

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91144
Folder ID Number: 91144-007

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with Israeli Ambassador Zalman Shoval, Wednesday, October 24, 9:30 a.m. (1 pp.)	10/23/90	(b)(1)	S
02. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with King Fahd (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversations with President Mubarak (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04a. List	Re: European Steering Group [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	10/26/90	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
04b. Handwritten Note	Re: If we could... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04c. Memo	Philip Zelikow to Robert Gates Re: Your Meeting of the European Strategy Steering Group on Monday, October 29, from 3:00 to 5:00 pm (7 pp.)	10/26/90	(b)(1)	S
05a. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for Calls to Kohl and Lubbers (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
05b. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points for Call to Andreotti (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1204
OA/ID Number: 91144-007
Date Closed: 6/25/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05c. Talking Points	Re: Talking points for calls to Thatcher, Mitterrand, & Andreotti (1 pp.)	10/26	(b)(1)	C
06a. Letter	President Bush to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu Re: I enjoyed meeting with you in New York... (2 pp.)	10/26/90	(b)(1)	
06b. Letter	President Bush to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu Re: I enjoyed meeting with you in New York... (2 pp.)	10/26/90	(b)(1)	
06c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister Kaifu (1 pp.)	10/25/90	(b)(1)	C
06d. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister Kaifu (1 pp.)	10/25/90	(b)(1)	C
06e. Letter	Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu to President Bush (2 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(1)	
06f. Memo	From Karl D. Jackson to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Presidential Reply to Prime Minister Kaifu's Letter of October 18 [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	10/23/90	(b)(1)	C
07. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak (2 pp.)	10/25/90	(b)(1)	C
08a. Outline	Re: Meeting with Vatican Secretary of State Agostino Cardinal Casaroli (2 pp.)	10/30/90	(b)(1)	C
08b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Cardinal Casaroli (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Page 2 of 3

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08c. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	10/15/90	(b)(1)	S
08d. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	8/16/90	(b)(1)	C
08e. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Meeting with Vatican Secretary of State Agostino Cardinal Casaroli (1 pp.)	10/29/90	(b)(1)	S
09a. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Points for Telephone Call to Turkish President Ozal on a Presidential Visit to Turkey (1 pp.)	10/30/90	(b)(1)	C
09b. Talking Points	Re: Telephone Conversation with Turgut Ozal Points To Be Made (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Page 3 of 3

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Date Closed: 6/25/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008449
RECEIVED: 23 OCT 90 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 23 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL
UN

ANSA



PERSONS: SHOVAL, ZALMAN

SUBJECT: SCOWCROFT MTG W/ ISRAELI AMB SHOVAL ON 24 OCT

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 26 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAASS
NSC CHRON
WELCH

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 6/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: LMS LOG # 8449
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MSA/O

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
WED Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>has copy</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>has copy</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>APNSA Has Seen</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>7.19.25</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>PRM 10/24</u>	<u>N/R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action	<u>I = Information</u>	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8449

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 23, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Israeli Ambassador Zalman
Shoval, Wednesday, October 24, 9:30 a.m.

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Shoval, a Likudnik, hopes to play a more prominent role in U.S.-Israel relations than his predecessor, who found it tough to reconcile his position here with divided politics at home and in his own mission. Your basic message should be to welcome the opportunity for regular dialogue with Shoval, noting your good personal relationship with Moshe Arad, and to encourage him to stay in touch with us. It would be worthwhile to mention forthrightly U.S.-Israeli tensions, which too often are public, and suggest that mutual, private effort can help.

We will give you an update on the situation in the Security Council (i.e., the Secretary General's mission) before the meeting. Shoval will probably have received a readout of Bill Brown's meeting with Shamir, where he presented the President's letter. Israel is sticking to its negative position on the mission, despite the President's appeal. We think candor is essential on this issue: the Israeli turndown will only escalate the issue at the United Nations; we have a shared longterm strategic stake in keeping Iraq, not Israel, on the griddle; and, Israel's posture has forced a situation where we face a choice we could have avoided between protecting an anti-Iraqi consensus or Israel in the Security Council. Shoval will respond with arguments about Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, the unbalanced nature of UNSCR 672, and the unfairness of the United Nations, but our bottom line should be that it is Israel that elected to escalate the issue and highlight these factors. Most of all, Shoval should understand how we perceive our stakes and that we expect Israel to show some appreciation and adjust its behavior accordingly.

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0837-MR

mm 9/19/2016

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008489
RECEIVED: 24 OCT 90 19

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: MELBY
DEAL

DOC DATE: 25 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: OIL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 27 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MELBY

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MELBY

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8489

October 25, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL 

FROM: ERIC MELBY 

SUBJECT: Strategic Petroleum Reserve


Nat'l Sec Advisor
has seen

At Tab I is a memo from Secretary Watkins informing you that DOE believes that the supply/demand situation for November/December is likely to be satisfactory and that the SPR drawdown option should be put on the back burner.

The key element governing the behavior of oil companies and traders remains perceptions of possible political and military developments in the Persian Gulf. We will continue working closely with State and DOE to ensure we are ready to respond on the energy front should the supply situation deteriorate.

Attachment

Tab I Memo from Watkins



The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

October 23, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN H. SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE

Brent:

The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you that we seem to have weathered the Iraqi-caused crude oil storm during the most critical transition months of September and October. It now appears that new production coming on line combined with energy restraint measures in effect within IEA nations have been sufficiently successful to place the SPR drawdown on the "back burner" once again -- barring, of course, unforeseen events which would disrupt a very tight world-wide petroleum system. As a result, projected availability of crude oil stock for delivery to market in November/December now seems to be assured.

I appreciate the assistance you have provided as we moved through this period of tight oil supplies. If, at a later date, I feel that the world oil supply situation warrants reconsideration, I will keep you advised.


James D. Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Strategic Petroleum Reserve

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: ME

LOG # 8489

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 24 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	<u>1</u>	<u>EA</u>	<u>I</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>	<u>NOTED</u>	<u>10/29</u>
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008552
RECEIVED: 26 OCT 90 19

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 25 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA

TELCALL

PERSONS: FAHD

SUBJECT: TELCALL TO KING FAHD / POINTS TO BE MADE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 30 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES

HAASS

NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cag NARA, Date 6/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

POINTS TO BE MADE
FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
KING FAHD

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0837-MR
mm 9/19/2016

- It was very good to hear your strong public statement reaffirming that your policy toward Iraq has not changed.
- There can be no flexibility in our objective for a complete and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Saddam cannot be rewarded for his aggression. To do so would set a terrible precedent for other aggressors with similar territorial ambitions.
- We don't object to territorial claims and the other issues that Iraq and Kuwait had tabled before Iraq's invasion being addressed ~~as part of an overall settlement~~ -- but only after Iraqi forces have withdrawn and Kuwait's legitimate government is restored. There can be no deals; to do so would undermine much of what we want to achieve.
- After all our efforts, we cannot afford to have rifts occur in the international coalition against Saddam on the objectives laid out in the UN Security Council resolutions.
- General Powell will be briefing me later this week after he returns from your country. Again, I appreciate all the support we are getting in the Kingdom.
- It is important that we continue our military build-up by getting the rest of the U.S. forces, as well as the Egyptian and Syrian troops there as soon as possible.

HA -- I plan to send Jim Baker ~~and~~ out there early next month to consult with you and the other principal members of our coalition about next steps.

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

coalition

about

-- I spoke with our good friend Ozal yesterday about his trip to the Gulf, and he told me that we are all on the same wavelength. I think he is still concerned about the economic impact of the sanctions, particularly on their oil supply, and would appreciate whatever help you can provide.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008591
RECEIVED: 29 OCT 90 19

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 25 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT

TELCALL

2

PERSONS: MUBARAK, HOSNI

SUBJECT: POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELCALL TO PRES MUBARAK OF EGYPT

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 01 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES

HAASS

NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8591

POINTS TO BE MADE
FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT MUBARAK

-- Hosni, I hear you've been traveling to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. I wanted to get your sense of how things are going and how your trip went. (U)

-- Let me just report to you that we have made some progress here on the FMS debt cancellation. Last night, the Senate passed their version of the Foreign Aid bill, with a provision for the cancellation; the next stage is a

conference committee to reach a compromise with the House. *that, in the end,*
(U)
We still have some hard fighting to do, but in the end I think the prognosis is good. We should get what we want, and i.e., the ability to cancel the FMS debt as I told you we would. (U)
hopeful we will get what we need,

-- On the Gulf crisis, I see a lot of maneuvering by Saddam but apparently no change in the substance of his position that Kuwait is part of Iraq. (U)

-- He's trying to split the international consensus by giving out hostages like candy, but I don't think it will work. (U)

-- I understand you will be seeing Primakov. I wanted you to know that I had a very tough talk with him and sent a candid message to Gorbachev afterwards. (U)

-- I told them that going to Saddam with proposals that suggest *would be prepared to* what we ~~could~~ do after withdrawal would violate the basic principle of unconditionality. (U)

-- Saddam could ~~present~~ *such as* a "face-saving" approach as a reward, and thus profit from the invasion. (U)

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2010-0837-MR
MM 9/19/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- I think you and I agree that Saddam will only get the message if we are firm and united against him. Aggression must not be seen to pay. I feel confident that the Soviet government understands, also. *th (C)*
- *I am planning to send Jim Baker out early next month to discuss with you, King Fahd, and the other principals in the coalition our thoughts about next steps.*

(C)

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008535
RECEIVED: 26 OCT 90 15

TO: GATES

CHRON FILE

FROM: ZELIKOW

DOC DATE: 26 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

EC

PERSONS:



SUBJECT: GATES MTG OF EUROPEON STRATEGY STEERING GRP ON 29 OCT

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 30 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR INFO

GOMPERT

KANTER

NSC CHRON

ZELIKOW

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTAS

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 8535

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>2</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
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90 DEC 4 A 9: 41

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. List	Re: European Steering Group [50 U.S.C. 403g, Sec. 6] [Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.)	10/26/90	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [2]

Date Closed: 6/25/2009	OA/ID Number: 91144-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

EUROPEAN STEERING GROUP
MONDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1990
3:00PM - 5:00PM
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE

Andy Card (Invited)
Robert Gates

OVP

Carnes Lord

NSC

David Gompert
Arnold Kanter
Philip Zelikow

STATE

Robert Zoellick
Reginald Bartholomew
Raymond Seitz
Dennis Ross

DOD

Stephen Hadley
J.D. Crouch

JCS

Howard Graves
John Sewall

CIA

Richard Kerr

(b)(3) USC 50, 403g, Sec 6.

ACDA

Ronald Lehman

(b)(6)

If we could find some place
like Monrovia to hold CSBM talks,
the agenda would become much less
ambitious.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8535

October 26, 1990

INFORMATION

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT/ARNOLD KANTER *PK* *AK*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting of the European Strategy Steering
Group on Monday, October 29, from 3:00 to 5:00 pm

There are two broad subjects for this meeting: the NATO strategy review and the upcoming CSCE Summit. We have already sent you a copy of the agenda that was sent out. The agenda is substantial. If you are unable to get through these issues on Monday, you may wish to set up a follow-up meeting, probably on Wednesday, to finish the work.

NATO Strategy Review

NATO has decided to split this review into two tracks: a 'political' track at 16 to consider NATO's overall mission and position in Europe, run directly by the NAC with French participation; and a 'military' track to draw up the doctrines which will replace flexible response and forward defense, run by ASYG Michael Legge in a 'Strategy Review Group,' without the French. In addition, NATO's Military Committee is developing the operational concepts which would implement the new strategy.

Legge's group is already producing papers -- still pretty anodyne so far. Meanwhile the NAC has begun a series of "brainstorming" sessions to discuss essential political topics. To play our customary leadership role on substance and avoid too much free-lancing, the USG needs soon -- starting with your meeting on Monday -- to begin defining its position on central issues.

Initial guidance for the Legge group, developed in a group chaired by Steve Hadley, has already been sent and breaks no new ground. We are concerned that further development of our position is not progressing quickly. At the end of your discussion of the political track of the NATO strategy review, you might turn to Steve Hadley for a status report on the military track. Some key questions to push OSD are provided later.

Several meetings on the political track of NATO's strategy review

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Declassify on: OADR

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MM 2/24/2015

have already been held, chaired by Ray Seitz and Jim Dobbins. The product is the paper attached to the package providing the agenda for this meeting, which you have already received, at Tab I. An essential element of this paper is its definition of NATO's core security functions, at the bottom of page 1. **We suggest you open the discussion by obtaining agreement on this definition of NATO's core security functions.**

You should then seek agreement on the following objectives for the political track of the NATO Strategy Review:

- Sustaining the vitality of the Alliance in the new Europe as a basis for the continued American military presence on the continent, and the engagement in European politics that comes with that presence.
- Winning Allied agreement on the scope and role of NATO in addressing the security concerns of its member states.
- Expanding this consensus to include France if this can be done without impairing our achievement of the first objective.
- Using this consensus to head off the push for major European defense institutions outside of the Alliance.

You should then address a series of issues which are presented by the State paper and in previous interagency discussions, as follows:

1. Is the US prepared to support changes in the command structure of NATO forces to reflect an increasing European role and adjust to political changes in Germany and Europe?

You need not have a prolonged discussion of this issue. We want to keep substantial nuclear and conventional forces based in a more unified and assertive Europe for the foreseeable future. We need to arrange NATO's organization, and the setup for foreign troops in Germany, in a way that will adapt to change and can command European and German support for years to come. There is no doubt that the introduction of multinational corps made up of national units will need to be accompanied by adjustments in NATO's command structure. JCS may wish to talk about their current plans.

Desired outcome/tasking: The answer to question #1 should be yes, if the revised command structure stays inside the Alliance. You should ask OSD, on their own, to look into the possibilities.

2. Is the US prepared to accept a 'European caucus' within NATO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

Costs/benefits
models
security

to accommodate the growing harmonization of European views on security issues?

The Europeans (read - EC members) have agreed to seek political union, accompanied by a more common foreign and security policy. The EPC process already closely coordinates EC foreign policy on a number of issues, including the future of European arms control and the CSCE. The EC will run into many obstacles, of course, in trying to realize the goal of political union by 1993 or 1994. But a nascent European 'caucus', largely within the EC framework, on issues of interest to NATO is already a reality and its scope is likely to grow. This caucusing is a byproduct, if nothing else, simply of the fact that European foreign ministers and top officials tend to confer at least twice each month --while we meet with them twice a year.

On the issue of a European caucus, the State paper (pp. 4-5) tends to treat this too formally, in describing "a European form within the Alliance" with a given membership, etc.

Desired outcome/tasking: You could probably get your group to agree that a de facto European caucus is likely to become a reality and that we should accept this without theological denunciations, but without inviting the creation of some formal structure. We should look instead for informal ways to persuade the Europeans to work their views on Alliance issues within the Alliance, and not just present them as faits accomplis. You could ask State to draw up an appropriate formulation in the revision of their paper.

What is the purpose of the caucus?

3. Is the US prepared to promote or even propose new institutional arrangements for European defense cooperation, inside or outside of the Alliance framework?

Although European coordination on security policy is already occurring, significant European defense cooperation -- in the sense of a European military structure with a separate staff and assigned forces -- is still far from reality. However, Will Taft has suggested (and already discussed with French, British, and German colleagues) the idea of allowing the WEU to become the entity for such European defense cooperation. Taft supports this because he thinks such a European defense pillar is inevitable, so we should try to steer it into a friendly organization that is organically close to the Alliance.

We think Taft's idea is a bad one. European military cooperation and the construction of a European pillar, or European defense identity, should be accommodated inside the Alliance rather than outside of it. Our past good work with a weak WEU, an organization in NATO's shadow, should not blind us to the

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implications of creating a strong WEU, which does not include Turkey and other European allies, outside the Alliance. If the idea is designed to allow for a greater European voice in Alliance defense, we should accommodate the wish in our answer to issue #1. If the idea is meant to give structure to a separate European defense entity, that is far away and may never materialize.

Desired outcome/tasking: We would like to see any new institutional arrangements stay within the NATO framework. Taft should be instructed to cease and desist.) *study*

4. What should be NATO's role in addressing threats to the vital interests of NATO countries, but not to NATO member territory, that arise outside of the NATO treaty area?

Threats to NATO territory, from whatever quarter, should start be given greater recognition as a core security function of the Alliance, with implications for organization and force planning. This thought is reflected in the second tick on page 1 and in section III of the State paper (pp. 2-3).

For true out-of-area problems, we think NATO should realistically be viewed as a forum for consultation, not for action. This approach is captured by the fifth tick on page 1 and in section IX of the State paper (pp. 9-10) and the last tick of the conclusions on p. 11. This is a subject where EPC is already strong, and the Europeans have chosen to at least nominally coordinate their actions in European structures such as the WEU.

If we look at our own interests, we may also find that although the US often talks of seeking NATO work on out-of-area problems, we really mean only those out-of-area problems where we are prepared to tolerate European partnership. We would probably not, for example, welcome NATO coordination of action to deal with threats to our vital interests in the Western Hemisphere, East Asia, or perhaps even southern Africa. We recommend that you seek endorsement of the general balance described in the State paper.

Desired outcome/tasking: Endorsement of approach in State paper.

5. Should the US and NATO now signal to the new democracies of Eastern Europe NATO's readiness to contemplate their future membership?

All agencies agree that East European governments should not be invited to join NATO anytime in the immediate future. There is general satisfaction with the way the State paper ended up handling the issue of Eastern Europe (pp. 8-9). However, OSD and

State's Policy Planning Staff (and possibly Zoellick) would like to keep the door ajar and not give the East Europeans the impression that NATO is forever a closed club. State's European Bureau and Under Secretary Bartholomew are likely to prefer a more inscrutable pose, simply treating the issue as premature and not on the table, while of course reserving our options as the political situation in Europe evolves. They are deeply skeptical about the ultimate wisdom of extending security guarantees to Eastern Europe since they believe history has shown that the control of these states does not affect our vital interests.

We believe, as the State paper points out, that NATO must recognize the relationship between its vital interests and any Soviet effort to reassert hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe. The group should endorse the strategy toward Eastern Europe described in the State paper. But on NATO membership, even if the issue is just one of tone, we think it is important to avoid any ambiguity in the signals we send. The issue of how to treat Eastern Europe in the military strategy review is even more controversial and delicate, but need not be engaged in this meeting.

Desired outcome/tasking: The State paper's general strategy is endorsed. The specific question above is answered: No. We recommend that you seek agreement to a formulation like this to use in subsequent diplomatic exchanges:

- The United States believes that there is no need to consider the issue of East European membership in NATO in connection with the current NATO strategy review. Nor will we indulge in speculation about what our policy might be under different circumstances in the future.

In addition to the political track of the NATO strategy review, the US is also working on positions to allow us to lead NATO deliberations on new nuclear and conventional military strategies for the Alliance. The nuclear work, mainly in the HLG, is proceeding well. The conventional effort is lagging. You might wish to ask OSD to describe the status of work on the military track and probe them by asking questions like:

1. What are the major planning contingencies for NATO's military strategy, and how do we assess the risks?
2. How do we define 'forward presence' as a replacement for 'forward defense'?
3. Will remaining US forces be structured principally for combat or as bases for reinforcement from CONUS?

4. What should the strategy say about crisis management and the transition to war?

CSCE Summit

A number of policy issues related to the upcoming CSCE Summit have already been resolved, at lower levels, in a CSCE Summit Planning Group chaired by Zelikow. There are two issues, though, that require discussion at your level:

1. What should be the US policy toward the continuation of separate CSBM negotiations among the 34 CSCE countries after the Paris Summit?

A State paper on this subject was tab II in the agenda package. It admits that future CSBM negotiations -- as currently conceived -- seem to hold little or no security advantage for the US. The main purpose of this forum is to find a way to divert the European neutrals and give them a place to play. In order to keep them from doing much harm, State argues they should be further diverted by being allowed to negotiate Open Skies, though not as part of CSCE. State also notes some other useful chores with which to "gainfully employ veteran CSCE negotiators in Vienna," like running the CSCE Center for Prevention of Conflict and military doctrine seminars.

The Open Skies idea is not good, since it may confuse the Open Skies area of application (which includes the continental United States) with the CSCE area -- very much to our detriment. It also would require involving states like Cyprus, The Vatican, San Marino, and others that create new political problems or are unnecessary in negotiating overflights. Our Open Skies Ambassador, John Hawes, agrees.

We think some arms control process at 34 may be needed for political reasons, even if we can find little security justification for it. This train has gathered too much speed to block, even if a dead hand is at the throttle. We should try to come up with some better ideas for its future, if we can, and reserve the option of arms control discussions and agreements at less than 34.

Desired outcome/tasking: Agreement that the State recommendation in their paper is unsatisfactory, and that a new arms control negotiation needs a better sense of purpose. NSC would be asked to direct preparation of some alternative ideas.

2. Should the US seek to develop substantive ideas on CSCE mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes for the

Paris Summit, either generally or for the specific case of Yugoslavia?

There is currently a debate in Vienna about what language should appear in the Summit document on how the CSCE can aid in the peaceful settlement of disputes. The UK has a substantive proposal, the Benelux countries, the European neutrals (including Yugoslavia) have a third, and the Soviets have a view as well. Ambassador Maresca's cable was Tab III of the agenda package. The Ambassador's view is that the US does not need to have a substantive view, or become engaged in this debate, because the issue is too hard to try to solve meaningfully in the few weeks before Paris. Instead, he argues, we should allow the CSCE intersessional meeting assigned to this subject (in Valletta in early 1991) tackle the problem.

We disagree. We find it too ironic that the prime function cast for the CSCE in assuring Europe's future stability, the conciliation of disputes, should find no substantive mention at the first CSCE Summit in fifteen years -- taking place as one CSCE state is falling apart and on the verge of civil war. The Valletta results, whatever they are, will attract little notice and may be too little, too late. Parts of the State Department share this concern. A political impulse from your group may be needed, however, to galvanize some action.

Desired outcome/tasking: We recommend that you win the group's agreement that a subgroup, led by State, should promptly analyze the various positions on the table in Vienna and arrive within a week on a US position for a substantive paragraph for the Summit document. We would then try to win support for it. If we fail, we have done no worse than to be back at Maresca's original recommendation. But we might do better. There is, for example, substantial European support for a reference to requiring mandatory participation by countries in a dispute conciliation process, and such a phrase could then form the basis for CSCE action -- at the Summit or later -- on Yugoslavia. We should take a harder look at what is possible on this issue for the Summit.

Concurrences by: Heather Wilson ^{PZ for HW} and Michael Hayden ^{PZ for MH}

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9005820
RECEIVED: 19 JUL 90 11

TO: BARNARD, DOUGLAS

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 26 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: COCOM
IRAQ

EXPORT CONTROLS
NCO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RESPONSES TO REP BARNARD ON IRAQ FURNACES

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD LTR DUE DATE: 23 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BARTH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BARTH
CHARLES
COULSON
DEAL
HAASS
LAMPLEY
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN
ROSTOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRCB

CLOSED BY: NSJWD

DOC 5 OF 5

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1990

Dear Congressman Barnard:

Thank you for your recent letter, regarding the status of export controls for nonproliferation purposes. I regret the delay in responding to your inquiry. However, as you know, the Administration did prevent the proposed export of furnaces to Iraq to which you referred in your letter. The sanctions now in effect would prevent any other shipment of this type.

Regarding related issues addressed in your letter, the Administration has under way a comprehensive review of export controls based on historic East-West national security concerns. As part of that review, we have provided clear guidance to the interagency working teams to maintain and enhance our chemical, biological, nuclear and missile nonproliferation controls. That review will result in fewer controlled goods pursuant to our COCOM agreements. However, whenever warranted by nonproliferation concerns, controls previously based on COCOM agreements will be maintained.

In addition, we have formally requested that our allies carefully evaluate their legal and regulatory mechanisms for maintaining nonproliferation controls. I would also note that we have sent briefing teams to Eastern Europe to ensure that newly emerging democracies in that region do not inadvertently increase proliferation risks. We have followed up those briefings with offers of technical assistance in establishing effective export control systems.

Beyond certain countries posing a special concern, such as Iraq, interagency teams are carefully evaluating the need for enhanced export controls. Because export controls are most effective when applied multilaterally, we will work closely with our allies to ensure the broadest possible application of any new controls.

As we continue to improve our export controls for nonproliferation purposes, it is essential to maintain

flexibility and discretion for the President to manage this important program. I hope we can count on your continued support in meeting these goals.

Sincerely,


Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Doug Barnard, Jr.
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5820
REDO #3

October 22, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

SIGNED

THROUGH: TIMOTHY DEAL *D*
FROM: RICHARD C. BARTH *RB*
SUBJECT: Response to Congressman Barnard on Iraq Furnaces

Congressman Barnard asked that the White House intervene to stop the sale of industrial furnaces to Iraq (Tab II). This shipment was stopped, but because of various legal requirements for confidentiality of the shipper's business affairs, your response (Tab I) is vague on the details of that transaction. Because of delays in responding to Barnard, we have inserted an apology for the lateness of this response.

Congressman Barnard goes on to urge a thorough evaluation of our national security and foreign policy export controls. We had identified this to you as a probable project for this Directorate, and as the COCOM Core List exercise is completed, this will be actively pursued.

Finally, in general terms, we note the interagency efforts underway that will tighten export controls for nonproliferation purposes, and seek to ensure that they are multilateral and preserve the President's discretionary authority. The letter closes by seeking Barnard's support for this effort.

Concurrences by: *bc* Bret Coulson, *DP* Daniel Poneman, *SC* Sandra Charles,
RB Richard Haass, *NR* Nicholas Rostow

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Congressman Barnard (Tab I).

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Congressman Barnard
Tab II Letter from Congressman Barnard

DOUG BARNARD, JR., GEORGIA, CHAIRMAN
JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., SOUTH CAROLINA
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, CALIFORNIA
JOE KOLTER, PENNSYLVANIA
ALBERT G. BUSTAMANTE, TEXAS
HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA

ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
COMMERCE, CONSUMER, AND MONETARY AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE

J. DENNIS HASTERT, ILLINOIS
STEVEN SCHIFF, NEW MEXICO
CHUCK DOUGLAS, NEW HAMPSHIRE
C. CHRISTOPHER COX, CALIFORNIA

MAJORITY—(202) 225-4407
FAX—(202) 225-2441

OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM B-377
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

July 18, 1990

Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.)
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Executive Office of the President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear General Scowcroft:

As you know, the United States, together with its COCOM partners, have recently relaxed export controls on several categories of goods and technology for export to the Warsaw Pact countries and to the Soviet Union. While generally supportive of the need for liberalization of controls, this Subcommittee has also expressed its concern that easing of controls may have the unintended consequence of making it easier for several countries, some of whom are anxious to obtain nuclear technology by "back-door" means, to acquire militarily significant nuclear, biological and missile-related technology and products. One of these countries is Iraq, and it is a shipment to this country which is of immediate concern to this subcommittee.

There have been recent reports ("U.S. Seeks to Block an Export to Iraq," New York Times, July 15, 1990, p. 3, copy enclosed) that licenses have been issued by the Department of Commerce for shipment to Iraq of a category of industrial furnaces that would have been previously barred. According to this report, the Department of Defense believes that these furnaces, together with several other to be supplied by the British, are destined for a major industrial complex located adjacent to an Iraqi missile production facility.


We write now to request that the President intervene immediately to prevent this shipment. This shipment should be stopped immediately unless it is determined that it would not add to Iraq's missile and atomic weapons capabilities. We are concerned that, once again, the United States is put in a position of having to react to circumstances rather than being in a position of anticipating and managing them.

With regard to the larger issue of preventing countries such as Iraq from taking advantage of export control liberalization, we urge you to focus the attention of the Administration on establishing an effective, workable mechanism which can integrate economic, foreign policy, and national security

considerations in establishing and implementing this country's export controls policy. In short, measures must be found to prevent the export of nuclear and missile technology to countries which may use such technology to manufacture weapons which they would not otherwise be able to acquire. As the risk of export of such technology to the Soviet bloc recedes, it is clear that risk is being substituted by one of equal danger emanating from countries such as Iraq. We urge you to deal with this problem without delay.

We are convinced that the Iraqi incident represents only one of many such cases we will face in the future. Last minute, crisis-mode decision making which may have profound consequences for the security of the world is not acceptable when it is predictable that such decision-making will be required.

Sincerely yours,



Doug Barnard, Jr.
Chairman

DB:tjj:jm
Enclosure

cc: Honorable James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State

Honorable Reginald Bartholomew
Department of State

U.S. Seeks to Block an Export to Iraq

By MICHAEL WINES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 14 — Concerned about the growing sophistication of Iraq's military, the Pentagon is leading a last-minute effort to prevent Baghdad from importing industrial furnaces that some experts say could be used to make components for missiles and atomic weapons.

In a letter sent this week, Paul D. Wolfowitz, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, urged the State Department to prohibit the Consarc Corporation of Rancocas, N.J., from shipping the furnaces, in which titanium and other exotic metals can be melted and cast, to a Government installation near the Iraqi capital.

Mr. Wolfowitz's action comes days before a temporary Government ban on the export of the furnaces is set to expire. The sale had Commerce Department approval, but the Customs Service ordered Consarc last month to

delay the shipment for 20 days while officials studied the furnaces's capabilities more closely. That prohibition expires on Tuesday.

List of Prohibited Exports

The Pentagon effort underscores a growing worry of United States officials that a recent easing of controls on high-technology exports, primarily aimed at Eastern European nations, will make it easier for some third-world dictatorships to acquire advanced military components.

Some officials believe that the sale to Iraq could easily have been barred had a category of industrial furnaces similar to the Consarc equipment, once on a list of prohibited exports, not been removed in an agreement with European allies in early June.

Iraq contends that the furnaces will be used primarily to process titanium, a strong, lightweight metal, for use in artificial arms and legs. But United States officials said this week that a re-

view of the furnaces's specifications indicated that they were far more technologically sophisticated than such a purpose would require.

In particular, they said, one device, called an induction skull melting furnace, has state-of-the-art technology found almost nowhere else in the United States or Europe.

"The primary concern is that they can make parts for missiles," said an official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "In tandem, these furnaces give the Iraqis a capacity for a production line much greater than they need for medical prosthetics."

In an interview on Friday, the president of Consarc, Raymond J. Roberts, said that he was "somewhat mystified" by the controversy and that two similar furnaces in the United States and West Germany did not have military uses.

Seeking Advanced Equipment

Iraq's military is making an extensive effort to purchase advanced-technology equipment abroad for its missile and conventional and nuclear weapons programs. The American and British authorities said in April that they had foiled an Iraqi attempt April to use a front company in Britain to buy triggers for nuclear devices.

Mr. Roberts said Consarc had won Commerce Department approval a year ago to sell Iraq three furnaces, including the skull melting furnace, so named because it has a crucible inside it shaped like a skull. Two other furnaces bound for Iraq are now in Britain.

Officials said export applications listed the buyer of the furnaces as the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Minerals, a nonexistent agency. They said the actual destination was a military research complex in the Karbala region of Iraq, just south of Baghdad, which is managed by the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization.

Last month, as the three furnaces were being prepared for shipment near Philadelphia, the Customs Service became concerned that the skull melting furnace had restricted military applications and ordered the shipment held for inspection.

The Commerce Department, which originally approved the export application, declined to comment on the matter on Friday.

N.Y. Times

7/15/90

P. 3

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008537
RECEIVED: 26 OCT 90 16

TO: GATES

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 26 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R
NETHERLANDS

ITALY
TELCON

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT
ANDREOTTI, GIULIO

LUBBERS, RUUD

SUBJECT: TELCON FM PRES TO KOHL / LUBBERS W/ POSSIBLE TELCON TO ANDREOTTI
RE TALKING POINTS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 30 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCOWCROFT

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

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SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	_____	_____	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	1	27.10/26	Log FRD
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
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90 OCT 26 P 2:15

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

West Wing Desk

Pls put in system files.

Cy to R. Haass

SS sent to sales (w/Pres in Calif)
Self Delivered - 1239L 26 OCT 90

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1990

Bob:

Here are the talking points
to be added to the Kohl and
Lubbers phone calls.

In addition, it might be good
to call Andreotti who, as
you know, is currently
President of the EC.

Talkings points are attached.

Brent

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Talking points for Calls to Kohl and Lubbers

- I understand that there is the possibility that this weekend's EC Summit will issue a resolution on the Middle East situation, and possibly call for an international conference.
- As you know, I have long thought such a conference could be constructive if timed and structured properly.
- But now is simply not the time to push for one. It will be interpreted in Baghdad and elsewhere as giving Saddam just what he asked for. We cannot be seen to be rewarding him by linking his aggression against Kuwait and the Israeli-Arab problem. I also see no reason to reward the PLO at a time it is supporting Saddam and working against our common interests.
- In addition, you might want to consider the importance that we not do anything now that might taint or discredit the idea of an international conference. This may be something we want to return to once the current crisis is behind us.
- In short, I hope I can count on you to use your influence to prevent such an EC resolution or statement from surfacing.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0837-MR

MM 9/19/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Talking points for Call to Andreotti

- I wanted to get in touch about two things.
- First, by now you should have my letter on the Uruguay Round. I just want to reiterate my strong hope that real progress can be made on reforming agricultural trade. Without such reform the prospects for the entire Uruguay Round are in jeopardy.
- Second, I wanted to mention the situation in the Gulf. I continue to believe we are succeeding despite Saddam's persistent efforts to change the focus and weaken the coalition against him.
- I understand that there is the possibility that this weekend's EC Summit will issue a resolution on the Middle East situation, and possibly call for an international conference.
- As you know, I have long thought such a conference could be constructive if timed and structured properly.
- But now is simply not the time to push for one. It will be interpreted in Baghdad and elsewhere as giving Saddam just what he asked for. We cannot be seen to be rewarding him by linking his aggression against Kuwait and the Israeli-Arab problem. I also see no reason to reward the PLO at a time it is supporting Saddam and working against our common interests.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0837-MR

MM 9/19/2016

- In addition, you might want to consider the importance that we not do anything now that might taint or discredit the idea of an international conference. This may be something we want to return to once the current crisis is behind us.
- In short, I hope I can count on you to use your influence to prevent such an EC resolution or statement from surfacing.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Richard Haass

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Oct 26

Talking points for Calls to Thatcher, Mitterrand, & Andreotti
(note: can be added to Kohl; for Lubbers, add Middle East only)

--I wanted to get in touch about two things.

--First, by now you should have my letter on the Uruguay Round. I just want to reiterate my strong hope that real progress can be made on reforming agricultural trade. Without such reform the prospects for the entire Uruguay Round are in jeopardy.

--Second, I wanted to mention the situation in the Gulf. I continue to believe we are succeeding despite Saddam's persistent efforts to change the focus and weaken the coalition against him.

--I understand that there is the possibility that this week-end's EC Summit will issue a resolution on the Middle East situation, and possibly call for an international conference.

--As you know, I have long thought such a conference could be constructive if timed and structured properly.

--But now is simply not the time to push for one. It will be interpreted in Baghdad and elsewhere as giving Saddam just what he asked for. We cannot be seen to be rewarding him by linking his aggression against Kuwait and the Israeli-Arab problem. I also see no reason to reward the PLO at a time it is supporting Saddam and working against our common interests.

--In addition, you might want to consider the importance that we not do anything now that might taint or discredit the idea of an international conference. This may be something we want to return to once the current crisis is behind us.

--In short, I hope I can count on you to use your influence to prevent such an EC resolution or statement from surfacing.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0837-112

mm 9/19/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

October 26, 1990

Dear Senator Akaka:

Thank you for your letter of September 26 concerning the Administration's request to sell U.S. military equipment to Saudi Arabia. As you know, that sale was formally notified to Congress on September 27, and since then Administration witnesses have met with congressmen in various settings to explain the rationale for this request.

The Administration has always believed that Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states must share the responsibility for their own defense in the face of any aggression. With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the states of the region clearly were unable to defend themselves against this aggression and, therefore, had to seek U.S. and other foreign military intervention. Such sales, therefore, are an important step in assisting the states of the region to provide for their own defense, thereby reducing the need for U.S. forces to have to respond to regional threats to the degree that we have in Operation Desert Shield.

To bolster Saudi defense capabilities and to allow it to participate credibly in the immediate defense of the Kingdom, we have prepared the package currently pending on the Hill to fill gaps in Saudi air defense, anti-armor, fire support, combat support and command, control and communications capabilities. The items were chosen based on two criteria: 1) that these items were needed and available relatively soon (within 12 months); or 2) there were production line considerations.

I appreciate your strong words of support for the actions we have taken thus far in the Gulf. It is important that we maintain strong unity of purpose among the Congress, the Administration and the American people. I hope I can continue to count on you and your colleagues for that support.

Sincerely,

Cy Burt

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

*The Congressional
letters are
identical. Only
one need be
included*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 26, 1990

90 OCT 26 PM 2:42

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Response to Senators on the Pending Arms Sales Package for Saudi Arabia

SIGNEDPurpose

To reassure Congress of the need to enhance the security and stability of Saudi Arabia by approving the second arms package for Saudi Arabia that included items required for the immediate defense of the Kingdom.

Background

On September 26 Senator Moynihan and 13 of his colleagues wrote you to express their concerns about the Administration's arms sales request for Saudi Arabia (Tab B). Their primary concern is that the items proposed for sale cannot be delivered within the next six months in order to provide for the immediate defense of the Kingdom and, therefore, any decision on such sales ought to be postponed until we have a clearer sense of the post-crisis security environment.

Your response advises the Senators that this arms sales package was prepared by applying two criteria: either that there is an immediate need and immediate availability, or that there are production line considerations that argue for a commitment now. The formal review period for the sale ends on October 26, and, while proposed bills opposing certain items are pending, it appears there will be no serious congressional opposition.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to Senator Moynihan and his colleagues at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Response to Senator Moynihan, et al.
Tab B Letter from Senator Moynihan, et al.

*Fred McChesney concurs.**OK for signature per Jim.**John D. Gardner**10/26/90*

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 18, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: ~~SANDRA~~ CHARLES

SUBJECT: Letter from Senators on Arms Package for Saudi Arabia

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding for his signature a response (Tab A) to a letter from Senator Moynihan and several of his colleagues expressing their concern about the arms sales request for Saudi Arabia (Tab B).

Concurrence by: Virginia Lampley

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Response to Senator Moynihan, et al.
Tab B Letter from Senator Moynihan, et al.

57
Receipt

ID# 178582

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

CD 134

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: SEPTEMBER 28, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN

SUBJECT: URGES THE ADMINISTRATION TO CONSIDER WAITING
FOR 6 MONTHS TO ALLOW ADEQUATE TIME TO WEIGH
CONSEQUENCES OF THE MASSIVE SALE OF ADVANCED
WEAPONRY AND EQUIPMENT TO SAUDIA ARABIA

ACTION		DISPOSITION				
ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE		ORG	90/09/28	FM	A	90/10/03
NSC	REFERRAL NOTE:	R	90/10/05			
99DOD	REFERRAL NOTE:	I	90/10/08			
99DOS	REFERRAL NOTE:	I	90/10/09			
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS: Letters sent to all signers

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 13 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1210 1220

MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

*ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING *
* * * * *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL * OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED * CODE = A *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC * OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * * *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE * * *
*X-INTERIM REPLY * * *

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,EOEB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

October 3, 1990

Dear Senator Moynihan:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President, cosigned by 13 of your colleagues, regarding the possible sale of military equipment to Saudi Arabia.

We appreciate being apprised of your specific concerns and receiving your recommendation that consideration of any such sales be postponed. Please know that I have shared your comments with the President. Additionally, I have taken the liberty of providing your remarks to several of the President's key national security advisors so that they, too, are aware of your concerns.

Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

FDM/SLM/lynn (10FDMG)
Saudi.Sp

bcc: w/copy of inc to NSC -- for direct response
bcc: w/copy of inc to Department of Defense -- FYI
bcc: w/copy of inc to Department of State -- FYI

178 582
8193

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

September 26, 1990

President George Bush
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We applaud the strong steps you have taken to confront Saddam Hussein's illegal aggression in Kuwait and to assist in the defense of Saudi Arabia, and we welcome your efforts to carry out the resolutions of the Security Council concerning this serious crisis.


We understand that the Administration is considering a massive sale of advanced weaponry and equipment to Saudi Arabia. Because most of the weapons involved would not be in Saudi hands for several years it seems clear that the sale has not too much to do with the current crisis.


We believe that the sale of weapons which would not be delivered in the near future should be postponed until its effects on this unstable region have been thoroughly studied by both the Administration and the Congress. This seems especially important given the fact that so much has changed in the world in recent months. For the first time there may be a realistic possibility of limiting the flow of sophisticated weapons to this region. It may be that regional stability and the security of states in the region would be better secured by a reduction rather than a sharp escalation of the volume and sophistication of weapons in the area. Major arms supplying nations -- the Soviet Union, France and others -- may be willing to exercise restraint and cooperate with the United States in limiting sales to this region in a manner which would have been inconceivable even two months ago. It is only prudent to make every effort to explore this possibility before plunging into another round of massive arms sales.

For decades nations outside of the Middle East have stoked the fires of conflict in the region by selling weapons there with little restraint. The results have been ambiguous at best. Massive weapons sales to the Shah of Iran did not preserve his regime; French troops will soon be within range of weapons France sold to Saddam Hussein; weapons we provided to Kuwait are now in Iraqi hands; Saddam Hussein was able to acquire chemical weapons and missiles. We believe that, in light of this history, careful study and thought should precede a proposal to conclude the largest arms sale in history.


We understand the desire to improve Saudi Arabia's defense capabilities in the context of the current crisis and would be willing to consider now the sale of those arms that are both available for delivery in the near future and needed on an urgent basis, as well as items of purely defensive equipment such as systems to deal with the current and future threat of tactical missiles in the region. However, we urge you to refrain from making any proposal including large amounts of offensive weapons which will not be delivered in the near future for at least six months to allow adequate time for both the Administration and the Congress to weigh its potential consequences.

Sincerely,



Daniel Patrick Moynihan



Terry Sanford


Bob Packwood


Larry Pressler


Daniel K. Akaka


Frank R. Lautenberg


Arlen Specter


Claiborne Pell


Paul Simon


Paul S. Sarbanes


John E. Kerry


Brock Adams


Timothy E. Wirth


Edward M. Kennedy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008425
RECEIVED: 23 OCT 90 09

TO: KAIFU, TOSHIKI

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 26 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JAPAN
EGYPT
UN

PERSIAN GULF
TURKEY

PERSONS: KAIFU, TOSHIKI
RAMADHAN

HUSSEIN I

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PM KAIFU OF JAPAN

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 26 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JACKSON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JACKSON
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY MEU DATE 10/29 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSTAS

DOC 3 OF 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9008425

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
002 PRESIDENT
002
003 STATE

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90102319 FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
Z 90102519 FOR SIGNATURE
X 90102712 PRES SGD LTR
X 90102712 FOR DISPATCH

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 6/13/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9008425

REFERRAL

DATE: 29 OCT 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: KAIFU, TOSHIKI

SOURCE: PRESIDENT


DATE: 26 OCT 90

SUBJ: PRES LTR TO PM KAIFU OF JAPAN

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 29 OCT 90

COMMENT: THIS LTR IS UPDATED AND BEING SENT PER CONVERSATION W/ VICKY FUTCHER



FOR

GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

LOG 9008425
DATE 26 OCT 90

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PM KAIFU OF JAPAN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

COPY: ORIGINAL

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC/S, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1990

Dear Toshiki:

I enjoyed meeting with you in New York last month. It is always helpful to review the progress we are making together to achieve our common goals throughout the world.

Thank you for the valuable information on your visit to the Middle East. It is obvious that your conversations with leaders in the region were quite helpful in promoting our common objective of reversing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. I especially appreciate your firmness with Mr. Ramadhan; the points you made to him were right on target. It is important that the Iraqis understand that the major nations of the world stand united in opposition to Saddam Hussein's aggression. I am grateful as well for the strong support you expressed to the leaders of Egypt and Turkey, and for Japan's generous economic assistance to those countries and to Jordan. The political support, tempered by a firm stand on sanctions, was just the right balance in Jordan and closely parallels the message we have been conveying to Amman.

Jordan has made considerable progress on supporting the sanctions, and the stability of Jordan remains a key element in managing the Gulf crisis. Jordan has not received as much assistance as the other front-line states. Immediate international assistance is warranted by economic conditions and will insure continued Jordanian cooperation in our efforts to resolve the current crisis. Assistance to Jordan is an issue on which Japan could play a vital role, and I hope you will consider these points in

deciding what further economic assistance you can offer to Jordan.

I am also urging donors to the front-line states to provide assistance in the form of untied grants rather than credits, in order to avoid adding to the recipients' already overwhelming debt. I hope for Japan's help in making the terms, as well as the fact, of our support attractive to the front-line states.

I understand that the UN Peace Cooperation Bill, which you outlined in New York, has now been submitted to the Diet. This is a courageous and innovative approach which will allow Japan to make a direct and visible contribution to vital multinational peace operations. As I have said on several occasions, I am sure that all of the other participants in the multinational undertaking in the Persian Gulf will welcome the participation envisioned under the Peace Cooperation Bill.

Again, let me state my deep appreciation for Japan's solidarity with us in meeting the requirements of the crisis. I have no doubt that eventually we will have the satisfaction of seeing our principles and actions justified by the attainment of our objectives. I look forward to staying in touch with you as we move closer to our common goal of restoring peace and stability in the Persian Gulf.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Ayaz Bural". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Ayaz" and the last name "Bural" clearly distinguishable.

His Excellency
Toshiki Kaifu
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008425
RECEIVED: 23 OCT 90 09

TO: KAIFU, TOSHIKI

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 26 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JAPAN
EGYPT
UN

PERSIAN GULF
TURKEY

PERSONS: KAIFU, TOSHIKI
RAMADHAN

HUSSEIN I

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PM KAIFU OF JAPAN

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 26 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JACKSON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
JACKSON
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSTAS

DOC 3 OF 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9008425

REFERRAL

DATE: 27 OCT 90

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J

DEPT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: KAIFU, TOSHIKI

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 26 OCT 90

SUBJ: PRES LTR TO PM KAIFU OF JAPAN

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 28 OCT 90

COMMENT:

FOR



GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/15/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE

30 OCT 27 AID: 27

SITUATION ROOM

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

13 of

MESSAGE NO. 1494 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES 2
FROM WILLIAM P. SITTMANN (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES LTR TO PM KAIFU RE PERSIAN GULF
PROMISES: LOG # 8425

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>J. STAPLETON ROY</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	<u> </u>
<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

REMARKS **FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING ** SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW**

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/15/09

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES 2
FROM WILLIAM P. SITTMANN (NAME) _____ (EXTENSION) _____ (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES LTR TO PM KAIFU RE PERSIAN GULF
PROMISES

LOG # 8425

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>J. STAPLETON ROY</u>	<u>EXEC SEC</u>	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS **FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING ** SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW**

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/16/09

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 26, 1990

Dear Toshiki:

I enjoyed meeting with you in New York last month. It is always helpful to review the progress we are making together to achieve our common goals throughout the world.

Thank you for the valuable information on your visit to the Middle East. It is obvious that your conversations with leaders in the region were quite helpful in promoting our common objective of reversing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. I especially appreciate your firmness with Mr. Ramadhan; the points you made to him were right on target. It is important that the Iraqis understand that the major nations of the world stand united in opposition to Saddam Hussein's aggression. I am grateful as well for the strong support you expressed to the leaders of Egypt and Turkey, and for Japan's generous economic assistance to those countries and to Jordan. The political support, tempered by a firm stand on sanctions, was just the right balance in Jordan and closely parallels the message we have been conveying to Amman.

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I understand that the UN Peace Cooperation Bill, which you outlined in New York, has now been submitted to the Diet. This is a courageous and innovative approach which will allow Japan to make a direct and visible contribution to vital multinational peace operations. As I have said on several occasions, I am sure that all of the other participants in the multinational undertaking in the Persian Gulf will welcome the participation envisioned under the Peace Cooperation Bill.

Again, let me state my deep appreciation for Japan's solidarity with us in meeting the requirements of the crisis. I have no doubt that eventually we will have the satisfaction of seeing our principles and actions justified by the attainment of our objectives. I look forward to staying in touch with you as we move closer to our common goal of restoring peace and stability in the Persian Gulf.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Toshiki Kaifu
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8425

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

90 OCT 25 PM 8:12

October 25, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *B*

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister Kaifu

GB
10-26
132
1

Purpose

To facilitate Kaifu's ability to deliver on Gulf promises.

Background

Prime Minister Kaifu's letter of October 18 (Tab B) deals with his trip to the Middle East. Your reply is designed to praise his activities thereby encouraging him to do more to fulfill Japan's international responsibilities during the Persian Gulf crisis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Kaifu at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A President/PM Kaifu Letter
Tab B PM Kaifu/President Letter

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Signed by Pres. in

L. A.

*Original autopenned
in Washington.*

J.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0838-MR
MM 7/15/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declass

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8425

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

90 OCT 25 PM 8:12

October 25, 1990

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister Kaifu

Purpose

To facilitate Kaifu's ability to deliver on Gulf promises.

Background

Prime Minister Kaifu's letter of October 18 (Tab B) deals with his trip to the Middle East. Your reply is designed to praise his activities thereby encouraging him to do more to fulfill Japan's international responsibilities during the Persian Gulf crisis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Kaifu at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A President/PM Kaifu Letter
Tab B PM Kaifu/President Letter

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0838-MR

MM 7/15/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



EMBASSY OF JAPAN
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 18, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit to you, enclosed herewith, a message from Mr. Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan.

Allow me to extend my warmest regards.

Respectfully yours,

Ryohei Murata
Ambassador of Japan

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06e. Letter	Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu to President Bush (2 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [2]

Date Closed:	6/25/2009	OA/ID Number:	91144-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06f. Memo	From Karl D. Jackson to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Presidential Reply to Prime Minister Kaifu's Letter of October 18 [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	10/23/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 4/7/2023

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [2]

Date Closed: 6/25/2009	OA/ID Number: 91144-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0838-MR(505.05)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 7/15/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8425

October 23, 1990

*Brent:
Kaifu is having difficulty
with the Upper House
and needs this boost
now.*

K

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: KARL D. JACKSON *KDJ*

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Prime Minister Kaifu's
Letter of October 18

Prime Minister Kaifu traveled to the Middle East after meeting the President in New York. At Tab B is his report to the President on meetings with King Hussein and Deputy Premier Ramadhan, as well as his discussions in Egypt and Turkey.

The President's reply (Tab A) is designed to give Kaifu a boost during his special Diet session which must 1) finance the second billion of Japan's contribution to the multinational forces and, 2) pass the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill authorizing a Japanese non-combat presence in the Gulf.

1.4(d)

Concurrence by: *Richard* Haass

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to the President
Tab A	President/PM Kaifu Letter
Tab B	PM Kaifu/President Letter



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0838-MR

MM 7/15/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008567
RECEIVED: 29 OCT 90 11

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 29 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: EGYPT
PERSIAN GULF

TELCON

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: MUBARAK, HOSNI

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES MUBARAK RE GULF CRISIS / OCT 25

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 01 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAASS
WELCH

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9008567

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SITTMANN
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 90103011 FOR DECISION
X 90103018 SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/15/09

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8567

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt
Notetaker: John Montgomery

DATE, TIME: October 25, 1990; 1:32 - 1:39 P.M. EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hello Hosni, how's the world traveler? (U)

President Mubarak: Hello, I just got here ten minutes ago. (U)

The President: I just wanted to talk to you to get a sense of how your trip went and before you meet with Primakov (special envoy for Gorbachev). I just spoke with King Fahd and had a good talk and feel that despite some earlier confusion, we are pretty much together, don't you? (U)

President Mubarak: Yes, I spoke with King Fahd about his statement and think he gave a very good statement. (U)

The President: I also was calling to report to you that we have made some progress on the FMS debt cancellation. Last night, the Senate passed their version of the Foreign Aid bill, with a provision for the cancellation; the next stage is a conference committee to reach a compromise with the House. I am pleased with what the Senate has done and will keep on fighting. (U)

President Mubarak: Thank you. (U)

The President: On the Gulf crisis, I see a lot of maneuvering by Saddam but apparently no change in the substance of his position that Kuwait is part of Iraq. He's trying to split the international coalition by giving out hostages. They called a Canadian parliament member and said if you come over you will go home with hostages. They did the same with Genscher and Heath trying to divide us and parcel out these people in such a brutal way. On Primakov, I had a very candid and frank discussion with him and sent a very candid message to Gorbachev. I told them that going to Saddam with proposals that suggest what we would be prepared to do after withdrawal would indeed violate the basic principle of no concessions. Primakov said he understood. I wanted you to know I didn't show any flexibility and I've told Gorbachev the same thing. You know Saddam could present such a

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
2/25/2009 MM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

face saving approach as a reward. This is not the time to show any willingness to let him off the hook. I wanted you to know what I said to Primakov before you see him. Lastly, I am planning to send Jim Baker out early next month to see you, King Fahd, and others in the coalition about the next steps. We've got some good ideas but I can't talk about them on this phone.

(C)

President Mubarak: Primakov just met with my aide, and he (Osama el-Baz) told him there can be no rewards for Saddam. The second point was that there will be no negotiations before an unconditional withdrawal and the return of the legitimate government of Kuwait. I am going to take the same line. Afterwards, we could help in the negotiations, but to give him any reward for this could be very dangerous. (C)

The President: I'm delighted to hear your aide told him that. Primakov is a good man. We were impressed but he thinks he knows the area and maybe he does. We need the Soviets, they've been very good and I think they'll stay on the line. (C)

President Mubarak: I'm going to convince Primakov to be aligned with us on the situation. He should not separate with us. (C)

The President: How do you think the sanctions are working? (C)

President Mubarak: I think they're very good right now. (C)

The President: I'm more optimistic. They have imposed gas rationing and there are reports of machine parts shortages. (C)

President Mubarak: He's getting in a much more difficult position now. (C)

The President: We must stay together and in touch. Any time you want to call, day or night, do so. (U)

President Mubarak: I will call you after I meet with Primakov. (U)

The President: Will you apologize to your beautiful wife for me. I saw her across the room at the UN but didn't get a chance to say hello. They rushed me out to some damn meeting. (U)

President Mubarak: She told me she saw you. (U)

The President: Well, I send her 1,000 apologies. Good bye and take care. (U)

President Mubarak: Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008560
RECEIVED: 29 OCT 90 08

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 30 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: VATICAN
AP

VISIT



PERSONS: CASAROLI, AGOSTINO

SUBJECT: MTG W/ VATICAN SECRETARY OF STATE CARDINAL CASAROLI ON 31 OCT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 30 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF: 9004823

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR INFO

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 6/5/09

COMMENTS: _____

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CLOSED BY: NSMJT

DOC 3 OF 3

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8560
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 30, 1990

MEETING WITH VATICAN SECRETARY OF STATE

AGOSTINO CARDINAL CASAROLI

DATE: October 31, 1990

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 10:15 - 10:35 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *RS for*

CHRON FILE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0838-MR
mm 7/15/2016

I. PURPOSE

To reaffirm our strong and constructive relations with the Holy See and seek Vatican support for de-linking the Gulf crisis from the Palestinian Question.

II. BACKGROUND

Cardinal Casaroli, whom you last saw in November 1989, is in the United States to receive the "Prisoner of Conscience" Award from the Appeal of Conscience Foundation in New York on October 29. The Foundation is specifically recognizing Casaroli's role in resolving the question of a memorial for Catholic nuns at Auschwitz in a manner that did not offend Jewish victims of the Holocaust. Although he is expected to retire early next year and sees this U.S. visit as his farewell call, Casaroli has not yet set a retirement date.

This visit will give you an opportunity to urge that the Vatican avoid directly linking the Gulf crisis with the Arab-Israeli dispute and focus instead on the immediate task of confronting Iraqi aggression. As Casaroli proceeds straight from his meeting with you to a luncheon in New York with Perez de Cuellar, it will be particularly important to discourage any Vatican initiatives for an international conference. Your assurances that the U.S. is prepared to work toward a comprehensive peace in the Middle East -- after the Iraqi situation is resolved -- may help persuade Casaroli to leave the matter alone for now.

In Lebanon, the surrender of General Aoun may open the door to Vatican support for the government of President Hrawi. Casaroli may, however, reiterate the Vatican's request for U.S. help in securing Aoun's safe passage from the French Embassy in Beirut. The Vatican has also expressed concern over alleged atrocities by Syrian forces in the wake of Aoun's ouster. As we have no hard evidence to substantiate such charges, you might simply ask Casaroli what he knows or has heard.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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As the original architect of Vatican "Ostpolitik," Casaroli would be worth sounding out on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Vatican-Soviet relations have improved steadily in the past year, and in June the Vatican sent Archbishop Colasuonno as its first envoy to the USSR. A strong supporter of Gorbachev's reforms, Casaroli worries about instability in the USSR and has urged patience on Roman Catholic Ukrainian and Lithuanian nationalists.

In light of similar expressions of nationalism among Roman Catholics in central and eastern Europe, you might ask Casaroli's views on national independence movements in Yugoslavia (Slovenia and Croatia) and in Slovakia. Given our recent efforts to "internationalize" the Yugoslav situation, you might explore with Casaroli how the U.S. and Europe might work together to support a peaceful, democratic framework in which Yugoslavia's national groups can settle their differences.

Concerning Central America, you might reassure Casaroli that we are pressing the Salvadoran military for better cooperation in investigating the Jesuit murder case, while also stressing the importance of continuing U.S. support for the Salvadoran Government. Finally, although Pope John Paul II's planned trip to Cuba has been indefinitely postponed, it would be worth reminding Casaroli of the importance we attach to pressing Castro on human rights issues and Cuba's continued support for insurrection in Salvador and elsewhere.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity followed by meeting

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Participants List
Tab C	Biography

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
CARDINAL CASAROLI

- Let me congratulate you on your selection for this year's "Prisoner of Conscience" Award.
- Please convey my warmest greetings to His Holiness Pope John Paul II. As you know, I greatly value his moral leadership and wise counsel.

GULF CRISIS

- I appreciate the Vatican's support for UN sanctions against Iraq, as well as the prayer Pope John Paul said for the success of my Helsinki meeting with President Gorbachev.
- I believe the Joint Statement we issued in Helsinki reflects the strong view of the international community: "Nothing - short of complete implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions is acceptable."
- We also believe it important for all states to condemn Saddam Hussein's barbaric practices of using human beings as "human shields" and hostages as pawns in a propaganda war.
- We believe the sanctions are beginning to work. Now is the time for us to remain firm in our position that Iraq must withdraw unconditionally.
- Saddam Hussein wants to shift world attention away from his own aggression by combining the Kuwait issue with the Palestinian Question. He wants it to be the Arabs against the United States rather than the world against Iraq.
- The Arab states are not accepting that, and neither should we. We should not link Arab-Israeli disputes of long-

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PER E.O. 13526

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standing with the urgent task of opposing Iraqi aggression.

- As I said in my UN address, after Iraq has withdrawn from Kuwait, there may be opportunities for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. But we should not link the two issues. This would only make it harder to solve either.

LEBANON

- The surrender of General Aoun may open the way to national reconciliation in Lebanon. We have said publicly that a trial of General Aoun would detract from that process and that he should be permitted to go into exile. I would welcome your ideas about how we might work together toward that end.
- We have told the Lebanese Government that it must move quickly to restore law and order, and have told the Syrians they have a special responsibility to prevent abuses in areas of Lebanon where they have de facto control.
- We have heard reports of Syrian abuses but have little hard evidence. What have you heard?

NATIONALISM IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

- The Vatican has played a vital role in supporting religious freedom in the Soviet Union. We are particularly encouraged by the Supreme Soviet's passage of the historic new law on freedom of religion.
- I appreciate the position the Vatican has taken in encouraging Ukrainian Catholics to heal the rift with their Orthodox neighbors and to be patient in calling for full independence for the Ukraine.
- I am also gratified that our positions on the issue of

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Lithuanian independence have been very close.

- I would be very interested in your views on the general phenomenon of national independence movements in Eastern Europe. We are seeing it among Slovak nationalists demanding an independent Slovakia, and among Croats and Slovenians who want to break away from Yugoslavia.
- How do you see the situation in Slovakia? Can the Vatican play a role in persuading Slovak nationalists to work within the framework of a federal structure in Czechoslovakia?
- We are worried about Yugoslavia. Our experts see a danger of major ethnic violence, which almost certainly would spread beyond Yugoslavia's borders. We think it time to put Yugoslavia high on the international agenda in Europe.
 - o A message from the Pope to Croatian and Slovenian Catholics -- similar to what he has told the Ukrainians -- might be helpful.
 - o I would be interested in your thinking about the role CSCE might play -- perhaps through a mechanism for international mediation under the umbrella of CSCE.

CENTRAL AMERICA

- I thank you for the help of your Nuncio in Panama City during the Noriega affair.
- Regarding El Salvador, we are pressing the Salvadoran military to cooperate in the investigation of the Jesuit murder case.
- We believe there should be pressures on the FMLN guerrillas to negotiate in good faith. We have been impressed with the government's willingness to accept FMLN proposals, such as

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agreeing to dissolve armed forces units after a cease-fire.

- We are doing our best to cooperate with the UN Secretary General to promote a cease-fire as soon as possible, and we know the Church shares our concern that the killing be stopped.
- The human rights situation in Cuba is deteriorating as Castro imprisons most of the Cuban human rights leaders and metes out harsher sentences to members of dissident groups.
- Although I understand that the Pope's planned trip to Cuba has been put off, I hope that the Vatican will join us in calling attention to the state of human rights in Cuba and Castro's continuing efforts to export revolution.

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PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

James A. Baker III, Secretary of State

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs

Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs

Thomas Melady, Ambassador to the Holy See

Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European Political
Affairs, NSC Staff

Vatican

Agostino Cardinal Casaroli, Secretary of State

Archbishop Agostino Cacciavillan, Apostolic Pro-Nuncio

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08c. Report	Re: Government Report (0 pp.)	10/15/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [2]

Date Closed: 6/25/2009 **OA/ID Number:** 91144-007

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S **Appeal Case #:**
Re-review Case #: **Appeal Disposition:**
P-2/P-5 Review Case #: **Disposition Date:**

AR Case #: **MR Case #:**
AR Disposition: **MR Disposition:**
AR Disposition Date: **MR Disposition Date:**

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08d. Report	Re: Government Report (1 pp.)	8/16/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [2]

Date Closed: 6/25/2009	OA/ID Number: 91144-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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8560

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 29, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT *[Signature]*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Vatican Secretary of State Agostino
Cardinal Casaroli

At Tab I is the President's briefing package for his meeting with
Cardinal Casaroli, October 31, 1990.

Concurrences by: *in draft* David Welch, David Pacelli

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Participants List
Tab C Biography

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By *CS* NARA, Date *7/25/10*

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008634
RECEIVED: 30 OCT 90 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: BURNS
GOMPERT

CHRON FILE

DOC DATE: 30 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: TURKEY
PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL

TELCALL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POINT FOR TELCALL TO TURKISH PRES OZAL RE PRES TRIP TO TURKEY

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 02 NOV 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/15/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

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CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 1 OF 1

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National Security Council
The White House



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LOG # 8634

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 11/6 AIO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>Ken Hill</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>KH</u>	<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Bob Gates	_____	_____	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>2</u>	APNSA Has Seen	_____
Bill Sittmann	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>11/6</u>	Tab I has been forwarded to Pres
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>OBE/ONR</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

90 OCT 30 P 8: 09

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS Original given to Pres by Scowcroft on 11/6. No copy provided to WWD.

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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8634

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 30, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT 

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS 

SUBJECT: Points for Telephone Call to Turkish President
Ozal on a Presidential Visit to Turkey

Attached at Tab I are talking points for an Ozal phone call on the President's November trip to the Middle East, his desire to meet with Ozal in Paris and to visit Turkey in the first half of 1991, and on Secretary Baker's upcoming trip to Ankara. We have also included some contingency points on bilateral issues should Ozal raise them with the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached talking points for the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Talking Points for the President

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0839-MR
SCS 4/16/12

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH TURGUT OZAL
POINTS TO BE MADE

Visit to Turkey

- My purpose in calling you today is to give you advance notice of my intention to travel to the Middle East in mid-November just after the Paris CSCE Summit.
- I thought it was time for me to visit our troops in Saudi Arabia and to give visible support to our strategy of maintaining firm sanctions on Iraq.
- Because we have worked so closely on this crisis, I wanted to make sure you heard about these plans from me first.
- As you know, I also want to visit Turkey soon. The last American President to visit Turkey was Eisenhower over thirty years ago -- that is much too long a time for a close ally.
- If you agree, I would plan to come to Turkey during the first part of 1991. I would also visit Greece. We will be in touch with you as soon as we can on specific proposed dates for my trip.
- I would also hope we can meet for a good substantive talk in Paris at the time of the CSCE Summit. If you concur, I thought we could announce my intention to visit Turkey after our Paris meeting.

Gulf Crisis

- I thought we had a very useful review of the Gulf situation when we talked last week.
- As you know, Jim Baker will be coming to Ankara next week. You expressed an interest in our phone conversation in hearing more details on our military strategy. He will be prepared to discuss that issue with you.
- I thought it was time for us to be in touch personally with you and King Fahd and others to discuss the sanctions and the road ahead.
- I also want you to know that we continue to press donor states to honor their commitments to you and to disburse funds rapidly.

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0839-MR
SCS 4/16/12

- We know, in particular, that the Saudis have not yet confirmed to you their pledge to provide oil on a grant basis to compensate for your losses in shutting down the pipeline.
- We are urging them to resolve this problem as soon as possible.

(If Ozal asks about our FMS funding for FY-91:

- You undoubtedly know by now that the Congress decided on a figure of \$500 million in FMS for Turkey for our fiscal year 1991.
- I was disappointed because we had made funding at \$545 million one of my Administration's very top priorities. We had a tough fight on the budget and I am afraid we were not able to get you as much as you deserve.
- I can assure you that we will have Turkey's defense requirements firmly in mind as we proceed with the next budget and the variety of other assistance programs Dick Cheney discussed with you in September.)

(If Ozal asks about Textile Negotiations:

- We are ready to negotiate a new textile agreement and are prepared to make a substantial increase in Turkey's quota.
- I understand we are proposing talks in Geneva in the next ten days to get that process started.)

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008800
RECEIVED: 05 NOV 90 19

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: WATKINS, J

DOC DATE: 31 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: OIL
CM

OIL VULNERABILITY
STOCKPILES



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE TEST SALE 1990 SITUATION RPT #6

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 08 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF: 9007809 9007917

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL
HILL
MELBY
NSC CHRON
SITTMANN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


November 5, 1990

NSC/S:

Please file
the attached
for record purposes.
Scowcroft has
seen.

*Do you want
this stopped
Send To Tim
Dech*

pb





The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

October 31, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS



SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE TEST SALE-90
SITUATION REPORT #6

Brent:

This is to provide you a summary of the most recent SPR Test Sale events.

1. On October 29, the second and third Test Sale-90 crude oil deliveries took place as scheduled. Shell Oil received 95,000 barrels and Ultramar received 75,000 barrels via pipeline at the ARCO Terminal in Texas City, Texas.
2. The next Test Sale-90 deliveries are scheduled for November 1 to Marathon (75,000 barrels) and Amoco (200,000 barrels) via the Capline pipeline at the St. James Terminal in St. James, Louisiana.
3. SPR crude oil sales prices are based on an index of spot market prices for domestic crude oils during a 5-day period surrounding the day of delivery. The first Test Sale-90 delivery of October 19 took place at a price of \$27.07 per barrel, a price that reflects the temporary drop in prices that took place in the oil market.
4. The remainder of Test Sale-90 deliveries are scheduled to take place by November 30. The current schedule is attached. Changes in schedule may take place if requested by buyers.

Future planned event and date is as follows:

o Deliveries at Contracted Rate Occur November 1-30

I will continue to keep you advised of the progress of this test as deliveries take place. Thus far, all planned drawdown milestones have been achieved by the time planned and without difficulties.




James D. Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Attachment

STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE

Test Sale - 90 Delivery Schedule



Note: 1) Schedule as of 10/29/90; subject to change

2) Color represents separate deliveries on same day to different buyers



The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

October 31, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE DRAWDOWN

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve test drawdown is functioning well. Initially, 40 bids were received from 33 offerors. Of the 33 offerors, 11 contracts were awarded for 3.925 million barrels of crude oil. The first delivery took place on October 19. Two additional deliveries took place on October 29, with remaining deliveries scheduled for the month of November. We did not receive reasonable offers for the remaining 1.075 million barrels, as there appeared to be a surplus of sour crude at the time of the sale. Attached is a series of situation reports, including today's, on the drawdown.

Lod Cook was in to see me yesterday and confirmed that the industry was pleased with the test.


James D. Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Attachments

bcc: The Honorable Brent Scowcroft ✓

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008827
RECEIVED: 06 NOV 90 15

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: CICCONI, J

DOC DATE: 31 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: OIL
CM

OIL VULNERABILITY
STOCKPILES



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE DRAWDOWN

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 09 NOV 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF: 9007809 9007917

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GORDON
HILL
MELBY
NSC CHRON
PILLING
SITTMANN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8827

Date: 10/31/90

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: **JAMES W. CICONI**
Assistant to the President and
Deputy to the Chief of Staff

The attached has been forwarded
to the President.

8827



The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

90 OCT 31 PM 7:04

October 31, 1990

APNSA Has Seen

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE DRAWDOWN

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James D. Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Attachments



The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

September 28, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT



THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE TEST SALE-90
SITUATION REPORT #1

John:

Following the President's direction late Wednesday, September 26, to perform a 5 million barrel test drawdown of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), I ordered on September 27 an immediate activation of the SPR drawdown process. Actions taken to date include:

1. Final SPR operational readiness preparations, including curtailment of interfering operational and construction activities, preparation of detailed operational plans, acceleration of preventive maintenance actions, and establishment of a proper security posture.
2. Final preparation and issuance of a Notice of Sale which was mailed (overnight express/U.S. mail) to over 250 potential bidders Friday afternoon, September 28. This Notice of Sale will offer crude oil for sale from four SPR storage sites for delivery by either pipeline, barge, or ship. While deliveries of crude oil may commence as early as October 13, such quick action is dependent on purchaser's ability to arrange transportation. Most crude oil is expected to be delivered during November at a rate of approximately 167,000 barrel per day. A Press Release identifying the salient features of the Test Notice of Sale was issued late Friday, September 28.

Future planned events and dates are as follows:

o Offerors' Bids Received	October 5
o Apparently Successful Offerors Notified	October 10
o Financial Guarantees Submitted	October 11-17
o Deliveries Scheduled	October 11-31
o SPR Achieves Full Operational Readiness	October 12
o Contracts Awarded	October 12-18
o Early Deliveries Occur*	October 13-31
o Deliveries at Contracted Rate Occur	November 1-30

* Subject to contract award and purchasers' request and ability to arrange transportation

I will keep you advised of the progress as well as an assessment of the success of this test.

 James D. Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)



The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

October 2, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE TEST SALE-90
SITUATION REPORT #2

John:

This is to provide you with an updated status of the 5 million barrel test drawdown of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).

1. The Notice of Sale was issued (overnight express/U.S. mail) on Friday afternoon, September 28 to 255 initially identified potential offerors. In response to subsequent industry requests, an additional 9 copies of the Notice were issued on October 1.
2. Priced offers are due at the SPR's Project Management Office, New Orleans, Louisiana, by 2:00 p.m. EST, Friday, October 5. The SPR will evaluate the offers during the weekend.
3. Operational readiness activities continue. At this time, there are no identified issues affecting the performance of the test as planned.

A summary of the future planned events and dates is as follows:

o Offerors' Bids Received	October 5
o Apparently Successful Offerors Notified	October 10
o Financial Guarantees Submitted	October 11-17
o Deliveries Scheduled	October 11-31
o SPR Achieves Full Operational Readiness	October 12
o Contracts Awarded	October 12-18
o Early Deliveries Occur*	October 13-31
o Deliveries at Contracted Rate Occur	November 1-30

* Subject to purchasers' request and ability to arrange transportation

I will continue to keep you advised of the progress of this test as significant events take place.



James D. Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)



The Deputy Secretary of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

OCT 5 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT



THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE TEST SALE-90
SITUATION REPORT #3

The New Orleans Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) Project Management Office today received 40 bids from 33 offerors. The deadline for receipt of bids in the 5-million barrel SPR test sale was 2:00 p.m. EDT. Six different crude oil streams from four sites are being offered in the test sale; several offerors submitted multiple bids.

A listing of the offerors, along with bid quantities and prices, will be compiled over the weekend and will be available on Tuesday. We remain on schedule to notify Apparently Successful Offerors on October 10.

A summary of the future planned events and dates is as follows:

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| o Apparently Successful Offerors Notified | October 10 |
| o Financial Guarantees Submitted | October 11-17 |
| o Deliveries Scheduled | October 11-31 |
| o SPR Achieves Full Operational Readiness | October 12 |
| o Contracts Awarded | October 12-18 |
| o Early Deliveries Occur* | October 13-31 |
| o Deliveries at Contracted Rate Occur | November 1-30 |

- * Subject to purchasers' request and ability to arrange transportation

I will continue to keep you advised of the progress of this test as significant events take place.

W. Henson Moore
Deputy Secretary



The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

October 9, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE TEST SALE-90
SITUATION REPORT #4

John:

This is to provide you with an updated status of the 5-million-barrel test drawdown of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).

1. Attached for your information are details of the offers received by the SPR on October 5 under the 5-million-barrel SPR test sale. In summary:
 - o Thirty-three companies submitted 40 separate offers encompassing 64 line item bids for a total of 10.390 million barrels.
 - o The range of bid prices for low sulfur sweet crude oil was \$27.85 to \$39.06 per barrel; the bid price range for high sulfur sour crude oil was \$30.29 to \$35.84 per barrel. Index pricing is being utilized, i.e., actual prices to be paid for the crude oil will be indexed to the day of delivery.
 - o There was sufficient bid coverage on the quantities offered for sale on four of the six crude oil streams, but there were no bids to purchase the offered 800,000 barrels of Weeks Island Sour and there was insufficient bid coverage for the West Hackberry Sour stream.
2. An abstract of the offers will be publicized today, and we are on schedule to notify Apparently Successful Offerors tomorrow, October 10.



The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

October 19, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE TEST SALE-90
SITUATION REPORT #5

John:

This is to provide you a summary of the most recent SPR Test Sale events.

1. On October 17 and 18, contract awards were made to the eleven successful offerors in the SPR Test Sale for 3.925 million barrels of crude oil. The total award quantity was less than the 5 million barrels of crude oil offered for sale due to an apparent lack of interest in the sour crude. Market information suggests a surplus of this type of crude oil in the U.S. Gulf.
2. Today, October 19, the first delivery will take place 21 days after issuance of the Notice of Sale and 2 days after contract award. This early delivery of 75,000 barrels was requested by Citgo to satisfy an urgent need caused by a delay in delivery of imports due to a restriction of marine traffic in the ship channel serving their refinery at Lake Charles, Louisiana. A summary of all currently planned deliveries is attached.

Future planned events and dates are as follows:

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|
| o Early Deliveries Occur | October 19&29 |
| o Deliveries at Contracted Rate Occur | November 1-30 |

I will continue to keep you advised of the progress of this test as deliveries take place. Thus far, all planned drawdown milestones have been achieved by the time planned and without difficulties.



James D. Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Attachment

STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE

Test Sale - 90

Delivery Schedule



Note: 1) Preliminary, subject to change

2) Color represents separate deliveries to different buyer's

SPR 1979



The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

October 31, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT



THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE TEST SALE-90
SITUATION REPORT #6

John:

This is to provide you a summary of the most recent SPR Test Sale events.

1. On October 29, the second and third Test Sale-90 crude oil deliveries took place as scheduled. Shell Oil received 95,000 barrels and Ultramar received 75,000 barrels via pipeline at the ARCO Terminal in Texas City, Texas.
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


James D. Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Attachment

STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE

Test Sale - 90 Delivery Schedule



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