Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 91143
Folder ID Number: 91143-008

Folder Title:
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	6	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Executive Orders on Ordering the Selected Reserves to Active Duty and Delegating Authority to Suspend Laws on Promotion, Retirement or Seperation (2 pp.)	8/21/90	(b)(1)	S
01b. Memo	Secretary Cheney to POTUS Re: Order to Active Duty of the Selected Reserves (2 pp.)	8/16/90	(b)(1)	S
02a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl, August 22, 1990 (2 pp.)	8/21/90	(b)(1)	C
02b. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made in Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
02c. Memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Brent Scowcroft Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, August 22, 1990 (1 pp.)	8/21/90	(b)(1)	C
03a. Memo	C. David Welch to Brent Scowcroft Re: Egypt's FMS Debt (1 pp.)	8/22/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Egypt's FMS Debt (2 pp.)	8/20/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1195
OA/ID Number: 91143-008
Date Closed: 5/26/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04. Memo	David V. Kitchen to Robert M. Gates Re: Sanctions Against Iraqi Establishments in U.S. (1 pp.)	8/24/90	(b)(1)	TS
05a. Profile Sheet	To Scowcroft Re: Terroist Threat Update (1 pp.)	8/24/90	(b)(1)	TS
05b. Memo	To Scowcroft Re: Terroist Threat Update (1 pp.)	8/24/90	(b)(1)	TS
05c. Report	Re: Update on Anti-U.S. Threats [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	8/23/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	TS
05d. Report	From Federal Bureau of Investigation, Re: [Immigrant Presence in the United States] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	8/23/90	(b)(1)	S
06. Message	Re: Message from the President to Prime Minister Shamir (1 pp.)	8/26	(b)(1)	S
07a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Waivers for Arms Sales for Saudi Arabia (2 pp.)	8/26/90	(b)(1)	S
07b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Waivers for Arms Sales for Saudi Arabia (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
07c. Memo	Re: Memorandum of Justification [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
07d. Memo	From Lawrence S. Eagleburger to POTUS, Re: Urgent Military Sales to Saudi Arabia [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	8/24/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [1]

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FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07e. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: Additional Arms Sales for Saudi Arabia (1 pp.)	8/25/90	(b)(1)	S
08. Memo	Richard N. Haass to Brent Scowcroft Re: What Next in the Gulf? (4 pp.)	8/27/90	(b)(1)	TS
09a. Profile Sheet	Haass and Welch to Sittmann Re: Telcon… (1 pp.)	8/27/90	(b)(1)	C
09b. Memo	C. David Welch to William F. Sittmann Re: [Memorandum of Telephone Call… (1 pp.)	8/27/90	(b)(1)	C
09c. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (2 pp.)	8/26/90	(b)(1)	C
10a. Memo	Don Pilling to Bob Gates Re: Cost of Middle East Operations (3 pp.)	8/26/90	(b)(1)	S
10b. Outline	Re: Assessment of U.S. Military Costs for Desert Shield (8 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1195
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Date Closed: 5/26/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

CHRON FILE

~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006624
RECEIVED: 17 AUG 90 17

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 21 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY
EO

MANPOWER

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: EO RE ORDERING SELECT RESERVES TO ACTIVE DUTY & DELEGATING AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND LAWS ON PROMOTION / RETIREMENT OR SEPARATION

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 21 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAYDEN LOGREF: 9006585

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HAYDEN
		NSC CHRON
		PILLING

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/26/2009

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

National Security Cou
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6624

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG CM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	4	KH	A
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates	2		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5/6	8/21 AE	D
NSC Secretariat			N

RECEIVED 90 AUG 20 P9:04

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

Exec Sec

Need Signature at Tab II

8/21

6624

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 21, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES CICCONI

FROM: WILLIAM SITTMANN

SUBJECT: Press Release on the Call-Up of Reserve Forces

The press release (Tab A) announces that the President has authorized the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation to order units and individual members of the selected reserve to active duty. The Qs and As (Tab B) provide additional background material.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Press Release + Clerk's Offices releases
Tab B Qs and As

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The President today authorized the Secretary of Defense to call Reserve units of the Armed Forces to active duty. The order permits the Secretary of Defense to call to duty selected members and units of the Reserve components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps as needed to support United States and multinational operations now underway. The President signed the order after the Secretary of Defense advised him that the effective conduct of military operations in and around the Arabian Peninsula may require augmentation of Active components of the Armed Forces. The actual number of Reserve personnel to be called to active duty will depend upon the operational needs of the Armed Forces but, at this time, we do not anticipate approaching the full 200,000 authority provided by law.

The Total Force Policy, which was established in 1973, allocates various military capabilities among the Active, Reserve, and National Guard components that together make up the Armed Forces of the United States. Under this policy, the capability to perform certain critical military activities has been concentrated in the Reserve component. Activating reservists to support operations such as those now underway has been a central feature of this approach.

The skills concentrated in the Reserve component include airlift, food and water handling, surface transportation, cargo handling, medical services, construction, and intelligence. By making judicious use of the President's authorization, the Secretary of Defense will be able to ensure that essential capabilities such as these and others are available to support our operational requirements.

The President issued the order authorizing the Secretary of Defense to call Reserve units to active duty in accordance with section 673b of title 10 of the United States Code. The order also authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to call to active duty elements of the Coast Guard Reserve. Another order signed by the President permits the Secretary of Defense greater flexibility in military personnel management actions.

SECDEF Requests Authority to Activate Reserves

Q: Do we plan to call 200,000 reservists to active duty?

A: We have no plans to do so. 200,000 is simply the number cited in the legislation as the maximum that the President can call up under this particular statute.

Q: When was the last time reserves were involuntarily called to active duty?

A: The last time reserves were called involuntarily for military action was in 1968 when 37,000 were activated in response to the Tet offensive and the seizure of the Pueblo. In 1961 President Kennedy activated some 150,000 during the Berlin crisis.

Q: Is this mobilization?

A: No. It is a call to active duty of selected reserves. It will focus on those individuals and units with skills that are not found in adequate numbers in the active component. This will largely involve such activities as airlift, cargo handling, medical support, and especially what the Army calls combat service support. It does not indicate an overall manpower shortage.

Q: Does the 180 day limit define the end of our commitment in the Persian Gulf?

A: No. The President has ample authority in law to protect the vital interests of the United States.

Q: Does the need to call up reserves indicate that we have organized our forces poorly?

A: No. The division of labor between active and reserve components reflects what each can now do best. This is the way we have planned to deal with a large-scale contingency like the current one in the Persian Gulf. And now we are taking advantage of the capabilities that our reserve forces provide us. Our Total Force Policy means just that.

Q: What kinds of capabilities are included in the reserves?

A: Reserve units and personnel are assigned combat support roles, such as combat construction, airlift, artillery, and military intelligence, and combat service support roles, such as food and water handling, ammunition handling, and medical services. They are also assigned combat roles.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Executive Orders on Ordering the Selected Reserves to Active Duty and Delegating Authority to Suspend Laws on Promotion, Retirement or Seperation (2 pp.)	8/21/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [1]

Date Closed:	5/26/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91143-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

6624

August 18, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: MICHAEL HAYDEN/DON PILLING

SUBJECT: SECDEF Requests Authority to Activate Reserves

Secretary Cheney has asked the President (Tab D) to authorize the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation to order reservists to active duty. He has also asked the President to delegate his authority to suspend laws on promotion, retirement and separation of military members.

The President can authorize the call-up of up to 200,000 members of the selected reserve for up to 90 days, and then extend the period an additional 90 days, without declaring a national emergency. The President must notify Congress within 24 hours but approval is not required. When the President authorizes such an involuntary call-up, he may also suspend laws on promotion, retirement and separation for all military members.

As you know, this request does not indicate an overall shortage of manpower but the effect of past decisions that have placed all or most of some important military activities in the reserves. The immediate call-up will focus on support personnel: cargo handlers, airlifters, and Army combat service support like fuel specialists and water storage units. The last time reserves were called involuntarily for military action was in 1968 when 37,000 were activated in response to the Tet offensive and the seizure of the Pueblo. In 1961 President Kennedy activated some 150,000 during the Berlin crisis.

The memo to the President at Tab I recommends he authorize the involuntary call-up of reserves and the suspension of laws on promotion, retirement and separations. It also recommends he sign the letters notifying Congress of his decision. We have scrubbed both the executive order and the letters to remove direct reference to the figure 200,000. We have also prepared a short White House press announcement that explains the reasons for the call-up, and gives some idea of the expected scope of the current call-up.

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT
Declassify on: OADR

Concurrences by: Roman Popadiuk, Virginia Lampley, Sandy Charles and Dan Levin

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you sign the proposed memo to the President at Tab I.
Approve_____ Disapprove____

That you authorize Bill Sittmann to sign the proposed memo to Jim Cicconi at Tab II.
Approve____ Disapprove____

Attachments
Tab I Proposed Memo to the President
- Tab A Executive Order Ordering the Selected Reserve to Active Duty and Notification Letters
- Tab B Memorandum from Director Darman
- Tab C Executive Order Delegating Authority to Suspend Laws on Promotion, Retirement or Separation
- Tab D Memorandum from Secretary Cheney

Tab II Proposed Memo from Bill Sittmann to James Cicconi
- Tab A Proposed Press Release
- Tab B Contingency Qs and As

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

EXECUTIVE ORDER

- - - - - - -

DELEGATING THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND ANY PROVISION OF LAW RELATING TO THE PROMOTION, RETIREMENT, OR SEPARATION OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 673c of title 10 of the United States Code and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, I hereby order:

Section 1. The Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Department of the Navy, are hereby designated and empowered to exercise, without the approval, ratification, or other action of the President, the authority vested in the President by section 673c of title 10 of the United States Code (1) to suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces determined to be essential to the national security of the United States, and (2) to determine, for the purposes of said section, that members of the armed forces are essential to the national security of the United States.

Sec. 2. The authority delegated to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation by this order may be redelegated and further subdelegated to subordinates who are appointed to their offices by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Sec. 3. This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.

GEORGE BUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE,

# # #

EXECUTIVE ORDER

- - - - - -

ORDERING THE SELECTED RESERVE OF THE
ARMED FORCES TO ACTIVE DUTY

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 121 and 673b of title 10 of the United States Code, I hereby determine that it is necessary to augment the active armed forces of the United States for the operational mission of assisting the defense of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region. Further, under the stated authority, I hereby authorize the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when the latter is not operating as a service in the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty for a period not to exceed 90 days, such units, and individual members not assigned to units, of the Selected Reserve, not to exceed the statutory limit of 200,000, as the Secretary of Defense considers necessary to augment the active armed forces for the mission referenced above.

This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the Executive branch, and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.

This order shall be published immediately in the Federal Register and transmitted promptly to the Congress.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

EXECUTIVE ORDER

- - - - - -

ORDERING THE SELECTED RESERVE OF THE
ARMED FORCES TO ACTIVE DUTY

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 121 and 673b of title 10 of the United States Code, I hereby determine that it is necessary to augment the active armed forces of the United States for the operational mission of assisting the defense of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region. Further, under the stated authority, I hereby authorize the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when the latter is not operating as a service in the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty units and individual members not assigned to units, of the Selected Reserve.

This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the Executive branch, and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.

This order shall be published immediately in the Federal Register and transmitted promptly to the Congress.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

EXECUTIVE ORDER

- - - - - -

ORDERING THE SELECTED RESERVE OF THE
ARMED FORCES TO ACTIVE DUTY

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 121 and 673b of title 10 of the United States Code, I hereby determine that it is necessary to augment the active armed forces of the United States for the operational mission of assisting the defense of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region. Further, under the stated authority, I hereby authorize the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when the latter is not operating as a service in the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty for a period not to exceed 90 days, such units, and individual members not assigned to units, of the Selected Reserve with critically needed skills, as the Secretary of Defense considers necessary to augment the active armed forces for the mission referenced above.

This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the Executive branch, and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.

This order shall be published immediately in the Federal Register and transmitted promptly to the Congress.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ORDERING THE SELECTED RESERVE OF THE
ARMED FORCES TO ACTIVE DUTY

By the authority invested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 121 and 673b of title 10 of the United States Code, I hereby determine that it is necessary to augment the active armed forces of the United States for the effective conduct of operational missions in and around the Arabian Peninsula. Further, under the stated authority, I hereby authorize the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when the latter is not operating as a service in the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty units and individual members not assigned to units, of the Selected Reserve.

This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the Executive branch, and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.

This order shall be published immediately in the Federal Register and transmitted promptly to the Congress.

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

EXECUTIVE ORDER

- - - - - - -

ORDERING THE SELECTED RESERVE OF THE
ARMED FORCES TO ACTIVE DUTY

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 121 and 673b of title 10 of the United States Code, I hereby determine that it is necessary to augment the active armed forces of the United States for the effective conduct of operational missions in and around the Arabian Peninsula. Further, under the stated authority, I hereby authorize the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when the latter is not operating as a service in the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty units and individual members not assigned to units, of the Selected Reserve.

This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch, and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.

This order shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted promptly to the Congress.

GEORGE BUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE,

# # #

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM
THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

I have today, pursuant to section 673b of title 10, United States Code, authorized the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service within the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty units and individual members not assigned to units of the Selected Reserve to perform such missions the Secretary of Defense may determine necessary. The deployment of United States forces to conduct operational missions in and around the Arabian Peninsula necessitates this action.

A copy of the Executive order implementing this action is attached.

Sincerely,

GEORGE BUSH

# # #

Dear Mr. President:

I have this date, pursuant to section 673b of title 10, United States Code, authorized the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service within the Department of the Navy, to order members of the Selected Reserve to active duty. The deployment of United States forces to assist in the defense of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region and the need to augment the active force structure to ensure adequate support for our deployed forces necessitate this action.

The units and members of the Selected Reserve ordered to active duty under this authority may perform combat, combat support, and combat service support missions.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
President pro tempore
of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

cc: The Honorable Robert J. Dole
Republican Leader

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I have this date, pursuant to section 673b of title 10, United States Code, authorized the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service within the Department of the Navy, to order members of the Selected Reserve to active duty. The deployment of United States forces to assist in the defense of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region and the need to augment the active force structure to ensure adequate support for our deployed forces necessitate this action.

The units and members of the Selected Reserve ordered to active duty under this authority may perform combat, combat support, and combat service support missions.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas Foley
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

cc: The Honorable Robert H. Michel
Republican Leader

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

I have today, pursuant to section 673b of title 10, United States Code, authorized the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service within the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty units and individual members not assigned to units of the Selected Reserve to perform such missions the Secretary of Defense may determine necessary. The deployment of United States forces to conduct operational missions in and around the Arabian Peninsula necessitates this action.

A copy of the Executive Order implementing this action is attached.

Sincerely,

The Honorable J. Danforth Quayle
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I have today, pursuant to section 673b of title 10, United States Code, authorized the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service within the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty units and individual members not assigned to units of the Selected Reserve to perform such missions the Secretary of Defense may determine necessary. The deployment of United States forces to conduct operational missions in and around the Arabian Peninsula necessitates this action.

A copy of the Executive Order implementing this action is attached.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas Foley
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

THE DIRECTOR

August 17, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Richard G. Darman
Director

SUBJECT: Proposed Executive Order Entitled "Ordering the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty"

SUMMARY: This memorandum forwards for your consideration a proposed Executive order, prepared and recommended by the Department of Defense, that would augment the active forces to ensure adequate support of current operations in the defense of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region.

BACKGROUND: Under 10 U.S.C. 673b, you are authorized to determine that it is necessary to augment the active armed forces of the United States for the operational mission of assisting in the defense of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region. You are further authorized by this statute to direct the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service within the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty for a period of 90 days, individuals and units of the Selected Reserve within the 200,000 personnel ceiling. If it is later determined that these forces are needed for a longer period, you have the authority to extend the active duty period an additional 90 days.

The statute requires that you notify the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate within 24 hours, in writing, of the circumstances necessitating the action taken and of the anticipated use of Reserve units or individuals called. Proposed letters of notification are attached.

RECOMMENDATION: I forward the DOD-recommended version in response to Dick Cheney's urgent request. However, I note that the DOD-proposed order and the DOD-proposed transmittal letters authorize "up to 200,000." This number is the statutory limit. The order will be public, and may cause unnecessary concern. Further, it is not entirely clear (to me) that 200,000 are necessary at this time. My understanding suggests a much smaller number.

ALTERNATIVES: As alternatives to the DOD-proposed language, I have attached two possible orders that do not use the phrase "up to 200,000."

(a) One of these is substantively identical to the DOD proposal -- but merely drops the explicit reference to "200,000." This is acceptable to DOD and NSC.

(b) Another not only drops the reference to "200,000"; it also limits the call-up to "critically-needed skills." DOD fears litigation with this approach.

Either alternative (a) or alternative (b) seems to me to be preferable to the DOD proposal. (If you prefer one of these, conforming changes would be made in the notification letters.) On balance, I would recommend alternative (a). I have spoken directly with Dick Cheney, who is comfortable with this.

With whatever option you choose, I would also recommend:

-- that appropriate press briefings indicate that current plans are for far less than the full 200,000; and

-- that you have a supplementary understanding with Dick Cheney that incremental call-ups beyond some number be made only after consultation with you.

Attachments

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

THE DIRECTOR

August 17, 1990

1990 AUG 17 PM 7:4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Richard G. Darman
Director

SUBJECT: Proposed Executive Order Entitled "Delegating the President's Authority to Suspend Any Provision of Law Relating to the Promotion, Retirement, or Separation of Members of the Armed Forces"

SUMMARY: This memorandum forwards for your consideration a proposed Executive order, prepared by the Department of Defense, that would delegate to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Department of the Navy, your authority under 10 U.S.C. 673c to suspend any laws regarding promotion, retirement, or separation of members of the armed forces who you determine to be essential to the national security.

BACKGROUND: Under 10 U.S.C. 673c, during any period members of a reserve component are serving on active duty pursuant to your order, you are authorized to suspend any laws regarding promotion, retirement, or separation of members of the armed forces who you determine are essential to national security.

The proposed Executive order would delegate to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Department of the Navy, your authority to suspend any laws relating to promotion, retirement, or separation of members of the armed forces determined to be essential to the national security, and your authority to determine that members of the armed services are essential to the national security. The proposed Executive order would authorize further delegation of these authorities by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation.

RECOMMENDATION: I recommend that you sign the proposed Executive order.

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel

Office of the
Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

August 17, 1990

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I am herewith transmitting three drafts of a proposed Executive Order entitled "Ordering the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty." The three drafts of the proposed Executive Order were forwarded by the Office of Management and Budget, with the approval of the Director, to this Department for review of their form and legality. Included among the three drafts is the initial draft submitted by the Department of Defense.

Each of the three drafts of the proposed Executive Order is approved with respect to its form and legality.

Respectfully,

J. Michael Luttig

J. Michael Luttig
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Legal Counsel

Office of the
Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

August 17, 1990

MEMORANDUM

Re: Proposed Executive Order Entitled "Ordering the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty"

The attached three drafts of a proposed Executive Order were forwarded by the Office of Management and Budget, with the approval of the Director, to this Department for review of their form and legality. Included among the three drafts is the initial draft submitted by the Department of Defense.

Each of the three drafts of the proposed Executive Order would provide for the augmentation of the active armed forces by authorizing the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, to order members of the Selected Reserve to active duty. The three drafts, however, differ in certain details. One draft limits the Secretaries to ordering to active duty only those units or individual members of the Selected Reserve "with critically needed skills." The other two drafts, including the draft submitted by the Department of Defense, do not include this limitation and differ only to the extent to which they expressly recite the statutory limitations on the authority to order members of the Selected Reserve to active duty.

Each of the three drafts of the proposed Executive Order is approved with respect to its form and legality.

J. Michael Luttig

J. Michael Luttig
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel

Office of the
Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

August 17, 1990

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I am herewith transmitting a proposed Executive Order entitled "Delegating the President's Authority to Suspend Any Provision of Law Relating to the Promotion, Retirement, or Separation of Members of the Armed Forces." This proposed Executive Order was submitted by the Department of Defense. The Office of Management and Budget, with the approval of the Director, forwarded it to this Department for review of its form and legality.

The proposed Executive Order is approved with respect to its form and legality.

Respectfully,

J. Michael Luttig

J. Michael Luttig
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Legal Counsel

Office of the
Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

August 17, 1990

MEMORANDUM

Re: Proposed Executive Order Entitled "Delegating the President's Authority to Suspend Any Provision of Law Relating to the Promotion, Retirement, or Separation of Members of the Armed Forces"

The attached proposed Executive Order was submitted by the Department of Defense. The Office of Management and Budget, with the approval of the Director, forwarded it to this Department for review of its form and legality.

The proposed Executive Order will delegate to the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, the authority of the President under section 673c of title 10 of the United States Code (1) to suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation of members of the armed forces who are determined to be essential to the national security of the United States, and (2) to determine, for purposes of section 673c, that members of the armed forces are essential to the national security of the United States.

The proposed Executive Order is approved with respect to its form and legality.

J. Michael Luttig

J. Michael Luttig
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

~~SECRET~~

6585

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

August 16, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Order to Active Duty of the Selected Reserve (U)

(S) In view of the situation in the Middle East, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I have determined that there is a need to augment the Active components to ensure adequate support in connection with current operations. Accordingly the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I recommend that, pursuant to title 10, United States Code, section 673b, you authorize me, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service within the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty for a period of 90 days, individuals and units of the Selected Reserve within the 200,000 personnel ceiling. If it is later determined that these forces are needed for a longer period, you have the authority to extend the active duty period an additional 90 days.

(S) Section 673b of title 10, United States Code, requires you to notify Congress within 24 hours, in writing, of the circumstances necessitating the action taken and of the anticipated use of Reserve units or individuals called. Proposed letters of notification are attached.

(S) I further recommend that you delegate to me, and to the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service within the Department of the Navy, with authority to redelegate, your authority under title 10, United States Code, Section 673c, to suspend any laws regarding promotion, retirement, or separation of members of the armed forces determined to be essential to national security.

Classified by: Secretary of Defense
Declassified on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0398-MR
1/27/2014 MM

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~~(S)~~ Accordingly, I recommend you approve this request, sign the attached notification letters to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and issue appropriate Executive Orders relating to implementation of the provisions of sections 673b and 673c of title 10, United States Code. Proposed Executive Orders are attached for your consideration.

Dick Cheney

Attachments
as stated

Copy to:
Secretary of Transportation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006687
RECEIVED: 21 AUG 90 17

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: HUTCHINGS
BASORA

DOC DATE: 21 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R
IRAQ

TELCON
GERMAN UNIFICATION

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCALL FM KOHL RE IRAQ & PERSIAN GULF / & UNIFICATION / AUG 22

ACTION: STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 24 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 5/24/2009

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN CLOSED BY: NSRLG DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6687

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 21, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl, August 22, 1990

Purpose

To receive Kohl's call and discuss the Gulf conflict as well as next steps toward German unification.

Background

Despite Kohl's efforts to overcome the Constitutional inhibitions against out-of-area military activities, the Bonn Government has decided not to contribute forces directly to the multinational effort in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Having participated in the August 21 WEU meeting in Paris, however, the Germans will support those efforts indirectly by dispatching naval units to the eastern Mediterranean. In thanking Kohl for his efforts, you might also encourage him to look at other ways, particularly financial, of contributing.

Within Germany, the pace of unification continues to be driven by the economic and political collapse of the GDR. Although events in the very wobbly GDR could force an even faster pace, the most likely timetable is as follows: agreement on the settlement document for a united Germany at the Two Plus Four Ministerial in Moscow September 12, formal unification of the two Germanys some time between then and October 14, and all-German elections December 2.

While we are comfortable with whatever pace of unification the market will bear, we have a lot of work to do before the September 12 Moscow meeting to insure that (a) the united Germany is fully sovereign from the moment of unification and (b) we replace our Four Power rights with new stationing and status of forces agreements governing our presence in Berlin and Germany as a whole. Aside from various specific issues that we are hammering out, there is a general problem arising from the FRG Foreign Ministry's inclination to extend these stationing and SOFA agreements only on an interim basis and then renegotiate

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PER E.O. 13526
2005-1148-MR
9/13/2011 MM

them soon after unification. In this area, it would be very helpful for you to stress with Kohl that we believe the emphasis should be on the continuity of relations between a united Germany and its NATO partners and that a new round of negotiations on these basic agreements would send just the wrong signal at the time of unification.

Kohl may also raise the question of a 300-meter floor on our low-level flying -- up from the 200-meter limit Dick Cheney and Gerhard Stoltenberg had been discussing. In stressing that the U.S. wants to be responsive on these issues, you might suggest that we take a broader look so that both we and Kohl get some credit for the steps we take. (The recent pattern of salami tactics has us acceding to one request after another in a constantly reactive mode. A better approach would be for the U.S., in consultation with the Germans, to agree on a broad set of measures that will help symbolize U.S. relations with the new, unified Germany.)

RECOMMENDATION

That you draw on the attached talking points in your telephone conversation with Chancellor Kohl.

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL

GULF CONFLICT

-- I appreciate your strong support for our common efforts to exert pressure on Iraq. I was glad to see the WEU's helpful statement yesterday.

-- I also understand the constraints you have against out-of-area commitments and appreciate your efforts to overcome them. Regardless, there are other steps you can take and are taking to support the multinational effort.

-- Sending your forces to the eastern Mediterranean to substitute for those deployed to the Gulf will certainly help. I understand our people have also been discussing the possibility of air- and sealift support.

-- Another area that I really hope you will consider is to offer direct assistance to Turkey, either military or financial. The Egyptians and, if they support our efforts, the Jordanians will also need financial help.

-- It is important that Germany is viewed by the Congress and the American people to be making a visible contribution commensurate with its economic means and stake in the region.

GERMAN UNIFICATION

-- I know that there are strong pressures, especially in the GDR, for moving even faster toward unification. When do you now expect unification to occur? Will the October 14 date hold, or is unification likely to come sooner?

-- Following the London Summit and your meeting with Gorbachev last month, the way seems to be clear for the conclusion of a final settlement document at the Two Plus Four Ministerial in Moscow on September 12.

-- I know what this means for you and the German people, and we share those feelings here.

-- Our representatives are working with yours to ensure that Germany is fully sovereign from the moment of unification. That has been our goal from the beginning, and it is now within sight.

-- This faster timetable means that we also have to work hard on the various stationing and status of forces agreements that will be needed when Four Power rights are terminated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2005-1148-MR
9/13/2011 MM

-- As we do so, I think it important to emphasize the continuity of relations between a united Germany and its NATO partners. I think it would send the wrong signal to reopen these complex stationing and status of forces agreements immediately after unification. Our representatives will be meeting in Bonn and then in Berlin to work on these issues.

LOW-LEVEL FLYING (IF KOHL RAISES)

-- I know that Dick Cheney and Gerhard Stoltenberg have been in regular contact on this subject and that we have already taken several steps to address the problem.

-- We want to be responsive to your concerns, and I think it important to approach the issue in a way that makes sense operationally and also politically.

-- ((IF KOHL SPECIFICALLY PRESSES FOR 300 METERS AS A LOW LEVEL FLOOR)) We want to be forthcoming and I know that you want to ensure the effectiveness of NATO forces is preserved. If you view this change now as absolutely essential, I'll tell Dick Cheney to be responsive.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6687

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 21, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ADRIAN A. BASORA (Acting) AAB

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RLH

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, August 22, 1990

Chancellor Kohl will call the President at 8:00 a.m. August 22. Although he will want to compare notes on the Gulf conflict, he may also want to fill the President in on the fast-moving train of German unification. We have provided talking points on both issues, as well as "if raised" points on low-level flying. Given the complexity of the German scene, we have added two paragraphs of background in your memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Richard ~~Haass~~ and Mike Hayden concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be Made

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2005-1148-MR
9/13/2011 MM

CHRON FILE

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006677
RECEIVED: 21 AUG 90 12

2

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 21 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY MANPOWER

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PROPOSED REMARKS FOR PRES ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESERVE CALL UP

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 24 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PILLING LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HAYDEN
		NSC CHRON
		PILLING

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WEA
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 6677
SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT
DOCLOG ~~OAO~~ A/O _____

RECEIVED 90 AUG 21 P3:48

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann	1	—	A
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft	~~APNSA~~ Has Seen		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		Tab I is w/ Pres
NSC Secretariat	4		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: V

Dispatch to

(Date/Time)

COMME: Pres by APNSA

EA Sa

6

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 21, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Proposed Remarks for Announcement of the Reserve Call-Up

Purpose

To forward proposed remarks.

Background

You are scheduled to announce the delegation of your reserve call-up authority to the Secretary of Defense on August 22, 1990 with Dick Cheney and Colin Powell at Kennebunkport. Because this is the first reserve call-up for a military operation since 1968, we believe your remarks should assure the American public that this call-up is a necessary and normal action because of the way we have structured the Reserves under our Total Force Policy; it is not a mobilization.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the prepared remarks at Tab A for the reserve call-up announcement.

Attachments
Tab A Proposed Remarks

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

REMARKS FOR
ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESERVE CALL-UP
AUGUST 22, 1990

- Today I have authorized the Secretary of Defense to call Reserve units of the Armed Forces to active duty.

- Dick Cheney has told me that he needs this authority to ensure the effective conduct of military operations in and around the Arabian Peninsula.

- The actual number of Reserve personnel to be called to active duty will depend on operational needs but, at this time, we do not anticipate approaching the full 200,000 authority provided by the law.

- This is not a mobilization nor does it suggest a shortage of active manpower. This is a call-up of people with skills which we have concentrated in the Reserves under a Total Force Policy which was established in 1973.

- This initial call-up will largely be of individuals and units involved with activities such as combat construction, airlift, food and water handling, and medical services.

- This action reflects our commitment to our objectives in the Middle East. It does not signal any change in our objectives there.

- They remain the same: the complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; second, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; third, the security and stability of Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf; and fourth, the safety and protection of American citizens abroad.

- As I have repeatedly said, half a century ago the world missed a chance to stop aggression -- we will not make that mistake again. Calling reserves to active duty is part of that effort.

REMARKS FOR
ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESERVE CALL-UP
AUGUST 22, 1990

- TODAY I HAVE AUTHORIZED THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO CALL RESERVE UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES TO ACTIVE DUTY.
- DICK CHENEY HAS TOLD ME THAT HE NEEDS THIS AUTHORITY TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVE CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AND AROUND THE ARABIAN PENINSULA.
- THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF RESERVE PERSONNEL TO BE CALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY WILL DEPEND ON OPERATIONAL NEEDS BUT, AT THIS TIME, WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE APPROACHING THE FULL 200,000 AUTHORITY PROVIDED BY THE LAW.

- THIS IS NOT A MOBILIZATION NOR DOES IT SUGGEST A SHORTAGE OF ACTIVE MANPOWER. THIS IS A CALL-UP OF PEOPLE WITH SKILLS WHICH WE HAVE CONCENTRATED IN THE RESERVES UNDER A TOTAL FORCE POLICY WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1973.
- THIS INITIAL CALL-UP WILL LARGELY BE OF INDIVIDUALS AND UNITS INVOLVED WITH ACTIVITIES SUCH AS COMBAT CONSTRUCTION, AIRLIFT, FOOD AND WATER HANDLING, AND MEDICAL SERVICES.
- THIS ACTION REFLECTS OUR COMMITMENT TO OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT DOES NOT SIGNAL ANY CHANGE IN OUR OBJECTIVES THERE.
- THEY REMAIN THE SAME: THE COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT; SECOND, THE RESTORATION OF KUWAIT'S LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT;

THIRD, THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF SAUDI ARABIA, AND THE PERSIAN GULF; AND FOURTH, THE SAFETY AND PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD.

- AS I HAVE REPEATEDLY SAID, HALF A CENTURY AGO THE WORLD MISSED A CHANCE TO STOP AGGRESSION
- WE WILL NOT MAKE THAT MISTAKE AGAIN. CALLING RESERVES TO ACTIVE DUTY IS PART OF THAT EFFORT.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 21, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: DON PILLING/MICHAEL HAYDEN

SUBJECT: Presidential Announcement of Reserve Call-Up

We understand that the President will make the announcement of a reserve call-up tomorrow, August 22, at Kennebunkport with Secretary Cheney and General Powell. Although we have not been asked to provide remarks for the President, we believe that we should provide them to ensure that it is clear that:

- This is not a call-up by the President but a delegation of authority to Secretary Cheney;

- This is not a mobilization but a call-up which is necessary due to our concentration of particular skills in the Reserves as part of the Total Force Policy since 1973.

- This does not indicate any change in our objectives in the Middle East but a continuation of our efforts.

At Tab I is a memo for your signature forwarding the proposed remarks at Tab A to the President.

Concurrences by: Roman Popadiuk and Sandra Charles

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Proposed Remarks

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

CHRON FILE

RECORD ID: 9006669
RECEIVED: 20 AUG 90 19

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: WELCH
HAASS

DOC DATE: 22 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EGYPT
FMS

ECONOMICS

2

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: EGYPT FMS DEBT

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 23 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON
		WELCH

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cop NARA, Date 12/6/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTAS CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

Egypt's FMS debt

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6669

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG GD A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	copy ✓	A
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft	2	✓ Done 8/25	
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3		N
NSC Secretariat	4		N

RECEIVED 90 AUG 21 P7:17

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6669

August 22, 1990

[redacted]

Brent
pls take up to
K Bentsen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Egypt's FMS Debt

A memo from Jim Baker to the President is attached at Tab I, conveying Jim's recommendation (Tab A) that the President endorse unilateral, unconditional debt relief for Egypt. As we indicated earlier to you, this may be the best time to tackle the Egyptian FMS debt issue. Since Treasury, Defense, and OMB have major interests in this issue, it should be discussed by the DC and, subsequently, NSC.

RECOMMENDATION

That you give the memo (Tab I) to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum from Secretary Baker

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0578-F
3/28/2005 MM

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON August 20, 1990

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: James A. Baker, III plz JABIII

Subject: Egypt's FMS Debt

Egypt's supportive role in the Gulf crisis affords us an opportunity to resolve the long-festering Egyptian FMS debt issue -- for many years the biggest bilateral irritant between us and Mubarak. Moving forward decisively on the debt issue will also demonstrate to our moderate Arab friends that we can be flexible and responsive to legitimate needs at a time when their relationships with us are under severe Iraqi attack.

Egypt stands to lose up to $3 billion per year in lower remittances, Suez Canal revenues and tourism earnings as a result of the Gulf crisis. Under these conditions, Mubarak will be increasingly hard pressed to meet the $700 million in annual FMS debt repayments needed to forestall a cutoff in U.S. aid under the Brooke amendment. He might approach the Saudis, the Kuwaitis and the UAE (if he hasn't already) for some help in the short run. But FMS is really our problem and we need to be responsive.

I believe we should take a fresh look at finding a way to eliminate Egypt's FMS debt. At the same time, we should seek to catalyze Gulf economic aid to Egypt to ensure that the Saudis, Kuwaitis and UAE also do their share for Mubarak. While the Arabs would not finance our debt reduction per se, they might assume responsibility for meeting Egypt's future balance of payments requirements, especially its vital food needs. Such a commitment could accelerate the development of broad assistance relationships between Egypt and its Gulf allies, similar to those in the mid-1970's. These in turn might enable us to reduce gradually our economic aid over the next decade, thereby reducing the political (for Egypt) and budgetary (for us) strains of Egyptian dependence on U.S. assistance.

Unilateral, unconditional FMS debt relief is justified now by Egypt's support in the Gulf crisis, combined with the political nature of the original loans themselves. These considerations, in addition to Egypt's poor economic conditions and its inability to meet its FMS payments anytime in the

DECL: OADR

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AS AMENDED
1999-0578-F
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foreseeable future, should help to ensure that this special treatment of Egypt does not spill over and affect our overall debt strategy. The budgetary costs of this approach would need to be built into the budget summit negotiations. However, given Egypt's poor repayment record and limited creditworthiness, the effect of Egyptian debt reduction on net outlays is not likely to be great.

Congress should strongly support a reasonable FMS debt reduction proposal for Egypt. Senators Leahy and Kasten want this issue resolved, as does Congressman Hamilton on the House side. Congressman Obey has also pressed us for a solution to Egypt's debt problem. Resumption of significant Gulf assistance to Egypt would help reassure the Hill that others are doing their part and that over the medium-term U.S. assistance levels to Egypt could be on a downward path. There may be reasons to consider extending these debt reduction benefits to others, like Israel and Turkey, but these are issues that can best be addressed later. Egypt's need are immediate, and we should move on Egypt now.

I believe the time is right to attack Egypt's FMS debt problem in a comprehensive way. Unilateral U.S. official debt reduction will bolster Mubarak and signal that moderation can yield tangible benefits. The resumption of broad-scale aid from the Gulf will help ensure that Egypt's stability is preserved.

Should you agree, I suggest that you communicate your view to Nick Brady and Dick Darman so that we can work together to get legislation drafted in time for the return of Congress in early September. If we are to do this, we must move quickly to insure that the "costs" of the proposal are factored into the budget summit discussions and that all bases are touched on the Hill.

We knew at the time of the Latin official debt forgiveness initiative that we would face this issue with Egypt and perhaps others. The developments in the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, I think, require that we move now without delay.

cc: Secretary Brady
OMB Director Darman
General Scowcroft

CLOSE HOLD

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP RECEIVED
90 AUG 20 P7:18

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 6669

ACTION OFFICER: HAASS DUE: ASAP

- [X] Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates
- [ ] Appropriate Action
- [ ] Prepare Memo For Cicconi
- [ ] Prepare Memo for Sittmann
- [ ] Prepare Memo _____ to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* *PHONE** to action officer at ext. 6900

	FYI		FYI		FYI
[ ]	[ ] Barth	[ ]	[ ] Johnson	[ ]	[ ] Pryce
[ ]	[ ] Basora	[ ]	[ ] Kaeuper	[ ]	[ ] Rademaker
[ ]	[ ] Beers	[ ]	[ ] Kanter	[ ]	[ ] Rice
[ ]	[ ] Blackwill	[ ]	[ ] Kitchen	[ ]	[ ] Rodman
[ ]	[ ] Broome	[ ]	[ ] LaMagna	[ ]	[ ] Rostow
[ ]	[ ] Burns	[ ]	[ ] Lampley	[ ]	[ ] Salvetti
[ ]	[ ] Chamberlin	[ ]	[ ] Levin	[ ]	[ ] Tilley
[X]	[ ] Charles	[ ]	[ ] Lundsager	[ ]	[ ] Tobey
[ ]	[ ] Coulson	[ ]	[ ] Mandel	[ ]	[ ] Van Eron
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[ ]	[ ] Dorminey	[ ]	[ ] Merchant	[ ]	[ ] Whitley
[ ]	[ ] Dyke	[ ]	[ ] Miller	[ ]	[ ] Wilson
[ ]	[ ] Fry	[ ]	[ ] Needels	[ ]	[ ] Working
[ ]	[ ] Gaughan	[ ]	[ ] O'Leary	[ ]	[ ] Zelikow
[ ]	[ ] Gordon	[ ]	[ ] Ordway	[ ]	[ ] _____
[ ]	[ ] Haass	[ ]	[ ] Paal	[ ]	[ ] _____
[ ]	[ ] Hayden	[ ]	[ ] Pacelli	[ ]	[ ] _____
[ ]	[ ] Hutchings	[ ]	[ ] Pilling	[ ]	[ ] _____
[ ]	[ ] Jackson	[ ]	[ ] Popadiuk	[ ]	[ ] _____

INFORMATION
- [X] Sittmann
- [X] Scowcroft (advance)
- [X] Deputy Exec. Sec.
- [X] Gates (advance)
- [ ] Exec. Sec. Desk
- [X] Secretariat

COMMENTS CRW#:

CLOSE HOLD

Logged By MFA

Return to Secretariat

~~TOP SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006761
RECEIVED: 24 AUG 90 08

CHRON FILE

TO: GATES

FROM: KITCHEN
MILLER

DOC DATE: 24 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
FBI

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQI ESTABLISHMENTS IN US

ACTION: NOTED BY GATES W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 28 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KITCHEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KITCHEN
		MILLER
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cof NARA, Date 5/26/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN CLOSED BY: NSBTM DOC 1 OF 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Memo	David V. Kitchen to Robert M. Gates Re: Sanctions Against Iraqi Establishments in U.S. (1 pp.)	8/24/90	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [1]

Date Closed:	5/26/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91143-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~TOP SECRET~~/CODEWORD
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006782
RECEIVED: 24 AUG 90 16

CHRON FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: CHAMBERLIN
MILLER

DOC DATE: 24 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TERRORIST THREAT UPDATE

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 28 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: CHAMBERLIN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CHAMBERLIN
		MILLER
		NSC CHRON

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-0398-MR
mm 12/20/2016

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRLG CLOSED BY: NSLMS DOC 1 OF 1

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6782

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5		N
NSC Secretariat	6		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

noted by BS

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Memo	To Scowcroft Re: Terroist Threat Update (1 pp.)	8/24/90	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [1]

Date Closed:	5/26/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91143-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05c. Report	Re: Update on Anti-U.S. Threats [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	8/23/90	(b)(1), (b)(3)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 3/20/2023

Date Closed:	5/26/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91143-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0399-MR(504.02)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	12/12/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~TOP SECRET~~ 1.4(c)

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504.02

SUBJECT: 1.4(c) UPDATE ON ANTI-U.S. THREATS
(As Of 1700 Hours, 23 August)

1) Cairo, Egypt 19 August

1.4(c) [redacted]

Saddam Hussein has devised a plan for attacks against a U.S. aircraft carrier using suicide planes. 1.4(c) [redacted]

2) **Frankfurt, West Germany 20 August**

On 20 August, a Lebanese national approached officials at Rhein Main Air Force Base and volunteered information about Iraq paying Lebanese terrorist groups to carry out attacks against U.S. airlines if the U.S. undertakes military action against Iraq. The source claimed that, at the direction of the group, he scaled the perimeter security fence at Frankfurt Airport and made his way to a Pan Am aircraft. Air Force officials and German police assess the source's story about penetrating security at the airport as credible and have passed the information to the appropriate authorities. U.S. military and German police officials have concluded that there is no imminent threat associated with this source. German authorities have him in custody and are attempting to verify or refute his claim to be collecting intelligence for another group.

3) Algiers, Algeria 20 August

The U.S. Embassy received a threatening letter condemning U.S. policy in the Middle East in general, and U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf in particular.

4) Algiers, Algeria 21 August

U.S. Embassy received a letter, typewritten in French, from "Arab Algerian citizens" condemning U.S. military intervention in the Gulf and threatening suicide attacks against U.S. interests worldwide. It claimed that a request from Baghdad, Tripoli, or Algiers was all that was needed.

---WARNING NOTICE---
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

1.4(c) [redacted]

1

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0399-MR
MR 12/12/2016

237

5) **Karachi, Pakistan** **21 August**

On 21 August, an estimated 1,000 demonstrators, many members of the Jamiat-I-Ulma-I-Pakistan, staged anti-U.S. protests in downtown Karachi. The demonstrators attempted to deviate from a prearranged route and threatened to break police lines. Pakistan Army troops reportedly took up blocking positions, leveled their machineguns and threatened to shoot if the demonstrators refused to turn back. The demonstrators then abandoned their plan to march on the U.S. Consulate, where they intended to burn an effigy of President Bush at the front gate.

6) Rome/Vatican City 21 August

An Italian speaking male telephoned the U.S. Embassies in Rome and the Holy See and announced that bombs were about to explode. The calls were placed approximately three minutes apart.

7) **Nouakchott, Mauritania** **22 August**

1.4(c) Mauritanian Islamic fundamentalists have compiled lists of names and addresses for U.S. citizens in Nouakchott, including U.S. Embassy, AID, and Peace Corps staff. The Embassy reports that attempts have been made to identify residences of Embassy personnel in the past few weeks.

8) 1.4(c); 3.3(b)(3) 22 August

1.4(c); 3.3(b)(3); (b)(3)

237

1.4(c); 3.3(b)(3); (b)(3)

9) Sana, Yemen 22 August

1.4(c) the PLO has ordered 300 Palestinian frogmen to relocate from the Sudan to Yemen, where they are to survey the Yemeni islands in the Bab al-Mandeb to prepare for potential operations against ships transiting the straits. 1.4(c) no information regarding whether the operations would be purely military in nature, or whether they might be used to target merchant vessels in terrorist-type attacks.

10) Rome, Italy 22 August

1.4(c)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05d. Report	From Federal Bureau of Investigation, Re: [Immigrant Presence in the United States] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	8/23/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 3/20/2023

Date Closed:	5/26/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91143-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0399-MR(504.03)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	9/26/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
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(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~ U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

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504.03

August 23, 1990

3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6) INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6) PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

This communication is classified ~~SECRET~~ in its entirety.

On 8/20/90, in response to inquiries from the Counterterrorism Section at Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Office of Intelligence, furnished the following data relative to 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6) immigrants and visitors present in the United States.

I. IMMIGRANTS IN THE U.S. 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

1980 CENSUS FIGURES:		
Naturalized citizens	9,693	420
Non-naturalized	22,228	3,917
Total Immigrants (1980)	31,921	4,337
Immigrant arrivals in U.S. since 1980	19,126	4,328
Total Immigrants in U.S. (1990)	51,047	8,665

~~SECRET~~
Classified by G-3
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0399-MR
MM 9/26/2016

3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6) Intelligence Matters
3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6) presence in the United States

II. VISITORS TO THE U.S. 3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6)

(A) Students in the U.S. (8/1/90):		
Academic Students	1,300	5,010
Vocational and non-academic students	9	25
Exchange students	94	---
Total	1,403	5,035
(B) Other non-Immigrant visitors (1983-1989):		
Temporary Visitors - Business	5,166	8,157
Temporary Visitors - Pleasure	14,792	35,630
Temporary workers; Exchanges; Intra-company transfers	1,013	1,545
	*20,971	*45,332
(C) Nationals entering U.S. since 1/1/90:	2,696	Unavailable

3.3(b)(1); 3.3(b)(6) These totals represent a significantly high percentage of the total in that only seldom used types of visitor visas have not been included by INS.

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006854
RECEIVED: 28 AUG 90 20

CHRON FILE

TO: SHAMIR, YITZHAK

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 26 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL
PERSIAN GULF

HS

2

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PM SHAMIR FM PRES RE CRISIS IN GULF

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES DUE DATE: 31 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF: 9006246 9006283

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CHARLES
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON
		SALVETTI, L

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/26/2009

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDAI CLOSED BY: NSDAI DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

6854

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR

1. ~~Secret~~ (Entire Text)

2. Please pass the text of the following letter from the President to Prime Minister Shamir as soon as possible. There will be no signed original.

3. Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want to tell you personally how much I appreciate the restraint shown by the Government of Israel in the current crisis in the Gulf. Such restraint has been most helpful to our endeavors to mount a successful strategy to reverse the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. I am sure you realize the extreme importance of continuing in this posture. As you know, vital American interests are at stake and it is equally vital that nothing ——> be done that could prejudice them.

Let me add that I can appreciate that this is not an easy juncture for you or for Israel. You, too, have potentially vital interests at stake. I welcome the continuing discussions between our two governments to ensure close cooperation and to prevent the development of any misunderstandings between us.

Sincerely,

George Bush

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1998-0099-F/3
7/23/2003 MM

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006791
RECEIVED: 24 AUG 90 19

TO: BAKER, J

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 26 AUG 90
SOURCE REF: PD 90-36

KEYWORDS: SAUDI ARABIA
PD

ARMS SALES

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PD 90-36 / EMERGENCY MILITARY SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA

ACTION: PRES SGD PD 90-26 DUE DATE: 28 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS LOGREF:

FILES: PA C WH O NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		CHARLES
		HAASS
		NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/26/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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OPENED BY: NSRLG CLOSED BY: NSMEN DOC 4 OF 4

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

LOG 9006791
DATE 26 AUG 90

SUBJECT: PD 90-36 / EMERGENCY MILITARY SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
BAKER, J DEPARTMENT OF STATE VIA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROOM 7224 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: ORIG + 1
ROY, J DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 2
MEYER, R AID, ROOM 3754 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 2
DUSAULT, P OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET INTL SECURITY AFFAIRS ROOM 8201 NEOB	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 2
GEISLER, R WH EXECUTIVE CLERK ROOM 5 OEOB	_____	_____	_____ COPY: 2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC/S. OEOB ROOM 379

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 26, 1990

Presidential Determination
No. 90-36

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Emergency Military Sales to Saudi Arabia

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 614(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. 2364(a)(2), I hereby determine that it is vital to the national security interests of the United States to sell M833 depleted uranium anti-tank ammunition, Stinger missiles, and associated equipment to Saudi Arabia, and hereby authorize such sales notwithstanding the requirements of sections 558 and 580 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990 (Public Law 101-167), or any other provision of law within the scope of section 614 that would restrict such sales.

Pursuant to section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776(b)(1), I hereby certify that an emergency exists which requires the immediate sale of 150 M60A3 tanks and 24 F-15C/D aircraft to Saudi Arabia in the national security interests of the United States.

You are hereby authorized and directed to transmit this determination to Congress and to arrange for its publication in the Federal Register.

George Bush

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX #____

ADMIN FAX #____

PAGES 13

DTG_____

Rreleaser_____

FROM/LOCATION

1. William Sittmann / White House / NSC

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Florence Gantt for General Scowcroft / K-Port
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.
2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

#6642 Add-on

Florence - Please notify the Exec Sec office when the General has has approved this to go forward to the Executive Clerk's office.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/26/2009

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

...dent sgd per WH
...tive Clerk 8/26/90

6642 Re-do

August 26, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Waivers for Arms Sales for Saudi Arabia

PURPOSE

Pursuant to your decision in principle to sell Saudi Arabia an additional 24 F-15 aircraft, 150 M60A3 tanks, 200 Stinger weapons rounds and reloads, and depleted uranium (DU) ammunition, to obtain the necessary presidential waivers to implement and expedite the sales.

BACKGROUND

24 F-15 Aircraft: Because of the Saudi Air Force's urgent need for this equipment, for which informal Hill soundings indicate support, Secretary Cheney intends to direct the USAF to deliver 24 aircraft from its inventory to the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) immediately. Doing so would preclude the normal 30-day congressional notification process required under section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). State and DoD have requested you approve a 36(b) waiver so the F-15s can be delivered as soon as possible. On August 8 you waived the Metzenbaum Amendment that restricted the number of F-15s in the RSAF inventory to 60. This sale of 24 F-15s will be in addition to the 12 F-15 attrition aircraft approved by the Congress in March 1988 for the RSAF.

M603 TANKS: In order to expedite delivery of 150 M60A3s to Saudi Arabia within the next 2-3 weeks, you would have to approve waiving section 36(b) of the AECA.

200 Stinger Weapons Rounds and Reloads: Although the Saudis currently have a total of 374 Stinger weapons rounds and reloads, Defense and State support the sale of an additional 200 Stingers to bolster the defense of key fixed installations and provide air

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~
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2010-0399-MR
MM 4/7/2016

defense for forward deployed Saudi ground forces and the Saudi Navy. Section 580 (the Deconcini Amendment) of the FY 90 Foreign Operations Act prohibits the sale of Stingers to Persian Gulf nations, including Saudi Arabia, with a limited exception for Bahrain. To remove this prohibition for Saudi Arabia would require use of your special authority under section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA).

Depleted Uranium Ammunition: To sell the Saudis up to 15,000 rounds of M833 depleted uranium (DU) antitank ammunition also would require use of your special authority under section 614 of the FAA to waive the prohibition on the sale of DU ammunition to most countries, including Saudi Arabia. Since both the Stingers and DU ammunition are under the dollar thresholds for congressional notification, a 36(b) waiver is not required to accelerate the delivery of these items.

State (Tab C) and Defense have recommended that you exercise your waiver authority for these four cases. If you agree to do so, State would then undertake the required congressional consultations on the Stingers and DU ammunition, delivering the justification for the sales at Tab B, and report back immediately on the results of their consultations. If congressional consultations do not suggest a different course, your determination would then be released.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve waiving 614 and 36(b) to implement and expedite these sales by signing the determination at Tab A. State will then be instructed to hold the signed determination until after Hill consultations have been completed successfully.

Approve ✓ 8.26.90 Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Presidential Determination
Tab B Congressional Justification
Tab C Memo from Secretary Eagleburger

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

6642 Re-do

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Waivers for Arms Sales for Saudi Arabia

PURPOSE

Pursuant to your decision in principle to sell Saudi Arabia an additional 24 F-15 aircraft, 150 M60A3 tanks, 200 Stinger weapons rounds and reloads, and depleted uranium (DU) ammunition, to obtain the necessary presidential waivers to implement and expedite the sales.

BACKGROUND

24 F-15 Aircraft: Because of the Saudi Air Force's urgent need for this equipment, for which informal Hill soundings indicate support, Secretary Cheney intends to direct the USAF to deliver 24 aircraft from its inventory to the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) immediately. Doing so would preclude the normal 30-day congressional notification process required under section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). State and DoD have requested you approve a 36(b) waiver so the F-15s can be delivered as soon as possible. On August 8 you waived the Metzenbaum Amendment that restricted the number of F-15s in the RSAF inventory to 60. This sale of 24 F-15s will be in addition to the 12 F-15 attrition aircraft approved by the Congress in March 1988 for the RSAF.

M603 TANKS: In order to expedite delivery of 150 M60A3s to Saudi Arabia within the next 2-3 weeks, you would have to approve waiving section 36(b) of the AECA.

200 Stinger Weapons Rounds and Reloads: Although the Saudis currently have a total of 374 Stinger weapons rounds and reloads, Defense and State support the sale of an additional 200 Stingers to bolster the defense of key fixed installations and provide air

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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2010-0399-MR
MM 4/7/2016

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defense for forward deployed Saudi ground forces and the Saudi Navy. Section 580 (the Deconcini Amendment) of the FY 90 Foreign Operations Act prohibits the sale of Stingers to Persian Gulf nations, including Saudi Arabia, with a limited exception for Bahrain. To remove this prohibition for Saudi Arabia would require use of your special authority under section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA).

Depleted Uranium Ammunition: To sell the Saudis up to 15,000 rounds of M833 depleted uranium (DU) antitank ammunition also would require use of your special authority under section 614 of the FAA to waive the prohibition on the sale of DU ammunition to most countries, including Saudi Arabia. Since both the Stingers and DU ammunition are under the dollar thresholds for congressional notification, a 36(b) waiver is not required to accelerate the delivery of these items.

State (Tab C) and Defense have recommended that you exercise your waiver authority for these four cases. If you agree to do so, State would then undertake the required congressional consultations on the Stingers and DU ammunition, delivering the justification for the sales at Tab B, and report back immediately on the results of their consultations. If congressional consultations do not suggest a different course, your determination would then be released.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve waiving 614 and 36(b) to implement and expedite these sales by signing the determination at Tab A. State will then be instructed to hold the signed determination until after Hill consultations have been completed successfully.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Presidential Determination
Tab B Congressional Justification
Tab C Memo from Secretary Eagleburger

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07c. Memo	Re: Memorandum of Justification [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 3/20/2023

Date Closed:	5/26/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91143-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0399-MR(506.02)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	4/7/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION

The unlawful invasion of Kuwait by Iraq has created a crisis in the Persian Gulf which threatens vital U.S. interests including the security of Saudi Arabia. In that regard, Iraq's armor and air capabilities are of particular concern as they have the potential to overwhelm the Saudi Armed Forces and threaten U.S. Armed Forces deployed in defense of Saudi Arabia.

Iraq has a 5500 to 550 advantage over Saudi Arabia in numbers of tanks. In addition to this vast quantitative advantage, Iraq enjoys a significant qualitative advantage as well in that Saudi forces currently lack any ammunition for their 250 M60 tanks (or for their 300 AMX-30 tanks for that matter) that is capable of defeating the more than 1100 T-72 and T-72M1 tanks in the Iraqi inventory. This situation is all the more alarming in that not only can the Iraqi T-72s and T-72M1s defeat all tanks in the Saudi inventory, but so can its more that 1400 T-62s. Saudi TOW anti-tank missiles only partially offset the Iraqi advantage as the most advanced version of the TOW presently in Saudi possession, the I-TOW, has been found to be ineffective against the T-72 and the T-72M1.

Given Saudi Arabia's need for a capability to blunt an attack by Iraq's much more powerful armored forces, it is essential that Saudi Arabian forces be immediately provided additional M60A3 tanks. It is also imperative that Saudi armored forces be provided M833 1.4(f) anti-tank ammunition, the only type of ammunition made for the M60 tank which is capable of defeating the T-72. (Even M833 ammunition would not be effective against the T-72M1s.)

In the air, the Saudis must also defend against a significantly larger Iraqi force. Although Saudi Arabia has a number of air defense assets in its inventory including I-Hawk and Crotale ground-to-air missiles, its most effective air defense system is its F-15C/D aircraft. However, given the much greater size of the Iraqi Air Force, it is essential that Saudi Arabian fleet of 58 F-15s be augmented quickly.

Particularly vulnerable to the Iraqi air threat are Saudi ground and naval forces which will, in all likelihood, be required to operate away from the protective umbrella provided by Saudi ground-to-air missiles and cannot always be protected by the F-15s. These forces are in need of close-in, low-level air defense protection which can be most effectively provided by man-portable Stinger missiles. Stinger missiles are also needed to provide air defense protection to key fixed installations. Although Saudi Arabia already has 200 Stinger

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weapon rounds (i.e., launcher with missile) and 178 reload missiles (for a total of 378 Stinger missiles), additional Stinger weapon rounds and reload missiles are required to provide adequate protection.

The United States Government is currently prohibited from selling Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region. Section 580 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (Public Law 101-167) provides that 1.4(b); 1.4(d) 1.4(b); 1.4(d) the United States may not sell or otherwise make available any Stingers to any country bordering on the Persian Gulf under the Arms Export Control Act or chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

In addition, section 558 of Public Law 101-167, which provides that none of the funds appropriated by that act or any other act may be made available to facilitate in any way the sale of M833 anti-tank shells or any comparable anti-tank shells containing a depleted uranium penetrating component to any country other than (1) countries which are members of NATO, (2) countries which have been designated as a major non-NATO ally for purposes of section 1105 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 or, (3) Pakistan.

Pursuant to the extraordinary authority granted under section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President may authorize this sale of Stinger missiles and M833 ammunition without regard to these provisions to the extent that they may apply to these sales upon determining, and notifying in writing the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, that to do so is vital to the national security interests of the United States. In view of the circumstances described above, the President has determined that the sale of Stinger missiles and M833 ammunition to Saudi Arabia is indeed vital to those interests.

We intend to provide 50 Stinger weapon rounds and 150 reload missiles (for a total of 200 Stinger missiles) and up to 15,000 rounds of M833 DU ammunition to Saudi Arabia. This quantity of DU ammunition averages out to what a U.S. tank crew would have.

For reasons indicated above, the President's determination also states that an emergency exists that requires the immediate sale of 150 M60A3 tanks and 24 F-15C/D aircraft in the national security interests of the United States thereby waiving the 30-day notification procedures specified in section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act. In addition to these 24 aircraft, the Saudis will receive the 12 F-15 C/Ds that were notified in 1988 and are scheduled for delivery in the 1991-1992 time frame.

The President remains committed to close consultations with Congress concerning the supply of military equipment to Saudi Arabia and other aspects of the Gulf crisis.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07d. Memo	From Lawrence S. Eagleburger to POTUS, Re: Urgent Military Sales to Saudi Arabia [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	8/24/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Desert Shield/Desert Storm (August 1990) Part III [1]

Document Partially Declassified
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AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2010-0399-MR(506.03)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	4/7/2016

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S/S 9018708
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 24, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Acting

SUBJECT: Urgent Military Sales to Saudi Arabia

Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, we have received a number of urgent requests from the Saudi Arabian Government for military equipment. This memo will address those requests that can be provided, with the exercise of your waiver authority, on an immediate basis. Requests that cannot be provided in the near term due to availability or production considerations, such as M1A2 tanks, additional fighter and other aircraft, and Patriot air defense missiles, will be addressed in a second memo to follow shortly.

Saudi Arabia's most urgent requests are for anti-armor and air defense equipment. Believing that the current situation requires an immediate and positive response to these requests, we recommend that you: 1) invoke your extraordinary authority under section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) to permit the sale of [1.4(a)] and [1.4(a)] [1.4(a)] anti-tank ammunition after required consultations with Congress, and 2) determine that an emergency exists and thereby waive the 30-day congressional notification requirement under section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) to permit the immediate sale of 150 M60A3 tanks and 24 F-15C/D aircraft. Our rationale for these recommendations follows.

1) Exercise of 614 Authority

Although the Saudis already have [1.4(a)] weapon rounds (i.e., launcher with missile) and [1.4(a)] (for a total of [1.4(a)], an additional 50 weapon rounds and [1.4(a)] (i.e., [1.4(a)]) are considered essential for bolstering the defense of key fixed installations and for providing air defense protection to the most forward-deployed of the Saudi ground forces and the Saudi Navy. However, section 580 (the DeConcini Amendment) of the FY-90 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 101-167) prohibits the sale of [1.4(a)] to countries, such as Saudi Arabia, that border on the Persian Gulf. (There is a limited exception for Bahrain.)

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We face a similar restriction with regard to a Saudi request for 15,000 rounds of [1.4(a)] anti-tank ammunition. Provision of this particular type of ammunition is critical in that it is the only type of ammunition usable by Saudi Arabia's current fleet of 250 M60 tanks that is capable of defeating Iraq's more than 700 T-72 tanks. (Iraq also has over 400 T-72M1s, against which even [1.4(a)] ammunition is only marginally effective, as well as over 4400 older tanks.) Section 558 of P.L. 101-167, however, prohibits the use of appropriated funds to facilitate the sale of [1.4(a)] ammunition to other than NATO countries, major non-NATO allies, and Pakistan. DOD believes that it is necessary to waive this provision.

Given the Saudi need to be able to blunt an attack by Iraq's much more powerful armored forces, and the need for additional air defense assets, we recommend that you exercise your extraordinary authority under section 614 of the FAA and authorize the sale of [1.4(a)] and [1.4(a)] ammunition to Saudi Arabia without regard to the above restrictions. We believe that present circumstances fully support your making the statutorily required determination that such sales are "vital to the national security interests of the United States."

We would need to consult with Congress and provide a written justification before you actually exercise the section 614 authority. In that justification (draft at Tab 2) we would state that we are contemplating the sale of [1.4(a)] weapon rounds and [1.4(a)] (i.e., [1.4(a)] missiles), and up to 15,000 rounds of [1.4(a)] ammunition (an amount that averages out to what U.S. Army tank crews would have for a basic load and one replenishment load per tank).

If you concur, we will initiate congressional consultations immediately. Assuming our congressional consultations do not suggest a different course of action, we would report back promptly and request that you sign the determination at Tab 1.

2) <u>Waiver of 30-Day Congressional Notification</u>

The Saudis have also made urgent requests for 150 M60A3 tanks and 24 F-15C/D aircraft. As indicated above, Saudi armored forces are vastly outnumbered by those of Iraq. While 150 additional M60A3s will only partially offset the Iraqi advantage, it will enlarge total Saudi tank assets by over 25 percent--probably the most that could be absorbed given limited Saudi manpower. The U.S. Army is prepared to make these tanks available for transfer immediately from its stocks in Europe. Actual delivery would be contingent upon transportation availability.

As for the additional F-15 aircraft, expeditious delivery is necessary to enhance Saudi capability to defend against attack from Iraq's much larger air forces. In view of your August 8 waiver of the Metzenbaum Amendment, which lifted limitations on the sale and delivery of F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia, we are prepared to respond to the Saudi request by immediately diverting 24 F-15C/Ds from USAF stocks.

Inhibiting our expeditious response to the M60A3 and F-15 requests is the requirement set forth in section 36(b) of the AECA that Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for sales of this kind not be issued until 30 days after Congress receives a statutorily required Presidential certification as to the need for the equipment. This 30-day waiting period is waived, however, if you state in that certification that "an emergency exists which requires such sales in the national security interests of the United States."

In view of Saudi Arabia's urgent need for additional anti-tank and air defense capabilities, we recommend that you make the emergency certification by signing the determination at Tab 1, thereby waiving the 30-day notification period for the sale of 150 M60A3 tanks and 24 F-15C aircraft.

Since the projected sales of 1.4(a) and 1.4(a) ammunition do not meet the thresholds for congressional notification established in section 36(b) of the AECA, there is no need to waive the 30-day notification period for them.

The Secretary of Defense concurs in these recommendations.

Attachments:

1 - Presidential Determination
2 - Memorandum of Justification

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 6642 Add-On

August 25, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: ~~S~~SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Additional Arms Sales for Saudi Arabia

Brent:
Once we have a green light from you, we'll move this thru the Executive Clerk. We can also autopen the President's ok ... or we can hold off until the Gas is here Tuesday. RH

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President asking him to approve waiving Congressional restrictions to allow for the sale and expedited delivery of the first arms package to Saudi Arabia that includes 24 more F-15s, depleted uranium ammunition, Stinger missiles and M60A3 tanks. (This is in addition to the 12 attrition F-15s already approved by Congress in March 1988 that will come out of production and will be delivered to the Saudis in May 1991.) The memorandum at Tab A provides the necessary presidential determination, and Tab B the justification to Congress on the exercise of the President's waiver authority.

The contents of the second arms package are still under interagency discussion. Right now it includes 385 M1A2 tanks, an unspecified number of F-15s (model to be determined), PATRIOT, and "other items" presently unidentified. There is general agreement that this package would be submitted to Congress for the normal 30-day review process.

Dan Levin and Bret Coulson concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Presidential Determination
Tab B Justification to Congress
Tab C Memo from Secretary Eagleburger

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National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann	1	Copy	
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft	2		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	2	done 8/25	Dacom to BS
NSC Secretariat	3	done 8/25	N D

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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

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Ken Hill	1	KH	A
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Bob Gates	2		
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			

(A = Action) I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: DHD LOG # 6642

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill	1	—	A
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft	2		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			

90 AUG 21 P12:58

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006811
RECEIVED: 27 AUG 90 14

TO: SCOWCROFT

CHRON FILE

FROM: HAASS

DOC DATE: 27 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: IRAQ KUWAIT
PERSIAN GULF

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: WHAT NEXT IN GULF / OUTLINE OF CURRENT OPTIONS

ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 30 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
HAASS
NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/26/2009

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSRLG DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SCOWCROFT	Z	90082819	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	90082819	NOTED BY SCOWCROFT W/ COMMENT

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cp NARA, Date 8/6/2009

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 27, 1990

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2005-1146-MR
SS 3/22/10

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: RICHARD N. HAASS

SUBJECT: What Next in the Gulf?

We now have in place the major elements of our policy toward the Gulf in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait:

-- The UN Security Council has condemned the Iraqi invasion, called for Iraqi military withdrawal, and rejected Iraq's declared annexation; applied sanctions against Iraq and justified "measures as may be necessary" to enforce them; and has called upon Iraq to release all foreign nationals.

-- A multinational force with an American core is in place in Saudi Arabia; similarly, a multinational force is at sea and is prepared to begin to intercept vessels acting contrary to mandated sanctions. This latter effort is designed to complement voluntary compliance with sanctions, which for the most part has gone well.

-- About half of the lost oil output of Kuwait and Iraq has been offset by the Saudis and others. The upcoming OPEC meeting may stimulate even more production. We still have the option of drawing upon strategic reserves in this country and elsewhere.

-- Also on the economic side, we are putting the final touches on a strategy for compensating those countries most affected by the cost of complying with sanctions, contributing to the defense of Saudi Arabia, or both.

-- We have underway an active public diplomacy effort to complement a covert policy designed among other things to bolster the Kuwaiti resistance and weaken the regime in Baghdad.

The logic behind this approach is to isolate Iraq politically and more important economically while deterring it from further aggression. If the policy works as intended, Iraq will become increasingly frustrated in its efforts to break sanctions and will reluctantly but inexorably turn to diplomacy to find a way out.

Although this policy is not ideal--even if successful it would leave us with a powerful Iraq that would likely return to threaten us another day--it should be given a chance to work. No one should either underestimate the costs of the alternatives or assume their success. Also, we should not assume that we cannot cope with the consequences of success. Containment of Iraq, if properly designed, is a viable alternative.

What this means in the first instance is that we must be seen as supporting diplomacy and not rushing to use force. Supporting diplomacy requires that we allow the UN Secretary General or some other viable mediator to seek to build an initiative based upon Security Council Resolution 660 and its successors. We have some flexibility, but not a great deal; it is essential that Iraq not directly benefit from what it has done or be allowed to dictate to Kuwait or anyone.

We should also ensure that any diplomatic approach is consistent with the objectives we have already articulated and with what we project would be the requirements of a viable containment strategy. This would entail allowance for a UN or Arab peacekeeping force on the Iraq-Kuwait border and no prohibition of the presence of other outside ground or air forces (including our own) in the region if desired by a local government. We would maintain a naval presence regardless. We would also take other military steps, such as leaving in place equipment, conducting regular exercises, etc. We would work with others to ensure that Iraq was denied what it needed to realize its missile and nuclear ambitions. And we would maintain covert efforts designed to keep the regime in Baghdad on the defensive.

Needless to say, all this is predicated upon the idea that our sanctions and military preparations persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait on terms we and others could accept. It is far from clear this will be the case. Iraq shows no signs of wanting to give up what it has annexed, and the sanctions may be sufficiently porous to allow totalitarian Iraq to hold firm.

Time becomes an important factor here. We need sufficient time to give sanctions a fair chance to work as designed. We also need some time to give diplomacy a chance. And we need time so that we can get an adequate force--American and Arab--on the ground.

But at some point--by the end of September or so--enough time will have passed for all this to have occurred. When this happens, simply allowing more time to pass will not serve our interests. In this country, public opinion could start to soften given customary impatience and inevitable criticism. Maintaining a large military force in Saudi Arabia is likely to pose serious

political problems for it and other regimes we seek to bolster; incidents involving our troops and the local population are inevitable. Maintaining military readiness will prove difficult in the heat. Saddam will start appearing as a hero able to stand up to the superpower.

Absent any clear pretext to act--unambiguous acts of terrorism against U.S. or allied targets or threats to our hostages--the only basis for action would be on the core issue itself: Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. If we believe what we have said, that the status quo is unacceptable, and if sanctions do not succeed, then we will have no choice but to use force to liberate Kuwait.

The real question in such circumstances is under what umbrella. We have a legal basis for opposing what has happened in several of the resolutions passed by the Security Council. What we do not have is explicit UN endorsement for the use of force for achieving the goals set force in these resolutions. In a sense, we would be in a situation analogous to where we were vis-a-vis sanctions enforcement prior to the recent passage of UNSC Resolution 665. Again, we could seek explicit UN endorsement, or we could act with what we have.

Obtaining explicit UN endorsement would be a major accomplishment that would set an important precedent for this post-Cold War era. It would allow us to act virtually immune from domestic and international criticism. Unfortunately, it would also be a long shot. It would be risky too; if we failed, it would be that much more difficult to gain support for any use of force.

Any game plan would have to be secret and sequential. Following an initial approach to King Fahd, the Amir of Kuwait and both President Mubarak and President Assad, we would approach in turn the British, the French, the Soviets and the Chinese--at the highest levels and in their capitals. We would only go to the Security Council if we knew in advance that we had the votes and the active support of most of the Arab bloc. If at any point during these consultations it became clear we could not succeed, we would back away from the UN effort and cobble together a multinational effort build upon friendly Arab and allied participation. Our basis in this latter instance for collective action would be UNSC Resolution 660 as well as the subsequent resolutions, Article 51 of the UN Charter, and a request from the Amir of Kuwait--exactly the same basis on which we were prepared to begin sanctions enforcement prior to the passage of 665.

Such a basis would not be ideal but it would be adequate. Key would be how quickly we could accomplish our military goals. The approach would be to attack Iraq from the air--in the process, destroying its C3, key military bases, and

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unconventional warfare sites--and use airpower to attrit Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Ground forces--including heavy Arab elements--would largely be used to block off approaches into Saudi Arabia. The goal would be to effectively isolate Iraq's armed forces in Kuwait from the homeland and bring about their surrender.

The advantage of this approach to the alternative of roll-back via successful diplomacy is that it would greatly ease the post-war challenge of containing Iraq and maintaining security in the Gulf. The drawbacks are the costs in lives and treasure of any conflict, the risk to the oil fields in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and the potential for political instability in the region (for example, Jordan) if we were to attack Iraq.

In the end, there may be no need to choose. We must first see if the current sanctions-centered approach works. This provides the perfect backdrop for diplomacy. If it succeeds, we must live with the fruits of success and make containment work. If it fails, we must use force. If we do, our ability to garner the necessary political support for using force, whether with a UN endorsement or without, will be enhanced significantly by the fact that we were seen to have given diplomacy a chance.

cc: Mr. Gates

~~TOP SECRET~~ // SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

MODE
SECURE FAX #
ADMIN FAX #

PAGES 4
DTG
RELEASER KLG

FROM · LOCATION:

1. WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM / Dr. HAASS

TO · LOCATION · TIME OF RECEIPT:

1. GENERAL SCOWCROFT / K-POST
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

INFORMATION ADDEES · LOCATION · TIME OF RECEIPT:

1.
2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS · REMARKS:

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 200
By Cap NARA, Date 5/20/2009

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EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

EYES ONLY

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006801
RECEIVED: 27 AUG 90 08

TO: SITTMANN

FROM: HAASS
WELCH

DOC DATE: 27 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

2

KEYWORDS: EGYPT
PERSIAN GULF

TELCON

CHRON FILE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES MUBARAK RE PERSIAN GULF SITUATION / AUG 26

ACTION: SITTMANN APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 30 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		HAASS
		WELCH

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN CLOSED BY: NSMEN DOC 1 OF 1

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 8/8/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6801

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NOTED

August 27, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Call with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt on August 26, 1990

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation for the President's telephone call to President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt on August 26, 1990.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
7/28/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6801

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt on August 26, 1990 (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Interpreter: None required
Notetaker: Richard Haass, David Radi

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 26, 1990, 1:05 - 1:12 pm EDT
Kennebunkport

The President telephoned President Mubarak concerning the situation in the Persian Gulf region. (C)

The President: Hosni, how's the world's greatest diplomat? (U)

President Mubarak: Fine, fine. (U)

The President: I'm calling on a closely held matter. I'm going to visit our troops in Saudi Arabia and I want your judgment. I want to show the proper interest in their well-being and am thinking of going around 5 September, but I'm flexible. The trip has been broached to King Fahd who is agreeable to it. If it doesn't look like too much of an American presence, I'd like to call on you and maybe two or three other leaders. I'm thinking about maybe Turkey or Morocco, but because of your key role in all this, I'd like to stop by for a night and show you how much I cherish your leadership. But I really want your judgment on whether I should come and, if so, whether I should meet with some other leaders. (C)

President Mubarak: You would be welcome. Let me think this over whether you should stay overnight, for lunch, or for a couple of hours. (C)

The President: Okay, and think of maybe whether we want to add a couple of more leaders. (C)

President Mubarak: I will study this and call you tomorrow if I can. (C)

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(B) 7/28/03

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The President: Okay, please do call. See if it makes sense for me to be going to Cairo; I know it is a sensitive time. I see on CNN people chanting "George Bush go home," but hell I haven't even left yet! You might want to invite a few other leaders, or maybe not. I don't want to impose. Please be frank with me. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I will study this very sincerely. (Ø)

The President: Everything else seems to be going very well. I am pleased with the UN action. We must stop the Iraqi shipping. It is not fair to our and your soldiers out there in the heat to allow these ships to just go steaming by. We will interdict them if we have to. (Ø)

President Mubarak: We must be very firm in the sanctions. (Ø)

The President: I was very pleased with the Soviet reaction. At the beginning I was worried, but not now. They seem to want to be part of the response to the problem. (Ø)

President Mubarak: It is good that you have brought them in. (Ø)

The President: Hosni, let me know if you have any other suggestions. You know that you gave me the original suggestion for all this here in Washington long before Saddam Hussein came on the scene. You told me to get on the phone and call these other leaders. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Oh, thank you. (U)

The President: My only problem is if you invite my old friend Muammar Qadhafi. (Ø)

President Mubarak: He's a lot more sensible now. (Ø)

The President: You will have trouble convincing me! But, I will be glad to talk about it. (Ø)

President Mubarak: I will study your ideas and phone you tomorrow afternoon.

The President: Thank you and goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9006800
RECEIVED: 27 AUG 90 08

TO: GATES

CHRON FILE

FROM: PILLING
KANTER

DOC DATE: 27 AUG 90
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE BUDGET
KUWAIT
MILITARY OPERATIONS
IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA

PERSONS: CHENEY, R

SUBJECT: COST OF MIDDLE EAST OPERATIONS

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 30 AUG 90 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PILLING LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		KANTER
		NSC CHRON
		PILLING

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 5/26/2009

COMMENTS: _____

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National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6800

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Ken Hill			
Bill Sittmann			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft			
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk		24.2/6	
NSC Secretariat	1		OBE/ONR

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

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6800

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 26, 1990

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB GATES

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER

FROM: DON PILLING

OBE-NFAR

SUBJECT: Cost of Middle East Operations

At Tab I is a package produced this weekend by Defense which addresses the incremental and total costs for a steady state force of 160,000 U.S. military personnel in the Middle East. The package is a compilation of service inputs compiled by OSD and JCS staffers over the weekend. It was clear from their responses to my questions that they do not fully understand what they have accounted for in the estimates. There are essentially four things you should know about the costing:

-- The Defense estimate for the incremental costs by the end of the current fiscal year has doubled to $2.5 billion in the last week. You may recall that Secretary Cheney told the President the costs would be about $1.2 billion to $1.3 billion. The increases are due to a number of factors not previously considered such as Defense-wide fuel increases($400 million, of which about $100 million is in-theater and about $300 million is for worldwide operations not directly related to Desert Shield), the reserve call-up($200 million), operating costs in Saudi Arabia which cover water/ice/refrigeration contracts, bus/heavy equipment rentals, etc.($250 million), and the realization that as the units deploy they are expending enormous amounts of money on filling supply bins, ordering rations, and accelerating maintenance actions($400 million). You should also know that there is $30 million of military construction for facilities in Saudi Arabia for the "health,safety and support of deployed military personnel".

-- The comparable monthly incremental cost once the force is in place is about $1.2 billion. This includes the cost of the reserves, a $10 cost increase per barrel of oil over pre-crisis prices, the increased optempo for the aircraft and ships, and the logistics costs for supplying this force by air and sea. It also includes an estimate of $150 million per month for military construction -- this equates to an annual expenditure of $1.8 billion. As we understand it, this investment is for troop facilities and doesn't include warehouses and other infrastructure facilities which they have not included yet in the

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plans. A final point to keep in mind is what isn't included in this cost estimate. For example, it doesn't include a reserve call-up beyond the present 48,800, any troop rotations(although this might be a late add Sunday night), and no combat expenditures. In brief, this $1.2 billion/month estimate almost certainly will grow.

-- In addition to these incremental costs, Defense also includes a share of the fixed cost of maintaining our overall conventional force structure. To arrive at this figure, Defense split the calculation into two parts. The first is the actual resources we have in the budget to pay for and operate the Desert Shield force were it not deployed to the Middle East. That calculation yielded a figure of about $.8 billion per month to cover the salaries of the active military and the reserve drill pay already in the budget, and the costs for the budgeted optempo. The second piece, the cost of the deployed equipment, is based on the actual order of battle we plan to have in place. Actual prices paid were used when they were available, e.g., the flyaway costs for F-15Es and sailaway costs for the Aegis cruisers in the theater. The total arrived at is probably very low, $130 billion. (As an example, it would cost much more to replace the WISCONSIN than the figure used($660 million).) More important is how the $130 billion figure is used. Although the Defense staffers claim that the $130 billion figure is illustrative only, both they and the OMB staffers discussed amortizing the total over 15 years to get a monthly figure for use in dealing with other countries as prospective cash contributors.

-- Trying to get other countries to pay for these last two items is a political decision with a significant downside. It would put us in a position of arguing that we are a holding company that rents out its military capability at full cost recovery rates, not a superpower who uses that capability to protect its own vital interests. It would have us trying to convince the Saudis and other potential donors that they have to "rent" our capability, certainly not what we would have in mind if we had to exercise our capability with our allies in defense of Europe.

The following table summarizes the above:

Monthly Incremental Ops Costs (after Oct 1)	$1.2 billion
Monthly Ops Costs in Budget	$ .8 billion
Monthly Equipment Amortization	$ .7 billion
Total Monthly Costs	$2.7 billion

In sum, the key policy question is whether the USG should try to recover as much as possible of the true incremental costs of Desert Shield, or whether it should also use Desert Shield to help address the underlying defense budget problem.

A final point to keep in mind is that the services view this as an exercise to stake out claims for as much money as the market will bear. As a result, this weekend drill may have produced some estimates that overstate the requirements and this won't be sorted out until the OSD and OMB staff scrub the inputs further. However, the fact that the estimate of costs to the end of the year have doubled in a week suggests that even with a good scrub of what was provided, the costs might not go down once all the requirements are identified.

Concurrences by: Tim Deal and Sandy Charles

Assessment of U.S. Military Costs for Desert Shield

Cost Estimate Assumptions

- Cost estimates do not assume a shooting war; hostilites could increase incremental costs by three fold or more depending on the intensity of action and attrition of weapons and personnel.
- Incremental costs reflect only those directly related to current operations.
  - Personnel and operating cost of forces/lift allocated to the action.
  - Cost of supplies, stocks, spares, consumables used.
- No rotation of personnel is assumed.
- Assumes reserve call up of 48,800.

Cost Estimate Assumptions

- All fuel costs are based on a $10 per barrel price increase over pre-invasion cost estimates.
- FY 1991monthly costs reflect the requirement to sustain the Dec 31 force through FY 1991.
- The cost to return forces to the U.S. is not included in the FY 1991 estimates. Return costs could range as high as $500 million, depending on what equipment is returned to the U.S.
- Includes the callup of Coast Guard personnel

Force Structure Investment
($ in billions)

	Investment Cost	Annual Operating Cost
Desert Shield Forces	130	9.4

- Investment includes the cost to acquire 3 Carrier Battlegroups, 600 + Combat Aircraft, 190 + Cargo Aircraft, 500 + Armored Vehicles, 50 + Tanker Aircraft, Sealift ships, communications equipment, support vehicles, initial ammunition loadout and numerous types of support equipment for all units.
- Annual Operating Cost includes normal aircraft, ship, tank and unit training and operations.
- Estimates do not include indirect costs such as those to train the forces, build and operate bases, research and development for weapons systems and strategic intelligence gathering systems.

Summary of Incremental Costs
($ in Millions)

	FY 1990 Aug-Sep	FY 1991 Monthly
Operational Costs*	1,862	700
Fuel Costs	640	350
Military Construction	30	150
Total	2,532	1,200

*Increased fuel consumption reflected in Fuel Costs.

Incremental Operations Costs
($ in Millions)

	FY 1990 Aug-Sep	FY 1991 Monthly
Airlift	420	130
Sealift	230	96
Other Deployment	295	36
Medical	30	4
Operating Costs	395	77
Reserve Callup	217	202
In-Theater Support	250	150
Other	25	5
Total	1,862	700

Fuel Cost Increase
($ in Millions)

	FY 1990 Aug-Sep	FY 1991 Monthly
• Increased Operating Tempo		
FY 1990 10.2 M BBL	340	-
FY 1991 5 M BBL/Month	-	200
• Fuel cost increase of $10/BBL on Normal Monthly Useage	300	150
Total	640	350

Military Construction Costs

FY 1990	FY 1991
Aug-Sep	Monthly
30	150

- Assumes that troops will be in-theater for more than 6 months.
- Facilities with a design life of 24 months.
- Facilities for billeting, mess, unit level administration, supply and vehicle maintenance.
- Assumes civilian hourly wage rates for Saudi Arabia.
- No mission support facilities for ammunition storage, petroleum storage and distribution and warehousing.