Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries:	Chronological Files

OA/ID Number:	91144
Folder ID Number:	91144-003

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Wendy Chamberlin to Robert M. Gates Re: FBI Security Measures within the US re Iraq Related Terrorism Threats (2 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memo	To Ambassador David C. Miller, Jr. Re: Iraqi Crisis and Resulting Terrorist Threat in the United States (4 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	S
01c. Cable	Director FBI to Distribution List Re: Terrorist Threat Warning System in the United States (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01d. Cable	Director FBI to All Field Offices Re: Iraqi Terrorist Activities: IT-Iraq (3 pp.)	9/13/90	(b)(1)	
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Second Arms Sales Package for Saudi Arabia (2 pp.)	9/26/90	(b)(1)	S
02b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Second Arms Sales Package for Saudi Arabia (2 pp.)	9/26/90	(b)(1)	S
02c. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Military Sales to Saudi Arabia -- The Second Package (8 pp.)	9/26/90	(b)(1)	S
02d. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: Second Arms Package for Saudi Arabia (1 pp.)	9/26/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1200
OA/ID Number: 91144-003
Date Closed: 6/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
03a. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Analysis of Mitterrand's Speech to the UNGA (2 pp.)	9/26/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Cable	Re: Take 1 of Several -- Mitterrand Adresses UN (2 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	
03c. Cable	Re: Take 2 of Several -- Mitterrand Adresses UN (2 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	
03d. Cable	Re: Take 3 of Several -- Mitterrand Adresses UN (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03e. Cable	Re: Take 4 of 7 -- Mitterrand Adresses UN (2 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	
03f. Cable	Re: Take 5 of 7 -- Mitterrand Adresses UN (2 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	
03g. Cable	Re: Take 6 of 7 -- Mitterrand Adresses UN (3 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	
03h. Cable	Re: Take 7 of 7 -- Mitterrand Adresses UN (2 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	
04a. Report	Re: Saudi Arabia -- Phase I (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04b. Report	Re: Saudi Arabia -- Phase II (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04c. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points The Saudi Arms Sales Packages (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
04d. Talking Points	Re: DOD [Department of Defense]Talking Points (3 pp.)	9/20/90	(b)(1)	S
04e. Report	Re: Items Discussed with Israel (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1200
OA/ID Number: 91144-003
Date Closed: 6/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan, Friday, September 28, 4:00 - 5:30 p.m., Willard Hotel (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
06. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Brent Scowcroft Re: Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group (2 pp.)	9/27/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1200
OA/ID Number: 91144-003
Date Closed: 6/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007642
RECEIVED: 25 SEP 90 18

CHRON FILE

TO: GATES

FROM: CHAMBERLIN
MILLER

DOC DATE: 25 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM IRAQ
PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FBI SECURITY MEASURES WITHIN US RE IRAQ RELATED TERRORISM THREATS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 28 SEP 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHAMBERLIN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CHAMBERLIN
		MILLER
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/4/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

FYI — FBI Security Measures re Iraq

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: UEA LOG # 7642

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	KH	I
Bill Sittmann	2		
Bob Gates	3		
Brent Scowcroft	4		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	AM 10/8	N
NSC Secretariat	6	AM 10/10	N

90 SEP 25 P7:41 RECEIVED

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Memo	Wendy Chamberlin to Robert M. Gates Re: FBI Security Measures within the US re Iraq Related Terrorism Threats (2 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Memo	To Ambassador David C. Miller, Jr. Re: Iraqi Crisis and Resulting Terrorist Threat in the United States (4 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Cable	Director FBI to Distribution List Re: Terrorist Threat Warning System in the United States (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01d. Cable	Director FBI to All Field Offices Re: Iraqi Terrorist Activities: IT-Iraq (3 pp.)	9/13/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007653
RECEIVED: 26 SEP 90 08

CHRON FILE

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 26 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA ARMS SALES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SECOND ARMS SALES PACKAGE FOR SAUDI ARABIA

ACTION: PRES APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 29 SEP 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CHARLES
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/4/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLMS CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ *LOG #* 7653

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* (PRS) *NSC INT*

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	9/28	N
NSC Secretariat	2	10/1	R

SEP 28 P7:15

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Second Arms Package Saudi Arabia

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: [redacted] LOG # 7653

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG [redacted] A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	KH	A
Bill Sittmann	2	W	
Bob Gates	3		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room	4	7.9/26	Dacm
West Wing Desk	5	7.9/20	D
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

7653

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 26, 1990

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0820-MR
EB 11/3/15

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Second Arms Sales Package for Saudi Arabia

Purpose

To further enhance the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain by approving the second arms package for Saudi Arabia and a small tank sale for Bahrain for immediate notification to Congress.

Background

As you will recall, Congress posed no objection to the emergency arms package (planes, tanks, Stingers, DU ammunition) we proposed for Saudi Arabia last month. Congress did, however, balk at the size of the second package we suggested some two weeks ago. Now, subsequent to our consultations with Congress and the Saudi government, State and Defense have submitted a two-phased Saudi arms sales request (Tab A). The first phase was prepared by applying two criteria that justify seeking rapid approval: either that there is an immediate need and immediate availability, or that there are production line considerations that argue for a commitment now. Notifying the first phase would mean curtailing the normal 30-day congressional notification period.

This Phase I package reduces the armor package by half and includes some Patriot and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). On these two latter systems, the idea would be to let the Saudis train and operate a small number of units and launchers in-country that subsequently would be left behind by the Army.

All the items in Phase I meet the two criteria with the exception of the M1A2 tanks; nevertheless, we do not anticipate a major problem. The real argument for keeping some tanks in Phase I is that it would reduce the per unit cost of the tanks for the U.S. Army, and lowers the overall cost of Phase II. With the tanks, Phase I would be $7.5 billion and Phase II $14.2 billion. Without the tanks, Phase I would be $6.2 billion, and Phase II

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

SECRET

$15.5 billion which could make it more of a target. In addition, if Congress should decide against the second phase of the package, the Saudis would still get an armor component in the first phase. All the items listed in Phase II have two-to-three year leadtimes.

We also would like to notify the sale of 27 used M60A3 tanks for Bahrain now since they can be taken out of U.S. Army inventory.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the second arms sales package for Saudi Arabia (Tab A) and the tank sale for Bahrain for immediate notification to Congress.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachment
Tab A Baker Memo forwarding Saudi Arms Package

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

The President has seen
9/26/92

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # 46

ADMIN FAX #

RECORD #

PAGES 10

DTG 26 21007 SEP 92

RELEASER STACK

FROM/LOCATION

1. JAMES CICCONI/THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. JOHN GARDNER/

2.

3. TOR 262112

4.

5.

6.

7.

INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cp NARA, Date 6/4/09

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

John:

Please see that Bob Gates gives this to the President ofr approval immediately. Then call me AS SOON AS he has signed off. This is VERY time sensative.

Thanks.

JIM

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

WHCA FORM 8, 15 OCTOBER 84

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 26, 1990

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0820-MR
ES 11/3/15

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Second Arms Sales Package for Saudi Arabia

Purpose

To further enhance the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain by approving the second arms package for Saudi Arabia and a small tank sale for Bahrain for immediate notification to Congress.

Background

As you will recall, Congress posed no objection to the emergency arms package (planes, tanks, Stingers, DU ammunition) we proposed for Saudi Arabia last month. Congress did, however, balk at the size of the second package we suggested some two weeks ago. Now, subsequent to our consultations with Congress and the Saudi government, State and Defense have submitted a two-phased Saudi arms sales request (Tab A). The first phase was prepared by applying two criteria that justify seeking rapid approval: either that there is an immediate need and immediate availability, or that there are production line considerations that argue for a commitment now. Notifying the first phase would mean curtailing the normal 30-day congressional notification period.

This Phase I package reduces the armor package by half and includes some Patriot and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). On these two latter systems, the idea would be to let the Saudis train and operate a small number of units and launchers in-country that subsequently would be left behind by the Army.

All the items in Phase I meet the two criteria with the exception of the M1A2 tanks; nevertheless, we do not anticipate a major problem. The real argument for keeping some tanks in Phase I is that it would reduce the per unit cost of the tanks for the U.S. Army, and lowers the overall cost of Phase II. With the tanks, Phase I would be $7.5 billion and Phase II $14.2 billion. Without the tanks, Phase I would be $6.2 billion, and Phase II

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

SECRET

$15.5 billion which could make it more of a target. In addition, if Congress should decide against the second phase of the package, the Saudis would still get an armor component in the first phase. All the items listed in Phase II have two-to-three year leadtimes.

We also would like to notify the sale of 27 used M60A3 tanks for Bahrain now since they can be taken out of U.S. Army inventory.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the second arms sales package for Saudi Arabia (Tab A) and the tank sale for Bahrain for immediate notification to Congress.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachment
Tab A Baker Memo forwarding Saudi Arms Package

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

September 26, 1990

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James A. Baker, III

SUBJECT: Military Sales to Saudi Arabia--The Second Package

Since our September 13 memorandum, we and DOD have conducted consultations on the Hill to ascertain Congressional reaction to our proposed Saudi arms sale. The discussions revealed strong concern as to the total size of the package and raised questions as to what we would provide concurrently to Israel. Further, a number of Congressional interlocutors strongly recommended that the package be divided in order to address immediate Saudi needs now while deferring longer-term needs until next year.

In light of our consultative efforts, we have reviewed the arms package recommended in our September 13 memo. While we remain convinced that all items are valid defense requirements, we have worked with DOD and the NSC Staff to craft a package which will take into account Congressional concerns by providing the needed defense equipment in two phases. Equipment available for delivery in the short-term or that meets other criteria for prompt processing would be included in the first phase, to be notified, subject to your approval, this week. Items in the second phase would be notified in accordance with our normal procedures when Congress reconvenes next January. We believe this phased approach will satisfy Congressional concerns over the size of the sale and accord with Saudi capacity to absorb new equipment. We have also discussed the package and our notification plans with Prince Bandar, who understands our rationale for, and supports, this approach.

PHASE I PACKAGE

In dividing the package, we have endeavored to ensure that items in the following categories were included in Phase I (see summary at Tab 1):

-- Items that can be delivered at an early date.

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0820-MR
ES 11/3/15

-- Items that require an immediate decision due to production considerations (e.g., to preclude shut down of a production line).

-- Items that greatly reduce future lift requirements for reinforcing forces.

The items we have identified as meeting these criteria and propose to move in Phase I are cumulatively valued at approximately $7.5 billion. They include:

Air Defense

1) Patriot Air Defense System

We believe that Patriot is critical because it is the only system in our inventory with any capability to intercept and destroy short range tactical ballistic missiles such as the SCUD and FROG rockets in the Iraqi inventory. In response to a Saudi request for a total of 26 Patriot fire units, we propose that six fire units now with U.S. Army air defense elements in Saudi Arabia be transferred to Saudi Arabia, with delivery to occur when we are ready to withdraw our forces. The remaining 20 would be provided from production as part of Phase II. By providing six under Phase I, we would be able to initiate Saudi training on this very complex system at an early date, while these fire units are still in our possession, thus facilitating the later absorption of the remaining 20.

Anti-Armor

2) Armored Vehicles

To offset Iraq's 5500 to 550 advantage in numbers of tanks, the Saudis seek to expand their armored capability as much as limited manpower will permit and to enhance the effectiveness of existing armored forces through the acquisition of qualitatively superior equipment. To this end, we propose that 150 M1A2 tanks (out of a total requirement of 385) be provided as part of Phase I to serve as the foundation of a new armored brigade. In addition, 200 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 207 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers, and other armored vehicles would be provided to equip this new brigade as well as to continue the upgrading of existing mechanized infantry units. A further upgrade of armored forces would be provided for in Phase II with 235 additional M1A2s, 554 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and other armored vehicles. We believe it important to deliver large numbers of armored vehicles as quickly as possible in order to reduce future lift requirements for reinforcing forces to the greatest extent possible.

3) AH-64 Apache Helicopters

To enhance their anti-armor capability still further, the Saudis have requested a total of 48 Apache helicopters. Current production considerations would enable us to divert 12 Apaches due to be produced for the U.S. Army during the next eight months to Saudi Arabia. The balance of the Saudi requirement can be met as part of Phase II in accordance with the standard production time of 36 months.

4) TOW IIA Missiles and Launchers

To provide an immediate night capability and to counter Iraq's more than 1000 T-72 and T-72M1 tanks, the Saudis seek to purchase 3,500 TOW IIA missiles and 150 TOW IIA launchers. Since half of the missiles and all of the launchers can be provided from U.S. Army stocks within one month, both are recommended for inclusion in the Phase I package. The remaining 1,750 missiles would be provided as part of Phase II.

Fire Support

5) Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)

The Saudis have requested a total of 79 MLRS launchers to meet their needs for fire support assets to offset Iraq's 8 to 1 advantage in artillery. We propose diverting nine launchers, enough to equip one MLRS battery, from Army stocks during the next one-to-three months as part of Phase I. The balance would be provided as part of Phase II from normal production. As with Patriot, this phased delivery will enable the Saudis to initiate crew training at the earliest possible date, thus facilitating future integration of additional systems.

Command and Control

6) To facilitate coordination of Saudi Navy coastal patrol activity with other elements of the armed forces, the Saudis seek to upgrade their Navy's command, control and communications system. Since one of the essential components of such an upgrade, the Link 11, could be provided within five months, we propose that the entire effort be included as part of Phase I to ensure the expeditious start of the upgrade.

Combat Support

7) KC-130 Aircraft

The need to support increased operational requirements of its F-5 fleet has caused the Saudis to seek seven additional KC-130 tanker aircraft. Since these aircraft can be provided from production within the next 12 months, we propose that they be included in Phase I.

8) Tactical Wheeled Vehicles

To meet transportation and other logistical support requirements incident to current situation, the Saudis have requested a total of 10,000 trucks of various types. Since all 10,000 vehicles can be delivered within 12 months, we propose to include the full request in Phase I.

9) C-130H Aircraft

To offset a lift shortfall in the Royal Saudi Air Force, the Saudis have requested six C-130H and four C-130H-30 (the stretch version) aircraft. These are proposed for inclusion in Phase I as they can be provided from current production within the next two months.

10) UH-60 Medevac Helicopters

To meet anticipated requirements for evacuation of casualties, the Saudis have requested a total of eight UH-60 Medevac helicopters. Although these were not mentioned in our September 13 memo and they cannot be provided for 24 months, we recommend their inclusion as part of Phase I to expedite their delivery in view of their very necessary role.

PHASE II PACKAGE

Items which cannot be provided in a relatively short time or do not meet other criteria for inclusion in the Phase I package as outlined above would be included in a Phase II package (cumulatively valued at approximately $14.2 billion) which would be notified to the Congress next year.
In addition to items mentioned above which will be delivered in both phases (i.e. Patriot, Armored Vehicles, Apache helicopters, and MLRS), the following items constitute the Phase II package (see Summary at Tab 2):

Air Defense

1) F-15F/H Aircraft

To offset Iraq's 4 to 1 advantage in numbers of combat aircraft, the Saudis have requested 24 F-15F/H aircraft. With the addition of these aircraft, the Saudi F-15 fleet (their principal air defense aircraft) will increase to 118 when deliveries are complete in the 1994-1995 time frame.

Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence

2) RE-3 Reconnaissance Aircraft

Given Iraq's massive advantages over Saudi Arabia in both air and ground forces, it is essential that the Saudis have an

intelligence acquisition capability which will permit early detection of potentially threatening Iraqi military moves. To that end, we have previously approved Saudi purchase of a SIGINT capable aircraft which is currently under construction. In order to have the capability to monitor electronic emissions on a 24-hour basis, the Saudis are requesting two additional RE-3 aircraft.

Combat Support

3) KE-3 Aerial Refueling Tankers

To support the greater number of AWACS and F-15 sorties now being flown by the Royal Saudi Air Force, the Saudis require five additional KE-3 aerial refueling tankers. In view of the large number of USAF tankers that have been required to support Desert Shield, this modest enhancement of Saudi refueling capability could also be of great benefit to the U.S. should we need to deploy forces to the Gulf in the future.

Assistance for Other Gulf States

In our previous Saudi arms sale memo we mentioned several requests for equipment sought by Bahrain and the UAE totaling approximately $3.2 billion. The cumulative value of those requests has since been reduced substantially because we do not yet have a firm UAE decision to proceed with a major M1A1 tank buy. Following our consultations with Congress, we reviewed the remaining requests of the Gulf States using the same criteria as outlined above for Saudi Arabia. On the basis of that review, we have decided to defer our proposed notification of Apache helicopter sales to the UAE and Bahrain until January because those helicopters would not be available for 36 months and thus fall into the same category as the Apache helicopters included in Phase II of the Saudi package. We propose, however, to proceed with notification of the sale of 27 M60A3 tanks to Bahrain concurrently with Phase I of the Saudi package, since these items can be provided within the next few months from Army stocks and are needed in the field as soon as they are available. A summary of the Bahraini and UAE requests is at Tab 3.

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Phase I of Second Saudi Package

Tab 2 - Phase II of Second Saudi Package

Tab 3 - Equipment Requests from Other Gulf States

PHASE I OF SECOND SAUDI PACKAGE

ITEM	QUANTITY	EST VALUE ($)	EST AVAIL (MOS)
Air Defense Equipment			
Patriot	6	1,038	TBD*
Anti-Armor Equipment			
Armored Brigades		3,135	
M1A2 Abrams	150	1,309	36
M2A2 Bradley	200	800	18
M88A1 Rec Veh	17	49	18
M113 Family of Veh	207	150	3
M578 Rec Veh	43	25	3
M548 Cargo Carrier	50	30	1-3
Support Equipment/Spares		750	
AH-64 Apache Helo (with 155 Hellfire missiles)	12	300	8
TOW IIA			
Launchers	150	33	1
TOW IIA Missiles	1750	22	1
Fire Support			
Multiple Launch Rocket System		64	1-3
Launchers	9		
Rocket Pods	2880		
Command, and Control			
Navy Communications Gear		307	
Link 11	22		5
C-3 Upgrade			24
Combat Service Support			
KC-130 Tanker**	7	490	12
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (Transporters, trucks, trailers, etc.)	10000	1,800	4 (2300) Remainder avg 12 mos
C-130H Aircraft**	10	310	2
UH-60 Medevac Helo	8	70	24
TOTAL		7,547	

* From U.S. Army stock at a time to be determined.

** Commercial sale

Wang 4705K

PHASE II OF SECOND SAUDI PACKAGE

ITEM	QUANTITY	EST VALUE ($M)
Air Defense Equipment		
F-15F/H Aircraft	24	2,400
Patriot**	20	3,461
Anti-Armor Equipment		
Armored Vehicles		5,255
M1A2 Abrams	235	2,051
M2A2 Bradley	554	2,216
M109A6 Howitzer	50	186
TOW IIA Missiles	1750	22
Support Equipment/Spares	X	750
AH-64 Apache Helicopters (with 445 Hellfire missiles)	36	900
Fire Support		
Multiple Launch Rocket System		496
Launchers	70	
M77 Rockets	22400	
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence		
RE-3 Reconnaissance Aircraft	2	540
Combat Service Support		
KE-3 Tanker Aircraft	5	1,200
TOTAL		**14,222**

** Commercial Sale

REQUESTS FROM OTHER GULF STATES

BAHRAIN

Item	Quantity	Value (in Millions)
M60A3 Tanks*	27	37
AH-64 Apache Helicopters** with 450 Hellfire Missiles	8	226

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

AH-64 Apache Helicopters** with 355 Hellfire Missiles	20	440
Total		703

* To be notified at the same time that we notify Phase I of the Second Saudi Package.

** To be notified next year.

Wang 4728K

~~SECRET~~ 7653

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 26, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Second Arms Package for Saudi Arabia

Attached at Tab I is a memo to the President forwarding for his approval a two-phased arms package for Saudi Arabia as recommended by State and Defense (Tab A). We have scrubbed Phase I trying to apply the two criteria that the Hill used to judge our first Phase I attempt: that there is an immediate need and immediate availability; or that there are production line considerations that argue for a commitment now. Phase I now includes some Patriot, MLRS, and half of the armor package. Submitting the first phase now would mean curtailing the normal 30-day congressional notification period.

State and DoD also have included an M60A3 tank sale for Bahrain that would be notified now since these 27 tanks can be taken from the U.S. Army inventory.

Ginny Lampley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Baker Memo forwarding Saudi Arms Package

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0820-MR
EO 11/3/15

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Declassify on: OADR

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007665
RECEIVED: 26 SEP 90 12

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 26 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
IRAQ
PERSIAN GULF
UNGA
KUWAIT
SPEECHES

PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF MITTERRAND SPEECH TO UNGA

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 29 SEP 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
HAASS
NSC CHRON
WELCH

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/4/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM CLOSED BY: NSPMP DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

FYI — Analysis Mitterrand Speech to UNGA - 24 Sept

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: KEA
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Bill Sittmann	2	W	
Bob Gates	3	has copy	
Brent Scowcroft	4	APNSA Has Seen	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room		9/27	D
West Wing Desk	5		NJK
NSC Secretariat	No		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

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7665

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0820-MR
EO 11/2/15

CHRON FILE

September 26, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Analysis of Mitterrand's Speech to the UNGA

Thanks. I think I discussed with you on stage 2.

In his September 24 speech to the UNGA, Mitterrand said that the conclusion of the crisis initiated by Iraq will set the example for whether a new world order can succeed. His tone, language, and logic were strongly anti-Iraqi. While reiterating a preference for a peaceful solution, Mitterrand stressed that Iraq had not given the "slightest indication of reconciliation." He referred to the positive possibilities of Arab solutions, but warned against "wishful thinking." Where he made direct reference to the United States, his remarks were supportive.

The heart of the speech was a somewhat rambling four points, the "context diplomacy could still win over the escalation." The following are the four points, mated to an indication of where congruity or difference may exist with our policy.

-- **"[T]here will not be compromise as long as Iraq does not subscribe to the views of the UNSC and then withdraws from Kuwait....On the other hand, if Iraq states its intention to withdraw its troops, release the hostages, everything becomes possible."** Clearly, we would agree with the objectives cited by Mitterrand. That being the case, and since Iraq has repeatedly declared that it will not leave Kuwait, there would appear to be little difference between these statements and U.S. policy, despite the media's interpretation that the second sentence indicates greater French flexibility.

-- **"In a second stage, as I see things this way, the international community, which has sanctioned the aggression, would guarantee the implementation of the military withdrawal, the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty, and the democratic expression of the choices of the Kuwaiti people."** In the context of the first point, we believe Mitterrand meant Iraqi military withdrawal (the New York Times alone among major U.S. papers read this as multinational withdrawal). The only nuance here is that Mitterrand did not explicitly call for restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, as we do. His statement does not rule out return of the al-Sabah, but the language on a choice for Kuwaitis is reflective of French unease about making that a condition.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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-- **"The third stage....the time to substitute the clashes that make the Middle East bleed with a dynamic of good neighborhood with security and peace for everyone."** Citing Lebanon, the Palestinian issue, and Israel, Mitterrand points out that he is not making a comparison of conflicts "which are not of the same nature" and that a global approach "gives a pretext to whomsoever wants to do nothing." Since this stage is clearly distinguished from and not linked to the previous two stages for resolving the Kuwait invasion, this also does not conflict with U.S. policy. Indeed, we would also look to address those problems <u>afterwards</u>.

-- **"...a fourth stage, in which there would be a mutual and agreed arms reduction in that region..."** Again, this is not linked to previous stages and, as an goal, not inconsistent with U.S. policy.

In sum, we find no dramatic differences between Mitterrand's ideas and U.S. policy. The conclusion that there is light between us is wrong. Mitterrand may have used nuance and language more delicately than we would have in his first two points, but the press made more of this than appears to be warranted by the facts. As a result, any follow-up (public comments, call to Mitterrand, letter, etc.) ought to be supportive and complimentary. Let us know if you want something specific prepared.

Adrian Basora concurs.

Tab I: Mitterrand's September 24 Speech to the UNGA

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RUFHTVB/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUFHVOA/VOA MUNICH GE
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//((ADDRESS BY FRENCH PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION IN NEW YORK - LIVE))

((TEXT)) ((MONITORED IN PROGRESS))...THE WALL THAT WAS
THE CRAZY IDEA THAT THE ORDER THEY WERE PROTECTING WOULD NEVER BE BLOWN AWAY BY THE GREAT WIND OF SPACE -- A DREAM, AN IDEA -- I REMEMBER SAYING TO MY COMPATRIOTS IN FRANCE THAT IN THIS MOMENT OF HAPPINESS, SUCH AS HISTORY HAS SELDOM EXPERIENCED IN THE PAST, THE END OF AN ORDER DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT ANOTHER ORDER IS GOING TO BE BORN IMMEDIATELY; IT WILL BE VERY DIFFERENT. I PUT THIS QUESTION TO YOU: WHAT ARE WE GOING TO DO WITH THIS PERIOD WE ARE ENTERING, WHICH IS BOTH SO PROMISING AND SO DANGEROUS? YES, WHAT ARE WE GOING TO DO? ((TWO-MINUTE BREAK IN AUDIO RECEPTION; FILLED BY STUDIO DISCUSSION))...WHAT IS ILLUSORY IN THE VISION OF A WORLD WHICH HAS SUDDENLY FOUND ITS PATH ((LA VOIE OR LA VOIX)) WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. THE ATTACKS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ARE MANY AND MARKED; THEY ARE UNACCEPTABLE. ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ARE STILL PERSECUTED. INTERESTS HAVE LOST NOTHING OF THEIR BRUTALITY. THE STRONG STILL THREATEN THE WEAK AND THE OPPRESSED NURTURE REVENGE. HOWEVER, CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE BLOCS CAN HENCEFORTH NO LONGER SERVE AS AN EXCUSE FOR THOSE WHO JEOPARDIZE DEMOCRACY, FOR THOSE WHO BELIEVE THEY CAN PUT OFF TILL TOMORROW WHAT IS EXPECTED FROM THEM TODAY. I THINK YOU REALIZE THAT HERE I AM REFERRING TO THE MATTER OF NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS.

IN A WORLD WHERE NO ONE, NOT EVEN THE STRONGEST, CAN ESCAPE FROM THE FACT THAT OUR DESTINIES ARE INTERDEPENDENT, IT IS TEMPTING TO SEEK ONE'S DIFFERENCE BY LOOKING INWARD, BY EVASION, AS IF THE ONLY WAY OF ASSERTING ONE'S IDENTITY, ONE'S DIFFERENCE, WERE TO DENY THAT OF OTHERS, AS IF THIS NEED COULD FIND AN OUTLET IN XENOPHOBIA OR NATIONALISM. THE CONCLUSION OF THE CRISIS INITIATED BY THE IRAQI ACT OF AGGRESSION WILL, IN THIS RESPECT, BE EXEMPLARY, JUST AS THE DRAMA STRIKING LIBERIA SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A WARNING.

IF WE ARE NOT CAREFUL ABOUT THIS, THE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY OFFERED BY THE ENDING OF THE BLOC SYSTEM WILL CHANGE INTO A BAD DREAM. IN ORDER TO STOP THIS ANARCHY, TO EXCLUDE THE CONCEPT THAT MIGHT IS RIGHT, AND ALSO TO PREVENT AN ALLIANCE OF THE STRONG FROM IMPOSING AN ORDER IN WHICH THE OTHERS WOULD BE LOST, I HAVE NO OTHER REPLY THAN THAT OF LAW -- YES, LAW. LAW IS THE MONOPOLY OF NO ONE, NOR IS IT THE MONOPOLY OF ANY STATE OR ANY PHILOSOPHY. IT EXPRESSES THE GENERAL WILL. AND, IN THIS RESPECT, IS IT NOT REMARKABLE THAT WE ARE WITNESSING THE EMERGENCE OF AN AGREEMENT, WHICH IS ALMOST UNIVERSAL, ON SIMPLE VALUES -- CALLED FREEDOM, THE FREEDOM TO SPEAK, TO ACT, TO MOVE AROUND, TO ELECT ONE'S LEADERS -- EQUALITY, JUSTICE, RESPECT FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, TOLERANCE, THE ACCEPTANCE OF DIFFERENCES, OF ALL VALUES, WHICH FAVORS DIALOGUE OVER RELATIONS OF FORCE? AND EVERYONE FEELS AND EVERYONE KNOWS THAT, IN THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PEOPLES, THERE CAN ONLY BE LASTING PEACE AND FREEDOM IF THE STATES AGREE TO BOW TO THE COMMON RULES WHICH IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO DECREE.

(MORE) 241531 GERMANOS/HORNING/DP 25/1955Z SEP

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

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03c. Cable	Re: Take 2 of Several -- Mitterrand Adresses UN (2 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

RUEATAC/CDR USAITAC WASHINGTON DC
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THEIR COUNTRY.
TEXT:
((TEXT)) HOW COULD WE NOT HAVE BEEN APPALLED BY THE TAKING OF THOUSANDS OF HOSTAGES, AMONG THEM 500 OR MORE OF OUR OWN FELLOW COUNTRYMEN, WHO WERE RECEIVED NOT LONG AGO BY IRAQ, ACCORDING TO ITS OWN ADMISSION, AS GUESTS, AS FRIENDS WHO TRUSTED IN THE HOSPITALITY OF A NOBLE PEOPLE WHICH IS AMONG THE MOST ANCIENT AND MOST ILLUSTRIOUS ON EARTH? HOW COULD WE ACCEPT THAT SOME OF THEM AS IS

THE CASE, SHOULD SERVE AS HUMAN SHIELDS IN BATTLE POSITIONS, IN A BATTLE WHICH IS NOT THEIRS? HOW COULD WE ACCEPT THAT THE RESIDENCE OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN KUWAIT SHOULD BE VIOLATED, PLUNDERED, AND ROBBED, AND ITS OCCUPANTS ARRESTED? HOW COULD WE ACCEPT THAT THE RESIDENCE OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN KUWAIT SHOULD BE VIOLATED, PLUNDERED, AND ROBBED, AND ITS OCCUPANTS ARRESTED? IF THERE WAS A MISTAKE, WHY PROCLAIM IT SO LATE, WHY INCREASE THE NUMBER OF THE HOSTAGES WITH THESE VICTIMS? FACED WITH THESE SUCCESSIVE ACTS, I MADE THE DECISIONS IMPOSED ON ME BY HONOR AND SOLIDARITY AND I SENT GROUND REINFORCEMENTS TO THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES WHICH WERE THREATENED. MY DIRECTIVES HAVE REMAINED AS THEY WERE: TO MAKE THE EMBARGO SUCCESSFUL; THAT IS, TO USE IT TO IMPOSE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL; TO CONTAIN ANY AGGRESSION; TO SERVE PEACE WHILE RESPECTING THE LAW AND WITHOUT CEDING ANYTHING TO VIOLENCE. I WOULD ADD THAT FRANCE IS ACTING IN CLOSE AGREEMENT WITH ITS PARTNERS IN THE EC OF THE 12 AND THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION IN COORDINATION WITH THE U.S., ARAB, AND OTHER MILITARY FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN DISPATCHED TO THE MIDDLE EAST FOR THE SAME REASONS. THIS COORDINATION IN NO WAY AFFECTS OUR AUTONOMY IN DECISIONMAKING. THERE YOU ARE, WE REMAIN OPEN TO ALL OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE AND WE ARE SEEKING THESE. OUR LOGIC IS THE LOGIC OF PEACE AS AGAINST THE LOGIC OF WAR, WHICH SEEMS NEVERTHELESS TO BE PREVAILING AND WHICH THE IRAQI POLICY IS IMPOSING ON AN ANGUISHED WORLD.
(MORE) 241531 GERMANO/HORNING/MC 25/1958Z SEP
BT
#3498

<SECT>
SECTION: 01 OF 01
<SSN>
0203
<TOR>
900925160523 MSG000275587522

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03e. Cable	Re: Take 4 of 7 -- Mitterrand Adresses UN (2 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03f. Cable	Re: Take 5 of 7 -- Mitterrand Adresses UN (2 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03g. Cable	Re: Take 6 of 7 -- Mitterrand Adresses UN (3 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03h. Cable	Re: Take 7 of 7 -- Mitterrand Adresses UN (2 pp.)	9/25/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007715
RECEIVED: 27 SEP 90 14

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: BARTHOLOMEW, R

DOC DATE: 26 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA
ARMS SALES
ISRAEL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FIGURES & TALKING POINTS FOR ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA & CONCERNS FM ISRAEL

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 01 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 6/4/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG CLOSED BY: NSRLG DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

United States Department of State

Under Secretary of State
for Security Assistance, Science
and Technology

9-26?

7715

Gen. Scowcroft

Brent:

I'm sending this to you per VAB's instructions.

Reg Bartholomew

APNSA Has Seen

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Report	Re: Saudi Arabia -- Phase I (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Report	Re: Saudi Arabia -- Phase II (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points The Saudi Arms Sales Packages (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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DoD TALKING POINTS

- This Administration and previous Administrations have held that the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council are vital to the national interest.

- The security of Israel is of profound importance to the United States. We are unshakeably committed to ensuring Israel's ability to live safely and in peace. We have backed up this commitment in tangible form for many years and will continue to do so. There can be no doubt of this commitment.

- On August 7, the President ordered the deployment of more than 100,000 US military personnel to Saudi Arabia, other countries in the region, and the adjacent seas in response to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and the threat it posed to Saudi Arabia and to US vital interests. This deployment was carried out to deter further Iraqi aggression, to defend against it should deterrence fail, and to enforce the UN-mandated economic sanctions against Iraq.

- The United States is conducting these efforts as part of a coalition of forces from Arab as well as other countries from around the world.

- It should be apparent from the events of early August that major improvements are needed in the security of this vital region. These improvements require a combination of cooperative measures involving all the friendly countries of the Persian Gulf region, other moderate Arab and Islamic states, and nations such as the United States and the other countries who have been invited to participate in the defense of the region.

- An urgent requirement in this connection is to strengthen the armed forces of our partners in this coalition, particularly our leading partner in the effort, Saudi Arabia.

- Furthermore, we must enable the Saudi armed forces to shoulder a greater share of the burden of defending this vital region in order to make it less likely that US forces will again have to reinforce our friends in the region so quickly or in such large numbers. The Saudis have demonstrated the will to take on this responsibility.

- To do so, the Saudi armed forces, which are very small relative to Iraq's, must be made larger and stronger. Saudi Arabia has never sought to build armed forces rivalling in size those of the regional military powers, such as Iraq. They still have no wish to do so. However, it is now obvious that the Saudis cannot depend on moral or political constraints to deter foreign aggression; they must be better prepared militarily to deal with it.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0821-MR
MM 10/31/2016

• The Administration has already taken steps, in an emergency sale of military materiel, to fill some of the most urgent needs. We did this in the early days of our own build-up to help meet the immediate challenge.

• It is now necessary to take the next step toward enhancing Saudi Arabia's defense capabilities. We have therefore developed a package of defense sales which will relatively quickly improve Saudi Arabia's forces in the areas of logistics, anti-armor, and air defense.

• Conscious of the short time remaining in this year's Congressional session, but cognizant of the need to start the process of strengthening Saudi defenses as soon as possible, we have been conducting consultations with members of Congress with a view toward proceeding with this package as a major step in the long-term process.

• The Administration recognizes the need for cooperation between the Executive and Legislative Branches in this long-term effort. We firmly believe that a full and careful review of our proposals will strengthen Congressional support for the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Accordingly, we are prepared to accommodate the requests from some members of Congress and divide the sale into two phases:

- (1) a portion we will notify now under accelerated procedures, altering the customary notification process but still complying with the law; and

- (2) a portion which will be notified in January under the ordinary procedures when Congress reconvenes.

• The first phase, which we are notifying to Congress now, contains those items that:

- can be delivered at an early date,

- require immediate decisions because of production considerations,

- are inseparable parts of integrated programs, or

- would reduce lift requirements for reinforcing forces.

• The second phase of this package, which will be notified in January, will round out the Saudi requirements at this stage. I am confident that the proposals will receive a fair and thorough review and gain the support of Congress at that time.

• I want to emphasize that this entire package is a beginning, not an end, to the cooperative improvement of Saudi Arabia's defense capabilities, and that it opens a new period in the long-standing US security relationship with the Kingdom and the

other friendly countries in the region. These defense relationships will help ensure that the region's energy resources will not be dominated by a hostile power.

• Maintaining a strong Israel has long been a vital American goal and it remains one. It is now very important that we help strengthen Saudi Arabia. These are compatible aims.

• It is a fact that the security of the Gulf countries is also of profound importance to the United States. We are and must be similarly committed to ensuring the ability of Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies to live safely and in peace without fear of aggression or domination by any hostile power.

• The threat to the Gulf is not imaginary. It is real. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait proves that. Saudi Arabia does not seek a stronger military capability for frivolous reasons. But it is inescapable that Saudi Arabia cannot remain as vulnerable as it was when the decision to execute Operation DESERT SHIELD was made.

ISA/NESA, 20 September 1990

Items Discussed with Israel

When MOD Director General Ivry visited Washington, August 28-29, he presented a list of equipment desired by Israel. Ivry characterized these items as being needed to help Israel meet the heightened threat as a consequence of the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

Shortly after Ivry returned to Israel, Secretary Cheney sent a message to Defense Minister Arens on the Ivry visit and informed Arens that we could make 10 CH-53 helicopters available to Israel at no cost under the SRA as they were taken out of US service during the rest of the year.

During Arens' visit to Washington, September 16-18, the Israelis again raised the Ivry list on several occasions with DOD officials. The Israelis were given no concrete responses since the US reply was to be given during the meetings between Secretary Cheney and Minister Arens.

At the Cheney/Arens meetings, no commitment was made but two batteries of PATRIOT, 15 F-15 A/B and the acceleration of delivery of materiel to be prepositioned in Israel could be offered if an understanding on the Saudi arms sale were reached. ~~These three items have been selected to be the Phase I package for Israel.~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0822-MR
SCS 7/5/13

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007709
RECEIVED: 27 SEP 90 13

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 27 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: JORDAN
ANSA

PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS: HASSAN

SUBJECT: SCOWCROFT MTG W/ HASSAN ON 28 SEP

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 01 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		GANTT
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON
		WELCH

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 6/4/09

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT CLOSED BY: NSGLM DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: NHT LOG # 7709

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	3		S
Bill Sittmann	1	Copy	I
Bob Gates	2		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	9/28	N
NSC Secretariat	4	9/28	N

RECEIVED 90 SEP 27 P8:15

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

Mtg w/ Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan on Sept. 28 at 4:00pm

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Your Meeting with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan, Friday, September 28, 4:00 - 5:30 p.m., Willard Hotel (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (September 1990) Part II [1]

Date Closed:	6/4/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91144-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007711
RECEIVED: 27 SEP 90 13

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: ROSTOW

DOC DATE: 27 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: LEGAL ISSUES IRAQ

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DECLARATION OF WAR LEGAL ANALYSIS

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 01 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ROSTOW LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		NSC CHRON
		ROSTOW

COMMENTS: _____

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DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSBTM CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

B2/b/1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 7711
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 27, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT OBE-NFAR

FROM: NICHOLAS ROSTOW NR

SUBJECT: Declaration of War

A declaration of war has implications under domestic and international law.

A. U.S. Law

A declaration of war is not constitutionally required for the President to direct U.S. Armed Forces to engage in hostilities. While there have been five declarations of war in our history, Presidents have ordered the Armed Forces into action on more than 200 occasions, sometimes with, and often without, congressional authorization in the form of a joint resolution. As a constitutional matter, joint resolutions authorizing the use of armed force may substitute for declarations of war, which, in any event, always have been in the form of joint resolutions. Occasionally, Congress has indirectly ratified the President's decision through the appropriation process.

The War Powers Resolution attempts to narrow the President's flexibility to deploy troops into hostilities or situations where hostilities are imminent beyond 60 days absent a declaration of war or other specific authorization. It provides that congressional inaction or indirect authorization (e.g., the appropriation of funds) shall not be deemed specific authorization sufficient to continue involvement in hostile situations beyond 60 days. All Presidents have asserted that the Resolution is unconstitutional. A declaration of war or other joint resolution specifically authorizing the use of force would remove the War Powers Resolution as an issue between the Executive and Legislative branches.

In this century, American declarations of war have been the prelude to a total national effort directed at the destruction of the enemy and military campaigns world-wide. They have provided the basis for the President's assertion of extensive powers to direct and regulate American society, particularly with respect to access to commodities, price controls, seizure of enemy alien property, control of manufacturing capability, labor, and public information. Based on the Commander in Chief power during wartime, Presidents Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt established an array of Executive agencies to assert presidential authority in

each of these areas. In contrast, the war against Spain was fought in Spanish colonies, not against the Spanish homeland, and did not provide the occasion for expansive exercises of Executive authority.

B. International Law

Under international law, a declaration of war constitutes one way a state may signal the existence of a "state of war" with a foreign state. International legal authorities have long debated whether the laws of war become applicable only once such a state of war has been declared to exist. The common view, reflected in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, is that no such formality is required.

Customarily, the relevance of the laws of war between contending belligerents and between belligerents and neutrals depends on objective facts, not on nice distinctions between formal states of peace or war. In both World Wars, for example, a number of countries declared war on Germany but never engaged in hostilities. Since World War II, international armed conflict typically has occurred without declarations of war, and the laws of war have governed. Though the 1907 Hague Convention III requires warning by declaration of war or ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war as a prelude to armed conflict, no country has been subjected to legal penalty for violating that requirement since the Nuremberg trials. While the U.N. Charter prohibits the threat or use of force except in exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense and does not specifically address the continued applicability of the laws of war, it is generally accepted that the Charter did not thereby remove declarations of war as an option for states or the laws of war from international legal norms. At a minimum, declarations of war formally bring into play the complex regime of belligerent and neutral rights.

International and domestic law overlap with regard to the treatment of enemy property. The disposition of private property is subject to settlement after the reestablishment of peace. Accordingly, after both World Wars mixed tribunals were established to adjudicate the disposition of enemy property. As a matter of international law, belligerents may seize enemy government property and use it in connection with prosecuting hostilities. Under U.S. law, a declaration of war would permit invocation of the Trading with the Enemy Act and implementation of its regime regarding enemy property, public and private.

C. Gray Memorandum

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Boyden Gray to the President on the potential significance of a declaration of war against Iraq. Gray's memorandum makes the following principal points:

-- under international law, declarations of war notify neutrals of the existence of a state of war and provide one method by which states acquire belligerent status (including the right to intern enemy aliens);

-- under domestic law, a declaration of war would fully satisfy the requirements of the War Powers Resolution, thus eliminating the need for periodic reports;

-- a declaration would permit the President to (1) invoke the Trading with the Enemy Act, allowing the confiscation of enemy property in the United States; (2) call up the reserves for the duration of the conflict; (3) reclaim title to former military facilities; (4) use the military in extraordinary ways, for example, to requisition property and compel services of citizens and aliens without regard to the availability of appropriated funds; and (5) intervene across a broad front in American society without authorizing legislation.

Gray concluded that, on balance, a declaration of war would grant the President more authority than he would probably need or want in the present crisis and, because of the rights it would confer on Iraq under international law to intern U.S. nationals, might play into Iraq's hands. Accordingly, he recommended seeking a properly worded joint resolution, which would satisfy our political and legal desire for an expression of congressional support.

D. Conclusion

Declarations of war in this century have been used only for world wars, where full mobilization and total national effort in all areas were required. In circumstances demanding lesser mobilization and concentration of national effort, other authority has been used as a basis for engaging in hostile actions. In Korea, for example, President Truman relied on authority emanating from the United Nations. His decision was controversial, and, accordingly, President Johnson sought and obtained congressional authorization for military action in Vietnam. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, of course, did not guarantee congressional staying power. Subsequent uses of force have been based on the President's Commander in Chief power standing alone (except in the case of Lebanon in 1983, where Congress ultimately insisted on authorizing the U.S. deployment in order to preserve its position on the War Powers Resolution).

In the event of armed conflict with Iraq, a declaration of war would appear not to be warranted. The President does not need one as a constitutional or statutory matter. A declaration of war would give the President more power than he reasonably may be expected to need. It might also suggest that, in future,

Congress would have even greater say in the use of the Armed Forces than it historically has had. A declaration of war, moreover, might change the complexion of the crisis into an Iraq-U.S., not Iraq-world community, problem. If such a declaration preceded hostilities, it would reduce the strength of our position on hostages by providing Iraq with a justification in international law for interning enemy aliens.

On balance, therefore, I concur in Gray's conclusion.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum by Boyden Gray

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
August 7, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: C. BOYDEN GRAY CBG

SUBJECT: Potential Significance of a Declaration of War Against Iraq

As you requested, I have looked at the advantages and disadvantages that would follow from a declaration of war against Iraq. For the reasons set forth below, there are few legal advantages to a declaration of war unless you anticipate serious and sustained hostilities with Iraq requiring wartime mobilization of the American people and economy. If you anticipate a more modest military commitment to the Persian Gulf region, depending on the size of the commitment, its likely duration, and the risk of involvement in hostilities, you can proceed either without any formal congressional approval at all, or seek a joint resolution of Congress endorsing your action.

International Law

Under customary international practice, declarations of war serve to (1) notify neutral powers of the existence of a state of war, (2) prepare the nation's political structure and populace for war, and (3) publicly explain the circumstances necessitating the declaration.

Declaring war is one way that a state can acquire belligerent status under international law. States with such status acquire belligerent rights, including the rights to intern enemy aliens and confiscate enemy property found within their territory, blockade enemy ports, and seize enemy shipping. Of course, states against whom war is declared acquire these same rights against the declaring state. This would mean that if Iraq acquired belligerent status by virtue of a U.S. declaration of war, Iraq would have a strong basis under international law for interning U.S. citizens for the duration of the conflict. Belligerent status can also be acquired by engaging in acts of war, however, and throughout history many if not most conflicts have been fought without formal declarations of war.

Constitutional Issues

Under our Constitution, Congress has the power to declare war and the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has the power to conduct it. The records of the constitutional convention suggest that an important purpose of this division was to afford the President

flexibility to respond quickly to aggression, while ensuring that Congress approved of any decision to commit aggression against other countries. Obviously this distinction is easier to draw in theory than in practice. Because we believe that the United States does not initiate aggression, the Executive branch has generally held that the President can order U.S. forces into combat without a declaration of war. Accordingly, we have proceeded without a declaration of war or other congressional authorization when it was politically tenable to do so, as in Grenada and Panama.

Congress, on the other hand, has sometimes taken a more restrictive view of the President's authority. Because the U.S. cannot long sustain military commitments without the support of Congress and the American people, other mechanisms have been resorted to when politically expedient and a declaration of war was not desired. The most commonly used mechanism is the joint resolution. The two most recent examples are the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was adopted at President Johnson's request in 1964 in furtherance of his policy in Viet Nam, and the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, which Congress insisted on enacting in 1983 in order to preserve its position concerning application of the War Powers Resolution to Lebanon.[1]

Consequences Under U.S. Law

If you order a U.S. military response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it will be immaterial under U.S. law whether that response is unilateral or undertaken under auspices of the United

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[1] Another example, arguably relevant to the current situation, is the Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, adopted in 1957 in support of President Eisenhower's intervention in Lebanon. This resolution, which remains in effect and is currently codified at 22 U.S.C 1961-1965, provides in pertinent part:

> . . . the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism . . .

This resolution would appear to provide congressional authorization for the deployment of U.S. forces to the Middle East in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait only if we could plausibly claim that Iraq is a "country controlled by international communism."

Nations. In either case, your legal options and the legal consequences under U.S. law of your actions will be the same.

A declaration of war would have limited effect under existing statutes. It would fully satisfy the requirements of the War Powers Resolution[2], thereby eliminating the need to report certain force deployments to Congress and providing congressional authorization to continue deployments into hostile situations for more than 60 days. A joint resolution of Congress would also provide authorization to continue such deployments, however, though the requirement that certain deployments be reported to Congress would remain in effect. In the absence of either a declaration of war or a joint resolution, we would be subject to both the War Powers Resolution's reporting requirement and its requirement -- which we regard as unconstitutional -- to terminate deployments into hostile situations after 60 days.

A declaration of war would also allow us to invoke the Trading With the Enemy Act against the assets of Iraq and its citizens in the United States. The principal advantage of this Act over the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (which we have already invoked against Iraq) is that it would permit us not only to freeze Iraqi assets, but to confiscate them as well.

A declaration of war or national emergency by Congress empowers the President to call up all members the reserves for the duration of the war or emergency plus six months. However, the President already has statutory authority to call up 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve for 24 months upon issuing his own declaration of national emergency. In addition, he has authority to call up 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for 90 days if he determines that doing so "is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission."

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[2]The War Powers Resolution provides that the President is to consult with Congress "in every possible instance" prior to introducing U.S. military forces into hostilities or situations where involvement in hostilities is imminent. It also requires the President to report to Congress within 48 hours any deployment (1) "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated," (2) "into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation while equipped for combat," or (3) "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation." The Resolution further provides that, with respect to the first category of deployments (into hostilities or situations where involvement in hostilities is imminent), the forces must be withdrawn after 60 days unless Congress has declared war or enacted a joint resolution authorizing continued deployment.

Various other statutes empower the President to reclaim U.S. title to former military facilities in the event of war. These statutes vary, but as a general rule they give the President greater authority to reclaim title in the event of a congressional declaration of war or emergency than in the absence of such a declaration. Another statute authorizes the President to require communications common carriers to give priority to national security communications "during the continuance of a war in which the United States is engaged." This provision probably could be invoked even in the absence of a declaration of war, but its availability would be clearer in the event war was declared.

The most important consequences of a declaration of war arise not under any statute, but under the Constitution. During states of war, Presidents have been able to assume extraordinary authority over American society under the Commander-in-Chief clause. During World War II, for example, President Roosevelt created dozens of Executive branch agencies to oversee the economy, and those agencies were generally successful in compelling private sector compliance with their edicts, even in the absence of authorizing legislation. The internment of Japanese-American citizens was first ordered by Roosevelt pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority, though Congress had ratified this action prior to the Supreme Court decision upholding it. The President also gains extraordinary authority over the military in times of war. He can, for example, direct the military to requisition property and compel services of citizens and aliens, irrespective of the availability of appropriated funds.

Conclusion

In the event that the United States undertakes any sort of military response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, you will have three options: (1) proceed on your inherent authority as Commander-in-Chief without seeking congressional authorization, (2) seek a joint resolution of Congress approving your action, or (3) request a declaration of war. We believe it is legally sufficient to proceed with no formal congressional authorization at all. However, if U.S. forces will be involved in hostilities or situations where involvement in hostilities is imminent and you wish to avoid a dispute over the War Powers Resolution, or if a congressional endorsement would useful in gaining public support for your action, you should consider seeking a joint resolution approving your action. A declaration of war would give you greater authority to wage war against Iraq and undertake massive intervention in the U.S. economy, but the principal benefits of such a declaration are ones that you are not likely to need -- or indeed want -- in the current situation. Further, because of the implications under international law, such a declaration could play into Iraq's hands.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007702
RECEIVED: 27 SEP 90 11

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: DEAL

DOC DATE: 27 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF ECONOMICS

PERSONS: MULFORD, D MCCORMACK, R

SUBJECT: MTG OF GULF CRISIS FINANCIAL COORDINATION GRP ON 26 SEP

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 01 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		DEAL
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 6/4/09

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMJT CLOSED BY: NSMJT DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7702

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

September 27, 1990

Good memo. Thanks. BS

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL

SUBJECT: Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group

The Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group held its first meeting yesterday at Treasury. David Mulford chaired the meeting; Dick McCormack was Deputy Chairman. Although the EC and the French appeared intent on torpedoing the exercise -- or at least slowing the momentum -- the meeting's outcome was positive from our standpoint. Here are the highlights:

-- All strongly supported Mulford's assessment that the economic pillar was absolutely essential to complement diplomatic and military efforts to isolate Saddam and strengthen the resolve of the Front Line states.

-- The Germans, British, and Japanese emphasized the need to show unity to the outside world. While we may differ some on projected needs of the Front Line states, that should not prevent the group from moving ahead expeditiously and efficiently in providing assistance to them. Other delegations echoed this theme.

-- The Group should be an informal coordinating mechanism. It should not become a permanent institution.

-- We need better data. The management group should try to reconcile the various assessments of Front Line states, recognizing that any data will be a rough approximation.

-- The group of Front Line states must be kept small to avoid dissipating scarce resources. Clearly, Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan meet the general criteria, but some donors want to add countries on a selective basis. The Gulf countries, for example, want Syria in. On the other hand, the Kuwaitis stressed that no funds should go to countries that do not support U.N. sanctions, making clear without saying so that they had Jordan in mind.

-- Assistance for 1990 should be unconditional. For 1991, economic and political conditionality should apply, although the standard would need to be flexible, not rigid as in the case of traditional IMF programs. No country is willing to consider commitments beyond 1991.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0822-MR
8/22/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-- The IMF and World Bank should have significant roles but in a technical advisory capacity, not as overall coordinators.

The EC, through the Italian Presidency, a Brussels EC Commission representative, and the EC's Ambassador in Washington, and with the support of France, was unhelpful. They quibbled over whether the Group "could agree" to schedule the next meeting, questioned whether the Group should go beyond informal information-sharing at this stage, and asserted that the thrust of Baker's conversation with EC Foreign Ministers in New York was inconsistent with the tone and purpose of this meeting. They also challenged the innocuous wording of Mulford's press guidance. The French had the gall to suggest that the next meeting of the Group should be in Europe and that they should have an opportunity to clear yesterday's press guidance. Mulford reminded the French that all meetings on the creation of the EBRD had been in France and that Attali had never once sought clearance for his press statements.

Brady, Robson, and Mulford were hopping mad over the behavior of EC representatives and especially resented the suggestion that Baker had a separate operation going in New York which might supercede this Group's decisions and deliberations. Brady or Robson will want to meet with you or have Bob call another Informal Steering Group meeting to clarify Baker's position with respect to the Coordination Group.

Next Steps

While the EC's position is unclear, the rest of the participants, including several EC member states, agreed to hold another meeting of the Coordination Group on October 12. The management group will begin its analysis of the data on October 1.

cc: Adrian Basora
Condi Rice
Karl Jackson
Richard Haass

9/27/90

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Brent:

Robson has called you to discuss the EC's stance at yesterday's Coordinators Group meeting. The details are on the second page of the memo.

Jim

Jim was to use this for a conversation w/ Robson — He talked with Gates so he cancelled his call to you.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007749
RECEIVED: 28 SEP 90 12

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 27 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF
UN
ANSA
CONGRESSIONAL
KUWAIT
FMS

2

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR MTG W/ CONGRESS ON 27 SEP

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 02 OCT 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

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		GANTT
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

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7749

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 27, 1990

Natl Sec Adviser has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: Richard N. Haass

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Your Meetings with Congress, Thursday, September 27

Attached are the talking points for your meetings with Congress today.

Attachment:
Talking Points

UNCLASSIFIED

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH CONGRESS

-- Glad to have this opportunity to meet with you, both to give you a sense of what we are up to and to hear from you.

-- Right now we are naturally focused on the Gulf. We have the key pieces of our policy in place: 8 UNSC resolutions, sanctions, growing multinational forces, burden-sharing. The intent is to give sanctions time to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait without condition.

-- If we succeed, I fully believe that we, together with our friends in the region, the UN, and possibly the Soviets, can work out satisfactory arrangements that would contain Iraq.

-- If it becomes clear that sanctions are not working, or if Iraq escalates one way or another, we will reassess our approach...but not our objectives. Too much is at stake to falter here.

-- To succeed, we in the administration are looking to help from the Congress: to fund the Desert Shield supplemental, to forgive Egypt's FMS debt, to support arms for Saudi Arabia.

-- Our need for the supplemental funding is obvious. Despite the considerable help we have received from our allies in Europe and the Asia and from our friends in the Middle East, the total cost of Desert Shield will require additional resources of our own. This is not only necessary but proper: it is important that we be seen to be making sacrifices as we ask others to as well.

-- On Egypt, let me simply say that it constitutes half the Arab world, and that without Mubarak we cannot succeed, and that without FMS debt forgiveness Egypt and Mubarak will be in danger. The President is on record saying just how critical this request is to our overall undertaking. Egypt's case is unique, both economically and politically.

-- On Saudi arms, I can appreciate your concern. But let me point out that we cannot support the Saudis and not provide them with the means to deter Iraq and help defend themselves. Also, they have a record of acting responsibly with what we have sold them.

-- We have taken congressional concerns into account in reshaping our request, and now I ask for your support.

-- As for Israel, let me say that we are sensitive to its very real security needs and are already meeting them where we can.

-- Last, I would only add that amidst all these clouds in the current crisis there may also be some silver linings...in improved US-Soviet relations, in a stronger UN, and even in the peace process. But all this requires that we succeed, and your continued support is a pre-requisite.

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH CONGRESS

-- Glad to have this opportunity to meet with you, both to give you a sense of what we are up to and to hear from you.

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-- Last, I would only add that amidst all these clouds in the current crisis there may also be some silver linings...in improved US-Soviet relations, in a stronger UN, and even in the peace process. But all this requires that we succeed, and your continued support is a pre-requisite.

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7749

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat	1		N

90 SEP 26 A10:06 RECEIVED

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9007670
RECEIVED: 26 SEP 90 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 26 SEP 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: OIL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE / SPR

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 29 SEP 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MELBY LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		MELBY
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN CLOSED BY: NSLMS DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ *LOG #* 7670

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* *PRS* *NSC* *INT*

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft	1		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	[illegible]	N
NSC Secretariat	3		N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

7670

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 26, 1990

NOTED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: SPR Test

Purpose

To announce a test of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

Background

You have agreed with Secretary Watkins that DOE should conduct a 5 million barrel test of the SPR. At Tab A is a draft announcement, coordinated with Jim Brady and Jim Watkins, which can be inserted in your speech this evening.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the insert at Tab A in your speech.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Insert for Speech

will be handled on rd.

cc: The Vice President
Chief of Staff

Insert for President's September 26 Speech

SPR Test

The crisis in the Persian Gulf is reflected in the recent run-up in oil prices. However, industry leaders do not believe that oil markets have taken into account the additional production which is coming on stream from a variety of sources, nor available commercial stocks. While the oil market is very tight, with little spare capacity, there is sufficient oil to meet current needs. There is no justification for panic buying, nor for volatile movements in oil prices which only aggravate the situation, particularly for oil-importing developing countries.

Should the oil supply situation change for the worse, the U.S., in concert with our partners in the International Energy Agency, is prepared to bring additional oil to the market. To ensure U.S. ability to act quickly if needed, I have today directed the Secretary of Energy to conduct an immediate test of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which contains 590 million barrels, by selling 5,000,000 barrels of SPR oil. This test will ensure that all systems are functioning properly and demonstrate our ability to meet commitments under the IEA's coordinated emergency response mechanism. I am prepared to take additional steps as necessary.

7670

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 26, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL

FROM: ERIC MELBY

SUBJECT: Presidential Announcement of SPR Test

At Tab A is a draft announcement of the SPR test. It has been coordinated with Treasury and DOE.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Insert for Speech

6674

CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 26, 1990

Dear Chuck:

You wrote me last month about the need for Japan and other nations affected by the crisis in the Persian Gulf to make substantial contributions to our common effort there. It was precisely to meet this pressing need that I sent Jim Baker and Nick Brady to several countries that we felt could make a difference. I am pleased to report to you that our friends in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, Japan and Germany have agreed to help.

In particular, Japan will be providing a substantial sum. Prime Minister Kaifu called me September 13 to say that his government will commit $2 billion to the front line states facing Iraq and a total of $2 billion for the costs of the multinational force.

Even with this level of international support for efforts to counter Iraq's aggression, there is still an urgent need for U.S. leadership, a role no other nation can provide. I hope I can count, therefore, on your support for the Desert Shield Supplemental, including provision for forgiveness of Egypt's FMS debt. As you know, Chuck, Egypt is essential -- its contribution, politically and militarily, is irreplaceable.

Sincerely,

George Bush

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

6674

9-26-90

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

90 SEP 25 PM 12:13

September 25, 1990

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT RSS for

SUBJECT: Reply to Senator Grassley re Japan's Contribution to the Gulf Effort

Purpose

To inform Senator Grassley of your success in persuading Japan and other nations to increase substantially their contribution to the front line states and the multinational force in the Persian Gulf; to seek support for Egypt.

Background

Senator Grassley wrote you (Tab B) in August urging you to ask Japan and other affected nations to share the burden. Fred McClure responded initially on your behalf. Your reply was withheld in anticipation of reporting the Administration's successful approach to the Japanese and others.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the reply to Senator Grassley at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Letter to Senator Grassley
Tab B Original Letter from Senator Grassley

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

August 16, 1990

Dear Chuck:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President expressing your thoughts on the importance of Japanese military or economic participation in the Persian Gulf operation. I have shared your comments with the President's foreign policy and national security advisors so that they, too, are aware of your specific recommendations.

Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

FDM:HGP:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for Direct Response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Department of State - FYI

REPLY TO:

☐ 135 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1501
(202) 224-3744
TTY: (202) 224-4479

☐ 721 FEDERAL BUILDING
210 WALNUT STREET
DES MOINES, IA 50309-2140
(515) 284-4890

☐ 206 FEDERAL BUILDING
101 1ST STREET S.E.
CEDAR RAPIDS, IA 52401-1227
(319) 363-6832

REPLY TO: 166061

☐ 103 FEDERAL COURTHOUSE BUILDING
320 6TH STREET
SIOUX CITY, IA 51101-1244
(712) 233-1860

☐ 210 WATERLOO BUILDING
531 COMMERCIAL STREET
WATERLOO, IA 50701-5497
(319) 232-6657

☐ 116 FEDERAL BUILDING
131 E. 4TH STREET
DAVENPORT, IA 52801-1513
(319) 322-4331

United States Senate

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1501

August 9, 1990

The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing about our current multinational effort in the Persian Gulf to protect our allies, as well as our own strategic interests, in the region from Suddam Hussein.

More specifically, I am interested in the participation of Japan and other allies in our military effort. I understand that Japan has been very cooperative and has joined in the embargo against Iraq and has suspended all economic transactions with Iraq.

These are commendable actions. However, Japan's 99% dependence on imported oil gives Japan a considerable stake in the success of our efforts. Therefore, Japan should be more than eager to make substantial contributions either economically or militarily to the current Persian Gulf operation. However, according to the State Department, the United States has not yet requested Japan or other major powers to make these contributions to help ensure our mutual success.

Our efforts in the Persian Gulf will have a major impact on our federal budget, which is already under tremendous strain. The United States cannot be expected to bear even a majority of the burden of this operation that greatly benefits the entire industrialized world.

I, therefore, urge you, Mr. President, to ask Japan and other affected nations to share in the overall burden of protecting our mutual interests. The long term success of our Persian Gulf policy depends upon a strong commitment and involvement that is shared by all.

Sincerely,

Chuck Grassley

Charles E. Grassley
United States Senator

Committee Assignments:

APPROPRIATIONS
BUDGET

JUDICIARY
SMALL BUSINESS

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 18, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: KARL JACKSON KJ

FROM: DOUGLAS PAAL

SUBJECT: Reply to Senator Grassley on Japanese Contribution to Gulf Effort

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President asking him to sign a reply to Senator Grassley's letter (Tab B) urging greater Japanese contributions to the Gulf effort. The reply has been delayed so that the President would be able to report the Administration's successful handling of this issue.

Concurrences by: Virginia Dampley, Eric Melby, Richard Haass

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments:
Tab I Scowcroft-President memo
Tab A Draft reply
Tab B Incoming from Grassley

6674

ID# 166061

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: AUGUST 10, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE CHARLES E. GRASSLEY

SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO ASK JAPAN AND OTHER AFFECTED NATIONS TO SHARE IN THE OVERALL BURDEN OF PROTECTING MUTUAL OIL INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	ACTION DATE YY/MM/DD	DISPOSITION TYPE RESP	DISPOSITION C D	DISPOSITION COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE	ORG	90/08/10	FM A		90/08/16
NSC	R	90/08/11			/ /
99DOS	I	90/08/11			/ /
		/ /			/ /
		/ /			/ /

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1220 ____ ____

MAIL USER CODES: (A)_____ (B)_____ (C)_____

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS OF SIGNER
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	*CODE = A
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF OUTGOING
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY		
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE		
*X-INTERIM REPLY		

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE (ROOM 75,OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT.

6545

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CHRONOLOGY

September 26, 1990

2-

Barbara

Dear Senator Mikulski:

Thank you for your letter of August 8 to the President, concerning the increases in crude and product prices since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

I share your concern that oil prices should reflect actual market conditions. Indeed, the President, in his speech to the nation on August 2, urged oil companies to show restraint and not abuse the existing uncertainties to raise prices.

We are also working diligently to ensure that the shortfall caused by the loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil is made up. We have been in contact with oil producing countries to raise production. The stock position of oil companies is very healthy and should permit the draw down of private stocks.

We are also consulting closely with our partners in the International Energy Agency to determine what additional steps, such as a coordinated draw down of strategic stocks, would be desirable.

Thank you for sharing your views.

Sincerely,

Brent

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Barbara Mikulski
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 15, 1990

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL

FROM: ERIC MELBY

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Mikulski

Senator Mikulski wrote the President on August 8 (Tab II) regarding the increase in crude and product prices in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Your response (Tab I) cites the President's concern and our efforts to get additional supplies on the market.

Concurrences by: Ginny Lampley, Richard Haass and Dan Levin

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Mikulski at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Letter to Senator Mikulski
Tab II Letter from Senator Mikulski

A. MIKULSKI
MARYLAND

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2003

August 6, 1990

President George Bush
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing to express outrage over the recent surge in gasoline prices in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Many oil companies and service station dealers are apparently cashing in on the crisis and taking advantage of U.S. consumers by raising pump prices -- some as much as 15 cents a gallon! I urge you to exercise leadership and all presidential powers at your disposal to end this obvious consumer gouging. We cannot allow greed in our country to exploit this difficult international situation.

The size, rapidity, and timing of these increases is not only unfair, it is causing panic-buying among some consumers, especially farmers, commuters, and truckers whose livelyhood depends on gasoline. If motorists begin hoarding gasoline or topping off their tanks, real shortages and gas lines might not be far behind. Moreover, such rapid price increases play into the hands of Saddam Hussein, jeopardizing this nation's military, economic, and energy security.

Mr. President, know that I will stand by you. If you need us for consultation or a vote, you can count on me.

Sincerely,

Barbara A. Mikulski

Barbara A. Mikulski
United States Senator

BAM:clp

6545

August 8, 1990

Dear Senator Mikulski:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President regarding increases in the price of oil in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

We appreciate being apprised of your concerns regarding the dramatic price increases and its impact on consumers throughout the country. Please know that your comments have been shared with the President. Additionally, I have taken the liberty of providing your remarks to the President's national security and energy policy advisors so that they, too, are aware of your views.

Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Barbara Mikulski
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

FDM:SLM:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for direct response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of Energy - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI

7068

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

September 26, 1990

2

Dale

Dear Senator Bumpers:

Thank you for your letter of August 22 to the President urging that other countries help pick up some of the burden of Desert Shield.

I fully share your concerns. The Administration is working hard with a number of countries to ensure that the military and economic burden imposed on all of us by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is shared by the principal beneficiaries of our resolve to stand up to Saddam.

In this regard, Secretaries Baker and Brady have just completed very fruitful discussions with our principal allies. We will continue to work closely together in the coming days and months to deal responsibly with this issue.

I appreciate your writing with your views.

Sincerely,

Brent

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Dale Bumpers
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

7068

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 26, 1990

Leon

Dear Congressman Panetta:

Thank you for your letter of August 24 to the President urging that other countries help pick up some of the burden of Desert Shield.

I fully share your concerns. The Administration is working hard with a number of countries to ensure that the military and economic burden imposed on all of us by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is shared by the principal beneficiaries of our resolve to stand up to Saddam.

In this regard, Secretaries Baker and Brady have just completed very fruitful discussions with our principal allies. We will continue to work closely together in the coming days and months to deal responsibly with this issue.

I appreciate your writing with your views.

Sincerely,

Brent

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Leon E. Panetta
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

7068

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 26, 1990

Dear Congressman McGrath:

Thank you for your letter of August 20 to the President urging that other countries help pick up some of the burden of Desert Shield.

I fully share your concerns. The Administration is working hard with a number of countries to ensure that the military and economic burden imposed on all of us by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is shared by the principal beneficiaries of our resolve to stand up to Saddam.

In this regard, Secretaries Baker and Brady have just completed very fruitful discussions with our principal allies. We will continue to work closely together in the coming days and months to deal responsibly with this issue.

I appreciate your writing with your views.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Raymond J. McGrath
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

7068

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen

September 11, 1990

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ERIC MELBY EM.

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Gulf Burdensharing

Senator Bumpers and Representatives Panetta and McGrath have written the President (Tab II) urging that we approach other countries to share in the costs of paying for Desert Shield.

Fred McClure has asked that you reply directly to the Congressmen.

Concurrences by: Ginny Hampley and Richard Haass

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Letters to Bumpers, Panetta and McGrath
Tab II Letters from Bumpers, Panetta and McGrath

DALE BUMPERS
ARKANSAS

COMMITTEES:
APPROPRIATIONS
ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES
SMALL BUSINESS

7068

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

August 22, 1990

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

While American men in the Persian Gulf are facing the possibility of hostilities, and the American taxpayers are being asked to foot the bill for our efforts there, nations which are much more dependent on Middle East oil than the U. S. are bearing little of either the manpower or financial burden. Both Germany and Japan have indicated a willingness to send troops, but are apparently prohibited from doing so by their constitutions. Germany is even considering an amendment to its constitution so it can send troops.

Meanwhile, I would strongly urge you to request all nations which import oil from the Middle East and have not or cannot share the manpower burden to share the financial load. The U. S. is facing its biggest deficit in history, and it is unfair to ask our taxpayers to provide the money, and our men the blood, for an enterprise that benefits other nations much more than it does us.

This suggestion is not to demean or castigate other nations, because I believe they are willing to help. We should not hesitate in requesting it.

Sincerely,

Dale Bumpers

Dale Bumpers

DBdjn

August 27, 1990

Dear Senator Bumpers:

Thank you very much for your recent letter to the President regarding the current situation in the Persian Gulf.

We appreciate being apprised of your concerns regarding the potential costs of maintaining our military forces in the Persian Gulf and your recommendation that the U.S. should ask nations who have not or cannot share the manpower burden to share the financial burden. I have taken the liberty of providing your comments to the President's national security advisors so that they, too, are aware of your views and recommendation.

Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Dale Bumpers
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

FDM:SLM:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for direct response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of Defense - FYI

ID# 169075

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: AUGUST 24, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE DALE BUMPERS

SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO REQUEST ALL NATIONS THAT IMPORT OIL FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAVE NOT OR CANNOT SHARE THE BURDEN OF SUPPLYING MANPOWER TO SHARE THE FINANCIAL LOAD

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	DISPOSITION C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE	ORG	90/08/24	FM	A	90/08/27 LJ
REFERRAL NOTE:					
NS SITT	R	90/09/05 LJ			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:					
99 DOS	F	90/09/05 LJ		C	90/09/05
REFERRAL NOTE:					
99 DOD	I	90/09/05 LJ		C	90/09/05
REFERRAL NOTE:					
		/ /			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1210 ____ ____

__ MAIL USER CODES: (A)_____ (B)_____ (C)_____

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS OF SIGNER
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	*CODE = A
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF OUTGOING
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY		
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE		
*X-INTERIM REPLY		

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE (ROOM 75,OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT.

LEON E. PANETTA, CALIFORNIA
CHAIRMAN

THOMAS S. FOLEY, WASHINGTON
MARTY RUSSO, ILLINOIS
ED JENKINS, GEORGIA
MARVIN LEATH, TEXAS
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, NEW YORK
BARBARA BOXER, CALIFORNIA
JIM SLATTERY, KANSAS
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, MINNESOTA
FRANK J. GUARINI, NEW JERSEY
RICHARD J. DURBIN, ILLINOIS
MIKE ESPY, MISSISSIPPI
DALE E. KILDEE, MICHIGAN
ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, CALIFORNIA
JERRY HUCKABY, LOUISIANA
MARTIN SABO, MINNESOTA
BERNARD J. DWYER, NEW JERSEY
HOWARD L. BERMAN, CALIFORNIA
ROBERT E. WISE, JR., WEST VIRGINIA
MARCY KAPTUR, OHIO
JOHN BRYANT, TEXAS

JOHN C. ANGELL
CHIEF OF STAFF
226-7200

ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS

U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
Washington, DC 20515

BILL FRENZEL, MINNESOTA
RANKING REPUBLICAN MEMBER
WILLIS D. GRADISON, JR., OHIO
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, PENNSYLVANIA
DENNY SMITH, OREGON
WILLIAM M. THOMAS, CALIFORNIA
HAROLD ROGERS, KENTUCKY
RICHARD K. ARMEY, TEXAS
JACK BUECHNER, MISSOURI
AMO HOUGHTON, NEW YORK
JIM McCRERY, LOUISIANA
JOHN R. KASICH, OHIO
DEAN A. GALLO, NEW JERSEY
BILL SCHUETTE, MICHIGAN
HELEN DELICH BENTLEY, MARYLAND

MARTHA H. PHILLIPS,
REPUBLICAN STAFF DIRECTOR
226-7270

7077

August 24, 1990

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As you are well aware, the United States response to Iraqi aggression in the Middle East puts an additional strain on our already fragile economy and further complicates the crucial task of reducing the Federal deficit. While your primary responsibility at this time is the successful prosecution of our efforts in the Middle East, I urge you to make every effort to ensure that the full burden of the Middle East initiative does not fall on the United States budget.

While our involvement in the Middle East clearly will impose an additional burden on the U.S. economy and the Federal budget, the burden can be limited if other nations pay their fair share of the costs of ensuring that Iraqi aggression does not threaten the rule of international law, regional peace, the world's supply of oil and the world economy. I urge you to take every possible step to secure from all countries with vital interests at stake commitments to contribute financial and other resources to this effort commensurate with their interests and their ability to pay. I believe American citizens are willing to bear their fair share of the costs of guaranteeing peace and securing borders in the Middle East, but they should not have to bear a disproportionate share of that burden.

I commend you for the strong but cautious leadership you have shown in this difficult challenge in the Middle East. The crisis we confront is both military and economic. A weak economy at home can be equally devastating to our future national security. It is more important than ever that we work together to ensure that these additional costs are paid for and that a strong budget agreement is reached to substantially reduce the Federal deficit over five years. You can be assured of my continuing support in those efforts.

Sincerely,

LEON E. PANETTA
Chairman

cc: Secretary Brady
Director Darman

August 28, 1990

Dear Leon:

Thank you very much for your recent letter to the President regarding the current situation in the Persian Gulf.

We appreciate both being apprised of your concerns regarding the potential costs of maintaining our military forces in the Persian Gulf and receiving your recommendation that the United States take steps to secure financial assistance and other resources from nations that also have vital interests at stake. Please know that I have taken the liberty of sharing your comments with the President's national security and budget advisors so that they, too, are aware of your recommendation.

Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Leon E. Panetta
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

FDM:SLM:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for direct response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to OMB - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to the Dept. of Treasury - FYI

SUM

ID# 169455

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

CO 001-07

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: AUGUST 27, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE LEON E. PANETTA

SUBJECT: CONCERNS REGARDING THE EFFECT THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WILL HAVE ON THE UNITED STATES BUDGET

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	DISPOSITION C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE	ORG	90/08/27	FM	A	90/08/28 IJ
REFERRAL NOTE:					
NSSITT	R	90/09/05	IJ		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:					
99 OMB	I	90/09/05	IJ	C	90/09/05
REFERRAL NOTE:					
99 DOS	I	90/09/05	IJ	C	90/09/05
REFERRAL NOTE:					
99 TRES	I	90/09/05	IJ	C	90/09/05
REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230 ____ ____

__ MAIL USER CODES: (A)_____ (B)_____ (C)_____

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS OF SIGNER
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	* CODE = A
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF OUTGOING
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY		
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE		
*X-INTERIM REPLY		

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE (ROOM 75,OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT.

ID# 168573

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

FO 003-02

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: AUGUST 22, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE RAYMOND J. MCGRATH

SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO SEEK HELP FROM JAPAN AND OTHER ALLIES WHO ARE UNABLE TO MAKE LARGE MILITARY COMMITMENTS BUT CAN ASSIST WITH THE COST OF MAINTAINING TROOPS IN SAUDI ARABIA

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	DISPOSITION C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE	ORG	90/08/22	FM	A	90/08/24 LJ
REFERRAL NOTE: NS SITT	R	90/09/04	LJ		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: 99 DOS	I	90/09/05	LJ	C	/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: 99 DOD	I	90/09/05	LJ	C	/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240 ____ ____

__ MAIL USER CODES: (A)_____ (B)_____ (C)_____

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS OF SIGNER
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	* CODE = A
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF OUTGOING
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY		
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE		
*X-INTERIM REPLY		

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE (ROOM 75,OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT.

RAYMOND J. McGRATH
5TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

MEMBER
COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
SELECT REVENUE
MEASURES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT

16857

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
ROOM 205
CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
(202) 225-5516

DISTRICT OFFICE:
203 ROCKAWAY AVENUE
VALLEY STREAM, NY 11580
(516) 872-9550

7069

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

August 20, 1990

F Mr. Chief.

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Over the last three weeks, your leadership has been outstanding in the effort to isolate Iraq and to prevent further aggression by Saddam Hussein and his forces. In my conversations with constituents thus far in the Summer recess, I have heard great appreciation for your personal command of our nation's diplomatic and military initiatives.

One recurring concern I have heard in conversations at home has been the potential costs of maintaining our military forces in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. My constituents are willing to make sacrifices to protect our national interests. They are, however, upset that other nations with equal or greater reliance on oil supplies from the Middle East do not appear to be making an equivalent contribution to the defensive efforts we have undertaken with some of our allies. Japan in particular has been singled out as a nation which ought to offer substantial financial support as they are major beneficiaries of our presence in the Middle East. While this view may be based on a misunderstanding of international affairs, it does appear to be widely held by patriotic and sophisticated constituents.

If the crisis in the Middle East requires a prolonged American presence, I urge you to use every available channel to seek significant and visible assistance from the Japanese and from other allies who are unable to make large military commitments in the effort to contain Iraqi aggression. Such assistance is in my opinion crucial to maintain the broad public support we need for any long term military operation.

Please let me know if I can assist you in any way in efforts to inform my constituents and residents of the greater New York area of your ongoing initiatives with our allies. I realize that these activities may go unnoticed in the daily reports of military activity.

My thoughts and prayers are with you at this difficult time.

Sincerely,

Ray

Raymond J. McGrath, M.C.

August 28, 1990

Dear Leon:

Thank you very much for your recent letter to the President regarding the current situation in the Persian Gulf.

We appreciate both being apprised of your concerns regarding the potential costs of maintaining our military forces in the Persian Gulf and receiving your recommendation that the United States take steps to secure financial assistance and other resources from nations that also have vital interests at stake. Please know that I have taken the liberty of sharing your comments with the President's national security and budget advisors so that they, too, are aware of your recommendation.

Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Leon E. Panetta
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

FDM:SLM:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for direct response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to OMB - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to the Dept. of Treasury - FYI

August 24, 1990

Dear Ray:

Thank you very much for your recent letter to the President regarding the United States response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

We appreciate your sharing both the concerns you have heard while traveling in your district regarding the potential costs of maintaining our military forces in Saudi Arabia and your recommendation that the U.S. should seek financial assistance from Japan and other allies who are unable to make large military commitments. We welcome your input on this matter, and I have taken the liberty of sharing your comments with the President's national security advisors so that they, too, are aware of your recommendation.

Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Raymond J. McGrath
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

FDM:SLM:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for direct response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of Defense - FYI

7066

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

September 26, 1990

2.

Tom

Dear Congressman McMillen:

Thank you for your letter of August 23 to the President concerning the need for Saudi compensation for the deployment of U.S. forces to the Kingdom. As you know, Secretary Baker just led an interagency delegation on a very successful mission where he met with Saudi, Kuwaiti and UAE officials on this subject. All three governments were very responsive to our request for compensation. They have agreed to cover a substantial amount of the incremental costs of our military deployments. These payments will either be monetary or in kind, including such items as fuel, food, and other forms of in-country support.

The Kingdom also agreed some time ago to a significant increase in oil production to make up the loss from Kuwait and Iraq to ease the impact of the loss on the price and availability of oil to the consumer.

I believe the Saudi government and our other friends in the Gulf region are shouldering their fair share of the burden through both military and financial contributions. They, like we, believe it is a small price to pay considering what is at stake for our larger mutual interests.

Thank you for writing on this matter of serious interest to our national security.

Sincerely,

Brent

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Tom McMillen
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 14, 1990

Nat Sec Adviser has seen

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: ~~SANDRA~~ CHARLES

SUBJECT: Response to Congressman McMillen on Compensation for U.S. Forces in Saudi Arabia

Attached at Tab I is a response to Congressman McMillen's letter to the President (Tab II) concerning lack of compensation from the Saudis for the development of U.S. forces to the Kingdom. The letter advises him of the SAG's generous "donation" to Secretary Baker.

Ginney Lampley and Eric Melby concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Congressman McMillen at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Response to Congressman McMillan
Tab II Letter from Congressman McMillan

ID# 169294

CO 134

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: AUGUST 24, 1990

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE TOM MCMILLEN

SUBJECT: SUGGESTS THAT THE PRESIDENT DIRECT OFFICIALS TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH KING FAHD ABOUT SOME FORM OF COMPENSATION FOR THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS IN SAUDI ARABIA

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	ACTION DATE YY/MM/DD	DISPOSITION TYPE RESP	DISPOSITION C D	DISPOSITION COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE	ORG	90/08/24	FM	A	90/08/27 LJ
NS SITT — REFERRAL NOTE:	R	90/09/05 LJ			/ /
99 DOS — REFERRAL NOTE:	I	90/09/05		C	90/09/05
99 DOD — REFERRAL NOTE:	I	90/09/05 LJ		C	90/09/05
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1230 ____ ____

__ MAIL USER CODES: (A)_____ (B)_____ (C)_____

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS OF SIGNER
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	* CODE = A
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	* OUTGOING
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY		
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE		
*X-INTERIM REPLY		

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TOM McMILLEN
4TH DISTRICT, MARYLAND

COMMITTEES:
ENERGY AND COMMERCE
SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

7066

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
327 CANNON OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
202-225-8090

DISTRICT OFFICES:
ARUNDEL CENTER NORTH
101 CRAIN HIGHWAY, NORTH
SUITE 509
GLEN BURNIE, MD 21061
301-768-8050/301-261-2008

132 HOLIDAY COURT
ANNAPOLIS, MD 21401
301-841-5392/301-261-8401

6196 OXON HILL ROAD
SUITE 370
OXON HILL, MD 20745
301-567-9212

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

August 23, 1990

The Honorable George Bush
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing because I am gravely concerned about the long-term economic effects of a continued U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia without any form of financial renumeration by the government of King Fahd to the U.S. government.

Mr. President, I want to commend you for the leadership you have shown in leading the worldwide condemnation of Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait. There is no question that American troops are needed in Saudi Arabia to secure the continued flow of Mideast oil to the rest of the World. However, the security of Saudi Arabia and ensuring the flow of Mideast oil should not be the primary responsibility of the United States. It is my belief that if the U.S. is providing the bulk of the armed forces to protect Saudi Arabia, that the Saudi government should help to defray some of the costs of keeping our military in their country.

It is my understanding that at present, the government of Saudi Arabia is only compensating the United States by providing our military forces there with free petroleum. Yet, in light of some reports that the cost of keeping American forces in Saudi Arabia will cost the American taxpayer $21.5 million per day, free gasoline for our armed forces is simply not enough. Furthermore, after the Iraqi invasion, oil prices rose from $18 to $27 per barrel. It has been estimated that if oil prices were to drop to $20 a barrel, because of increased OPEC production to offset the loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti petroleum, Saudi Arabia could expect a windfall of $14.6 billion a year. Even taking into account additional costs for war preparations, the Saudis can expect a large increase in oil revenue because of the crisis. On the other hand, the U.S. will be forced to endure an increased economic burden that is almost certain to exacerbate our budget deficit.

Therefore, I ask that you direct officials in your Administration to begin discussions with the government of King Fahd concerning some form of financial compensation for the continued presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia. This could include petroleum credits to offset the financial losses caused by

the embargo on Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil.

Polls clearly indicate that the American public is not willing to pay for our military presence in Saudi Arabia with new taxes. Therefore, if we are to avoid even greater budget deficits the Saudi government must agree to compensate us for the cost of maintaining our military force in the kingdom.

Mr. President, I hope that you will give serious consideration to this suggestion. Please do not hesitate to call upon me for any assistance that I can offer during this difficult crisis.

With best wishes, I remain

Sincerely,

Tom McMillen
Member of Congress

TM/pw

August 27, 1990

Dear Tom:

Thank you very much for your recent letter to the President regarding the United States response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

We appreciate being apprised of your concerns regarding the potential costs of maintaining our military forces in Saudi Arabia and receiving your recommendation that the U.S. seek financial compensation from the Saudi government. Please know that I have shared your remarks with the President. Additionally, I have taken the liberty of sharing your comments with the President's national security advisors so that they, too, are aware of your recommendation.

Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Thomas McMillen
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of Defense - FYI

August 27, 1990

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Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Thomas McMillen
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Washington, D.C. 20515

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