

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):  
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:  
2009-0275-S

# FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an  
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential  
Library Staff.**

---

**Record Group/Collection:** George H.W. Bush Presidential Records  
**Collection/Office of Origin:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files

---

**OA/ID Number:** 91143  
**Folder ID Number:** 91143-009

---

**Folder Title:**  
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

---

| Stack:   | Row:      | Section: | Shelf:   | Position: |
|----------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| <b>G</b> | <b>34</b> | <b>3</b> | <b>6</b> | <b>1</b>  |

---

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type    | Subject/Title                                                                                                                                         | Date    | Restriction    | Classification |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|----------------|----------------|
| 01a. Profile Sheet | From Chamberlin and Miller to Scowcroft, Re: Terrorism Update/Terrorist Threats Linked to Crisis in Persian Gulf [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.) | 8/28/90 | (b)(1), (b)(6) | S              |
| 01b. Memo          | Wendy Chamberlin to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Terrorism Update (2 pp.)                                                                                   | 8/28/90 | (b)(1)         | S              |
| 01c. Report        | Re: Update on Current Terrorist Threat Reporting (3 pp.)                                                                                              | 8/27    | (b)(1)         | S              |
| 01d. Letter        | To President Bush (1 pp.)                                                                                                                             | 8/13/90 | (b)(1)         |                |
| 01e. Cable         | American Embassy Athens to Secretary of State Washington DC<br>Re: Rashid to be Tried in Greece (1 pp.)                                               | 8/27/90 | (b)(1)         | <del>S</del>   |
| 02a. Memo          | C. David Welch to Robert M. Gates<br>Re: Egyptian FMS Debt (1 pp.)                                                                                    | 8/28/90 | (b)(1)         | <del>S</del>   |
| 02b. Memo          | Dick Cheney to POTUS<br>Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)                                                                                                      | 8/23/90 | (b)(1)         | <del>S</del>   |
| 02c. Memo          | James A. Baker, III to POTUS<br>Re: Egypt's FMS Debt (2 pp.)                                                                                          | n.d.    | (b)(1)         | <del>S</del>   |
| 03a. Outline       | Re: Meeting with Yusuf Bin Alawi [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)                                                                                 | 8/28/90 | (b)(1)         | S              |

Page 1 of 5

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1196  
**OA/ID Number:** 91143-009  
**Date Closed:** 5/26/2009  
**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2009-0275-S  
**Re-review Case #:**  
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type     | Subject/Title                                                                                                                             | Date       | Restriction | Classification |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|----------------|
| 03b. Talking Points | Points To Be Made for Meeting with Yusuf Bin Alawi, Omani Foreign Minister [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)                           | n.d.       | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 03c. Memo           | Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Meeting with Yusuf bin Alawi, Omani Foreign Minister, and the President, August 28, 1990 (1 pp.) | 8/24/90    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 04a. Outline        | Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney (3 pp.)                                                                                          | 8/27-28/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 04b. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made (3 pp.)                                                                                                             | n.d.       | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 04c. Report         | Re: Government report (2 pp.)                                                                                                             | 4/2/90     | (b)(1)      | C              |
| 04d. Report         | Re: Government report (2 pp.)                                                                                                             | 8/28/89    | (b)(1)      | C              |
| 04e. Memo           | J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Event Paper for Bush - Mulroney Kennebunkport Meeting (1 pp.)                                  | 8/22/90    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 04f. Paper          | Re: Scope Paper (8 pp.)                                                                                                                   | n.d.       | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 05a. Report         | Re: Oil Situation as of August 28 (1 pp.)                                                                                                 | n.d.       | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 05b. Outline        | Re: Key Energy Issues Arising Out of Gulf Crisis (1 pp.)                                                                                  | n.d.       | (b)(1)      |                |
| 06. Memo            | Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Talks with the Israelis (1 pp.)                                                                | 8/31/90    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |

Page 2 of 5

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1196  
**OA/ID Number:** 91143-009  
**Date Closed:** 5/26/2009  
**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2009-0275-S  
**Re-review Case #:**  
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type     | Subject/Title                                                                                                                                    | Date    | Restriction | Classification |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 07a. Memo           | Brent Scowcroft to POTUS<br>Re: Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan (2 pp.)                                                                | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 07b. Memo           | Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan (1 pp.)                                                                                                | 8/29/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 08a. Memo           | C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Message from Jordanian Crown Prince Hasan (1 pp.)                                                       | 8/30/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 08b. Fax            | The Private Secretary to His Highness the Crown Prince of Jordan to Mr. David Welch (5 pp.)                                                      | 8/28/90 | (b)(1)      |                |
| 09a. Telcon         | Re: Telephone Call to Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (2 pp.)                                                         | 8/30/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 09b. Memo           | Stephen E. Benko to William F. Sittmann<br>Re: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany of August 30, 1990 (1 pp.) | 8/30/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 10a. Memo           | Brent Scowcroft to POTUS<br>Re: Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan (2 pp.)                                                                | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 10b. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for Phone Call to President Zayyid (2 pp.)                                                                                 | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 10c. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for Phone Call to Amir of Kuwait (2 pp.)                                                                                   | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 10d. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for Phone Call to Chancellor Kohl (2 pp.)                                                                                  | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |

Page 3 of 5

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1196  
**OA/ID Number:** 91143-009  
**Date Closed:** 5/26/2009  
**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2009-0275-S  
**Re-review Case #:**  
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type     | Subject/Title                                                                          | Date    | Restriction | Classification |
|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 10e. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for Phone Call to President Mitterrand (3 pp.)                   | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 10f. Talking Points | Re: Points To Be Made for Phone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher (2 pp.)                | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 10g. Draft Letter   | Re: Presidential Letter to Prime Minister Kaifu (3 pp.)                                | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 10h. Draft Letter   | Re: Presidential Letter to Korean President Roh (3 pp.)                                | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 10i. Draft Letter   | Re: Presidential Letter to Prime Minister Andreotti (3 pp.)                            | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 10j. Draft Letter   | Re: Presidential Letter to EC Commission President Delors (2 pp.)                      | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 10k. Draft Letter   | Re: Presidential Letter to King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)                              | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 10l. Draft Letter   | Re: Presidential Letter to President Gorbachev (3 pp.)                                 | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 10m. Draft Message  | Draft Message to Taiwan [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)                           | n.d.    | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 10n. Memo           | Eric Melby to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan (1 pp.) | 8/30/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |
| 11a. Telcon         | Re: Telephone Call to Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (4 pp.)  | 8/31/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |

Page 4 of 5

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files

**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files

**Subseries:** Chronological Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1196

**OA/ID Number:** 91143-009

**Date Closed:** 5/26/2009

**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2009-0275-S

**Re-review Case #:**

**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type | Subject/Title                                                                                                          | Date    | Restriction | Classification |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
| 11b. Memo       | Stephen E. Benko to William F. Sittmann<br>Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom (1 pp.) | 8/31/90 | (b)(1)      | <del>S</del>   |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

**Pinksheet Number:** cap1196  
**OA/ID Number:** 91143-009  
**Date Closed:** 5/26/2009  
**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2009-0275-S  
**Re-review Case #:**  
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                                                                                             | Date    | Restriction    | Class. |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|----------------|--------|
| 01a. Profile Sheet       | From Chamberlin and Miller to Scowcroft, Re: Terrorism Update/Terrorist Threats Linked to Crisis in Persian Gulf [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.) | 8/28/90 | (b)(1), (b)(6) | S      |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files

**Document Partially Declassified**  
**(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 3/20/2023

### WHORM Cat.:

**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

|                                     |                                         |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 5/26/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91143-009          |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>                   |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>              |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>                |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b> 2010-0401-MR(500)     |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 8/24/2016   |

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

#### Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006846  
RECEIVED: 28 AUG 90 16

TO: SCOWCROFT


FROM: CHAMBERLIN  
MILLER

DOC DATE: 28 AUG 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM  
PERSIAN GULF

INTELLIGENCE

PERSONS: 1.4(c); (b)(6)



200N FILE

SUBJECT: TERRORISM UPDATE / TERRORIST THREATS LINKED TO CRISIS IN PERSIAN  
GULF

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 31 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHAMBERLIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
CHAMBERLIN  
MILLER  
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0401-MR  
MM 8/24/2016

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                           | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 01b. Memo                | Wendy Chamberlin to Brent Scowcroft<br>Re: Terrorism Update (2 pp.) | 8/28/90 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 5/26/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91143-009 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 01c. Report              | Re: Update on Current Terrorist Threat Reporting (3 pp.) | 8/27 | (b)(1)      | S      |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

|                               |             |                             |           |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 5/26/2009   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 91143-009 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |           |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |           |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |           |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |           |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |           |

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 01d. Letter              | To President Bush (1 pp.) | 8/13/90 | (b)(1)      |        |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 5/26/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91143-009 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>PRT: COMM SIT  
SIT: BEERS BENKO BURNS CHAMBERLIN NEEDELS SIT SUM VAX BRANSCUM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~<OSRI> RUEHTH<DTG> 271559Z AUG 90  
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
<TO>TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9115

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: RASHID TO BE TRIED IN GREECE

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 10870

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, PREL, KPAL, GR

SUBJECT: RASHID TO BE TRIED IN GREECE

REF: A) COHEN-RANSOM FONECON AUG. 27; B) ATHENS 10551;

C) STATE 285507

1. FOREIGN MINISTER SAMARAS INFORMED THE AMBASSADOR AUGUST 27 THAT PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS HAD FIRMLY DECIDED RASHID WOULD STAND TRIAL IN GREECE. MITSOTAKIS IS PERSUADED THAT THE GREEK AUTHORITIES CAN MOUNT A SOLID CASE AGAINST RASHID. SAMARAS ASKED THAT THIS INFORMATION BE HELD VERY TIGHTLY UNTIL THE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT, WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE MADE "SHORTLY".

2. COMMENT: WHILE SAMARAS DID NOT GET INTO LEGAL DETAIL, WE ASSUME RASHID WILL BE TRIED AFTER PARLIAMENT PASSES NEW LEGISLATION, WHICH NEWS STORIES IN THE PAST FEW DAYS SAID WOULD BE INTRODUCED IN PARLIAMENT BY SEPTEMBER 13 (REF. B), ALLOWING PROSECUTION FOR TERRORIST ACTS COMMITTED OUTSIDE GREECE AND APPLYING RETROACTIVELY. THOUGH THE JUSTICE MINISTRY'S ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING THE NEW LEGISLATION DID NOT NAME RASHID OR ANY OTHER SPECIFIC DEFENDANT WHO MIGHT BE TRIED UNDER IT, THE PRESS, AND WE, HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE BILL WAS PROMPTED BY THIS CASE. WE ARE CURRENTLY TRYING TO GET A COPY OF THE DRAFT BILL. END COMMENT.

SOTIRHOS

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 0870<STOR> 900827150335 MSG000273078214  
<TOR>900827151206

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0401-MR  
MM 8/24/2016

# Terrorism Update

## National Security Council The White House

PROOFED BY: TRG

LOG # 6846

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG LANS NO \_\_\_\_\_

|                          | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | DISPOSITION    |
|--------------------------|-------------|----------|----------------|
| Ken Hill                 | <u>3</u>    |          | <del>III</del> |
| <del>Bill</del> Sittmann | <u>1</u>    | <u>W</u> | <u>I</u>       |
| Bob Gates                | <u>2</u>    | <u>J</u> |                |
| Brent Scowcroft          | <u>3</u>    | <u>✓</u> |                |
| Bill Sittmann            |             |          |                |
| Situation Room           |             |          |                |
| West Wing Desk           | <u>4</u>    |          | <u>✓</u>       |
| NSC Secretariat          | <u>5</u>    |          | <u>N</u>       |
|                          |             |          |                |
|                          |             |          |                |

90 AUG 29 P 5:14

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Sununu    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006787  
RECEIVED: 24 AUG 90 17

TO: GATES

**CHRON FILE**

FROM: WELCH  
HAASS

DOC DATE: 28 AUG 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT  
ECONOMICS

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE  
MIDDLE EAST

**CHRON FILE**

PERSONS: BAKER, J

SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN FMS DEBT



ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 28 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON  
WELCH

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cop NARA, Date 5/24/2009

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

6787

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 28, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES  
THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS  
FROM: C. DAVID WELCH  
SUBJECT: Egyptian FMS Debt

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

For your information, attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Dick Cheney concerning Secretary Baker's proposals on Egyptian FMS debt.

Attachment  
Tab I Cheney Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006  
By MM NARA, Date 8/12/2013

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR



~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA



6787

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

23 AUG 1990

(S) As I said yesterday in Kennebunkport, I believe it is critical that we move out quickly to assist President Mubarak in establishing his leadership at home and in the Arab world.

(U) I think Jim Baker has the right idea in his memo to you (attached) and I support it heartily.

*Dick Cheney*

Attachment

*Mr. President - I really believe Mubarak is crucial to the future of the Middle East and we must find ways to help him. That means we have to cut through the red tape that surrounds this issue in our own government! I wholeheartedly support Jim's memo.*

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-0401-MR  
2/10/2014 MM

CLASSIFIED BY: USD/P  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont Nr.

X54106

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

6787

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: James A. Baker, III  
Subject: Egypt's FMS Debt

Egypt's supportive role in the Gulf crisis affords us an opportunity to resolve the long-festered Egyptian FMS debt issue -- for many years the biggest bilateral irritant between us and Mubarak. Moving forward decisively on the debt issue will also demonstrate to our moderate Arab friends that we can be flexible and responsive to legitimate needs at a time when their relationships with us are under severe Iraqi attack.

Egypt stands to lose up to \$3 billion per year in lower remittances, Suez Canal revenues and tourism earnings as a result of the Gulf crisis. Under these conditions, Mubarak will be increasingly hard pressed to meet the \$700 million in annual FMS debt repayments needed to forestall a cutoff in U.S. aid under the Brooke amendment. He might approach the Saudis, the Kuwaitis and the UAE (if he hasn't already) for some help in the short run. But FMS is really our problem and we need to be responsive.

I believe we should take a fresh look at finding a way to eliminate Egypt's FMS debt. At the same time, we should seek to catalyze Gulf economic aid to Egypt to ensure that the Saudis, Kuwaitis and UAE also do their share for Mubarak. While the Arabs would not finance our debt reduction per se, they might assume responsibility for meeting Egypt's future balance of payments requirements, especially its vital food needs. Such a commitment could accelerate the development of broad assistance relationships between Egypt and its Gulf allies, similar to those in the mid-1970's. These in turn might enable us to reduce gradually our economic aid over the next decade, thereby reducing the political (for Egypt) and budgetary (for us) strains of Egyptian dependence on U.S. assistance.

Unilateral, unconditional FMS debt relief is justified now by Egypt's support in the Gulf crisis, combined with the political nature of the original loans themselves. These considerations, in addition to Egypt's poor economic conditions and its inability to meet its FMS payments anytime in the

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 12958,  
AS AMENDED  
1999-0578-F  
2/20/2005



~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

foreseeable future, should help to ensure that this special treatment of Egypt does not spill over and affect our overall debt strategy. The budgetary costs of this approach would need to be built into the Budget Summit negotiations. However, given Egypt's poor repayment record and limited creditworthiness, the effect of Egyptian debt reduction on net outlays is not likely to be great.

Congress should strongly support a reasonable FMS debt reduction proposal for Egypt. Senators Leahy and Kasten want this issue resolved, as does Congressman Hamilton on the House side. Congressman Obey has also pressed us for a solution to Egypt's debt problem. Resumption of significant Gulf assistance to Egypt would help reassure the Hill that others are doing their part and that over the medium-term U.S. assistance levels to Egypt could be on a downward path. There may be reasons to consider extending these debt reduction benefits to others, like Israel and Turkey, but these are issues that can best be addressed later. Egypt's need are immediate, and we should move on Egypt now.

I believe the time is right to attack Egypt's FMS debt problem in a comprehensive way. Unilateral U.S. official debt reduction will bolster Mubarak and signal that moderation can yield tangible benefits. The resumption of broad-scale aid from the Gulf will help ensure that Egypt's stability is preserved.

Should you agree, I suggest that Brent Scowcroft communicate your view to Nick Brady and Dick Darman so that we can work together to get legislation drafted in time for the return of Congress in early September. If we are to do this, we must move quickly to insure that the "costs" of the proposal are factored into the budget summit discussions and that all bases are touched on the Hill.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006771  
RECEIVED: 24 AUG 90 10

TO: PRESIDENT

**CHRON FILE**

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 27 AUG 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: OMAN  
IRAQ

IRAN  
AP

PERSONS: ALAWI, YUSUF

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ YUSUF BIN ALAWI / FOMIN OF OMAN / AUG 28

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 28 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHARLES

LOGREF: 9006805

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
CHARLES  
NSC CHRON

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 5/24/2009

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGLM

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                             | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 03a. Outline             | Re: Meeting with Yusuf Bin Alawi [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.) | 8/28/90 | (b)(1)      | S      |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

**Document Partially Declassified**  
**(Copy of Document Follows)**  
 By MM on 3/20/2023

|                                     |                                         |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 5/26/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91143-009          |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>                   |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>              |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>                |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b> 2010-0401-MR(502)     |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 8/24/2016   |

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

#### Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information  
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information  
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]  
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6771

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 27, 1990

MEETING WITH  
YUSUF BIN ALAWI


DATE: August 28, 1990

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 4:30 - 5:00 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

*Bj fw*




I. PURPOSE

To receive a briefing from the Omani Foreign Minister <sup>1.4(b); 1.4(d)</sup> and  
<sup>1.4(b); 1.4(d)</sup> to discuss the current situation in the Gulf.

II. BACKGROUND

When you and Sultan Qaboos spoke on August 8<sup>1.4(d)</sup>



We have seen reports that Iran is considering ways to circumvent the food embargo. While reiterating our desire to improve relations with Iran in the long run, you should remind Alawi of the obstacles that remain: the hostages in Lebanon and Iran's continued support for terrorism. <sup>1.4(d)</sup>

<sup>1.4(d)</sup> our military deployments are purely defensive in nature, including our naval presence in the Gulf, and we would hope to avoid any incidents in that regard. <sup>1.4(d)</sup>



cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0401-MR

MM 8/24/2016



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

III. PARTICIPANTS

See Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer.

V. SEQUENCE

4:30 - 5:00 p.m - Photo Opportunity and Brief Remarks

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made  
Tab B Participants List

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                                                       | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 03b. Talking Points      | Points To Be Made for Meeting with Yusuf Bin Alawi, Omani Foreign Minister [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files

**Document Partially Declassified**  
**(Copy of Document Follows)**  
 By MM on 3/20/2023

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

|                                     |                                         |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 5/26/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91143-009          |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>                   |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>              |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>                |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b> 2010-0401-MR(502.01)  |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 8/24/2016   |

### RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~



POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH  
YUSUF BIN ALAWI, OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER

-- I am delighted to see you again, and appreciate your efforts

1.4(d)

--

-- It is important that we maintain global solidarity in complying with the UN mandated economic sanctions against Saddam's regime. We have seen some reports that elements within Iran are considering circumventing the food embargo.

1.4(d)

-- We also are pleased that Iran has increased its oil production to help defray the loss of Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil.

-- As I told His Majesty, 1.4(d)

1.4(d) there are great differences between us and Iran that are still difficult for us to bridge. 1.4(d)

1.4(d)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0401-MR

MM 8/24/2016

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

-- I welcome your advice

1.4(d)

1.4(d)

-- Please thank his Majesty for his invaluable support in these difficult times. Oman has been a true and steadfast friend on so many occasions when we had to stand together to protect our mutual interests. It is at times like this when you know who your true friends really are.

## PARTICIPANTS

### U.S.

The President

James Baker, Secretary of State

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for  
National Security Affairs

John H. Kelly Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and  
South Asian Affairs

Sandra Charles, Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs

### Oman

Yusuf bin Alawi, Omani Foreign Minister

Awadh Bader Al-Shanfari, Omani Ambassador to the U.S.



~~SECRET~~

6771

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 24, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS 

FROM:  SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Meeting with Yusuf bin Alawi, Omani Foreign Minister, and the President, August 28, 1990

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum for the Omani Foreign Minister's meeting with the President on Tuesday, August 28 at 4:30 p.m. At Sultan Qaboos direction, Yusuf bin Alawi has been asked to bring the President a message concerning their latest contact with Iran.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to the President  
Tab A Points to be Made  
Tab B Participants List

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0402-MR

MM 11/16/2016

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

TO: PRESIDENT

**CHRON FILE**

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 27 AUG 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CANADA

VISIT

PERSONS: MULRONEY, BRIAN

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ PM MULRONEY / AUG 27 - 28

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 25 AUG 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BASORA

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASORA  
NSC CHRON  
RICE

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cap NARA, Date 12/6/2009

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6716

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Retained for President's use*

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY

DATE: August 27-28, 1990

LOCATION: Kennebunkport, Maine

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0402-MR  
MM 10/3/2016

I. PURPOSE

To receive Mulroney in a relaxed setting and to review world events of common concern.

II. BACKGROUND

Mulroney is now regrouping after his severe political setback just two months ago with the demise of the Meech Lake agreement. He has named an expert in federal/provincial relations as his new Chief of Staff and he plans to launch a national unity campaign in the fall. Meanwhile, Francophone leaders in Quebec are starting their own provincial debate aimed at defining a new form of "sovereignty-association". While the demise of the Canadian federation as we know it is not yet imminent, Mulroney faces a daunting task in trying to regenerate a new Canadian consensus.

True to form, Mulroney has delivered solid Canadian cooperation on the Iraq/Kuwait crisis. He has recently dispatched two Canadian destroyers and an oiler to the area and -- except for an early "misunderstanding" at the UN Security Council in which the Canadian representative was reportedly critical of the U.S. stance -- Canada's position has been aligned closely with ours. While Canada hopes for a further UN Security Council resolution sanctioning the use of force, Ottawa shares our view that the current juridical basis for interdiction is sufficient. Mulroney himself plans to wait until September 14, when his task force will be in the region, to give it precise military orders. Unless he calls a special session of Parliament, he cannot instruct Canadian forces to enter combat without getting legislative approval within 10 days, and Parliament does not reconvene until September 24.

Mulroney remains very taken with Gorbachev and concerned about his survival, and he may revisit the issue of economic

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
2

assistance or other support for Gorbachev. However, Canada is squeezed by its own fiscal problems and by a faltering economy, and Mulroney also shares your concern that, in the absence of serious economic reforms, financial aid to the Soviets would be wasted.

On the perennial issue of acid rain, the news is good. Formal negotiations for a bilateral agreement begin August 29, and the initial U.S. and Canadian texts do not seem too far apart. Our own legislation is in Conference and is expected to be ready for your signature by the October 5 Congressional recess.

Mulroney may raise the question of Canadian participation in the upcoming U.S.-Mexican trade agreement negotiations. We have indications that he is currently leaning in favor of asking to participate, although he may not yet have made a final decision. If he does open the subject, you should make it clear that the decision would need to involve the assent of the Mexicans, who have already told us that they prefer a bilateral U.S.-Mexico negotiation. You should reaffirm our commitment to consult closely with Canada as the negotiations proceed.

Also in the context of not wanting to be "left out", Mulroney may sound you out about the possibility of Canada's joining in on a possible U.S.-EC joint declaration this fall. The idea of a trans-Atlantic declaration was proposed by Genscher last April, and the Canadians have been intrigued from the start. Although they have had a formal agreement with the EC since 1979, they feel they have little real influence with the EC and that their best chance might be to join forces with the U.S. Our own purpose in negotiating a declaration would be to lay the groundwork for a more effective foreign policy dialogue with the EC and, historically, Canadian policy has often diverged from ours. A "North America-EC dialogue" would be both cumbersome and potentially reduced to a low common denominator -- at least with some of Mulroney's potential successors.

Other issues that may be touched on are the Mohawk land claims dispute at Oka near Montreal, in which some of the Mohawks manning the barricades come from the nearby St. Regis reservation in the U.S. Mulroney might also mention lobsters. After the recent finding in our favor of a Free Trade Agreement Panel, we agreed with Canada to try to reach a comprehensive agreement on all outstanding lobster disputes. Although some of the related conservation issues are still being studied, the initiative seems to hold promise.

### III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab B.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
3

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer only.

Attachments

|       |                              |
|-------|------------------------------|
| Tab A | Points to be Made            |
| Tab B | List of Participants         |
| Tab C | Bio                          |
| Tab D | State Department Scope Paper |

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

Iraqi/Kuwait

- I appreciate Canada's help and support in the Iraqi crisis.
- Your dispatch of 2 destroyers and an oiler to the Gulf is especially helpful.
- Canada's participation in multinational maritime interdiction operations, either under a new UN resolution or Article 51, would greatly assist a unified western response to Saddam Husayn's aggression.

Assistance to the USSR

- My views on aid to the USSR remain as stated in Houston.
- I look forward to Soviet passage of an emigration bill which should open the way for a waiver of Jackson-Vanik, access to American markets, and the possibility of official USG lending and credit guarantees.
- We are working now to expand our technical cooperation program with the Soviet Union, as suggested in Houston.
- I do not believe financial aid will promote reform or have any lasting economic results until Gorbachev embarks on a serious program of economic reform.
- He has taken a much more decisive public stance recently on his commitment to reform and will face a major debate in the Supreme Soviet on this issue next month.
- The IMF-led study we commissioned at Houston should help to focus the Soviets, and us, on the major obstacles to reform and Soviet integration into the western economic system.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0402-MR  
MM 10/3/2016

U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Talks

- I expect to inform Congress next month, once I hear formally from President Salinas, that the United States and Mexico intend to negotiate an FTA. Formal negotiations are expected next spring, at the end of the required Congressional notification period.
- President Salinas is keenly interested in an FTA with us and I want to be as responsive as I can. We have an historic opportunity here to help promote fundamental economic reform in Mexico, which should benefit the entire region.

(IF CANADA ASKS TO PARTICIPATE IN AN FTA WITH MEXICO)

- I want to reaffirm our commitment to consult closely with Canada as the FTA negotiations proceed. Canadian concerns are appropriately considered as we proceed.
- Trying for a trilateral agreement would obviously complicate matters. The Mexicans have already indicated to us that they prefer a bilateral negotiation. They add that if there were a three-way negotiation they would want to reopen the U.S.-Canada FTA.
- From our perspective, this would present serious political problems, as I imagine it would for you. If you want to explore the possibilities further, however, we can have Jim Baker and Joe Clark look at the issues more closely.

U.S.-EC Declaration of Principles

(IF ASKED ABOUT THE U.S.-EC DECLARATION)

- We have begun exploratory talks with the EC through the Italian presidency on a U.S.-EC declaration of principles.

We see this as a general political declaration, including the listing of the consultative links we have recently established. New economic agreements are not being considered as part of this Declaration.

(IF ASKED ABOUT CANADA BEING PART OF A U.S.-EC DECLARATION)

- I want to look into the idea further. I am certainly open to your views. In the meantime, just as we are developing ideas on the kind of declaration we would like to have with the EC, you may wish to develop your own ideas on the nature of a possible Canada-EC declaration and of a trans-Atlantic declaration.
- We may find that parallel declarations are more appropriate, particularly since you already have a formal agreement with the EC and we don't.

#### Lobsters

- I am glad that we are trying to solve our lobster disputes through consultations.
- I understand we are making good progress towards an overall settlement.

#### Environment

- I am pleased that formal negotiations on an acid rain accord will begin August 29. We look forward to an early signing.
- I understand that EPA Administrator Reilly and Canadian Environment Minister De Cotret have agreed to give top priority to dealing with Great Lakes pollution and the zebra mussel infestation problem. You can count on our full support.



## PARTICIPANTS

### U.S.

The President

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

### CANADA

Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister

Derek H. Burney, Canadian Ambassador

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document | Date   | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| 04c. Report              | Re: Biography (2 pp.)     | 4/2/90 | (b)(1)      | C      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 5/26/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91143-009 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 04d. Report              | Re: Biography (2 pp.)     | 8/28/89 | (b)(1)      | C      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

|                                     |                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 5/26/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91143-009 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>          |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>     |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>       |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>              |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>         |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.~~

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



070 0010000  
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

# 6716

~~SECRET~~

August 22, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Event Paper for Bush-Mulroney Kennebunkport Meeting

Attached is the Event Paper for President Bush's Meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney on August 27-28, 1990 in Kennebunkport.

  
J. Stapleton Roy  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006  
By MM NARA, Date 8/12/2013



~~SECRET~~

## SCOPE PAPER

### I. AGENDA

Prime Minister Mulroney is looking forward to a relaxed family get together. Stanley Hartt told Ambassador Ney the Prime Minister would particularly like to discuss: (1) Western assistance for Gorbachev; (2) possible Canadian participation in a U.S.- EC Declaration of Principles; and (3) U.S.-Mexican Free Trade Talks. The Prime Minister also is likely to briefly raise the subject of lobsters. Naturally, Iraq will be a major focus of the meeting.

### II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

With the demise of the Meech Lake accord, Prime Minister Mulroney has been calling for national unity and seeking to avoid the perception that his government is adrift. In several regional meetings, provincial premiers have indicated they want more powers at Ottawa's expense and have ideas of their own about constitutional reform. A major debate on the appropriate mix of federal and provincial power appears to be shaping up for the fall. Mulroney will seek to take the lead by launching a major debate on the future of the country in the autumn. He has chosen Norman Spector, the architect of Meech Lake, as his new Chief of Staff to lead that effort.

The Province of Quebec has initiated a lengthy review to determine the shape of its future relationship with Canada. That process could lead to an election/referendum scenario next spring on a new form of "sovereignty-association" with Canada. Moderate Liberal Premier Bourassa and PQ leader Parizeau are sparring over the composition of the commission which will undertake the review. Former Tory Cabinet Minister Lucien Bouchard, who defected to form the separatist Bloc Quebecois in Parliament, is a potential spoiler. The Bloc recently won a massive by-election victory in Quebec, enhancing Bouchard's prestige and increasing the possibility of further Quebec Tory defections to Bouchard's new parliamentary group.

Meanwhile, Mulroney has been criticized for not dealing more forthrightly with a serious native land claims dispute on the Oka Reservation near Montreal. Heavily armed Mohawks have built barricades to hold off provincial police. The dispute has dragged on for months, enraging local residents, attracting international attention and generating demonstrations of

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0402-MR

MM 10/3/2016

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

support from native groups across Canada. We are watching the situation carefully because some Mohawks manning the barricades come from the St. Regis Reservation in New York and fought in Vietnam.

The economic news from Canada is not encouraging. The GOC faces considerable domestic criticism of its tough anti-inflation program. Canadian companies say they can't compete because of record high interest rates (over 14 percent) and the high Canadian dollar (87 cents). The GOC's proposed Goods and Services tax, scheduled for implementation January 1, 1990, also faces widespread opposition across Canada and is being used by unions to press for unrealistic wage demands. The difficult economic situation contributes to criticism of the FTA and narrows the Prime Minister's flexibility on other trade issues.

Before the Gulf crisis, we expected Canada's economy to grow by 1-1.3 percent in 1990. Rising oil prices may tip Canada into recession in the third and fourth quarters of 1990. Higher oil prices will also add to inflation, up to three-tenths of a percent for each dollar increase in the price of oil. This impact may be mitigated somewhat, since Canadian oil companies have delayed passing the increased crude prices through to the retail level.

Despite Canada's domestic problems, the U.S.-Canada bilateral relationship remains superb. Formal negotiations on an acid rain accord will begin August 29 and should be completed by the end of the year, subject to the passage of the Clean Air Act amendments. The bilateral FTA is working smoothly, and negotiations to liberalize our civil air agreement are expected to begin this fall. The recent successful celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense underscores our excellent bilateral defense cooperation. Drug and cross border law enforcement cooperation has been very fruitful.

III. U.S. OBJECTIVES

- Review our position on the Iraq crisis and seek Canadian support for U.S. efforts.
- Encourage the Prime Minister to permit Canadian navy ships to join the multinational force - whether or not under U.N. command.
- Reiterate our commitment to the Houston Summit statement on aid to the USSR.
- If Mulroney states that Canada would like to participate with us in a Declaration of Principles with the EC, indicate we would like further time to consider such a proposal.
- Update Mulroney on the latest U.S.-Mexico FTA developments. Explain why we decided to proceed now with formal Congressional notification. If Canada indicates interest in joining negotiations, caution the PM that a three-way negotiation would be difficult and that Mexico also must agree.
- Indicate satisfaction that negotiations on an acid rain accord are starting this month. Tell Mulroney we look forward to working closely with Canada on Great Lakes pollution and the zebra mussel infestation problem.

IV. BACKGROUND AND TALKING POINTS:o Iraqi Crisis

Canada co-sponsored Security Council resolution 661, promptly implemented a trade embargo, froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets and agreed to dispatch a three ship force to the Gulf. While the GOC would prefer that its force operate under a U.N. mandate in a peacekeeping mode, Mulroney has kept open the possibility of joining a multilateral force under Article 51. One reason the GOC is reluctant to operate under Article 51, however, is that this would require recalling Parliament into session. Mulroney is very concerned about hostages as there are 700 Canadians in Iraq and Kuwait.

- I appreciate Canada's help and support in the Iraqi crisis.
- I hope you will maintain the option of joining a multilateral force under Article 51 at an appropriate time. Canada's participation would greatly assist a unified western response to Saddam Hussein's aggression.



o Assistance to the USSR

Mulroney would like to reinforce the economic and political change taking place in the USSR. He was satisfied with the results of the Houston Summit including the proposed IMF-led study, but he believes we need to look for other ways to be helpful. Mulroney has in mind primarily technical assistance, but he would also be prepared to have the Soviet Union join a number of Western economic institutions now.

- Our policy on aid to the USSR remains as stated in Houston.
- We look forward to Soviet passage of an emigration bill which should open the way for a waiver of Jackson-Vanik, greater access to American markets, and official USG lending and credit guarantees.
- We are working now to expand our technical assistance to the Soviet Union, as suggested in Houston.
- We do not believe direct aid will promote reform or have any lasting economic results

o U.S.-EC Declaration of Principles

Last spring, Foreign Minister Genscher proposed the idea of a transatlantic Declaration of Principles, an idea later endorsed by the EC summit in Dublin. Although Canada was included in both formulations, its role was not clear, and EC officials have told us they prefer parallel agreements with the United States and Canada. At this time, we also prefer a separate approach because one of our key goals is to get better access to EC political decision-making. We are more likely to succeed by working with the EC bilaterally, rather than in tandem with another country, even Canada.

Prime Minister Mulroney has expressed a personal interest in this issue. The Canadians believe that with EC attention focussed on 1992 and Eastern Europe, Canada will be neglected unless it joins with the U.S. Mulroney may seek Canadian participation in the declaration. We recommend that you make no commitment on this point. It would be helpful to lay down a marker that Canada should continue to pursue work on a separate declaration with the EC to parallel our approach. You may also wish to remind Mulroney that you are certainly willing to keep in mind Canadian concerns as the negotiations progress.



(IF ASKED ABOUT THE U.S. - EC DECLARATION)

- I understand your interest in the concept of a transatlantic declaration.
- We have begun exploratory talks with the EC through the Italian presidency on a U.S.-EC declaration of principles. We see this as a general political declaration, including the listing of the consultative links we have recently established. New economic agreements are not being considered as part of this Declaration.
- (IF ASKED ABOUT CANADA BEING PART OF A U.S.- EC DECLARATION)
- I want to think about that. As I noted earlier, I am certainly open to your views. In the meantime, just as we are developing ideas on the kind of declaration we would like to have with the EC, you may wish to develop your own ideas on the nature of a Canada-EC declaration.

o U.S. Mexico Free Trade Talks

Canada has taken a non-committal stance on the issue of a U.S. - Mexico FTA as it tries to decide whether it will ask to take part. Canada is concerned that a decision to participate will reopen the free trade debate among Canadians; at the same time, Canada does not want the gains from its FTA with us undercut by an agreement with Mexico.

We expect that the GOC will make a decision about whether it wishes to participate by early September. It is possible that Mulroney will inform the President at Kennebunkport that Canada will likely wish to participate. Should Mulroney ask to take an active part, we will need to remind him that a decision to involve Canada would entail political costs and is not ours alone to make. It must be a joint decision by the U.S. and Mexico.

Canadian participation would complicate the negotiations. Mexico has stated that if Canada joined the negotiations, the U.S. - Canada FTA would have to be significantly revised. This would cause significant problems in both the U.S. and Canada. Beyond this, it reflects a Mexican intention to seek a considerably lower level of obligations.

- As you recently heard, I expect to inform Congress next month, once I hear formally from President Salinas, that the United States and Mexico intend to negotiate an FTA. Formal negotiations are expected next spring, at the end of the required Congressional notification period.
- President Salinas is keenly interested in an FTA with us and I want to be as responsive as I can. We have an historic opportunity here to help promote fundamental economic reform in Mexico, which should benefit the entire region.
- We accelerated the announcement of our intent to negotiate in response to our and Mexico's interest in moving ahead promptly with the process and to provide adequate notice to Congress.

(IF CANADA ASKS TO PARTICIPATE IN AN FTA WITH MEXICO)

- As we discussed in the past, we are certainly open to your views and will work with you to ensure that Canadian concerns are appropriately considered as we proceed.
- But frankly, broadening the scope of the negotiations would obviously complicate matters. While we can't speak for the Mexicans, they have already indicated to us that in a three-way negotiation they would want to reopen the U.S. - Canada FTA. From our perspective, this would present serious political problems.

o U.S. - Canada FTA

Despite continuing attacks from unions and the opposition, this is a bright spot for Mulroney and for U.S.- Canadian relations. The Agreement's implementation is going smoothly. We have few trade issues looming on the horizon, although the recent 301 case on beer and our continuing complaints on Canadian restrictions on U.S. dairy imports are ongoing irritants.

Should Mulroney raise the FTA, you might note that the continuing smooth implementation of the agreement is a good advertisement for free trade in general.

- We are indeed pleased with the pace and tenor of the implementation of our Free Trade Agreement.
- The fact that the implementation of such a broad agreement is going so smoothly is indicative of the special and unique nature of U.S. - Canadian relations.



o Lobsters

In May, a Free Trade-Agreement Panel agreed with us that federal legislation preventing undersized Canadian lobsters from being sold in the United States was not an impermissible import restriction. The minimum size legislation, enacted last December, was sponsored by Senator Mitchell. The panel did not decide other remaining questions though.

After the panel decision was announced on May 15, we agreed with Canada to try to reach a comprehensive settlement of all outstanding lobster disputes. The industries in the two countries have made a proposal that could form the basis for such a settlement. Under the proposal, Canada would refrain from challenging our minimum size requirements and we would agree not to raise our minimum size for the next three years. In the meantime, Canada would bring its size requirement up to ours and we would agree to change certain trade-restrictive state laws.

We are now considering whether we can, consistent with sound conservation, agree to keep our minimum lobster size constant for the next three years. If we can do so, it is very likely that we can reach an agreement ending the lobster disputes. Such an agreement would be a good precedent for cooperation with Canada on other common fish resources.

- I am glad that we are trying to solve our lobster disputes through consultations.
- I understand we are making good progress towards a settlement.

o Environment

The Clean Air bill is in Conference and we hope it will be ready for Presidential signature by the October 5 Congressional recess. Meanwhile, formal negotiations with Canada on an acid rain accord begin August 29 and the agreement should be ready for signature by the end of the year. The U.S. and Canada have agreed that future priorities should include (1) a pollution prevention strategy for the Great Lakes and (2) bilateral action to deal with the zebra mussel infestation problem in the Great Lakes.

- I am pleased that formal negotiations on an acid rain accord will begin August 29. We look forward to an early signing.
- I understand that EPA Minister Reilly and Canadian Environment Minister De Cotret have agreed to give top priority to dealing with Great Lakes pollution and the zebra mussel infestation problem. You can count on our full support.

o U.S. Force Realignment

We have been consulting with our Allies on our planned restructuring and force reductions in Europe. The only affected base in Canada is Argentia, Newfoundland, which is likely to be reduced or closed by the mid 90's.

- We are closing bases throughout Europe and the U.S., and in the coming months will be bringing 40,000 troops back to the U.S. from Europe.
- These reductions are part of a belt-tightening effort to make U.S. forces leaner and more efficient.
- Our plan will begin to adjust the U.S. presence in Europe to post-CFE force levels, taking political and fiscal realities into account.
- In determining the structure for realigned U.S. forces, we worked to maximize U.S. combat capability, avoid a hollow force, and retain the ability to support NATO's evolving strategy.
- We remain firmly committed to NATO and to retaining a substantial force presence in Europe as long as our Allies want us there. I appreciate your commitment to this common goal as well.
- One of the bases affected will be Argentia in Newfoundland. Bilateral consultations about the future of that base are currently in progress. I know we can count on your understanding and support.



CHRON FILE

UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006888  
RECEIVED: 29 AUG 90 20

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: MELBY  
DEAL

DOC DATE: 29 AUG 90  
SOURCE REF:



KEYWORDS: ENERGY  
ANSA

PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MTG W/ PRES & SEC BAKER / BRADY / MOSBACHER & WATKINS RE ENERGY  
ISSUES ARISING OUT OF GULF CRISIS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 01 SEP 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MELBY

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL

MELBY

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 6888

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | DISPOSITION |
|-----------------|-------------|----------|-------------|
| Ken Hill        | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Bob Gates       | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Brent Scowcroft | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Situation Room  | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| West Wing Desk  | 2           | _____    | N           |
| NSC Secretariat | 3           | _____    | N           |
| _____           | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| _____           | _____       | _____    | _____       |

90 AUG 31 AIO: 48

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc:    VP    Sununu    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

**COMMENTS**

**DISPATCH**

pls note:

Tim Deal added

2nd page to TAB I

BS requested

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 29, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL 

FROM: ERIC MELBY 

SUBJECT: Energy Issues Arising Out of the Gulf Crisis

APNSA Has Seen

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

You will be meeting tomorrow with the President, Secretaries Baker, Brady, Mosbacher and Watkins, Director Darman and Chairman Deland to discuss energy issues arising out of the Gulf crisis.

At Tab I is a list of key issues which merit discussion.

Attachment

Tab I List of Key Issues

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Oil Situation as of August 28  
(millions of barrels per day)

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Production</u> |               |
|----------------|-------------------|---------------|
|                | <u>July</u>       | <u>August</u> |
| OPEC           |                   |               |
| Saudi Arabia   | 6.2               | 7.2           |
| Iran           | 2.9               | 3.1           |
| U.A.E          | 2.1               | 2.1           |
| Qatar          | 0.4               | 0.4           |
| Algeria        | 1.1               | 1.2           |
| Ecuador        | 0.3               | 0.3           |
| Gabon          | 0.3               | 0.3           |
| Indonesia      | 1.4               | 1.4           |
| Libya          | 1.3               | 1.4           |
| Venezuela      | 2.3               | 2.3           |
| Nigeria        | 1.6               | 1.8           |
| Neutral Zone   | NA                | 0.2           |
| Iraq           | 3.0               | 0.3           |
| Kuwait         | 1.8               | 0             |
| Total          | <u>24.7</u>       | <u>22.0</u>   |

|          |             |
|----------|-------------|
| NON-OPEC |             |
| OECD     | 15.3        |
| LDCs     | 9.7         |
| Other    | 3.2         |
| Total    | <u>28.2</u> |

Shortfall

(based on CIA estimates of third and fourth quarter demand)

Shortfall due to loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude: 4.3 mbd

Existing shortfall taking into account increased production to date: 2.1 mbd

New production likely:

|                         |            |
|-------------------------|------------|
| Saudi Arabia            | 0.6        |
| U.A.E.                  | 0.2        |
| Venezuela               | 0.2        |
| Others (including U.S.) | <u>0.1</u> |
| Total                   | 1.1        |

Remaining shortfall: 1.0 mbd

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0402-MR

mm 10/3/2016



## Key Energy Issues Arising Out of Gulf Crisis

### 1. Oil Supply

- o Iraq/Kuwait shortfall -- 4.3 mbd. OPEC accord clears way for potential additional 3.0 mbd from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Venezuela, Nigeria, Iran and other OPEC.
- o Net shortfall likely to be around 1.5 mbd, depending on how much companies draw down their stocks. Available IEA commercial stocks around 470 million barrels.
- o Heading into winter season where oil demand highest. Companies build stocks in fall for drawdown in winter.

### 2. SPR

- o In September likely to be Congressional pressure to draw down SPR (\$20 billion invested in SPR over past 15 years).
- o Administration must avoid mandated drawdown. Any SPR draw down should be coordinated fully with allies in IEA. Unilateral action by U.S. would be badly received by allies and damage IEA.

### 3. Economic Implications

- o Oil prices likely to fluctuate, sometimes sharply, in response to developments in Gulf and rumors in market. Prices set by market psychology as much as by supply and demand.
- o Higher oil prices will cause higher inflation, slower growth -- developing countries particularly hurt.

### 4. U.S. Actions

- o Few credible actions U.S. can take in short term to increase oil supply substantially or encourage large switch from oil.
- o Can take action to approve natural gas projects pending before FERC. Iroquois pipeline could replace 100,000 b/d by late next year.
- o Longer term, need White House leadership to get nuclear moving again.
- o Conservation potential large but difficult to realize quickly.

### 5. IEA

- o Governing Board meeting August 31 to assess supply and demand. Likely to issue statement saying situation is in hand for time being, but complacency unwarranted as demand will increase next quarter. Will note that increased OPEC production and draw down of company stocks bringing additional supplies to market.

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006879  
RECEIVED: 29 AUG 90 16

TO: SCOWCROFT

**CHRON FILE**

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 29 AUG 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

IRAQ

PERSONS: WOLFOWITZ, P

IVRY, DAVID

SUBJECT: TALKS W/ ISRAELIS

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 01 SEP 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS

NSC CHRON

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Co NARA, Date 12/1/2009

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH \_\_\_\_\_

OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY: NSDAI

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6879

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 31, 1990

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS   
SUBJECT: Talks with the Israelis

Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Clarke, Lee Butler and I met for four hours with an Israeli team headed by MoD Director General David Ivry. Our main goal was to persuade them that they ought to move back their red lines. We made clear that we were serious and that we had a lot on the line, and that they ought not to play into Saddam's hands by making this the Arab-Israeli struggle he was seeking to portray it as. This meant showing more tolerance for events in Jordan and for missiles in Western Iraq.

I was explicit in saying that we hoped and expected that they would act differently today than they might have a month ago. Ivry countered that we could not expect Israel not to act when its existence was threatened. I argued that in most of the scenarios we were considering it would be important to distinguish between Israel's interests and its existence, and that instability in Jordan or missiles in Iraq fell under the former. Ivry stated that Israel would calculate differently now, meaning that they had the message and would be less prone to act.

What they want most of all is intelligence about Iraqi military deployments (especially missiles) in real time or close to it. They hinted that their willingness not to act would be increased if they had a better sense of what was going on. We told them our willingness to provide it would be affected by what use the Israelis planned to make of it. As I told Ivry, we would be more amenable if their intention was to take defensive rather than pre-emptive measures. We also made clear that we were not interested in joint or even simultaneous operations. And we made no promises on their shopping list, which was (as you might expect) considerable.

What also surfaced was the concern on their part that our current definition of success did not require the removal of Saddam or his offensive capability. We tried to make the case that a containment option was viable, but we have yet to convince many in Israel. We need to keep working at this, though, because Israel will be more likely to act in ways contrary to what we want if they conclude that their interests are not being served by our policy.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0402- MR

MM 10/3/2016

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 6879

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG De A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN        | DISPOSITION                                                                                  |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Ken Hill        | <u>1</u>    | <u>copy</u>     |                                                                                              |
| Bill Sittmann   |             |                 |                                                                                              |
| Bob Gates       | <u>2</u>    | <u>8</u>        |                                                                                              |
| Brent Scowcroft | <u>3</u>    | <u>✓</u>        | <u>I</u> <u>Copy</u><br><u>Fax'd</u><br><u>to SS</u><br><u>this AM.</u><br><u>via Sittm.</u> |
| Bill Sittmann   |             |                 |                                                                                              |
| Situation Room  |             |                 |                                                                                              |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>4</u>    | <u>LMG 9/31</u> | <u>N</u>                                                                                     |
| NSC Secretariat | <u>5</u>    |                 | <u>N/R</u>                                                                                   |

90 AUG 31 P 2.33

RECEIVED

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc:    VP    Sununu    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:



~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006887  
RECEIVED: 29 AUG 90 19

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 30 AUG 90  
SOURCE REF

CHRON FILE

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF  
IRAQ  
SANCTIONS

ECONOMICS  
OIL

PERSONS: HUSSEIN, SADDAM

SUBJECT: PERSIAN GULF CRISIS / ECONOMIC ACTION PLAN

ACTION: PRES APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 01 SEP 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DEAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DEAL  
HAASS  
NSC CHRON

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cep NARA, Date 12/1/2009

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI

CLOSED BY: NSMEN

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

NOTED

ACTION

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan

At yesterday's NSC meeting, your advisors unanimously recommended the adoption of the approach outlined in the interagency report, calling on our allies and friends to: (a) help alleviate the economic pressures on the front-line states resulting from implementation of U.N. sanctions against Iraq and higher oil prices; and (b) share the defense costs associated with Desert Shield.

To implement this strategy, your advisors recommend dispatching high-level Presidential missions to potential donor countries to discuss the approach with your counterparts and other officials and to begin the process of nailing down specific commitments by all contributors. Ideally, these missions could depart by early next week.

We propose four missions:

- One headed by Secretary Baker with John Robson and Don Atwood to Brussels, Bonn, Rome (for EC Presidency), Saudi Arabia (for both Saudi Government and Kuwaiti Government-in-exile), and the UAE.
- A second headed by Secretary Brady with Larry Eagleburger and Paul Wolfowitz to Tokyo, Seoul, Singapore and Brunei.
- A third to Jordan that perhaps I or Bob Gates might lead with participation by John Kelly of State.
- A fourth to Taiwan headed by a non-official American (e.g., Richard Armitage).

To launch this effort, your advisors propose that you:

- Telephone Prime Minister Thatcher and President Mitterrand to inform them of our approach and game plan for mobilizing international support.
- Call and send messages to Chancellor Kohl, King Fahd, the Amir of Kuwait, and the President of the UAE, asking them to discuss the coordinated approach with your special emissaries.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0403-MR  
MUR 7/15/2016

- Send messages along similar lines to other potential donors.
- Send a separate message to President Gorbachev, drawing special attention to the specific needs of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union's important role in minimizing the economic burden of these countries through maintenance of contracted oil deliveries (at presently subsidized prices).
- Send a message to King Hussein, reflecting Jordan's special situation in this crisis.
- Brief the press on the overall approach on your return to Kennebunkport.

If you approve this approach, I will transmit to you appropriate talking points, messages and themes for your discussion with the press.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize us to proceed with the approach outlined above.

Approve CB Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

8-30-90

~~SECRET~~

6887

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 29, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL  
RICHARD HAASS

SUBJECT: Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President, outlining the proposed implementing strategy for the economic action plan.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum for the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memo for the President

*BS  
TAB I handwritten to Pres  
8/30/90*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006  
By MM NARA, Date 8/12/2013



**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 6887

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG X A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO        | HAS SEEN | DISPOSITION |
|-----------------|--------------------|----------|-------------|
| Ken Hill        | _____              | _____    | _____       |
| Bill Sittmann   | <u>1</u>           | <u>W</u> | <u>I</u>    |
| Bob Gates       | <u>[Signature]</u> | _____    | _____       |
| Brent Scowcroft | _____              | _____    | _____       |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____              | _____    | _____       |
| Situation Room  | _____              | _____    | _____       |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>2</u>           | _____    | <u>N</u>    |
| NSC Secretariat | <u>3</u>           | _____    | <u>N</u>    |
| _____           | _____              | _____    | _____       |
| _____           | _____              | _____    | _____       |

90 SEP 8 A 9:13

RECEIVED

|            |                 |              |            |                       |
|------------|-----------------|--------------|------------|-----------------------|
| A = Action | I = Information | D = Dispatch | R = Retain | N = No further Action |
|------------|-----------------|--------------|------------|-----------------------|

cc: VP Sununu Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006913  
RECEIVED: 30 AUG 90 18

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: WELCH  
HAASS

DOC DATE: 30 AUG 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: JORDAN

PERSONS: HASAN, PRINCE

SUBJECT: MSG TO SCOWCROFT FM JORDANIAN CROWN PRINCE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT

DUE DATE: 03 SEP 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WELCH

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HAASS  
NSC CHRON  
WELCH

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSW

CLOSED BY: NSGLM

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

FyI Msg Fr Jordanian Crown Prince  
**National Security Council**  
**The White House**

PROOFED BY: WEA LOG # 6913  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG LMB A/O \_\_\_\_\_

*[Signature]*  
 Ken Hill

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

90 AUG 30 P 8: 15

| SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN                 | DISPOSITION |
|-------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| <u>1</u>    | <u>KH</u>                | <u>I</u>    |
| <u>2</u>    | <u>8</u>                 |             |
| <u>3</u>    | <u>APNSA Has Seen</u>    |             |
|             |                          |             |
| <u>4</u>    | <u>[Signature] 10/18</u> | <u>N</u>    |
| <u>5</u>    | <u>[Signature] 10/18</u> | <u>N</u>    |
|             |                          |             |
|             |                          |             |

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc: VP [Signature] Sununu Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

7700 111 32

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 30, 1990

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Message from Jordanian Crown Prince Hasan

Crown Prince Hasan sent you a manuscript setting out Jordan's position on the Gulf crisis. There was no accompanying note from Hasan, although his Private Secretary told me that the Crown Prince admired your remarks on TV last Sunday and wanted to give you further elaboration of his own views.

I do not believe it is necessary to respond to this "fyi" message.

Attachment

Tab I Fax from Crown Prince Hasan



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                                   | Date    | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 08b. Fax                 | The Private Secretary to His Highness the Crown Prince of Jordan to Mr. David Welch (5 pp.) | 8/28/90 | (b)(1)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Collection  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

|                               |             |                             |           |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 5/26/2009   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | 91143-009 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |           |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |           |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |           |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |           |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |           |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006909  
RECEIVED: 30 AUG 90 16

TO: SITTMANN


**CHRON FILE**

FROM: BENKO  
BASORA

DOC DATE: 30 AUG 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R  
IRAQ  
UN

TELCON  
KUWAIT  
JAPAN



PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W/ CHANCELLOR KOHL OF FRG ON 30 AUG RE SITUATION IN GULF

ACTION: HILL DISAPPROVED RECOM #2 DUE DATE: 03 SEP 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BENKO

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASORA

BENKO

NSC CHRON

**DECLASSIFIED**  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006  
By Col NARA, Date 12/1/2009

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSW

CLOSED BY: NSGAD

DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6909

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ORSON FILE

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor  
Notetaker: Stephen E. Benko, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 30, 1990, 2:45 p.m. - 2:55 p.m.  
AND PLACE: White House Situation Room

The President: Helmut, how are you? Well, I'm calling to give you an update on the Gulf. I believe we're in pretty good shape. The world is demonstrating its resolve, both in the Gulf and at the UN, to resist aggression. Now we have to wait to see whether sanctions can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait. (S)

And the UN sanctions are widespread and effective, but this invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries: you know, costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity, higher oil prices, etc. And we're spending huge sums daily, the U.S. is and other nations around the world are, to roll back Saddam. (S)

We've just enacted a new program of consultation in terms of coordinating assistance. I know Germany is helping out militarily within the terms of the constitutional constraints you explained to me. (S)

Some countries have been hit very hard -- Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, and the countries of Eastern Europe and Morocco, the Philippines, Pakistan, and India. They've all been hit very hard. We have been working to develop some ideas on the needs of specific countries and how these might be met. (S)

I'm calling to ask you to see Jim Baker next week to discuss these ideas with you. I'm also asking Andreotti and Jacques Delors to meet with him. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, George, I'm glad to do it. When will he come? (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 12958,  
AS AMENDED  
2000-0429-F  
2/1/2009 MM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The President: I'll have to get you exact dates. I'm calling Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand to see Nick Brady. So it's not just a Germany trip, but worldwide. (S)

Helmut, I'm sensitive to the burdens you face with unification. I ask that you listen to Jim with an open mind; I'm very grateful to you for seeing him. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: George, we don't even need to talk about it at length. First of all, I am very pleased to see Jim Baker when he comes. I will not only listen with an open mind, I will start thinking about what we can do. It is just a matter of costs. This is a problem we all have now. I only ask him to agree on dates with me so we can work things out. (S)

The President: I'll get him to get them to you right away through our Embassy. Nick Brady will be visiting the Japanese. So this is a worldwide coordinating and consultation effort right now. (S)

Thanks very much, Helmut. Good night. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you, George. Good night. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6909

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 30, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: ADRIAN A. BASORA *AAB*

FROM: STEPHEN E. BENKO

SUBJECT: Telcon with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the  
Federal Republic of Germany of August 30, 1990

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation  
between the President and Chancellor Kohl.

Concurrence by: Richard Haass

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed  
for the record.

Approve *KSA* *fn*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of  
Telephone Conversation to State on an "Eyes Only" basis for  
insertion in Secretary Baker's briefing book.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove *KSA* *fn*

Attachments

Tab I Memo to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0403-MR  
MM 7/15/2016

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006901  
RECEIVED: 30 AUG 90 12

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 30 AUG 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF  
OIL  
SAUDI ARABIA

ECONOMICS  
TELCALL  
KUWAIT

PERSONS: FAHD  
ZAYYID

SABAH, JABER  
KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: PERSIAN GULF CRISIS / ECONOMIC ACTION PLAN

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 03 SEP 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MELBY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
MELBY

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cep NARA, Date 5/24/2009

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

**National Security Council  
The White House**



PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 0901

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO              | HAS SEEN | DISPOSITION |
|-----------------|--------------------------|----------|-------------|
| Ken Hill        | _____                    | _____    | _____       |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____                    | _____    | _____       |
| Bob Gates       | <u>3</u> <u>Has seen</u> | _____    | _____       |
| Brent Scowcroft | _____                    | _____    | _____       |
| Bill Sittmann   | _____                    | _____    | _____       |
| Situation Room  | _____                    | _____    | _____       |
| West Wing Desk  | <u>4</u>                 | _____    | <u>N</u>    |
| NSC Secretariat | <u>5</u>                 | _____    | <u>N</u>    |
| _____           | _____                    | _____    | _____       |
| _____           | _____                    | _____    | _____       |

90 AUG 31 AIO: 29


A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No further Action

cc:    VP    Sununu    Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

**COMMENTS**

**DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:**



*12512N 5 ref 12512N*  
National Security Council  
The White House

*Economic ACTION Plan*

PROOFED BY: *[Signature]*

LOG # 6901

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM *PAS* NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG *EL* ATO \_\_\_\_\_

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Ken Hill

Bill Sittmann

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Bill Sittmann

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

RECEIVED

90 AUG 30 P 2. 18

1

A

2

LMS 8/30

SEE NOTE

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

6901

8/30

THIS PACKAGE WAS HAND CARRIED  
TO SCOWCROFT & SCOWCROFT  
HAND CARRIED IT TO THE PRES.  
(PER GRAY)

LMS



~~SECRET~~

6901

*Action  
already  
completed*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

30 Aug

8-30-90

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*  
SUBJECT: Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0403-MR  
MM 7/15/2016

Purpose

To inform selected world leaders of your proposals for an economic action plan to deal with the Persian Gulf crisis.

Background

At the NSC meeting yesterday, an economic action plan was discussed to help deal with the economic consequences of the Persian Gulf crisis. The implementation strategy, including missions led by Secretaries Baker and Brady, was discussed with you this morning. In addition to the phone calls we propose you make and messages you send, we will get in touch separately with Taiwan.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you call King Fahd, the Amir of Kuwait, President Zayyid and Chancellor Kohl this afternoon. Talking points for each call are at Tab A.

Approve *C* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you call President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Thatcher tomorrow. Talking points for each call are at Tab B.

Approve *h* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you approve messages to Prime Minister Kaifu, President Roh, Prime Minister Andreotti (in his capacity as EC President) and EC Commission President Delors. Texts of each message are at Tab C.

Approve *h* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you approve a message to King Hussein. Text is at Tab D.

Approve *h* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: The Vice President  
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

That you approve a message to President Gorbachev. Text is at Tab E.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you approve the message to Taiwan at Tab F.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

|       |                                                                                                           |
|-------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tab A | Talking Points for Calls to King Fahd, the Amir of Kuwait, the President Zayyid, and Chancellor Kohl      |
| Tab B | Talking Points for Calls to President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Thatcher                              |
| Tab C | Messages to Prime Minister Kaifu, President Roh, Prime Minister Andreotti, EC Commission President Delors |
| Tab D | Message to King Hussein                                                                                   |
| Tab E | Message to President Gorbachev                                                                            |
| Tab F | Message to Taiwan                                                                                         |

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT ZAYYID

- Your Highness, I want to share our latest thinking on the effects of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Overall, we have made considerable progress, a tribute to our close cooperation and the overwhelming international support for our efforts to get Iraq out of Kuwait.
- The invasion and sanctions are imposing real costs on many countries, however. Your decision to increase oil production will substantially ease the burden on all oil-importing countries.
- My military commanders and I appreciate all the support we have received thus far from your government. Despite your generosity, the costs to support our forces are high. We will need additional help to offset these costs.
- The economic consequences of the Gulf crisis also have hit Egypt, Turkey and Jordan particularly hard, along with other countries like Morocco, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Sanctions compliance will be harder still if these countries do not get some economic support.
- Today, I approved a proposal for international compensation for countries most affected by Iraq's invasion and sanctions compliance. Like our military operations, it will succeed if we work together.
- I understand you may already be providing financial aid to some countries. We would like to coordinate our efforts to maximize the benefits to the recipients. Therefore, early

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0403-MR  
MM 7/15/2016

~~SECRET~~

2

next week, I would like to send a high-level delegation, led by Secretary Baker, to discuss our ideas with you in detail.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PHONE CALL TO THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

- Your Highness, I want to share our thinking on our efforts to achieve our mutual objectives in the Gulf. Overall, we have made considerable progress. The entire world supports our efforts, a clear tribute to the righteousness of our cause: Iraqi withdrawal and the restoration of your government in Kuwait.
- The invasion and sanctions are imposing real costs on many countries, however. OPEC's decision to increase oil production will ease the burden somewhat on all oil-importing countries.
- The United States and several other countries have come to Kuwait's aid by providing military forces. The costs to support our forces are high. We will need additional financial help to offset these expenses. I appreciate your offer to assist us in this way.
- The economic consequences of the Gulf crisis also have hit Egypt, Turkey and Jordan particularly hard, along with Morocco, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Eastern Europe. Sanctions compliance will be harder still if these countries do not get some economic support.
- Today, I approved a proposal for international compensation for countries most affected by Iraq's invasion and sanctions compliance. Like our military operations, it will succeed if we work together.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0403-MR

MM 7/15/2016

-- I understand you may already be providing financial aid to some countries. We would like to coordinate our efforts with you to maximize the benefits to the recipients. Therefore, early next week, I would like to send a high-level delegation, led by Secretary Baker, to discuss our ideas with you in detail.

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PHONE CALL TO CHANCELLOR KOHL

- I want to share with you my assessment of the Gulf situation and our latest thinking on ways to help countries most affected economically.
- Overall, I believe we are in good shape. The world is demonstrating its resolve, both in the Gulf region and at the U.N., to resist aggression. Now we have to see whether sanctions can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait.
- While the U.N. sanctions are widespread and effective, the invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries: costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and higher oil prices.
- The U.S. is spending huge sums daily to deter further Iraqi aggression and convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. However, we need assistance in supporting the military deployment.
- I know you are helping out militarily within the limits of your constitutional constraints.
- The economic consequences of the Gulf crisis are increasing daily. The front line states of Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan are particularly hard hit due to the cutoff of extensive economic ties.
- Eastern Europe and other countries like Morocco, the Philippines, Pakistan and India also have been hard hit.
- Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do not get some economic assistance.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0403-MR

MM 7/15/2016

- We have developed some ideas on the needs of specific countries and how these might be met.
- I would like to send Jim Baker early next week to discuss these ideas with you. I am also asking Giulio Andreotti, in his capacity as EC President, and Jacques Delors to meet with Jim. I have asked Francois Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher to meet with Nick Brady.
- Helmut, I am very sensitive to the economic costs you face in connection with unification and know that it is difficult for you to assume additional financial burdens. But if we fail in our efforts to keep the pressure on Iraq, we would all face the prospect of sharply higher oil prices and a possible recession. The economic costs of unification would then be much harder to bear.
- It is in that connection that I would ask that you consider what steps the Federal Republic can take to provide economic and other assistance to assure that the sanctions regime succeeds.



~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

- I want to share with you our assessment of the Gulf situation and our latest thinking on ways to help countries most affected.
- Overall, I believe we are in good shape. Our military deployment is continuing, as you know, and your own efforts have been indispensable. We have to see whether sanctions can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait.
- If neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will all have to review our options. We cannot let Saddam remain in Kuwait. You understand what is at stake.
- We are getting great support for the U.N. sanctions, but the invasion and the embargo are imposing real costs on many countries: costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and higher oil prices.
- We are spending huge sums daily to deter further Iraqi aggression and convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. We do this willingly because of the essential interests that are at stake.
- However, we will be seeking assistance in supporting the military deployment, particularly from the oil-rich states of the Arabian peninsula and from Japan, as well as continuing support from NATO allies.
- Given the enormous U.S. contribution to the military effort, we are going to try to offset some of our incremental costs.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0404-MR  
MM 6/9/2016

- The economic costs of the Gulf crisis are also starting to be felt. The front line states of Egypt, Turkey and Jordan are particularly hard hit.
- Eastern Europe's delicate transition to democracy and free markets may be threatened by the sharp rise in petroleum prices and the loss of Iraqi oil supplies, after they have already begun to lose privileged access to Soviet oil.
- Other countries such as Morocco, the Philippines, Pakistan and India are hurting too.
- Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do not get some economic assistance. Jordan is in a special situation; we need to consider incentives to keep King Hussein afloat and encourage him to abide by the U.N.-mandated embargo.
- It is time for concerted action to share the responsibility of helping these countries. I believe our two countries, the EC, other OECD and NATO countries, the Gulf states and other major beneficiaries of our resolve to stand up to Saddam should work together to provide economic assistance.
- We have developed some ideas over the past week on the needs of specific countries and how these might be met. I would like to send Nick Brady to discuss these ideas with you early next week. I am also asking Margaret Thatcher to receive Nick.
- I also plan to send Secretary Baker to Rome to discuss these ideas with Giulio Andreotti in his capacity as EC President as well as with Jacques Delors in Brussels.

~~SECRET~~

3

-- I have also asked him to go to Bonn to talk to Helmut Kohl about economic support, in view of Germany's economic position and inability to play a military role in the Gulf.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR PHONE CALL TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

- I want to share with you our assessment of the Gulf situation and our latest thinking on ways to help countries most affected.
- Overall, I believe we are in good shape. Our military deployment is continuing, as you know, and your own efforts have been indispensable. We have to see whether sanctions can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait.
- If neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will all have to review our options. We cannot let Saddam remain in Kuwait. You understand what is at stake.
- While we are getting great support for the U.N. sanctions, the invasion and the embargo are imposing real costs many countries: costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and higher oil prices.
- We are spending huge sums everyday to deter further Iraqi aggression and convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. We do this willingly because of the essential interests that are at stake.
- However, we will be seeking assistance in supporting the military deployment, particularly from the oil-rich states of the Arabian peninsula and from Japan.
- The economic consequences of the Gulf crisis are also starting to be felt. The front line states of Egypt, Turkey and Jordan are particularly hard hit.

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2010-1101-MR  
GLS 5/16/11

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR



- Eastern Europe's delicate transition to democracy and free markets may be threatened by the sharp rise in petroleum prices and the loss of Iraqi oil supplies, after they have already begun to lose privileged access to Soviet oil.
- Other countries like the Philippines, Pakistan, Morocco and India are hurting too.
- Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do not get some economic assistance. Jordan is in a special situation; we need to consider incentives to keep King Hussein afloat and encourage him to abide by the U.N.-mandated embargo.
- It is time for concerted action to share the burden of helping these countries. I believe our two countries, other OECD countries, the Gulf states and other major beneficiaries of our resolve to stand up to Saddam should work together to provide economic assistance.
- We have developed some ideas over the past week on the needs of specific countries and how these might be met. I would like to send Nick Brady to discuss these issues with you early next week. I am also asking Francois Mitterrand to receive Nick.
- I plan to send Secretary Baker to Rome to discuss these ideas with Giulio Andreotti in his EC capacity as well as to Brussels to see Jacques Delors.
- I have also asked him to go to Bonn to talk to Helmut Kohl about economic support, in view of Germany's economic position and inability to play a military role in the Gulf.

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER KAIFU

Dear Toshiki:

I very much appreciated the opportunity to talk with you ~~last Wednesday~~ <sup>last Wednesday</sup> and be personally briefed on your very positive initial assistance proposals for dealing with the crisis in the Persian Gulf. Japan's efforts, combined with those of other countries, clearly demonstrate that the world is united in its determination to turn back Saddam Hussein.

If neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will all have to review our options. One thing is clear -- we cannot let Saddam Hussein remain in Kuwait. What is at stake transcends Kuwait. It is a question of standing firm against aggression and protecting the economic security of our societies. The issue here is the kind of world we want to create for ourselves and future generations.

The U.S. is spending huge sums daily to deter further Iraqi aggression and convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. We do this willingly because essential democratic values and economic freedoms are threatened. As I mentioned to you over the telephone, we sincerely appreciate your assistance in sharing the burden of the multinational force deployment. In the near term, your help with certain kinds of materiel, transport and construction is very useful.

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0404-MR

MM 6/9/2016

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

While the U.N. sanctions are widespread and effective, the invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries: costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and higher oil prices.

The economic consequences of the Gulf crisis are increasing daily. The front line states of Egypt, Turkey and Jordan are particularly hard hit due to the cutoff of extensive economic ties.

In addition, Eastern Europe's delicate transition to democracy and free markets is threatened by the sharp rise in oil prices and the loss of privileged access to Soviet oil supplies. Other countries like the Philippines, Morocco, Pakistan and India also have been hard hit.

Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do not get some economic assistance.

Since we talked, I have had further discussions with my senior advisers some ideas on the needs of specific countries, our requirements for helping with the defense burden and how these might be met. I would like to send Secretary Brady, accompanied by senior officials, early next week to discuss these ideas with you.

As we agreed in our calls, it is time for concerted action to share the responsibility of helping these countries. I believe our countries, the European Community, other OECD countries, the Gulf states and other major beneficiaries of our resolve to stand up to Saddam should work together to provide economic assistance.

~~SECRET~~

3

I will look forward to hearing your views once you have had a chance to meet with Secretary Brady.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Toshiki Kaifu  
Prime Minister of Japan  
Tokyo

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO KOREAN PRESIDENT ROH

Dear Mr. President:

I want to share with you my assessment of the situation in the Gulf region and our latest thinking on ways to help countries most affected economically by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Overall, I believe we are in good shape. The world is demonstrating its resolve, both in the Gulf region and at the U.N., to resist aggression. Now we have to see whether sanctions can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait.

If neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will all have to review our options. One thing is clear -- we cannot let Saddam Hussein remain in Kuwait. What is at stake transcends Kuwait. It is a question of standing firm against aggression and of protecting the economic security of our societies. The issue is the kind of world we want to create for ourselves and future generations.

The U.S. is spending huge sums daily to deter further Iraqi aggression and convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. We do this willingly because essential democratic values and economic freedoms are threatened. However, we need assistance in supporting the military deployment. We particularly need help on certain kinds of materiel and transport.

I appreciate your contributions thus far and would like to discuss additional assistance which Korea may be able to provide.

While the U.N. sanctions are widespread and effective, the invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries:

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0404-MR

MM 6/9/2016

costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and higher oil prices.

The economic costs of the Gulf crisis are increasing daily. The front line states of Egypt, Turkey and Jordan are particularly hard hit due to the cutoff of extensive economic ties.

In addition, Eastern Europe's delicate transition to democracy and free markets is threatened by the sharp rise in oil prices and the loss of privileged access to Soviet oil supplies. Other countries like Morocco, the Philippines, Pakistan and India have been particularly hard hit.

Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do not get some economic assistance.

We have developed some ideas on the needs of specific countries, our requirements to help with the defense burden and how these might be met, and I would like to send Secretary Brady, accompanied by senior officials, early next week to discuss these ideas with you.

It is time for concerted action to share the responsibility of helping these countries. I believe our countries, OECD countries, the Gulf states and other major beneficiaries of our resolve to stand up to Saddam should work together to provide economic assistance.

I will look forward to hearing your views once you have had a chance to meet with Secretary Brady.

Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~

3

His Excellency  
Roh Tae Woo  
President of the Republic of Korea  
Seoul

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI

Dear Giulio:

I want to follow up on our recent telephone conversation by sharing with you my assessment of the situation in the Gulf region and our latest thinking on ways to help countries most affected economically by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Overall, I believe we are in good shape. The world is demonstrating its resolve, both in the Gulf region and at the U.N., to resist aggression. Now we have to see whether sanctions can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait.

If neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will all have to review our options. One thing is clear -- we cannot let Saddam Hussein remain in Kuwait. What is at stake transcends Kuwait. It is a question of standing firm against aggression and protecting the economic security of the West.

The U.S. is spending huge sums daily to deter further Iraqi aggression and convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. We do this willingly because essential democratic values and economic freedoms are threatened. However, we will be seeking assistance in supporting the military deployment. We particularly need help on certain kinds of materiel and transport. My representatives at NATO have already provided our allies with information on the most urgent requirements.

While the U.N. sanctions are widespread and effective, the invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries:

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0404-MR  
MM 6/9/2016



costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and higher oil prices.

Both collectively and through individual efforts, the EC is providing urgently needed food, medical, and other humanitarian assistance to front-line states. I am gratified that the EC is also actively considering assistance to Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and other countries.

The economic costs of the Gulf crisis are increasing daily. The front line states of Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan are particularly hard hit due to the cutoff of extensive economic ties.

In addition, Eastern Europe's delicate transition to democracy and free markets is threatened by the sharp rise in oil prices and the loss of privileged access to Soviet oil supplies. Other countries such as Morocco, the Philippines, Pakistan and India also have been hard hit.

Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do not get some economic assistance.

We have developed some ideas on the needs of specific countries and how these might be met. I outlined some of these ideas in my press conference today. I would also like to send Jim Baker, accompanied by senior officials, early next week to discuss these ideas with you in your capacity as EC President. I have also asked him to meet with Helmut Kohl and Jacques Delors. In addition, I have asked Francois Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher to meet with Nick Brady.

I will look forward to hearing your views once you have had a chance to meet with Secretary Baker.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Giulio Andreotti  
President of the Council of Ministers  
of the Italian Republic  
Rome

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO EC COMMISSION PRESIDENT DELORS

Dear Jacques:

I want to share with you my assessment of the situation in the Gulf region and our latest thinking on ways to help countries most affected economically by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Overall, I believe we are in good shape for now. The world is demonstrating its resolve, both in the Gulf region and at the U.N., to resist aggression. Now we have to see whether sanctions can persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait.

If neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will all have to review our options. One thing is clear -- we cannot let Saddam Hussein remain in Kuwait. What is at stake transcends Kuwait. It is a question of standing firm against aggression and protecting the economic security the West.

While the U.N. sanctions are widespread and effective, the invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries: costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and higher oil prices.

Both collectively and through individual efforts, the EC is providing urgently needed food, medical, and other humanitarian assistance to front-line states. I am gratified that the EC is also actively considering assistance to Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and other countries.

The economic costs of the Gulf crisis are increasing daily. The front line states of Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan are particularly hard hit due to the cutoff of extensive economic ties.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0404-MR  
MM 6/9/2016

In addition, Eastern Europe's delicate transition to democracy and free markets may be threatened by the sharp rise in oil prices and the loss of privileged access to Soviet oil supplies. Other countries such as Morocco, the Philippines, Pakistan and India also have been hard hit.

Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do not get some economic assistance.

We have developed some ideas on the needs of specific countries and how these might be met, and I outlined some of these in my press conference today. I would like to send Secretary Baker, accompanied by senior officials, early next week to discuss these ideas with you. [I have also asked him to meet with Giulio Andreotti in his capacity as EC President.]

I will look forward to hearing your views once you have had a chance to meet with Secretary Baker.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Jacques Delors  
President of the Commission  
of the European Communities  
Brussels



~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

Your Majesty:

In the days since we met at Kennebunkport, the international community has strengthened its unified position against Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Forces of twenty-two nations will soon be on the ground or at sea in the region, a remarkable display of international, including Arab and Islamic, solidarity. Sanctions are being implemented, with excellent compliance, and there is additional United Nations support for measures to enforce them if necessary. Iraq has further isolated itself with its seizure of innocent people of many nationalities as hostages.

I have thought a lot about Jordan and its special situation, particularly in light of your commitment to observe the sanctions resolution. We would like to see the fullest possible compliance with sanctions by Jordan, in conformity with the international community's decisions and practice. At the same time, I realize that the costs for Jordan would be severe unless redressed by external help. Your Majesty, we have some ideas about what might be done to enhance Jordan's ability to make these economic readjustments. I have asked                      to discuss our proposals with you. In the spirit of our friendship, I hope you will be as candid with him as you always have been with me, and that you will permit him to be equally open. It is my belief that very private U.S.-Jordanian consultation is essential, so that we may reach understandings that can be translated into specific actions.

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0404-MR  
MM 6/9/2016

~~SECRET~~

We agree, Your Majesty, that a peaceful resolution of this crisis can only be attained if everyone meets his responsibilities and shoulders part of the burden. You were eloquent in explaining Jordan's search for a peaceful resolution, and I was impressed by your sense of duty. As you know, I have been skeptical of the possibilities with Iraq, but I sincerely hope for success in opening the avenue of a peaceful Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait that we all seek.

With best regards,

His Majesty

Hussein I

King of the Hashemite

Kingdom of Jordan

Amman

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to share with you my assessment of the situation in the Gulf region since my last letter of August 20, and to inform you of my thinking on how we might help those countries most affected by the imposition of U.N. sanctions due to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

As I noted in my last letter, I am very gratified by the constructive position you and your government have taken in helping to marshall international support for the U.N. resolutions designed to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, agree to the return of the legally constituted Kuwaiti government, and release all foreign hostages. Thanks in large part to your own consistent support for these objectives, I believe we are in good shape.

We have demonstrated at the UN and through the efforts of the multinational force that the world is united on this issue. The image of our two nations standing together has sent a powerful message that the U.S. and USSR will resist unlawful aggression.

Our task now is to make sure that the U.N.-mandated sanctions are strictly enforced by all countries. Again, we have been pleased by your government's public commitment to the sanctions and prompt efforts to cut off Soviet trade with Iraq. We will need to consult closely in the weeks ahead to make sure that the effect of the sanctions begins to be felt by Sadaam Hussein.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0404-MR  
MM 6/9/2016

In that spirit, while we have no doubt about your commitment to comply with the sanctions, we have seen reports of possible slippage on the part of some of your government agencies. We will be providing further details to your government on this issue on a confidential and constructive basis.

While we have every reason to believe that the U.N. sanctions will continue to be widespread and effective, the invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries: costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and higher oil prices. Indeed, the economic costs of the crisis are increasing daily.

In particular, I believe that Eastern Europe's transition to stable, free market economies is threatened specifically by the sharp rise in oil prices. Given the USSR's historical trade and energy ties with Eastern Europe, any effort you could make to ensure the delivery of contracted levels of oil to those countries and to take into account Eastern European difficulties as you make the transition to hard currency trade, would be most helpful. I am well aware of the costs and difficulties associated with your own economic reform efforts, but I believe that such a step is essential in helping the Eastern Europeans through this crisis.

I wanted you to know that, during the coming week, I will be sending representatives to selected countries that are in a position to help those developing countries which are most affected by these economic dislocations, such as Turkey, Egypt,



Jordan, Morocco, the Philippines, India and Pakistan. We will also be seeking support for Eastern Europe.

I will keep you informed of the results of these discussions, and Jim Baker will discuss this matter in full with Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow during the second week in September.

I would be most interested in your own views on these issues, and look forward to continued and fruitful cooperation between our two countries.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Mikhail Gorbachev  
President of the Union of  
Soviet Socialist Republics  
Moscow

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                       | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 10m. Draft<br>Message    | Draft Message to Taiwan [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2<br>pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
**Series:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files  
**Subseries:** Chronological Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [2]

**Document Partially Declassified**  
**(Copy of Document Follows)**  
 By MM on 3/20/2023

|                                     |                                         |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 5/26/2009       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91143-009          |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2009-0275-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>                   |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>              |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>                |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b> 2010-0404-MR(509.12)  |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 6/9/2016    |

### RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information  
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information  
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]  
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~



DRAFT MESSAGE TO TAIWAN

Communication to Mr. Scott Hallford, Acting Director of the  
American Institute in Taiwan

Message: Please convey the following oral message from the President to President Lee Teng-Hui. A non-paper with the text of the oral message should be left with Lee. The message is classified "~~Secret~~." Its contents should not be made public.

BEGIN TEXT: "Dear President Lee, as you know, there are international efforts underway to demonstrate that the world is united in its determination to turn back Saddam Hussein.

If neither diplomacy nor sanctions work, we will all have to review our options. One thing is clear -- we cannot let Saddam Hussein remain in Kuwait. What is at stake transcends Kuwait. It is a question of standing firm against aggression and protecting the economic security of our societies. The issue here is the kind of world we want to create for ourselves and future generations.

The U.S. is spending huge sums daily to deter further Iraqi aggression and convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. We do this willingly because essential democratic values and economic freedoms are threatened. We need substantial assistance in sharing the burden of our military deployment. In the near term, we particularly are interested in help with certain kinds of materiel, transport and construction.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0404-MR  
MM 6/9/2016

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

While the U.N. sanctions are widespread and effective, the invasion and embargo are imposing real costs on many countries: costs of enforcement and costs of reduced economic activity and higher oil prices.

The economic consequences of the Gulf crisis are increasing daily. The front line states of Egypt, Turkey and Jordan are particularly hard hit due to the cutoff of extensive economic ties.

In addition, Eastern Europe's delicate transition to democracy and free markets is threatened by the sharp rise in oil prices and the loss of privileged access to Soviet oil supplies. Other countries like the Philippines, Morocco, Pakistan and India also have been hard hit.

Sustaining the embargo will be harder if these countries do not get some economic assistance.

I have discussed with my senior advisers some ideas on the needs of specific countries, our requirements for helping with the defense burden and how these might be met.

3.3(b)(6)

Sincerely,

George Bush" END TEXT

If Lee raises his July 3 letter to President Bush, you should say we are giving it careful study.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Brant:

The package should be complete except that the message to Jordan does not name the leader of the Presidential mission.

Tom

~~SECRET~~

6901

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 30, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: TIMOTHY E. DEAL *TE*  
RICHARD HAASS *WH*  
FROM: ERIC MELBY *EM*  
SUBJECT: Persian Gulf Crisis: Economic Action Plan

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President, transmitting talking points and messages to various heads of state and government and EC Commission President Delors as the initial step in implementation of our economic action plan for the Persian Gulf crisis. The talking points and messages, which have been coordinated with State, Treasury and DOD, make specific reference to two missions headed by Secretaries Baker and Brady respectively.

Secretary Baker has not yet cleared the proposed letter to Gorbachev. Larry Eagleburger believes the first paragraph on page 2 of the letter should be deleted and that we should raise this point separately with the Soviets.

Concurrences by: Adrian *AS* Basora, Peter Watson *AW*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

|       |                                                                                                           |
|-------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tab I | Memo to the President                                                                                     |
| Tab A | Talking Points for Calls to King Fahd, the Amir of Kuwait, President Zayyid, and Chancellor Kohl          |
| Tab B | Talking Points for Calls to President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Thatcher                              |
| Tab C | Messages to Prime Minister Kaifu, President Roh, Prime Minister Andreotti, EC Commission President Delors |
| Tab D | Message to King Hussein                                                                                   |
| Tab E | Message to President Gorbachev                                                                            |
| Tab F | Message to Taiwan                                                                                         |

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0404-MSR  
MM 6/9/2016

UNCLASSIFIED  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006911  
RECEIVED: 30 AUG 90 16

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: DYKE  
MILLER

**CHRON FILE**

DOC DATE: 30 AUG 90  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PERSIAN GULF  
IRAQ  
JORDAN

REFUGEES  
KUWAIT  
UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PERSIAN GULF CRISIS REFUGEE UPDATE

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES

DUE DATE: 03 SEP 90

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DYKE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DYKE  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG

CLOSED BY: NSRLG

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6911

August 30, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. MILLER, JR. *MD*

FROM: NANCY BEARG DYKE

SUBJECT: Persian Gulf Crisis Refugee Update

*Deputy Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen*

The United States has been actively involved with other nations and international organizations in responding to the Persian Gulf refugee situation. At present, there are about 60,000 people, who have fled Iraq and Kuwait, in Jordan. The international community has already moved about 120,000 people; primarily, this has been Egypt moving Egyptians home. The refugee population in Jordan is predominantly Egyptian, Filipino, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, and Bangladeshi.

The US has sent \$1 million in assistance so far in money, tents, and water jugs, and we pledged \$13 million in food assistance. We are working with international organizations (the UN Disaster Relief Organization has the coordinating role) to determine how best to provide further assistance. Emergency funds are available, if needed.

Problems to be confronted soon by the international community are:

- how to move the foreign nationals, such as Filipinos, who have to go long distances;
- people moving in large numbers to new borders, such as 20,000 to Turkey and thousands to Iran.

cc: Haass  
Charles  
Welch  
Popadiuk



~~SECRET~~  
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006934  
RECEIVED: 31 AUG 90 11

TO: SITTMANN

CHRON FILE

FROM: BENKO  
BASORA

DOC DATE: 31 AUG 90  
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN  
IRAQ  
JORDAN

TELCON  
KUWAIT  
HOSTAGES

PERSONS: THATCHER, MARGARET

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W/ PM THATCHER ON 31 AUG RE SITUATION IN GULF

ACTION: HILL APPROVED RECOM #1 DUE DATE: 04 SEP 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BENKO LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BASORA  
BENKO  
NSC CHRON

**DECLASSIFIED**  
White House Guidelines  
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006  
By Cap NARA, Date 12/12/09

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRCB CLOSED BY: NSGAD DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

## MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister  
Notetaker: Stephen E. Benko, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 31, 1990, 6:46 - 7:03 a.m.  
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Margaret, how have you been? We're back here in Kennebunkport. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Just fine, George. I'm going to see Governor Sununu today. (S)

The President: He had very good talks with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I'm going to be seeing King Hussein in half an hour. (S)

The President: I wanted to share a few thoughts with you. The sanctions are having good effect. I just hung up with King Fahd. He says he has reports that people in Iraq are becoming quite dissatisfied with what Saddam has done. This is also what Ozal of Turkey told me. I'm a little disappointed with Tunisia and Libya, although not surprised. We must tighten enforcement of the sanctions. (S)

But if neither diplomacy or sanctions work, we need to review our options. I have not changed my thinking on our goals, even though we keep hearing from some of negotiating proposals that stop short of the UN mandate. I am worried by talk of elections, or anything that does not restore the legitimate rulers of Kuwait. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I agree totally. Our strategy is the same as ever. We need to maintain the sanctions and tighten them, following up with every person or country which breaks them. That's the weapon we need to get him out. We can't rule out the military option, but that's way, way ahead. In the

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 135262000-0429-F  
SCS 6/6/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

meantime, we must use the embargo. We couldn't have predicted two months ago that we'd be where we are now, and we can't predict where we'll be two months from now. (S)

The President: There's another point I wanted to raise with you. I hope it doesn't complicate your life. Yesterday the hostages issue came up at a press conference, and I made the statement that our policy wouldn't change because of the hostages. This may be distressful to some of the hostage families, but I wanted you to know about it. I feel very strongly about it. It's important to get that message to Saddam Husayn. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, it's very important. There should be no negotiations. The UN has said what must be done. Saddam Husayn must get out. We must not fall into the trap of negotiations. (S)

The President: I believe Perez de Cuellar has the same views. Do you think so? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes I do. Although some of his staff has been saying to him that Saddam has released women and children and therefore there should be a conciliatory gesture on our side. They may be trying to soften him up. (S)

George, I want to tell you about some intelligence I've got. There is a ship coming down the Gulf tomorrow, the Hittin. (S)

The President: We have to stop this ship if it comes from Iraq. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, it has to be stopped. (S)

The President: What did you say the name of the ship was? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: The Hittin, H-I-T-T-I-N. It's loading up at the moment, loading up right now. We've got from the UN what we need to stop it. (S)

The President: This is very interesting. I'll tell Cheney or Scowcroft. (S)

I want to shift to King Hussein. He came here, and was very distraught -- caught. I believe he feels trapped. He called me with what he thought was good news, that is, the release of the women and children. Well, it was promised, but it hasn't happened in four days now. I don't trust Saddam Husayn. King Hussein asked me to kind of cool it and reciprocate. But I feel that when a hostage is released and people ask "what are you going to do to show good faith?" that it's impossible -- when they undo one-third or one-fourth or one-seventh of what they should never have done. I'm afraid the Gulf states, Mubarak and others, are very upset with Hussein. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: This wrong must be righted. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The President: We can't have any of these arguments about age-old decisions about Kuwait. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Absolutely. (S)

The President: Margaret, I wanted to talk about the announcement I made yesterday. Would you be willing to talk to Nick Brady? We're trying to get a coordinated approach to economic assistance. I spoke to Kohl yesterday. I saw the statement that you made up in Finland, which we all appreciated. Britain has already responded, but we'd like to explain how we want to coordinate paying for transport and other things. I don't want this mission to have the appearance that we're coming hat in hand to beg. The mission is for coordination and consultation. I'd appreciate it if you could see Brady. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, of course. It's important to coordinate aid to those states which are suffering. Others can contribute to support the military effort, for example, Saudi Arabia. But the Germans have said they are quite willing to contribute heavily financially. (S)

The President: That's good news. The Saudis and the free Kuwaitis are ready to step up now. The Kuwaitis are back in control of their financial assets, and have said they'll help. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I'd be delighted to see Nick. This afternoon I will tell Governor Sununu about my meeting with King Hussein. Saddam Husayn will be the loser. (S)

The President: Thanks very much. We need to think about how we get this off dead center if there is no provocation, or if the sanctions don't hurt a lot. We can't do anything now; all our forces are not in place yet. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: It won't be difficult. But if it goes on for a long time, we'll have to look at the military options. (S)

You know, George, I'll be in the States at the end of September in New York for the Children's meeting. I could stop in at Washington then if it was needed. (S)

The President: That's a must. Anthony can give us the details. I'm participating in the Children's event, although I'm not sure what it will achieve -- but it will be a good way to get some talks in. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Our strategy is absolutely right. We must stick together. (S)

The President: Tell Governor Sununu that the President said to tell you, privately, a very sensitive message. I don't want to get into it over the phone now, but get him off in a corner and ask him to tell you in person. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, I will. (S)

The President: All right. King Hussein is a long time friend but he's under a lot of pressure now. He promised to enforce the UN embargo but said he needed a clarification of the humanitarian clause. I'm afraid he hasn't done it yet. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, he needs to have things made quite clear to him. I'll talk to him about it and make certain he understands it. (S)

The President: I'm sure you will. Thanks so much. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: God bless. Thanks for phoning. (U)

--End of conversation--

~~SECRET~~

6934

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 31, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: ADRIAN A. BASORA *AAB*

FROM: STEPHEN E. BENKO

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Thatcher on August 31, 1990.

Concurrence by: Richard Haass

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *KSH/fn*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to State on an "Eyes Only" basis for insertion in Secretary Brady's briefing book.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove *KSH/fn*

Attachments

Tab I Memo to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 12958,  
AS AMENDED

Q 7128103