hussein in his unlawful claims on Kuwait, one should not, I believe, put off the more general problem of the future of that region, including the curbing of the arms race there, confidence-building measures, the regional security structure, the Palestinian problem and, generally, that of Arabs - Israel.

I recognize that it is tactically not advisable to directly link this whole range of problems (or even one - Palestinian) with eliminating the consequences of Hussein's aggression. But we would benefit from creating the hope in the Arab world that you and I and the Security Council, keep all this within their field of vision and shall promptly address it after Kuwait's sovereignty has been restored.

Those are the thoughts, George, that I wanted to share with you at this no easy time. I think that in Paris we will have an opportunity to have a more detailed conversation.

Sincerely,

M.GORBACHEV

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008450
RECEIVED: 23 OCT 90 18

2

TO: MONTGOMERY, G V

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 07 NOV 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY
SAUDI ARABIA
CO
IRAQ
PERSIAN GULF
WH REFERRAL

PERSONS: MONTGOMERY, G V

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO LTR RE USE OF RESERVE FORCES IN GULF

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH DUE DATE: 26 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAYDEN LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
WH STRIPPING DESK		HAYDEN
		KANTER
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE 11/8 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSDAI DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9008450

REFERRAL

DATE: 08 NOV 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: MONTGOMERY, G V

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 07 NOV 90

SUBJ: RESPONSE TO LTR RE USE OF RESERVE FORCES IN GULF

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUEDATE: 08 NOV 90

COMMENT:

FOR GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 7, 1990

Dear Sonny:

Thank you for your candid advice on the question of Guard and Reserve combat units in the Gulf. I always stop to reflect when you tell me we are coming down on different sides of an issue.

As you point out, our Total Force Policy was developed to deal with a major war with the Soviets and in such a conflict we would have needed and immediately activated round-out units. Our immediate combat needs in the Gulf could be met by active forces, however, so we did not call-up reserve combat elements. If our need for forces or the length of our stay in the Gulf overtaxes our active component, I will not hesitate to call on Guard and Reserve combat units. My new authority to activate these forces for up to 360 days will help ensure that they will be fully prepared and fully utilized.

I very much appreciated the sense in your letter that we have entered a new era in our defense policy. In this new era we must significantly restructure our armed forces and such a restructuring will affect the reserves. I will need your support and special expertise to ensure that we respond to new realities while preserving the still important contributions of reserve forces.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Gillespie V. Montgomery
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
8450
11-7-90

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 2, 1990

90 NOV -2 PM 6:1
Revised - 11-7-90

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Response to Congressman Montgomery on the Use of Reserve Forces

Purpose

To respond to Sonny Montgomery's recommendation that you activate Guard and Reserve combat units for Desert Shield.

Background

Congressman Montgomery has sent you a letter covering a White Paper he recently released with Les Aspin and Beverly Byron on "Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Reserve Components: Missing Lessons for a Future Force Structure." The letter and paper argue we should use Desert Shield to test the readiness and effectiveness of reserve combat units and thereby judge whether or not our current Total Force Policy should be sustained in a new era.

Dick Cheney and Colin Powell have argued -- with substantial justification -- that reserve combat units would consume much of their 180 days of active duty in training and in transit to and from the Gulf. This is a strong argument, although we would find work-arounds if our manpower needs demanded it. Beyond this, however, is the more fundamental question of why we would choose to put part-time soldiers in harm's way as long as we have an ample number of professionals available.

The future of reserve forces will be the most politically sensitive issue we will face as we restructure the armed forces. Montgomery is right when he says that the end of the Cold War calls into question our entire Total Force Policy. Although there is no need to take on this larger issue now, we will need Montgomery's support when we do tackle it. Our proposed response -- in addition to supporting current policy in the Gulf -- shows you are sensitive to this larger question and solicits Montgomery's help in dealing with it.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed letter to Sonny Montgomery at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Letter to Congressman Montgomery
Tab B Letter from Congressman Montgomery

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
2184 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-5031

COMMITTEES:
VETERANS' AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN
ARMED SERVICES

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT:
ANDRE CLEMANDOT

G.V. "SONNY" MONTGOMERY
3D DISTRICT, MISSISSIPPI

DISTRICT OFFICES:
FEDERAL BUILDING
MERIDIAN, MS 39301
(601) 693-6681

GOLDEN TRIANGLE AIRPORT
COLUMBUS, MS 39701
(601) 327-2766

FEDERAL BUILDING
LAUREL, MS 39440
(601) 649-1231

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

October 18, 1990

Honorable George Bush
The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Les Aspin, Beverly Byron and I released a White Paper this week entitled "Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Reserve Components: Missing Lessons of a future Force Structure". It's a review of the Pentagon's decision to limit the use of the National Guard and Reserves to only support units and not combat units.

This paper is worthy of your time to read. Secretary Cheney and General Powell are wrong in not using the combat elements of the Guard and Reserve. For the past twenty years, the "Total Force Policy" has worked and worked well. During this time the Congress and the Administration have put considerable resources into the Guard and Reserve. With declining defense budgets, the Guard and Reserve is a lower cost alternative to active-duty forces. However, they are only a lower cost alternative if they are used.

Mr. President, I urge you to change this policy decision on the use of combat elements of the Guard and Reserve. This is a unique opportunity to establish the principle of a viable Guard and Reserve within the future organization of our armed forces.

I commend this paper to your review. As always, thanks for your attention.

Sincerely,

Gillespie V. Montgomery

GILLESPIE V. MONTGOMERY
Member of Congress

GVM:ahb

Mr President Just glance at it — We are right —

Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Reserve Components: Missing Lessons for a Future Force Structure

by

Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman
Committee on Armed Services

and

Rep. Beverly Byron, Chairwoman
Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation

and

Rep. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Chairman
Committee on Veterans' Affairs

October 15, 1990

I. INTRODUCTION

The country is just beginning a great debate on the makeup of its military forces for the future. Central to that debate is the role of the reserves, particularly in the Army. While the debate is growing more impassioned, it is not growing better informed.

For the last 17 years, the armed forces of the United States have been organized under the Total Force concept which would integrate active and reserve components in time of hostilities. It was aimed chiefly at an engagement in Europe of the dimensions of the epic struggle of World War II. This Total Force concept has never been tested.

Operation Desert Shield, mounted in response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, offers the opportunity to test this concept on which the nation has spent tens of billions of defense dollars. So far, the Department of Defense has called up relatively small numbers of combat support and combat service support units from the reserve components, but no combat units. The opportunity for a test of the Total Force policy has been largely ignored.

II. HISTORY OF THE TOTAL FORCE

The Total Force concept was first articulated by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970. The Total Force policy was formally adopted in 1973 under Secretary James Schlesinger. It has governed the organization of the Armed Forces of the United States ever since.

Two tenets have governed the policy: plan for the integrated use of all available forces — active, reserve, civilian and allied — and the use of reserve forces, rather than the draft, as the primary augmentation for the active forces. The objective of the policy was, and is today, to provide the maximum military capability within fiscal constraints by integrating the capabilities and strengths of active and reserve units in the most cost effective manner.

Over the past decade, this nation has invested substantial resources in upgrading the caliber of the reserves and ensuring the overall viability of the Total Force. Since 1984 the Congress has provided in excess of $26 billion for procurement of equipment for the National Guard and the reserves. Congress has approved a comprehensive package of educational benefits and other incentives to attract and retain high quality young men and women in the reserve components. Reserve and National Guard units are now receiving top of the line equipment. Opportunities for realistic training have been greatly enhanced. By the sustained level of resources provided the reserves, Congress has clearly demonstrated its strong commitment to the Total Force and the place of the reserve components in it.

III. OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

Operation Desert Shield has provided the first occasion to observe and evaluate a large scale operational deployment of forces constructed after the adoption of the Total Force policy. The Department of Defense had a unique opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Total Force policy by including combat units of the reserve components. To date, it has chosen not to do so.

The major events leading to Operation Desert Shield are well known. Iraqi troops crossed the border of Kuwait during the morning of August 2, 1990, and on August 3 were on the border of Saudi Arabia. In response, the President committed the aircraft carriers *USS Independence* and *USS Eisenhower* to the area. On August 7, the U.N. Security Council voted 13-0 to impose a sweeping embargo on trade with Iraq. On August 8, following consultations between Defense Secretary Cheney and Saudi Arabia's King Fahd, the President announced that he had ordered U.S. military aircraft and troops to Saudi Arabia. In response to the President's order, Army, Air Force and additional Navy and Marine forces were alerted on August 8, and began to deploy to the Persian Gulf. By August 9, U.S. ground and air forces had begun to arrive in Saudi Arabia.

IV. USE OF RESERVE COMPONENTS

On August 22, based on an executive order of President Bush, the Secretary of Defense authorized the involuntary ordering to active duty of approximately 50,000 reservists under section 673b of Title 10, US Code. This statute authorizes the President, without a declaration of national emergency, to order up to 200,000 reservists to active duty at any one time for a period of up to 90 days, with a possible extension of an additional 90 days.

Secretary of Defense Cheney authorized the following call-up:

- o Army. No more than 25,000 members of the Army National Guard and the Army reserve, limited to providing "combat supportand combat service support."
- o Navy. No more than 6,300 members of the Naval selected reserve.
- o Marine Corps. No more than 3,000 members of the Marine Corps reserve.
- o Air Force. No more than 14,500 members of the Air National Guard and the Air Force reserve.

The President also authorized the call to active duty of up to 1,250 members of the Coast Guard reserve.

The Air Force reserve and Air National Guard units that have been ordered to active duty include strategic and tactical airlift units, communications, medical and other support personnel.

Navy reserve units ordered to active duty include mine sweepers, cargo handling and construction units, and medical personnel to augment and replace the active duty medical personnel deployed into the theater.

To date no Marine reservists have been called to active duty, although a number of Marine reservists have volunteered for service.

The Army called Army National Guard and Army reserve combat support and combat service support units, predominantly supply, maintenance, transportation, military police and medical, to augment and support active forces.

Of the 11 active Army divisions in the continental United States before Desert Shield began, all but three require the addition of mobilized reserve component battalions or brigades to bring them to full strength. The three not requiring roundout are the 82nd Airborne, 101st Air (Airmobile), and 7th Infantry Divisions, units that comprise the Army's immediate reaction forces for contingencies. The remainder of the forces based in the continental United States which would be used to reinforce the immediately deploying force in a contingency operation, or to reinforce forward-deployed forces in a larger operation, is based on a significant portion of the combat forces in the reserve components.

For Operation Desert Shield, in response to requirements from Central Command, the Army chose to use the 82nd Airborne, 101st Airborne, 24th Mechanized Division, 1st Cavalry Division, and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. In addition to the active units of the 1st Corps Support Command and other active combat support and combat service support units, the Army did, following the Presidential order, activate a number of reserve component combat support and combat service support units required to back up the force to be deployed.

The Department of Defense has not, at this point, chosen to activate the roundout combat brigades for the 24th Mechanized Division and the 1st Cavalry Division. The 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of the Georgia Army National Guard, is normally the roundout to the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). Instead of ordering the Georgia brigade to active duty, the Army decided to move a separate active Army mechanized infantry brigade - the 197th, stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia--to serve as the 24th Division's third brigade in Saudi Arabia.

The 1st Cavalry Division, preparing for deployment to Saudi Arabia, has a similar roundout brigade in the Army National Guard, the 155th Armored Brigade from Mississippi; however, the Department of Defense elected to use a brigade of the 2nd Armored Division from Fort Hood, Texas, to round out the 1st Cavalry Division. The brigade of the 2nd Armored Division was preparing for September exercises at the National Training Center, after which it was scheduled to return to Fort Hood for inactivation as a part of the Army's FY91 force reduction.

The Department of Defense has also chosen not to activate fighter squadrons from the Air Force reserve or the Air National Guard — units which have frequently demonstrated their proficiency in competition with active units — to reinforce the active combat squadrons deployed in the Persian Gulf.

V. RATIONALE FOR DESERT SHIELD CALL-UP POLICY

The advantages and disadvantages of active and reserve component units — of any service, not just the Army — are well-known. Generally, active units cost more than reserve units — although the cost savings can vary widely, depending on the type of unit, the equipment used, and how many full-time support personnel are attached to a reserve unit. Reserve units are cheaper to maintain, but only to the extent that they are usable when called upon. Generally, active units also can respond to contingencies more quickly; do not have their availability contingent on the politically sensitive decision to mobilize; and may contain more individual and unit expertise — although this, too, can vary — witness the performance of combat units of the Air Force reserve and Air National Guard, previously cited.

The major reason given for not calling the roundout combat units was that additional training would be required before the Army National Guard brigades could be deployed — training that would slow their deployment. Because of the limitation on the President's authority to call the reserves to 90 days plus a 90 day extension, any reserve call up would be limited to 180 days — meaning the reservists would no sooner be trained and sent to Saudi Arabia than they would have to be flown back for demobilization. The reserve combat units, this reasoning says, would be of limited utility in this contingency operation because of the short time that they would be available.

VI. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

Concerns about length of training time are not sufficiently supported to justify failure to call up reserve component combat units.

How long might be required to trainup the reserve combat units is debatable. The Army National Guard roundout brigades are supposed to be trained and ready so that they can be mobilized and begin deployment in a relatively short period of time — in the case of the 48th Mechanized Brigade within 30 days from the time they are mobilized. Similar readiness requirements apply to Air Force reserve and Air National Guard units.

The 180-day limit (90 plus 90) is not a bar to calling up combat units because the period can be lengthened by presidential action.

Authority is available to the President to call the reserves for longer than six months. He would only have to declare a national emergency— as was done to impound Kuwaiti assets in this country — to extend the call-up.

The announced reserve mobilization of even the support units appears to be quite small in comparison to the overall size of forces deployed.

The reported size of the Marine Corps deployment for Operation Desert Shield is up to 65,000 Marines or almost one-third of the entire active Marine Corps. The 3,000 Marine Reservists authorized for callup appears quite small — and, as a practical matter no Marine Corps Reservists have been ordered to active duty. Even the 25,000 Army reserve and National Guard personnel authorized for call up seems small in relation to the large Army forces being deployed to Saudi Arabia and the resulting reduction in forces remaining in the United States either for other contingencies or for future use in Desert Shield.

Failure to make greater use of reserve units may send a negative and unintended message about their overall place in the Total Force.

The men and women in our National Guard and reserve units work hard to serve their country. The suggestion, unintended or not, that their work is neither fully appreciated or really needed in time of hostilities would have a disastrous influence on morale and performance. The failure to make greater use of reserve units in this crisis raises the broader question of when — and even whether — they would be used in the future.

In Operation Desert Shield, the Department of Defense has had a unique opportunity to test the reserve system — including combat, combat support, and combat service support units — as a part of the Total Force. To this point the pentagon has chosen not to do so.

At the same time, a major debate has begun over the reserve components. Those who favor use of the reserves argue they are ready to execute their mission. Those who oppose it argue that they would need 60 to 90 days of additional training before they could be deployed in Operation Desert Shield. Both sides are speculating when real data would be available if more units were called up in a test of the system.

If the reserve component roundout units are not to be used, or are deemed unusable, when a short-notice war appears possible, then the viability of the whole roundout concept may be considered suspect. This would carry profound implications for the organization of the Armed Forces of the United States in the future.

We must know the answers to these questions. The contingency for which the Total Force concept was created — an epic clash of East and West in Europe — has virtually disappeared with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Whether Total Force remains a viable policy for the post-Cold War world is a question that must be answered. The issue before us now is whether the answer will be based on fact or conjecture.

####

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 25, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: MICHAEL HAYDEN

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Congressman Montgomery

Congressman Sonny Montgomery has sent the President a letter covering a White Paper he recently released with Les Aspin and Beverly Byron on "Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Reserve Components: Missing Lessons for a Future Force Structure." The letter, the White Paper, and a handwritten note from Montgomery strongly urge the President to reverse current policy and call up Guard and Reserve combat units.

Even though Montgomery has been a friend of a strong defense for years and his views on reserve forces are deeply felt, our response will have to reject his arguments. We ultimately may have to call on reserve combat units, but we cannot and should not put reserve forces in harms way -- when active units are available --just to test our Total Force Policy. It will also be important to put down a few Presidential markers that we expect reserve forces to be significantly reshaped for a new era.

The proposed Presidential response at Tab A outlines the reasons for our current policy -- but attempts to do so gently -- and in a way that might enlist Congressman Montgomery's support in reshaping the Total Force.

Concurrences by: Don Pilling, Richard Haass and Virginia Lampley

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo at Tab I to the President

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Proposed Memo to the President
Tab A Proposed Letter to Congressman Montgomery
Tab B Letter from Congressman Montgomery

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 10/23/90

TO: NSC

FROM: **JAMES W. CICCONI**
Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Chief of Staff

☐ **Information**

☒ **Action**

☐ **Let's Discuss**

Please draft a reply for the President's signature ASAP.

cc: MCCLURE

URGENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP HAYDEN RECEIVED Pilling 90 OCT 23 P6:52

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 8450

ACTION OFFICER: LAMPLEY DUE: ASAP

- ☐ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates
- ☒ Appropriate Action
- ☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi
- ☐ Prepare Memo for Sittmann
- ☐ Prepare Memo _____ to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

*PHONE** to action officer at ext. x3055

	FYI		FYI		FYI
☐	☐ Barth	☐	☐ Johnson	☐	☐ Pryce
☐	☐ Basora	☐	☐ Kaeuper	☐	☐ Rademaker
☐	☐ Beers	☐	☐ Kanter	☐	☐ Rice
☐	☐ Blackwill	☐	☐ Kitchen	☐	☐ Rodman
☐	☐ Broome	☐	☐ LaMagna	☐	☐ Rostow
☐	☐ Burns	☒	☐ Lampley	☐	☐ Salvetti
☐	☐ Chamberlin	☐	☐ Levin	☐	☐ Tilley
☐	☐ Charles	☐	☐ Lundsager	☐	☐ Tobey
☐	☐ Coulson	☐	☐ Mandel	☐	☒ Van Eron
☐	☐ Davis	☐	☐ Melby	☐	☐ Watson
☐	☐ Deal	☐	☐ Menan	☐	☐ Welch
☐	☐ Dorminey	☐	☐ Merchant	☐	☐ Whitley
☐	☐ Dyke	☐	☐ Miller	☐	☐ Wilson
☐	☐ Fry	☐	☐ Needels	☐	☐ Working
☐	☐ Gaughan	☐	☐ O'Leary	☐	☐ Zelikow
☐	☐ Gordon	☐	☐ Ordway	☒	UHL
☒	☐ Haass	☐	☐ Paal	☐	☐ _____
☐	☒ Hayden	☐	☐ Pacelli	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Hutchings	☐	☒ Pilling	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Jackson	☐	☐ Popadiuk	☐	☐ _____

INFORMATION
- ☐ Sittmann
- ☐ Scowcroft (advance)
- ☐ Deputy Exec. Sec.
- ☐ Gates (advance)
- ☐ Exec. Sec. Desk
- ☒ Secretariat

COMMENTS

CRW#:

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90 NOV -7 PM 4:42

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman Montgomery:

Thank you for your candid advice on the question of Guard and Reserve combat units in the Gulf. I always stop to reflect when we come down on different sides of an issue.

As you point out, our Total Force Policy was developed to deal with a major war with the Soviets and in such a conflict we would have needed and immediately activated round-out units. Since our current combat needs in the Gulf can be met by active forces, however, we have not called-up reserve combat units. I believe this is the right course for now and consistent with the philosophy behind the Total Force. Be assured however, that if our need for forces or the length of our stay in the Gulf overtaxes our active component, I will not hesitate to call on Guard and Reserve combat units.

I very much appreciated the sense in your letter that we have entered a new era in our defense policy. In this new era we must significantly restructure our armed forces and such a restructuring will affect the reserve components. I will need your support and special expertise to ensure that we respond to new realities while pr[illegible] still important contributions of [illegible] forces.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Gillespie V. Montgo
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

~~Ron~~ — Mike

(1) This should be Dear Sonny"

(2) This draft [illegible] dated [illegible] used since Congress [illegible] a provision limiting 180 day call-up. New word is [illegible] do what he suggest. Revise?

[illegible]
-tm

National Security Council
The White House

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Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	WEA 11/7	D N
NSC Secretariat	3	DAH 11/8	D

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COMMENTS

DATE: 11-7-90 ?

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Bob Gates			
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Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	6	EA 11/7	DN
NSC Secretariat			

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National Security Council — reserve forces
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Ken Hill	1	KWH	A
Bill Sittmann	2	W	
Bob Gates	3	8	
Brent Scowcroft	4	✓	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
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NSC Secretariat			

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	✓	
Bill Sittmann	2	—	
Bob Gates	3	✓	
Brent Scowcroft	4	✓	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	LMS 11/6	N
NSC Secretariat			
Hayden	6	✓	FYA (See note below)

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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

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COMMENTS

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