

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):  
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:  
2009-0275-S

# FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an  
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential  
Library Staff.**

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**Record Group/Collection:** George H.W. Bush Presidential Records  
**Collection/Office of Origin:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files

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**OA/ID Number:** 91144  
**Folder ID Number:** 91144-005

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**Folder Title:**  
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

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| Stack:   | Row:      | Section: | Shelf:   | Position: |
|----------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| <b>G</b> | <b>34</b> | <b>3</b> | <b>6</b> | <b>2</b>  |

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type     | Subject/Title                                                                                                                                                       | Date    | Restriction    | Classification |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|----------------|----------------|
| 01a. Memcon         | Re: President's Plenary Meeting with the Amir of Kuwait (4 pp.)                                                                                                     | 9/28/90 | (b)(1)         | <del>S</del>   |
| 01b. Memo           | Sandra Charles to William Sittmann<br>Re: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Plenary Meeting with the Amir of Kuwait, Friday, September 28, 1990 (1 pp.) | 10/1/90 | (b)(1)         | <del>S</del>   |
| 01c. Outline        | Re: Meeting with Sheikh Jaber, The Amir of Kuwait (3 pp.)                                                                                                           | 9/27/90 | (b)(1)         | <del>S</del>   |
| 01d. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for One-on-One Meeting with Amir Sheikh Jaber (2 pp.)                                                                                         | n.d.    | (b)(1)         | <del>S</del>   |
| 01e. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for Plenary Meeting with Amir Sheikh Jaber (2 pp.)                                                                                            | n.d.    | (b)(1)         | <del>S</del>   |
| 01f. Report         | Re: Biography (1 pp.)                                                                                                                                               | 9/25/90 | (b)(1)         | S              |
| 01g. Report         | Re: Sulayman 'Abd al-Razaq Mutawa [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)                                                                                              | 9/24/90 | (b)(1), (b)(3) | S              |
| 01h. Report         | Re: Biography (2 pp.)                                                                                                                                               | 9/25/90 | (b)(1)         | S              |
| 01i. Report         | Re: Biography (2 pp.)                                                                                                                                               | 9/25/90 | (b)(1)         | S              |
| 01j. Report         | Re: Biography (1 pp.)                                                                                                                                               | 9/25/90 | (b)(1)         | S              |

Page 1 of 6

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**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1202  
**OA/ID Number:** 91144-005  
**Date Closed:** 6/12/2009  
**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2009-0275-S  
**Re-review Case #:**  
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**



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## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type       | Subject/Title                                                                                                                                           | Date    | Restriction | Classification |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 01k. Report           | Re: Biography (1 pp.)                                                                                                                                   | 8/1/90  | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 01l. Report           | Re: Biography (1 pp.)                                                                                                                                   | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | C              |
| 01m. Memo             | Lawrence S. Eagleburger to POTUS<br>Re: Official Working Visit of Kuwaiti Amir Sheikh Jabir Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah (3 pp.)                                   | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 01n. Memo             | Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: President's Meeting with Sheikh Jaber, the Amir of Kuwait, September 28, 1990; 11:15 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. (1 pp.) | 9/26/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 01o. Memo             | J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Official Working Visit of the Amir of Kuwait (1 pp.)                                                         | 9/26/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 01p. Memo             | J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Official Working Visit of the Amir of Kuwait: Background Papers for the President (1 pp.)                    | 9/25/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 01q. Background Paper | Re: Status of Sanctions Report (1 pp.)                                                                                                                  | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 01r. Background Paper | Re: Status of Military Effort in the Gulf (1 pp.)                                                                                                       | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 01s. Report           | Re: Status of the Resistance (1 pp.)                                                                                                                    | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |

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**Collection:**

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**File Location:** Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

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| Doc. No. / Type       | Subject/Title                                                                                                                 | Date    | Restriction | Classification |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 01t. Background Paper | Re: Economic Assistance and Burden Sharing (1 pp.)                                                                            | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 02a. Memo             | Adrian Basora/C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Drawing the French toward Us on Kuwait (2 pp.)                         | 10/2/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 02b. Message          | Re: Message form General Scowcroft to Admiral Lanxade (2 pp.)                                                                 | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 02c. Letter           | President Mitterrand to President Bush<br>Re: Letter from President Mitterrand (2 pp.)                                        | 10/1/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 02d. Letter           | President Mitterrand to President Bush<br>[French] (1 pp.)                                                                    | n.d.    | (b)(1)      |                |
| 03a. Memo             | C. David Welch to Robert Gates<br>Re: Egyptian FMS Debt (1 pp.)                                                               | 10/2/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>C</del>   |
| 03b. Report           | Re: Alternative Method of Forgiving Egyptian FMS Debt Based<br>on Discussions at the NSC Saturday, September 29, 1990 (2 pp.) | 10/2/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 03c. Talking Points   | Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Egyptians on FMS Debt<br>Cancellation (2 pp.)                                          | n.d.    | (b)(1)      |                |
| 04a. Profile Sheet    | Dyke/Miller to Sittmann<br>Re: [Classified Subject] (1 pp.)                                                                   | 10/3/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 04b. Memcon           | Re: Memorandum of Conversation (5 pp.)                                                                                        | 10/1/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |

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**File Location:** Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

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| Doc. No. / Type | Subject/Title                                                                                                              | Date    | Restriction | Classification |
|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 04c. Memo       | Nancy Bearg Dyke to William F. Sittmann<br>Re: Memcon... (1 pp.)                                                           | 10/3/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 05a. Memo       | C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Letter to King Hassan of Morocco (1 pp.)                                          | 10/4/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 05b. Memo       | J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Presidential Message to King Hassan on the Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)                  | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 05c. Telegram   | Re: Presidential Correspondence (3 pp.)                                                                                    | 9/24/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 05d. Telegram   | Re: Moroccan Peace Initiative (2 pp.)                                                                                      | 9/24/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 05e. Telegram   | Re: Moroccan Peace Initiative (2 pp.)                                                                                      | 9/24/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 06. Memo        | Daniel Poneman to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Iraqi Nuclear Capability (2 pp.)                                                  | 10/4/90 | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 07a. Memo       | Brent Scowcroft to POTUS<br>Re: Egyptian FMS Debt (1 pp.)                                                                  | n.d.    | (b)(1)      |                |
| 07b. Memo       | Lawrence S. Eagleburger to POTUS<br>Re: Cancellation of Egypt's FMS Debt (2 pp.)                                           | 10/2/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 07c. Report     | Re: Alternative Method of Forgiving Egyptian FMS Debt Based on Discussions at the NSC Saturday, September 29, 1990 (2 pp.) | n.d.    | (b)(1)      |                |

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| Doc. No. / Type | Subject/Title                                                                                         | Date    | Restriction | Classification |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 07d. Memo       | C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Egyptian FMS Debt (1 pp.)                                    | 10/4/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 08a. Cable      | White House to Elysee Palace<br>Re: Letter to President Mitterrand from President Bush (4 pp.)        | 10/5/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 08b. Letter     | President Bush to President Mitterrand<br>Re: Letter to President Mitterrand (2 pp.)                  | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 08c. Memo       | Brent Scowcroft to POTUS<br>Re: President Mitterrand's Letter on Iraq/Kuwait (2 pp.)                  | 10/3/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 08d. Memo       | Adrian Basora to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Reply to Mitterrand's Letter on Kuwait (1 pp.)                | 10/3/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 08e. Letter     | President Mitterrand to President Bush<br>Re: Letter from President Mitterrand (2 pp.)                | 10/1/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 08f. Letter     | President Mitterrand to President Bush<br>[French] (1 pp.)                                            | n.d.    | (b)(1)      |                |
| 08g. Memo       | Adrian Basora/C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Drawing the French toward Us on Kuwait (2 pp.) | 10/2/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 08h. Message    | Re: Message from General Scowcroft to Admiral Lanxade (2 pp.)                                         | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 08i. Letter     | President Mitterrand to President Bush<br>Re: Letter from President Mitterrand (2 pp.)                | 10/1/90 | (b)(1)      |                |

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| Doc. No. / Type     | Subject/Title                                                                                                                | Date     | Restriction | Classification |
|---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|----------------|
| 08j. Letter         | President Mitterrand to President Bush<br>French (1 pp.)                                                                     | n.d.     | (b)(1)      |                |
| 09a. Outline        | Re: Meeting with Prince Saud bin Faisal (2 pp.)                                                                              | 10/6/90  | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 09b. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Prince Saud Bin Faisal<br>(2 pp.)                                                     | n.d.     | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 09c. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for Meeting with Prince Saud Bin Faisal<br>(2 pp.)                                                     | n.d.     | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 09d. Report         | Re: Biography (1 pp.)                                                                                                        | 12/28/89 | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 09e. Memo           | Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Meeting for Prince Saud bin Faisal with President Bush (1<br>pp.)                   | 10/6/90  | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 10. Letter          | Lloyd N. Cutler to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Suggestion to assemble bipartisan group<br>[Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.) | 9/13/90  | (b)(6)      |                |

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~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007636  
RECEIVED: 25 SEP 90 17

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: CHARLES  
HAASS

DOC DATE: 01 OCT 90  
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: KUWAIT  
AP

VISIT  
MEMCON

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: SABAH, JABER

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF MTG W/ AMIR OF KUWAIT / SEP 28

---

ACTION: SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM      DUE DATE: 28 SEP 90      STATUS: C  
STAFF OFFICER: HAASS      LOGREF: 9007287      9007650  
FILES: PA      NSCP:      CODES:

---

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES  
HAASS  
NSC CHRON

**DECLASSIFIED**  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006  
By Cop NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 8 OF 8

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7636 ADD ON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Plenary Meeting with the Amir of  
Kuwait (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of Treasury  
Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense  
James D. Watkins, Secretary of Energy  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
General Colin L. Powell, Chairman,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff  
William Webster, Director, Central  
Intelligence Agency  
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary  
of State  
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President  
and Deputy for National Security Affairs  
Richard N. Haass, Special Assistant to the  
President and Senior Director for Near  
East and South Asian Affairs  
Edward Gnehm, Jr., Ambassador-Designate to Kuwait  
Sandra Charles, NSC (Notetaker)

Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, the Amir  
Sheikh Sabah al-Sabah, Deputy Prime Minister  
and Foreign Minister  
Sheikh Ali Al-Khalifa, Minister of Planning  
Sulaiman Al-Mutawwa, Minister of Planning  
Abdul Rahman Al-Ateeqi, Advisor to the Amir  
Sheikh Saud Naser Al-Sabah, Ambassador to U.S.  
Abdulaziz Al-Sharekh, Ambassador to Tokyo and  
Advisor  
Tawfeeq Al-Nasser, Assistant Under Secretary,  
Interpreter

DATE, TIME September 28, 1990; 12:00 - 12:30 p.m.  
AND PLACE: Cabinet Room

The President: The Amir and I have been discussing the current situation in Kuwait. Before I was shocked, and now I am even more shocked at the brutality of Saddam Hussein's forces to the people in Kuwait. Inside I had a chance to reaffirm to him our commitment that Saddam Hussein will go out, and the rightful

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 12958,  
AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F  
8/21/2009 MM



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

rulers will be restored. I also didn't thank you in there for your generous support for Desert Shield. With Secretary Cheney here and the Chairman, I want you to know how much we appreciate that. I also want to thank you for your part in helping others that have been most hurt by the sanctions. You feel like we do that it sends a strong, good message around the world. (S)

I also want to tell you how moved we all were with your reception at the United Nations. I think it sent the clearest signal to Saddam Hussein ever sent on how the world feels about his aggression. (S)

I also am concerned about the success of Saddam Hussein's propaganda, not in our country but others. He is making it the Arab world against the United States. No one knows better than you that is not the case. (S)

Now with those opening comments, I will turn the floor over to you. You and your associates can make statements if you care to and I also am happy to answer your questions. We are all working to fulfill the commitments we've made. We have moved a lot of force into that area. I know there is a sensitivity to that but with your welcome and King Fahd's and the GCC states, our people feel welcome. And they will conduct themselves in a way to see that welcome continue. Now I'd like to hear from you and to respond to your questions. But the main thing is that I am glad you are here and that you came to Washington. (S)

Amir Jaber: Thank you, Mr. President, for your remarks. There is no doubt and let me repeat this that we welcomed and do welcome the U.S. forces and we consider these forces are there not to occupy the area but to liberate a country -- a small country, a peaceful country that a larger, more powerful country wanted to solve the problems between us by occupying a smaller country, not by negotiations or talks around a negotiating table. This principle, if we are quiet about it, means a new law for the world, that each country that is stronger, instead of solving problems at the negotiating table could annex it. That was the way of the Middle Ages, not the twentieth century, when the superpowers are cooperating regardless of political differences, as is the case now between the United States and the Soviet Union. (S)

The support for our delegation at the UN is clear evidence that the world rejects this approach for a large country to occupy a smaller one. Thank you again and I leave the floor to any one else to talk. (S)

The President: Let me ask the Secretary of Defense to comment on the military perspective and maybe the Chairman also could in broad terms. I told His Highness that we are still moving in forces, they are not all there. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



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Secretary Cheney: Your Highness, there are two things we are watching closely. Our own buildup has gone smoothly. There are 170,000 personnel in the region, three aircraft carriers, and the equipment and support including armor and tanks. On the Iraqi side, I've been impressed with the size of their force in Kuwait and southern Iraq. We estimate they have in excess of 400,000 troops in Kuwait. The best we can tell is that they have deployed in a defensive posture and on short notice. Our buildup will continue until the commander on scene says that there is enough force. (S)

General Powell: Let me start by saying the buildup has gone well. The troops are adjusting and doing operational training well in the desert. In their training activity, they are working with some Kuwaiti forces to improve their readiness and training. We will make sure we are doing what we can to assist your air force and your brigade. On sea actions, they are doing a very good job stopping commerce to and from Iraq. A number of ships have been challenged, and no oil is getting out. I think the importance of that is we are seeing vividly the difficulty they are having dealing with food and material not coming in. We will continue to work to enforce sanctions. (S)

The President: Who on your team is the best one to give us an appraisal of how you view Saddam Hussein's military, how effective a force they are? They are big, as the Secretary said, but the one question widely debated is how good are they. Can anyone comment? It would be interesting to hear this. (S)

Amir Jaber: The information we have and the information we receive daily from Kuwait and the people who go back -- as individuals not as families -- what we hear them say is that the road leading north is occupied by heavy troop concentrations, such as armored personnel carriers and tanks. But they didn't see any such tanks near the Saudi border, and even along the Kuwaiti coastline, they said these forces were in certain locations but not as concentrated a presence of these troops as there was twenty days ago. They are not military but ordinary individuals. Kuwait is a small country and it is impossible for a big number of soldiers and large amount of weapons to disappear in Kuwait. But the Secretary with his satellites may see things other than what we are receiving. (S)

The President: I would appreciate it if Colin could give you a rough estimate and more detail later on the numbers and quality of the forces. (S)

General Powell: I agree with your assessment along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. There is infantry not armor or mech, and along the coast there is infantry. From the coastline across Kuwait and north toward Iraq there are five infantry divisions deployed. Then behind them reinforcing the delta is armor and mech in northern Kuwait and southern Iraq. Along the Iraqi-Kuwait border are the republican guard divisions. They are

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the most capable divisions for Saddam. Along the border, there are infantry divisions for reinforcement. Regular army units are north of Kuwait city, what we call second echelon forces. The republican guards and others are along the way going further north toward Basra at the end of what we call the theater of operations. That is approximately 435,000 troops including support elements. (S)

Amir Jaber: If combination of spirit and willingness to fight, based on what we hear and what is practiced in Kuwait, many troops don't want war. Many soldiers are selling their arms to Kuwaitis simply to get civilian clothes and flee. How much do you know about that? (S)

General Powell: I believe that units along the border are having difficulty based on reports we get from Saudi Arabia as soldiers cross to get something to eat and drink. Morale is not high. It is hard for them to supply units farthest from Iraq. Morale is better in the guard units. They have better abilities than the other units. (S)

The President: Bill, maybe you want to add something from an intelligence standpoint. He is the head of our central intelligence. (S)

Judge Webster: I have nothing more, except we have been working with a number of your people and we are impressed with the help we are receiving. Some are working 16 hours a day. They are training. We are pleased and proud to be working in concert with them. (S)

Amir Jaber: I think any cooperation between us and our friends is beneficial. It gives us clearer information because you have a sense here of the problem. (S)

The President: Your Highness, we are a little behind schedule. So why don't we walk to lunch, and we can continue to talk at lunch if that is okay with you. (S)

Amir Jaber: I agree. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

7636 ADD ON

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 1, 1990

**NOTED**

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM SITTMANN

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's  
Plenary Meeting with the Amir of Kuwait, Friday,  
September 28, 1990

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum of conversation of the  
President's meeting on September 28, 1990 with Sheikh  
Jaber al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, the Amir of Kuwait.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum at Tab I for file purposes.

Approve VN

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2008  
By MM NARA, Date 11/12/2013

~~SECRET~~



**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: men

LOG # 7636

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG 24 A/O 01

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN          | DISPOSITION       |
|-----------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| <u>Ken Hill</u> | <u>1</u>    | <u>[initials]</u> | <u>[initials]</u> |
| Bill Sittmann   | <u>2</u>    |                   |                   |
| Bob Gates       |             |                   |                   |
| Brent Scowcroft |             |                   |                   |
| Bill Sittmann   |             |                   |                   |
| Situation Room  |             |                   |                   |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>3</u>    | <u>24. 12/4</u>   | <u>[initials]</u> |
| NSC Secretariat | <u>4</u>    |                   | <u>N/R</u>        |
|                 |             |                   |                   |
|                 |             |                   |                   |

90 OCT 3 AM 11:35

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc:    VP    Sununu    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:



~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007636  
RECEIVED: 25 SEP 90 17

TO: PRESIDENT

**CHRON FILE**

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 27 SEP 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KUWAIT  
AP

VISIT

PERSONS: SABAH, JABER

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ SHEIKH JABER / AMIR OF KUWAIT ON 28 SEP / TALKING POINTS  
/ BIO / PARTICIPANTS LIST / DEPARTURE STATEMENT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 28 SEP 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF: 9007287 9007650

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cep NARA, Date 4/12/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 7 OF 7

~~SECRET~~

*Pres. Mtg w/ Amir of Kuwait*  
**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: WFA

LOG # 7636

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM RRS NSC INT

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DOCLOG ATO

|                    | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN          | DISPOSITION |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|
| <i>SW</i> Ken Hill | <u>1</u>    | <u>KH</u>         | <u>A</u>    |
| Bill Sittmann      | <u>2</u>    |                   |             |
| Bob Gates          | <u>3</u>    | <u>has copies</u> |             |
| Brent Scowcroft    | <u>4</u>    | <u>✓</u>          |             |
| Bill Sittmann      |             |                   |             |
| Situation Room     |             |                   |             |
| West Wing Desk     | <u>5</u>    | <u>Sgt 9/21</u>   | <u>D</u>    |
| NSC Secretariat    | <u>6</u>    |                   | <u>N</u>    |
|                    |             |                   |             |
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90 SEP 27 P 27:16

**A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action**

cc: VP    Sununu    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

**COMMENTS**

*Pres mtg w/ the Amir of Kuwait on  
Sept. 28 at 11:15 am.*

**DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:**

*Exec Sec office has diskette*

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 7436

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

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|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | DISPOSITION |
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| Ken Hill        | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Bob Gates       | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Brent Scowcroft | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Situation Room  | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>2</u>    | _____    | <u>R</u>    |
| NSC Secretariat | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| _____           | _____       | _____    | _____       |
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| _____           | _____       | _____    | _____       |

*[Signature]*  
Deputy Nat Sec Advisor  
has seen

90 SEP 28 P12:02

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc:    VP    Sununu    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7636

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

90 SEP 27 PM 10:05

September 27, 1990

MEETING WITH  
SHEIKH JABER, THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

DATE: September 28, 1990  
LOCATION: The Oval Office and Cabinet Room  
TIME: 11:15 a.m. - 12:00 noon

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *B*

I. PURPOSE

Sheikh Jaber, the Amir of Kuwait since 1978, is here as your guest for an official working visit. He met with President Reagan at the UN in 1988, but this is his first visit to Washington. The Amir will profusely thank you for U.S. support for his country, recount Iraqi atrocities against Kuwaiti citizens and territory, and seek guidance on when the United States plans to liberate Kuwait. We want to reaffirm to the Amir our commitment to bring about the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate government. We also want to thank the Amir for Kuwaiti financial assistance for Desert Shield and for countries hurt by sanctions compliance. The visit also provides an opportunity to explain to the American public Kuwait and the political and ethical basis for U.S. policy toward Iraq's invasion.

II. BACKGROUND

This is the first major appearance abroad since the Iraqi invasion for Sheikh Jaber, whom you have spoken with twice over the phone since the invasion. As such, the visit will symbolize our strengthened bilateral relations and shared determination to reverse the Iraqi invasion. It also will have an important effect on the GOK's public image both here and abroad.

The Amir, frequently described as taciturn and retiring, is viewed as the preeminent symbol of Kuwait's national existence. While not noted for his public stature, his esteem among his countrymen is derived from his careful stewardship of Kuwait's economic and political future. As with the Crown Prince's 1988 visit, which you hosted, the attention and respect shown to the Amir ceremonially and his

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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access to you should boost Kuwaiti morale and send a strong signal to the other Arabs. The GOK hopes his visit will instill pride and determination in Kuwaitis worldwide. They also want the visit to showcase the horrors the Iraqi occupation has brought Kuwait and its people.

The Amir's most immediate concern will be to learn when we plan to rid Kuwait of its Iraqi invaders and restore his government. While recognizing the need to give sanctions a chance to take effect and our military forces time to deploy, the Kuwaitis are concerned that with each passing day, Kuwait is becoming history as its infrastructure is destroyed and its citizens brutalized. Believing that sanctions won't work, they are concerned that Saddam Hussein is buying time in hopes that delayed action on our part will weaken allied and Arab resolve.

Even if you are unable to give the Amir a direct answer to this probing question, he will expect you to assure him of our resolve. Throughout the crisis, the determination reflected in your statements has been the most important source of encouragement to the GOK. In responding to his concerns, you should reiterate our commitment to our four stated objectives: a complete, unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, restoration of the legitimate government, security and stability of the Persian Gulf, and the safety and well-being of American citizens. Since you will be unable to give the Amir a timeframe for possible military action, they will be reassured to hear that the United States has not foreclosed any option if sanctions fail. Your tone in reiterating these points will be important even if the basic message is the same.

On compensation for Desert Shield and those adversely affected by sanctions, the GOK offered Secretary Baker \$5 billion through the end of 1990. While the GOK in principle included money for Jordan in this package, their extreme disappointment with King Hussein may keep them from disbursing funds. You should note our own concern about King Hussein's public support for Saddam, but stress that his compliance with sanctions will be the true test of Jordan's position on the invasion, and Jordan's compliance will require economic aid in order to be sustained.

Another area that we have tried to focus GOK attention to is public relations. Despite their hiring Hill and Knowlton, there is still a lack of articulate GOK officials to rebut Iraqi propaganda. The GOK should be encouraged to do more, particularly to counter Iraq's alleged historical claims, and to highlight the inhumane treatment of Kuwaiti and other citizens by the Iraqis. The GOK also needs to do a better job in communicating its support for pluralism and "democratic" procedures, thereby highlighting the distinction between it and Saddam's Iraq.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

One-on-One Meeting: Open photo, writing pool

Cabinet Room Meeting: White House photographer

Working Luncheon: White House photographer

V. SEQUENCE

11:15 - 11:30 a.m. Photo Op followed by Oval Office Meeting

11:30 - Noon Plenary Meeting in the Cabinet Room

12:15 - 1:00 p.m. Working Luncheon in the Family Dining  
Room

1:00 p.m. Departure Statements

Attachments

|       |                           |
|-------|---------------------------|
| Tab A | One-on-One Talking Points |
| Tab B | Plenary Talking Points    |
| Tab C | Departure Statement       |
| Tab D | Participants List         |
| Tab E | Biography                 |
| Tab F | Eagleburger Memo          |

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~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR ONE-ON-ONE MEETING  
WITH AMIR SHEIKH JABER

WELCOMING REMARKS

- Your Highness, I am pleased you are here during this difficult, trying time. On behalf of Americans everywhere, let me begin by reiterating to you now what I told you on August 4: I will not rest until you are in your rightful place with your people in Kuwait.
- And let me also express to you our horror and revulsion at the Iraqi actions we have witnessed against Kuwaiti and other citizens and your country.
- I know from your visit to New York and watching the reaction of the world community in recent weeks you must be heartened by the outpouring of global support your country has received.
- The UN Security Council, in the form of eight resolutions, has sent a clear, unambiguous signal to Iraq: it must withdraw completely and unconditionally from your country and allow the restoration of your government.
- As we discussed then, we believe that effective economic sanctions against Iraq can force Iraq to withdraw peacefully. Virtually everyone is complying, and the boycott is being felt particularly on Iraqi industry and foreign exchange. Iraq must continue to be completely isolated until its actions are reversed.

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- I appreciate that Kuwait is undergoing an extremely difficult time, and your people untold hardship. As a leader, I share your deep concern over the welfare of your country and the suffering your people are enduring at the hands of ruthless Iraqi invaders.
- I would like your assessment of the situation in country, the extent of the damage that has been done, and how hard you think it will be both physically and psychologically to rebuild your country.
- To the extent possible, we need to give sanctions a chance to work. If sanctions should fail, the United States and our allies have agreed to keep all options open to ensure that our objectives are met.
- I know you have found Jordan's position in this crisis hard to understand. We have, too. I have discussed our differences frankly with King Hussein. It is important that Jordan be brought on board with the international consensus, especially on sanctions compliance. They are largely complying thus far, and hurting economically from doing so. In return for additional economic aid, I hope they can be persuaded to moderate their current political actions.
- I will continue to press the King on this issue, and I hope your government will keep the issue of aid to Jordan under active consideration. We must signal the King that such assistance will be provided as he alters his position on the crisis.



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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PLENARY MEETING  
WITH AMIR SHEIKH JABER

- The Amir and I have just been discussing the current situation inside Kuwait. It is a horrifying story and I would like him to share some of what he told me with you. And I have reaffirmed to him our commitment to reverse the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and to restore his government.
- One other thing I want to do, in the presence of Dick Cheney, Colin Powell and Nick Brady, is to thank you, Your Highness, for your generous contribution in support of Desert Shield, and also for your economic aid to those countries hurt the most by the sanctions effort.
- You recognize, as we do, that the visible willingness of other countries to share the financial responsibility will help ensure continued high levels of public and congressional support for our efforts in the Gulf.
- We also spoke about the need for universal compliance in order for sanctions to work to convince Saddam to reverse his actions against Kuwait.
- Your government and ours also have worked hard to focus international attention on the plight of your people and your resolve to return to a free Kuwait and to fight for what is rightfully yours.
- We must keep up our public efforts. Iraqi propaganda is relentless. It is critical that it be rigorously and repeatedly rebutted so that public opinion in the Arab world and in the West is not manipulated by Saddam.

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- We believe an even more intensive public diplomacy effort by your government will be critical in shaping public support for your cause.
- Iraq's alleged historical claims should be challenged, and Iraq's inhumane treatment of Kuwaitis and other citizens should be highlighted. In addition, it is important for you to communicate your support for pluralism and democratic procedures to highlight the distinction between your government and Saddam's autocratic dictatorship in Iraq.
- We have been impressed with the pictures we see and stories we hear of tremendous Kuwaiti courage and determination in facing Iraq's brutal invasion. The selfless efforts of the Kuwaiti resistance in fighting this aggression, and the help they are providing those hiding for their lives, are truly heroic. It is important that these people get the support they need to keep their morale high and activities effective.
- Let me end by just saying how pleased we are with your visit, and how much we look forward to hearing from you.

DRAFT DEPARTURE STATEMENT  
FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON WITH AMIR JABER  
1:15 pm, September 28, 1990

IT IS MY GREAT PLEASURE TO WELCOME HIS HIGHNESS SHEIKH JABER AL-SABAH TO THE UNITED STATES. HIS HIGHNESS IS VISITING WASHINGTON FOR THE FIRST TIME. WHAT NORMALLY WOULD BE A PLEASURABLE OCCASION INSTEAD IS A TIME FOR SOBRIETY AND SORROW. OUR MEETING HAS TAKEN PLACE WITH THE BACKDROP OF THE TRAGEDY THAT HAS BEEN VESTED ON KUWAIT AND ITS PEOPLE BY A RUTHLESS AND AMBITIOUS DICTATOR.

THIS NAKED AGGRESSION HAS RANSACKED AND PILLAGED A ONCE PEACEFUL AND SECURE COUNTRY, ITS POPULATION ASSAULTED, INCARCERATED, INTIMIDATED, AND EVEN MURDERED. IRAQ'S LEADERS ARE TRYING TO WIPE AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED SOVEREIGN STATE -- A MEMBER OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND UNITED NATIONS -- OFF THE FACE OF THE MAP. TO THEM AND TO THE WORLD I WILL STATE WHAT I TOLD HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR: THEY WILL FAIL. KUWAIT -- FREE KUWAIT -- WILL ENDURE.

I HAVE REAFFIRMED TO THE AMIR THAT AMERICA'S RESOLVE TO END THIS AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT REMAINS FIRM AND UNDIMINISHED. WE WILL NOT REST UNTIL KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IS RESTORED, THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION IS ASSURED, AND THE SAFETY OF ALL INNOCENT CITIZENS IS SECURED. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR LONGSTANDING INTERESTS -- ENDORSED BY ALL MY PREDECESSORS SINCE HARRY TRUMAN. AND THIS IS

CONSISTENT WITH THE WILL OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY -- ENDORSED  
BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN EIGHT SECURITY COUNCIL  
RESOLUTIONS.

HIS HIGHNESS AND I REAFFIRMED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE UN  
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AS THE MEANS TO BRING ABOUT A  
PEACEFUL END TO THIS CRISIS. BUT ULTIMATELY THAT IS UP TO  
SADDAM HUSSEIN. I REITERATED OUR STRONG BELIEF THAT WE  
MUST CONTINUE TO STAND ON THE PRINCIPLES BY WHICH THE  
UNITED STATES AND THE REST OF THE CIVILIZED WORLD ARE  
GOVERNED. AND THAT MEANS THAT NO NATION SHOULD BE ALLOWED  
TO CONDUCT ITS RELATIONS WITH ANOTHER ON THE BASIS OF  
THREATS OR THE USE OF BRUTE FORCE. FINALLY, HIS HIGHNESS  
AND I AGREED THAT WE MUST KEEP ALL OUR OPTIONS OPEN TO  
ENSURE THAT IRAQ'S UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT IS ENDED  
AND KUWAIT'S LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT RESTORED.

WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE KEY ROLE THAT HIS HIGHNESS, HIS  
GOVERNMENT AND THE KUWAITI PEOPLE ARE PLAYING AND WILL  
CONTINUE TO PLAY IN THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO ACHIEVE  
THESE EFFORTS. I WANT TO THANK THE AMIR FOR HIS GENEROUS  
SUPPORT FOR THOSE WHO ARE BEING ASKED TO MAKE SACRIFICES.  
I ALSO WANT TO SINGLE OUT THE VALIANT EFFORTS OF THE  
KUWAITI RESISTANCE WHO ARE CONTINUING TO FIGHT VIGOROUSLY  
FOR THEIR COUNTRY. DESPITE INCALCUABLE RISKS, MANY ARE  
WILLING TO PAY THE HIGHEST PRICE TO RID THEIR COUNTRY OF  
FOREIGN OCCUPATION AND TO PROTECT INNOCENT CITIZENS --  
INCLUDING AMERICANS -- FROM HARM. AND MANY HAVE ALREADY



PAID THAT PRICE.

HIS HIGHNESS AND I WILL CONTINUE TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH AND TO WORK TOGETHER TO FIND A SOLUTION TO END THIS TRAGEDY. AS I STATED IN MY ADDRESS TO THE NATION EARLIER THIS MONTH, WE WILL STAND BY OUR FRIENDS. AND TO MY GUEST, LET ME SAY ONE MORE THING: I LOOK FORWARD TO THE DAY WHEN I CAN VISIT YOU AND THE KUWAITI PEOPLE IN YOUR RIGHTFUL HOME, KUWAIT.

## PARTICIPANTS

### OVAL OFFICE

#### U.S.

The President  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Shukran Kamal, interpreter

#### Kuwait

Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, Amir of Kuwait  
Ambassador to the United States Sheikh Saud Nasir Al-Sabah  
Tawfeeq Al-Nassar, Asst Under Secretary, interpreter

### PLENARY MEETING

#### U.S.

The President  
The Vice President  
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury  
Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense  
James D. Watkins, Secretary of Energy  
Governor John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
General Colin L. Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
William Webster, Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State  
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for  
National Security Affairs  
Edward W. Gnehm, U.S. Ambassador-designate to Kuwait  
Richard N. Haass, Special Assistant to the President and  
Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs  
Sandra Charles, NSC notetaker  
Shukran Kamal, interpreter

#### KUWAIT

Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, the Amir  
Sheikh Sabah Al-Sabah, Deputy Prime Minister and  
Foreign Minister  
Sheikh Ali Al-Khalifa, Minister of Finance  
Sulaiman Al-Mutawwa, Minister of Planning  
Abdul Rahman Al-Ateeqi, Advisor to the Amir  
Sheikh Saud Naser Al-Sabah, Ambassador to the U.S.  
Abdulaziz Al-Sharekh, Ambassador to Tokyo and Advisor  
Tawfeeq Al-Nasser, Assistant Under Secretary, Interpreter

## PARTICIPANTS

### WORKING LUNCHEON

#### U.S.

The President  
The Vice President  
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury  
Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense  
Governor John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State  
General Colin L. Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for  
National Security Affairs


#### KUWAIT

Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, the Amir  
Sheikh Sabah Al-Sabah, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister  
Sheikh Ali Al-Khalifa, Minister of Finance  
Sulaiman Al-Mutawwa, Minister of Planning  
Abdul Rahman Al-Ateeqi, Advisor to the Amir  
Sheikh Saud Naser Al-Sabah, Ambassador to the U.S.  
Abdulaziz Al-Sharekh, Ambassador to Tokyo and Advisor

DOOR

Friday, September 28, 1990, 11:30 a.m.

DOOR



**Seated along side:**

Amb-Des Gnehm (U.S. Amb-Des to Kuwait)

Mr Haass (NSC)

Ms Charles (NSC)

DOOR



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 01f. Report              | Re: Biography (1 pp.)     | 9/25/90 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/12/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91144-005 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                 | Date    | Restriction    | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|----------------|--------|
| 01g. Report              | Re: Sulayman 'Abd al-Razaq Mutawa [FOIA<br>RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.) | 9/24/90 | (b)(1), (b)(3) | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files

**Document Partially Declassified**  
**(Copy of Document Follows)**  
 By MM on 3/9/2016

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                               |             |                             |                      |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 6/12/2009   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 91144-005            |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |                      |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |                      |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |                      |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           | 2010-0826-MR(500.06) |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      | Released in Part     |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> | 5/8/2014             |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



**Sulayman 'Abd al-Razaq MUTAWA**  
(Phonetic: muhTAHwah)

KUWAIT

*Minister of Planning (since June 1990)*


*Addressed as: Mr. Minister*

Sulayman 'Abd al-Razaq Mutawa, an experienced technocrat, is acting as Amir Jabir's de facto chief of staff and as the top administrative official for the Cabinet while Kuwait's legitimate government is in exile in Saudi Arabia.

1.4(c); 1.4(d); 3.5(c)

Mutawa was eloquent in providing Kuwait's thanks for US support and invoked the principles of freedom, independence, and democracy in seeking help to stand against Iraqi aggression.

1.4(c); 1.4(d); 3.5(c)



Mutawa probably received a Cabinet posting because his clan supported the Amir over the past six months during the debate on the restoration of parliament. Mutawa is the only Cabinet member from the Jana't clan—one of Kuwait's largest Sunni merchant families. The Jana't are originally from Iraq but have a history of traveling widely and being receptive to foreign influences. The clan was among the first to educate its children abroad

1.4(c); 1.4(d); 3.5(c)

Although Mutawa is new to Cabinet affairs, he appears to have stepped skillfully into his duties and has been actively involved in planning Kuwait's public relations campaign,

1.4(c); 1.4(d); 3.5(c)

Mutawa is well qualified for his post as Planning Minister; he has held other senior positions, including deputy managing director of the Kuwait Oil Company, director of the Institute of Economic and Social Planning in the Middle East, and a membership on the Kuwait University Board of Governors.

1.4(c); 1.4(d); 3.5(c)

Mutawa was born in 1933. He graduated from the University of London in 1958 and received an M.A. degree from Columbia in 1962. Mutawa speaks excellent English

1.4(c); 1.4(d); 3.5(c)

His wife, Fatima Husayn al-'Isa, is also a member of the Jana't clan. She is well known in Kuwait for being one of the first women to remove the veil; she insisted on an unveiled photograph for her passport when she accompanied her husband to New York in 1960. The couple has three sons.

1.4(c); 1.4(d); 3.5(c)

LDA M 90-15746  
24 September 1990

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0826-MR  
5/8/2014 MM

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 01h. Report              | Re: Biography (2 pp.)     | 9/25/90 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/12/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91144-005 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
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|                                     |                                |
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| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
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|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 01j. Report              | Re: Biography (1 pp.)     | 9/25/90 | (b)(1)      | S      |

### Collection:

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**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                               |             |                             |           |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 6/12/2009   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 91144-005 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |           |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |           |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |           |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |           |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |           |

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| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document | Date   | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| 01k. Report              | Re: Biography (1 pp.)     | 8/1/90 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/12/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91144-005 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 011. Report              | Re: Biography (1 pp.)     | n.d. | (b)(1)      | C      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/12/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91144-005 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
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| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                                                             | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 01m. Memo                | Lawrence S. Eagleburger to POTUS<br>Re: Official Working Visit of Kuwaiti Amir Sheikh Jabir Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah (3 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

Document Partially Declassified  
 (Copy of Document Follows)  
 By ES On 7/24/22

|                                     |                                         |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/12/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91144-005          |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>                   |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>              |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>                |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b> 2010-0827-MR (500.12) |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 3/23/2015   |

### RESTRICTION CODES

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**Deed of Gift Restrictions**

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information  
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information  
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]  
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

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9020753 7696

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Acting Secretary

SUBJECT: Official Working Visit of Kuwaiti Amir Sheikh Jabir Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah

I. SETTING

- o This is the Amir's first visit to Washington since his accession in 1978. It will symbolize the strengthened bilateral relationship and will emphasize our common determination to reverse the results of the Iraqi invasion.
- o The visit will also be the Amir's first major appearance abroad since the invasion; as such, it will have an important effect on the GOK's public image in the U.S. and around the world.
- o This meeting follows your two telephone calls to the Amir early in the crisis, as well as his meetings in Taif, Saudi Arabia with Secretary Baker on September 7 and CENTCOM Commander Gen. Schwarzkopf on September 19.
- o 1.4(d) 

II. OBJECTIVES

- o Reaffirm our support for the legitimate government of Kuwait.

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DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0827-MR  
Eg 3/23/15



SECRET

-2-

- o Acknowledge and commend the appropriateness of the GOK's assistance package for Desert Shield and third countries hurt by sanctions.

o 1.4(d)

o

### III. STRATEGY

- o We should give the Amir a warm welcome, noting our continued commitment to the return of his government to Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's independence.

o 1.4(d)

o

o

- o 1.4(d) you will want to restate our four goals: complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait; restoration of the legitimate government; the safe departure of foreigners from Kuwait and Iraq; and freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

o 1.4(d)

o


SECRET  
DECL:OADR



SECRET

-3-

- o Throughout this crisis, your words have been the single most important source of encouragement to the GOK. This visit will be an important reinforcement of our consistent message of support. Tone will be important, even if the message stays the same.
- o The GOK offered financial support for Desert Shield very early on in the crisis, and responded with alacrity to our formal request for aid to offset both our military expenses and the economic losses to frontline states supporting sanctions. During Secretary Baker's recent trip to the Gulf, the Amir committed the GOK to a \$5 billion assistance package through the end of 1990. You should express our appreciation for Kuwait's swift, generous contribution.



SECRET  
DECL:OADR



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7636

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 26, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Sheikh Jaber, the Amir of  
Kuwait, September 28, 1990; 11:15 a.m. - 12:00  
p.m.

Attached for your signature at Tab I is the memorandum to the  
President for his meeting with the Amir of Kuwait.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

|       |                           |
|-------|---------------------------|
| Tab I | Memo to the President     |
| Tab A | One-on-One Talking Points |
| Tab B | Plenary Talking Points    |
| Tab C | Departure Statement       |
| Tab D | Participants List         |
| Tab E | Biography                 |
| Tab F | Eagleburger Memo          |

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006  
By MM NARA, Date 11/2/2013

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                                       | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 01o. Memo                | J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Official Working Visit of the Amir of Kuwait (1 pp.) | 9/26/90 | (b)(1)      |        |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

Document Partially Declassified  
 (Copy of Document Follows)  
 By EL On 7/20/22

|                                     |                                         |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/12/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91144-005          |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>                   |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>              |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>                |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b> 2010-0827-MR (500.14) |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 3/23/2015   |

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9020930 7636  
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 26, 1990


LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
(with SECRET/NOFORN attachments)



MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Official Working Visit of the Amir of Kuwait:  
1.4(c); (b)(3)

1.4(c); (b)(3)

  
J. Stapleton Roy  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1.4(c); (b)(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0827-MR  
EJ 3/23/15

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(with SECRET/NOFORN attachments)





9020764

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 #7636 add-on

September 25, 1990

CONFIDENTIAL (WITH SECRET ATTACHMENTS)

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Official Working Visit of the Amir of Kuwait:  
Background Papers for the President

Background papers for use by the President for his meeting  
and working lunch with the Amir of Kuwait are attached.

  
J. Stapleton Roy  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Status of Sanctions Effort
- Tab 2 - Status of Military Effort in the Gulf
- Tab 3 - Status of the Resistance
- Tab 4 - Economic Assistance/Burden Sharing

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0827-MR  
E8 3/23/15

CONFIDENTIAL  
(With SECRET Attachments)  
DECL:OADR

SECRET/NOFORN

STATUS OF SANCTIONS EFFORT

- o The UN sanctions enjoy an unprecedented level of international cooperation and support. Iraqi assets are effectively frozen and no oil is getting out. We are interceding with other governments to counter Iraqi circumvention efforts and have a special program focusing on interdicting arms transactions.
- o The Security Council is considering how to make the sanctions more effective, e.g. inspection of air shipments and seizing Iraqi ships.
- o Five countries -- Jordan, Iran, Yemen, Libya and Tunisia -- profess support, but have been uneven in implementation.
  - Jordan has said that it has ended trade and frozen Iraqi assets. It will continue to receive Iraqi oil for debt payments. We will continue to monitor Iraq's efforts to use Jordan to circumvent sanctions.
  - Growing evidence suggests that Iran is following a policy of calculated ambiguity and may not enforce sanctions effectively, e.g. cross border trade, the shipment of food and possibly exporting Iraqi oil.
  - While President Salih has given assurances of compliance with sanctions, he also has expressed support for Iraq. Yemen has stopped the off-loading of Iraqi oil and other cargoes but the Iraqis continue to direct cargoes to Yemen, presumably for transshipment to Baghdad.
  - Libya is also officially supporting the sanctions but we continue to see evidence of Libyan flights to Iraq. These flights may be related to a previous military bilateral agreement but it is unlikely Libya can provide Iraq with significant supplies by air.
  - Tunisian President Ben Ali has been openly supportive of Iraqi goals and interests. However, Tunisia has issued oral instructions blocking banks and trading firms from conducting business with Iraq.

SECRET/NOFORN  
DECL: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0827-MR  
28 3/23/15

~~SECRET~~

Status of Military Effort in the Gulf

- o U.S. forces in the region number over 173,000 personnel and are growing by approximately 2,000 each day.
  - Army: The main units in place are the 24th Infantry Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Assault Division and special forces groups. Elements of the Third Corps (the 1st Cavalry Division, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the first brigade/2nd Armored Division) will be in place by mid-October completing planned ground deployments.
  - Marines: The 1st MEF, numbering over 25,000 men, is in defensive positions in Saudi Arabia. The 4th MEB and 13th MEU are on ship in the region preparing for amphibious contingencies.
  - Air Force: We have over 550 combat aircraft in the region along with hundreds of support aircraft. The Air Force is currently exercising with allied forces in the region.
  - Navy: Three carrier battle groups and a fourth group of ships, including the battleship Wisconsin, are in the area of operations. The carriers add over 150 combat aircraft to our available assets.
- o Arab/Islamic forces in Saudi Arabia include the Saudi armed forces plus ground contributions from 10 other states. These include Peninsula Shield forces, the majority of which are deployed on the front lines.
- o These forces will soon be augmented by the Egyptian 3rd Mechanized Division, a Syrian heavy division, and possibly a second Egyptian armor division.
- o The U.S. is re-equipping Kuwaiti A-4s that escaped the invasion and are training Kuwait land forces that have regrouped in Saudi Arabia.
- o Several WEU countries (the UK, France, and Italy) and Canada either have forces on the ground or have stated that they would contribute ground or air forces. The UK is proposing sending the 7th armor brigade (6,000 men, 120 tanks). The French are deploying a 4,000 man regiment. The Italians and Canadians are each sending a squadron of combat aircraft.
- o The multinational naval force is currently composed of nine nations (apart from the U.S.). Another eight nations have naval forces en route to the Persian Gulf or eastern Mediterranean.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0827-MR

MM 5/17/2016



~~SECRET~~

STATUS OF THE RESISTANCE

- o The Kuwaiti resistance appears to operate primarily in the Kuwaiti capital, staging hit-and-run attacks against Iraqi troops, tanks and other military vehicles, and checkpoints.
- o The resistance is also sheltering some Westerners and Kuwaiti ruling family members from the Iraqi occupiers and helping supply food to the Kuwaiti populace.
- o The exact size of the resistance movement is unknown, but it may consist of several hundred regular Kuwaiti cadres, many with military or security backgrounds.
  - The resistance also has auxiliary members, apparently including some Palestinians; there is no evidence of mercenaries serving in the resistance despite reported Kuwaiti efforts to hire some.
- o The exiled Kuwaiti government in Taif is expanding its support to the resistance, but needs to do more. Resistance members travel secretly between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to maintain regular contact with the exiled government.
- o The resistance, whose weaponry appears to be confined primarily to small arms, has probably killed scores of Iraqi soldiers and destroyed some vehicles and other equipment.
  - The resistance-inflicted losses, however, are not a major problem for the Iraqi occupation, amounting to little more than pin pricks.
- o There are indications that morale in resistance ranks may be declining because of the increasingly harsh Iraqi countermeasures--house-to-house searches, torture, and executions--and because of the perceived delay in liberating Kuwait.
- o Elements opposed to the Amir's return to power may also have surfaced in the resistance, but most members, like the Kuwaiti public generally, are likely to support the Amiri regime's restoration.

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0827 MR  
EJ 3/23/15

~~SECRET~~  
DECL:OADR

SECRET

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND BURDEN SHARING

- o U.S. efforts to mobilize international support for Operation Desert Shield and the countries of the region hard-hit by the Gulf crisis and sanctions against Saddam Hussein have been highly successful.
- o The commitments of the Saudis, Kuwaitis and UAE for the remainder of 1990 now total over \$12 billion.
- o All states in the Gulf Cooperation Council have contributed troops to the Peninsula Shield Force in Saudi Arabia and are providing access and services in support of U.S. forces. Host nation support for our deployed forces includes the free use of ports, logistics facilities, beddown bases, and fuel.
- o The Kuwaitis are providing \$1.2 billion in emergency assistance to the countries of the region and have pledged additional aid of \$4-5 billion. In support of Operation Desert Shield the Kuwaitis are providing two wide body jets and all their surviving ground and air forces.
- o (The Japanese have announced a \$4 billion contribution and the FRG plans a \$2 billion contribution, with both divided evenly between military and frontline support. The EC Foreign Ministers are now firming up their contribution, expected to total about \$2 billion to the frontline states.)
- o At U.S. initiative, a multilateral Coordination Group, consisting of donor countries and technically supported by the IMF and IBRD, is now being formed. This Group will reinforce support for our Gulf policy objectives by promoting responsibility-sharing among donors and the **adequate distribution** of financial assistance to **individual front line states**.

(This paper will be updated to reflect the results of the first organizational meeting of the Consultative Group on September 26.)

SECRET  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0827-NR  
28 3/23/15

OK per  
document

DRAFT DEPARTURE STATEMENT  
FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON WITH AMIR JABER  
1:15 pm, September 28, 1990

IT IS MY GREAT PLEASURE TO WELCOME HIS HIGHNESS SHEIKH JABER AL-SABAH TO THE UNITED STATES. HIS HIGHNESS IS VISITING WASHINGTON FOR THE FIRST TIME. WHAT NORMALLY WOULD BE A PLEASURABLE OCCASION INSTEAD IS A TIME FOR SOBRIETY AND SORROW. OUR MEETING HAS TAKEN PLACE WITH THE BACKDROP OF THE TRAGEDY THAT HAS BEEN VESTED ON KUWAIT AND ITS PEOPLE BY A RUTHLESS AND AMBITIOUS DICTATOR.

THIS NAKED AGGRESSION HAS RANSACKED AND PILLAGED A ONCE PEACEFUL AND SECURE COUNTRY, ITS POPULATION ASSAULTED, INCARCERATED, INTIMIDATED, AND EVEN MURDERED. IRAQ'S LEADERS ARE TRYING TO WIPE AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED SOVEREIGN STATE -- A MEMBER OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND UNITED NATIONS -- OFF THE FACE OF THE MAP. TO THEM AND TO THE WORLD I WILL STATE WHAT I TOLD HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR: THEY WILL FAIL. KUWAIT -- FREE KUWAIT -- WILL ENDURE.

I HAVE REAFFIRMED TO THE AMIR THAT AMERICA'S RESOLVE TO END THIS AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT REMAINS FIRM AND UNDIMINISHED. WE WILL NOT REST UNTIL KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IS RESTORED, THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION IS ASSURED, AND THE SAFETY OF ALL INNOCENT CITIZENS IS SECURED. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR LONGSTANDING INTERESTS -- ENDORSED BY ALL MY PREDECESSORS SINCE HARRY TRUMAN. AND THIS IS



CONSISTENT WITH THE WILL OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY -- ENDORSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN EIGHT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

HIS HIGHNESS AND I REAFFIRMED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AS THE MEANS TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL END TO THIS CRISIS. BUT ULTIMATELY THAT IS UP TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. I REITERATED OUR STRONG BELIEF THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO STAND ON THE PRINCIPLES BY WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND THE REST OF THE CIVILIZED WORLD ARE GOVERNED. AND THAT MEANS THAT NO NATION SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONDUCT ITS RELATIONS WITH ANOTHER ON THE BASIS OF THREATS OR THE USE OF BRUTE FORCE. FINALLY, HIS HIGHNESS AND I AGREED THAT WE MUST KEEP ALL OUR OPTIONS OPEN TO ENSURE THAT IRAQ'S UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT IS ENDED AND KUWAIT'S LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT RESTORED.

WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE KEY ROLE THAT HIS HIGHNESS, HIS GOVERNMENT AND THE KUWAITI PEOPLE ARE PLAYING AND WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY IN THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THESE EFFORTS. I WANT TO THANK THE AMIR FOR HIS GENEROUS SUPPORT FOR THOSE WHO ARE BEING ASKED TO MAKE SACRIFICES. I ALSO WANT TO SINGLE OUT THE VALIANT EFFORTS OF THE KUWAITI RESISTANCE WHO ARE CONTINUING TO FIGHT VIGOROUSLY FOR THEIR COUNTRY. DESPITE INCALCUABLE RISKS, MANY ARE WILLING TO PAY THE HIGHEST PRICE TO RID THEIR COUNTRY OF FOREIGN OCCUPATION AND TO PROTECT INNOCENT CITIZENS -- INCLUDING AMERICANS -- FROM HARM. AND MANY HAVE ALREADY

PAID THAT PRICE.

HIS HIGHNESS AND I WILL CONTINUE TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH AND TO WORK TOGETHER TO FIND A SOLUTION TO END THIS TRAGEDY. AS I STATED IN MY ADDRESS TO THE NATION EARLIER THIS MONTH, WE WILL STAND BY OUR FRIENDS. AND TO MY GUEST, LET ME SAY ONE MORE THING: I LOOK FORWARD TO THE DAY WHEN I CAN VISIT YOU AND THE KUWAITI PEOPLE IN YOUR RIGHTFUL HOME, KUWAIT.

UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007809  
RECEIVED: 01 OCT 90 14

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: MELBY  
DEAL

CHRON FILE  
DOC DATE: 02 OCT 90  
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: ENERGY  
CM

OIL VULNERABILITY  
STOCKPILES

PERSONS: WATKINS, J

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE TEST SALE 90 / BIDS DUE BY 5 OCT

---

|                            |                     |           |
|----------------------------|---------------------|-----------|
| ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT | DUE DATE: 04 OCT 90 | STATUS: C |
| STAFF OFFICER: MELBY       | LOGREF: 9007917     | 9007933   |
| FILES: WH                  | NSCP:               | CODES:    |

---

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL  
MELBY  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED



SPR TEST

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: DAD

LOG # 7809

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG 24 A/O \_\_\_\_\_

*[Signature]*  
Ken Hill

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

1

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*I*

2

*W*

3

*8*

4

*✓*

5

*Am 10/8*

6

*AM 10/10*

*N*

RECEIVED

90 OCT 2 P12:39

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc:

VP

Sununu

Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seenINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL FROM: ERIC MELBY 

SUBJECT: SPR Test



At Tab I is a memorandum from Secretary Watkins on the test sale of 5 million barrels of SPR oil.

On September 28, DOE informed potential bidders of the test sale. Bids are due by October 5 with successful contracts awarded October 12. While deliveries could begin as early as October 13, it is more likely they will begin November 1.

Attachment

Tab I Memo from Watkins



**The Secretary of Energy**

Washington, DC 20585

September 28, 1990

7809

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN SUNUNU  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE TEST SALE-90  
SITUATION REPORT #1

*Brent:*

Following the President's direction late Wednesday, September 26, to perform a 5 million barrel test drawdown of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), I ordered on September 27 an immediate activation of the SPR drawdown process. Actions taken to date include:

1. Final SPR operational readiness preparations, including curtailment of interfering operational and construction activities, preparation of detailed operational plans, acceleration of preventive maintenance actions, and establishment of a proper security posture.
2. Final preparation and issuance of a Notice of Sale which was mailed (overnight express/U.S. mail) to over 250 potential bidders Friday afternoon, September 28. This Notice of Sale will offer crude oil for sale from four SPR storage sites for delivery by either pipeline, barge, or ship. While deliveries of crude oil may commence as early as October 13, such quick action is dependent on purchaser's ability to arrange transportation. Most crude oil is expected to be delivered during November at a rate of approximately 167,000 barrel per day. A Press Release identifying the salient features of the Test Notice of Sale was issued late Friday, September 28.



Future planned events and dates are as follows:

|                                           |               |
|-------------------------------------------|---------------|
| o Offerors' Bids Received                 | October 5     |
| o Apparently Successful Offerors Notified | October 10    |
| o Financial Guarantees Submitted          | October 11-17 |
| o Deliveries Scheduled                    | October 11-31 |
| o SPR Achieves Full Operational Readiness | October 12    |
| o Contracts Awarded                       | October 12-18 |
| o Early Deliveries Occur*                 | October 13-31 |
| o Deliveries at Contracted Rate Occur     | November 1-30 |

\* Subject to contract award and purchasers' request and ability to arrange transportation

I will keep you advised of the progress as well as an assessment of the success of this test.

  
James D. Watkins  
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007815  
RECEIVED: 01 OCT 90 17

TO: SCOWCROFT

**CHRON FILE**

FROM: BASORA  
WELCH  
GOMPERT

DOC DATE: 02 OCT 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE  
IRAQ

KUWAIT  
HS

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: DRAWING THE FRENCH TWD US ON KUWAIT / CABLE TO LANXADE

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 04 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA LOGREF: 9007798 9007805

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASORA  
NSC CHRON  
WELCH

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006  
By Cop NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

October 2, 1990

OBE-NFAR

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT/RICHARD HAASS

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA/C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Drawing the French toward Us on Kuwait

Based on a letter just received last night from President Mitterrand, there now seems to be one important difference between us on the Gulf crisis. The letter is partly reassuring, especially in its acceptance of the need for "non-negotiable" implementation of UNSC resolution 660. However, Mitterrand does stake out an insistence on "the democratic expression of choice of the Kuwaiti people."

In essence, Mitterrand says that his intention was to evoke the need for a democratic outcome in Kuwait. He goes on to say that he is unwilling to shed French blood to restore an "absolutist system." The letter, with informal translation, is at Tab II.

Even before receiving the letter, we had been concerned about the appearance of increasing distance between France and the U.S. on Iraq, and about the lack of recent contact with the Elysee. An immediate message from you to Lanxade reacting to the substance of Mitterrand's letter would afford us a chance to narrow the gap with the Elysee further before the President attempts to close it altogether at his level. We suggest that you send this message today in order to lay down an interim marker. This would provide a few days in which to further assess French intentions and prepare a Presidential response.

We understand that the President and Mrs. Thatcher discussed Mitterrand in New York and that both indicated an intention to call him. Should the President still wish to call, he could refer to your message and endorse it. Otherwise, he could follow up with a letter later this week. Alternatively, we could

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 135262011-1183-MR  
6/25/2014 MM

quickly convert your message to Lanxade into a Presidential letter. However, we think it important that, one way or the other, there be a written message laying out our views in the precise terms that are difficult to achieve in a telephone conversation, particularly with interpretation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize transmission of the attached message to Admiral Lanxade.

Attachment

Tab I        Message to Lanxade

Tab II      Incoming Mitterrand letter



~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT TO ADMIRAL LANXADE, FOR  
TRANSMISSION VIA BLUE CHANNEL

Dear Admiral Lanxade:

I am looking forward to your October 15-16 visit and hope we will be able to focus primarily on Alliance issues, despite the continued urgency of the Gulf crisis.

We read President Mitterrand's UNGA speech with great interest, and we have been intrigued by Saddam Hussein's attempt to play it up as a significant departure from previous policy. So far, of course, he is giving no indication of willingness to comply with the fundamental premise of the UNSC and Arab League resolutions, namely that Iraq withdraw its troops from Kuwait -- unless you have seen any evidence to the contrary.

Strong solidarity between France and the United States is essential to convincing Saddam that he must adhere to the will of the international community. My only concern at this stage is that the impression should not be created that there is any significant distance between France and the U.S., especially with regard to the necessity for immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait in accordance with UNSCR 660. We have tried to ensure this through our own backgrounding to the press, and I understand the Elysee has done some backgrounding as well. We may both need to continue to do this.

In this context, I should add that I have just seen President Mitterrand's letter to President Bush, which arrived only last night. I could not agree more that we, the democratic nations of the West, must stand unequivocally for democratic principles, political pluralism and human rights. At the same time, we must recognize that such developments can only take root if grounded firmly in the political culture of a country and its people. Democracy cannot be imposed.

We believe the best way to bring about democratic reform in Kuwait -- which, as you know, was one of the more open countries in the region -- is first to restore the former regime, which can and in my view should address the democratic desires of the Kuwaiti people. We would naturally be disposed to encourage such progress through the legitimate government of Kuwait. This issue obviously merits further discussion. In the meantime, however, I believe it essential that Saddam not be allowed to create, much less benefit from, the impression that there is any difference between us on this point of principle. To the degree he thinks he can divide us, he will be that much more intransigent.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2011-1183-MR

6/25/2014 MM

The President will no doubt respond soon to President Mitterrand's letter, but I wanted to share these thoughts with you in advance, in view of the fast pace of events.

Should you receive anything appearing to be a genuine feeler from Saddam Hussein, we would of course be interested in hearing about it as soon as possible. With Saddam's progressive pillaging and obliteration of Kuwait, there are limits as to how long we can reasonably wait for the economic embargo to have an effect.

Brent Scowcroft

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                              | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 02c. Letter              | President Mitterrand to President Bush<br>Re: Letter from President Mitterrand (2 pp.) | 10/1/90 | (b)(1)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                               |             |                             |           |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 6/12/2009   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 91144-005 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |           |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |           |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |           |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |           |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |           |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

*Ambassade de France  
aux Etats-Unis*

*L' Ambassadeur*


October 1st, 1990

Dear General Scowcroft :

Please find herewith the text of a message from Mr François MITTERRAND, the French President, that I was asked to forward to you.

With high regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'J. Andreani', with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Jacques ANDREANI

General SCOWCROFT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON DC



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                  | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 02d. Letter              | President Mitterrand to President Bush<br>[French] (1 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/12/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91144-005 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007856  
RECEIVED: 02 OCT 90 18

**CHRON FILE**

TO: GATES

FROM: WELCH  
HAASS

DOC DATE: 02 OCT 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT  
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

FMS MIDDLE EAST

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN FMS DEBT

|                            |                     |           |
|----------------------------|---------------------|-----------|
| ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT | DUE DATE: 05 OCT 90 | STATUS: C |
| STAFF OFFICER: WELCH       | LOGREF: 9006669     | 9006787   |
| FILES: WH                  | NSCP:               | CODES:    |

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
HAASS  
NSC CHRON  
WELCH

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006  
By Cop NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA      CLOSED BY: NSGLM      DOC    1 OF    1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FYE

Egyptian FMS Delet

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: lms

LOG # 7856

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG MAIO

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN       | DISPOSITION |
|-----------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
| Ken Hill        | <u>1</u>    | <u>KA</u>      | <u>I</u>    |
| Bill Sittmann   |             |                |             |
| Bob Gates       | <u>2</u>    |                |             |
| Brent Scowcroft |             |                |             |
| Bill Sittmann   |             |                |             |
| Situation Room  |             |                |             |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>3</u>    |                |             |
| NSC Secretariat |             | <u>9/11/12</u> |             |

90 OCT 2 P 8: 12

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7856

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

THROUGH: Richard N. Haass

FROM: C. David Welch

SUBJECT: Egyptian FMS Debt

Attached is the latest State draft of the FMS debt proposal, plus some talkers for handling the proposal with Egypt. The latter will be useful in taking Brent and the President through the proposal.

Still at issue are legislative tactics. The Egyptians (El-Reedy, former Ambassador to the U.S. Ghorbal, and former MOD Abu Ghazaleh -- their lobby team) count 18/19 votes out of 29 on their side in the Senate Appropriations Committee. If the President's initial proposal can carry these, it may be better to surface the alternative in conference. The President's initial proposal went through the Leahy subcommittee intact today.

Treasury has cleared the proposal and State has cleared as talking points.

Attachment

|       |                |
|-------|----------------|
| Tab A | Proposal       |
| Tab B | Talking Points |

*Handwritten signature*  
Nat'l Sec Advisor  
has seen

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-08-08 MR  
Eg 3/20/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF FORGIVING EGYPTIAN FMS DEBT  
BASED ON DISCUSSIONS AT THE NSC  
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1990

Legislation would incorporate the following steps:

1. A moratorium would be placed immediately on Egyptian FMS payments. The moratorium would be for a fixed period of time (i.e., until April 1, 1991). During this period, the debt would be frozen, no additional interest would accrue on the payments not being made and the Brooke amendment would be waived.
2. Egyptian FMS debt would be consolidated in one place (i.e., in the Department of Defense), using the Guarantee Reserve Fund mechanism that has already been proposed to the Congress.
3. The legislation would authorize the President to determine the value of the \$6.7 billion Egyptian FMS debt based on realistic payments expectations, as indicated in paragraph 4 below. The President would be further authorized to amend or modify the existing FMS loans in a way that would represent such value under terms and conditions that he might specify. This value would be a small percentage of the current \$6.7 billion.
4. It is contemplated that the assessment of the value of existing Egyptian FMS debt based on realistic payments expectations would need to take into account Egypt's particular circumstances. Key factors which could be taken into account in making this assessment include its economic and financial situation, actual past payments modified to reflect future expected payments, and, where appropriate, the secondary market price on commercial debt, adjusted as necessary to reflect concessionality.
5. The President would then negotiate with friends and allies who also hold Egyptian military debt to treat Egyptian military debt in a manner similar to the way that we have treated it.
6. After a reasonable period of time (but not later than March 31, 1991), the President would report to the Congress on the degree of success he has had in convincing others to accord Egyptian military debt similar treatment.

-2-

7. Notwithstanding the outcome of those negotiations, the President would have the authority, as provided in the legislation, to cancel the remaining Egyptian FMS debt, based on unique national security and geostrategic criteria. These criteria would be specified in the bill.
8. At this point all of Egypt's FMS debt would be cancelled and, if successful in our negotiations with others, some of the military debt that Egypt owes to other countries might be cancelled as well.
9. During this process, all obligations of the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Treasury would be reduced in the same manner that Egypt's debt to the United States is reduced. After the completion of step 7, the Secretary of Defense would no longer have any obligation to repay the Secretary of the Treasury for amounts borrowed that were directly related to Egyptian FMS debt.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH  
EGYPTIANS ON FMS DEBT CANCELLATION

- In August, the President gave President Mubarak a commitment to cancel Egypt's FMS debt. That commitment stands.
- Congressional assent is required, and we have been working hard **together** to achieve it.
- The President instructed us to work out a legislative formula that delivers on his commitment; that is the purpose of all that we are doing with Congress.
- We have worked hard to develop a legislative proposal that meets some of the serious concerns of members of Congress and still achieves the President's commitment.
- We now believe that Congress will accept a legislative proposal to deal with Egyptian FMS debt consisting of the following elements:
  - A six month timetable for all actions under the legislation.
  - A moratorium on interest payments, a cap on the debt, and a waiver of Brooke.
  - The legislation would authorize the President to set a new value for the \$6.7 billion in outstanding debt, **under terms that the President would specify. Our expectations are that the residual amount would be very low and that the President would exercise this authority very rapidly upon enactment of the law.**
  - The United States would then negotiate with friends and allies to treat their holdings of Egyptian military debt in a similarly generous manner; the President would be required to report to Congress on the success of this effort. **Our actions as set out in the legislation would be powerful leverage to convince others to reduce their debt as well.**
  - After a reasonable period of time, **but within the six months of the law**, the President would have the authority to **cancel the remaining Egyptian FMS debt, based on unique national security criteria, as set out in the legislation.**
- As you can see, the legislative proposal has considerable advantages for Egypt: a moratorium is placed on your FMS debt service to the United States; the politically sensitive \$6.7 billion figure will stop growing; shortly thereafter (within days), it will be sharply diminished; there is the

possibility that we might encourage others to accord you similar treatment; and, the President gains the authority to cancel any remaining debt at some point within six months after enactment of the law.

- Shaping a saleable legislative proposal for Egyptian debt forgiveness is an exceptionally difficult task, given U.S. domestic political sensitivities as we approach elections.
- To address some Congressional concerns, our strategy has been to shift the political burden from Congress to the President.
- We recognize you have concerns about how U.S. Congressional actions, our legislative strategy, and various proposals are viewed by the Egyptian public.
- Our key objective is to meet President Bush's personal commitment to President Mubarak. We stand by that commitment and have told the Congress nothing less than complete elimination of Egypt's FMS debt is acceptable.
- Every proposed idea we have discussed with Congress must meet this criterion.
- The alternative I have described, which may resolve some of the Congressional concerns, accomplishes our goal.
- In the first stage, there are clear advantages to Egypt:
  - There are no payments obligations during the implementation period.
  - Immediately after the legislation is enacted, most of Egypt's debt will be discounted to a much lower value.
  - We will actively urge your other military creditors to give their debt similar treatment.
- In the second stage, the President has the authority to cancel this remaining value.
- These mechanics may sound cumbersome, but the practical result is clear: this legislation gives us the ability to realize the President's commitment.



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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007873  
RECEIVED: 03 OCT 90 10

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: DYKE  
MILLER

DOC DATE: 03 OCT 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BANGLADESH  
MEMCON

PERSIAN GULF

CHRON FILE

PERSONS: ERSHAD, HUSSAIN M

SUBJECT: MEMCON RE PRES MTG W/ PRES ERSHAD ON 1 OCT RE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 06 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DYKE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DYKE  
MILLER  
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006  
By MM NARA, Date 11/12/2013

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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7873

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Hussain Muhammad Ershad of Bangladesh (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State  
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
Nancy Bearg Dyke, NSC Staff (Notetaker)  
  
Hussain Muhammad Ershad, President  
Anisul Islam Mahmud, Minister of Foreign  
Affairs  
Ataul Karim, Ambassador to the United States  
Ambassador Mohiudiz  
Iftekar Ahmed Chowdhury (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME October 1, 1990, 5:00 - 5:40 p.m.  
AND PLACE: Bilateral Suite, Waldorf Astoria Hotel,  
New York City

The President: I want to thank you for your steadfast support in the Persian Gulf. I am hopeful there can be a peaceful resolution. I am constantly concerned about a provocation from Saddam Hussein. He is unpredictable. (S)

President Ershad: We have underway a six-nation Asian-Muslim peace initiative that will be a positive element and will put 400 million Muslims in those six countries on record against Iraq. It is a joint declaration by Bangladesh, Pakistan, Maldives, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei demanding: 1) unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait; 2) restoration of the legal government of Kuwait; only after that would be 3) discussion of the differences that led to the tensions between Iraq and Kuwait. (S)

The President: Are you optimistic about Muslim solidarity? Can he break it? (S)

President Ershad: No, he can't break it. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,  
AS AMENDED  
2000-0429-F  
8/21/2009 MM

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I know Saddam Hussein very well; he is a good friend of mine. I have been to Iraq many times. We have a good relationship. Today he has given an indication that he is ready to talk to us. He is taking a chance. They don't say anything against him in Iraq. He has a one million man Army, and he may have chemical weapons; but it is not an Army that can fight against the Army you have put against him. He is a modern man and knows what he is doing. He may have miscalculated. (S)

The President: Do you think he miscalculated on the world response to his aggression? (S)

President Ershad: Yes. He did not think the whole world would go against him. (S)

The President: What do you think he might do as a provocation? Terrorism? He uses a lot of rhetoric. We are watching closely. I was concerned in the early days for the safety of Saudi Arabia. He said, "I'm leaving Kuwait," but there was one truck going north and everyone else was going south. When he saw the forces going into Saudi Arabia, he realized he couldn't take the next step. What will he do? He's just hoping American public opinion will turn against this action like happened with Vietnam. I don't think so. What might he do militarily? (S)

President Ershad: King Fahd told me. . . Saddam Hussein has 99 names, such as Saddam the Creator, Saddam the Great. He's gone mad. (S)

The President: If there is a clear provocation and he doesn't get a response, he will keep doing it. It could be one of several acts and I don't know what he is apt to do. We want a peaceful solution. If there is clear provocation, we can't just sit there. We have a heck of a lot of air power. (S)

President Ershad: If he just quits with his army intact, no one will be safe in the region. We have to monitor his buildup or he will do the same thing again. (S)

The President: That is a very, very important point. (S)

President Ershad: He has become a hero in his country. (S)

The President: Will he pull out? Mubarak told me he can't pull out. (S)

President Ershad: Mubarak is right about that. He won't be able to sustain himself then. But, if he survives, he will be an absolute terror in the region, with his chemical weapons. (S)

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Secretary Baker: What direction is Arab opinion going? (S)

President Ershad: He may do something to get public opinion totally on his side. (S)

The President: Attack Israel? (S)

President Ershad: Yes, he could. (U)

The President: Suppose I call you up and say he has launched three Scud missiles into Jerusalem. What would you suggest we do? (S)

President Ershad: It must be a military response. (S)

The President: Just the US, or Israel? (S)

President Ershad: The US must retaliate. (S)

The President: We want better relations with Iran. I agree with you. If provoked, we have to do something with the other countries. (S)

Foreign Minister Mahmud: Your United Nations speech dealt with that. You said there is more after the Gulf crisis. (S)

The President: We wanted it to be a separate point. (S)

Foreign Minister Mahmud: Yes, it was. You brought it up but not as part of this crisis. We hope we can help with the six-nation initiative. (S)

The President: I would like to get your advice on India/Pakistan. We are not trying to manipulate the situation, but General Scowcroft and I have been talking about it and we are worried. (S)

President Ershad: I don't think there will be war. I talked to the Indian Prime Minister and he thought Bhutto wouldn't last. I doubt very much there will be war. (S)

Foreign Minister Mahmud: Pakistan cannot win. (S)

The President: One of the charges Saddam Hussein makes is that we are violating the sacred places. We're miles away and only intend to respect the holy places. Does he think he can turn all Muslims against us? (S)

President Ershad: No, everyone knows it is propaganda. You are 1000 km. away. (S)

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The President: I also put in my speech today that I want every single American out as soon as our mission is complete. Iran thinks we are trying to get a foothold. What do the Muslims think? (S)

President Ershad: They know. (U)

The President: What about Chadli Benjadid? Is he more supportive now? (S)

President Ershad: He hesitates to act. (S)

The President: Saddam Hussein will sit with his chemical potential, including biological. The status quo ante is not reassuring to those in the area. He's ravaging Kuwait: raping the women, spilling babies out of incubators, etc. (S)

President Ershad: He may be giving us a signal that he is going to eventually leave. It may mean he is preparing to leave because he is taking everything. But I have my doubts he will vacate. (S)

The President: My understanding is that before he always fought with short supply lines and controlling the air. What if he can't control the air? We have lots of air power there. (S)

President Ershad: If you don't strike first and get his chemical weapons, he may use them. (S)

The President: On the military assessment, if he got pounded in the air and his armor was attacked by air and in large part destroyed, what then? (S)

President Ershad: Then he has to kill himself. (S)

The President: Or someone else might do it. The people turned on Ceaucescu. It depends on how he is seen, if he is seen as evil. This is a rare occasion to talk with someone who knows Saddam Hussein well. (S)

President Ershad: I've been to Faw. Thirty to forty thousand people were lost there. Ten million shells were expended. One hundred forty thousand casualties. He won't leave Faw. (S)

The President: Why in that war was he unable to knock out Kharq Island? (S)

President Ershad: He didn't use his air force. He used his armor as a defensive line not as an offensive force. No military

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commander can disagree with him. He won't listen. He didn't utilize his air force at all. (S)

The President: Why? (U)

President Ershad: He was cautious. He is not a military man himself. (S)

The President: This is a fascinating conversation; very valuable. I hope the sanctions take effect. But, I don't think they will make him give up. Are they hurting him? (S)

President Ershad: Yes. (U)

The President: Do you think the sanctions by themselves will drive him out? (S)

President Ershad: No. (U)

The President: The sanctions won't drive him out? (S)

President Ershad: No, but if he suffers a defeat, the population may turn against him. (S)

The President: There is an interesting article in the New York Times Sunday Magazine (September 30, 1990) about Saddam Hussein. It's a tough article. I recommend you read it. We will send it to you. (S)

The President: This has been so fruitful and interesting. I welcome any thoughts from you. I really would welcome them. We're in this together. A Bangladeshi life is just as precious as a US life. (S)

Farewells. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

7873

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

October 3, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: DAVID C. MILLER <sup>MD</sup> JR.

FROM: NANCY BEARG DYKE <sup>ABD</sup>

SUBJECT: Memcon With President Hussain Muhammad Ershad  
of Bangladesh, October 1, 1990

Attached for the record is a Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with President Ershad of Bangladesh.

**Please note that Bob Gates is anxious to read this memcon.**

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve W Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab I Memcon

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~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 12958,  
AS AMENDED  
1998-0099-F/3  
7/28/2003 MM

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: MEN LOG # 7873  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG 24 A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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| <br>Ken Hill | <u>1</u>    | <u>CH</u>      | <u>A</u>    |
| Bill Sittmann                                                                                 | <u>2</u>    | <u>W</u>       |             |
| Bob Gates                                                                                     | <u>3</u>    | <u>8</u>       |             |
| Brent Scowcroft                                                                               |             |                |             |
| Bill Sittmann                                                                                 |             |                |             |
| Situation Room                                                                                |             |                |             |
| West Wing Desk                                                                                | <u>4</u>    | <u>24-1015</u> | <u>R</u>    |
| NSC Secretariat                                                                               | <u>5</u>    |                | <u>N/R</u>  |
|                                                                                               |             |                |             |
|                                                                                               |             |                |             |

10-24-06 10:00 AM

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Sununu    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

**COMMENTS**

**DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:**





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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007826  
RECEIVED: 02 OCT 90 10

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: WELCH  
HAASS

DOC DATE: 04 OCT 90  
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: MOROCCO  
ARAB STATES  
UN

PERSIAN GULF  
KUWAIT  
HS

PERSONS: HASSAN II  
BENDJEDID, CHADLI

HUSSEIN, SADDAM  
GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: LTR TO KING HASSAN RE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

ACTION: PRES MSG SENT VIA SITROOM

DUE DATE: 03 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS  
NSC CHRON  
WELCH

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White House Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006  
By Cop NARA, Date 1/12/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 3 OF 3

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~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

7826

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 4, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *RAH*  
FROM: C. DAVID WELCH *mw*  
SUBJECT: Letter to King Hassan of Morocco

About three weeks ago, you asked us to prepare a message from the President to King Hassan of Morocco. State did so, but we decided at the last moment not to deliver the message because of late-breaking news of a Moroccan peace initiative toward Iraq.

State has now recommended (Tab A) that we send a revised message to Hassan. Some of the uncertainties about the King's initiative have been clarified. More importantly, we can also use a message to reiterate the principles we see as essential for any solution to the crisis. The message may seem somewhat dated on the Soviet part, but State thought Hassan would welcome the geostrategic perspective.

The cross-hatch with the message to Hassan is at Tab B. We have made two changes; otherwise, its content is unexceptional and there is no need for a signed original. Therefore, we leave it to you whether it should be run by the President. If you approve this letter, Mike Ussery will use the talking points at Tab C when he delivers it.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the text of a Presidential message to King Hassan at Tab A.

Approve *BD*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

|       |                        |
|-------|------------------------|
| Tab A | State Memo             |
| Tab B | Message to King Hassan |
| Tab C | Talking Points         |

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0829.MR  
mw 3/8/2016

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to King Hassan on the Gulf Crisis

Last week the Department forwarded to the NSC a suggested draft message from President Bush to King Hassan thanking the King for Morocco's strong support in the Gulf crisis. This message was approved at the NSC and transmitted on September 17 to Rabat. However, before the message could be delivered, the Department learned that King Hassan had undertaken his own peace initiative to deal with the Gulf crisis. The Embassy was instructed not to deliver the message until the contents of the Hassan initiative became clear.

The Moroccans have been reluctant to detail to us the elements of the Hassan initiative. We know that Hassan met with King Hussein and Algerian President Bendjedid in Rabat September 19-20. From readouts we have received from several capitals, we also know that the meetings produced little agreement beyond the decision to send King Hussein to Baghdad to put "certain questions" to Saddam Hussein. It is clear that, while King Hassan is unwilling at this time to see his initiative regarded as "stillborn" (as King Fahd reported), he understands that there can be no initiative that does not include the key UN Security Council and Arab League resolutions.

Therefore, the earlier message to Hassan has been amended to commend Hassan for his support but caution him in a general fashion (without specifically referring to his initiative) against any efforts that may fall short of fully meeting the UN Security Council and Arab League resolutions. This message, which includes a short debriefing of the President's meeting with Gorbachev, is positive in tone and intended to bolster a long-time friend who has strongly supported the US during the Gulf crisis. Accompanying talking points to supplement the letter also are attached.

  
J. Stapleton Roy  
Executive Secretary

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DECL: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-0829-MR  
MM 3/8/2016

OUTGOING TELEGRAM  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INITIAL HERE + 10/1

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3 W 4 W 5 W  
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NEA/AFN:TJMILLER  
09/24/90 74679 SEAFNGEN 1158  
NEA:RKIMMITT

NEA:JHKELLY  
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S/P:WBURNS

NEA:BPERRIN  
S/S:  
C:MFOULON  
P:MMALINOWSKI

IMMEDIATE

RABAT

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPDC, PREL, MO, US

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

1. ~~18~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE AMBASSADOR SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO KING HASSAN ASAP. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

YOUR MAJESTY: IN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED OUR RELATIONSHIP FOR MANY YEARS, I WANT TO COMMEND THE STRONG SUPPORT AND SOLIDARITY MOROCCO HAS SHOWN DURING THE GULF CRISIS. YOUR COUNTRY'S EARLY CONDEMNATION OF IRAQI AGGRESSION, SUPPORT OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS, AND ABOVE ALL, DISPATCH OF MOROCCAN TROOPS TO SAUDI ARABIA, ARE TRUE INDICATORS THAT IN TIMES OF CRISIS FRIENDS STAND TOGETHER.

AS PART OF OUR LONGSTANDING AND CLOSE CONSULTATIONS, I ALSO WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU THE FULLER SENSE OF WHAT HAPPENED IN MY MEETINGS WITH MR. GORBACHEV IN HELSINKI.

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0829-MR  
mm 3/8/2016

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ORIGINAL



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2

THE JOINT STATEMENT I ISSUED WITH MR. GORBACHEV PLACES THE SOVIETS FIRMLY ON RECORD AS OPPOSING IRAQI ACTIONS, NARROWS THE POTENTIAL FOOD LOOPHOLE IN THE SANCTIONS, AND SAYS SOME VERY USEFUL THINGS ABOUT WHERE WE MAY PROCEED FROM HERE.

IN MY MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV I MADE A POINT OF SAYING HOW MUCH WAS AT STAKE AND STRESSED THAT THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW WORLD ORDER DEPENDED UPON HOW WE MANAGED THIS CHALLENGE. GORBACHEV MADE CLEAR THAT HE SUPPORTED ALL WE WERE DOING AND THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS A GREAT SUCCESS. ~~WHILE AGREEING ENTIRELY WITH ME IN OPPOSING WHAT IRAQ HAD DONE, GORBACHEV ALSO STRONGLY OPPOSED THE USE OF FORCE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, COUNSELING THAT ANY USE OF FORCE TO LIBERATE KUWAIT COULD CREATE CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR SADDAM.~~

GORBACHEV ALSO STRESSED THE NEED TO USE DIPLOMACY TO OFFER SADDAM A WAY OUT. I STRESSED MY BELIEF THAT IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO LINK OR IN ANY WAY EQUATE US FORCES IN THE GULF, WHICH ARE DEFENSIVE AND THERE BY INVITATION, AND IRAQI FORCES, WHICH ARE FORCES OF CONQUEST AND OCCUPATION.

YOUR MAJESTY, BEFORE ENDING I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR KEEPING AMBASSADOR USSERY INFORMED OF YOUR INITIATIVE TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS IN AN ARAB CONTEXT BUT IN CONFORMITY TO WORLD OPINION AND THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ARAB LEAGUE. IN MY VIEW, IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT ANY SUCH EFFORTS FULLY ACCORD WITH THOSE RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING THE RESTORATION OF AN INDEPENDENT KUWAIT AND THE RETURN OF THE LEGITIMATE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT. THEREFORE I WOULD HOPE THAT ANY INITIATIVE, NO MATTER HOW WELL MEANING, WOULD NOT BE PROPOSED IN A MANNER THAT WOULD SUGGEST THAT THESE POINTS ARE NEGOTIABLE. SUCH INITIATIVES WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE SADDAM HUSSEIN TO HOLD FIRM TO HIS UNACCEPTABLE POSITION THAT KUWAIT IS NOW UNALTERABLY PART OF IRAQ AND THAT THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO RETURN. THERE ALSO IS A DANGER THAT ANY SUCH INITIATIVES WHICH OFFER, EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY, LESS THAN FULL SUPPORT FOR SECURITY COUNCIL AND ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS WILL LEAD SADDAM HUSSEIN TO BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE EXPLOITABLE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS.

LET ME CLOSE BY ONCE AGAIN REAFFIRMING MY RESPECT FOR MOROCCO'S POSITIONS DURING THIS CRISIS AND FOR YOUR SUPPORT TO SAUDI ARABIA. I AM CERTAIN THAT INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY--WELL EXEMPLIFIED BY MOROCCO'S POSITION--WILL

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AGGRESSION PAYS AND that

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3

ULTIMATELY ACCOMPLISH THE OBJECTIVES WE ALL SEEK.

SINCERELY, GEORGE BUSH. END TEXT YY

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ORIGINAL

AUTH m DRAFT BC 10/1  
CLEAR 1 Wife BT  
3 Refer Refer  
6 Refer Refer  
9 Refer Refer Refer

~~SECRET~~

NEA/AFN:BWCLARK:BC  
09/24/90 74675 SEAFNGEN 1170  
P:RKIMMITT

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0829-mR  
MM 3/8/2016

NEA:JHKELLY S/S:  
P:MMALINOWSKI S/S-0:  
TFKU01:RCROCKER NSCS:  
NEA/ARP:DKEENE

NEA:BPERRIN  
NEA:DMACK  
IO/UNP:MWILLIAMSON  
NEA/NGA:EHULL

IMMEDIATE RABAT

PRIORITY RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE, ANKARA PRIORITY,  
PARIS PRIORITY +

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MO, IZ, KU

SUBJECT: MOROCCAN PEACE INITIATIVE

REFS: A} RABAT 9596, B} AMMAN 12043

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN PRESENTING THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO KING HASSAN {SEPTTEL}, THE AMBASSADOR SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- WE APPRECIATE FONMIN FILALI'S SEPT 14 BRIEFING ON THE KING'S EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE GULF CRISIS; WE HOPE THE MOROCCANS WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP US INFORMED.

-- WE MUST DEMONSTRATE BEYOND ANY DOUBT THAT AGGRESSION CANNOT AND WILL NOT PAY; IRAQ MUST NOT BENEFIT IN ACTUALITY OR APPEARANCE FROM ITS AGGRESSION.

-- THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION LIES IN COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNSC AND ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS; WE WOULD BE CONCERNED BY ANY PROPOSAL THAT INDICATED A SOFTENING OR DEVIATION FROM THE CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN THE UNSC AND ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS: THAT THE GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

OF IRAQ WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY FROM KUWAIT, RESTORE KUWAIT'S LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, AND FREE ALL HOSTAGES NOW HELD IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT.

-- WE ALSO NOTE THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE IS ON RECORD IN ITS RESOLUTION ADOPTED SEPTEMBER 1 REQUIRING THAT ANY ARAB SOLUTION BE BASED ON ARAB SUMMIT RESOLUTION 195 WHICH, INTER ALIA, EMPHASIZES THE RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT EXISTED IN KUWAIT BEFORE THE IRAQI INVASION.

-- WE ALSO ARE CONCERNED THAT THE PROLIFERATION OF PEACE PROPOSALS MAY ENCOURAGE IRAQ TO HOLD OUT OR PLAY ONE PROPOSAL AGAINST ANOTHER TO ITS OWN BENEFIT AND THE DETRIMENT OF THE UN AND ARAB LEAGUE EFFORTS.

-- IN ADDITION TO REPORTS THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS DECLARED THAT KUWAIT IS NOW UNALTERABLY PART OF IRAQ, WE UNDERSTAND FROM ANOTHER ARAB GOVERNMENT (SEPTTEL BEING REPEATED TO RABAT ONLY) THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN ALREADY TOLD THE MOROCCAN SPECIAL ENVOY THAT EVERYTHING IS NEGOTIABLE EXCEPT THE RETURN OF AN INDEPENDENT KUWAIT AND ITS RULING FAMILY. IN LIGHT OF THESE REPORTS, WE WONDER WHETHER MOROCCO BELIEVES THAT IRAQ MIGHT WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT AND EVENTUALLY PERMIT THE RESTORATION OF THE KUWAITI RULING FAMILY.

3. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. YY

RUCJACC/USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FL Y

~~SECRET~~



WASHFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

WHITE HOUSE

90 SEP 31 PG: 42

SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 056758 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 7224

FROM: BOB PEARSON S/S 5302 (Room number)  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO RABAT: MOROCCAN PEACE INITIATIVE

ALSO SEE CABLE TO RABAT: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE  
(S/S 9020768)

| TO: (Agency) | DELIVER TO:                  | Extension       | Room No.       |
|--------------|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <u>NSCS</u>  | <u>WILLIAM SITTMANN</u>      | <u>456-6534</u> | <u>WHSITRM</u> |
| <u>NSCS</u>  | <u>KENNETH HILL</u>          |                 |                |
| <u>NSCS</u>  | <u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u> |                 |                |
|              | <u>Haass</u>                 |                 |                |
|              | <u>Welch</u>                 |                 |                |

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: 10/1 TWO CABLES TO RABAT  
- SHOULD BE CLEARED AT SAME TIME

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997  
By Cap NARA, Date 6/12/04

S/S Officer:

BP  
BOB PEARSON

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INITIAL HERE +

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ORIGINAL

AUTH m DRAFT BC  
CLEAR 1 W. H. R. B. D.  
3 R. H. R. H. R. R.  
6 H. R. R. R. H. R.  
9 H. R. R. R. H. R.

~~SECRET~~

NEA/AFN:BWCLARK:BC  
09/24/90 74675 SEAFNGEN 1170  
P:RKIMMITT

NEA:JHKELLY S/S:  
P:MMALINOWSKI S/S-O:  
TFKU01:RCROCKER NSCS:  
NEA/ARP:DKEENE

NEA:BPERRIN  
NEA:DMACK  
IO/UNP:MWILLIAMSON  
NEA/NGA:EHULL

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0829-MR  
MM 3/8/2016

IMMEDIATE

RABAT

PRIORITY  
PARIS PRIORITY

RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE, ANKARA PRIORITY,  
+

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MO, IZ, KU

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-- THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION LIES IN COMPLETE  
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SOFTENING OR DEVIATION FROM THE CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN  
THE UNSC AND ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS: THAT THE GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

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3. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. YY

RUCJACC/USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FL Y

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: MEN

LOG # 7826

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG AL AIO \_\_\_\_\_

*John Hill*  
Ken Hill

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

HAASS

90 OCT 5 AIO: 00

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

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4

Alm 10/5

N  
N

5

FFA

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

*Phoned in to WWD*

Crosshatch options:

Prepare Sittmann to Roy memo for State to complete the crosshatch

OR

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS

(2)

Talk w/ Sittmann's office to arrange crosshatch from Sit room.



~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007928  
RECEIVED: 04 OCT 90 15

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: PONEMAN  
KANTER

CHRON FILE  
DOC DATE: 04 OCT 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ  
PERSIAN GULF

NUCLEAR MATTERS

PERSONS: HUSSEIN, SADDAM

SUBJECT: IRAQ NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 08 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON  
PONEMAN

**DECLASSIFIED**  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006  
By Cap NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSMJT

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                 | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 06. Memo                 | Daniel Poneman to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Iraqi Nuclear Capability (2 pp.) | 10/4/90 | (b)(1)      | S      |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/12/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91144-005 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007884  
RECEIVED: 03 OCT 90 14

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: WELCH  
HAASS

DOC DATE: 04 OCT 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT  
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

FMS MIDDLE EAST

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN FMS DEBT

ACTION: PRES APPROVED RECOM PER BS DUE DATE: 06 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF: 9006669 9006787

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS  
NSC CHRON  
WELCH

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Egyptian FMS Debt

*President has  
seen and  
approved*  
BD

Purpose

To consider a fall-back approach to implement your commitment on cancellation of Egypt's FMS debt.

Background

As you will recall, we have been looking at ways to overcome Congressional uneasiness about forgiveness of Egypt's large FMS debt. We tried a proposal on David Obey, which would shift the political burden from Congress to you. Obey was attracted, but suggested an alternative that envisions an intermediate stage of re-valuing the debt.

Larry Eagleburger has set out this alternative in a memo to you (Tab A). He would like your approval of the fall-back approach and authority to use it as necessary in the Congressional process.

I feel this fall-back protects your commitment to Mubarak, while offering a mechanism that will enhance chances for Congressional assent to the cancellation. I share Larry's view that this is the way to proceed, although it is probably advisable not to go back to Obey until the outcome in the Senate is clear.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the fall-back approach on Egyptian FMS debt.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab A Eagleburger Memo to the President

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 2, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Cancellation of Egypt's FMS Debt

Over the weekend, several of us met with David Obey to discuss possible alternative methods of "repackaging" our FMS debt forgiveness proposal for Egypt. Our objective was to see if we could satisfy some of his concerns (and the concerns of others as well) without backing away from our commitment to President Mubarak that we would unilaterally and unconditionally forgive his FMS debt.

Attached at Tab 1 is the result of that effort. The proposal would shift the burden of cancelling Egypt's FMS debt from the Congress to the Executive. It would involve the "writing down" of the current \$6.7 billion of FMS debt to something closer to its real value. By amending the FMS loans to reflect that value, as much as 90 percent of the original debt would be eliminated almost immediately. The Administration would then negotiate with other holders of Egyptian military debt in an attempt to get them to accord Egypt similar treatment. After those negotiations were completed and notwithstanding their outcome, the legislation (which is attached at Tab 2) would allow the President to cancel the remaining debt for the political and economic considerations outlined in the bill.

If you agree with this approach, we will use it only as a fall back. The Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee marked up the Foreign Aid bill today (Tuesday) and included in it our original FMS debt forgiveness language. Senators Leahy and Kasten have done an excellent job for us on Egyptian debt forgiveness and intend to continue to press the original proposal through the full Appropriations Committee and onto the Senate floor. We will use the fall back proposal in the Senate only if we have to.

If Leahy and Kasten are successful in the Senate, we can hold off on the attached alternative approach until the Foreign Aid bill reaches conference with the House. In the conference it may be necessary to offer the alternative to get the House to go along.

With your approval, I will go over the attached approach with Chairman Obey and with Ambassador El Reedy to be sure that we have a vehicle and a strategy that will work and that will achieve our political objectives in Egypt.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'LSE', followed by a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger  
Acting Secretary

ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF FORGIVING EGYPTIAN FMS DEBT  
BASED ON DISCUSSIONS AT THE NSC  
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1990

Legislation would incorporate the following steps:

1. A moratorium would be placed immediately on Egyptian FMS payments. The moratorium would be for a fixed period of time (i.e., until April 1, 1991). During this period, the debt would be frozen, no additional interest would accrue on the payments not being made and the Brooke amendment would be waived.
2. Egyptian FMS debt would be consolidated in one place (i.e., in the Department of Defense), using the Guarantee Reserve Fund mechanism that has already been proposed to the Congress.
3. The legislation would authorize the President to determine the value of the \$6.7 billion Egyptian FMS debt based on realistic payments expectations, as indicated in paragraph 4 below. The President would be further authorized to amend or modify the existing FMS loans in a way that would represent such value under terms and conditions that he might specify. This value would be a small percentage of the current \$6.7 billion.
4. It is contemplated that the assessment of the value of existing Egyptian FMS debt based on realistic payments expectations would need to take into account Egypt's particular circumstances. Key factors which could be taken into account in making this assessment include its economic and financial situation, actual past payments modified to reflect future expected payments, and, where appropriate, the secondary market price on commercial debt, adjusted as necessary to reflect concessionality.
5. The President would then negotiate with friends and allies who also hold Egyptian military debt to treat Egyptian military debt in a manner similar to the way that we have treated it.
6. After a reasonable period of time (but not later than March 31, 1991), the President would report to the Congress on the degree of success he has had in convincing others to accord Egyptian military debt similar treatment.

7. Notwithstanding the outcome of those negotiations, the President would have the authority, as provided in the legislation, to cancel the remaining Egyptian FMS debt, based on unique national security and geostrategic criteria. These criteria would be specified in the bill.
8. At this point all of Egypt's FMS debt would be cancelled and, if successful in our negotiations with others, some of the military debt that Egypt owes to other countries might be cancelled as well.
9. During this process, all obligations of the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Treasury would be reduced in the same manner that Egypt's debt to the United States is reduced. After the completion of step 7, the Secretary of Defense would no longer have any obligation to repay the Secretary of the Treasury for amounts borrowed that were directly related to Egyptian FMS debt.



October 2, 1990

Sec. \_\_\_\_ (a) (1) There shall be a moratorium on the payment obligation by Egypt beginning on October 1, 1990, and ending on March 31, 1991, with respect to the notes described in paragraph (2);

(2) the notes with respect to which this moratorium shall apply are all notes made by Egypt evidencing amounts owed by Egypt to the United States (or any agency of the United States) as a result of loans made before October 1, 1990, by the United States (or any of its agencies) to Egypt under the Arms Export Control Act (all such loans being hereinafter collectively referred to as the "AECA Loans");

(3) section 518 of this Act, section 620(q) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and any other provision that similarly restricts the furnishing of assistance to countries in default on payment to the United States of principal or interest shall not apply during the moratorium described in paragraph (1) with respect to amounts owed by Egypt under the AECA Loans; and

(4) nothing in this subsection shall interfere with, or otherwise diminish, the obligation of the Secretary of Defense as guarantor with respect to the AECA Loans.

(b) As soon as feasible after the enactment of this Act, the the Secretary of Defense shall--

(1) issue to the Secretary of the Treasury sufficient notes or other obligations to purchase all notes made by Egypt evidencing amounts owed by Egypt to the United States (or any agency of the United States), other than amounts already owed to the Secretary of Defense, as a result of AECA Loans; and

(2) purchase all such notes made by Egypt, such purchase being considered to discharge the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as guarantor of such notes.

(c) After taking the actions described in subsection (b), the President shall--

(1) submit a report to Congress in which he determines the value of the AECA Loans based on realistic payment expectations as of October 1, 1990, and an explanation of the factors considered by the President in determining the value; and

(2) (A) reduce the amount owed by Egypt to the Secretary of Defense to an amount that equals the value of the AECA Loans as determined by the President in the report described in paragraph (1); and

(B) direct the Secretary of Defense to amend, modify or otherwise alter the notes described in subsection (a)(2) so that the amended, modified or altered notes (the "amended notes") evidence a principal amount owed by Egypt to the Secretary of Defense equal to the value of the AECA Loans as determined under paragraph (1), and contain such terms and conditions as the President may determine consistent with the purposes of this section, provided that such terms and conditions shall not--

(i) reflect any interest in respect of the period between October 1, 1990, and March 31, 1991; and

(ii) require Egypt to make any payment before March 31, 1991; and

(C) reduce the amount owed by the Secretary of Defense under all notes or other obligations issued by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Treasury that are related to any guarantees of any AECA Loans (including all notes or other obligations issued under subsection (b)) by multiplying it by a fraction, the numerator of which shall equal the of the AECA Loans as determined under paragraph (1), and the denominator of which shall equal the sum of (i) the amount owed by the Secretary of Defense under notes issued to the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to section (b)(1), plus (ii) the amount owed by Egypt as a result of the AECA Loans to the Secretary of Defense as of October 1, 1990, plus (iii) the amount that Egypt would have owed as a result of the AECA Loans to the Secretary of Defense in respect of the period beginning October 1, 1990, and ending immediately before the President makes the reduction described in subsection (c)(2)(A).

(d) After the President submits the report described in section (c)(1) and takes the steps described in subsection (c)(2), he should engage in negotiations with other friendly countries that are holding official Egyptian military debt with a view toward obtaining agreement on a plan to address the issue of such debt on a multilateral basis;

(e) (1) If the President engages in negotiations as described in subsection (d), he may thereafter, at any time before March 31, 1991, submit a report to Congress containing a determination whether it is in the national interest of the United States for Egypt to be required to make payments under the amended notes. In making this determination, the President should consider--

(A) the unique nature of Egypt's contribution to, and leadership role in, supporting international efforts in the face of Iraqi aggression in the Arabian Peninsula;

(B) the impact on the Egyptian economy of the events surrounding the Iraqi aggression;

(C) the long-term prospects for economic growth and stability in Egypt, and the effect on those prospects of such a determination;

(D) the role that Egypt's assumption of FMS debt played in furtherance of the common security interests of Egypt and the United States, and the role if any that such debt was expected to have relative to other forms of official debt in generating income and promoting growth in the Egyptian economy;

(E) the willingness of other countries to participate in efforts to address the issue of official Egyptian military debt on a multilateral basis; and

(F) any other national security interests of the United States; and

(2) if the President determines in such report that it is not in the national interest of the United States for Egypt to be required to make payments under the amended notes, then he shall reduce to zero--

(A) the amount owed by Egypt to the Secretary of Defense under such notes; and

(B) the amount owed by the Secretary of Defense under all notes or other obligations issued by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Treasury that are related to any guarantees of any AECA Loans, including all notes or other obligations issued under subsection (b)(1).

(f) The President may exercise the authorities provided in this section notwithstanding any other provision of law.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 4, 1990

ACTION

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT


THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS 

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH 

SUBJECT: Egyptian FMS Debt

Larry Eagleburger has sent the President a memo (Tab A) requesting his concurrence in a fall-back approach on Egyptian FMS debt cancellation. The proposal is familiar to you. Eagleburger further suggested that, if the President approves, he will go over the proposal with David Obey and Ambassador el-Reedy.

So far, it appears that the President's original language will prevail in the Senate Appropriations Committee. If that proves to be the case, then the conference would be the place to surface the fall-back, if needed.

 Ginny Lampley concurs, but suggests we delay taking this back to Obey as long as possible as any leak that a Presidentially-approved alternative is available will weaken our support in the Senate.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Eagleburger Memo to the President

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007890  
RECEIVED: 03 OCT 90 16

TO: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

**CHRON FILE**

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 05 OCT 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE  
IRAQ

KUWAIT  
HS

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: REPLY TO MITTERRAND LETTER ON KUWAIT

ACTION: PRES APPROVED CABLE

DUE DATE: 06 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASORA

GOMPERT

HAASS

NSC CHRON

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cef NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 3 OF 3

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 051540Z OCT 90

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO ELYSEE PALACE

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO PRESIDENT MITTERAND  
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

-  
BEGIN TEXT:

-  
DEAR FRANCOIS:

-  
I VERY MUCH APPRECIATED YOUR LETTER, WHICH ARRIVED AT THE  
WHITE HOUSE MONDAY EVENING. I HAD READ YOUR UN GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY SPEECH WITH GREAT INTEREST, AND THE POINTS STRESSED  
IN YOUR LETTER PROVIDED VERY USEFUL CLARIFICATION. THERE ARE,  
HOWEVER, SOME POINTS THAT I FEEL MERIT FURTHER DISCUSSION AND  
COMMENT.

-  
SOME CONFUSION WAS INITIALLY CREATED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN'S  
ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY YOUR SPEECH AS A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM  
PREVIOUS POLICY, AND IT WAS MAGNIFIED BY A CERTAIN NUMBER OF  
FACILE PRESS INTERPRETATIONS. STRONG SOLIDARITY BETWEEN  
FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES, AND WITH THE OTHER NATIONS THAT  
HAVE TAKEN A FIRM STAND IN THE GULF, IS ESSENTIAL TO  
CONVINCING SADDAM THAT HE MUST ADHERE TO THE WILL OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

-  
IT THUS FOLLOWS THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE THE APPEARANCE OF

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

DISTANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THE NECESSITY FOR IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 660. WE HAVE TRIED TO ENSURE THIS THROUGH OUR OWN EXPLANATIONS TO THE PRESS, AND I KNOW THAT THE ELYSEE AND FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS HAVE DONE EXTENSIVE INTERVIEWS AS WELL. I KNOW YOU WILL CONTINUE TO UNDERScore THE UNITY OF OUR PURPOSE AND OUR POSITION ON THIS MOST FUNDAMENTAL MATTER.

-

YOUR LETTER EMPHASIZES YOUR SUPPORT FOR ALL OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS PASSED SINCE AUGUST 6 AND THAT THESE CONSTITUTE NON-NEGOTIABLE PRECONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT. I AGREE COMPLETELY, AND I FULLY CONCUR IN YOUR EMPHASIS ON THE RELEASE OF ALL HOSTAGES AND ON UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT.

-

AS JIM BAKER HAS MENTIONED TO ROLAND DUMAS, HOWEVER, WE ARE WORRIED ABOUT ANY APPERARANCE OF DIVERGENCE BY FRANCE FROM THE ELEMENTS OF THESE RESOLUTIONS, IN PARTICULAR THE POINT THAT KUWAIT'S LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT MUST BE RESTORED. AS YOU KNOW, SEVERAL UN RESOLUTIONS ARE CLEAR IN EXPRESSING THE COUNCIL'S "DETERMINATION TO RESTORE THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT" AND UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 661

SPECIFICALLY DECIDED ON SANCTIONS AS A MEANS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL. THERE IS RISK THAT ESPOUSAL OF ANY OTHER POSITION IN ADVANCE OF IRAQI WITHDRAWAL WOULD PLAY INTO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S STRATEGY AND WOULD CONTRAVENE THE POSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS THAT SUCH A WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE UNCONDITIONAL.

-

IN YOUR LETTER, YOU ALSO STRESS YOUR CONCERN THAT THERE BE A DEMOCRATIC OUTCOME IN KUWAIT. THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONS OF THE WEST MUST OF COURSE STAND UNEQUIVOCALLY FOR DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS CAN ONLY TAKE ROOT IF GROUNDED FIRMLY IN THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF A COUNTRY AND ITS

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

PEOPLE. DEMOCRACY CANNOT BE IMPOSED, BUT RATHER NURTURED FROM WITHIN.

-  
I BELIEVE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO BRING ABOUT DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN KUWAIT -- WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, WAS ONE OF THE MORE OPEN COUNTRIES IN THE REGION -- IS FIRST TO RESTORE THE FORMER REGIME. WHICH CAN AND IN MY VIEW SHOULD ADDRESS THE DEMOCRATIC DESIRES OF THE KUWAITI PEOPLE. I BELIEVE WE CAN BEST ENCOURAGE SUCH PROGRESS BY WORKING WITH THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT.

-  
THE ISSUE OBVIOUSLY MERITS FURTHER PRIVATE DISCUSSION, AND I WOULD WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON HOW THIS CONCEPT MIGHT BE IMPLEMENTED. IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT SADDAM NOT BE ALLOWED TO CREATE, MUCH LESS BENEFIT FROM, THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS ANY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US ON THIS POINT. TO THE DEGREE HE THINKS HE CAN DIVIDE US, HE WILL BE THAT MUCH MORE INTRANSIGENT.

-  
SADDAM HUSSEIN APPEARS TOTALLY UNWILLING TO COMPLY WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE OF SECURITY COUNCIL AND ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS, NAMELY THAT IRAQ WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM KUWAIT. IF YOU HAVE SEEN ANY EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, OR IF YOU SHOULD RECEIVE ANYTHING SUGGESTING A GENUINE MOVE BY SADDAM HUSSEIN, I WOULD OF COURSE BE VERY INTERESTED IN HEARING ABOUT IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

-  
SADDAM'S PROGRESSIVE PILLAGING AND OBLITERATION OF KUWAIT RAISES ANOTHER CONCERN. WE MAY WANT TO CONSIDER A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THIS BEHAVIOR, AT THE SAME TIME PUTTING IRAQ ON NOTICE THAT IT WILL BE LIABLE FOR REPARATIONS. IN ADDITION, THERE MAY BE LIMITS AS TO HOW LONG WE CAN REASONABLY WAIT FOR THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO TO HAVE AN EFFECT. I WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THESE ISSUES AS WELL.

-  
I WILL LOOK FORWARD TO STAYING IN CLOSE TOUCH DURING THE

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IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

COMING WEEKS.

-

WITH MY WARMEST REGARDS,

-

-

GEORGE BUSH

-

END TEXT

-

DECL: OADR

-

#0058

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~~SECRET~~

LETTER TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FOR TRANSMISSION VIA BLUE CHANNEL

Dear Francois:

I very much appreciated your letter, which arrived at the White House Monday evening. I had read your UN General Assembly speech with great interest, and the points stressed in your letter provided very useful clarification. There are, however, some points that I feel merit further discussion and comment.

Some confusion was initially created by Saddam Hussein's attempt to portray your speech as a significant departure from previous policy, and it was magnified by a certain number of facile press interpretations. Strong solidarity between France and the United States, and with the other nations that have taken a firm stand in the Gulf, is essential to convincing Saddam that he must adhere to the will of the international community.

It thus follows that there should not be the appearance of distance between France and the United States, especially with regard to the necessity for immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait in accordance with Security Council Resolution 660. We have tried to ensure this through our own explanations to the press, and I know that the Elysee and Foreign Minister Dumas have done extensive interviews as well. I know you will continue to underscore the unity of our purpose and our position on this most fundamental matter.

Your letter emphasizes your support for all of the UN Security Council resolutions passed since August 6 and that these constitute non-negotiable preconditions for a settlement. I agree completely, and I fully concur in your emphasis on the release of all hostages and on unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

*As Jim Baker has mentioned to Roland Dumas, however, we are*  
~~I am, however~~ I am worried about any appearance of divergence by France from the elements of these resolutions, in particular the point that Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored. As you know, several UN resolutions are clear in expressing the Council's "determination to restore the authority of the legitimate government of Kuwait" and UN Security Council Resolution 661 specifically decided on sanctions as a means to achieve this goal. There is risk that espousal of any other position in advance of Iraqi withdrawal would play into Saddam Hussein's strategy and would contravene the position of the United Nations that such a withdrawal should be unconditional.

In your letter, you also stress your concern that there be a democratic outcome in Kuwait. The democratic nations of the West

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2010-0830-MR  
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must of course stand unequivocally for democratic principles and human rights. At the same time, we must recognize that such developments can only take root if grounded firmly in the political culture of a country and its people. Democracy cannot be imposed, but rather nurtured from within.

I believe the most effective way to bring about democratic reform in Kuwait -- which, as you know, was one of the more open countries in the region -- is first to restore the former regime, which can and in my view should address the democratic desires of the Kuwaiti people. I believe we can best encourage such progress by working with the legitimate government of Kuwait.

The issue obviously merits further private discussion, and I would welcome your thoughts on how this concept might be implemented. In the meantime, however, I believe it essential that Saddam not be allowed to create, much less benefit from, the impression that there is any difference between us on this point. To the degree he thinks he can divide us, he will be that much more intransigent.

Saddam Hussein appears totally unwilling to comply with the fundamental premise of Security Council and Arab League resolutions, namely that Iraq withdraw its troops from Kuwait. If you have seen any evidence to the contrary, or if you should receive anything suggesting a genuine move by Saddam Hussein, I would of course be very interested in hearing about it as soon as possible.

Saddam's progressive pillaging and obliteration of Kuwait raises another concern. We may want to consider a new Security Council resolution condemning this behavior, at the same time putting Iraq on notice that it will be liable for reparations. In addition, there may be limits as to how long we can reasonably wait for the economic embargo to have an effect. I would welcome your views on these issues as well.

I will look forward to staying in close touch during the coming weeks.

With my warmest regards,

George Bush

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 3, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: President Mitterrand's Letter on Iraq/Kuwait

Purpose

To respond to Mitterrand's incoming letter.

Background

Mitterrand's letter, at Tab B, is positive in many important respects, but it poses a significant potential issue in its insistence on "the need for an outcome in Kuwait involving democratic institutions."

The positive points in the letter are Mitterrand's reaffirmation of his full support for all of the UN Security Council resolutions passed since August 6, and his statement that their application constitutes a non-negotiable precondition for a settlement. He particularly stresses that no relaxation or compromise can be envisaged without the liberation of hostages and the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Backgrounding in recent days by the Elysee and by Foreign Minister Dumas makes it clear that Mitterrand is trying to eliminate the appearance of significant distance from the U.S. on this issue. Contrary to the impression created by his words at the U.N., Mitterrand's stated position is that actual Iraqi withdrawal, rather than just a statement of intent, must occur before there can be a settlement. He does add, however, that, should Saddam commit himself to this, "the Security Council could quickly decide on the conditions of its execution" -- which could create a loophole in the "non-negotiable precondition."

On the issue of democratic institutions for Kuwait, Mitterrand's intentions are less clear. He stresses the progress of democracy throughout the world over the past two years and implies that Kuwait should not be exempted from this trend.

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cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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He adds that he "would not risk the death of one single French soldier if it was exclusively in order to restore an absolutist system."

Judging from the tone and extent of his comments, Mitterrand seems rather heavily dug in on this issue -- one on which there is considerable resonance in French public opinion. What this will mean in practice, however, is hard to predict. It is quite possible that Mitterrand would be willing to settle for a statement, at the appropriate moment, by the Amir that he intends to restore the previous Parliament and eventually to hold elections. The danger, of course, is that he may instead weaken support for restoration of the Kuwaiti government and thus hand Saddam Hussein a chance for partial success.

The suggested response to Mitterrand at Tab I attempts to draw Mitterrand onto ground acceptable to us, by granting him the desirability of greater democratization in principle, while trying to ensure that, in practice, the return to Kuwait of its legitimate government is not put into jeopardy.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the attached letter for transmission through White House privacy channels.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Mitterrand  
Tab B Mitterrand incoming

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 3, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

*As AB for DG*  
DAVID GOMPERT/RICHARD HAASS

FROM:

ADRIAN BASORA *AB*

SUBJECT:

Reply to Mitterrand's Letter on Kuwait

Based on your indication that the President prefers to answer Mitterrand directly, we have prepared a response under cover of a memo to the President.

The proposed letter to Mitterrand has not been cleared with State. In view of the sensitivity of the issue and the recent Baker/Dumas conversation in New York, we suggest you discuss it directly with Secretary Baker.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President  
Tab A Letter to Mitterrand  
Tab B Mitterrand incoming

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PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0830 MR  
28 7/30/15



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                              | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 08e. Letter              | President Mitterrand to President Bush<br>Re: Letter from President Mitterrand (2 pp.) | 10/1/90 | (b)(1)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/12/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91144-005 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



*Ambassade de France  
aux Etats-Unis*

*L'Ambassadeur*


October 1st, 1990

Dear General Scowcroft :

Please find herewith the text of a message from Mr François MITTERRAND, the French President, that I was asked to forward to you.

With high regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'J. Andreani', with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Jacques ANDREANI

General SCOWCROFT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON DC

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                  | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 08f. Letter              | President Mitterrand to President Bush<br>[French] (1 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                                     |                                |
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| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THROUGH: DAVID GOMPERT/RICHARD HAASS  
FROM: ADRIAN BASORA/C. DAVID WELCH  
SUBJECT: Drawing the French toward Us on Kuwait

Based on a letter just received last night from President Mitterrand, there now seems to be one important difference between us on the Gulf crisis. The letter is partly reassuring, especially in its acceptance of the need for "non-negotiable" implementation of UNSC resolution 660. However, Mitterrand does stake out an insistence on "the democratic expression of choice of the Kuwaiti people."

In essence, Mitterrand says that his intention was to evoke the need for a democratic outcome in Kuwait. He goes on to say that he is unwilling to shed French blood to restore an "absolutist system." The letter, with informal translation, is at Tab II.

Even before receiving the letter, we had been concerned about the appearance of increasing distance between France and the U.S. on Iraq, and about the lack of recent contact with the Elysee. An immediate message from you to Lanxade reacting to the substance of Mitterrand's letter would afford us a chance to narrow the gap with the Elysee further before the President attempts to close it altogether at his level. We suggest that you send this message today in order to lay down an interim marker. This would provide a few days in which to further assess French intentions and prepare a Presidential response.

We understand that the President and Mrs. Thatcher discussed Mitterrand in New York and that both indicated an intention to call him. Should the President still wish to call, he could refer to your message and endorse it. Otherwise, he could follow up with a letter later this week. Alternatively, we could

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6/25/2014 MM

quickly convert your message to Lanxade into a Presidential letter. However, we think it important that, one way or the other, there be a written message laying out our views in the precise terms that are difficult to achieve in a telephone conversation, particularly with interpretation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize transmission of the attached message to Admiral Lanxade.

Attachment

Tab I        Message to Lanxade  
Tab II       Incoming Mitterrand letter



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MESSAGE FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT TO ADMIRAL LANXADE, FOR  
TRANSMISSION VIA BLUE CHANNEL

Dear Admiral Lanxade:

I am looking forward to your October 15-16 visit and hope we will be able to focus primarily on Alliance issues, despite the continued urgency of the Gulf crisis.

We read President Mitterrand's UNGA speech with great interest, and we have been intrigued by Saddam Hussein's attempt to play it up as a significant departure from previous policy. So far, of course, he is giving no indication of willingness to comply with the fundamental premise of the UNSC and Arab League resolutions, namely that Iraq withdraw its troops from Kuwait -- unless you have seen any evidence to the contrary.

Strong solidarity between France and the United States is essential to convincing Saddam that he must adhere to the will of the international community. My only concern at this stage is that the impression should not be created that there is any significant distance between France and the U.S., especially with regard to the necessity for immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait in accordance with UNSCR 660. We have tried to ensure this through our own backgrounding to the press, and I understand the Elysee has done some backgrounding as well. We may both need to continue to do this.

In this context, I should add that I have just seen President Mitterrand's letter to President Bush, which arrived only last night. I could not agree more that we, the democratic nations of the West, must stand unequivocally for democratic principles, political pluralism and human rights. At the same time, we must recognize that such developments can only take root if grounded firmly in the political culture of a country and its people. Democracy cannot be imposed.

We believe the best way to bring about democratic reform in Kuwait -- which, as you know, was one of the more open countries in the region -- is first to restore the former regime, which can and in my view should address the democratic desires of the Kuwaiti people. We would naturally be disposed to encourage such progress through the legitimate government of Kuwait. This issue obviously merits further discussion. In the meantime, however, I believe it essential that Saddam not be allowed to create, much less benefit from, the impression that there is any difference between us on this point of principle. To the degree he thinks he can divide us, he will be that much more intransigent.

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2011-1183-MR  
6/25/2014 MM

The President will no doubt respond soon to President Mitterrand's letter, but I wanted to share these thoughts with you in advance, in view of the fast pace of events.

Should you receive anything appearing to be a genuine feeler from Saddam Hussein, we would of course be interested in hearing about it as soon as possible. With Saddam's progressive pillaging and obliteration of Kuwait, there are limits as to how long we can reasonably wait for the economic embargo to have an effect.

Brent Scowcroft

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                              | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 08i. Letter              | President Mitterrand to President Bush<br>Re: Letter from President Mitterrand (2 pp.) | 10/1/90 | (b)(1)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/12/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91144-005 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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*Ambassade de France  
aux Etats-Unis*

*L' Ambassadeur*


October 1st, 1990

Dear General Scowcroft :

Please find herewith the text of a message from Mr François MITTERRAND, the French President, that I was asked to forward to you.

With high regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'J. Andreani', with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Jacques ANDREANI

General SCOWCROFT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON DC



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 08j. Letter              | President Mitterrand to President Bush<br>French (1 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                               |             |                             |           |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 6/12/2009   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 91144-005 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |           |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |           |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |           |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |           |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |           |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007973  
RECEIVED: 06 OCT 90 12

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 06 OCT 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA  
AP

PERSIAN GULF

**CHRON FILE**

PERSONS: FAISAL, SAUD BIN

SUBJECT: PRES MTG 9 OCT W/ PRINCE SAUD BIN FAISAL RE GULF

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 10 OCT 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES  
HAASS  
NSC CHRON

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 6/12/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSCLG

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 2 OF 2

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7973

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

90 OCT -6 PM 3:21

October 6, 1990

MEETING WITH  
PRINCE SAUD BIN FAISAL  
DATE: Tuesday, October 9, 1990  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 3:45 - 4:00 p.m.  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

I. PURPOSE

To reaffirm our commitment in the Gulf, to discuss the impact of sanctions, and contingencies related to the oil supply.

II. BACKGROUND

Prince Saud will be returning to the Kingdom this week and has asked to see you before he leaves to carry any messages you might have for King Fahd and our latest thinking on the Gulf crisis. In addition, we understand Prince Saud will propose joint contingency planning with us on oil supply in the event Saudi oil facilities are attacked, or there has to be a significant drawdown of the the SPR. The Saudis also might ask about your plans to visit U.S. forces in the Kingdom in view of press reports about a proposed visit in November.

Your meeting will give us a chance to ask Prince Saud about latest Saudi thinking on its relations with Jordan and Yemen. Another issue Defense brought to our attention is the problem of getting funds disbursed from the SAG to reimburse support costs for Desert Shield, particularly for fuel. A related issue is whether bills accrued from the beginning of our deployment before Secretary Baker obtained SAG agreement on compensation will be paid.

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0831-MR  
28 7/13/15

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab B

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer.

V. SEQUENCE

3:45 - 4:00 P.M. - Meeting

Attachments

|       |                   |
|-------|-------------------|
| Tab A | Points to be Made |
| Tab B | Participants      |
| Tab C | Biography         |

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~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH  
PRINCE SAUD BIN FAISAL

- Your Highness, please convey to His Majesty my respects and assurance of our continued support for our shared objectives in ending Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.
- We have become exceedingly concerned about the deplorable conditions inside Kuwait. When I met with His Highness the Amir of Kuwait, I was shocked to hear the horror stories he had to relate of Iraqi atrocities against the Kuwaitis and their country. I assured him we will not rest until Kuwait is liberated from Iraqi aggression.
- I am pleased with the continued global solidarity for our efforts, particularly at the UN. We intend to work on some additional resolutions on reparations and other issues. Our UN Ambassador will be in touch with yours.
- We still believe that it is important to let economic sanctions work to force Iraq to withdraw peacefully. If they don't, as I have said before, all options are on the table.
- I know you are displeased with Jordan's position in this crisis. We have been, too, and I have discussed our differences frankly with King Hussein.
- But we must not lose sight of our larger interests. They have been largely complying with sanctions thus far, and are hurting economically from doing so. We believe it is important that Jordan be brought on board. I would like to

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PER E.O. 13526  
0610-0831-142  
E8 7/13/15

hear your views, particularly on the chances of your reconsidering and resuming oil shipments and opening the border to truck traffic from Jordan.

-- There is one last "housekeeping" matter Secretary Cheney is interested in resolving -- on payment for support for Desert Shield. We deeply appreciate His Majesty's generous offer, but apparently there is an immediate problem of payment for fuel bills and a broader problem of how to implement procedures for reimbursement.

-- (if raised) I agree that it would be prudent for us to consider the implications of a disruption of oil supplies if your facilities are attacked, or if we are forced to make a significant drawdown from the SPR. I will ask Secretary Watkins to work with you on such planning.

-- (if raised) I would like very much to visit U.S. forces in the region and to meet with the King and other Heads of State. When I do go, my time will be limited. What would you think about the other Gulf Heads of State coming to the Kingdom where I could meet with them in the context of the GCC to thank them for their support.

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CARD 1 OF 4

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH  
PRINCE SAUD BIN FAISAL

- YOUR HIGHNESS, PLEASE CONVEY TO HIS MAJESTY MY RESPECTS AND ASSURANCE OF OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR OUR SHARED OBJECTIVES IN ENDING IRAQ'S OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT.
- WE HAVE BECOME EXCEEDINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DEPLORABLE CONDITIONS INSIDE KUWAIT. WHEN I MET WITH HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF KUWAIT, I WAS SHOCKED TO HEAR THE HORROR STORIES HE HAD TO RELATE OF IRAQI ATROCITIES AGAINST THE KUWAITIS AND THEIR COUNTRY. I ASSURED HIM WE WILL NOT REST UNTIL KUWAIT IS LIBERATED FROM IRAQI AGGRESSION.

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Declassify on: OADR

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CARD 2 OF 4

- I AM PLEASED WITH THE CONTINUED GLOBAL SOLIDARITY FOR OUR EFFORTS, PARTICULARLY AT THE UN. WE INTEND TO WORK ON SOME ADDITIONAL RESOLUTIONS ON REPARATIONS AND OTHER ISSUES. OUR UN AMBASSADOR WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOURS.
- WE STILL BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO LET ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORK TO FORCE IRAQ TO WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY. IF THEY DON'T, AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, ALL OPTIONS ARE ON THE TABLE.
- I KNOW YOU ARE DISPLEASED WITH JORDAN'S POSITION IN THIS CRISIS. WE HAVE BEEN, TOO, AND I HAVE DISCUSSED OUR DIFFERENCES FRANKLY WITH KING HUSSEIN.
- BUT WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF OUR LARGER INTERESTS. THEY HAVE BEEN LARGELY COMPLYING WITH SANCTIONS THUS FAR, AND ARE HURTING

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DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

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28 7/13/15

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CARD 3 OF 4

- ECONOMICALLY FROM DOING SO. WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT JORDAN BE BROUGHT ON BOARD. I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS, PARTICULARLY ON THE CHANCES OF YOUR RECONSIDERING AND RESUMING OIL SHIPMENTS AND OPENING THE BORDER TO TRUCK TRAFFIC FROM JORDAN.
- THERE IS ONE LAST "HOUSEKEEPING" MATTER SECRETARY CHENEY IS INTERESTED IN RESOLVING -- ON PAYMENT FOR SUPPORT FOR DESERT SHIELD. WE DEEPLY APPRECIATE HIS MAJESTY'S GENEROUS OFFER, BUT APPARENTLY THERE IS AN IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF PAYMENT FOR FUEL BILLS AND A BROADER PROBLEM OF HOW TO IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES FOR REIMBURSEMENT.



SECRET

~~SECRET~~

CARD 4 OF 4

- (IF RAISED) I AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT FOR US TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS OF A DISRUPTION OF OIL SUPPLIES IF YOUR FACILITIES ARE ATTACKED, OR IF WE ARE FORCED TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT DRAWDOWN FROM THE SPR. I WILL ASK SECRETARY WATKINS TO WORK WITH YOU ON SUCH PLANNING.
- (IF RAISED) I WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO VISIT U.S. FORCES IN THE REGION AND TO MEET WITH THE KING AND OTHER HEADS OF STATE. WHEN I DO GO, MY TIME WILL BE LIMITED. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE OTHER GULF HEADS OF STATE COULD COME TO THE KINGDOM WHERE I COULD MEET WITH THEM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GCC TO THANK THEM FOR THEIR SUPPORT.

SECRET

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CARD 4 OF 4

- (IF RAISED) I AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT FOR US TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS OF A DISRUPTION OF OIL SUPPLIES IF YOUR FACILITIES ARE ATTACKED, OR IF WE ARE FORCED TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT DRAWDOWN FROM THE SPR. I WILL ASK SECRETARY WATKINS TO WORK WITH YOU ON SUCH PLANNING.
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SECRET

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## PARTICIPANTS

### U.S.

The President

James A. Baker, Secretary of State

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for  
National Security Affairs

John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and  
South Asian Affairs

Richard Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian  
Affairs

Sandra Charles, Director for Near East and South Asian  
Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

### SAUDI ARABIA

Prince Saud al-Faysal al Saud, Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Royal Highness Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Ambassador to the  
United States

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 09d. Report              | Re: Biography (1 pp.)     | 12/28/89 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shiled/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 6/12/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91144-005 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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7973

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 6, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ~~RICHARD~~ RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: ~~SANDRA~~ SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Meeting for Prince Saud bin Faisal with President Bush

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum for Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud's meeting with the President on Tuesday, October 9 at 3:45 p.m. Prince Saud will want to discuss the current situation in the Gulf, and reportedly will raise a proposal that we do contingency planning in the event of further oil market disruptions -- from loss of Saudi facilities or SPR drawdowns.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Points to be Made

Tab B Participants List

Tab C Biography

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010 0831MR  
28 7/13/15

13 May 01 Three  
Faisal

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: DM

LOG # 7973

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOC LOG DM A/O \_\_\_\_\_

Ken Hill

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

1

Ken Hill

A

2

APNSA Has Seen

3

DM 196

A

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Pres Meeting w/ Prince Faisal  
10/9 3:45pm

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Exec Sec O R has diskette



**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 7973

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM (PAS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCKLOG M NO \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | DISPOSITION |
|-----------------|-------------|----------|-------------|
| Ken Hill        | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Bob Gates       | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Brent Scowcroft | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Situation Room  | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| West Wing Desk  | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| NSC Secretariat | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| _____           | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| _____           | _____       | _____    | _____       |

90 OCT 9 P 6: 57

|            |                 |              |            |                       |
|------------|-----------------|--------------|------------|-----------------------|
| A = Action | I = Information | D = Dispatch | R = Retain | N = No further Action |
|------------|-----------------|--------------|------------|-----------------------|

cc: VP Sununu Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

7279

CHRON FILE

2

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 8, 1990

*Charlie*

Dear Congressman Bennett:

The President has asked me to respond to your letter of September 6 concerning the situation in the Persian Gulf region.

We welcome your support for the President's response to Iraqi aggression and agree that Congress has a vital role to play in this matter. As you know, we have consulted closely with the congressional leadership about the situation and are working with the appropriate committees regarding an appropriate expression of support for the President's actions.

We also share your belief that our objectives can best be achieved through collective action with the international community. As you know, the United Nations Security Council has now adopted eight resolutions on the subject, and many nations have contributed to the multinational defense effort. We intend to continue working with the United Nations and friendly governments to ensure that the crisis does not come to be perceived as a dispute between the United States and Iraq.

We look forward to continued close cooperation with Congress to protect American interests and lives in the Persian Gulf region.

Sincerely,

*Brent*

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Charles E. Bennett  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7279

September 26, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: NICHOLAS ROSTOW *NR*  
FROM: STEPHEN RADEMAKER *SR*  
SUBJECT: Response to Congressman Bennett Concerning the  
Situation in the Persian Gulf Region

*need to be  
reviewed for a  
reso. dropped.*

Congressman Charles Bennett (D-Fla) has written the President (Tab II) to express his general support for the steps we have taken in response to the invasion of Kuwait. He cautions, however, that we should ask Congress to approve or disapprove our actions, and that we should seek formation of a "United Nations police force" to ensure multinational participation in the effort to free Kuwait.

Your response (Tab I) thanks him for his support, notes that we are seeking a congressional resolution of support, and, without discussing the merits of his U.N. police force proposal, states that we are mindful of the importance of continuing to work with the United Nations and friendly governments.

Concurrences by: Ginny *W*ampley, Richard Haass *RDH*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to Congressman Bennett at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Letter to Congressman Bennett  
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7279

September 28, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB GATES

FROM: STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER *SR*

As indicated in the attached article from today's Washington Post, we are continuing to work with Congress on a resolution supporting our actions in the Persian Gulf. Accordingly, I see no need to change the letter to Congressman Bennett.

Attachment



## CRISIS IN THE GULF

## House Panel Approves Resolution Supporting Bush

By Walter Pincus  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The House Foreign Affairs Committee late yesterday unanimously approved a resolution supporting President Bush's actions in the Persian Gulf crisis after haggling for two days over the wording.

The purpose of the resolution is to show "broad-based support" for what the president has done so far, Committee Chairman Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.) told committee members Wednesday when it first came up for discussion. He said it avoids dealing with any future commit-

ment to battle of deployed U.S. forces and does not give the president any "conditional or open-ended" authority.

Fascell said he "fully expected" that if U.S. troops went into battle, the "regular constitutional and legal processes will be followed," meaning that Bush should ask Congress for a declaration of war.

Rep. William S. Broomfield (Mich.), the committee's ranking Republican, said Bush had told legislators who met with him at the White House last week that he was seeking "support up until now" and hoped any congressional resolution

would reflect "almost unanimous support."

Early yesterday afternoon, when the committee had to recess because Democrats kept seeking White House approval for additional language changes in the resolution, Broomfield told reporters he found it "amazing" that "we can get approval through the United Nations for the president's actions, but not through the Congress."

By limiting the resolution to support action so far, the House panel avoided a debate that House leaders and the White House believed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein or Mid-

dle Eastern U.S. allies might read as weakness in U.S. resolve.

Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.) said Bush's actions in the gulf were the "most significant foreign policy moves of this president" and said he "was not comfortable if Congress just ignored it."

House leaders plan to bring up the resolution on the House floor under a procedure that prohibits any amendments and requires a vote of two-thirds of the members for approval.

The White House has been nervous about any congressional resolution that might appear to limit

Bush's authority to act as commander-in-chief. At the same time, some members of Congress have been critical of colleagues for not invoking the War Powers act, which requires the president to seek authorization to continue keeping troops in a situation 60 days after they are deemed in "imminent danger."

One of the final language agreements worked out with the White House yesterday afternoon was to assuage some committee Democrats' concerns that one phrase "might be giving the president encouragement" to use troops, a com-

mittee aide said. The changed from "The shall, to the extent diplomatic and other means" to "The United continue to emphasize diplomatic and other achieve objectives."

In the Senate, the vices Committee approved Bush's request \$2 billion for the U.S. up in Saudi Arabia, in active \$110 per month duty pay for U.S. troops. In the Senate, a bill would establish a operation Fund to act from other nations from other nations the Defense Department congressional approval that money. Only direct the buildup would be

THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

C0001-07

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: SEPTEMBER 07, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE CHARLES E. BENNETT

SUBJECT: OPPOSES THE U.S. ACTION ON THE MIDEAST CRISIS  
AND SUPPORTS THE FREEING OF KUWAIT BY A U.N.  
POLICE FORCE ACTION WITH THE U.S. AS A  
PARTICIPANT

|                   |              | ACTION |          | DISPOSITION |             |
|-------------------|--------------|--------|----------|-------------|-------------|
| ROUTE TO:         |              | ACT    | DATE     | TYPE        | C COMPLETED |
| OFFICE/AGENCY     | (STAFF NAME) | CODE   | YY/MM/DD | RESP        | D YY/MM/DD  |
| FREDERICK MCCLURE |              | ORG    | 90/09/07 | Em          | A9009110    |
| REFERRAL NOTE:    |              |        |          |             |             |
| 99D05             |              |        | 900912   |             |             |
| REFERRAL NOTE:    |              |        |          |             |             |
| 99D0D             |              |        | 900913   |             |             |
| REFERRAL NOTE:    |              |        |          |             |             |
| REFERRAL NOTE:    |              |        | 900913   |             |             |
| REFERRAL NOTE:    |              |        |          |             |             |
| REFERRAL NOTE:    |              |        |          |             |             |

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230  
MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

\*\*\*\*\*

|                         |                      |                      |   |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES:          | *DISPOSITION         | *OUTGOING            | * |
| *                       | *                    | *CORRESPONDENCE:     | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION   | *A-ANSWERED          | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS  | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM        | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | *OF SIGNER           | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE       | *C-COMPLETED         | *CODE = A            | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET   | *S-SUSPENDED         | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC |                      | *OUTGOING            | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY  |                      |                      | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE        |                      |                      | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY        |                      |                      | * |

\*\*\*\*\*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.

CHARLES E. BENNETT

MEMBER

9 DISTRICT FLORIDA

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN OF SEAPOWERS SUBCOMMITTEE

MEMBER OF RESEARCH AND  
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DELEGATION

# Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

September 6, 1990

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DONNA M. WELDON

JACKSONVILLE OFFICE STAFF

Honorable George Bush  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

You deserve great credit for acting decisively and promptly in the emergency caused by the aggressive action of President Saddam Hussein in his overrunning Kuwait and threatening Saudi Arabia. You also deserve great credit for your able leadership in bringing widespread international support against the aggressions of President Hussein. However, I believe Congress should be asked to approve or disapprove of U. S. actions in opposing President Hussein and to clearly state U. S. policy objectives in the conflict. The Constitution specifically requires Congress to be the decision maker in such matters and I believe the Constitution will be nullified if, in practice, Congress does not make these decisions.

I support your actions to maintain the borders of our ally, Saudi Arabia, against aggression; and to take the necessary steps to secure the release of the hostages and maintain the safety of U. S. forces. It also seems to me that the United States should take leadership in the United Nations to establish a United Nations police force, in which the U. S. would participate, in efforts to regain the independence of Kuwait. However, I believe, the freeing of Kuwait should be a U. N. police force action with the U. S. as a participant, rather than this effort being a U. S. initiative with limited allied support.

I do not approve of the idea of fighting a war for oil that we do not own. To do that would be to abandon U. S. policy of only fighting wars for highest human ideals.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely,



Charles E. Bennett

CEB:ss



September 10, 1990

Dear Congressman Bennett:

Thank you very much for your recent letter to the President regarding the present situation in the Persian Gulf.

We appreciate being apprised of your views. Please know that I have taken the liberty of sharing your comments with the President and several of his advisors so that they, too, are aware of your concerns and recommendations.

Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure  
Assistant to the President  
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Charles E. Bennett  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

FDM:SLM:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for direct response  
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI  
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of Defense - FYI



UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007306  
RECEIVED: 14 SEP 90 10

TO: CUTLER, LLOYD N

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 08 OCT 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF

MP

PERSONS:

CHRON FILE

SUBJECT: RESPONSE RE BIPARTISAN GRP OF WISE MEN ON THE GULF

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 18 SEP 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DAI DATE 10/8 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 8, 1990

Dear Lloyd:

Thanks for taking the time to write and share your thinking about a "wise men" group to help guide us through the Gulf crisis. All things considered, we prefer to hold off setting up such a group for the time being. We will take another look after some time passes; if the conclusion changes, I promise to be in touch.

Thanks too for your kind words about how we are doing.

Sincerely,

*we are  
considering some  
thing along the  
lines of  
remember*

*Brent*  
Brent Scowcroft

Mr. Lloyd N. Cutler  
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering  
2445 M Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20037-1420

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                                                                    | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 10. Letter               | Lloyd N. Cutler to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Suggestion to assemble bipartisan group<br>[Personal Information Redacted] (1 pp.) | 9/13/90 | (b)(6)      |        |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part I

|                               |             |                             |           |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 6/12/2009   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 91144-005 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |           |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |           |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |           |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |           |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |           |

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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B-1040 BRUSSELS  
TELEPHONE 011 (322) 231-0903  
FACSIMILE 011 (322) 230-4322

LLOYD N. CUTLER

DIRECT LINE

(b)(6)

September 13, 1990

Honorable Brent Scowcroft  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

It was good to run into you today.

I am writing this to flesh out my suggestion that the President consider assembling an informal bipartisan group of "Wise Men" to confer from time to time on the Gulf Crisis, which will probably be running for many months to come.

During the 1979 flap over the discovery (in fact the re-discovery) of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, Hedley Donovan and I persuaded President Carter to bring in a similar bipartisan group to study the evidence and advise on the positions we should take in the discussions with the Soviets. It included you, Averell Harriman, George Ball, Henry Kissinger, Dean Rusk, Bill Rogers, Mac Bundy, Ros Gilpatric, Sol Linowitz, Jack McCloy, Clark Clifford, Jim Schlesinger, Nick Katzenbach, John McCone, and David Packard. Harriman, McCloy, and McCone are now dead, but possible replacements could include Cy Vance, Harold Brown,



Honorable Brent Scowcroft  
September 13, 1990  
Page 2

Warren Christopher, Zbig Brzezinski, Al Haig, George Shultz, and Cap Weinberger.

Occasional consultations with such a group could help to create an atmosphere of bipartisan deliberation and consensus. They might also contribute some useful advice and judgment. It would show the public that the hard decisions that lie ahead are being made after listening to the most experienced crisis managers of all recent administrations.

Such a group might be particularly useful in persuading Congress to remain supportive and to refrain from micro-managing every future step. For this purpose, the group might be augmented by distinguished former legislators such as Mike Mansfield, Mac Mathias, Abe Ribicoff and Mel Laird.

There is the risk, of course, that some members of such a group would go public to criticize what the President actually decides, but I believe this risk would be lower if they were inside the tent instead of outside.

Best regards and good luck. You have been almost letter perfect so far.

Sincerely,



Lloyd N. Cutler

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 24, 1990

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS

SUBJECT: Letter to Lloyd N. Cutler

Lloyd Cutler sent you a letter (Tab B) suggesting the President consider assembling an informal bipartisan group of "Wise Men" to confer on the Gulf Crisis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter (Tab A).

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Lloyd Cutler  
Tab B Letter from Lloyd Cutler

BS - Lloyd Cutler — Gulf Crisis

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: MEN

LOG # 7306

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG PR A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN              | DISPOSITION |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|
| <u>Ken Hill</u> | <u>1</u>    | <u>W</u>              | <u>A</u>    |
| Bill Sittmann   | <u>2</u>    | <u>W</u>              |             |
| Bob Gates       | <u>3</u>    | <u>8</u>              |             |
| Brent Scowcroft | <u>4</u>    | <u>APNSA Has Seen</u> |             |
| Bill Sittmann   |             |                       |             |
| Situation Room  |             |                       |             |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>5</u>    | <u>DMO/8</u>          | <u>R</u>    |
| NSC Secretariat | <u>6</u>    | <u>DAD 1/8</u>        | <u>D</u>    |
|                 |             |                       |             |
|                 |             |                       |             |
|                 |             |                       |             |

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: