Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:	Chronological Files
OA/ID Number:	91144
Folder ID Number:	91144-006

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Secretary Brady's Trip Report (2 pp.)	10/8/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memo	Nicholas F. Brady to POTUS Re: Burden Sharing Mission to Europe and Asia (4 pp.)	9/11/90	(b)(1)	S
01c. Memo	Meg Lundsager to Brent Scowcroft Re: Secretary Brady's Report on his Mission to Europe and Asia (1 pp.)	9/17/90	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Eric Melby to Brent Scowcroft Re: Oil Production Figures from Secretary Watkins (1 pp.)	10/9/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memo	Admiral James D. Watkins to John H. Sununu and Brent Scowcroft Re: surge production of crude oil (1 pp.)	10/3/90	(b)(1)	S
02c. Graph	Re: Net Worldwide Petroleum (1 pp.)	9/9/90	(b)(1)	S
03a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to David C. Gompert Re: Presidential Visit to Germany (1 pp.)	10/9/90	(b)(1)	C
03b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Call to Horst Teltschik (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
04a. Letter	Brent Scowcroft to Charles D. Powell (1 pp.)	10/9/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1203
OA/ID Number: 91144-006
Date Closed: 6/12/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04b. Memo	David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft Re: Bringing the French Back in Line on Kuwait (1 pp.)	10/5/90	(b)(1)	S
05a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar of the United Nations (4 pp.)	10/1/90	(b)(1)	S
05b. Memo	Nancy Bearg Dyke to William F. Sittmann Re: Memcon of President's Meeting with UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, October 1, 1990 (1 pp.)	10/10/90	(b)(1)	S
06a. Summary	Re: Page 2 [Head of State Correspondence Summary] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
06b. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush [Translation] (2 pp.)	9/22/90	(b)(1)	
06c. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush [German] (2 pp.)	9/22/90	(b)(1)	
07a. Letter	President Bush to Shimon Peres Re: August 16 note (1 pp.)	10/10/90	(b)(1)	
07b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Reply Letter to Shimon Peres (1 pp.)	10/8/90	(b)(1)	
07c. Letter	Shimon Peres to President Bush Re: handling of the crisis in the Gulf (1 pp.)	8/16/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1203
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Date Closed: 6/12/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: IEPR Breakfast, October 12, 1990, at Treasury (3 pp.)	10/11/90	(b)(1)	C
09a. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	10/12/90	(b)(1)	C
09b. Memo	Richard N. Haass to William F. Sittmann Re: Memorandum of Telephone Call with President Mubarak, October 12, 1990 (1 pp.)	10/12/90	(b)(1)	C
10. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: IEPR Breakfast, October 12, 1990 (2 pp.)	10/12/90	(b)(1)	C
11a. Memo	Sandra Charles to William F. Sittmann Re: Memorandum of Conversation for Meeting with GCC Secretary Bishara (1 pp.)	10/12/90	(b)(1)	S
11b. Memcon	Re: National Secretary Advisor's Meeting with GCC Secretary General Bishara (3 pp.)	10/10/90	(b)(1)	S
12a. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group Meeting, October 12, 1990 (2 pp.)	10/16/90	(b)(1)	C
12b. Table	Re: Commitments & Disbursements of Economic Assistance to Frontline States (2 pp.)	10/12/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1203
OA/ID Number: 91144-006
Date Closed: 6/12/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
13a. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Telephone Calls to Presidents Bendjedid and Ben Ali (1 pp.)	10/17/90	(b)(1)	C
13b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Bendjedid of Algeria (1 pp.)	10/19/90	(b)(1)	C
13c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversations with President Bendjedid of Algeria (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
13d. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Ben Ali of Tunisia (1 pp.)	10/19/90	(b)(1)	C
13e. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Ben Ali of Tunisia (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
13f. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Phone Call to Tunisian President Ben Ali (1 pp.)	10/15/90	(b)(1)	C
13g. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Phone Call to Tunisian Algerian President Bendjedid (1 pp.)	10/15/90	(b)(1)	C
14a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letter to King Hussein (1 pp.)	10/19/90	(b)(1)	S
14b. Draft Letter	President Bush to King Hussein (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1203
OA/ID Number: 91144-006
Date Closed: 6/12/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
14c. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to King Hussein (1 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(1)	S
15a. Memo	George Van Eron to Brent Scowcroft Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary as of October 19 (1 pp.)	10/19/90	(b)(1)	C
15b. Summary	Re: Heads of State Correspondence Summary (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
15c. Letter	President Vaclav Havel to President Bush [Translation] (3 pp.)	9/27/90	(b)(1)	
16a. Cable	From White House Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	10/20/90	(b)(1)	S
16b. Cable	From White House Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	10/20/90	(b)(1)	S
16c. Draft Cable	President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
17a. Letter	President Bush to Prime Minister Yatzhak Shamir (3 pp.)	10/23/90	(b)(1)	
17b. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Prime Minister Shamir (1 pp.)	10/22/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1203
OA/ID Number: 91144-006
Date Closed: 6/12/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
17c. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Response to Lette from Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (1 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(1)	S
17d. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Israeli Prime Minister Shamir (1 pp.)	10/16/90	(b)(1)	S
17e. Letter	Prime Minister Yatzhik Shamir to President Bush (3 pp.)	10/15/90	(b)(1)	TS
18a. Memo	Nicholas Burns to Brent Scowcroft Re: Points for October 24 Telephone Call from Turkish President Ozal (1 pp.)	10/23/90	(b)(1)	S
18b. Talking Points	Re: Telephone Conversation with Turgut Ozal Points To Be Made (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1203
OA/ID Number: 91144-006
Date Closed: 6/12/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007236
RECEIVED: 12 SEP 90 17

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 08 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: ECONOMICS
EUROPE
KUWAIT
PERSIAN GULF
ASIA
IRAQ

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SEC BRADY TRIP RPT / UK / FRANCE / JAPAN / KOREA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 15 SEP 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LUNDSAGER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
DEAL
LUNDSAGER
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 3 OF 3

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re Brady Rpt on his mtgs in Europe

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MEN LOG # 7236

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 21 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
~~Ken Hill~~	1	~~KH~~	I
Bill Sittmann	2	W	
Bob Gates	3		
Brent Scowcroft	4	APNSA Has Seen	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	10/6	D
NSC Secretariat	6		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7236

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

90 OCT -8 AM 11:53

October 8, 1990

INFORMATION

NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Secretary Brady's Trip Report

Attached at Tab A is Secretary Brady's report on his burden-sharing mission to the United Kingdom, France, Korea and Japan. Brady concludes that additional defense burden-sharing assistance as well as assistance to the front line states will be forthcoming from these allies. Nonetheless, continued pressure on the allies will be necessary in order to ensure that U.S. objectives are achieved. Highlights of his report follow.

United Kingdom

Mrs. Thatcher was very supportive of U.S. actions in the Gulf and our leadership role. She agreed with Secretary Brady that assistance to the front-line countries during the remainder of 1990 should be unconditional. In the medium-term she favored linkage to IMF/World Bank programs to ensure that needed economic reforms would be put in place.

France

The French believe that the EC should play the major role in conveying European aid to the region. They were open to ideas about integrating Arab assistance with that of the industrial countries and coordinating this with the IMF and World Bank.

Korea

Korea, while responsive to Secretary Brady's points on military cooperation, expressed concern that it not be presented with a bill similar in size to that presented to the major world economies.

Japan

Japan was the most difficult stop in that the $1 billion committed at that time by the Japanese to our military effort was subject to many restrictions and a complicated Japanese budget

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Declassify on: OADR

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2011-0788-MR
ES 5/23/13

process which would slow disbursement. Knowing this, Secretary Brady asked for an immediate commitment of $2 billion over the next seven months for military support. He also asked for Japanese economic assistance of $2 billion in the next seven months for the front-line states. Since then the Japanese have announced their willingness to meet the $4 billion target.

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Brady

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

September 11, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Nicholas F. Brady

SUBJECT: Burden Sharing Mission to Europe and Asia

Summary

My recent discussions in Europe and Asia revealed deep support for your actions in the Persian Gulf, and a sense of gratitude and respect for the strong leadership role the United States is playing in mobilizing an effective international response, diplomatically, militarily, and economically.

There appears to be a clear understanding of the enormous contribution being made by the American people -- militarily, politically, and financially -- and as a result I came away with an expectation that additional defense burden sharing assistance from our allies will be forthcoming. There was also full appreciation of the unique importance of the front line states in maintaining an effective blockade of Iraq, and agreement with our assessment that they will require special economic assistance.

In both areas, however, it is clear that achieving our full objectives will require follow up efforts by the United States in the form of continued pressure on potential contributors and resolution of technical details regarding the contribution mechanisms themselves.

Military Burden-sharing

On the military side, we stressed that we are seeking support only for the incremental costs of our Persian Gulf operations, and emphasized that expanding the multilateral character of the operation is critically important as a tangible expression of the global consensus against Saddam. On this latter point we also stressed the domestic political realities in the United States, highlighting that a substantial and visible contribution by our allies is essential to maintain domestic public and Congressional support for what we all agree is a vitally important enterprise.

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2011-0788-NLR
ES 5/23/13

Economic Assistance to the Front Line States

On the economic side, there was full agreement on the special vulnerability of the front line states to sanctions-related economic disruptions and their crucial role in making the sanctions effective. Others also shared our view that the immediate financial needs of these countries differ from their medium-term needs and therefore require different kinds of assistance. I was pleased to find general agreement with our view that while short-term economic assistance to the front line countries should be largely unconditional, medium-term assistance should be designed fundamentally to strengthen their economies and therefore contribute to greater regional stability.

The View from the U.K.

Our conversation with Mrs. Thatcher was especially gratifying. We conveyed your personal appreciation for Britain's rapid military assistance and robust public support. She, in turn, is obviously delighted by your leadership on this issue, not only in terms of our military response but in terms of mobilizing economic support for the front line states as well.

On economic assistance to Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, the British share our preference for using bilateral, essentially unconditional, financial assistance in the near term (until end-1990) to prevent serious economic disruption and strengthen implementation of the sanctions. They stated that medium-term assistance, in contrast, should be more closely linked to the IMF and World Bank in order to encourage the kind of sound policies needed to strengthen these economies for the future.

Separately, the British have serious reservations about a major EC role in providing financial assistance. They are convinced this will result in inadequate participation by a self-absorbed Germany, with London's share disproportionately large. (In my view, this concern has real merit.) There was no immediate response to our suggestion that London consider a contribution to the front line states in the range of $100-110 million this year and $260-300 million in 1991, but Mrs. Thatcher was quite clear that Great Britain would contribute.

The View from Paris

The French also expressed solid support for U.S. actions in the Gulf, and appreciation for the leadership role you have taken in marshalling financial assistance for the front line countries.

On the economic side they share our view that support for the front line is absolutely vital, both to ensure the effectiveness of the sanctions and to lay the economic groundwork for greater regional stability.

Not surprisingly, the French have a preference for using the EC as the primary conduit for European economic aid to the region. However, they also appear open to new ideas to integrate assistance from the Arab States with that of the industrial countries, and to provide this assistance in cooperation with the IMF and World Bank.

As with the U.K., the French did not offer any immediate views on the size of the economic assistance we suggested (in the range of $100-110 million in 1990 and $260-300 million in 1991; identical to the U.K.). My sense was that these figures are within a range they would consider appropriate.

The View from Seoul

We focussed on a few basic points in our conversation with Korean Prime Minister Roh. On the military side, we recalled that Korea itself had suffered from the aggression of a neighbor and had benefitted from a large and generous international sacrifice. We also suggested that Korean participation would have beneficial effects on its relations with the Arab world, the improvement of which has been a major Korean diplomatic objective for some years.

On the economic side, we mainly emphasized the huge benefits to Korea -- in terms of cost avoidance -- of maintaining a free flow of oil at a market-determined price rather than the much higher price which would surely prevail if Saddam went unchecked.

I believe these arguments had some resonance with Roh. In responding to our presentation, however, he expressed some concern that Korea not be "billed" as if it were a major economy on the scale of Japan or the U.S. Roh's response to our suggested contributions ($150 million for military in 1990, and $100 million for economic assistance in 1990 and 1991) was non-committal, although he was supportive of the general plan.

The View from Tokyo

A number of considerations suggested that we would need to push hard in Tokyo for substantial additional military assistance commitments and equally substantial commitments for the front line states.

On military, while the $1 billion Japanese commitment is substantial, there is abundant evidence that these funds will be heavily encumbered by a multitude of restrictions, and delayed by a byzantine budget process.We therefore requested the Japanese immediately commit an additional $1 billion as part of the budget for FY 1990 (i.e., before March 31, 1991). Thus, their total contribution would be $2 billion over the next seven months.

Our concerns about the depth of the Japanese commitment extended as well to its economic assistance to the front line states. In my view it is critical to secure a firm Japanese commitment now for the period through March 1991. Our suggestion to the Japanese was therefore that they provide economic assistance amounting to $2 billion by March 1991, of which $600 million should be available for disbursement this year.

The Japanese did not seem prepared for a request of this magnitude, but I think we will see a substantial improvement in their contribution level.

Next Steps

My concern now is that we have a coordinated follow up process so that the verbal commitments we have received from both missions turn into reality. We should talk about this with the NSC when you get the joint session address behind you.

cc: General Scowcroft
Deputy Secretary Eagleburger
Under Secretary Wolfowitz
Deputy Assistant Gates

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7236

September 17, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL

FROM: MEG LUNDSAGER

SUBJECT: Secretary Brady's Report on his Mission to Europe and Asia

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President conveying Secretary Brady's report on his burden sharing mission to Europe and Asia. In brief, Secretary Brady reports that there is a clear understanding of the United States' contribution and that the four countries he visited were to varying degrees willing to provide military and financial support.

We plan to evaluate the results of Secretary Brady's and Secretary Baker's missions and to determine how best to keep the pressure on other countries to meet their commitments.

Concurrence: David Welch

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Brady

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0832-MR
Ej 3/20/15

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007917
RECEIVED: 04 OCT 90 12

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: MELBY
DEAL

DOC DATE: 09 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: OIL
KUWAIT
CM
IRAQ
STOCKPILES

2

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: OIL PRODUCTION FIGURES FM SEC WATKINS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 05 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MELBY LOGREF: 9007809 9007933

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
DEAL
MELBY
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI CLOSED BY: NSRLG DOC 2 OF 2

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Memo	Eric Melby to Brent Scowcroft Re: Oil Production Figures from Secretary Watkins (1 pp.)	10/9/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~ Unique Document No. OLWHMulti-ES90017188.2

7917

Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
October 3, 1990

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MEMORANDUM FOR The Honorable John H. Sununu
Chief of Staff
The White House

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

We have received updated information today concerning the surge production of crude oil from other nations. This surge production will be used to offset the 4.3 million barrels a day of lost Iraq and Kuwait output. The current estimates of surge production differ from those furnished to the National Security Council on September 19, 1990. Surge production is now expected to be considerably higher than what was expected then. The new data show increased surge production of 550 thousand barrels a day during the 4th quarter 1990 (October - December) above what was projected on September 19, 1990. This reduces the expected shortfall in crude oil supply for the 4th quarter from 890 thousand barrels a day to only 340 thousand. The September 19th projections are presented on the graph at the top of the page following, and the new projections (October 3rd) are on the bottom graph. (S/NF)

While this reduction in anticipated shortfall reduces the supply pressures for a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) drawdown, the other reasons for the drawdown remain unchanged. There is no remaining surge capacity left in the world. We face the possibility of a colder than usual winter. The speculative demand for crude oil will continue to keep prices high so long as there remains a possibility of war in the Gulf. (S/NF)

You may receive from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) a graph which presents this information in a different format. The CIA graph records the crude during the month of production. The graphs on the following page record the crude during the month of arrival on world markets which is about one month later due to the time necessary to transport the crude from site of production to where it will be refined. (U)

As new data on world supply becomes available, we will keep you updated. (U)

James D. Watkins
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)

Attachments

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2010-0832-MR
5/21/2014 MM

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Unique Document No. OEWHdr01-E39001.10e.2a
This document consists of 1 pages
No. 2 of 3 copies, Series A

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UNCLASSIFIED

Net Worldwide Petroleum Supply Loss*: 1990-1991



*Average Monthly Loss

UNCLASSIFIED

September 19, 1990

~~Secret~~ Noforn

Net Worldwide Petroleum Supply Loss*



Source: DOE/IN in consultation with DOE/EIA and CIA

*Delivered Basis Average Monthly Loss

October 3, 1990

~~Secret~~ Noforn

~~Secret~~ Noforn

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0832-MR
5/21/2014 MM

The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

October 2, 1990

7933
w/copy back

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE TEST SALE-90
SITUATION REPORT #2

Brent:

This is to provide you with an updated status of the 5 million barrel test drawdown of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).

1. The Notice of Sale was issued (overnight express/U.S. mail) on Friday afternoon, September 28 to 255 initially identified potential offerors. In response to subsequent industry requests, an additional 9 copies of the Notice were issued on October 1.

2. Priced offers are due at the SPR's Project Management Office, New Orleans, Louisiana, by 2:00 p.m. EST, Friday, October 5. The SPR will evaluate the offers during the weekend.

3. Operational readiness activities continue. At this time, there are no identified issues affecting the performance of the test as planned.

A summary of the future planned events and dates is as follows:

o Offerors' Bids Received	October 5
o Apparently Successful Offerors Notified	October 10
o Financial Guarantees Submitted	October 11-17
o Deliveries Scheduled	October 11-31
o SPR Achieves Full Operational Readiness	October 12
o Contracts Awarded	October 12-18
o Early Deliveries Occur*	October 13-31
o Deliveries at Contracted Rate Occur	November 1-30

* Subject to purchasers' request and ability to arrange transportation

I will continue to keep you advised of the progress of this test as significant events take place.

James D. Watkins
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008023
RECEIVED: 09 OCT 90 17

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 09 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY AP

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT TELTSCHIK, HORST

SUBJECT: PRES VISIT TO GERMANY

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 12 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOMPERT LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSMEN DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 9, 1990

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID C. GOMPERT

SUBJECT: Presidential Visit to Germany

An informal visit confined to private talks with Kohl (whose home is in Southwest Germany) would be fine for policy discussion but lacking in political impact. For the latter, we'd prefer to visit Berlin and to have some public exposure, e.g., a speech.

Perhaps you can feel out Teltschik on the possibility of a visit to Berlin. Visiting both Kohl's home and Berlin in 24 hours will not be easy on the President at the front-end of this trip; but it can be done. If the Germans are not wed to a visit at the Chancellor's home, perhaps they'll come around to the view that meeting in Berlin makes most sense.

Attached are suggested talking points for a call to Teltschik.

Attachment
Tab I Points to be Made for Call to Horst Teltschik

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0832-NR
Eg 3/20/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR CALL TO HORST TELTSCHIK

-- The President is delighted that a mid-November visit is agreeable to the Chancellor.

-- Our idea would be for the President to leave Washington Friday night, November 16, arriving in Germany the morning of Saturday the 17th.

-- He wants to make a brief stop in Prague on the 18th before proceeding on to Paris that evening. This would give the President only about 24 hours in Germany.

-- The President very much wants to have time for an extended private discussion with the Chancellor, and he appreciates the invitation to the Chancellor's home in Ludwigshafen.

-- The President would also welcome a suitable public occasion to underscore German-American friendship and our continuing commitment.

-- We were thinking that Berlin would be the ideal place for the President to speak, particularly since he has not been there as President.

-- As the President's time will be short, it might be difficult to visit both Ludwigshafen and Berlin in the same trip.

-- One alternative would be for the President and the Chancellor to meet at Ludwigshafen the morning of the 17th and then fly together to Berlin.

-- Another would be for the President and the Chancellor to meet in Berlin only.

-- We don't need to make a firm decision yet, but perhaps we can begin planning with these considerations in mind.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0832-MR
ES 3/2015

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: LMS LOG # 3023

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AM A/O _____

WSJ.

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	KH	I
Bill Sittmann	2		
Bob Gates	3	APNSA Has Seen	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			BE
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		N
NSC Secretariat	5		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID [illegible]
RECEIVED: 05 OCT 90 16

CHRON FILE

TO: POWELL, CHARLES

FROM: GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 09 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
IRAQ
KUWAIT
PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS: POWELL, CHARLES

SUBJECT: LTR TO POWELL RE PRESSURE ON FRENCH

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD LTR DUE DATE: 09 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOMPERT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
STATE		GOMPERT
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS: ** W/ GOMPERT -- EACH PARAGRAPH ON OUTGOING LTR MUST BE CLASSIFIED PER BRIAN **

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

Changing the Memo
Back in Line on
/Kuwait

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WEA
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 7958
SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT
DOC LOG A/O _____

WEA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	KH	A
Bill Sittmann	2		
Bob Gates		8	
Brent Scowcroft	3 ~	Redo w/ BS chgs	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room		APNSA Has Seen	
West Wing Desk	4	10/9	
NSC Secretariat	5	WEA 10/10 D	

RECEIVED 00 OCT 5 P6:08

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: Send via State Secretariat on Referral.
Tell State to send this ltr via
Classified Diplomatic Pouch. BGW

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 9, 1990

Dear Charles:

As you may know when the Prime Minister and the President met recently in New York, they agreed to convey to President Mitterrand their acute concern about the lack of unequivocal French support for our position toward Iraq. I wanted you to be aware that the President has in fact communicated his concern. (S)

More specifically, President Bush has told President Mitterrand that we must avoid any daylight among us with regard to the need for immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal in accordance with Resolution 660. Further, the President underscored the perils of any weakening of our position regarding the restoration of the Government of Kuwait. While we would naturally be pleased by further democratic reform once the legitimate government has returned, the recent French position on this aspect is a departure from the Security Council Resolution 661 and a recipe for encouraging Saddam Hussein's further intransigence. (S)

We are grateful for your continued strong position, which is an important factor in the unity of purpose and power confronting Saddam Hussein. (U)

Sincerely,

Brent

Brent Scowcroft

Mr. Charles D. Powell
Private Secretary for the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London
SW1A 2AA

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0788-MR
ES 5/23/13

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 7958

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 5, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID C. GOMPERT

SUBJECT: Bringing the French Back in Line on Kuwait

I believe it would be useful for you to send the attached letter at Tab A to your British counterpart. We need to keep pressure on the French through this and other means. Richard Haass agrees.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A to Charles Powell.

Attachment
Tab A Letter to Charles Powell

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
8011-0488-MR
ES 5/23/13

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007984
RECEIVED: 09 OCT 90 11

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: DYKE
MILLER

DOC DATE: 09 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

7

KEYWORDS: UN
PERSIAN GULF
KUWAIT

MEMCON
IRAQ
CENTRAL AMERICA

Bremen FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ UN SECGEN DE CUELLAR / OCT 1

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 12 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DYKE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
DYKE
EXECSEC
MILLER

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN CLOSED BY: NSMEN DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

7984

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar of the United Nations (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Thomas Pickering, US Ambassador to the UN
John Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
Nancy Bearg Dyke, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN Secretary General
Virendra Dayal, Chief of Staff
Ronald Spiers, Under Secretary General
Alvaro de Soto, Executive Assistant to UNSYG
Jean Claude Aime, Acting Assistant to UNSYG

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 1, 1990, 10:55 - 11:35 a.m.
38th Floor Office, United Nations

Secretary General de Cuellar: You are most welcome here. You are an old UN hand. There are many reasons for us to be most pleased. There has been some positive action here on the Middle East. (U)

The President: Did you hear anything from Jordan yesterday? Do you see any option for further diplomatic action? ~~(C)~~

Secretary General de Cuellar: No diplomatic option, only military options. I don't see anything that gives me a chance of doing anything. Because of public opinion, there is no effort to find a solution. Morocco and others have tried with no success. I tried, and nothing came of it. ~~(S)~~

The President: The UN has played a very useful role. The world understands and knows you have tried and has seen the almost frantic shuttling of King Hussein. I don't think there is a feeling yet around the world that peace is not possible. My concern is holding the world together on these sanctions. ~~(C)~~

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
8/21/2009 MM

Secretary General de Cuellar: He can do a U-turn all of a sudden. He did a U-turn on Iran and gave them everything they wanted. He doesn't care about public opinion. He doesn't need to save face. He looks at his interests; doesn't inspire confidence. I'm still hopeful the sanctions will be felt by him. (C)

The President: Yemen has backed away a little. (C)

Secretary Baker: Have you had a chance to talk to Iraq regarding the French proposal? (U)

Secretary General de Cuellar: I talked to the French Ambassador. The French have made statements through the press: "There has been no particular contact between France and Iraq except normal diplomatic dialogue. Our charge keeps contact in Baghdad regarding French citizens in Iraq." The French have said that any useful discussion would have two conditions: 1. Iraqi troops must leave Kuwait. 2. Let the hostages go. (U)

The President: But what about returning the legitimate rulers of Kuwait? (C)

Secretary General de Cuellar: That is not in there. (C)

The President: We have op-ed writers in the US that would go along, but I think we have to do what the UN set out to do. We won't back away. We want a peaceful resolution, but we may be faced with provocation. (C)

Secretary General de Cuellar: Yes. There are rumors about nuclear devices that could be launched from a plane. (C)

The President: We are well aware they have used chemical weapons. I would discount the nuclear. How do you see the Israeli card? (C)

Secretary General de Cuellar: Levy came to see me. They are being careful to be low key. I don't know what he will say to the General Assembly today. There is always a chance of an Iraqi strike. There are a lot of negative possibilities. Saddam Hussein is clever, criminal. (C)

Secretary Baker: How do you see Arab governments reacting if Iraq did an unprovoked attack on Israel? (S)

Secretary General de Cuellar: I don't see any Arab government that would come to the defense of Israel. What about combining the French initiative with an Arab initiative? The situation is extremely explosive. If I had something to say I wouldn't

hesitate to go (to the region). Tariq Aziz is afraid to say anything in front of me. (S)

The President: Some think the sanctions are having a major effect. I don't know if it is true. The UN position is good; there is provision for humanitarian aid. (C)

Secretary General de Cuellar: It is important to monitor closely. (U)

The President: The US has a lot at stake. We have many soldiers there. It is working well in terms of hospitality. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others are willing to see a fast military end to this. (S)

I trust King Hussein. He is honest. Israel is on one side of him; Iraq on the other. The King will honor what he said. (S)

Some feel it is too early for action. (C)

General Scowcroft: I think they know we are ready. (C)

The President: You can tell Velayati I see a new world as including better relations with Iran. We gave that message two ways. It was received seriously, but word came back that it is not time yet. But the response from Velayati and Rafsanjani was serious. They have right wing problems and can't move forward. Do you think the Iranians are complying with blockades? (S)

Secretary Baker: The Turks and Syrians think they are complying. (C)

Secretary General de Cuellar: Can we move to Central America? We are stuck on the negotiations. The FMLN told me they won't leave now. We need more from them. I told him (Cristiani?) he should have a multiparty delegation. It would add to their credibility. (C)

On Afghanistan, we have a group of countries to help us, and they are trying to have influence. (C)

The President: Let me ask Jim to bring you up on our Congressional action. (U)

Secretary Baker: Congress will adjourn between October 15-19. Then we'll know about aid to El Salvador. Either we will negotiate or have a vote. We have a sense of the FMLN stalling. I agree that Cristiani is acting in good faith. He knows about our desire for movement on the Jesuit case. They must move. If the FMLN is at the table and negotiating, then aid will be

released. Mexico, Venezuela, and Spain have agreed to act as friends of the UN Secretary General. Tell the FMLN to negotiate in good faith and to not start an offensive. If the FMLN agrees to a ceasefire, it gives a better environment to look at direct talks. ~~(C)~~

The President: I am embarrassed about the back money for the UN. I am continuing to try with Congress. You've done a good job on the Hill. We'll keep struggling. (U)

Secretary General de Cuellar: We know you have been trying. (U)

Mutual thanks for conversation. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MEN LOG # 2984

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ~~PRS~~ NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1		A
Bill Sittmann	2	✓	
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	MS 10/10	N
NSC Secretariat	4		N/R

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

7984 Redo

October 10, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: DAVID C. ~~MILLER~~ Miller, JR.

FROM: NANCY BEARG DYKE NBD

SUBJECT: Memcon of President's Meeting with UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, October 1, 1990

Attached for the record is a Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with UN Secretary General de Cuellar.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve VM Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memcon

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/15/2013

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007989
RECEIVED: 09 OCT 90 12

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: SITTMANN
VAN ERON

DOC DATE: 10 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS
SAUDI ARABIA
GERMANY F R
PAKISTAN
ISRAEL
POLAND

PERSONS: KHAN, GHULAM I
KOHL, HELMUT
FAHD
MAZOWIECKI, TADEUSZ

SUBJECT: HEADS OF STATE CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY AS OF 10 OCT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 12 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON LOGREF: 9007963 9007975

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON
VAN ERON

Pls copy only:
Kohl 9/22

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/12/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSLMS DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chancellor Kohl of Germany - September 22, 1990
(Received October 5)

Chancellor Kohl announces the complete withdrawal of U.S. chemical weapons from Germany as of September 22. He appreciates your cooperation in achieving the withdrawal well ahead of the 1992 date agreed upon with President Reagan. Your understanding of the domestic issues caused by low-flying military aircraft and your willingness to further reduce such flights is also appreciated.

Prime Minister Mazowiecki of Poland - August 29, 1990
(Received October 9)

PM Mazowiecki appreciates U.S. care for Igancy Jan Paderewski's remains and believes that it is appropriate to begin planning for his return. President Roosevelt temporarily placed Paderewski's body in Arlington Cemetery and, in 1963, President Kennedy declared that his remains be returned when "Poland shall be free." Poland believes that June 29, 1991, the 50th anniversary of Paderewski's death, would be an appropriate occasion to bring him home.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0788 MR
ES 5/23/13

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06b. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush [Translation] (2 pp.)	9/22/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06c. Letter	Chancellor Helmut Kohl to President Bush [German] (2 pp.)	9/22/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

CHRON FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007018
RECEIVED: 05 SEP 90 08

TO: PEREZ, SHIMON

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 10 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS: PERES, SHIMON

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PERES RE ISRAELI SUPPORT OF US IN GULF CRISIS

ACTION: PRES SGD LTR DUE DATE: 11 SEP 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAASS
NSC CHRON
WELCH

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY VAA DATE 10/10 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 6 OF 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

P Ltr — Sharon Farrell

Gulf Crisis

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MEA LOG # 7018

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MEA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	KH	A
Bill Sittmann	2	W	
Bob Gates		8	
Brent Scowcroft	3	APNSA Has Seen	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	JMoK	D
NSC Secretariat			

RECEIVED 90 OCT 04 P 6:26

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: AC LOG # 7018

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	5		A
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	6		AC
NSC Secretariat	7	WH cable	D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DATE: Oct 10, 1990

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

DECLASSIFIED 90 OCT 10 A9:30

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 10, 1990

Dear Shimon:

Thank you for your August 16 note of support. I am encouraged that the entire international community has responded with such unanimity in rejecting Saddam Hussein's unacceptable behavior.

Through the concerted actions of many nations, I am confident that Iraq can be brought to withdraw from Kuwait and that Kuwait's sovereignty and legitimate government will be restored.

We hope the goals enshrined in the many UN Security Council resolutions condemning Iraq can be achieved peacefully. Toward that end, we are pursuing the course of economic sanctions against Iraq. I hope that the use of military force will not be necessary. That said, the consequences of Saddam Hussein's actions are too grave to be tolerated, and we will work with others to do what is necessary to reverse them.

Sincerely,

George Bush

The Honorable
Shimon Peres
Member of The Knesset
The Knesset
Jerusalem

With Warm Personal Best Wishes
GB

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 8, 1990

7018

90 OCT -8 AM 11:54

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Reply Letter to Shimon Peres

Purpose

To thank Shimon Peres for his recent letter expressing support for your actions in the Persian Gulf.

Background

Shimon Peres wrote you a warm personal letter applauding your leadership and actions in the Persian Gulf crisis. A similar response would be appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached reply at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Reply to Shimon Peres
Tab B Letter from Shimon Peres

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Reply for President Bush to Shimon Peres

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President that forwards a reply (Tab A, drafted by State, revised here) to a letter (Tab B) from Shimon Peres, leader of Israel's Labor Party. It thanks Shimon Peres for his kind letter applauding the President for his actions in the Persian Gulf crisis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Reply to Shimon Peres
Tab B Letter from Shimon Peres

S/S 9019332

הכנסת

חבר הכנסת

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

August 16, 1990

Dear Mr. President,

Like so many in the rapidly expanding Free World, I follow with admiration your handling of the crisis in the Gulf.

The projection of a staedy hand, a solid command, a clear vision and an unbending resolve -- all in the service of values we all cherish -- have reinforced confidence that under your leadership the U.S. is willing and able to carve a safer, more promising world order.

Your speach yesterday was but the most recent manifestation of all these leadership qualities that are so essential for a world in transition.

Although triggered by the ugly manifestation of irresponsibility and greed, we pray that your success in containing and reversing them -- in which we have full confidence -- will reinforce prospects for peace and stability in the region and beyond.

Sincerely,

Shimon Peres

Shimon Peres

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008116
RECEIVED: 11 OCT 90 17

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 11 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
EC
EGYPT
ECONOMICS
IMF
PERU

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: IEPR BREAKFAST ON OCT 12 RE PERSIAN GULF FINANCIAL COORDINATION GRP
IMF - WORLD BANK ROLE / EGYPT & PERU DEBT

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 15 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
DEAL
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CaQ NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: VEA LOG # 8116

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG VEA A/O _____

VEA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann	1	W	I
Bob Gates		APNSA Has Seen	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	10/12	N
NSC Secretariat	4	10/15	N

90 OCT 11 P6:34

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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8116

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 11, 1990

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL

SUBJECT: IEPR Breakfast, October 12, 1990, at Treasury

There are four issues for discussion at the IEPR breakfast:

1. Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group

The Coordination Group will hold its second meeting on Friday. David Mulford will chair; Bob Kimmitt will co-chair to underscore the political nature of the discussions and boost the role of Foreign Ministers, as distinct from Finance Ministers, in the coordination process. The purpose of this meeting will be to reach agreement on the anticipated needs of the Front Line states for 1990; nail down specific commitments by donor countries; and initiate discussions about needs and commitments for 1991. Other key issues are:

Country Coverage: Although participants at the organizing meeting stressed the need to keep the number of beneficiary countries small, there is pressure to expand coverage from the original three Front Line states: Saudi Arabia and Kuwait want to include Syria; the French may promote Morocco. State will push for favorable treatment of Eastern Europe, Morocco, Lebanon and Yemen. Obviously, if we push their candidacies, it will be hard to draw the line elsewhere. You may wish to ask Baker how State intends to obtain new financial commitments from the other donors.

Role of the EC: The EC Presidency (Italy) and the EC Commission have been uncomfortable with the effort from the start, seeming to resent our initiative while still recognizing the need for collective action. The Italians and Commission have put forward ideas of an exclusive steering group to advise the American Chairman, but we have politely rejected such proposals. The EC mission here is exploring other bases for compromises. EC participation is therefore still in doubt, although the British and Germans have made clear their intention to join other donor states irrespective of the EC's position. However this is resolved, State, Treasury and we agree on the continued need for U.S. leadership, although some compromise on form may be worth pursuing.

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0833-MR
ES 2/27/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. IMF/World Bank Role in Gulf Crisis

During the annual IMF/IBRD meeting last month, Brady put forward several ideas designed to ease the burden of countries seriously affected by the Gulf Crisis but not qualifying under our definition of Front Line states. He proposed greater access to normal IMF resources through lifting the ceilings on country quotas and by greater use of the IMF's Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF). On paper, these are positive steps which could offer the Eastern Europeans and others greater access to IFI resources; in reality, they may prove to be little more than window dressing given existing constraints in IMF lending.

State asserts that few countries are up against their annual ceilings on drawings so the offer of greater access is not worth much. In the case of the CCFF, there are two "windows": (a) "contingency" financing, which establishes conditionality terms nearly as strict as normal IMF programs; and (b) compensatory financing, which is more accessible with less stringent conditionality. If the measures that Brady announced are to have any real impact, we will need to work with the IMF to make the compensatory "window" as attractive as possible to provide relief for higher oil prices. Interest rate subsidies and/or a special oil facility in the IMF or elsewhere could complement changes in CCFF coverage. Your support for these proposals might help tip the balance between State and Treasury and put some meat on the multilateral portion of the Gulf Crisis assistance effort.

3. Egypt and the IMF

The IMF and Egypt are still arguing over the contents of a possible IMF stand-by program. The IMF contends that with the massive infusion of untied aid funds since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the promise of U.S. debt relief on FMS, Egypt does not need to reschedule short-term debt. The Fund argues that Egypt requires official debt relief over the medium-term and a comprehensive Fund program (with all the attendant political risks). Egypt wants to avoid tough IMF conditionality and seek a generous Paris Club rescheduling -- positions which are inherently inconsistent since Fund programs are generally a prerequisite to rescheduling. Treasury and State are not far apart on the issue. They want Egypt to agree to some reasonable economic targets, for example, commitments toward exchange rate reform without, however, the stringency of a traditional IMF program. But Treasury's notion of a "shadow" IMF program (i.e., targets, but no new money -- at least on the front end) is a non-starter. We need to keep the IMF and Egyptians talking with the call for realism on both sides and a prompt settlement. That should be the objective of the breakfast discussion.

4. Peru

Peru has $1.8 billion in arrears to the IMF, World Bank, and Interamerican Development Bank. Until it cleans up its arrears,

the country will remain a financial pariah. Under a new IMF program that we pushed Peru could become eligible again for new IMF loans with help for past arrearages <u>if</u> it behaves well for 2-3 years (i.e., accepts a tough austerity program and implements it). That program in itself offers little incentive, but coupled with World Bank help through a Support Group designed to clear up arrearages, Peru might find the offer attractive enough to make the first steps back toward fiscal sanity. It is unlikely at this meeting that we will reach any decisions, but among the issues requiring discussion are: (a) should Japan lead the Support Group; (b) should ESF be used to clear up arrearages (State says no; Treasury says yes); and (c) should we take any action in the absence of stronger Peruvian commitments on drugs? <u>I would suggest listening here since there is no action-forcing event for the moment</u>.

Concurrences by: David Welch, Adrian Basora, William Pryce

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008169
RECEIVED: 12 OCT 90 19

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 12 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT TELCON

CHRON FILE

2

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES MUBARAK / OCT 12

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 16 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON
		O'LEARY

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9008169

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SITTMANN	Z	90101210	FOR DECISION
001		X	90101512	SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/12/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Hosni Mubarak
Notetaker: Eric T. Johnson

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 12, 1990, 11:56 - 11:59 p.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

President: Hello Hosni. (U)

MUBARAK: Hello George. (U)

President: Hosni, I am deeply shocked at the terrible murder of Dr. Mahgoub this morning. I know this is a terrible loss to Israel (sic) and of course the family. Do you know the nationalities of those involved? (U)

Mubarak: Yes, it is a big tragedy. We don't know whether they were Egyptian or an outside nationality, but we are conducting an investigation. (U)

President: Yes, I was going to ask you who did this terrible thing. Give my condolences and Barbara's to the family of Dr. Mahgoub and the families of the bodyguards. On this other matter, and I'm sorry to bring it up at this sad time, but the UN Security Council resolution - we have a strong resolution; the Five permanent members are together, including France. I called Mitterrand and he feels the language is strong and good. We just need one vote, maybe Yemen, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Cuba - well we can forget Cuba - or Zaire. If you can help us with just one country, then we can get this thing separated from the Gulf Crisis. ~~(C)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
2/25/2009 MM

Mubarak: Yes, I said this yesterday. (U)

President: Do you have any influence with any of them. Zaire? Yemen? Yemen is probably mad at you. (C)

Mubarak: We will try with Mobutu in Zaire. Butros Ghali knows him very well. (C)

President: Well, I was thinking of Yemen. I was thinking of calling Saleh. You know Yemen voted once for us. I know you are being helpful but is there anything else you can do to get the PLO to back away from their draft? I would like to see this thing wrapped up now; it has dragged on too long. (C)

Mubarak: Okay. I will see what I can do. I am going to do it now. Thanks for the condolences. (C)

President: Stay in touch. (U)

Mubarak: I will. Thanks to you. (U)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8169

October 12, 1990

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Call with President Mubarak, October 12, 1990

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation for the President's telephone call to President Mubarak of Egypt on October 12, 1990.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/15/2013

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MEN LOG # 8169

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG A A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	KH	A
Bill Sittmann	2	W	
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	21.10/15	N
NSC Secretariat	4		N/R

90 OCT 15 A8:07

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008162
RECEIVED: 12 OCT 90 16

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 12 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
EGYPT
EUROPE
PERU

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: IEPR BREAKFAST / 12 OCT

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 16 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
DEAL
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 9/12/09

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSMEN DOC 1 OF 1

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: IEPR Breakfast, October 12, 1990 (2 pp.)	10/12/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ES On 5/31/22

Date Closed:	6/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0834-MR(509)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	4/6/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

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C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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509
2010-0834-MR
PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

8162

October 12, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL

SUBJECT: IEPR Breakfast, October 12, 1990

Below is a summary of issues discussed at the IEPR breakfast:

1. Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group: The discussion on this issue continued well after your departure. The key points were:

   a. Data: We should make every effort to have oil price data (i.e. the effect of oil price rises) included in all calculations of the needs of Front Line states. The British, Japanese, and others want to exclude such data on the grounds that higher oil prices affect all countries, not just the Front Line states. But exclusion of such data understates the latter group's needs. Baker said that this position is unacceptable and that we should therefore push for inclusion of oil prices in the assessments.

   b. Commitments: Mulford stressed the importance of today's Coordination Group meeting in nailing down donor commitments. This was particularly important in the case of Saudi Arabia whose commitments to the Front Line states remain vague (e.g. the Saudis have still not clarified their position on providing free oil to Turkey).

   c. Conditionality: Baker referred to the need to obtain clarification on the question of conditionality. We had agreement that there would be no conditionality attached to 1990 disbursements to the Front Line states. The problem arises with respect to money committed in 1990, but actually disbursed in 1991. 1.4(d)

[redacted]

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0834-MR
EB 4/6/15

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1.4(d) [redacted]

d. Eastern Europe: At Eagleburger's urging, Mulford will emphasize the importance of Eastern Europe even if these countries are not part of the Front Line group. Baker said that we should also seek to include Yemen, Morocco, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Clearly, there will be a problem in drawing the line once we move beyond the three Front Line states. In the case of Eastern Europe, Baker and Brady agreed that we should put the case to the Gulf states "off camera", but rely on the G-24 mechanism to provide the bulk of the assistance to Eastern Europe. We might also try to find some way to associate the Gulf states with the G-24.

2. Egypt and the IMF: 1.4(d) [redacted]

3. Peru: Dallara pointed out that Peru is nearly $2 billion in arrears to the IMF, World Bank, and IDB. The Peruvians have approached the U.S., Japan, and Spain for help. 1.4(d) [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LETTR Bush
ON Oct 12

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: [illegible] LOG # 8162

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [illegible] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann	1	W	I
Bob Gates	2	8	
Brent Scowcroft	3	NOTED	10/28
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		2
NSC Secretariat	5		2

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

RECEIVED
90 OCT 12 P7:11

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008031
RECEIVED: 10 OCT 90 08

TO: SITTMANN

CHRON FILE

FROM: CHARLES
HAASS

DOC DATE: 12 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
IRAQ
ANSA
KUWAIT
IRAN
MEMCON

PERSONS: BISHARA, ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ GCC SECGEN BISHARA / OCT 10

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 13 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
CHARLES
EXECSEC
HAASS
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS: _____

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~~SECRET~~

Memo of Conv for Mtg w/ GCC Secretary Bishara

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MCN

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 8031

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	KH	A
Bill Sittmann	2	BS	
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft	3	ARNSA Has Seen	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room		9/7.09/22	N
West Wing Desk	4	9/7 10/22	N) R
NSC Secretariat	5		

RECEIVED 09 SEP 15 A10:37

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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8031 ADD ON

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 12, 1990

ACTION

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation for Meeting with GCC Secretary Bishara

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation for General Scowcroft's meeting with GCC Secretary General Bishara on October 10, 1990.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum at Tab I for file purposes and that General Scowcroft be provided a copy.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0834-MR
ES 4/6/15

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11b. Memcon	Re: National Secretary Advisor's Meeting with GCC Secretary General Bishara (3 pp.)	10/10/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ES On 5/31/22

Date Closed:	6/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0834-MR(510.01)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	4/6/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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510.01
2010-0834-MR
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: National Security Advisor's Meeting with GCC Secretary General Bishara

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 10, 1990; 4:00 - 4:30 p.m. West Wing office

PARTICIPANTS: Brent Scowcroft
Abdullah Bishara, GCC Secretary General
Sandra Charles, NSC, Notetaker

1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)



General Scowcroft: The Soviets gave Iraq a tough message and said they must comply with the UN resolutions, and if they refused, the Soviets would take the opposite side. (S)

1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)



General Scowcroft: The question is how to deliver that message. (S)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0834-MR
ES 4/6/15

1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)



General Scowcroft: We are unyielding on that. (C)

1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)



General Scowcroft: At the end of the road, we must be successful. We can't fail. (C)

1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)



Secretary Bishara: The GCC motto is "Kuwait at any cost". We don't want the destruction of Iraq, but the liberation of Kuwait. All the GCC supports this. 1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)

[redacted]

General Scowcroft: I am not sure what "soon" means. I know we have to be successful, we cannot fail. If sanctions don't work, and we can't convince him we are determined... (Ø)

1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)

[redacted]

General Scowcroft: We should try. (Ø)

1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)

[redacted]

1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)

[redacted]

-- End of Conversation --

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008154
RECEIVED: 12 OCT 90

2

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 12 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT
CONGRESSIONAL
TELCON

PERSONS: BURNS, CONRAD
CHAFEE, JOHN H
ARMSTRONG, WILLIAM L
MACK, CONNIE

SUBJECT: PROPOSED TELCALL TO SENS FM PRES

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 16 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LAMPLEY LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
LAMPLEY
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

RECORD ID: 9008154

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SCOWCROFT	Z	90101218	FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION
002		X	90101217	NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
002	PRESIDENT	Z	90101219	FOR SIGNATURE
002		X	91020617	OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8154

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk		2/6	
NSC Secretariat	1		OBE/ONR

01 FEB 6 P2:54

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8154

October 12, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: VIRGINIA A. LAMPLEY/VAL

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Senators Conrad Burns, William Armstrong, John Chafee, Connie Mack and John McCain

Attached at Tab I is a telephone call proposal for you to sign to the President asking him to call Senators Conrad Burns, William Armstrong, John Chafee, Connie Mack and John McCain as soon as possible requesting help on the Egyptian debt issue.

Concurrence by: Richard Haass

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the telephone call proposal at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be made

OBE for K

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON 8154

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Phone Calls to Senators Conrad Burns, William Armstrong, John Chafee, Connie Mack and John McCain

DATE: Today, October 12 or tomorrow morning, October 13, 1990

PURPOSE: To request help on the Egyptian debt issue when it is considered on the Senate Floor later this evening or tomorrow morning as part of the FY '91 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line Call

INTERPRETER: None Required

PHONE NUMBERS:

Conrad Burns	224-2644
William Armstrong	224-5941
John Chafee	224-2921
Connie Mack	224-5274
John McCain	224-2235

SUGGESTED TIMES: As soon as possible

TOPIC OF DISCUSSION: Egyptian debt issue

Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
SENATORS CONRAD BURNS, WILLIAM ARMSTRONG, JOHN CHAFEE,
CONNIE MACK AND JOHN MCCAIN

-- I understand that the Senate will shortly be considering the Egyptian debt issue as part of the fiscal year 1991 foreign operations appropriations bill.

-- I need your help on this. Mubarak has courageously stuck his neck out with his people and the Arab world. His contribution is absolutely fundamental to the success of our collective effort. Frankly, Egypt's political and strategic contribution dwarfs all others in the region. We have an obligation to help him.

-- The hard reality is that Egypt's debt was unpayable before the Gulf crisis, and the additional economic hardship that the crisis has imposed on Egypt makes it all the more imperative that we cancel the debt now.

-- Without our help, Egypt's economic crisis will undermine its ability to continue playing its key leadership role within the Arab community of nations in the search for peace and stability in the region. As you are probably aware we, the Speaker of the Egyptian Parliament was assassinated yesterday. We cannot afford to have Egypt further destabilized.

-- We have got to have this to keep our Gulf policy together.

-- I hope that I can count on your support on this crucial issue.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008217
RECEIVED: 16 OCT 90 09

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 16 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF ECONOMICS

CHRON FILE

2

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: GULF CRISIS FINANCIAL COORDINATION GRP MTG / OCT 12

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 19 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL LOGREF: 9007702

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DEAL
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSMEN CLOSED BY: NSMEN DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 16, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL

SUBJECT: Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group Meeting, October 12, 1990

The Gulf Crisis Coordination Group held its second meeting at Treasury on October 12. David Mulford chaired the session; Bob Kimmitt was co-chair. The EC, which had threatened to boycott the meeting because of questions regarding its role, participated after receiving assurances on the rotation of meeting sites. (The EC objected to having all meetings in Washington as this implied "unequal status" among contributing countries.)

The IMF and World Bank representatives briefly described their estimates of the needs of the Front Line states (see Tab I). Most of the discussion focused on the "scorecard" at Tab II, which summarizes commitments and disbursements to date. As the table shows, the Gulf states have made the largest commitments and account for 96% of all disbursements. Egypt has received nearly $2 billion since August 2; Jordan, nothing. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait together have provided $1.5 billion to "other states" including Syria ($1 billion), Lebanon, and Morocco. The UAE representative said that his country would like to help Jordan, but such assistance would depend on Jordanian compliance with UN sanctions.

Germany accounts for nearly 50% of the EC's commitments including its contribution to the EC budget. The EC has offered $2 billion for 1990-91, but for budgetary and other reasons will disburse most of its money in 1991. At the meeting, France announced that it would provide $100 million to the three Front Line states during the remainder of 1990 plus $13 million to Morocco. The UK will limit its contribution to that provided through the EC. The British pointed out that their military deployments to the Gulf cost approximately $2 billion on an annual basis.

Regarding assistance to other countries, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait asserted that Syria and Lebanon should be included as Front Line states. Japan also supported Syria's inclusion.

Mulford stressed the importance of Eastern Europe, noting that the strong, united response to Iraqi aggression was possible because of the momentous change in East-West relations. Eastern

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0834-MR
ES 4/6/15

Europe needed help to avert economic collapse. The EC Commission representative said that the G-24 would take up Eastern European energy and financing problems at a meeting on October 19.

In keeping with the decision to rotate meeting sites, the Coordination Group will next meet in Rome during the first half of November. The EC also extracted a pledge for the Italians to act as informal co-chairman of that meeting.

Attachments
Tab I Needs of Front Line States
Tab II Commitments and Disbursements to Date

cc: David Gompert
Karl Jackson
Richard Haass
William Pryce

P.3/9

Estimates of Incremental Financial Impact of Middle East Crisis 1/

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

	1990			1991			1990-91			
	Turkey	Egypt	Jordan	Turkey	Egypt	Jordan	Turkey	Egypt	Jordan	
Merchandise Costs										Merchandise Costs
Export losses	270	20	285	650	30	535	920	50	820	Export losses
Higher oil bill	855	-395	125	2000	-890	295	2855	-1285	420	Higher oil bill
Service Costs										Service Costs
Transportation	150	100	100	375	250	250	525	350	350	Transportation
Contractor fees	50	100		125	250		175	350	0	Contractor fees
Workers remittances	50	600	200	125	1300	500	175	1900	700	Workers remittances
Tourism	150	200	275	360	400	475	510	600	750	Tourism
Other services	0	100	50	0	240	135	0	340	185	Other services
Capital Account Costs										Capital Account Costs
Lost debt repayments	100	--	110	600	--	145	700	--	255	Lost debt repayments
Other Costs 2/	50	400	220	--	670	595	50	1070	815	Other Costs 2/
Refugee repatriation	0	75	20	--	--	--	--	75	20	Refugee repatriation
Refugee subsistence	50	200	100	--	50	20	50	250	120	Refugee subsistence
Job creation	0	125	100	--	620	575	--	745	675	Job creation
Total with oil at $31/BBL	1675	1125	1365	4235	2250	2930	5910	3375	4295	Total with oil at $31/BBL
Total ann'l		4165			9415			13580		Total Ann'l
Total with oil at $25/BBl	1250	1305	1102	3235	2680	2783	4485	3985	4085	Total with oil at $25/BBL
Total Ann'l		3857			8698			12555		Total Ann'l
Total with oil at $35/BBL	1965	995	1405	4900	1960	3030	6865	2955	4435	Total with oil at $35/BBL
Total Ann'l		4365			9890			14255		Total Ann'l

1/ On the basis of assumptions provided by U.S. authorities.

2/ Costs related to refugee repatriation, resettlement and job creation. Estimate is from United States Government. Fund/Bank staff are not in a position at this stage to provide their own estimate.

OCT 02 '90 13:41 O.U.S.E.D.

COMMITMENTS & DISBURSEMENTS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO FRONTLINE STATES*

10/12/90

(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

		TOTAL		Economic								Emergency & Humanitarian		*OTHER STATES a/*
				Egypt		Turkey		Jordan		Unallocated				
		Comm.	Disb.	Comm.	Disb.	Comm.	Disb.	Comm.	Disb.	Comm.	Disb.	Comm.	Disb.	
GULF														
Saudi Arabia	*b/*	2500	1175	1500	1000	oil						175	175	*1050*
Kuwait		2500	765	555	540	300	225							*533*
UAE		1000	700	450	450	250	250			300	0			
Qatar		n.a.	n.a.											
Other GCC		n.a.	n.a.											
EC	*c/*													
EC Budget	*d/*	751	78							673	0	78	78	
Bilateral:	*e/*	1345	12							1345	0			
Belgium		*n.a.*	*n.a.*											
France		*n.a.*	*n.a.*											
Germany	*f/*	*869*	*7*	*644*	*0*	*73*	*0*	*145*	*0*			*7*	*7*	
Italy		*n.a.*	*n.a.*											
Netherlands		*n.a.*	*n.a.*											
United Kingdom	*g/*	*116*	*5*							*111*	*0*	*5*	*5*	
OTHER EUROPE														
Sweden		22	22									22	22	
Switzerland		8	0					3	0			5	0	
JAPAN		2000	0	395	0	300	0	250	0	1055	0			
CANADA		68	6							62	0	6	6	
KOREA		100	0							65	0	35	0	
TOTAL		10293	2758	2900	1990	850	475	253	0	3500	0	320	281	*1583*

NOTES

* The precise definition of the frontline states remains under consideration.
Includes all commitments for economic assistance in 1990 and 1991, based on data submitted to the Coordinating Group.
Does not include military assistance.

a/ Assistance to other, non-frontline states not included in total.

b/ Assistance in form of oil supplies for Turkey has not been quantified.

c/ Total EC commitment for 1990-1991 consists of ECU 59 million in Humanitarian assistance (approximately $78 million), plus ECU 1.5 billion in Economic assistance (approximately $2 billion), one-third from Community budget and two-thirds from member country bilateral contributions.

d/ ECU 500 million total.

e/ ECU 1 billion total.

f/ May include amounts in addition to German share of EC bilateral assistance.

g/ The humanitarian assistance is provided through direct U.K. bilateral channels.

MEMORANDUM

Exchange rates as of New York close on 10/11/90 (in units per US$, except [i] is US$ per unit):

ECU [i]	1.3453
Deutschemark	1.5135
Swiss franc	1.2729
Canadian dollar	1.1466

Sup Mtg 10-12-90

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MEN LOG # 8217

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 24 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	KH	I
Bill Sittmann	2	W	
Bob Gates	3		
Brent Scowcroft	4	NOTED	10/28
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5		N
NSC Secretariat	6		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

CHRON FILE

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008281
RECEIVED: 17 OCT 90 14

TO: PRESIDENT

2

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 17 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT TELCALL

PERSONS: BOND, CHRISTOPHER S
WILSON, PETE
SYMMS, STEVEN D
COHEN, WILLIAM S

SUBJECT: PRES PHONE CALL TO SENS RE EGYPTIAN DEBT ISSUE 17 OCT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 20 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LAMPLEY LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HAASS
		LAMPLEY
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ *LOG #* 8281

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* *PRS* *NSC* *INT*

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	LMS 10/18	VFA
NSC Secretariat	2		N/B

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Sittmann has seen.

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 8281

URGENT NOT PROOFED: ✓ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 27 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	27 Oct	DN
NSC Secretariat			

90 OCT 17 P4:06

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 17, 1990

Mr. President:

Each of these people has been called either by Jim Baker or myself. Only you will be able to lock them in.

Brent Scowcroft

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
10-18-90

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8281

October 17, 1990

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Phone Calls to Senators Christopher Bond, Steven Symms, Pete Wilson, William Cohen, Richard Shelby and Charles Robb

DATE: Today, October 17

PURPOSE: To request help on the Egyptian debt issue when it is considered on the Senate Floor tomorrow as part of the FY '91 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill.

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line Call

INTERPRETER: None Required

PHONE NUMBERS:

Christopher Bond	224-5721	4:45 - will look at, +
Steven Symms	224-6142	4:55 - not sure how explain party gave 90 after Sadam
Pete Wilson	224-3841	
William Cohen	224-2523	
Richard Shelby	224-5744	5 PM - E. Ankara him today. Hope it goes as a package - Hopes not separate
Charles Robb	224-4024	

4:55 "with you"

SUGGESTED TIMES: As soon as possible

TOPIC OF DISCUSSION: Egyptian debt issue

Date of Submission:

Action:

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
SENATORS CHRISTOPHER BOND, STEVEN SYMMS, PETE WILSON,
WILLIAM COHEN, RICHARD SHELBY AND CHARLES ROBB

-- I understand that the Senate will tomorrow be considering the Egyptian debt issue as part of the fiscal year 1991 foreign operations appropriations bill.

-- I need your help on this. Mubarak has courageously stuck his neck out with his people and the Arab world. His contribution is absolutely fundamental to the success of our collective effort. Frankly, Egypt's political and strategic contribution dwarfs all others in the region. We have an obligation to help him.

-- The hard reality is that Egypt's debt was unpayable before the Gulf crisis, and the additional economic hardship that the crisis has imposed on Egypt makes it all the more imperative that we cancel the debt now.

-- Without our help, Egypt's economic crisis will undermine its ability to continue playing its key leadership role within the Arab community of nations in the search for peace and stability in the region. As you are probably aware, the Speaker of the Egyptian Parliament was recently assassinated. We cannot afford to have Egypt further destabilized.

-- We have got to have this to keep our Gulf policy together.

-- I hope that I can count on your support on this crucial issue.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8281

October 17, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: VIRGINIA A. LAMPLEY

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call to Senators Christopher Bond, Steven Symms, Pete Wilson, William Cohen, Richard Shelby and Charles Robb

Attached at Tab I is a telephone call proposal for you to sign to the President asking him to call Senators Christopher Bond, Steven Symms, Pete Wilson, William Cohen, Richard Shelby and Charles Robb as soon as possible requesting help on the Egyptian debt issue.

Concurrence by: Richard Haass

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the telephone call proposal at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008216
RECEIVED: 16 OCT 90 09

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 17 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ALGERIA
TELCALL
TUNISIA
IRAQ

PERSONS: BENDJEDID, CHADLI
BEN ALI, ZINE

2

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PRES CALLS TO BENDJEDID OF ALGERIA AND BEN ALI OF TUNISIA RE GULF CRISIS

ACTION: NFAR PER GATES DUE DATE: 17 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS LOGREF: 9008208

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON
		WELCH

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cep NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSMEN CLOSED BY: NSRLG DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 8216

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Brent thinks immediately

October 17, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen

SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Calls To Presidents Bendjedid and Ben Ali

State has proposed that the President make brief telephone calls to President Bendjedid of Algeria (Tab I) and President Ben Ali of Tunisia (Tab II) to discuss the Gulf crisis with both. Bendjedid is considering a trip to Baghdad, and State believes a call would reinforce our position. With Ben Ali, State suggests that the President register his concern with Tunisia's continued equivocation in its Gulf policy.

We are not convinced either of these calls would prove useful. This said, they might help at the margin. Given State's preference, we decided to give you the choice.

or are not the President's time

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached proposals for telephone calls to Presidents Bendjedid and Ben Ali at Tabs I and II.

Attachments
Tab I Telephone Call Proposal (President Bendjedid)
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab II Telephone Call Proposal (Ben Ali)
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab III Roy/Scowcroft Memos

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0834-MR
ES 4/6/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FOR:	THE PRESIDENT
FROM:	BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:	Telephone Call to President Bendjedid of Algeria
DATE:	October 19, 1990
PURPOSE:	To reiterate U.S. positions on the Gulf crisis.
SECURE OR OPEN:	Open line call
INTERPRETER:	Shukran Kamal President Bendjedid does not speak English.
PHONE NUMBER:	To be provided.
CONTACT PERSON:	To be provided.
TIME DIFFERENCE:	+5
SUGGESTED TIMES:	To be determined.
TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:	1. Reaffirm U.S. positions on Gulf crisis. 2. Urge Bendjedid to insist on complete implementation of UNSC resolutions.

Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0834-MR
ES 4/6/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BENDJEDID OF ALGERIA

-- I wanted to consult with you about where we stand in the Gulf crisis. I gather you may go to Baghdad and I thought we should share our views.

-- Despite recent Iraqi visits and statements, we see no evidence of any change in Iraq's intransigent refusal to withdraw completely and unconditionally.

-- The United States and its allies are not willing to link progress on withdrawal from Kuwait to progress on other Middle East issues. There should be no reward for Iraq's aggression.

-- I am happy to hear that Foreign Minister Ghozali has assured us that Algeria continues to hold these positions. This is key, as your country enjoys widespread respect in the Arab world and beyond.

-- I would appreciate your views and any ideas you may have. I would also appreciate any reaction you might have should you visit Baghdad.

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0834-NR
Ef 4/6/15

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FOR:	THE PRESIDENT
FROM:	BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:	Telephone Call to President Ben Ali of Tunisia
DATE:	October 19, 1990
PURPOSE:	To express disappointment over Tunisia's equivocal position in the Gulf crisis.
SECURE OR OPEN:	Open line call
INTERPRETER:	Shikram Kamal; President Ben Ali understands English but does not speak it.
PHONE NUMBER:	To be provided
CONTACT PERSON:	To be provided
TIME DIFFERENCE:	+5
SUGGESTED TIMES:	To be determined
TOPICS OF	1. Express disappointment at Tunisia's position on the Gulf crisis. 2. Encourage more direct consultations with our Ambassador.

Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

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1

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT BEN ALI OF TUNISIA

-- In the spirit of close consultations that have marked our relationship, I would like to share some of my thoughts about Tunisia's policy on the Gulf.

-- I remember well our conversation during your visit in May regarding the danger that Iraq's policies pose for regional stability. Our concerns have now become reality.

-- The U.S. has always looked to Tunisia as a voice of moderation and reason in the Arab world.

-- Therefore, I was very surprised and disturbed by Tunisia's apparent early tilt toward Iraq in the crisis.

-- We have noted some improvement in Tunisia's Gulf policy in recent weeks. We welcome your recent commitment to enforce UN sanctions.

-- But we remain concerned that Tunisia has criticized the introduction of foreign forces into the region and that you are not party to the Arab League consensus against Iraq.

-- We all would like to see a diplomatic solution to this crisis in conformance with relevant Security Council resolutions. The best hope for a diplomatic solution will come when Saddam realizes there are no cracks in the international consensus against him.

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-- The bottom line of the international community is clear: complete and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal.

-- It would be very helpful, Mr. President, if you could give us the benefit of your thoughts on Iraq through Ambassador Pelletreau on a regular basis.

-- Tunisia has long been a trusted and important ally of the U.S. in a turbulent region. I hope this will continue.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13f. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Phone Call to Tunisian President Ben Ali (1 pp.)	10/15/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ES On 7/21/22

Date Closed:	6/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0835-MR(512.05)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	4/2/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

Washington, D.C. 20520 9021886

October 15, 1990 8208

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512.05
2010-0835-MR
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MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Call to Tunisian President Ben Ali

The Department proposes a short telephone call from President Bush to President Ben Ali to register our concern over Tunisia's continued equivocation in its Gulf policy.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Suggested Talking Points

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2010-0835-MR
EB 4/2/15

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13g. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Phone Call to Tunisian Algerian President Bendjedid (1 pp.)	10/15/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ES On 7/21/22

Date Closed:	6/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0835-MR(512.06)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	4/2/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

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Washington, D.C. 20520 #8216

October 15, 1990

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MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Call to Algerian President Bendjedid

While President Bendjedid has not yet decided whether to accept Saddam Hussein's invitation to visit Baghdad "in the next several days", we suggest that the President phone Bendjedid before he makes this possible trip. A phone call from the President could spell out in clear and unambiguous terms the risks of such a trip--i.e., that it may encourage Saddam to think that there is a crack in the international front. Should Bendjedid make the trip, a direct message from the President would leave no doubt about the US position.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

[redacted]

J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Suggested Talking Points

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2010-0835-MR
ES 4/12/15

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008279
RECEIVED: 17 OCT 90 14

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2

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 19 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JORDAN HS
PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS: HUSSEIN I

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO KING HUSSEIN RE RECENT PUBLIC REMARKS INDICATING OPPOSITION TO US PRESENCE IN THE GULF & SUPPORT FOR IRAQ

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 20 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON
		WELCH

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS: PRES SENT HANDWRITTEN LTR TO KING HUSSEIN / NO COPY AVAILABLE

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM CLOSED BY: NSRLG DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

90 OCT 19 PM 2:50

October 19, 1990

Draft not used

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter to King Hussein

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

Purpose

To express your concern over King Hussein's recent public remarks indicating opposition to the U.S. presence in the Gulf and support for Iraq.

Background

After several weeks of relative quiet on the part of King Hussein, his interview with the New York Times suggests a continued willingness to speak out publicly against the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia and to provide rhetorical justification for Iraq's position. Hussein's remarks appear to be aimed mostly at Saudi Arabia (probably responding to the Bandar letter), not at you. We have prepared a letter to Hussein expressing your disappointment about his statements and noting the difficulty they cause for our efforts to encourage economic help for Jordan.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A to King Hussein.

Attachment
Tab A Letter to King Hussein of Jordan

Interview also said Saudis not threatened Please add sentence on that

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~
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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0788-MR
8/21/2013 MM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Your Majesty:

As you know from consultations between our representatives, including Crown Prince Hassan's meetings with Jim Baker and Brent Scowcroft, we have been trying to encourage economic support for Jordan. As I expect you also know, that effort has been hindered by Jordan's political position in the Gulf crisis. Despite your country's progress in implementing sanctions, recent Jordanian political actions and statements, such as the conference in Amman and your Prime Minister's public remarks on our motivation in putting forces into Saudi Arabia, have made our task even more difficult.

I cannot hide my disappointment, therefore, in your recent interview with the New York Times. Your Majesty, it is simply incorrect that the United States decided to send, let alone dispatched, troops to Saudi Arabia before receiving a request from King Fahd. Our only motivation was to deter Iraq and if necessary defend a friend; we went when asked and we will leave the same way. It is also deeply troubling to read that an old and close friend "honestly can't tell" if Iraq's invasion was justified, when the entire world is united in condemning this action. If my concern seems to you to be unfair, Your Majesty, I ask that you bear in mind my expectations. To find such differences between us, when so much is at stake, is a painful and unexpected chapter in the history of relations between our nations.

I would have preferred that you and I talk this over privately because of the damage such public statements inflict -- not only upon everyone's credibility, but also upon the prospects for

resolving the current situation in the Gulf peacefully. Indeed, and as you yourself are quoted as saying, "a dialogue across the airwaves is not constructive."

Nevertheless, we shall persist in the effort to help Jordan weather the dislocations caused by implementing sanctions. We are motivated by our longstanding friendship with Jordan, our support for Jordan's stability and well-being, and the feeling that Jordan's position had been evolving. Surmounting the reluctance of those most able to help is not going to be easy, and can only be made more difficult if frustrations and disagreements -- particularly if based upon fallacies -- become public. With regards,

Sincerely,

His Majesty
Hussein I
King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Amman

~~SECRET~~ SECRET 8279 REDO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

[redacted]

October 18, 1990

Brent: revised per our conversation + Bob's comments

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Letter to King Hussein

Attached is a memorandum to the President conveying a letter to King Hussein for his signature.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memo for the President
Tab A Letter to King Hussein of Jordan

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 11/15/2013

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1990

Mr. President:

Here is the King Hussein interview you requested.

Brent Scowcroft

Attachment

NY Times
Oct 16, 90

King Hussein on Kuwait and Dashed Hope

By JUDITH MILLER
Special to The New York Times

AMMAN, Jordan, Oct. 15 — He is chain-smoking again, and says it is impossible to sleep more than four hours a night. To relieve the pressure, he has taken to riding around his palace on a BMW motorcycle. While his eyes can sparkle at times, he looks at other times as if he is carrying the cares of 200 million Arabs on his shoulders.

Since the Persian Gulf crisis began, King Hussein of Jordan has traveled more than 50,000 miles and met with 15 leaders to avert a war that he warns would be catastrophic not only for his country, but also for this region and the West.

"With or without war, nothing will return to what it was," the King says. "This will be an area of turmoil unless people face up to the need to create new dreams and new realities."

Paul Conklin

King Hussein of Jordan said war might be imminent.

Missed Opportunities

Now, after 10 weeks, he says that war may be imminent, despite statements in Washington indicating that there are still months of waiting to see if the economic sanctions against President Saddam Hussein of Iraq will work.

If war comes, the Jordanian King says, it will be partly because of a failure by President Bush and other Western leaders to respond in time to signals from the Iraqi leader, soon after the Kuwait invasion, that he was ready to withdraw from most of the occupied territory.

The 54-year-old King, now in his 38th year on the throne, says that he believes a peaceful end to the Kuwait dispute is possible, but only if there is a greater willingness to compromise by the United States and its Arab allies, and what he called "an end to the current embargo on dialogue."

"A dialogue across the airwaves is not constructive," he said. If diplomacy fails, he said, his conversations with Saddam Hussein have

Continued on Page A18, Column 1

Mideast Tensions: A Talk With a Weary King

Jordanian Talks of Chances Missed And Trust Betrayed in Kuwait Crisis

Continued From Page A1

convinced him that the Iraqis would fight.

"If it's a question of humiliation and surrender, it won't work," the King said. "Capitulation is unacceptable."

Back at Nadwa, his yellow granite palace in downtown Amman, the King continues his diplomatic campaign with King Hassan II of Morocco and President Chadli Benjedid of Algeria, sending letters and messages back and forth between Baghdad and other Arab capitals, planning his next moves.

In a series of interviews over the weekend, he spoke at length about his efforts to prevent and later to contain the Persian Gulf crisis, the first time he has given a full public accounting of his actions.

He disclosed that on Aug. 2, the day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he had been given 48 hours by President Bush to secure a commitment from President Hussein to withdraw his troops. He said that President Hussein had promised to begin pulling out troops if the Arab League did not condemn him, something it did do, which he said, led to the collapse of his early efforts.

The King's mood, often frustrated and angry, was lightened by occasional bursts of humor as he mused about happier times, or watched the latest news on CNN. At one point, his spirits darkening, he spoke of thoughts of resigning from a job that many regard among the most dangerous in the Middle East, thoughts he said he has since put firmly out of his mind.

A Favored Land Now Out of Favor

Jordan was once regarded by the United States and other Western countries as the most dependable of the Arab nations. Now, King Hussein showed his distress at the way he and his country have been criticized since the start of the crisis by the United States and its allies. They have deplored what they regard as his hedging on condemning the Iraqi invasion, a stand that the harshest critics say comes close to condoning Baghdad's action.

What made his isolation particularly stressful, he says, is that he and President Bush are friends of long standing. And he went out of his way not to assail the United States. He was more critical of his former Arab allies.

Of all Arab leaders, King Hussein said, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt has disappointed him the most. The King said he had helped bring Egypt back into the Arab fold, after its peace treaty with Israel in 1979, but that the move seemed not to have assuaged Egyptian anger at having been excluded in the first place. At a Cairo summit meeting in August, the King said he had the feeling that Mr. Mubarak was "trying to pay back Iraq for having led the campaign against Egypt."

Mr. Mubarak has been bitter in turn at President Hussein for deceiving him before the invasion of Kuwait, by telling him that he would not take military action.

The King repeatedly emphasized that Jordan has supported all the United Nations Security Council resolutions on Kuwait. He has, however, opposed the presence of American forces in Saudi Arabia, something he said was neither anti-Western nor pro-Iraqi.

"I am pro-peace," he declared. "I have backed nobody except my conscience and the interests of all in peace and security in this region."

Nevertheless, in the interviews, he praised Mr. Hussein as "a friend and a new phenomenon in Arab politics."

When he was asked if he believed that President Hussein, his namesake but no relation, was justified in having invaded part or all of Kuwait, he seemed momentarily uncomfortable.

"I honestly can't tell, but given the leadership of Saddam Hussein, I know it was not easy," he replied. "I can't justify or condone, but the reason must have been pretty substantial to have had it happen. Both sides, I fear, gradually succumbed to a conspiracy theory about the other."

Quashing Rumors Of Lust for Land

The King seemed especially eager to rebut a conspiracy theory that has gained wide credence in Arab circles since the invasion, that Iraq, Jordan and Yemen had been eyeing Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for themselves, and had been planning for months before the invasion to divide up the oil-producing area among themselves.

According to these accounts, Iraq would have taken Kuwait, securing its long-sought free access to the Persian Gulf; Yemen would get part of disputed Saudi territory, and King Hussein, who is revered as a 33d-generation descendant of the prophet Mohammed, would be restored to his family's traditional role as custodian of Islam's most sacred sites in Saudi Arabia.

He said Jordan wanted nothing but peace, and had not been forewarned about the Iraqi invasion.

The King argued, however, that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait could have been prevented through astute Arab diplomacy, and that American forces would not have been needed if the Arabs had enough time to resolve the problem themselves.

And, he said, the United States' decision to send forces to the Saudi desert was taken before the Riyadh Government formally requested them and, he said, seemed ultimately intended not to defend Saudi Arabia but to destroy President Hussein.

According to the King's account, he received an agreement from President Bush, in a telephone conversation within hours of the Iraqi invasion, that he would be given 48 hours to secure a commitment from Mr. Hussein to withdraw his troops. The King said the commitment was given while he was meeting in Alexandria, Egypt, with Mr. Mubarak.

The King said he told the American and Eygptian leaders that he had talked to President Hussein by phone before flying to Egypt and that the Iraqi had said he was planning to begin withdrawing from Kuwait within days. "Within a week we'll be gone," the King quoted President Hussein as saying. The King told Mr. Bush and Mr. Mubarak that the Iraqi leader had also warned that he "would not respond positively to threats or intimidation."

Conciliatory Words From Iraqi Quoted

The Arab League foreign ministers were meeting in Cairo, and, the King said, Saddam Hussein suspected that the ministers might call for foreign involvement. "Let us not scratch each other's eyes out," the King quoted the Iraqi leader as saying. "If things go that way, we may say Kuwait is part of Iraq and annex it."

Early the next morning, Aug. 3, the King flew to Baghdad, where he found President Hussein "fine and more relaxed than on my previous visit" six days earlier. The Iraqi leader, he said, reiterated that he was willing to withdraw from most of Kuwait — exactly to where he did not say — and to discuss other grievances at a meeting of heads of government in Jidda on Sunday, provided the Arab League did not condemn him or call for foreign intervention.

The King returned to Amman later that day, confident that agreement was possible, but he said he was unable to get either King Fahd or President Mubarak on the phone. While still waiting to convey the results of the Baghdad meeting, he said, he learned that Egypt had just condemned Iraq's invasion, and that the Arab League was preparing to take similar action that night.

King Hussein said he still did not understand why his initiative was undermined. But the condemnations dashed hopes of an early peaceful resolution to the crisis, he said, adding "Suddenly, it was all torn apart."

From the King's version of the crisis, an extraordinary picture emerged of the world of Arab politics — a milieu of secrets and conspiracies; of lies and treachery; of humiliations for him and other, poorer Arabs; of duplicity, revenge and broken promises, and of dashed hopes that, he said, had brought him to consider resignation.

"When you look beyond this," he asked, "what is there for us? I'm proud of what I've done in Jordan, but the region itself is sitting on a time bomb. So before the crisis, I was thinking of quitting. I won't quit in the middle of this. But I'll never be a burden to my country."

When Baghdad Decided to Strike

Ranging back and forth through his experiences in recent weeks, the King shed fresh light on other aspects of the crisis.

Among other things, he said, after the invasion Mr. Hussein had told him that he had decided only late in July that military action was necessary. The King said the Iraqi leader had told him that he had decided to seize all of Kuwait, instead of the part of the territory long in dispute, because he expected the United States to defend the sheikdom with force, and believed he would be in stronger position militarily and politically if he could eventually withdraw to a point



Troops and Equipment Continue to Arrive in Saudi Arabia

American troops unloading a Bradley Fighting Vehicle of the First Cavalry Division at a Saudi port.

that left Iraq with the disputed territory only.

The King said Saddam Hussein also told him that he never intended to invade Saudi Arabia, a threat that was originally cited by the United States in sending troops there.

Furthermore, the King said, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had told him, during a meeting at her country residence, that the United States troops were "halfway to Saudi Arabia" before they were formally requested. The King said he had confirmed this later through what he described as his own sources.

The King of this small country, flanked on three sides by Iraq, Israel and Saudi Arabia, seemed most agitated when expressing the view that the invasion could have been prevented.

On at least five occasions since the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, he said, he had unsuccessfully tried to persuade Kuwait directly or through gulf intermediaries to resolve the financial and territorialdisputes with Baghdad that he said triggered the invasion. Saddam Hussein also made repeated, unsuccessful attempts, he said.

He said he first became concerned about an escalation of the dispute five months ago, at the end of May, at an Arab summit meeting in Baghdad.

"We had a closed meeting and he was very frank," the King said. President Hussein warned that his battered country was being strangled by economic warfare waged by "his brothers" among Arab leaders, and that these leaders seemed indifferent to the fact that Iraq had protected them and their people with "the blood of Iraqis" during the just-concluded war with Iran.

Saddam Hussein had already tried to resolve the border issue during the Iran-Iraq war, the King said. Kuwait and Iraq had formed several different levels of joint commissions to resolve it, but with no success.

A Volatile Mixture: Oil and Outrage

The King's "second jolt" came when he learned that Iraq's Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, had sent a scathing public memorandum to the Arab League on July 15 accusing Kuwait of violating its oil-production quotas and of stealing Iraqi oil from the Rumaila field, which the two countries shared. Terrible consequences might result, Mr. Aziz warned.

In retrospect, neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia seemed to have trusted him, the King said. But he added that relations with Kuwait had never been easy.An assistant to the King described his visits to Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti Emir, for discussions of financial matters, as a "tin-cup excercise," and said that they had become increasingly humiliating.

By 1988, the gulf states had stopped making payments that had continued for 10 years under a 1978 pledge to support Arab countries threatened by Israel. Some had not made full payments. Jordan had a $6 billion deficit. After 1988, the payments abruptly ended. "They were putting the squeeze on us and I realized we were going to have severe internal problems," the King said.

In the spring of 1989, as he had feared, severe food rioting erupted in Jordan. Kuwait ultimately paid Jordan a modest sum, for which the King said he was grateful.

He said his final effort to warn Kuwait about the potential consequences of its deteriorating relationship with Iraq came late in July. On July 29, he visited Mr. Hussein in Baghdad.

"They were bitter," the King recalled, speaking of the Iraqis. They recalled with fury, for example, that after Iranian-backed terrorists had tried to assassinate the Emir, "Iraq had blasted Iran with everything they had — ground to ground missiles, the works." Iran had retaliated, causing 1,500 civilian casualties, but Kuwait would not write off its debt, or end the border dispute, or stop stealing oil.

"I realized then that the situation was really very serious," the King said. "I knew they were hurting badly. The atmosphere was tense; the troops were on the border."

On July 30, the King visited the Emir in Kuwait and expressed hope that a special meeting in Jidda between Kuwait and Iraq, scheduled to open the next day, would succeed. And he warned that the meeting was critical.

"I pleaded with them," he said. "They were warm and cordial, unusually so. But there was no commitment, just hopes that it would not fail."

A View of Doom In Soldiers' Eyes

Before boarding his plane, he said, he had a premonition. "I looked at some Kuwaiti soldiers on the tarmac. I suddenly had a deep sense of sadness. Sometimes, leaders' failures can cost these young people's lives."

On the plane back to Jordan, the King said his aides told him that they, too, had failed to detect true concern in their meetings with the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister. "They said their Constitution does not permit us to give up an inch of territory. We won't give in. If they attack us, we would call the Americans." The Kuwaitis' only concern, the King said he was told, seemed to be that relying on American military backing would be "embarrassing" because of American support for Israel.

He said he had learned of the invasion at 6 A.M. on Aug. 2, when King Fahd telephoned him and urged him to call Saddam Hussein and ask the Iraqi leader to withdraw to the disputed territory. "It's all Kuwait's fault," King Hussein said, quoting King Fahd. "They would be this adamant. They've brought this about."

The King spoke to King Fahd rarely after that. On Aug. 6, the Saudi ruler invited "friendly forces" to assist in his country's defense. The next day, the he sent an envoy to assure King Hussein that relations between Riyadh and Baghdad were fine, that there was no evidence of a hostile Iraqi buildup on the border, and that despite American assertions, there was no truth to reports that Iraq planned to invade Saudi Arabia. Later that night, the presence of U.S. forces in the Saudi desert was announced.

ulf Involvement

ge relations with other Arab countries id strengthen the military position of e United States in the region.

"The direct involvement of Soviet oops in military activity against Iraq ill result in increased activity of the pposition inside the country," he said. And in the first order, that activity ill be aimed at the army."

He ridiculed the foreign ministry for onfusing the public by turning against raq after many years of supplying m with arms and proclaiming him a yal ally.

"We army political workers cannot eep pace with the reorientation of the olitical course of the foreign minisy," he said.

Evgeny Kogan, a deputy from Esto-

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RECORD ID: 9008316
RECEIVED: 18 OCT 90 13

TO: PRESIDENT

CHRON FILE

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 19 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HS
BOLIVIA
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
SPAIN
BAHAMAS

PERSONS: JUAN CARLOS I
PINDLING, LYNDEN O
PAZ ZAMORA, JAIME
HAVEL, VACLEV

other

SUBJECT: HS CORRESPONDENCE SUMMARY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 22 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VAN ERON LOGREF: 9008252 9008276

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

Havel letter only

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: LMS LOG # 8316

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOC CLASS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	~~KH~~	A
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates	2	APNSA Has ~~Seen~~	
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	SA. 10/22	~~A~~
NSC Secretariat	4	10/22	N/R

90 OCT 19 P6:27 RECEIVED

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Heads of State Correspondence Summary as of Oct 19.

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec's Ofc has diskette

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8316

October 19, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: GEORGE VAN ERON BFM for

SUBJECT: Heads of State Correspondence Summary as of October 19

Attached at Tab I is a summary of the Heads of State correspondence received by the Secretariat since Wednesday, October 17.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached summary to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Summary for the President
Tab A King Juan Carlos I - Spain
Tab B President Paz Zamora - Bolivia
Tab C PM Pindling - Bahamas
Tab D President Havel - Czech and Slovak Federal Republic

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0835-MR
EB 4/2/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APNSA Has Seen

8316

Heads of State Correspondence Summary

King Juan Carlos I of Spain - October 17, 1990 (Received October 18)

King Juan Carlos appreciates your national day message.

President Paz Zamora of Bolivia - October 13, 1990 (Received October 18)

President Paz Zamora expresses his sympathy for the DEA agent wounded in an ambush and the Bolivian police killed while protecting the U.S. Marine barracks.

Prime Minister Pindling of the Bahamas - October 9, 1990 (Received October 17)

PM Pindling is encouraged by the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act which you signed on August 20. He particularly appreciates the provision to extend duty-free tourist allowances "for U.S. nationals and residents for goods purchased in the Bahamas and for scholarships and training benefits."

President Havel of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic September 27, 1990 (Received October 17)

President Havel appreciates your letter regarding the Helsinki Summit. He is encouraged by the firm stance that the UN has taken and supports the economic embargo against Iraq. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is willing to join the international military forces in the Persian Gulf and is prepared to assist Saudi Arabia if there is any danger of a chemical weapons attack. However, compliance with the embargo and the higher price of oil coupled with the disruption in trade with East Germany and the Soviet Union significantly complicate transition to a market society. Nevertheless, this does not affect his firm position toward Iraq and he welcomes your proposal to establish a Group to Coordinate the Persian Gulf Crisis.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0835-NLR
& 4/2/15

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

PRES NOTED SUMMARY

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 133432
JS/PH
Czech

PRESIDENT OF THE CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC

Prague, 27 September 1990

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter and the detailed information about your meeting with President Gorbachev in Helsinki on September 9 of this year. I share your joy over the results that were achieved. I look upon the final joint statement as an important document that strongly condemns Iraqi aggression and at the same time clearly expresses the intent to restore peace and order in the Persian Gulf region by joint efforts and political means.

As the representative of a country that has experienced aggression at the hands of stronger and ruthless neighbors, I am following developments in the Persian Gulf very closely. I am glad that a firm stance toward the aggressor has prevailed in the United Nations as well, and that it has been confirmed in relevant Security Council resolutions. The Government of the

Czech and Slovak Federative Republic fully supports compliance with them, and has joined the economic embargo proclaimed in Security Council Resolution 661.

Recently I also stated that the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic is willing to participate in the international military forces operating in the Persian Gulf region. In case of need and if we are asked, we are prepared to offer assistance to Saudi Arabia if there is any danger of its being attacked with chemical weapons.

I also appreciate the fruitful cooperation between our agencies and your mission here in discussions on the Mid East crisis.

I must admit, however, that consistent observance of the embargo and the higher oil prices as well as the disruption in trade with the USSR and East Germany are seriously complicating the essential transition of our society to a market economy. Our Vice President and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier has therefore requested consultations and assistance both from the UN Security Council and from the European Community and the G-24 Group. I reemphasize, however, that this by no means signifies a change in our firm position toward Iraqi aggression. In this connection I welcome your proposal for the establishment of a Group for Coordinating the Persian Gulf Crisis.

Let me thank you, Mr. President, for additional information on the outcome of the Helsinki Summit, and permit me to wish you every success in your endeavors. It is gratifying to me that the ideals we share are being embodied in our common approaches to world problems. I am happy that we shall have the opportunity to discuss many of these matters personally in the next few days during our meeting in New York, and I firmly believe that you will soon be able to visit our country as well.

Sincerely,
[s] Vaclav Havel

Mr. George Bush
President of the United States of America
Washington

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008413
RECEIVED: 22 OCT 90 20

TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

2

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 20 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: USSR
KUWAIT
IRAQ
HS

CHRON FILE

1

PERSONS: PRIMAKOV, YEVGENIY

SUBJECT: PRES CABLE RE MTG W/ PRIMAKOV & US POSITION ON KUWAIT

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE DATE: 25 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF: 8908328 8908530

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG CLOSED BY: NSRLG DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16a. Cable	From White House Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	10/20/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ES on 2/5/14

Date Closed:	6/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2010-0835-MR (515)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	5/30/2013	**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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515
duplicate of
2011-1401-MR
#502

Released 2130
found misspells
will send corrected
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PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
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FM WHITE HOUSE

(b)(1)

~~S E C R E T~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY
QQQQ
-
(b)(1) PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK.
-
-
FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S EYES ONLY.
-
DEAR JACK:
-
PLEASE DELIVER TO CHERNIAEV THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. IT SHOULD BE DELIVERED BEFORE PRIMAKOV RETURNS TO MOSCOW, SATURDAY EVENING, OCTOBER 20.
-
BEGIN TEXT:
-
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
-
I HAVE JUST SEEN YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV AND HEARD HIS REPORT ON HIS MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. AT THE OUTSET, LET ME SAY HOW MUCH I APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT YOU SENT MR. PRIMAKOV HERE AND THE SPIRIT OF HIS VISIT. IT IS YET ANOTHER INDICATION OF JUST HOW MUCH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAS DEVELOPED. I WELCOMED HIS OBSERVATIONS BASED ON HIS LONG ACQUAINTANCE WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. OUR DISCUSSIONS WERE USEFUL. I KNOW THAT YOU WILL HEAR FIRST-HAND FROM MR. PRIMAKOV ABOUT OUR DISCUSSION. BUT

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2011-1401-MR
BS 5/30/13

I WANTED TO WRITE TO YOU RIGHT AWAY IN ORDER TO UNDERSCORE SEVERAL OF MY CONCERNS ABOUT SOME ELEMENTS OF OUR CONVERSATION. I AM AFRAID THAT GOING TO SADDAM WITH A PROPOSAL DETAILING WHAT WE ARE WILLING TO DO AFTER HE WITHDRAWS WOULD VIOLATE THE BASIC PRINCIPLES YOU AND I EMBRACEDIN HELSINKI. RATHER THAN INSISTING ON SADDAM'S UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL, THIS APPROACH WOULD OFFER HIM SIGNIFICANT "FACE-SAVERS" THAT HE WOULD INEVITABLY PRESENT AS A "REWARD".

-

IN OTHER WORDS, HE WOULD PROFIT FORM HIS INVASION, AND IN DOING SO, HE WOULD LIKELY ACQUIRE A STANDING OF HEROIC PROPORTIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD. HE WOULD BE SEEN AS SOMEONE WHO CAN OVERCOME ALL ODDS, AND HIS WAY OF DOING BUSINESS WOULD BECOME THE NORM IN THE ARAB WORLD. IT WOULD ELIMINATE ANY CHANCE WE HAVE OF BROKERING PEACE TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS. THAT IS NOT A PRESCRIPTION FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD RUN COUNTER TO THE VIEW I KNOW WE SHARE THAT IN DEALING WITH THIS FIRST REAL CRISIS OF THE POST COLD WAR ERA, WE CANNOT PERMIT AN AGGRESSOR TO PROFIT IN ANY WAY FROM AGGRESION. ANYTHING LESS WOULD REPEAT THE MISTAKES OF THE 193Ø'S.

-

INDEED, SADDAM WOULD MISREAD THIS AND SEE IT AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS. RATHER THAN PAVING THE WAY TO HIS WITHDRAWAL, AN

APPROACH OF THIS KIND WOULD PROBABLY CONVINCE HIM THAT THE COALITION AGAINST HIM IS BEGINNING TO UNRAVEL.

-

I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE SIGNS OF SADDAM'S RECOGNITION OF HIS REAL SITUATION -- SOMETHING ABOUT WHICH MR. PRIMAKOV SPOKE -- RESULT FROM THE REAL PRESSURE OF THE WHOLE WORLD BEING AGAINST HIM. THE TWO OF US -- THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR -- HAVE LED THE WAY. OUR COOPERATION HAS CEMENTED THE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS. IT REFLECTS OUR NEW AND GROWING PARTNERSHIP AND IT ALSO REFLECTS OUR JOINT RESPONSIBILITY IN SHAPING A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER WHERE AGGRESSION HAS NO PLACE.

-

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUR COOPERATION, OUR RESOLVE, AND OUR COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN ARE THE ONLY WAY TO SETTLE THIS CRISIS PEACEFULLY. HE MUST COME TO SEE THAT THERE IS NO PLACE IN THE WORLD FOR HIS AGGRESSION, NO EXCUSE FOR HIS BRUTAL DESTRUCTION OF A COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE, AND NO TOLERANCE WHATSOEVER FOR HIS INJUMANE AND UNCIVILIZED TREATMENT OF INNOCENT MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN. AS I EXPLAINED TO MR. PRIMAKOV, I AM NOW MORE CONVINCED THAN EVER THAT WE MUST SUCCEED IN THIS MATTER BECAUSE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S TREATMENT OF OUR EMBASSY'S PEOPLE IN KUWAIT AND BECAUSE OF THE SYSTEMATIC BRUTALIZING AND DISMANTLING OF KUWAIT, A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ARAB LEAGUE.

-

I BELIEVE SADDAM IS SLOWLY GETTING THE MESSAGE; THAT IS WHY HE IS PREPARED TO PROBE NOW. WE SHOULD NOT WEAKEN OUR COMMON FRONT OR THE MESSAGES WE SEND, MIKHAIL.

-

SINCERELY,

-

-

GEORGE BUSH

-

HIS EXCELLENCY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

-

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END TEXT

-

BEST REGARDS, BRENT
#0027

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16b. Cable	From White House Re: Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)	10/20/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ES on 2/5/14

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Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2010-0835-MR (515.01)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	5/30/2013	**MR Disposition Date:**	

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QQQQ
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BS 5/30/13

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SINCERELY,
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-
GEORGE BUSH
-
HIS EXCELLENCY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW
-
-
END TEXT
-
BEST REGARDS, BRENT
#0027
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0027 <TOR> 901019221123 MSG000277683083

Dear Mr. President:

I have just seen Yevgeniy Primakov and heard his report on his meeting with Saddam Hussein. At the outset, let me say how much I appreciate the fact that you sent Mr. Primakov here and the spirit of his visit. It is yet another indication of just how much the relationship between our two countries has developed. I welcomed his observations based on his long acquaintance with Saddam Hussein. Our discussions were useful. I know that you will hear first-hand from Mr. Primakov about our discussion. But I wanted to write to you right away in order to underscore several of my concerns about some elements of our conversation. I am afraid that going to Saddam with a proposal detailing what we are willing to do after he withdraws would violate the basic principles you and I embraced in Helsinki. Rather than insisting on Saddam's unconditional withdrawal, this approach would offer him significant "face-savers" that he would inevitably present as a "reward."

In other words, he would profit from his invasion, and in doing so, he would likely acquire a standing of heroic proportions in the Arab world. He would be seen as someone who can overcome all odds, and his way of doing business would become the norm in the Arab world. It would eliminate any chance we have of brokering peace talks between Israel and the Arabs. That is not a prescription for peace and stability in the area. In addition, it would run counter to the view I know we share that in dealing with this first real crisis of the post Cold War era, we cannot permit an aggressor to profit in any way from

aggression. Anything less would repeat the mistakes of the 1930's.

Indeed, Saddam would misread this and see it as a sign of weakness. Rather than paving the way to his withdrawal, an approach of this kind would probably convince him that the coalition against him is beginning to unravel.

I remain convinced that the signs of Saddam's recognition of his real situation -- something about which Mr. Primakov spoke -- result from the real pressure of the whole world being against him. The two of us -- the United States and the USSR -- have led the way. Our cooperation has cemented the international consensus. It reflects our new and growing partnership and it also reflects our joint responsibility in shaping a new international order where aggression has no place.

Our cooperation, our resolve, and our collective efforts to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein are the only way to settle this crisis peacefully. He must come to see that there is no place in the world for his aggression, no excuse for his brutal destruction of a country and its people, and no tolerance whatsoever for his inhumane and uncivilized treatment of innocent men, women and children. As I explained to Mr. Primakov, I am now more convinced than ever that we must succeed in this matter because of Saddam Hussein's treatment of our Embassy's people in Kuwait and because of the systematic brutalizing and dismantling of Kuwait, a member of the United Nations and the Arab League.

I believe Saddam is slowly getting the message; that is why he is prepared to probe now. We should not weaken our common front or the messages we send, Mikhail.

Sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

8054

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 22, 1990

CHRON FILE

2

Dear Senator Specter:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of September 26, 1990. The President asked that I respond on his behalf.

As you know better than most, the constitutional relationship between the President and Congress with respect to the employment of the Armed Forces is fraught with political tension. As the many arguments over the years attest, this tension was intended by the Framers and is inherent in our constitutional structure. Often those arguments have distracted from dealing with a policy problem confronting the Nation as a whole.

Partly to avoid such an open-ended debate, and partly because the President firmly believes that the two branches should work together so that the Nation's interests may best be served, we have consulted closely with Congress since the beginning of the Gulf crisis and will continue to do so until it is satisfactorily resolved. The success we have achieved so far in large part reflects the fact that our branches have the same goals.

Thanks again for writing. And thanks, too, for your generous words of praise and support.

Sincerely,

Brent

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3802

8054

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 15, 1990

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: NICHOLAS ROSTOW NR.

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Specter on the President's Constitutional Power to Initiate Military Action in the Gulf

Senator Specter wrote the President (Tab II) noting that "there is considerable talk in the Senate" about the President's constitutional authority "to initiate military action" in the Gulf and that he himself has reservations on the subject. A draft response on the President's behalf is attached for your signature (Tab I).

Concurrence by: Virginia Lampley, Richard Haass

RECOMMENDATION:

That you respond to Senator Specter on behalf of the President by signing the letter at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Letter to Senator Specter
Tab II Letter from Senator Specter

September 28, 1990

Dear Arlen:

Thank you very much for your recent letter to the President sharing your views regarding the President's Constitutional authority to initiate military action.

I have shared your thoughts on this issue with the President, and I am sure that he appreciates your input. I have also taken the liberty of providing several of the President's key advisors with your remarks as well, so that they, too, are aware of your concerns.

Thank you again for writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

FDM:SLM:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for direct response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to the Office of the White House Counsel - FYI

ID# 177930

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: SEPTEMBER 27, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE ARLEN SPECTER

SUBJECT: CONCERN OVER MEDIA REPORTS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF INITIATION OF U.S. MILITARY ACTION IN THE GULF AND HAS RESERVATIONS ON THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO INITIATE MILITARY

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	ACTION DATE YY/MM/DD	DISPOSITION TYPE RESP	DISPOSITION C D	DISPOSITION COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE	ORG	90/09/27	FM	A	90/09/28
REFERRAL NOTE:	R	90/10/03			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:	I	90/10/04			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:	I	90/10/23			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1210 ____ ____

__ MAIL USER CODES: (A)_____ (B)_____ (C)_____

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS OF SIGNER
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	* CODE = A
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF OUTGOING
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY		
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE		
*X-INTERIM REPLY		

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE (ROOM 75,OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT.

ARLEN SPECTER
PENNSYLVANIA

COMMITTEES:
JUDICIARY
APPROPRIATIONS
VETERANS' AFFAIRS
INTELLIGENCE

8054

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3802

September 26, 1990

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Yesterday, Secretary of Defense Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Powell presented an excellent summary of the U.S. military operation in the Persian Gulf. I compliment you, them and our armed forces on a job which has been extremely well done. I also compliment you, Secretary of State Baker and others in your Administration for an extraordinary job in international diplomacy for your leadership on action by the United Nations.

While I know that you are very sensitive to the Constitutional balance between the Executive and Legislative Branches in addition to the other many factors which you must consider, I do wish to express my concern over recent media reports (including those emanating from General Dugan) on the possibility of initiation of U.S. military action in the Gulf.

Over the years, I have studied the issues of the President's Constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief and the Congressional Constitutional authority to declare war; and I recently renewed that study in preparation for Judge Souter's hearings for the Supreme Court.

I realize that the President's authority and responsibility as Commander-in-Chief depend upon many considerations and the circumstances as they arise in a specific factual context, but I do wish you to know of my own reservations on the President's Constitutional authority to initiate military action.

My best.

Sincerely,

Arlen Specter

AS/kr

Knowing you as I do, I am sure you are carefully considering this issue; but I wanted you to have my own legal thinking on this subject. Beyond my own concerns, there is considerable talk in the Senate on this.

~~TOP SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008218
RECEIVED: 16 OCT 90 10

TO: SHAMIR, YITZHAK

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 23 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL
JERUSALEM
UN
HS

PERSONS: SHAMIR, YITZHAK

SUBJECT: REDONE PRES LTR TO PM SHAMIR RE UN SECURITY COUN RESOLUTION 672

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH DUE DATE: 18 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: STATE LOGREF: 9008115 9008145

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
STATE		HAASS
		NSC CHRON
		WELCH

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 4/13/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI CLOSED BY: NSEF DOC 6 OF 6

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 23, 1990

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of October 15. Let me say at the outset, Mr. Prime Minister, how deeply shocked and grieved I am over the senseless killings of innocent Israelis in Jerusalem during the last several days. I hope you will convey to the families of the victims our condolences and prayers. All Americans share with me the firm conviction that further hatred and killing will only make more difficult the reconciliation between your country and its neighbors that we all want to see evolve.

I wanted to respond quickly to your letter, given the importance of the matter you raised and my firm conviction that we ought to do everything possible to avoid a situation that could damage interests important to each of us. The recent tragedy has deepened my concern.

The United States voted for UN Security Council Resolution 672 because we thought it important to be on record opposing what we believe was unacceptable behavior by Israeli security forces. Although we would have preferred different language in some instances, we concluded that the final version of the text was acceptable and certainly preferable to an alternative being promoted by the PLO.

Our position in the Security Council was motivated by a genuine concern over what had taken place and the desire to see such occurrences avoided in the future. Our position would have been the same had there not been the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Let me add that our support for this resolution implied no criticism of Israel's policy governing access to the holy places, which has been praiseworthy; nor was our

vote in any way intended to slight the harm done to those of the Jewish faith whose prayers were interrupted by stones. There are and can be no excuses for that.

Much of your letter focuses upon Jerusalem itself. I am well aware of your position on the subject. I would expect that you are no less aware of positions held by the United States since 1967, including that Jerusalem should never be divided again, that it should remain united, and that its final status should be determined by negotiations.

I also expect that we are not going to be able to eliminate at present any differences between us on the final status of Jerusalem. This said, it is not essential that we do so now, because, as our position states, Jerusalem's future is a matter for negotiation.

I would hope, however, that you would not allow such long term concerns to interfere with the more circumscribed matter at hand, namely, the Security Council's call for the Secretary General to dispatch an envoy to investigate and report on the events of October 8. I would go so far as to express my hope that your government would actually cooperate with this mission. Israel's long and distinguished record in complying with the rule of law, as well as the investigation your own government has commissioned into the events of October 8, should be brought to bear so that the mission receives a full and accurate account of what transpired, in order to better reach any conclusions. It would be ironic, and in the end counterproductive, if the Government of Israel were to transform the issue into one either of the status of Jerusalem or Israel's prerogatives versus those of the UN Security Council. In either case, you would run the risk of placing yourselves, as well as us, in a most difficult and potentially unfortunate position.

Mr. Prime Minister, I believe it is essential that we not lose sight of what ought and indeed must be the focus of the international community at present--Iraq's invasion, occupation, and now destruction of Kuwait. As you yourself note in your letter, both of us share a vital interest in success against Saddam Hussein. It is a common strategic interest, and it is an interest that once fulfilled can pave the way for creating a far more stable, secure, and peaceful Middle East. We both want that, and I know that the people of Israel yearn for that. I would, therefore, ask that your government cooperate with the mission called for by Security Council Resolution 672.

Sincerely,

George Bush

His Excellency
Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister of Israel

~~SECRET~~

8218 REDO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 22, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

SIGNED

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister Shamir

As you know, the President's letter of October 19 to Prime Minister Shamir was held until we could determine whether Israel would agree to a compromise arrangement to receive the Secretary General's mission. No such deal has emerged; in the meantime, the killings of Israelis in Jerusalem have dominated public and political attention in Israel. We strongly recommend sending the letter, but its introduction had to be redrafted to account for the slayings.

State concurs (both in the text and in sending the letter now.)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to the President, requesting his signature on a revised letter to Prime Minister Shamir.

Attachment
Tab I Memo for the President
Tab A Response to Prime Minister Shamir
Tab B Letter from Prime Minister Shamir

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1998-0099-F/3
11/1/2002 MM

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

90 OCT 18 A 8218

October 18, 1990

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir

Purpose

To try to persuade Prime Minister Shamir to soften his opposition to the mission authorized by the UN Security Council to investigate the events in Jerusalem of October 8.

Background

As you know, UN Security Council Resolution 672 calls upon the Secretary General to send a mission to Israel to investigate and report back on the events of October 8 that resulted in the deaths of more than twenty Palestinians. Thus far, the Israeli Government has refused to cooperate, saying that it would not even "receive" the delegation. The Israelis are clearly worried that by cooperating they would risk compromising their claim to Jerusalem. While we do not accept their claim, this is not the time to pick a fight. My concern is that the Israelis risk stimulating additional Security Council resolutions, which promise only to confront us with painful choices while providing Saddam with the distraction and the linkage that he clearly wants.

As you can see, Prime Minister Shamir has written you a tough letter that shows little give (Tab B). The proposed response (Tab A) argues as best we can that he and his government ought to reconsider their hard line.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to Prime Minister Shamir at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Response to Prime Minister Shamir
Tab B Letter from Prime Minister Shamir

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1998-0099-F/3
11/1/2002 MM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

8218

Brent: Suggest you take this in to Wednesday a.m. meeting.

October 16, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS

SUBJECT: Letter to Israeli Prime Minister Shamir

Attached at Tab I is a memo to the President forwarding a response (Tab A) to a letter from Israeli Prime Minister Shamir (Tab B). You should act on this as soon as possible given that we want to see if we can influence the Israelis before they dig themselves (and possibly us) in any deeper.

Secretary Baker has cleared this language.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Response to Prime Minister Shamir
Tab B Letter from Prime Minister Shamir

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1998-0099-F/3
11/1/2002 MM

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17e. Letter	Prime Minister Yatzhik Shamir to President Bush (3 pp.)	10/15/90	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/12/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9008442
RECEIVED: 23 OCT 90 15

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: BURNS

DOC DATE: 23 OCT 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: TURKEY
KUWAIT
PERSIAN GULF
TELCON
IRAQ

PERSONS: OZAL, TURGUT

SUBJECT: POINTS FOR OCT 24 TELCON FM OZAL

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 26 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BURNS
		GOMPERT
		NSC CHRON
		O'LEARY

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By LSP NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: LMS LOG # 8442

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG LMS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	KH	A
Bill Sittmann	2	W	
Bob Gates	3 APNSA Has Seen		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	10/24	N
NSC Secretariat	5	10/24	N/K

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Pres phone call to Pres Ozal
Wed, Oct 24, 9:30am
– 10:15am.

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 23, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

Natl Sec Adviser has seen

SUBJECT: Points for October 24 Telephone Call from Turkish President Ozal

Attached at Tab 1 are talking points for the President's telephone conversation with Turkish President Turgut Ozal on October 24.

We expect Ozal to call the President between 9:30-10:15 a.m. our time. Ozal will brief the President on his recent trip to the Gulf and Egypt.

Concurrences: Richard Haass, Tim Deal, Bill Sittmann

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached talking points for the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Talking Points for the President

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0836-MR
ES 3/30/15

~~SECRET~~

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH TURGUT OZAL
POINTS TO BE MADE

Gulf Crisis

-- I would be particularly interested in your views on the effects of the sanctions. You have told me in our previous conversations that Saddam would begin to feel the bite of the sanctions fairly soon. Do you see any evidence of that happening now?

-- Did you pick up on your trip a good sense of developments inside Iraq--the mood of the Iraqi people, and any opposition to Saddam?

International Economic Aid to Turkey

-- We will continue to press donor states to honor their commitments to you and disburse funds rapidly.

-- How did your discussions on oil shipments with the Saudis go? I realize there are some concerns in Turkey that the Saudis have been slow to make good on their pledge to provide oil on a grant basis to compensate you for having shut off the Iraqi pipeline. We have urged the Saudis to resolve the problem as soon as possible.

Follow-Up on September Meeting

-- I just want to tell you again how good it was to see you here in September. I thought we had a very useful review of the Gulf situation.

-- Let me review very briefly where we stand on some of the bilateral issues you mentioned to me.

-- Textiles: We are ready to negotiate a new textile agreement

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0386-MR
EB 3/30/15

~~SECRET~~

and are prepared to make a substantial increase in Turkey's quota. I understand negotiations will begin soon.

-- Security Assistance: We are still committed to full funding for Turkey in FY-91. Our request was $545 million, and we have some support in the Senate for that figure.

The issue is now caught up in our budget process. We will make every effort to keep your levels as high as possible.

Turkey is one of our top security assistance priorities.

(If Ozal asks about a possible trip to Turkey:

-- As you know, I want to come to Turkey--its been much too long since an American President visited your country. The last President to do so was Eisenhower over thirty years ago.

-- I may be in the Middle East to visit our troops in November. I would be glad to stop by briefly--my schedule might only allow a few hours though--if that was convenient for you.

-- Alternatively, instead of a brief visit in November, I could also come very early in 1991 for a longer State visit, after my next summit meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow.